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Republic v. Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 226 INTRODUCTION I. Concept/definition of administrative law Facts: Sugar Regulatory Administration and Republic Planters Bank questioned the decision of the CA which dismissed the petition of the former on the ground of lack of capacity to sue. Issue: WON administrative agency has only such powers as expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof? RULING: The SC ruled in the negative. Administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof? In this case, administrative agency is judicially defined as government body charged with the administering and implementing particular legislation examples are workers compensation commissions and the like. The term agency includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority or bureau.
The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government and determines competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to individual remedies for the violations of his rights. II. Scope of administrative law
Administrative law embraces all the law that controls, or is intended to control, the administrative operations of the government. III. Classification of administrative law A. That body of statutes setting up or creating administrative agencies and endowing them with power and duties; B. That body of agency-made law, i.e., rules, regulations and orders promulgated in the exercise of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions; C. That body of legal principles governing the acts of public agents which conflict with private rights; D. That body of determinations, decisions and orders of administrative bodies made in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields. Origin and development of administrative law Advantages of the administrative process NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES I. Concept A. Definition of administrative agency - An administrative agency is defined as "[a] government body charged with administering and implementing particular legislation. Examples are workers' compensation commissions, x x x and the like. x x x The term 'agency' includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau x x x ."
B.
1. Mandatory statutory requirement intended for the protection of the citizens and by a disregard of which their rights are injuriously affected; 2. Directory if no substantial right depend on it and no injury can result from ignoring it and purpose of legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially, the same results attained. C. Administrative function, defined - Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
IV. V.
In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246 Facts: Its a petition file by judge manzano allowing him to accept the appointment by executive order by the governor of ilocos sur Rodolfo farinas as the member of
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E.
Solid Homes vs Payawal 29 August 1989 Ruling: As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.
1. Those created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege; (SSS, GSIS,PAO) 2. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain functions of government; (BIR, LRA, BoC, BI) 3. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public; (Bureau of Posts, PNR, MWS) 4. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest; (LTFRB, ERB, HLURB)
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4.
F.
Facts: Dorr is the owner of newspaper manila freedom charge with the crime of libel together with Eduard OBrian. The defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged in the complaint, and each was sentenced to six months imprisonment at hard labor and a fine of $1,000, United States currency. From this judgment the defendants have appealed to this court. During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the defendants asking that they be granted a trial by jury, as provided for in Article 111, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, and under the sixth amendment to the Constitution, which motion was denied by the court, and an exception was also taken to this ruling. Issue : The issue is to determine whether these provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating to trials by jury are in force in the Philippine Islands. Ruling: Administration is the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being. 1. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has been acquired by and belongs to the United States, there is a difference between such territory and the territories which are a part-of the United States with reference to the Constitution of the United States. 2. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the treaty of Paris, under which the Philippine Islands were acquired from Spain. By the treaty the status of the ceded territory was to be determined by Congress. 3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States did not extend the Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general principles of fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in the Constitution and its amendments, and which exist rather by inference and the
Administrative agencies have certain quasi-judicial powers which allows them to interpret and apply rules and regulations. Findings of these administrative agencies are rendered conclusive on the courts. G. Administrative framework of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 292) Iron and Steel Authority vs CA 249 SCRA 538 1. Definition of Government of the Republic of the Phils. refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. 2. Definition of Agency of the government - refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. 3. Definition of Instrumentality - refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
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Ruling: No. "Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function, In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office." B. Abolition of administrative agencies Busacay v. Buenaventura 93 Phil 787 Facts: Plaintiff Marcelino A. Busacay was a duly-appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector, classified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission, but was laid off due to the destruction of the bridge caused by flood. When the bridge was reconstructed and reopened to traffic, Busacay notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his duties, but he was refused reinstatement. Issue: Whether or not the total destruction of the bridge abolished the position of toll collector. Held: The SC ruled in the negative. All offices created by statute are more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the power of the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except for cause.
II.
Creation, reorganization, and abolition of administrative agencies A. Creation of administrative agencies Eugenio vs CSC 243 SCRA 196
Facts: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank, On August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission2 passed Resolution No. 934359. The resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV. Issue: WON the CSC had the power to abolish the career executive service board.
Facts: The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 by imputing the lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the president his authority to fix compensation and allowance of the justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. On the other hand, the solicitor general interposed a defense of legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa.
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Issue: WON the enactment into law of BP 129 was done in good faith. Ruling: Yes, it was done in good faith and is valid. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the cage of the Supreme Court.
C.
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs CSC 221 SCRA 145
Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1341 converting the Phil College of Commerce into a Polytechnic University, defining its objectives, organizational structure and functions, and expanding its curricular offerings. Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1341 did not abolish but only changed, the former PCC into what is now the PUP. Held: No, what took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution not in its corporate life. When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. Neither the addition of a new course offerings nor changes in its existing structure and organization bring about the abolition of an educational institution and the creation of a new one only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will. Stand transferred simply means that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the institution. But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and to create a new one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of a school without affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
Facts: he records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a First grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent status up to September 1984. She was for two years, more or less, designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) which authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for reconsideration but her motion remained unacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case was pending decision, her temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". Said Memorandum of Termination which took effect on February 9, 1987, was the subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Issue: Whether or not membership in the Bar, which is the qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of the abovesaid Executive Order.
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III.
Power of control, supervision and investigation by the President A. Executive power, defined Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 668
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the Tight of the marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
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Carpio vs Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290 Facts: The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 6975 otherwise known as the PNP Organic law placing the Philippine National Police under the reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government in pursuant to the provision of the constitution that the state shall establish and maintain one police force which is national in scope and civilian in character. The petitioner alleged that the said law limits only the power of the National Police Commission into an administrative control over the PNP, thus, control remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the PNP and NAPOLCOM were placed. Issue Whether or not the control over the PNP is vested soley to the Department Secretary of the DILG. Ruling The Presidential Power of control was held to mean the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. This Presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us. Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.
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Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 creating municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Phil and as a taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with prelim injunction against the Auditor general from passing in audit any public funds. The petitioner alleges that executive orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the separation of powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate of determinable The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he veto, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.
Noblejas vs Salas 67 SCRA 47 Facts: It appears that on several occasions prior to 1968, various land titles (Torrens titles) covering lands situated within the Province of Rizal were amended on the basis of supposed corrective resurveys, by increasing the respective areas covered by said titles. The corresponding certifications of the verifications of these resurveys were issued by the Land Registration Office, headed then by petitioner Noblejas, and subsequently approved by the court, in instances where the subdivision plans were complex, the action of the office being sufficient where the subdivision plans were simple. Allegedly, however, it turned out that the increases in said various amendments were far in excess of the respective corresponding real areas of the lands involve, so much so that even vast portions of lands and waters of the public domain not capable of appropriation by any private person or entity have been included within the expanded titles. Noblejas contention: That the State is stopped to prosecute the accused because it used him as a prosecution witness in cases similar to this case and because Fiscal Benjamin H. Aquino, with the approval of the Secretary of Justice, exonerated the defendant from any criminal complicity in resurveys with expanded areas.
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Rodriguez vs Montinola 94 Phil 973 Facts: An original action of certiorari instituted in the Supreme Court by the Provincial Governor and the members of the Provincial Board of Pangasinan to nullify the disapproval of the Secretary of Finance of their Resolution abolishing the positions of three special counsel in the province, to prohibit the provincial treasurer and the district from paying the salaries if three special counsel and to prevent the latter from continuing to occupy and exercise the functions incident to their positions. Issue: Whether or not the said resolution requires the approval of the Secretary of Finance. Ruling: The court granted the petition. While the Secretary of Finance has the power to revise their budget, local governments should be given a large degree of freedom in determining for themselves the propriety and wisdom of the expenses that they make provided that the expenses contemplated are within their financial capacity. The supervisory authority of the President over local governments is limited by the phrase as provided by law and where there is no law in accordance with which said authority is to be exercised, it must be exercised in accord with general principles of law. The Secretary of Finance is an official of the central government, not of provincial governments, which are distinct and separate. The power of general supervision granted to the President over local governments, in the absence of any express provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean that hem or his alter ego the Secretary of Finance, may direct the form and manner in which local officials shall perform or comply with their duties. Further, the court ruled that the act of the provincial board in suppressing the positions of three special counsel not being contrary to law, nor an act of maladministration, nor an act of abuse, the same may not be disapproved by the Secretary of Finance acting as a representative of he President by virtue of the latters power of general supervision over local governments.
Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino SecretaryVicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied by respondent Secretary. Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils. Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election? Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government. F. Power of review of other executive officers, defined Phil. Gamefowl Commission vs IAC 146 SCRA 294 Ruling: The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is necessary, it must be done
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POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES I. Doctrine of separation of powers A. Distribution of powers of government: 1. Legislative power is the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws. 2. Executive power is the power to execute and implement the laws. 3. Judicial power is the power of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving legal rights which are demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
So that the power of the government would not be concentrated in one department (one person or group of persons) that would lead to abuse. C. Blending of powers though each department has their own duties and functions, they nevertheless exercise the same in concert that
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American Tobacco vs Director of Patents 67 SCRA 287 GRN L-26803 Oct. 14, 1975
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Issue: Whether or not the Director has the power to delegate his functions. Ruling : It has been held that the power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purpose and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. There is no provision under the general law and RA 165 and 166 which prohibits such authority insofar as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director suggests that the aforementioned laws should be construed so as to give aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. Judgment and discretion will still be exercised by him since that the parties will still be able to adduce evidence. Due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require the actual taking of testimony before the same officer who will make the decision. III. Powers of administrative agencies, in general A. Sources of powers of an administrative agency 1. Constitution is the body of rules and principles by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined. 2. Statutes rules and regulations promulgated by the legislature. B. Limitations to the powers of an administrative agency
Facts : Private respondent herein led a group of residents in filing a case against herein petitioner with the Department of Public Works and Communications for the reason that latter were encroaching a part of the river with their fishpond. The petitioner countered that they were given permission by the Bureau of Fisheries. The secretary of public works designated the City Engineer to conduct hearings on the same and eventually ordered the same be removed. Petitioners went to the Court of First Instance to assail the decision of the secretary and obtain an injunction which were ruled in their favor. The secretary appealed the lower courts decision. Issues : Whether or not the secretary had the power to order an investigation and order the removal of the encroachment made on the river. Ruling : Section 1 of Republic Act 2056 is explicit in that "Any provision or provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction or building of dams, dikes x x x which encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways x x x shall be ordered removed as public nuisance or as prohibited construction as herein provided x x x. The record shows that the petitioners' fishpond permit was issued in 1948 while the Act took effect on June 3, 1958. Therefore, the Secretary's more specific authority to remove dikes constructed in fishponds whenever they obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river or stream or would cause inundation of agricultural areas (Section 2, Republic Act 2056) takes precedence. Moreover, the power of the Secretary of Public Works to investigate and clear public streams from unauthorized encroachments and obstructions was granted as early as Act 3708 of the old Philippine Legislature and has been upheld by this Court in the cases of Palanca v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 449) and Meneses v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 647). The same rule was applied in Lovina v. Moreno,
Matienzon vs Abellera 162 SCRA 1 Facts : Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators. Private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent board for the legalization of their unauthorized taxicab units citing PD 101 in order to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible operators. Petitioners contend that the BOT does not have jurisdiction over the case since the law provided a period of six (6) months which limited the time period to legitimize such clandestine operations by certain taxicab operators.
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Quasi legislative consists of issuance of rules and regulations; general applicability; and prospective in application; Quasi Judicial refers to orders, rewards or decision; applies to a specific situation; and determination of rights, privileges,etc. (fact finding investigate) Depends on the enabling statute D. Express and implied powers Villegas vs Subido 30 SCRA 498
Facts : The commissioner on Civil Service issued a memorandum which provided for the procedure of removal and suspension of policemen. Petitioner herein contends that the Civil Service Act impliedly repealed RA 557 which provides, among others, that charges against policemen shall be referred by the mayor and investigated by the city or municipal council. Issues : Whether or not RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove, suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in competitive service. Ruling : Republic Act 2260, particularly Section 16 (i) thereof, is not inconsistent with the power of the City Council under Republic Act 557 to decide cases against policemen and the power of the City Mayor of Manila under Section 22 of Republic Act 409 to remove city employees in the classified service. Section 16 (i) of Republic Act 2260 leaves no doubt that the removal, suspension or separation effected by said City Council or City Mayor, can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Nonetheless, the Commissioner's "final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension" of classified service employees presupposes, rather than negates, the power vested in another official to originally or initially decide the removal, separation or suspension which the Commissioner is thereunder empowered to pass upon.
Polloso vs Gangan 335 SCRA 750 Facts : Petitioner was the project manager of NPC who filed a letter of explanation and appeal from the notice of disallowance issued by the COA. The case stemmed from the hiring of a private lawyer, Atty. Satorre, who was compensated by virtue of a contract entered by the NPC and the former. The COA held several persons liable for payment of the amount due to said lawyer which included herein petitioner. Petitioner contends the nature of services that was contracted with the lawyer. Respondent contends that there was a memorandum prohibiting the hiring of private lawyers without following the necessary procedures required by the COA. Issue : Was the issuance of the COA circular valid and applicable in this case? Ruling : What can be gleaned from a reading of the circular is that government agencies and instrumentalities are restricted in their hiring of private lawyers to render legal services or handle their cases. No public funds will be disbursed for the payment to private lawyers unless prior to the hiring of said lawyer, there is a written conformity and acquiescence from the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel. It bears repeating that the purpose of the circular is to curtail the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public funds to private lawyers
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Blaquera vs Alcala 295 SCRA 411 Facts : Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 1 ("EO 292"), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V 2 of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos ("President Ramos") issued Administrative Order No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 3 and reiterating the prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 of Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO 268"), enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed "[a]ll departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1 hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of the excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of this Order." In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. To prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before the Supreme Court to seek relief. Issues : Whether or not the issued Administrative Orders are valid. Ruling : In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment." (Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V).
RCPI vs NTC 215 SCRA 455 GRN 93237 Buenaseda vs Flavier 226 SCRA 645 Facts : The petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners for violations of graft and corruption. Issues : Whether or not the ombudsman has power to suspend government officials and employees pending investigation of administrative complaints. Ruling : The Ombudsman is vested with authority to preventively suspend officers as contained in sec. 24 of the Ombudsman Act.
E.
Discretionary powers vs. ministerial duty Carino vs Capulong 222 SCRA 593
Facts: The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order issued by the respondent Judge and prevent the same in conducting further hearing thereof. AMA Computer College situated in Davao city operated as an Educational Institution without the required authorization that must be secured first before the DECS. As a consequence thereof, the DECS issued an order for the closure of the said school with the aid of the military as per agreement of the two governmental agencies. The private respondent filed a case before the RTC Davao to enjoin DECS from implementing the said closure pending the approval of the request to operate of the said school. The said request was denied by the DECS for not complying the requirements prescribed by the Department. The said case was dismissed, undaunted the private respondent appeal before the CA which later affirmed the decision of the lower court. The private respondent then filed a petition before the RTC of Makati with the same cause of action now using the organization of the
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Binamira vs Garrucho 188 SCRA 154 Facts : Petitioner herein filed a quo warranto seeking reinstatement to the Office of General Manager in the Department of Tourism. In 1986, petitioner was designated by then Minister Gonzales as General Manager of the PTA. The Minister sought the approval of the president which was favored by the latter. In 1990, respondent was the new Secretary of Tourism and asked for the resignation of the petitioner. The president issued a memorandum to Garrucho designating him as General Manager for the reason that petitioner was not appointed by the President as required by PD 564 but only by the Secretary of Tourism which was invalid. Petitioner contends that he was validly appointed to the position since that the act of then Minister Gonzales was also the act of the president which presumes that the act of the department heads were the act of the president. Issue : Whether or not petitioner was validly appointed to his position.
Mateo vs CA 196 SCRA 280 Facts : Petitioners filed an action for the recovery of a parcel of land. RTC ruled in favor the petitioner. Issued execution of judgment for private respondent. Petitioner filed relief from judgment. Judge denied petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner filed mandamus. Issues : Whether or not granting of the petition for relief from judgment is ministerial? Ruling : Ministerial duty in granting appeal. But deciding on judging on the appeal is discretionary. 1. Ministerial duty, defined - is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
Ruling : PD 564 clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet. An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute
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F. Mandatory/prohibitory and permissive/directory duties and powers Article 5 Civil Code Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
2.
Estoppel inapplicable
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs CTA 234 SCRA 348 Ruling : Illegal or invalid acts which are in excess of the jurisdiction of administrative agency cannot bind the government, therefore estoppels does not apply. 3. Presumption of regularity
Blue Bar Coconut vs Tantuico 163 SCRA 716 Facts: The President issued PD 232 creating the Philippine Coconut Authority and established a coconut stabilization fund. The members were originally 11 but
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IV.
De Leon : Investigatory or inquisitorial powers include the power to inspect, secure, require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise. They are conferred on practically all administrative agencies. In fact, the investigatory powers of administrative agencies, or their power and facilities to investigate, initiate action, and control the range of investigation, is one of the distinctive functions which sets them apart from the court.
