147614187.

doc

Dartmouth 2K9

A2: Foucault
1. Case Outweighs: CHANGE THE CASE OUTWEIGHS DEPENDING ON ADVANTAGES AND IMPACTS.

2. Their link evidence is not specific to the affirmative. It assumes welfare reform that is different from actual plan action. None of their evidence is specific to the CERD.
3. No link: The kritik assumes that all societal normalization and cultural divides are discursively formed, and in doing so ignore the core of human subjectivity that allows us to resist power. Boucher, Geoff. June, 2000.
[Hegelian Social Critic. From the Desire for Recognition to a Politics of Resistance. www.ethicalpolitics.org/geoffboucher/2005/resistance.htm] For Bourdieu, the habitus is a mediating concept it mediates between individual character, described as a bodily hexis, or style of the subject inscribed in corporeal deportment, and the complex structural terrain of an institutional apparatus, described by Bourdieu as the field. From the perspective of this materialist theory of social action, the individual is positioned structurally through

socialisation in the group habitus a differentially defined lifeworld, or structure of dispositions based on a practical taxonomy which defines a whole, socially antagonistic way of life. Habitus describes a collective relation to hegemonic norms that explains how, despite enormous individual variation, social groups as
statistical aggregates tend to exhibit the ideological characteristics that fit them to certain functional roles in the social division of labour. The generative schemes of the habitus are schemes for the interpretation and transformation of social practice.

The nature of the habitus as the ideological unconscious of practice creates a common-sense world, endowed with an objectivity that is secured by a consensus on the meaning of practices in the world. Habitus is a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively regulated and regular without in any way being the product of obedience to rules (Bourdieu, 1977: 72). 4. No link: Problematizing the traditional discourse of poverty is supplementary, not mutually exclusive with the aff. Schram, Professor of Social Policy at Bryn Mawr, 93(Sanford F. Schram, Postmodern Policy Analysis: Discourse and
Identity in Welfare Policy, August 1993, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4532290) To recognize the legitimacy of affirming and supporting, rather than marginalizing and blaming, alternative family arrangements would necessitate seriously enter- taining alternative policies. Therefore, welfare policy discourse continues to construct poverty as a problem of family structure and seeks to find its solu- tion in the two-parent family. In fact, discursive moves on behalf of the two- parent family intensify especially as that ideal becomes harder to sustain . Denial of the economic and social forces at work during the current post- industrial transition confine policy space to the familiar discursive structure. Insisting the family breakdown is a cause rather than a symptom of growing poverty allows social policy to continue to legitimate itself even as it becomes less and less able to address the social problems it is ostensibly designed to attack. To be sure, blaming female-headed families for growing poverty pro- vides a convenient and culturally ascendent way to deflect attention away from the deleterious effects of postindustrialism on poorer segments of soci- ety (see for instance Murray, 1993). The scapegoating of family structure for problems embedded in the sexist, racist and economic exclusionary practices of the 'contemporary postindustrial society of economic decline' propels popular resistance to public assistance and aggressively silence attempts to articulate a family policy which could ensure that all families have the re- sources to be able to avoid poverty. Moving from a 'culture of poverty' argu- ment which blames the poor for their problems, policy discourse stresses what could be called a 'culture of single motherhood' (Thomas, 1992) to fur- ther promote a punitive approach to poor women with children. The dwindl- ing economic opportunities associated with the current economic transition can thus be ignored. In the current climate, the prospects for affirming sup- port for all families is not good. Yet, challenging the embedded biases welfare policy discourse therefore remains an important part of attempts of achieving a more equitable, pluralistic and democratic welfare state.

Last printed

147614187.doc

Dartmouth 2K9

5. No impact: there was no impact in the 1nc. 6. Biopower exists now, none of their impacts are happening. All attemps to reject biopower have empirically failed. 7. Turn: aff solves for biopower- currently people are being deported without any legal defense- the aff provides legal counsel which solves for biopower. 8. perm do both: Must combine critical change with institutional policy otherwise alt gets co-opted Frank Munger 3 Professor of Law @ NY Law School Poverty, Welfare, and the Affirmative State Law & Society Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 Sep., 2003, pp. 659-686. Jstor.
I understand these books not only as responses to the evolving welfare state but as attempts to push forward our vision of what might follow. Here the authors part company. Katz suggests that contemporary welfare reform violates a consensus about the welfare state's commitments and suggests broadly that limiting citizenship to labor market values will ultimately prove unsatisfying to Americans. O'Connor calls for reforming poverty knowledge to persuade policy makers (and the public) of the value of a more redistributive welfare state. Neither describes how a new

