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e_ :
NASA
Technical
Memorandum
4628
Recommended Maintainability
A Continuous Maintainability
Techniques
for Effective
of the NASA
Reliability
and
December
1994
(NASA-TM-4628) RECOMMENOEO TECHNIQUES FOR EFFECTIVE MAINTAINABILITY. A CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE OF THE RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY STEERING
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N95-31530
Unclas
COMMITTEE
(NASA)
0060399
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PREFACE
Current success
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and future
NASA
of mission system of or
of technical
Although
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compromising
of systems throughout
Maintainability
n
is a process
for assuring
to
operation following a failure. and/or on-orbit maintenance. undertaken provide schedule program, a continuous a path toward benefits. operational
It is an essential consideration for any program requiring ground TheiOffice of S_._ty"and Mission Assurance (OSMA) has initiative life cycle to develop a technical roadmap while almost that will cost and result from in the desired degree costs of maintainability are a characteristic system availability realizing always
Although
and improved
__ w
a properlY administered maintainability programs has demonstrated the value the program life cycle. provides within guidance NASA.
of the life cycle Department evaluation is consistent of be may with technical methods of the techniques should
It has been
experience.
imposed represent
resides
and will require each applicable the information Product Team design success should Also,
applicability
w
OSMA systems
policy,
knowledge resulting
cost effectiveness
and programmatic
w
D. Gregory Administrator
for
and Mission
Assurance
DEVELOPING The development Maintainability from NASA provide NASA operating technique CENTER Appreciation individuals
ACTIVITY
U
memorandum Committee,
overseen of senior
Reliability
and
Headquarters
NASA
recommendations community,
improvement
"advice"
maintainable systems from the participating Centers and the Committee. Each presented in this memorandum has been reviewed and approved by the Committee. CONTACTS is expressed in the preparation for the dedication, of thismanual. time, and technical Without the support contributions of the following Centers,
of their individual
and their enthusiastic personal c-bmmittee, the capture oftlie possible. All of the NASA The Committee maintainability Centers members techniques.
to serve on the NASA R&M Steering _ofi/a_ned in this manual would not be
R
to participate
may be contacted
Mr. Leon Migdalski John F. Kennedy Space Center RT-SRD-2 KSC HQS 3548 Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899
B I
Center,
Mr. Vincent Lewis 21000 MS 501-4 Cleveland, Mr. Malcolm Lyndon Bldg. Houston,
NASA
Headquarters SW
Code
QS
g
DC 20546
B. Johnson Texas
45 RM 618A,
77058
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TABLE SECTION
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I. INTRODUCTION A. B. C. II.
Purpose .......................................................... Control/Contributions ............................................... Maintainability Technique TECHNIQUES Format FOR Summary EFFECTIVE
RECOMMENDED Management
Program
22 w
PM-I : The Benefits of Implementing Maqntainability on NASA PM-2 : Maintainability Program Management Considerations PM-3: Maintenance and Engineering : Selection Handling False of Robotically Mechanisms Mitigation Compatible Fasteners .................................... ................................... and Concept for Space Systems .......................
Programs .............
....
Factors DFE-I
DFE-2 DFE-8
Alarm
Neutral
Buoyancy Time
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Maintenance
............
A T-2: Mean
To Repair
Predictions
............................. Model
Prediction and Analysis ........................... Cost, and Resource Allocation (ACARA) Maintenance Failure Requirements Detection ......................... Using an Average
Engine
Technique Design
.............................
Robotic Removal and Application of SRB Thermal GHe Purging of H 2 Systems ............................... Programmable Logic Controller ...........................
III
TABLE SECTION: Operations Technique Technique Technique Technique Technique Technique m. and Operational OPS-6: OPS-7: OPS-8: DC Drive Design - Solid
OF CONTENTS
IBm
(cont.) ............................ ..................... Loading .... OPS-24 OPS-28 OPS-32 OPS-36 OPS-39 OPS-42
Systems-Dome Loaded Pressure Regulator Automatic Power Source Switching Device System Contamination TECHNIQUES Protection FOR
.................
m m
APPENDIX FUTURE
CANDIDATE
DEVELOPMENT
............................................
A-1
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INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE is a process a failure. and for assuring Designing support the ease and by which a system within rather can be restored maintainable In addition, projects. consider and requirements could result when to systems NASA
A.
Maintainability operation
f
operating a necessity
(both cannot
on-orbit
budgets,
up front
cycle costs
relaxation
increase Although
overall each
requirement.
W
Restoring Conducting
ground
and flight based) maintenance the NASA operations mission utilizing aging equipment
to support
management analysis
techniques;
applicable
maintenance
from NASA
maintenance
simulations). This document is a valuable resource for continuous improvement ideas in executing the systems development process in accordance with the NASA "better, faster, smaller,
w
and cheaper"
goal without
compromising
mission
safety.
B.
L .
CONTROL/CONTRIBU_ONS will be revised periodically to add-new techniques or revisions to the existing on should be in this
technical
data becomes
available.
project/program
experience
for inclusionin
this manual
Submissions should be fo _n-nattedid_entical!y to the techniques 1) and sent to the address below for consideration. and Space Administration
DC 20546
Organizations submitting techniques that are selected for inclusion in this manual will be recognized on the lower portion of the first page of the published item. Contacts listed earlier in this document should be used for assistance. If additional information on any technique is desired, the contacts listed earlier in this document can be utilized for assistance. C. MAINTAINABILITY TECHNIQUE FORMAT SUMMARY
The maintainability techniques included in this manual are Center-specific descriptions of processes that contribute to maintainability design, test, analysis and/or operations. Each technique follows a specific format so users can easily extract necessary information. The first page of each technique is a summary of the information contained, and the rest of the technique contains the specific detail of the process. Figure 1 shows the baseline format that has been used to develop each technique.
=_
IB
TECHNIQUE FORMAT
Techniaue: A brief statement defining the design technique and how it is used. andor impact on resource expenditure
Benefits: A concise statement of the technical realized from implementing the technique.
improvement
Key Words: Any term that captures the theme of the technique Utilized for document search purposes. Application Experience: and/or industry. Technical Rationale: Identifiable programs
or provides
insight
within NASA
BB
Contact Center:
Source of additional
Techniaue Description: A technical discussion that is intended to give the details of the process. information should be sufficient to understand how the technique should be implemented. References: Publications that contain additional information about the technique.
'* Each technique within a section is identified using one of the following acronyms 'ollowed by the associated sequential technique number. PM: Program Management DFE: Design Factors and Engineering AT: Analysis and Test OPS: Operations and Operational Design Considerations
Figure 1: Technique
Format Definitions
vi
! I
Program
w
Management
success is the development limited resources. for rapid of systems Early that are reliable definition of both with today's
and mission
and maintain
and software
requirements
that provide
the capability
restoration
occur is essential.
w
program
may require
The techniques
included
an understanding program
of all information
success
and lower
overall
Each
high-level application.
information
subject,
or expanded
Page PM- 1
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II
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II
The Benefits
of Impleraenting
Maintainability
on NASA
Programs, Technique
Page PM-I
Technique
Programmatic provisions for ease of maintenance greatly enhance hardware and software system operational effectiveness for both inspace and ground support systems.