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Concerned Officials of MWSS vs Vasquez 240 SCRA 502 Facts: MWSS launched the Angat Water Supply Optimization Project in order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million people in the Metropolitan area. The project was financed by funds loaned by the Overseas Economic Coop Fund of Japan to the National Government. MWSS caused the publication or an invitation for pre-qualification and bids. The major factors considered in the evaluation were the applicants financial condition, technical qualification and experience to undertake the project. Private Respondent Phil. Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers Association sent letters offering suggestions on the technical specifications. Thereafter 3 lowest bidders for the project were known PBAC-CSTE recommended F.F Cruz and Inc. but other members both disagreed and opted for a rebidding bating the contract to be awarded to Joint Venture. But MWSS Board Committee on construction Management and Board Committee on Engineering that contract be awarded to F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. being the lowest complying bidder. PLDPPMA, through its President filed with the office of the Ombudsman a lettercomplaint protesting the public bidding conducted by the MWSS to favor suppliers of fiberglass pipes and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation there on. Ombudsman, in its fact-finding investigation pursuant to power, functions and duties of the office under Sec. 15 of R.A 6670 MWSS was diverted to set aside the recommendation of MWSS to award contract. Petitioner filed a special civil, action in the SC and cited that respondent Ombudsman acted beyond the jurisdiction notwithstanding that Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act, which enumerated the administrative act, or omission that may not be the subject of investigation clearly among the cases exempts the same by his office. Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take cognizance of PLDPPMAs complaint and to correspondingly issue its challenged orders directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to se aside the recommendation of the PBACCTSE. Ruling : No, the particular aspect in question is the investigatory power and public assistance duties that can be found in the first and second part of Sec.13, Art. XI of
Deloso vs Domingo 191 SCRA 545 Facts : An alleged ambushed led to the prosecution of Governor Delloso who was charged before the Special Prosecutor with multiple murder. Governor Delloso questioned the said referral to the Ombudsman alleging that the same has no jurisdiction over the case for being irrelevant of the crime he committed to his official function as governor. Issue : Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case. Ruling : The Court ruled in positive manner. As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials and to investigate any act or omission of any public officials when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Ombudsman is also empowered to direct the officer concerned, in this case the Special Prosecutor, to take appropriate action against a public official and to recommend his prosecution. Further, the court ruled that the law does not required that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. B. Requirement of notice and hearing when the law is silent, notice and hearing may be dispensed with, which depends upon the stage of the proceedings. (substantial right can be given notice and hearing)
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Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160 Facts: A request for extradition was filed against Mark Jimenez for alleged violation of many criminal laws in the US. The DOJ formed a panel of lawyers to review and study the request. Pending the review, MJ requested copies of all documents and papers relative to the request that the proceedings be suspended for the meantime. The DOJ denied the request, hence MJ filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the DOJ to furnish him the documents. The RTC of Manila issued a TRO to maintain a status quo ante, hence the DOJ filed an appeal to the SC. Issue: Whether or not MJ is entitled to notice and hearing during the preliminary or the evaluation stage of the extradition treaty against him. Ruling : From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extradite. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Pefianco vs Moral 322 SCRA 439 Facts: Ma. Luisa Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria, who was later replaced by Secretary Pefianco, praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. Moral was ordered dismissed from the government service. Respondent did not appeal the judgement . Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for lack of cause of action but the trial court denied his motion, thus elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which sustained the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for Certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss. Ruling : A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. C. Right to counsel in administrative investigations a counsel may or may not assist a person under investigation. (Remolona v. CSC) D. Importance of administrative investigations
Ruiz vs Drilon 209 SCRA 695 Facts : GR No. 103570 refers to a petition for review on the decision of the court of appeals consolidated with GR No. 101666 for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the executive secretary. Petitioner herein was the president of Central Luzon State University who was dismissed by the President of the Philippines from his position after investigation of a committee on several charges against him. Petitioner undertook to ask for a reconsideration on the same which respondent Drilon, as executive secretary denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with a prayer for TRO which granted the latter prayer. After eight days, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for TRO. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition was not meritorious and a case of forum shopping. The SC dispensed with the comment of the Solicitor General for the public respondents it being that the pleadings and papers already filed were already adequate for them to act on said petition. Issue : Whether or not the public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed
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Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99 Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al. which order that preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further issuing subpoena in connection with the fact finding investigation against petitioner. Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. Ruling : Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. E. Executive power to investigate, source Section 64c Revised Administrative Code Power of the president to order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted. Section 20 Book III, 1987 Administrative Code Residual Powers unless congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.
Larin vs Executive Secretary 280 SCRA 713 Facts: Petitioner herein was an assistant commissioner of the excise tax service of the BIR being appointed by then President Aquino. Sometime in 1992, a decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner of grave misconduct. Acting on a report by then acting Finance Secretary Leong, the President, through its executive secretary, issued a memorandum creating an executive committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner submitted a position paper as required by the committee. Consequently, the president issued a memorandum which streamlined the operations of the BIR abolishing some of the offices which included the office of excise tax and another memorandum dismissing herein petitioner from office as a result of the investigation. Petitioner contends that he is a Career Executive Service officer and he cannot be removed. On the other hand, respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the president. Issue: Who has the power to discipline the petitioner or does the president have the power to order an investigation against herein petitioner? Ruling : The position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career Executive Service under the law which is appointed by the president. As a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the president in line with the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred by the Constitution. The memorandum issued by the president which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner was pursuant to the power of removal by the president. However, the power of removal is not absolute since the petitioner herein is a career service officer who has in his favor the security of tenure who may only be removed through a cause enumerated by law.
Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99 Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al. which order that preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further issuing subpoena in connection with the fact finding investigation against petitioner.
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Facts: Esrelito Romolona was the post master at the postal office service in Infanta, Quezon, District Supervisor of the DECS inquired from the Civil Service Commission as to the status of the Civil Service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who got a rating of 81.25% of as per report of rating issued by the National Board for Teachers. After an investigation, Remolonas name is not in the list of passing and failing examinees. Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge and that he did it because he wanted them to be together.
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Chapter 2 ORDINANCE POWER Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Ruling : Before the issuance of the eo, a resolution by the municipality allowed thrall fishing. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said policy. EO issued by the secretary was valid since that it was part of the agencies functions.
Olsen & Co. vs Aldanese, 43 Phil. 259 Facts: Walter Olsen, a duly licensed domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of cigars made of tobacco grown in the Philippines assailed the constitutionality of Act 2613, allegedly depriving them of their right of exporting cigars to the United States due to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue certificate of origin and that the cigars were not manufactured of long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the province of Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Viscaya. Issue: Whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to make rules and regulations which are not within the scope of Act 2613. Ruling: The only power conferred to the Collector of Internal Revenue was that a proper standard of the quality of tobacco should be fixed and defined and that all of these who produce tobacco of the same standard would have equal rights and opportunities. Such delegated power the rules and regulations promulgated should be confined to and limited by the power conferred by the legislative act.
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2.
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Sections 54, 55, 56, 57, Republic Act No. 7160 SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The Sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. (b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the Sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it. (c) ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its members, be signed by the Punong Barangay. SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive . - (a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing. (b) The local chief executive, except the Punong Barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an
First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30 Facts: BOI granted First Lepanto to amend certificate of recognition by changing scope of its reg product from glazed floor tiles to ceramic stiles. Mariwasa oppose filed motion for reconsideration. Mariwasa filed petition for review with respondent CA. it is temporarily restrained BOI from implementing decision, 20 days lapsed without respondent court issuing preliminary injunction. Lepanto filed motion to dismiss, court appellate. Jurisdiction over BOI vested with SC. Issue: Whether or not CA has jurisdiction. Held: Yes, E.O 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions of BOI. It simply deals with procedural aspects with court has the power to regulate by virtue of its cons rule-making power. Circular 1-91 repealed or suspended EO 226 in so far as the manner of appeal. Appeals from decisions of BOI, which statutes allowed to be filed with SC, are brought to CA.
3.
Delegation to LGUs
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B.
Rationale for the delegation of quasi-legislative power Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330
Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry." On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372. Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
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Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority has no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce the law, thus, there is a conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails. Petition is dismissed. Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221
Facts: Pangasinan Transportation Co. has been engaged in transporting passengers in Pangasinan and Tarlac to Nueva Ecija and Zambales by means of TPU buses for 20 years. It filed with Public Service Commission to be authorized to operate ten additional new Brockway Trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its current certificates. As a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. The Public Service Commission denied it. Motion for Reconsideration denied. Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. Issues: (1) Whether or not the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by Sec.1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 454 constitute a complete and total abdication of the Legislatures functions and thus unconstitutional and void. (2) Whether or not Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority. Held: (1) No, Commonwealth Act no. 454 is constitutional. Section 8 of Art. XIII of the Constitution provides that no franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be for a longer period than fifty years and when it was ordained. While in Sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454 that the Public Service Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a certificate. That it shall be valid only for a period of time it has been declared that the period shall not be longer than 50 years. Therefore, all that has been delegated to the commission is the admin function\, including the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner. With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and towards the approval of the practice by the courts. (2) No, this right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police power, applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines for sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent rendered pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent; herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA. The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its constitutionality. Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional
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Facts: Calalang in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public works and highways with the recommendation of the Director of Public works and the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission promulgated a rule closing a certain road in Manila for animal drawn vehicle for a specific time. The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with the recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws relative to the regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner contended that such act is an invalid delegation of legislative power. The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of rules is in connection with the powers vested to them by the said law. Issue: Whether or not the said Act constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation of power. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
C.
Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasilegislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasilegislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the 25 regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts
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Ruling : By virtue of such rule-making authority, the Secretary of Labor issued on May 1, 1977 a set of rules which exempts not only distressed employers but also "those who have granted in addition to the allowance under P.D. 525, at least P60.00 monthly wage increase on or after January 1, 1977, provided that those who paid less than this amount shall pay the difference (paragraph k of said rules). Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory authority granted to the Secretary of Labor, and the same is therefore void. The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the administration of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. It is of elementary knowledge that an act of Congress cannot be amended by a rule promulgated by an administrative agency. "It seems too clear for serious argument that an administrative officer cannot change a law enacted by Congress. A regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous becomes a nullity."
institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry." On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372. Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional? Ruling: the court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED. No. 372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call therefore should be for Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms to the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down RA. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than the supranormal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. When confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and guarantees both the political and economic rights of the people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the people's political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance to them for they are concerned more with the exoteric of living and less with the esoteric of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the people's economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.
D.
Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President,
1. Completeness test the law must be complete in all its items and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
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Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines for sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent rendered pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent; herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA. The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its constitutionality. Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority has no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce the law, thus, there is a conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails. Petition is dismissed. People vs Vera 65 Phil 56
Facts: Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming
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Facts: Petitioners challenged the validity of a provision of R.A 6734, authorizing the President of the Philippines to merge by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanano. Four provinces includes, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi voted in favor of creating an autonomous region, thus became ARMM. After the plebiscite, E.O 429 as amended by E.O 439 was issued by the Chief Executive providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. The contentions of the Petitioners contends that R.A 6734 is unconstitutional because 1.) it unduly delegates the legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge the existing regions. 2.) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
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Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 creating municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Phil and as a taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with prelim injunction against the Auditor general from passing in audit any public funds. The petitioner alleges that executive orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the separation of powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate of determinable
3. Exceptions to the requirement of sufficient legislative standards 1. power which is not directly or exclusively a legislative one and has no relation whatsoever to personal or property rights; 2. power to regulate a mere matter of privilege E. Issues on validity of legislation 1. Against the delegating statute itself --- whether or not the requisites of valid delegation are present; 2. Against the exercise of the delegated power --whether or not the rule or regulation conforms with what the statute provides and whether the same is reasonable.
Facts: The petitioner is questioning the validity of the Executive order issued by the President of the Philippines prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age. Obviously, the petitioner was affected to the said order with the contention that the said order is an invalid delegation of power and unduly oppressive to the industry. The Solicitor General contended that the said law is a proper delegation of legislative power to the President of the Republic.
Facts: For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally
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Facts: Eslao, in his capacity as president of the Pangasinan State University asked the SC to set aside the COA decision which denied honoraria and per diems claimed under the National Compensation Circular No. 53 by certain PSU personnel including petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the acts done by the COA in the case at bar are valid. Ruling: COA is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which it does not agree at least not before such law or regulation was set aside by authorized agency of government as unconstitutional or illegal and void. Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.
An ordinance to be valid: Must not be in contravention of the constitution Must not be oppressive Must not be discriminatory Must not regulate or prohibit trade Must not be against a statute F. Rule and rule-making, defined Section 2.2 Book VII, Admin Code of 1987 "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public. Section 4, Book VII, Admin Code of 1987
Supplementary legislation A statute which leaves to the executive the power to fill in the technical details in view of the latters expertise is a recognized delegation of legislative power. Must be in compliance with the enabling law and not 1. Classification of rules and regulations a. Those issued by an administrative superior and directed exclusively to the subordinates --- rules and regulations of internal administration to be observed by subordinate officials for the prompt and efficient dispatch of government business and to facilitate the transactions of the general public with the government; b. Those directed not only to the inferior officers but also and primarily to private individuals, fixing the manner by which the terms of a statute are to be complied with. Types of rule-making powers
2.
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Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that part of the decision of the Director of Mines, affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources, which declared that petitioners have abandoned and lost their rights over their mining claim. This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or encroachment between two mining claims. Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter complain against private respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim. The Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict between the "Ped and "Ullmann and dismissed the petition. Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of the law were made applicable to petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates compliance with certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims, such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree. Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost.
4 requisites of the valid supplementary delegation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law conform to the standards that the law prescribes must be reasonable must be related to carrying in to effect the general provisions of law
UST v. Court of Tax Appeals 93 Phil 376 Facts: The Collector of Internal Revenue notified petitioner that its income as an educational institution was taxable. Later on UST submitted a memorandum before the Sec. of Finance disputing the decision of the latter as regard the taxability of the formers income from tuition fees.
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GMCR vs Bell Telecommunication Phil., Inc. 271 SCRA 79 Boie Takeda Chemicals vs Dela Serna 228 SCRA 329 Facts: This is a consolidated case questioning the supplementary regulation issued by the Department of Labor and Employment Secretary regarding the application th and implementation of 13 month pay law. The Department order included th commission as part of the computation of determining the 13 month pay of the employees. Upon inspection, the petitioners were found to be violators of the law th for not including the commission on its employees in the computation of the 13 month pay. The petitioner contended that the Secretary Drilon is acting in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the same. The Secretary however contended that the said order was just a supplementary to the law which the same tried to erase the cloud thereof. Issue: Whether or not the said order is a valid administrative regulation. Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The court further ruled that the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 is even more emphatic in declaring that earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the l3thmonth pay. "While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which defines basic salary to include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and more controlling Supplementary Rules and Regulations Facts: Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals2 declaring the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under Executive Order No. 546 3 and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en bane, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions. Issue: WON NTC is a collegial body Held: We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC.
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3.
Requirement of reasonableness a. Bears a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be accomplished; b. Supported by good reasons; c. Free from constitutional infirmities or charge of arbitrariness Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848
Facts: PRC issued resolution no. 105 that no examine shall attend any review class, briefing, conference, or the like conducted by or shall receive any handouts, review material or any tip from school or any review center during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day. Issue: won the resolution no. 105 is valid. Ruling: the court rule in favor of petitioner. Its is an axiom of administrative law administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purpose for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held invalid.
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Issue: What weight should the court observes in administrative construction. Ruling: The court ruled that where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the stature, the rule is that the courts will give considerations to construction by administrative or executive departments of the state. The construction of the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a statute should be given controlling weight.
H.
Victorias Milling Co vs Social Security Commission 114 Phil 555 Ratio : When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, in the exercise of its rule making power delegated to it by the legislature, it makes a new law with the force and effect of a valid law. When it renders an opinion, or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law, hence, merely advisory. 2. Types of executive construction/interpretation a. Construction by an executive officer directly called to implement the law. It may be express (embodied in a circular, directive or regulation) or implied (practice or mode of enforcement of not applying the statute to certain situations; by usage or practice); b. Construction by the Secretary of Justice as chief legal adviser of the government. May be reversed by President in the exercise of the power to modify, alter or reverse; c. Interpretation handed down in an adversary proceeding in the form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising quasi-judicial power. 2. Weight accorded to administrative constructions
Melendres vs COMELEC 319 SCRA 262 Facts: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing and promulgating ex parte the assailed resolution without complying with the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 28, Section 1 of Rule 10, Sections 1 to 6 of Rule 14, Sections 1 to 4 of Rule 17 and Section 9 of Rule 18, all of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Petitioner were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay Caniogan, Pasig City, in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections. After the counting of the votes, petitioner (Concepcion) was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman. On May 21, 1997, private respondent (Melendres) filed an election protest against petitioner (Concepcion) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, contesting therein the results of the election in all forty-seven (47) precincts of said barangay. The case was assigned to Branch 68. On June 4, 1997, after the preliminary hearing of the election case, it was shown that no filing or docket fee was paid by the protestant therein, which payment is required in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6. Petitioner Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on the ground of failure to comply with this requirement. In the contested Order, public respondent denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the requirement of payment of filing or docket fee is merely an administrative procedural matter and [is] not jurisdictional. Issue: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Asturias Sugar Central vs Commissioner of Customs 29 SCRA 617 Facts: The Bureau of Customs issued an Administrative Order in the silence of the Tariff and Customs Code which extends the period of exportation of a specific containers in which the petitioner was directly affected. The petitioner questioned the said order alleging that the construction of a specific statute by an administrative body must not be observed. Held: On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved that the payment of the filing of fee for purposes of an election protest and counter-protest is not jurisdictional and, hence, non-compliance therewith at the outset will not operate to deprive the Court of jurisdiction conferred upon it by law and acquired pursuant to the Rules. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the instant petition is hereby denied.
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When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the court that finally determine what the law means. Peralta vs CSC 212 SCRA 425 United Christian Missionary Society vs SSC 30 SCRA 982 Facts: this is the appeal from SSC, seeking to annul the orders of commissioner in dismissing the petition, on the ground that in the absence of express provision in Social Security act, vesting in the commission the power to condone penalties. Petitioners contention that they had under the impression that international organization, they were not cover under SSC. They paid their premiums and ask for condonation, which was denied by commissioner. ISSUE: WON the commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under SSC to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premiums. RULING: No error in the commissioners action. The provision on the SSC precisely enumerates the power of the commission, nowhere from the said powers may it shown that the commissioner is granted expressly or by implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by the act.
J.
Penal rules and regulations 1. Requisites for validity of penal rules and regulations Marcos vs CA 278 SCRA 843 US v. Panlilio 28 Phil 608
Facts: Dependant Panlilio was charged and convicted of the CFI of Province of Pampaga of a violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous diseases known as rinderpest. The conviction was grounded on illegal and voluntary act of herein accused by way of permitting and ordering the carabaos on issue to be taken from the corral while the quarantines against the same was still enforce. On other hand, that herein defendant interposed a defense that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime. Issue: WON the acts complaint of in the case at bar did not constitute a crime. Ruling: the court ruled in the negative. The acts complaint in the case at bar do not fall within any of the provisions of the Act No. 1760. However, the said finding does not prevent the court from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the revised penal code.
3.
Ollada vs Secretary of Finance 109 Phil 1072 Ratio : An administrative body has the power to interpret its own rules and such interpretation becomes part of the rule itself. Unless shown to be erroneous, unreasonable or arbitrary, such interpretation is entitled to recognition and respect from the courts, as no one is better qualified to interpret the intent of the regulation than the authority that issued it. Thus, its interpretation that the rule it issued is not retroactive, not being unreasonable, should be followed. I. Contingent legislation or delegation to ascertain facts Cruz vs Youngberg 56 Phil 234 People vs Vera 65 Phil 56 US vs Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1 Lovina vs Moreno 9 SCRA 557 2. K. Imposition of penalties by administrative authorities
Facts: Philippine Satellite Corporation filed a petition seeking to annul and set aside an order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the NTC, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by 15% with the reservation to make further reduction later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial or procedural, as well as substantial due process of law. The said provisional reduction is allegedly under the
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L.