affirma- tive state might be constructed, and they have strong feelings of nostalgia for a vision previously possessed but now lost. Yet their histories should make us skeptical of any promises made by the present welfare state. Without some new alignment of political or institutional forces, what will change the patterns in which welfare serves those who control the labor market and poverty knowledge is trapped in its own cycle of dependency on culture and politics?
Does Gilliom's discovery of a potential political voice among welfare recipients offer another direction for the poverty research that might contribute to democratic change and a new way of "seeing" poverty? The state's current policies "see" a dependent welfare recipient as a potential moral threat to the community -threatening illegitimate redistribution of taxpayers' property. Munger 685 Gilliom spoke with the recipients, who viewed themselves in a different way. Recipients understood that their capacity to care for their families, work, and lead a fully human life was closely related to their interdependency the support they received from and gave to others. Gilliom suggests that changing the state's disciplinary practices for welfare recipients will come about only as consciousness of resistance and new ways of seeing interdependence prevail. On a wider scale, he says, struggle takes place in particular episodes, "in local languages within our political culture" (117). More Americans would join this conversation of resistance and concern if they could use their own language and not be limited to "normal" politics. Only then will the state respond by changing the language, and policies, that discipline its beneficiaries. The mainspring of this movement, as Gilliom suggests, is the reality that increasingly effective administrative control is reducing the autonomy of individuals, such as poor women, who perform essential care work with (or without) the state's help. The politics that he envisions that might be capable of reversing this trend constitutes a new domain of public discourse, one that can vie with rights in our national culture and restore a balance of power to oppressed citizens seeking greater space for nurturing and necessary relationships in their particular circumstances. But the landscapes of local resistance and emergent national politics that will achieve this goal, and the means by which it might coalesce from the daily experiences of typical Americans, are left entirely uncharted. Gilliom's narrators only take us to the threshold of this new political landscape. They cannot describe its contours or its ecology-where poor women's resistance will converge with other local languages of resistance. The question that lies ahead is how we can transform moral politics in the welfare state by democratizing our understanding of interdependency and thereby creating a more inclusive discourse about need.

9. Perm: do plan and criticize the discourse employed. Internal resistance solves democratically contextualized biopolitics is a positive means of producing progressive social change and is vital to efforts to solve biopower their perm answers ignore the fluid nature of biopower.
Last printed

147614187.doc

Dartmouth 2K9

Dickinson, History Prof. @ U-Cincy with a PHD from Berkely, 2004 p. online Edward Ross, Central European History vol. 37 no. 1 )
Second, I would argue that there is also a causal fit between cultures of expertise, or scientism, and democracy. Of course, scientism subverted the real, historical ideological underpinnings of authoritarian polities in Europe in the nineteenth century. It also in a sense replaced them. Democratic citizens have the freedom to ask why ; and in a democratic system there is therefore a bias toward pragmatic, objective or naturalized answers since values are often regarded as matters of opinion, with which any citizen has a right to differ. Scientific fact is democracys substitute for revealed truth, expertise its substitute for authority. The age of democracy is the age of professionalization, of

technocracy; there is a deeper connection between the two, this is not merely a matter of historical coincidence. Third, the vulnerability of explicitly moral values in democratic societies creates a problem of legitimation.
Of course there are moral values that all democratic societies must in some degree uphold (individual autonomy and freedom, human dignity, fairness, the rule of law), and those values are part of their strength. But as peoples states, democratic social and political orders are also implicitly and often explicitly expected to do something positive and tangible to enhance the well-being of their citizens . One of those things, of course, is simply to provide a rising standard of living ; and the visible and astonishing success of that project has been crucial to all Western democracies since 1945. Another is the provision of a rising standard of health; and here again, the democratic welfare state has delivered the goods in concrete, measurable, and extraordinary ways. In this sense, it may not be so simpleminded , after all, to insist on considering the fact that modern biopolitics has worked phenomenally well. Fourth, it was