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Benefits
Implementation increasing
of maintainability availability
operational
Provisions for system maintainability also yields long term benefits include decreased maintenance times, less wear and tear on project personnel, and extended useful life of ground and in-space assets.
Key
Words
System maintainability, program management, lifecycle availability, concept development, human factors
costs,
Application Experience
_5
Space Space
Station
Program,
Hubble
Space
Telescope,
SRB's,
Acceleration
Measurement
System,
and others.
Technical Rationale
requirements
ground
maintenance
and anomaly
to properly increased
_z_r r _
up-front
maintainability
problems
of the system,
and reduce
Contact
Center
All
NASA
Field
Installations
..
Page PM-2
The Benefits
of Implementing
Maintainability
Maintainability
environment
under
which
maintenance
is:
II
performed. Applying maintainability principles will enhance the systems readiness/availability through testability, factors such as visibility, accessibility, of
ill i
simplicity,
and interchangeability
Over the years, NASA has =successfully launched manned spacecraft to the moon, unmanned probes into the outer the sc' system, and developed space zems for earth orbitable reaches_f reusable missions.
sent -
the Systems being maintained. Using maintainability prediction techniques and other = qu_titativ e m_n_tainability analyses can greatly enhance the confidence in operational capabilities of a design. These predictions can also ai___d !n des!gn whe_sex, considered. schedule program dec!sions_an_d options savings [fade studies _ of the erfil-design impacts are being and fewer phase of support
l I
NASA alS _performs v_uable atmos.pheric research and development of ground systems, all of which contain complex hardware and : ,ftware that must be maintained during all :_ases of operafior[s environments. shrinking becoming budgets, an-d-in multiple in this age of more with less is theme. doing However,
i
g
maintenance
time, minimization
the overall
programmatic
equipment, and increased system availability. Another benefit is a decrease in management overhead including planning later on in the life cycle maintainability and development. TIC BENEFITS planning maintenance/logistics as a result as a full concept of
NASA space flight programs are being driven towards more automated, compact designs in which fewer support resources _e _nefits will be This of ...... available technique principles programs, scenario. than in past programs. will outline well-defined regardless Emphasis
par-trier in early
implementing
PROGRAMMA
ii
of maintainability is placed
of the operational
Maintainability Program Implementation Project management is responsible for implementing development effective maintainability on a program via of specific requirements for cost maintenance in the early phases of
m
I
why a maintainability program can enhance the effectiveness of a system and its overall operation. maintainability systems provides It must be noted, of unmanned a different however, deep space that
system
set of challenges.
maintainability design on life cycle costs are used to evaluate the balance between cost of designing to minim!ze the associated increase resulting a times. savings Usually, realized maintenance times and m system availability in maintenance cost of designingportion of =
Mal tainabilitY is defined inNASAHandbook 53(_).4(1E), "Maintainability Program Requirements for Space Systems," as: "A measure of the e a_ system or equipment operational consistent and rapiditY with which can be restored to
,= .
of Major Systems and Projects." It is a characteristic of equipment and installation, personnel availability inthe_qu_ed s_.kiH levels, adequacy of maintenance procedures and test equipment, and the physical Page ....
M
w
Several
programs
have
opted
to accept
the
[HI
D
short-term cost savings by deleting = _ maintainability requirements in the design phase, PM-3 but the associated increase in
The Benefits
of Implementing
Maintainability
on NASA
Programs, Technique
Page PM-1
maintenance during
f
costs incurred have been of this is the Space had deleted automated money. was to manpower FDIR, but when positive were ORU significant the cost center based Another Telescope where fault (FDIR),
operations Program,
the alternative
L w
for ground
this presented
a significant
cost increase
over the life cycle. is the Hubble Maintainability early planning saved on-orbit Figure between Space
in design
repairs introducing
became maintainability
necessary. tradeoffs
w
1 accentuates
concepts
into a program
which they are introduced. These tradeoffs can mean the difference between a successful maintainability effective one. The NASA
r--
program
and a costly,
less
Figure
1: Effect
Maintainability engineering process for MaintenanceLogistics Development concepts must include of the design. on a program the basis system for a program
systems
should require that the system be designed ease of maintenance within it's specified operating environment(s), personnel maintainability and should (design experts) and ensure that the proper
Concept early
of the maintenance the maintainability The maintenance and support it is operational. once
Z ,
operations
and funds
are committed
L
to development
of the process
to achieve maximum program benefit. Program schedule will be affected by lack of system maintainability because necessary ground support will increase, maintenance times will be higher, necessary maintenance actions will increase, EVA will be at a premium, and system availability will be lower. Table 1 highlights key program benefits.
L,
program, which will determine of spares and tools necessary The use of other logistic tools and test equipment, parts, will be optimized maintainability planning element. Derivation solidifies the life cycle
resources, facilities
_=_
of these plans
Y_
Page PM-4
H
The Benefits
of Implementing
Maintainability
Table
1: Maintainability Benefits
Programmatic
Testability Testability system replaceable is a measure component(s). of the ability to detect them at the lowest with The speed faults and to isolate
Enhanced System Readiness/Availability - Reduced Downtime - Supportable Systems - Ease of Troubleshooting and Repair
which faults are diagnosed downtime and maintenance deficiencies in Space Shuttle
System Growth Opportunities - Hardware/Software Modifications - Interchangeability - Modular Designs - Decreased Storage Considerations Reduced Maintenance Manpower Reduced Operational Costs Compatibility with other Programs Reduced Management Overhead
design have caused launch delays, translate to higher program costs. technology capability automatic substantially maintenance maintenance replacement systems systems, advances diagnostics reduces personnel costs of non-faulty referred continue and complexity
which As
i
to increase of FDIR
the
n
of systems,
use of
II
as a means
trained
of the program, thus allowing for integrated design and support planning development. MAINTAINABILITY Visibility Visibility design is an element of maintainability maintainer that provides the system DESIGN BENEFITS
equipment.
include
both internal
to as built-in-test (BITE),
II
II
to as automatic
to a system component for action(s). Even short duration space shuttle orbiter downtime inspection can increase greatly
support system, all of which will minimize down-time and cost over the operational life cycle. Simplicity System simplicity relates to the number of subsystems that are within the system, the number of parts in a system, and whether the parts are standard or special purpose. System simplification reduces spares investment, enhances the effectiveness of maintenance troubleshooting, and reduces the overall cost of the system while increasing the reliability. For example, program the International has simplified Space the design Station and Alpha
i
m
such as NASA
if the component
is blocked
Designing for visibility maintenance times. Accessibility Accessibility be accessed greatly impact
inherent in the design, especially on systems where on-orbit maintenance will be required. When accessibility is poor, other failures are often caused by removal/disconnection incorrect re-installation of other items hamper provide system access, Causing rework. of all replaceable, maintainer. maintainable and that
potentially increased of the space station, operational Command which space problems with the Freedom is the data station. different
the on-orbit maintainability thus avoiding many that might have flown is the Programl One example Subsystem, backbone processing for the consisted units,
L_ g
savings
the system
The Benefits
z
of lmplementing
Maintainability
on NASA
Programs, Technique
Page PM-1
central standards.
units,
However, development
early
anthrop0metriee0nsiderations. evaluations
leads to improved
largely in the areas of system provisions for equipment access, arrangement, assembly, storage, benefits improved and maintenance of the evaluation lower supportability task procedures. The include less time to costs, and improved systems,
Maintainability
effect repairs, can also be a direct Maintenance and Summary Implementation design in quantities safety.
maintenance
result requires
of design
simplification.
skill levels commensurate with the complexity of the maintenance characteristics of the system.