Effectivity of administrative rules and regulations 1. Publication requirement Section 2, Civil Code
Section 2, Civil Code states that the law shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following their completion of their publication in the Official Gazette unless otherwise provided. Section 18, Book 1, 1987 Administrative Code Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided. Chapter 2 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code
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Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders vs DOF 238 SCRA 63 3. Application, general rule that the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the law does not require that there be prior notice and hearing conducted by the administrative agencies. However, if the statute making the delegation requires such hearing, then one must be conducted before such rules and regulations are issued. On the other hand, if the statute is silent on the matter, a public hearing, if practicable, may be conducted.
VI.
Quasi-judicial power - This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. Quasi-judicial body an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making power.
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003 Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no
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Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA 433
Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a "Sublease and Dealer Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter known as Shell) originally in the year 1965 and superseded in the year 1969. The latter was filed and registered with the OIC. While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel B. Yap defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of gasoline and other petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand letters to respondent Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore these demands letters forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its contractual rights to terminate the contract. Petitioner Shell sent respondent Yap the required 90-day written notice to terminate their contract as provided for by Sec. 5 of their "Sublease and Dealer Agreement." Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision stating it has jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged contractual right of petitioner to declare Yap's contract terminated. The OIC negated the existence of such right because the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade practice." Respondent OIC also allowed respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of the decision within which to pay his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged in a Civil Case. Petitioner Shell moved for a reconsideration but respondent OIC denied it. Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company. Held: The contentions of petitioner are well-founded. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no express provision conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear and decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company. It is of course a well-settled principle of
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Judicial Power is the power to courts of justice to settle actual case of controversies involving legal rights which are demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion. Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483 Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as amass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight' their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. "For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807."
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Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion. Held: It will thus be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter.4 The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties,"5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders."6 Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator. c. Distinguished from administrative function
Administrative Function are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature as such are devoled upon the admin agency by the organic law of existence.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348 Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the country. PADS issued search warrants against certain companies. Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution? Held: A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties
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C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268 Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848 Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions: "No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having been completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. The case was set for initial hearing. It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The motion to dismiss was denied by the court contending that it had jurisdiction over the matter.
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P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of the modem world.
f.
Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative agency GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6) employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found to
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Cario vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483 Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164 Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Baez offered to sell to petitioner Enriqueto F. Tejada a 200 square meter lot owned by respondent corporation. Private respondent suggested that petitioner pay a reservation fee of P20,000.00, which would form part of the consideration in case they reach a final agreement of sale and which amount was to be returned to the petitioner should the parties fail to reach an agreement. After paying the reservation fee, the respondent corporation changed the terms of monthly amortization which resulted in the demand of the petitioner for the return of his reservation fee. Respondent refused to return the same and petitioner brought suit with the RTC for a collection of sum of money. Respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss contesting the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear the case. The same was denied and respondents appealed to the CA who decided in their favor. Petitioner argues that inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of sale between the parties, the claim for recovery of the reservation fee properly falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not that of the HSRC. Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation fee. Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
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Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104 Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390 Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic which required her to appear before his sala under the penalty of law. Caamic was surprised for she was not aware of any case filed against her. When she appeared at the date, time and place stated in the subpoena, she was berated by the respondent and demanded 8K from her. Said amount was the amount of the life insurance policy of Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair competition in the lower court. During the trial and after the presentation of some of private respondents witnesses, they requested the court for a subpoena duces tecum as regards to the books of herein petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that it can only be regarded as a fishing bill to discover evidence
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Ruling : The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasijudicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction. When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. ". . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the, administration of justice. The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.
VIII. Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27 Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged with several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3 boxes without the presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its Resolution. After appearing and showing cause why they should not be punished for contempt, the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposing a fine. Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC. Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.
Ruling: Rule 64 applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies, unless said contempt is [clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Sec. 580 of the revised administrative code. The refusal to comply with order of tenancy law, enforcement division is neither contempt nor a penalized offense.
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Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He filed an appealed contending that he married the victim therefore his criminal liability should be extinguished. The Attorney-General entered an opposition to said petition wherein, after discussing the scope of article 448 of the Penal Code and Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature amending said article, he concluded that the marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot extinguish his liability as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity. Issue: The question is a purely legal one and sifts down to whether or not section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of abuse against chastity among those cases in which criminal liability is extinguished by the marriage of the accused with the offended party. Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was that the marriage of the accused or convict with the offended party should extinguish the criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and rape and those involving offenses included in said crimes, such as frustrated or attempted seduction, abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability for a crime is extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for a stronger reason, in the lesser
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It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of judicial powers.19 The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves.20 Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations." There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.
II.
Procedure to be followed Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code A. Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as memberelect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified. Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election
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Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757 Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI, which declared null and void its decision in Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private respondent Simplicio C. Ibea and instead ordered then Municipal Mayor Braulio
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E.
F.
G.
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A. Substantive and procedural due process, defined DUE PROCESS contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting ones person or property. It is designed to secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to formality. For substance must prevail over form. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS Consists of the 2 basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal By procedural due process is meant a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial The constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law, which clause optimizes the principle of justice which hears before it condemns which upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356 Facts: Petitioner Santiago was charged with violation of Arts. Of War 96 and 97. He was arraigned though without summons and subpoena afforded to him. From the proven facts and the admission likewise of the respondents, the court martial
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Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160 Facts: President Marcos issued PD No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was
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Albert vs CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948 Facts: Plaintiff Albert sued University Publishing Company, Inc. for breach of contract. Albert died before the case proceeded to trial, and Justo R. Albert, his estate's administrator, was substituted. Finally, defendant's liability was determined by this Court in L-15275. Plaintiff was to recover P15,000.00 with legal interest from judicial demand. From the inception of the suit below up to the time the judgment in L15275 was to be executed, the corporate existence of University Publishing Company, Inc. appears to have been taken for granted, and was not then put in issue. However, when the Court of First Instance of Manila issued on July 22, 1961 an order of execution against University Publishing Company, Inc., a new problem cropped up. By virtue of this writ, plaintiff's counsel and the Sheriff of the City of Manila went to see Jose M. Aruego who signed the contract with plaintiff on behalf and as President of University Publishing Company, Inc. They then discovered that no such entity exists. A verification made at the Securities and Exchange Commission confirmed this fact. On July 31, 1961, said Commission issued a certification "that the records of this Commission do not show the registration of UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC., either as a corporation or partnership."2 This triggered a verified petition in the court below on August 10, 1961 for the issuance of a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff of Manila to cause the satisfaction of the judgment against the assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant in the case. All along, Jose M. Aruego and his law firm were counsel for the University Publishing Company, Inc. Instead of informing the lower court that it had in its possession copies of its certificate of registration, its article of incorporation, its bylaws and all other papers material to its disputed corporate existence, University Publishing Company, Inc. chose to remain silent. On August 11, 1961, University Publishing Company, Inc., by counsel Aruego, Mamaril and Associates (the law firm of Jose M. Aruego aforesaid) merely countered plaintiff's petition for execution as against Aruego with an unsworn manifestation in court that "said Jose M. Aruego is not a party to this case," and, therefore, plaintiff's petition should be denied. Issue: WON Aruego is a party to this case
Held: "The evidence is patently clear that Jose M. Aruego, acting as representative of a non-existent principal, was the real party to the contract sued upon; that he was the one who reaped the benefits resulting from it, so much so that partial payment of the consideration were made by him; that he violated its terms, thereby precipitating the suit in question; and that in the litigation he was the real defendant. Perforce, in line with the ends of justice, responsibility under the judgment falls on him. "By 'due process of law' we mean 'a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. . . .' (4 Wheaton, U.S. 518, 581); or, as this Court has said, 'Due process of law' contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting one's person or property.' (Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32).' (Sicat vs. Reyes, 100 Phil., 505; 54 Off. Gaz. [17]4945.) And it may not be amiss to mention here also that the 'due process' clause of the Constitution is designed to secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to formality. For substance must prevail over form. It may now be trite, but none the less apt, to quote what long ago we said in Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, 321322: 'A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Laws uits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should he no vested rights in technicalities. B. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Cardinal primary requirements of due process
The right to a hearing which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence The tribunal must consider the evidence presented The decision must have something to support itself The evidence must be substantial The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing The tribunal or body of any judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy The board or body should in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involves and reason for the decision rendered
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Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635 Facts: The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Uuion, Inc. Issue: What are the cardinal primary rights? Held: CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.-There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know Lin: various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
Fabella vs CA 282 SCRA 256 Facts: The petitioner herein, successor in-interest in the case of the former DECS Secretary against the public school teachers who were illegally dismissed for staging a mass action and failure to heed to the return-to-work order, filed a petition for the judgment of the trial court holding that said public school teachers were denied of due process in the proceedings. It was held that the proceedings contravened RA 4670 which required that administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding school superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who at least have the rank of a supervisor, where the teachers belong, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization and supervisor of the Division, the last 2 to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. Petitioner argued that DECS complied with RA 4670 because all the teachers who were members of the various committee are members of either the QC Teachers Federation or the QC Elementary teachers Federation and are deemed representatives of teachers organization. Issue: WON there was denial of due process Held: The Court held that there was indeed a denial of due process. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of the organizations. Under the law, the teachers organization possess the right to indicate its choice of representatives. Such right cannot be usurped by the Secretary of Education or the Director of Public Schools or their underlings. The teachers appointed by the DECS as members
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Air Manila vs Balatbat 38 SCRA 489 Facts: PAL's proposal to introduce new Mercury night flights had been referred to a hearing examiner for economic justification, PAL submitted a so-called consolidated schedule of flights that included the same Mercury night flights and this was allowed by Board Resolution No. 139(68). The Board's action was impelled by the authorizations of certain flight schedules previously allowed but were incorporated were about to expire; thus, the consolidated schedule had to be approved temporarily if the operations of the flights referred to were not to be suspended. In short, the temporary permit was issued to prevent the stoppage or cessation of services in the affected areas. The Board, considering the report of the hearing examiner, passed Resolution No. 190 (68) approving, for a period of 30 days starting 31 July 1968, only three or four frequencies of the seven proposed new flights. There is no proof, not even allegation, that in all those hearings petitioner was not notified or give opportunity to adduce evidence in support of its opposition. Issue: WON PAL violated the requisites of administrative due process Held: YES. It was precisely prescribed that "all schedules under the DTS-35 for which no previous approval has been granted by the Board, are hereby referred to a hearing examiner for reception of evidence on its economic justification." It has been correctly said that administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials (Asprec vs. Itchon. 16 SCRA 921). And this administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to notice*, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person s legal rights; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights*, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor: (c) a tribunal so constituted* as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and
In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into the enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with certain duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may adversely affected. Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers Association vs Premiere Productions, Inc., G.R. No. L-5621, 25 March 1953 Facts: The Court of Industrial Relations authorized lay off of workers solely on the basis of an ocular inspection. Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the layoff of workers on the basis of an ocular inspections without receiving full evidence to determine the cause or motive of such a lay off Held: No. The required process has not been followed. The court of quo merely acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of the respondent company was incurring financial losses. The allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of the place of labor specially when conducted at the request of the interested.