precisely the democratizing dynamic of modern societies that made the question of the quality of the mass of the population seem and not only in the eyes of the dominant classes increasingly important . Again, in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the expected level of the average citizens active participation in European political, social, cultural, and economic life rose steadily, as did the expected level of her effective influence in all these spheres . This made it a matter of increasing
importance whether the average person was more or less educated and informed, more or less moral and selfdisciplined,more or less healthy and physically capable,more or less socially competent. And modern social reform biopolitics defined very broadlyseemed to offer the possibility of creating the human foundation for a society ordered by autonomous participation , rather than by obedience. This too was part of the
Machbarkeitswahn of modernity; but this was potentially a democratic Wahn, not only an authoritarian one. Fifth, historically there has been a clear connection between the concept of political citizenship and the idea of moral autonomy. The political subject (or citizen as opposed to the political subject,who is an object of state action) is also a moral subject. The citizens capacity for moral reasoning is the legitimating postulate of all democratic politics. The regulation of sexual and reproductive life has long been understood in European societies to be among the most fundamental issues of morality. There is, therefore, a connection between political citizenship on the one hand, and the sexual and reproductive autonomy implied in the individual control that is a central element of the modern biopolitical complex, on the other. The association in the minds of conservatives in the late imperial period between democracy and declining fertility was not a panicky delusion; panicky it certainly was, but it was also a genuine insight into a deeper ideological connection.113 Perhaps it should not be surprising, therefore, that the first great homeland of eugenic legislation was the United States the first great homeland of modern democracy. In fact the United States served both as a kind of promised land for racial and eugenic progressives in Germany, and as a worst-case scenario of regression into barbarism for those opposed to coercive eugenic measures. 114 Nor should it be surprising that, apart from Nazi Germany, the other great land of eugenic sterilization in Europe in the 1930s was Scandinavia, where democratic governments heavily influenced by social democratic parties were busily constructing the most ambitious and extensive welfare states in the world.115 The lesson is not that modern democracy is dangerous or destructive, much less that it is crypto-fascist that, as Jacques Donzelot put it, the 1930s was the age of social fascism and our own age that of social sector fascism. 116 The relevant message is, rather, that it is time to place the less familiar history of modern democratic biopolitics alongside the more familiar history of modern totalitarian biopolitics. The dream of perfectibility Machbarkeitswahn

modernity. But social engineering, the management of society, can be organized in different ways. Historically, totalitarian biopolitics was a self-destructive failure . Democratic biopolitics has, in contrast, been not in any moral sense, but politically a howling success. For the historian interested in
is central to

modernity, that story is no less interesting or important than the story of the implosion of the Nazi racial state."

10. alt does not solve No audience for an alternative shift in perspective Frank Munger 3 Professor of Law @ NY Law School Poverty, Welfare, and the Affirmative State Law & Society Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 Sep., 2003, pp. 659-686. Jstor.

Last printed

147614187.doc

Dartmouth 2K9

First, O'Connor

underestimates the strength of institutional constraints on academic research, including professional standards for merit and criteria for government or foundation funding. 682 Poverty, Welfare, and
the Affirmative State Embedded in this culture herself, O'Connor wants research to maintain its integrity-to be "true" as well as politically effective. She accuses conservative think tanks of worrying only about the latter. How such

effectiveness may be matched while avoiding simplistic, or worse, propagandistic research is a serious challenge. A massive reorientation is required, not an occasional book or article with an alternative perspective (books by Galbraith or Reisman notwithstanding).12 Unless these institutional factors are neutralized, there will be no research equal in heft to the privately funded, ideologically guided work product of conservative think tanks. Second, a call for research that focuses on changing institutions rather than changing individuals ignores the problems inherent in choosing a perspective. Such research requires selecting a model of political economy in which to frame new questions-and there are many such models, especially among
progressive scholars. Like- wise, her third point, calling for more ethnographic research, ignores long-standing disagreement about underlying principles of research that distinguish positivism from interpretivism, among other axes of disagreement. That such perspectives can be complementary will get no argument from me, but this view is not widely shared. Third, O'Connor's history concerns a discourse about poverty shared among elite academics and policy makers. This elite discourse derives some of its content from the culture at large, and in turn, the scholars' views have had some impact on politics and popular discourse, although not always the desired one. But these exchanges between elite and popular discourses do not mean that these audiences interpret values, ideas, or experiences in the same way. To answer O'Connor's call for research on the construction and legitimacy of moral values at play in poverty policy, researchers must confront the meaning (or meanings) of "work ethic" or "responsibility" in the popular culture and in specific contexts. How will they approach such challenging research, and who will be their audience? While such cultural self-examination may be morally and ethically appropriate, we have few examples of social scientists making headway in such a mission. I am particularly drawn to the idea that public discourse on poverty can be reframed to make members of the public more thoughtful about the meaning of poverty and dependency. But poverty researchers cannot easily persuade the public to deconstruct such values using the traditional tools and concepts of academic research.