LJ
features systems.
in a The
can bring
cost savings
system thus
can be
of designing system for ease and reduction and can save a Hubble and exposure by in the programs Remote Space micro-
the availability
are numerous,
Interchangeability Interchangeability component without refers to a component's for ability to be replaced with a similar a requirement
gravity
can be achieved
procedures maintenance
reduces
been those
included
t_
Interchangeability
allows for system growth with minimum associated costs, due to the use of standard common end-items.
r
and contingency
planning
essential to assuring mission success where manned intervention is either undesireable or impractical.
Factors factors design requirements proper factors also design discipline features or and to design in be applied structure to ensure
References 1. NASA Space Handbook "March 5300.4(1E) Requirements 10, 1987, NASA for
and equipment
Program
an efficient
workspace
Handbook
7120.5,
"Management "November
of 1993,
and represented
Systems
and Projects,
Headquarters
evaluation
The Benefits
of Implementing
Maintainability
Design
Handbook
1-9 Electronic
(for Ground
"Maintainability
Cost of Maintainability," Revision II, January 1975, Rome Air Development Center. 5. Reliability, Maintainability, and
Supportability (RMS) Guidebook, Second Edition, 1992, Society of Automotive Engineers G- 11 International Committee. 6. MIL-STD-470B Program for Systems 30, 1989, Department RMS
aim
i
m i.al I
Page PM-7
ilI
Technique
T
Identify program management considerations necessary when implementing maintainability principles for NASA spaceflight, atmospheric, or ground support programs.
_::.
=======================
_J
ilMil:li,!ii:i
LJ
.::
Benefits
Early and effective planning and implementation of a maintainability program can significantly lower the risk of reduced system operational effectiveness resulting from maintainability design shortfalls. This reduces maintenance time/support, which directly relates to reduced operating costs and increased system operational time.
KeyWords
Support,
Application Experience
Technical Rationale
Decisions by program management to establish maintainability requirements early in the program will provide design impetus towards a system with higher operational availability at lower operational costs Lower downtime and less complicated maintenance actions will be needed when maintenance is required.
Contact
Center
NASA
Headquarters
__
Page PM-8
Maintainabili_F
Program
Management
Considerations, Technique
Page PM-2
Program
Management
PROGRAM
Z g
outlines to observe
the at
g
on how
PM- 1, "Benefits
guidelines
maintainability program been understood. Program establishing maintainability and ensuring application throughout 1 provides development Maintainability management proper early adequate
the benefits
for
of the maintainability discipline the development program. Figure flow diagram program of its goals for an effective beginning with
Program
II
reflect
(mission)
of the on if the of to do
and objectives,
followed by development of the program/system maintenance concept and the Mainta[nability Program control these Plan, and establishment during and operations. development of program design, elements production is The order and evaluation program
of the program
system to operate whenever called upon so) is very important, _and maximum availability Program should maintainability goals
as each affects
(1) ESTABLISH MAINTAINABILITY PART OF THE OVERALL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND PLANNING PROCESS. Set Goals and Objectives of the maintainability is to measure or restored designed OPERA TION
mindi hqwever, careful considerationo must also be given to the technical-and operational goals of the program. These qualitative by analyzing goals the
D w
and objectives
are developed
system oPerating cycle, the physical maintenance support environments, equipment mission Attention of support duplication characteristics and cost objectives. must programs during also be given to avoid development consistent
H
J
the ability of an item to to a specified into a system condition should to existing needless of new
H
maintenance
is performed.
The degree
Im
Page PM-9
H
Maintainability
Program
Management
Considerations, Technique
Page PM-2
support derivation
systems.
Development goals
repair
policies,
resources at
to
and objectives
level of maintainability life-cycle and feedback engineering and operational 2. personnel in the product and provide techniques management's and support paths
maintainability in Figure
Establish Interfaces Disciplines Maintainability engineering analysis of safety, costing discipline reliability,
must
be to
engineering
through
it is program between
responsibility
to develop
of system of interface
maintainability
and the of a
engineering
disciplines.
the combination
of design features,
is key to establishment
F_
Test& Evaluation
I I
Design Feedback
Figure
w
2:
System
Reliability,
Maintainability Page
and Support
Relationships
(typical)
PM- 10
Maintainability
Program
Management
Considerations, Technique
Page PM-2
engineering Program
process. Plan.
These in the
_ in that
must be mirrored
contributors
to system
(2) DEVELOP MAINTENANCE LOGISTICS CONCEPTS EARL CONCEPTUAL PROGRAM.. The program basis design contains policy. It defines and depot repair replacement, philosophy, concepts, responsibilities, responsibilities, maintenance these maintenance maintainability as mission reliability constraints, maintenance ground successful dictate repaired elements). overall repair policy, system policy, maintenance overall concept PHASE
AND Y IN THE
OF THE
can be held to a with the that of all It is important monitor inclusion the
provides and
the
Program logistics
maintainability on maintenance
on the program,
concepts drive
early in
planning
requirements.
Assess Another
Existing important
maintenance,
of planning
for a
vs. replacement
skill level requirements, diagnostic/testing contractor payload (PM-3 concept analysis profile, maintenance maintenance
new program is assessment of the existing logistic and support infrastructure. As an example, system numerous the infrastructure at KSC comprises assembly of the NSTS=: the launch pad, buildings,
and support
and crew time allocations provides is based details Development of the on initial inputs and
for
on each of
and support personnel and equipment. These are important factors to consider when planning for new structures programs that will use KSC base. If some of the can be used will be as the central operations
such
existing
system
by the new program, and operational reduced. management During Ttie from the of
mass properties
early planning
should
program can adapt to the existing infrastructure, and what equipment personnel may be used to eliminate unnecessary costs.
technology concept,
the
Establish master
The maintainability and support concepts is a maintainability activities goals program. program program
It provides necessary-to
function &the maintenance concept. The operational environment of the system, the level of support concept, drivers personnel defined by the maintenance are important programs. and cost and schedule for the logistics/support
and resources
and objectives
of the maintainability
It must be developed with the _ contractor(s) if they exist, or if the is in-house, all developmental and
Page PM-11
l
Maintainability
Program
Management
Considerations, Technique
Page PM-2
disciplines
The
These requirements are intended as rules system designers follow to meet overall program mission, concepts. goals and objectives. environment, absolutely can include parameters. requirements They include operational unless and system early and
and must
with the systems how the office program the three Production, major
contractor/program
w
not changed
to meet requirements The requirements quantitative maintainability maintainability result system and Operations/ the following and qualitative values
of maintainability availability
allocations made
Table
and operational
module, are
or component
maintainability tasks cited in the product specification or statement of work. Interfaces other engineering,
B
between
maintainability reliability,
and safety,
Table
2. Examples
of Quantitative
project
maintenance, Identification
narrative supporting
task descriptions,
of plans for
(M'rrgS)
Fault detection and isolation of subsystems task times
task execution
w
Description
the maintainability function formal and informal design authority approval of maintainability cycle for drawing
of maintenance and can help define maintenance criticalities and reduction (3) PROVIDE UNIFORM QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENTS. Maintainability established design requirements maintenance are Program concept. necessary requirements purposes. system First, components. they address are used to accomplish
Qualitative maintainability
design features which are vital in achieving the maintainability goals, but cannot be measured. For example, elimination of of safetywire/lockwire, standardization
Page
PM- 12
Maintainability
Program
Management
Considerations, Technique
Page PM-2
fasteners, coding orbital program Examples handtools intermediate designing personnel. qualitative requirements
fasteners,
and colorused on
of these
examples success
of program experience).
programs.