Mabuhay Textile Mills vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437 Facts: Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabubay) is a corporation engaged in the garments and textile import business for the last twenty-seven years. Among the government requirements for engaging in this type of business are the export quota allocations issued by the respondent Garments and Textile Export Board. Sometime in 1982, the Board granted export quota allocations for 1983 to the petitioner. These export quotas have been granted annually to the Petitioner since
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D.
A reviewing official or body tasked to resolve an appeal must refrain from participating in reviewing any decision rendered or concurred by him in another official capacity. The reviewing officer must be other than the officer whose decision is under review, otherwise there would be no different views or there could be no real review of the case, in violation of due process of law.
Zamboanga Chromite Mining Co. vs CA 94 SCRA 261 Facts: Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales. On the basis of petitioners' evidence, Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with law. The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending. Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, as if he was adjudicating the case for the first time. Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same case. We hold that Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines
E. Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of procedural due process In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into the enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with certain duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may adversely affected. Essential elements of due process: a. An impartial tribunal b. Due notice and opportunity to be heard be given c. The procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial d. The proceedings may be conducted in such a way that there will be opportunity for the court to determine whether the applicable rules of law and procedure e. That the decision or ruling be supported by substantial evidence
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Villa vs Lazaro 189 SCRA 34 Facts: Anita Villa was granted a building permit issued by the City Engineer to contrcust a funeral parlor. Following adverse judgment to the court in his suit to enjoin the construction of the funeral parlor, Veneracion, instead of appealing the judgment, lodged a complaint with the HSCR on substantially the same ground litigated in the action relative parlors distance from hospitals whether public or private. Villa received a telegram from the HSRC through Commissioner Dizon requesting transmittal of proof of location clearance granted by this Office. Villa sent a reply telegram reading: Locational Clearance based on certification of City Planning and Development Coordinator and Human Settlement Officer, copies mail. Subsequently, Villa received from Dizon an Order to Present Proof of Locational Clearance. Since she had already sent the required locational clearance, Villa made no response. Then Villa received a show cause Order, requiring her to show cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a ceaseand desist order issued against her for her failure to show proof of locational clearance. In spite of her communication that she had already mailed all required documents, she received an Order imposing on her a fine of P10,000 and requiring her to cease operations, and later, a writ of execution in implementation of the order. A motion for reconsideration to which she attached copies of the Commission Proper was also denied on account of the finality of the Order. An appeal to the office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, and so was the motion for reconsideration. Noteworthy are the following: neither Veneracion nor the Commision, ever made known the complaint of Veneracion to Villa until much later, after the Commission has rendered several adverse rulings against her; the orders of the Commission made no reference whatever to the documents Villa had already sent by registered mail; and the resolutions of the Presidential Assistant Lazaro likewise omitted to refer to the telegrams and documents sent by Veneracion Issue: WON Villa was denied due process against which the defense of failure of Villa to take timely appeal will not avail.
RCA Communications vs PLDT 110 Phil 420 Facts PLDTCO entered into an agreement with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, wherein both companies agreed to establish telephone services between the Philippines and the United States. As it lacked the necessary equipment and facilities, PLDTCO on the same date entered into another agreement with RCA whereby the latter constituted itself a carrier of PLDTCO's telephone messages to and from the United States. The term of the agreement was for five years and "shall thereafter continue in force until terminated by either party giving the other 24 calendar months previous notice in writing." On January 3, 1956, PLDTCO sent RCA a notice of termination of its arrangements with the latter, the same to be effective not later than February 2, 1958, and three months later, filed an application with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, through the Radio Control Board, for authority to construct and operate a radio-telephonic station of its own at Marilao, Bulacan, and for the assignment to It of appropriate radio frequencies.
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RCA filed a petition for prohibition) with the Court of First Instance of Manila to prevent the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the Radio Control Board from proceeding further on PLDTCO's pending application. The complaint alleged that the approval by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications of the construction permit in favor of PLDTCO without previous hearing and opportunity to plaintiff RCA to present evidence in support of its opposition was without due process of law. Issue: Whether or not RCA was denied of hearing and opportunity present case. Held: No, that in administrative proceedings, hearing is only necessary in those cases where the statute so requires. A cursory reading of the Radio Control Law (Act No. 3846, as amended) shows that, unlike in other proceedings or instances specified in section 3, paragraphs d and 1, of the said law, no, hearing is required in the consideration by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications of any application for the installation, establishment, or operation of a radio station (paragraph k). At any rate, even assuming that a hearing is required, RCA must be considered to have waived its right thereto, its counsel having addressed a letter to the Radio Control Board saying that "little would be gained by arguing the matter both before yourselves and before the Public Service Commission."
Facts: Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. information was filed against him and two others for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). That he and others wilfully and unlawfully enter into a purchase contract with REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for the purchase of certain office supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit prim of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit price for said item was only Fifty-Five Pews (P55.00) or a total price of Five Thousand Five Hundred Pews (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the government in the total amount of FortyNineThousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00) CONTRARY TO LAW.
F.
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Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs CA 199 SCRA 595 Central Bank vs CA 220 SCRA 536 Facts: Monetary Board (MB)issued Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure of Triumph Savings Bank (TSB), forbidding it from doing business in the Philippines, placing it under receivership, and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver. TSB filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Central Bank and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No. 596, with prayer for injunction, challenging in the process the constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269, otherwise known as 'The Central Bank Act," as amended, insofar as it authorizes the Central Bank to take over a banking institution even if it is not charged with violation of any few or regulation, much less found guilty thereof. The trial court granted the relief sought and denied the application of TSB for injunction. Thereafter, Triumph Savings under the receivership of the officials of the Central Bank was done without prior hearing, that is, without first hearing the side of the bank. They further admit that said resolution can be the subject of judicial review and may be set aside should it be found that the same was issued with arbitrariness and in bad faith. Issue: Whether or not summary closure was "arbitrary and in bad faith" and a denial of "due process. Held: Ruling: No, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under receivership. When par. 4 (now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289) provides for the filing of a case within ten (10) days after the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, it is unmistakable that the assailed actions should precede the filing of the case. Plainly, the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no prior notice and hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit to annul it on the basis of absence thereof. In the early case of Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. v Arca [1965],17 It was held that a hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor does the constitutional requirement of due process demand that the correctness of the. Monetary Board' s resolution to stop operation and proceed to liquidation be first Facts The Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin San, surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the building stands for a period of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was using the Quonset (hut) for the storage of copra. Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action Officer, notified Tan Gin San by mail to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and. stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard. Since the notifications remained unheeded by petitioner, Respondent Mayor ordered the demolition. Issue: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition of petitioner's Quonset building. Ruling: No, Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.
Sitchon vs Aquino 98 Phil 458 2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action; where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the
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Lastimosa vs Vasquez 243 SCRA 497 Facts: Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge of attempted rape to the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the Ombudsman and were placed under preventive suspension. It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. Issues: 1.
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his innocence.
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. Where the law is silent on prior notice and hearing as a requirement before an agency action, which refers to the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof, can be done, compliance with the requirement of prior notice and hearing depends upon the nature of the power to be exercised or the end to be achieved. Prior notice and hearing is not required in the exercise of police power Prior notice and hearing is not required in granting provisional reliefs Asprec vs Itchon 16 SCRA 921 Facts: Respondent Jacinto Hernandez lodged with the Board of Examiners for Surveyors administrative complaint2 for unprofessional conduct against petitioner Cleto Asprec. He requested Asprec to undertake survey on his lot in Port Junction, Ragay, Camarines Sur. That no survey was conducted and that it was a mere copy of one Damian Alham. that Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors. The Board's unanimous decision of October 27, 1959 revoked, and required surrender of, Asprec's certificate of registration as a private land surveyor. A complaint was but was absent in the hearing. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to present his case.
2.
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Whether or not the preventive suspension is invalid as it denied them opportunity to refute the charges against them
Ruling: 1.
2.