11. There are good and bad instances of biopower- make them prove that we are a bad instance. 12. Even if we are biopolitical we are a good form of biopower- giving people a civil right to counsel is good- solves for the prioritization of people based on status. 13. There is functionally no alternative to biopower- they cannot defend any positive action that happens post alternative implementation. 14. Turn - Foucaultian power relations denies agency, precluding progressive social change. Sangren, P. March 18th, 1999.
[Department of Anthropology at Cornell University. Power Against Ideology: A Critique of Foucaultian Usage. Jstor] I develop my critique in part by comparing Foucaultian conceptions of power with some Chinese notions of power, arguing that both are categories that represent the relations between producers and their productions in alienated form; in other words, both are ideological representations that deny to real social actors the productive power that constitutes social life. In the Chinese case, this productive, socially ordering power is attributed to supernatural entities or, more abstractly, to metaphysical categories such as ch'i or tao. In Foucault's case, this productive power is similarly attributed to a metaphysically conceived power itself (or, in some of his writings, to discourses). In both cases, social collectivities or real individuals are represented as objects of power; they are denied effective or authentic intention-in a word, agency. In short, I argue that Foucault's invocation of power as an explanatory principle in social analysis , despite its currency in academic discourse,

Last printed

147614187.doc

Dartmouth 2K9

is logically profoundly flawed. His own explicit denials and those of his disciples notwithstanding, Foucaultian power assumes demiurgic, demonic properties (some-times named "the state") that diminish the coherence of otherwise valuable academic explorations of the operations of power in social processes .4 I am
convinced that the issues surrounding power have implications beyond academic refinements of an analytical construct; I shall argue that embedded in Foucault's writings is an aggressive polemic against critical use of ideology in social analysis and that academic usage of Foucaultian power registers an ideological and alienating representation of the nature of social life. 15. Foucauldian

criticism is flawed - it obscures genuine analysis and denies all progressive social action.

Sangren, P. March 18th, 1999.

[Department of Anthropology at Cornell University. Power Against Ideology: A Critique of Foucaultian Usage. Jstor] It is Foucault's explicit disarticulation of power from subjectivity or agency that arguably most defines the novelty of his usage, and it is this element of his thinking that is most widely emulated by other scholars. Against Foucault's reifying, transcendental notion of power - a notion in which intentional action is incidental to power - I argue that power can be

employed coherently as an analytical category only when it is linkable to some socially constituted agent - that is, to a person or to a socially constituted collectivity. This is not to say that actors or agents are possessed of
complete knowledge of how their own desires and motives are also products of complex social circumstances or of how their actions have effects that exceed intentions.8 As Foucault frequently emphasizes, people, selves, the subjects are in part products of historically and locationally specific circumstances, cultures, discourses. However, denying agency - that is, power to actors, viewing people even at the level of their desires primarily as products and only trivially, if at all, as producers, is not only fatalistic , it significantly misrecognizes the realities of social life.9 In comparing "Chinese" notions of power (or, more precisely, some notions of power produced by Chinese culture) with Foucault's, my intention is to draw attention to similarities in their alienating properties. I suggest that in the Foucaultian categories of power and its ineluctable other, resistance, one can perceive remarkable affinities to Chinese contrastive oppositions such as yang (a metaphysically conceived representation of ordering) and yin (yang's disordering, resistant alter). Far from providing the kind of critical insights that Foucault would claim,

Foucaultian power and resistance obstruct genuine critical analysis and constitute elements of a romantic ideology whose "effects of truth" are most socially manifest in providing an avantgardist intelligentsia an ideology that dissociates its "theory" from its own individual and class interests - and, paradoxically, all this in the name of reflexivity and high-minded political virtue . This representative dissociation of power from intention in Foucault is also apparent in Chinese ideologies of power. Such dissociations-forms of alienation-are defining characteristics of ideology's operations in social processes. 16. Democracy checks negative forms of biopolitics and allows for constructive implementation of biopolitical strategies that are neither dangerous nor violent; the permutation solves the impacts both ways. Dickinson, History Prof. @ U-Cincy with a PHD from Berkely, 20 04 p. online Edward Ross, Central European History vol. 37 no.
1) "In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucaults ideas have fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its microphysics.48 The broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus on technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science was the focus of his interest.49 But the powerproducing effects in Foucaults microphysical sense (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure , one that could realize the

Last printed

147614187.doc

Dartmouth 2K9

disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them . In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the vlkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state."

Last printed