IB
are used to meet customer/ and enhance of the system. of common and and
maintainability:characteristics specification
I. NASA Space
Handbook "March
Program
Z
! I
11
so that only one skill level is required level maintenance Design Handbook Edition, 1-9, Electronic Revision States 7,
g I
(for Ground
(4) EXERCISE PROGRAM E VAL UA TI ON. The maintainability part of the systems design include design program engineering
CONTROL
AND
February
Air Force
and
activities. development
Air Development
I
of methods effectiveness,
for assessing dissemination Subcontractor/ implementation 4. Reliability, Supportability Edition, 1992, Maintainability, and _S) Guidebook, 'Second Society of Automotive RMS
J
and monitoring.
in the of sound programs is and Technique PM- 1, "Benefits of ImPlementing Maintainability on NASA Programs"
development maintainability extremely contains beyond, system system guidelines depending apT.,'oach p"
ground operations,
"Maintenance
Concept
for
J
_m
life cycle
on the type
of program.
engineering
ma:ntainability engineering
Page PM- 13
m
Maintenance
Concept
for
Space
Systems, Technique
Page
PM-3
Technique
a maintenance systems
concept
early
life cycle
to
that attributes
maintenance,
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Benefits
w
Effective planning
effectiveness
of maintenance
can also provide assessments of cost savings and resources allowable at each maintenance
_
Key Words
Maintenance Maintenance
Concept,
Spares
Requirement,
Logistics
Support,
Plan, Maintainability
Requirements.
Application Experience
Space
Acceleration
Measurement
System
(SAMS),
Combustion
Module-
1 (CM- 1) Shuttle/Station
Experiment.
Technical Rationale
quantity, required
cost,
types
of spares, a space
to sustain
system
capability is a prime driver in developing maintainability for a space system at the onset of its design. A system
L
concept conceptual
should
be developed requirements
to define
the basis
for establishing in the system the practical and maintenance by applying concept. the basis The
design
provides support
in the system's
Contact
Center
Lewis Research
Center
(LeRC)
,..,
Page PM- 14
Maintenance
Maintenance Technique
Concept PM-3
for
Space
Systems
orbital ground
space
program
where
on-orbit
and
is planned.
The maintenance the program, maintenance It establishes responsibility maintenance (maintenance to maintain structuring eliafinate m: and application
concept
provides detailed
overall maintainability
design
requirements
The repair
should
consider
the 1.
to be provided
policy for the operational of maintenance for each level (echelon) and the pers0_el manning a space system. and skill levels)
summarized
Table
1. Echelons
of Maintenance
resources
Organizational Maintenance
On-orbit
Depot Maintenance
ii
NASA Center or Contractor Center Engineers and Technicians Repair and return equipment to stock inventory Repair at module, ORU, and component level
interrupt
Flight Crew
The maintenance must early conceptual minimize operational being current principles, used development Space phase.
concept design
for a new system during the to is during the phase of a program approach experiment to incorporate support Acceleration
Inspect equipment
Remove
and
Measurement System (SAMS) and Combustion Module One (CM-1) operational and repair policy, Elements This maintenance planning basis concept will aid in logistics design by providing the Organizational Organizational performed flight crew) maintenance personnel, and occupied support and will guide and identified sparing requirements.
Adjust equipment
for establishment
of maintenance
requirements in terms of tasks to be performed, frequency of maintenance, preventive and corrective numbers equipment, Inputs include: availability weight design The concept maintenance and skill levels, tools, a mission constraints, should elements repair profile, to the maintenance requirements, downtime, items, personnel test and support and information. should reliability size and concept system overall
by the using organization on its own equipment. consists skills, tools, of functions of authorized
and test equipment. are generally and use of the time available at
level personnel
Page PM- 15
Maintenance
Concept
for
Space
Systems, Technique
Page PM-3
this level is restricted equipment equipment, removal modules referred forwarded performance. front
to periodic Cleaning
checks of
of
any on-orbit
repair
actions identified
are planned,
they
should be clearly
in the concept.
At the organizational level, failed items should be either discarded or sent to the NASA policies limited at plug-in Center or contractor for exchange and repair requirements. in accordance Corrective should with repair/discard maintenance, of faulty ORUs period. to have and to be Prime ready be specified
are removed
to the Depot
identified
in the system
Depot Maintenance Depot maintenance is maintenance performed NASA Centers or contractor facilities for completely equipment maintenance tasks to repair overhauling actions. faulty provides and rebuilding highly The support equipment the complex as well as to perform
for maintenance.
Quick-opening
includes
also be specified.
to the part of Replacement for proper should level of ORU compatible within failure the same consider parts ranking standards and also The design definition rates ORU.
the necessary
reliability (Ao) is defined as the point in time, the It is a function active time, contribute replacement
and maintainability criticality toward definitions. should and ORU the proper
Availability
and mission
is operable,
time, waiting
Maintenance and support of a system should involve two-tier maintenance echelons. The first level provides for repair select modules of the end-item faulty or diagnostic on-orbit by replacing plug-in through
(1)
and ORUs
use of specified
Where:
Faulty ORUs should then be to the second level of the echelon (depot Center level), for repair which if NASA for
UPTIME operable
= the total time a system state, and = the combination in which downtime spends
is in an
The particular
should items.
repair
Requirements should be designed to aid on-orbit and design not be required maintenance, a system. inspection,
Special
skills should
or 0RUs.
to maintain
The following
Page PM- 16
Maintenance
features Plug-in
should be incorporated: module special and 0RU tools, design to minimize for
Custom-made Long-lead
components/parts
time items of spares required availability according for each to sustain on-orbit to the the
modules
and ORUs
should
be by removal
for corrective
maintenance
and replacement. Plug-in preventive with respect module and 0RU designs maintenance requiring hours,
Items that have high failure rate Items that have limited life In the initial spares to the maximum should be purchased the layers early provisioning practical, directly period spares and
maintenance
should
be optimized extent
hardware
should with
i.e., lowest-tier
so that software revisions/ can be easily installed on-orbit skill level requirements. training for payload identify hands-on center training, at the NASA flight
of support
at
I
The initial provisioning of operation, experience of spares. shelf life should be acquired quantities Spares
should
the system
is built, to familiarize with limited and should that adequate when shelf lives should be
U
Spares support
Philosophy of spares should be required to a maintainable system: spares. development Development and and spares system test
needed.
be removed
spares and operational spares are those acquired activities, production. operations The quantity sustain to support integration,
Procurement of spares should be initiated sufficient advance of need to account for procurement production lead time (administrative lead time). and
in
check-out on-going
Operational on-orbit.