Yes, The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute. No, Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia:
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Ruling: No, petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of bearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. Presence of a party at a trial, petitioner concedes, is not always of the essence of due process. Really, all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner had notice of the trial of May 11th. More than this, that date of trial (May 11) had been previously agreed upon by the parties and their counsel. Petitioner cannot now charge that he received less-than-a-fairtreatment. He has forfeited his right to be heard in his defense.6 Petitioner insists that the proceeding before the Board are quasi-criminal in nature. From this he proceeds to draw the conclusion that no valid trial could proceed even if he absented himself therefrom. We do not see eye to eye with this view. It is best answered by a reference to the opinion of the court below, thus The rule applies even to quasi-criminal or criminal proceedings. So, where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard
Petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the former of an alleged letterpetition of "Congressman Floro Crisologo and 107 alleged residents of Vigan, Ilocos, Sur", charging the following: The sale of 2,000 ELECTRIC METERS in blackmarket by the Vigan Electric Light Company to Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal and also report that the electric meters in Vigan used by the consumers had been installed in bad faith and they register excessive rates much more than the actual consumption. The finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is making a net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, we believe that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately. Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the present meter rates for its electric service effective upon the billing for the month of June, 1962 Petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul said order of May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, latter had not furnished the former a "copy of the alleged letter-petition of Congressman Crisologo and others. Respondent then expressed the view that there was no necessity of serving copy of said letter to petitioner, because respondent was merely holding informal conferences to ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the reduction of its rates. That petitioner had not even been served a copy of the auditor's report upon which the order complained of is based, that such order had been issued without notice and hearing; and that, accordingly, petitioner had been denied due process. Issue: WON the twin notice of hearing is required in rate fixing? Rulig: The hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that, having been issued without previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and, hence, null and void. Whether notice and a hearing is proceedings before a public service commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the commission, and upon the nature and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are on the one hand, legislative and rule-making in character (SUBJECT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, ON DUE PROCESS), or are, on the other hand, determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial (IN ALL INSTANCES,
Banco Filipino vs Central Bank 204 SCRA 767 G. Notice and hearing in rate-fixing
As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission
Vigan Electric Light vs PSC 10 SCRA 46 Facts: Republic Act No. 316, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric light heat and/or power plant for the purpose of generating and distributing light, heat and/or power, for sale within the limits of several Municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur.
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i.
Right to counsel, not a due process requirement There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a noncriminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings
H.
The rule that the filling of a MR of the decision /ruling against a party cures the defect in the lack of prior notice and hearing as to preclude the party from claiming denial of due process assumes that the other requirements of due process have been complied with. However such opportunity is nothing and he is still denied due process, where the decision against him has nothing to support itself, one of the cardinal requirements of due process being that the decision or ruling of an administrative body must be supported by substantial evidence.
Lumiqued vs Exevea 282 SCRA 125 Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform - Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order. The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989,1 charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated July 31, 1992, finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. The investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him. This instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary Quisumbingit prays for the "payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994.
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278 Facts: Petitioner Medenilla is a contractual employee of DPWH as Public Officer II. Later on, she was detailed as Technical Assistant in the office of the assistant secretary for the admin. and manpower management. On Jan. 2, 1989, petitioner was appointed to the contested position of Supervising Human Resource Development Officer. Respondents {being the next-in-rank-employees} jointly lodged a protest before the DPWH task force re-organization contesting the appointment of petitioner. The task force dismissed the protest of the respondents thereby appealing before the Civil Service Commission. The Commission disapproved the appointment of the petitioner reversing the ruling of task force. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the CSC but to no avail, hence , the petition then was filed before the Supreme Court. Issue: WON CSC is correct in disapproving the appointment of petitioner and that WON the petitioner was denied of due process of law in the absence of notice? Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that CSC is incorrect in disapproving the appointment of petitioner. The CSC is limited only to determine whether the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility and not whether another is more qualified than the petitioner. Petitioner was not notified of the appeal before the Commission. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the
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IV.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff should first seek relief in an administrative proceeding before he seeks a remedy in court, even though the matter is properly presented to the court, which is within its jurisdiction. The court will not determine a controversy: 1. Where the question demands administrative determination requiring special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal Where the question requires determination of technical and intricate issues of fact Where uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered. Industrial Enterprises vs CA, 184 SCRA 426
2. 3.
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ISSUE: WON the director of land has primary jurisdiction over the case? RULING: Primary Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands and Finality of Factual Findings of the Court of Appeals Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary Jurisdiction; courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the Jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case, since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a sales application require a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters. Because these issues preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary Jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
Machete vs CA 250 SCRA 176 Facts: Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners Lope Machete and 11 others. The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to Villanons landholdings at Poblacion Norte, Carmen, Bohol, under which Machete et al. were to pay private respondent a certain amount or percentage of their harvests. However, despite repeated demands and with no valid reason, Machete et al. failed to pay their respective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him back rentals and damages. Machete et al. moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter. They contended that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations, hence, the subject matter of the complaint fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers under the Revised Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
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Philippine Veterans Bank vs CA 322 SCRA 139 Facts: Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao, which are covered by Transfer Certificates. The lands were taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank of the Philippines and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), petitioner filed a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property. The petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao, which dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. Since this case was filed only on January 26, 1994, the fifteen-day period provided for under Section 51 of Republic Act 6657 which is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law within which to appeal, already lapsed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed. It was held that: Jurisdiction over land valuation cases is lodged in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, as is plainly provided under Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner argues that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the just compensation for the taking of lands under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, because such jurisdiction is vested in Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts and, therefore, a petition for the fixing of just compensation can be filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal provided from the
Where the administrative agency has no jurisdiction, the doctrine does not apply. It does not apply in any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260 Facts : This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which was instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents for closing a logging road without authority. From the facts, petitioners were hauling logs to be loaded on a vessel. Private respondent EastCoast ordered the closure of the road, a national highway, through their security force, to prevent passage of the trucks hauling the logs for the Japanese vessel. Private respondent claim that they were the only authorized timber licensee to use the road. Petitioners filed a case before the trial court, which was dismissed on lack of jurisdiction, the court a quo holding that the issue is within the realm of the Bureau of Forestry which should have heard the case before filing t case in court.
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Gonzales vs Secretary of Education 5 SCRA 657 Facts: Jose L. Gonzales, a senior teacher civil service eligible, was appointed Principal of the Lambunao High School established in the municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo. Lambunao High School was later converted into a Regional Vocational High School under the name of Iloilo Vocational High School. Gonzales then received a letter from the Secretary of Education appointing him as Head of the Related Subjects Department of the Bureau of Public School. He also received a copy of a letter of the Director of Public Schools addressed to respondent Alfredo Pineda, at the time Principal of the Samar Trade School, appointing him as Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School. When Pineda came to assume the office of Principal of the latter school, Gonzales refused to yield the same to him, and sent a written protest against Pineda's appointment as well as against his own appointment as Head of the Related Subjects Department, addressed to the Superintendent of the Iloilo School of Arts and Trades, who forwarded it without undue delay to the Director of Public Schools by a second indorsement. Without waiting for any action on his protest-in fact even before said protest could be forwarded and submitted to the Director of Public Schools-Gonzales, filed the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to restrain the Secretary of Education and the Director of Public Schools from giving effect to the appointment of Alfredo Pineda as Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School, and to recover damages. After due trial, the lower court rendered the appealed judgment. Appellants claimed that the lower court erred in not holding that the present action was instituted prematurely. Issue: WON the appellee initiated the appropriate administrative proceeding.
V.
As a general rule, recourse through court action cannot prosper until all the remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.
Rosales vs CA 165 SCRA 344 Ruling : Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level. When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government, but nevertheless, a Litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of the party litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a remedy is
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Ruling: The facts of this case disclose that appellee initiated appropriate administrative procedures to obtain relief from the orders that he considered prejudicial to his rights by means of his first, addressed to the Superintendent of the Iloilo School of Arts and Trades. This protest was forwarded by the latter to the Director of Public Schools, but even before this date appellee instituted the present action. It is, therefore, clear that he did not give his superior officers any opportunity to reconsider the questioned orders before seeking judicial intervention. The rule of exhaustion of appropriate remedies before resorting to the courts to seek relief appears to be of stronger application to the present case where, according to the record, appellant Pineda and the superior officers of appellee did not appear to have exerted any undue pressure upon him to compel him to yield and give up the position in question. The decision appealed from is reserved, with the result that the present action is dismissed.
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The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where the agency exercise judicial or quasi-judicial function. It does not apply in the exercise of its rule-making power or legislative power.
Ang Tuan Kai vs Import Control Commission L-4427, 21 April 1952 Facts: The petitioner, a duly registered partnership of Manila, alleges in substance (1) that it had placed orders for textiles amounting to about P340,000 with foreign suppliers which orders were accepted before July 31, 1949; (2) that in November 1950 it requested the respondent to allow importation of the textiles against its quota for 1949 pursuant to circular No. 12 and (3) but that respondent with grave abuse of authority and discretion has denied the request and instead ordered that said orders of Ang Tuan Kai & Co., be charged against the firm's 1951 quota and exchange allocations in pursuant to the order issued previously by the same board. Hence this case.
Sunville Timber Products vs Abad 206 SCRA 482 Facts: The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992. On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the TLA, on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.