The location of the spares inventory (onorbit and on-ground) should be a function spares required quantities during to the the on-orbit stowage allocation capabilities
of
the required
and requirements. A volume/weight analysis should be conducted to determine the quantity to sustain availability. and types of spare items necessary satisfactoryoperationai The volume/weight analysis shall
planned test activities, integration, assembly, and check'out test should be determined according to the following:
Page PM- 17
Maintenance
Concept
for
Space
Systems, Technique
Page PM-3
payload
volume
and
to be functionally,
mechanically,
electrically, as practical
or available
on-board
and electronically as independent to facilitate maintenance. The concept operating/testing problems various types should also describe
be addressed
during
initial
techniques of items
in accordance
with NMI
and consider
is the spares from the original prime proves contractor, most costlist should and technical or
and associated (for all software, The techniques problems. safety concept.
source,
item requirement
In all cases
of fault
simulation, damage
the to
be maintained
by procurement
of personnel
in the that a
determining
Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis should be used to evaluate and determine to fault simulation. maintenance monitored, Preparation Functional Diagnostic isolate Repair replace, access Clean, time: adjust, Some of the fundamental are as follows: time actions to be evaluated,
The system
detect, isolate and support the display of failures to the plug-in module level. Crew observations may be used as a method visual general should checkout, of items. for lighting, of failure detection of the following: displays, speakers.
and recorded
keyboards/buttons, System
L :
design
provide repairable
fault detection,
gain access,
remove
to the on-orbit
and close
lubricate,
Manual override and/or inhibit capability all automatic control functions should be provided
[_
check-out for
of the repair
action
and to simplify
checkout
and enunciated
maintenance of purchased Such assurance is achieved the following: of subcontractors of demonstrated a maintainable product. from the capability to
sharp corners/edges and be equipped areas for safe maintenance activities. Systems/subsystems/items should
with grasp
be designed
Page PM- 18
Maintenance
Concept
for
Space
Systems, Technique
Page PM-3
Development of
specifications subcontractor-produced Development requirements Close (both minimize facilitate interface
adequate
ground processing
or maintenance
operations. The rationale for supporting these recommendations should include factors such as reduction in ground support
l m
maintainability
turnaround
COSTS.
II technical Allocation Action: identified complexity, requirements. of Crew Time for _: _ in accordance reliability, Maintenance
m
in design early
should
be of the exist
II
items to the system Continuous that each maintainability and assessment is implementing effectively. Maintenance responsible for or repair for maintenance identification in accordance to assure his subcontractor
and mission
Analytical
which can be used to prioritize and allocate crew time for maintenance actions.
Responsibilities for Payload Director of field installations launch activities planning necessary preparation, should be responsible
RefeYencg$
|
Instruction, NMI Spare Policy, Office: 5900.1A, DC, II
maintenance,
1. NASA NASA
Management
and for providing to support related requirements. include: a system problems activities
the resources
HM/Procurement
of maintenance with system responsibilities Implementing track, and status maintenance characteristics Providing collection quantitative estimates. identify growth
Maintainability that will identify, related to routine to the design and sofcware. Policy, Office: Quality, 1991. NMI Q/Office
and Mission
attributable
Washington,
DC, September
for use in a data the accuracy and availability can be used to reliability and to from ground design of
Handbook, Requirements
mi
system
to improve
5300.4(1E),
Reliability,
failure
influencing learned"
Washington,
characteristics
m t
communicate maintenance
System
U
(SAMS) Recommending responsible improvement hardware/software, to the Program Manager, of flight in Assurance NASA 5. for design and development areas for design the efficiency Space
SAMS-SS-005
Lewis
Research
to increase
Acceleration
Measurement
System U
Page PM-19
Maintenance
Express Ohio.
SAMS-SS
Center,
Space
Program,
Space
Station
Program Definition and Requirements, Sections 3 and 4, SSP 30000, NASA Lewis Research Center,
w
Assurance
Lewis
8. Blanchard, Edward
w
Benjamin
S., Jr. and Lowery, Electronics and 1969. Principles Inc., N.Y.,
E.
of General
Dynamics,
Division, Practices,
Maintainability McGraw-Hill
Page PM-20
=_
wig
mi
i
U
aiD
wi
|_
Design
|_
Factors
and
Engineering
The objective of the A4aintainabilityfunction m a cost effective discipline is to influence condition influence system design such that the end product downtime. design In order for principles to
operational
with minimum
to provide
maximum
to a program,
these objectives
Techniques as design
on previous
are presented
recommendations
Page DFEF = w .
II
mm
ii
m i
im
II
II
Im
m RB
Selec#on
J
(f Robotically
Compatible
Mechanisms, Technique
Page 1 DFE-1
Technique
Provide
guidelines
of maintainable
equipment selection
compatibility with dexterous robots by outlining associated fasteners and handling fixtures.
; r i
2 ,
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Benefits The application of these guidelines to the design process will increase the effectiveness of dexterous robots by allowing of robotics components used during maintenance because Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) tasks must be simplified intrinsically compatible EVA tasks. availability inferior designs to accommodate will facilitate robotics the simplified for optimized design tasks. In addition, with robots is robotically (which
performed
dexterity
Key Words
7
Robotically
compatible;
maintenance:
fasteners;
handling
fixtures
Application Experience
w
International
Space
Station
Program
Technical Rationale
selection
guidelines
enable
design
engineers
to identify their
required
for robotics
compatibility
and to tailor
robotics systems and environments. They for using robotically compatible fasteners and Station program
handling fixtures that have been applied on the Space and states the advantages of these concepts.
==: ,,,t..=,
Contact L_
Center
,lohnson
Space
Center
(JSC)
Page DFE-2
Selection
_f Roborically
Comparibh,
Fasteners
and
Handling
Mechanisms', Technique
Page DFE-
2 1
_m
Compatible
Fa._'teners
Provide
and Handling
Avoid jamming
Withstand the loads that may be imparted the robotics systems. or other component Provide adequate access. Simplify the operation ....... Assist ORUal_gnment and S0_d6ck and harddock functions. "Softdock" is defined the initial temporary or more inadvertent attachment. Reference pieces release attachment prior between pre_ent of equipinen(t_
designing
for robotics compatibility, the feasibility of such an effort must first be assessed. Some ;tei-ns (e.g., thermal blankets), because should &their by robotics show (i) if the by a of flexibility, Systemsl ORU cannot be manipulated
[]
as two
The assessment
[]
m
or component
to permanent
I
robot, (2) if not, whether the_tem will be required compatible, be d-etermined Reference that might of designing is determined be manipulated determined affects robotics Figure detailed which the system, and (3) what by simple will have on weight
2 lists a number
of guidelines t9
and
m
reqt!!ren2ents
designing for-iobotics Compatibility of Space Station hardware. Reference 3 lists a number analysis Once to it of different robotically compatible fasteners and handling fixtures for Space Station use. The purpose assist designers to their system contractual in objectives design tbllowing FASTENER I)ESIGN by Provide for alignment provisions may be implemented guides, of these and (3) options,
m
a preliminary compatibility.
to determine
the feasibility
of this technique,
however,
is to
that the item can be designed by a robot, of(l) it must then be relates layout, to and components how the design (2) the system's with which illustrates
in applying the stated ORU's and not to list and handling are addressed
concepts
l
other
requirements
[]
AND HANDLING FIXTURE
m
redesigning
for robotics
compatibility 1, shows
REQUIREMENTS
m
of items higher
flow impact Although alteration schedule applying should approach system, Once performed compatible begun, bidirectional
of the lower
as
m
(1) markings,
is addressed
arrows
mentioned
There
are more
options
for aligning
w
than there
fasteners proper
the objectives
part of an ORU.
if the
!
alignment
features
and is
Page
DFE-3
Selection
of Robotically
Compatible
Fasteners
and Handling
Mechanisms, Technique
Page 3 DFE-1
+
Dr.fine Factors for Loads of SalYtv
Revise L_ w
, Define/St'lcct Torque Fastener Values, Location and Type, Dennc/Sek'ct Fi_llll't_ ._lll(| Handling Lo;itiou
,7
RohrJlic'._
("om/_alihi/iO_
De.s_q77
properly
aligned
will
be properly
w
aligned
of alignrnent features is confined and end effector. The ORU design, which is discussed in 2 and 3, is an important
handling fixtures are grappled independent of the insertion and alignment of the 0RU, the
feature
Page DFE-4
_=_
Selection
of Robotically
Compatible
Fasteners
and
Handling
Mechanisms, Technique
Page DFE-1
m i
consideration, complexity. used for Space below. Alignment Robotic is proper fastener
allows
positional
misalignments of
of
techniques
misalignments
=--
Cylinder-over-cone of Tool testing to Fastener that, between structure, Head provided there inch the fastener a 7/16has shown The microconical tool slips over and attaches collets to the microconical interface, which is shaped like a cone. The allowable translational
=
Z mu
Earlier concepts specified or recornmended rounded heads because it was believed the rounded head would accommodate greater misalignment tolerances. It was found, however, that a flat-headed fastener provided the robot tolerances top. Alignment of Fastener to Nut the end with the same misalignment as the same fastener with a rounded
.lAMMING
ers
AND
BINDING
Ill
Once
alignment begins
fastener threading
the possibility
can be avoided
using the unthreaded can also be avoided thread consists housing internal springs diameter of three that, threads that force
to a nut by tapering
(pilot) of the bolt and by having a cone or countersink around the nut. For fasteners that form an assembly terminology, are housings Handling handling V-slot which FLvtures techniques are described for Space below. Station fixtures Insertion insertion technique is used with the and H handle, which interface with Purpose mechanism Dextrous (OTCM). Manipulator tool The OTCM the corners 2 for a or the ORU or that are, in Space mechanisms," tapered contain Station there "attachment
form the
held against
the threads
"fingers."
diameter,
come together, depending which the bolt is inserted. inserted, the segments allowing back and away,
are allowed
through without obstruction. This type of nut is described in detail in Reference 2. Handling When fixtures concept Fixtures compatible above (i.e., the handling which apply the slot in the V-groove
end effector
fits as a V into the grooves closes its V-shaped of the microinterface detailed fixture description). tolerance tolerance is approximately misalignment misalignment
of the H handle
microinterface or X handle), care must be taken that the corners are rounded. This precaution must be taken to keep the handle ii
from binding to the end effector, as happened in t]ie JSC _?obotlcslabora;cories with the firs( H handle concept which had sharp corners.
Page
DFE-5
Selection
of
Rohofically
Compatible
Fasteners
and
Handling
Mechanisms, Technique
Page DFE-I
The corners
of the H handle
(renamed
the X effect
following
methods: Fasteners fasteners is the best method to carry and insert for the of robotics for the robot operation. This eliminates the probability
handle) were rounded, was thus eliminated. WITHSTAND IMPARTED FASTENEIL9 SSP 30000, specifies LOADS AND table
Use Captive Use of captive THAT MAY BE FOR simplifying the need
BY ROBOTICS" HANDLING
SE._TEMS
3-3, "Factors
flight structures,
of Operations selected required. can reduce the need for the rotation. the For example,
-2
general factor of safety ultimate of 2.00. PRO VIDE Fasten ers Adequate access ADEQ
eliminates
UA TEA
CCESS
rotation,
since the bolt can be slid through with a single of Fastening the robot should (as
nut and then tightened for fasteners is provided by Choose Forms use more eliminated. increase and described necessitate more a Proper than Forms 1 degree
a proper layout of the system as in reference 3. The fastener selection scheme) if more can be influenced than 1 degree of by the robot A lever, 1 degree significantly the higher access by the access
to be
of freedom requirements
(or fastening
_-7
w
previously), but may also force moment accommodation control software. Excessive
and
of freedom
complex
therefore space
W
Requiring
Torque
bolt.
In addition,
the torque
fasteners
that require
excessive
the allowable
w
torque (ie., 50 foot-pounds or over), the robot must stabilize itself with one arm, constricting the allowable replacing additional configurations for removing and In the ORU. hardware This necessitates for robot stabilization. when
Space
Station
ORU's
care must be taken for fasteneing that will be present. Sizes different will reduce and
using robotic
that inadequate The problem interface in a "stabbing" i.e, access the space
is provided
Heads required
of fastener
around reduced.
Z=i
The grasping
a =
Simplify
The robotics
= .
by allowing the robot to grasp the interface fiom a number of different orientations. For
Page DFE-6
Selection
of Robotically
Compatible
Fastener_"
attd
Handling
Mechanisms, Technique
Page DFE-1
example,
the microinterface
and the
FL,ctures and sofldock below. Functions of the handling impact ORU fixture can The alignment. functions are
microconical interface can be grasped from two different orientations of the OTCM relative to the handling fixture, from while the X handle can There it only be grasped one orientation,
may be some instances, however, in which would be advisable to limit the allowable orientations. For example, if the robot can
grasp an ORU from only one orientation, there is less chance that the ORU will be improperly inserted ASSIST in its base plate. AND
further the handling fixture is from the ORU's center of gravity, for example, the mote difficult it is for the robot to maintain a line of insertion attachment that will be perpendicular plate. to its
Other location
factors
to be considered
when guides,
handling placement discussed dependence So.fidock Softdock ORU fastened. fastening handling Functions features are lacking for the ORU, of of the via the tapering on the housings
fixtures
are the size of the ORU, These items are 3 because of their features.
robotically
compatible
ORU's, may
the alignment guides and softdock features be incorporated as part of the ORU, or
fasteners with these features may be designed or selected. Sofldock fasteners are thus more complex and are called "attachment mechanisms" in the Space Station Program. Alignment below. Alignment If alignment and sofldock functions are described
may be used to prevent away" without The three prior by the mentioned
an
m m i
to its being
I
handling fixtures for Space Station have holes in their centers for fasteners, which allows the OTCM to grasp the ORU, insert it, and then drive the bolt with its nut driver without ever releasing Re[erences the ORU handle.
m m
Softdock
Functions Program, sofldock either on 1. t?ohoticx System_ htter/'ace Standards, I ?drone l, Robotics A ccommodation Requirements 2. are Rohotic'x (Draft), SSP 30550. Standard.', Standards"
W m u
For the Space Station Freedom attachment mechanisms achieve through an outer ramped separate pulled the use ofdetents casing method. of the attachment
mechanisms ,S);stems Interlace Interface is made to }drone (Draft), 3. 2. Robotics SSP 30550. Proce.s:sfor AchJevJng Report
u
the bolt to be remo\,ed functions 7he [)e.s'i_l Robotics (;ompatibJlity, No. <TBD>. Contractor
Page DFE-7
Techniques, Technique
Page I DFE-2
Technique
to reduce
and increase
equipment.