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The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City. The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by Section I of PD 605. Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987,1 and the motion for reconsideration on February 15,1988.2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988,3 and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not the lower court correctly applied the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Ruling: The lower court erred in misapplying the doctrine. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of noninterference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagethan City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.21 The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review. here is no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of
Gonzales vs Hechanova, 60 OG 802 Facts : Respondent executive secretary authorized the importation of several tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein for the implementation of said proposed importation. Petitioner is the president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association engaged in the production of rice and corn, filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are, acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency; that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a prelinainary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency of this case and to prevent the judgment therein from becoming ineffectual. Respondent, among others, countered that the petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies available to him before coming to court. Issue : WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case. Ruling : The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore, untenable. Paat vs CA 266 SCRA 167 Facts: The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural
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Corpus vs Cuaderno L-17860 30 March 1962 Facts: While petitioner-appellant was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines, he was charged in an administrative case, for alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc., preferred against him by employees of the Bank, resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board of the Bank and the creation of a 3-man committee to investigate him. The committee was composed of representatives of the Bank, Bureau of Civil Service and the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. After receiving the answer of the respondent therein, the committee heard the case, receiving testimonies of witnesses on both sides. On May 5, 1959, the committee submitted its Final Report, the pertinent conclusion and recommendation therein reading as follows: "(1) In view of the foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no basis upon which to recommend disciplinary action against respondent and therefore respectfully recommends that he be immediately reinstated." Unable to agree with the committee report, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 957 on July 20, 1959 which considered "the respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension." The pertinent portion of the resolution reads thus: "After an exhaustive and mature deliberation of the report of the aforesaid fact finding committee, in conjunction with the entire records of the case and representations of both complainants and respondent, through their respective counsel; and, further, after a thorough review of the service record of the respondent, particularly the various cases presented against him, object of Monetary Board Resolution No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955, which all involves fitness, discipline, etc. of respondent, and moreover, upon formal statement of the Governor that he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special Assistant to the Governor and In-Charge of the Export Department (such position being primarily confidential and highly technical in nature), the Monetary Board finds that the continuance of the respondent in the service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to be best interests of the Central Bank, and, therefore, in accordance
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Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case
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Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works 8 SCRA 179 Facts: It appears from the allegations of the petition that the petitioner was denounced before the Port and Harbor Board, Manila for making certain constructions near the mouth of Calat-an Creek in Sipalay, Negros Occidental; that on September 11, 1958, petitioner was served with copy of the charges filed against it by two investigators of respondent Secretary of Public Works and Communications who conducted an investigation of said charges; that on the basis of this investigation, respondent Secretary rendered a decision dated January 16, 1959 ordering the petitioner herein to remove the causeway illegally constructed at the mouth of the Calat-an River and restore the bed of said river to its original condition within thirty days from receipt of copy of the decision, otherwise, the removal shall be effected by the government at the expense of herein petitioner. Without appealing the decision of the respondent Secretary to the President, herein petitioner has filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari seeking that the decision of respondent be annulled."
Bueno vs Patanao 9 SCRA 794 Facts: On April 29, 1958, Pedro B. Patanao commenced Special Civil Case No. 48 with the Court of First Instance of Agusan, against Valeriano, C. Bueno and one Juanito Merin, for injunction and damages. In his amended petition, Patanao alleged that on March 10, 1958 the respondents therein disturbed him in his, possession of his timber concession by illegally entering the same and cutting and hauling logs therein; that when he went to the area to stop said respondents and their laborers, truckers and loggers from cutting and hauling logs "he was met with riot guns, pistols and other firearms"; and that defendants were able to cut no less
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Continental Marble Corp. vs NLRC 161 SCRA 151 Facts: In his complaint before the NLRC, herein private respondent Rodito Nasayao claimed that sometime in May 1974, he was appointed plant manager of the petitioner corporation, with an alleged compensation of P3,000.00, a month, or 25% of the monthly net income of the company, whichever is greater, and when the company failed to pay his salary for the months of May, June, and July 1974,
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Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez 205 SCRA 92 Facts: On 2 September 1985, the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa (hereinafter, Municipality), Metro Manila, thru its then Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr., entered into a contract with the KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MCA MAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM) represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez, for the latter's management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. The contract provides for a twenty-five (25) year term commencing on 2 September 1985, renewable for a like period, unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties, at a monthly consideration of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000) to be paid by the KBMBPM within the first five (5) days of each month which shall, however, be increased by ten percent (10%) each year during the first five (5) years only. Following his assumption into office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago Carlos, Jr., petitioner Ignacio Bunye, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337," and the "patently inequitable rental," directed a review of the aforesaid contract.3 He sought opinions from both the Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the validity of the in strument. In separate letters, these agencies urged that appropriate legal steps be taken towards its rescission. The letter of Hon. Elfren Cruz of the MMC even granted the Municipality authority "to take the necessary legal steps for the cancellation. rescission of the above cited contract and make representations with KBMBPM for the immediate transfer/takeover of the possession, management and operation of the New Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa." Consequently, upon representations made by Bunye with the Municipal Council, the latter approved on 1 August 1988 Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract. To implement this resolution, Bunye, together with his copetitioners and elements of the Capital Command of the Philippine Constabulary, proceeded, on 19 August 1986, to the public market and announced to the general
Almine vs CA 177 SCRA 796 Facts: On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for retention of her riceland or for exemption thereof from the Operation Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), Regional Office in Tobaco, Albay. After due hearing, Atty. Cidarminda Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation report dated June 26, 1980 for the cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be petitioner's tenant over her riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to take the necessary action, petitioner reiterated her application sometime in 1979-1985 alleging that her tenant deliberately failed and refused to deliver her landowner's share from 1975 up to the time of the Ming of the said application and, that the latter had distributed his landholding to his children. A reinvestigation was conducted this time by Atty. Seth Evasco who on October 31, 1985 filed his report recommending the cancellation of private respondent's CLT. Said report was elevated to the MAR. In an endorsement dated November 25, 1985, Regional Director Salvador Pejo manifested his concurrence with the report of Atty. Evasco holding that the properties of the petitioner consist of 4.3589 hectares as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 27167, 27168 and 27344 and hence not covered by the Operation Land Transfer Program. Juanito L. Lorena, the Officer-in-Charge of MAR likewise concurred therewith. However, in the order dated February 13, 1986, then
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Issue: Whether or not the contention of the CA is tenable. Ruling: A perusal of the provision above cited reveals that questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his landholdings are exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus excluded from those cognizable by the then CAR, now the Regional Trial Courts. There is no appeal from a decision of the President. However, the said decision may be reviewed by the courts through a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, as the case may be under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the petition for review by way of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that this is a matter within the competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President.
Quintos v. National Stud Farm 54 SCRA 210 Facts: Quintos is the legitimate owner of a racehorse which was duly and officially registered with NSF and for which he is issued a certificate of registration, thereby entitling it to participate in horse races and sweepstakes draws in legally authorized racing clubs or tracks. In line with the SOP and usual racing practices for horse owners, Quintos applied for inclusion of his horse in a particular race 3 days before the date of the race which application was duly approved by Phil Racing Club, Inc. On the very day when Quintos race-horse was scheduled to participate in race no. 15, the PRC announced thru the PA system before the start of race no. 13 that his horse was being excluded from taking part in race no. 15. It was then alleged that the cancellation of the certificate of registration of his horse was arbitrary and oppressive, due process being denied him in the absence of a formal investigation or inquiry prior thereto. The trial court dismissed the complaint primarily on the ground of lack of EAR that the admin remedy of Quintos was to ask the Board of Trustees of NSF to reconsider its resolution cancelling the certificate of registration, and in case of denial of appeal to the Games and
Tapales vs President of UP 7 SCRA 553 Facts: Ramon Tapales was duly appointed Director of the Conservatory Music in UP as recommended by the President of the University of the Philippines after
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Sunga v. NLRC 173 SCRA 338 Facts: Sunga, et al. filed before the NLRC a complaint against ACD Computer Services and Cabel for illegal dismissal and non-payment of certain benefits. The labor arbiter rendered a decision sustaining the petitioners' position. The labor arbiter, then, upon motion of the petitioners, issued a writ of execution to enforce said decision. The following day, the sheriff served a notice of garnishment to the Commercial Bank of Manila after which the total amount of P15,031.85 was garnished. This amount has already been turned over to the petitioners. A levy on execution was made upon the properties found in the respondents' office premises. ACD Group Inc., an American firm based in California, U.S.A., through its Chairman, Dulay filed a third-party claim in the NLRC case on the ground that it is the real owner of the computers levied upon and scheduled for auction. This thirdparty claim was denied. ACD Computer Services and Cabel filed before the NLRC a petition for relief from judgment in NLRC-NCR Case No. 6-2423-86 with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The NLRC then issued the questioned resolutions incidental to Injunction Case. The petitioners filed before
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Sabello v. DECS 100 SCRA 623 Facts: Petitioner Sabello, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the Division of Gingoog City. The barangay high school was in deficit at that time due to the fact that the students could hardly pay for their monthly tuition few. Since at that time
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Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil 490 Facts: Montes was charged with negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him bad sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his care). the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in not pumping, the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer. Montes then filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he instituted the action. The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598, which provides: The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power and authority to hear and decide all administrative cases brought before it on appeal, and its decisions in such cases shall be final, unless revised or modified by the President of the Philippines. Issue: WON the lower court erred in applying Sec 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598 in the instant case. Ruling: There is no duty imposed on a party against whom a decision has been rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals to appeal to the President, and that the tendency of courts has been not to subject the decision of the President to judicial review. It is further argued that if decisions of the Auditor General may be appealed to the courts, those of the Civil Service Board of Appeals need not be acted upon by the President also, before recourse may be had to the courts. It is also argued that if a case is appealed to the President, his action should be final and not reviewable by the courts because such a course of action would be derogatory to the high office of the President. The judgment appealed from is thus affirmed.
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