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
:::-::::
::::
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Benefits
implementing a system's
reduces
the manlife
Key Words
Anomalies,
Built-In-Test,
False Alarms,
Circuit Monitoring
Application
_.i
Experience
International System
Space
Station
Program,
National
Space
Transportation
Technical Rationale
of a system's
in part by the
it experiences.
If the BIT can not accurately then the test has failed its must be considered A system being just as for with the same level of importance can not removed
disciplines.
if its components
are constantly
Contact
Center
Johnson
Space
Center
=== w
Page DFE-8
False Alarm
Mitigation
Techniques, Technique
Page 2 DFE-2
Techniques
reported
while
only requiring
m I
or processor.
Monitoring monitoring with BIT filtering offa of a of the but only of a of a single can of the voting BIT results scheme. With
a system's
be used in place
performance. NASA Handbook 5300.4 (1E) defines a false alarm as "an indicated fault where no fault exists." system to detect Based on this definition, only with BIT a_ions.The this technique _" _nd]cadons0f unnecessary of a system is concerned maintenance
of successive a period
of time instead
check of the signal. The monitoring signal does not have to be continuous sampled signal over the time period. comparing the current
m u
inabiii@ .......i_olves
readings
This filtering aI!ows for the of sporadic out-of-limit Only when the same a signal is out-ofm
BIT should be designed to distinguish between actual failures and anomalies which must be tolerated limits. due to adverse anomalies To accomplish and techniques specifications, and design in the system operating within conditions acceptable or that are normal principles the system documents, implemented Voting With Scheme is called scheme, or more the "Voting all test data different Scheme." are computers. of the
To maximize monitoring,
of continuous
= = i m m m
Once recorded, the data need to be summarized and evaluated so that trends be tracked manage implemented. monitored be limited. collected restricted. be used data. failure Once and weaknesses controls The number and the maximum should identified. should of signals sample be all this data,
To help II
by three is declared
and the type of data accumulated Finally, that do not require the information be created. log should
should techniques
computers detect the same failure. An example of this type of architecture is the Space Shuttle Orbiter Avionics System. The five General Purpose Computers (GPCs) are all interconnected to the same 28 serial data channels. processing extensive effective complicated or triple more sensors The GPCs and require perfo_ ai[system-level agreement an on requires a majority
for future
i
BIT.
To improve failure
every
of anomalous to an identified
performance
mode should be analyzed and the root causes identified. Some form of corrective action must be taken change cannot to avoid be made, recurrence. Ira design must be
D
in series increases
Page DFE-9
m
to accommodate anomaly.
the non-failure
An excellent boundary
technology Boundary
unit
causing
level testing with system scan. requires BIT to be be able to This in the and application boundary provide
The need for modification flexible. control flexibility Test parameters easily changed. allows
of a partitioning of integrated
circuit (IC) designs and observability In Figure logic section, and a boundary of boundary 1, an IC is
controllability
or even change
BIT to be made
w
if false alarms start occurring. Station's Command System uses programmable and standard data of
scan scan
the Space
Timers (SDP's).
cells (BSC), one BSC per IC function pin. The BSCs are interconnected to form a scan path between the host IC's Test Data Input pin, (TDI) pin and Test Data Output (TDO) for serial access. During Normal Output normal Data 0qDO). IC operation, through However, Input
demultiplexer
(MDM's)
k=O
the timers can be adjusted by the system controller to accommodate changes in system configuration or mode of operation. However, the BIT software must be changed without disturbing the system operation. For this to be possible, the BIT soi_ware software. Architecture is must be independent of the operating Decentralized
input and output each BSC, when from the Data is can
the boundary
is entered,
Another technique for mitigating false alarms the use of a distributed or decentralized BIT architecture.
W
output (N'DO). The test response captured at each BSC input (NDI) out for inspection. Internal testing
the BIT is
so that a "NO GO" on a given test the implied failure to a Locating most of the BIT the possibility Although primarily the of reduces unit.
isolates
application logic is accomplished by applying test stimulus from the input BSCs and capturing External neighboring accomplished the output the input BSCs. test response testing at the output interconnects assembly test stimulus is from at BSCs. and of wiring
of a failure. consists
level testing
is still
TDI OUTPUT
BSC
"
_-_
LOGIC
Sb='O
Figure
1: Built
In Test Architecture
Page DFE- 10
False
Alarm
Mitigation
Techniques, Technique
Page DFE-2
of IC designs
provides
an can on
References 1. Coppola, Built-In-Test 1979. 2. Malcolm, Analysis Conditions, Anthony, (BIT), A Design Guide for April
capability
techniques
are in IEEE Scan" and 1149.5 Bus." should be of the BIT that of 3. NASA Maintainability Space Systems, 4. John G., Highland, False RADC-TR-81-220,
=
"Boundary
W., 1981.
and Maintenance
of Built-In-Test
II
Handbook
5300.4
(1E), for
m
at least equal
or exceed
it is testing.
also needs to be thoroughly tested and verified to ensure that it will not be a source of false alarms. effort Accordingly, and resources adequate amounts of must be allocated during
Texas Instruments
the design phase. The designer should not be unduly limited by memory size, component count, These false system or any other guidelines is unique allocated resource. The Each to
m ! l
alarm problem
__=
m l
m
=== 1
TEST
_ii_i..`:@_:.:ii.:_:i!!_.:_!_:i!!i!_!!:'..!_!i:.!!!!_i_ii!_ii_!_!!_i_ _iiiii::_
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=1 w
Figure
2: Typical
Test Regimen
for Space
Systems
m I
Page DIE-11
m
-__:_
decisions
not only
in question
will perform
within
the specific
maintenance
to be identified describe
containedwithin community
the NASA
should
provide
education,
communication,
and continuous
improvement.
Page AT- 1
mz Z I
IB
mm
ID
_rm m
[]
lid
gm
L_ lm
qmw
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Maintenance, Technique
Page AT-1
k.a
Technique
of space
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i._ii_i_._:'.._
::::: :8:_::::
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"
..i::
,.'"
::_:'
"
!:."
'.
:'
.._::_:_i:_:!.'.':i:i:!:i:i:_:i:i:i:::i:_:_!::_:_.:_::'.i:i_._:_:i:i:
_ ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::_::.'..:::_:::_:!:!`::_:._!..`._?:!_!_:_:_:.:._._!ii!_ +'"' +'" '::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: "::' :' :::" _:_'" +_ ................... _ :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
..'.'._!_! :_._:::-_::._:_ ?." _ ..'.'_: ::_:_ _ ......... +'_ " .......-'.'_! _'"'" :_:....... + "" _'" :._,_:.,'::::.'.':::: _'_ _"'"'" _''' _'::: ._:._ _: ._ _ _.,'_ Z_ _- ,_::_ '_S_ :"." :
and operational
Key
Words
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation,
Design Tools,
Criteria,
Space Weightless
Maintenance Environment,
Activities, Orbital
On-Orbit Maintenance
Simulated ORU
Application Experience
Skylab, Space
Hubble Station,
Space Apollo
Telescope,
Space
Shuttle
Orbiter,
International
Technical Rationale
interface
testing hardware
While motion
computer models) have proven effective in specific applications, underwater simulations have proven particularly beneficial in hardware development, crew/hardware since they can accommodate times. interface design, and operations planning, a large worksite volume and extended test
Contact
Center
Marshall
Space
Flight
Center
(MSFC)
..
Page AT-2
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Maintenance, Technique
Page
A T- 1
u
Simulation
of On-Orbit
communications taping
warning
facility
at MSFC
has
effectlve-ly
mm
mm
of space,
rnaint_nabilFty in extravehicular
II
m
(EVA). Use of full-scale neutral buoyancy simulations has also allowed for direct human hardware These purpose operations Other NASA simulating participation _veloped on-orbit of verifying in test operations, to the large for EVA environments and solidifying procedures. used for body as mock-up well as for access methods
fP.MS).
Air-lock for emergency evacuation. buoyancy 40 ft. deep The water at a range systems The tank test subject
u
II
the facility
neutral
facilities
temperature
hardware
crew training Environment Johnson Buoyancy of Maryland, neutral Douglas, Neutral following
Extravehicular
Mobility of
Huntington
Beach, buoyancy
Units are available for four test subjects. The tank can accommodate test durations up to 6 hours. lIST Simulations simulations facility strongly (I/ST) design : in the neutral influenced the criteria
The MSFC
Underwater Six-console Three-person, chamber. Floating 500-pound Removable large crane control buoyancy maintainability double-lock
in maintainability
of hardware
section
to accommodate
of a hardware
hardware.
by a pressure-suited
ma
Page AT-3
II
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Altogether, Units (ORUs) on-orbit. batteries, assemblies, guidance cameras. science pounds. equipment spacecraft. so components
some Some
Replacement ORUs wheel fine field planetary over 700 in of the doors and are
inch double types and keyhole simulations standardized torque maintenance connector simulation criteria presence, texture Response alignment, torque Studies
height
in three fasteners,
of fittings:
limits reduces
the complexity
One of the telephone-booth-sized are mounted the perimeter with large inspected
standardization, neutral buoyancy studies have evaluated such geometry (wing-tab and surface shapes). ease of length, and diameter) ridges, studied of grip,
bays around
as connector (knurls,
can be readily
handled. Using neutral buoyancy simulations, design features of these components were validated, verified, and refined to ensure that the ORU features of modularity, accessibility, in the design. a series of crew and simplicity Other features aids; stability were
and level of
to lock the connectors. scoop-proof, connectors. connectors Atmosphere Platform, and in robotic
U
-= j --2
inherent included
of a standard for blind-mate, low-force, and subminiature accepted would as a standard, be used these in the Upper
including handrails, portable handles, tether attachments, and foot restraints. Neutral buoyancy simulation studies also determined the placement HST and the accessibility. crew mobility transporting, Door latch of foot restraints on both the RMS arm for maximum These design features during ORUs. were also simulations stowed Instrument ORUs give the unstowing,
Research Satellite, Explorer International Space Station, manipulators. Human significant factors studies have
been a
part of neutral
buoyancy
simulation tests with large space structures. For example, experiments have been conducted structural experienced element general neutral EVA for 4 hours, to determine during test subject while assembly tetrahedral conditions buoyancy productivity in ground assembly the effect lengthy of fatigue An a 36 repeatedly rate and These higher time for on productivity EVA
criteria
buoyancy Science
All internally
except
are concealed
and closed by a crew member are installed or removed. Simulations A design increasingly maintenance using neutral standardization ORUs. and Design criterion
heart
monitored.
Influence
than in comparable
The practice
an experiment
became a key issue in HST development with the decision to mount ORUs with 7/16r
on Space Shuttle mission STS 61-B, revealed that a flexible structure can be
Page
AT-4
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Maintenance, Technique
Page AT-1
assembled in underwaterconditionswith
learning curve determined test subject; Structural of the strength, of 78 percent. coordination, It was that learning rate is independent
When
possible,
conduct buoyancy
paper
computer
m U
simulations,
and one-g
the MSFC neutral buoyancy obtain human factors data. experiment, six-element data used to obtain
simulations include: (1) the need to design hardware to accommodate the effects of water corrosion, to body (2) varying water pressure of movement. of with depth, the water The impact and (3) frictional resistance
i
[] ii
tetrahedrons
on learning
and on the
and equipment
relative value of a variety of assembly aids. The structural elements in these tetrahedrons were inches 11-foot-long in diameter. were tubes used of PVC plastic, 4 at Sleeve-locking to join the beams or "joint structures on fatigue, cluster."
of not taking
full advantage
the neutral buoyancy simulation capabilities at MSFC and other locations could mean
B
entering knowledge
a space tasks,
mission
without
full
u
particularly should
information
configurations and hardware. A single 3 6element tetrahedral truss served as a baseline structure assembly quantifying evaluating Results much neutral land. assembly This large kinematics significant the subjects the following when running problems: Assign two safety divers per test subject and monitor the for comparing with two-person productivity assembly structural other single-person assembly, changes aids, and for for due to the
to ensure
to do so results
in a greater
II
use of various
_z
lllB
of structural higher
assembly
__= I
have shown
information below:
to this practice
buoyancy operations
task during the beams. is due to the is not a process if the less,
Russell Space
D.:
II1
In SPIE,
m
Robotics
in Space,
the assembly
must be taken
2. Akin, David L. and Bowden, "EVA Capabilities Large Space for Structures,"
Mary of
L.: -
L." A Design
Methodology
[]
Page AT-5
U
II
Neutral
Buoyancy
Simulation
of On-Orbit
Buoyancy 88-4628-CP,
Simulation September
Learned MDC
Document
Massachusetts
of Technology, Mary
McDonnell
4.
Barnby,
Thomas for
Studying
12. Sexton,
of Transfer NASA/MSFC,
Proceedings
Contingency
Extravehicular
33rd Annual
149-153,
5. Designing Maintenance
E
an Observatory in Orbit:
J.D.:
Test Report
for
Neutral Space
of Hubble of liST
Experience,
Standard
for
Connector,
Electrical, S18,
p_
American
Inc., November
7. Griffin, B.N.: Zero-G EVA Servicing of Space AIAA-86-2312, Twenty-First September 8. Neutral Checkout Operations, AIAA, Century, 3-5, 1986. Buoyancy Procedures
NBS-TCP-90,
NASA/MSFC,
=._
April
17, 1992. G.: Space Telescope Simulations - The First 1982. of the Buoyancy December
9. Sanders, Fred Neutral Buoyancy Two Years, NASA/MSFC, 10. The Design Space Final
NASA-TM-82485, June
Hubble Trainer,
Corporation,
Page AT-6
= Z
ii
_ _-b r
<_%
_i
_i
|
i
ND
miD
Hi
Technique
the mean time to repair systems level) using failure rate, analytical and should
of avionics
electronics
(on orbit,
::_//_i_ili_i_
_.:::'::::::" 'i_::._ _::.::::::::..-.:.:.:_
l !iiiit!i! ti ...... i
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=================================================================================================================
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
.-
. ::.
._:_:_:i:_:::_:i:!:::::i:::: .,'..":_ ,'::: :_..':'_';:'_i:::::::::::-:::. _ :.":::: .':._:::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: i:::_ :::_: :_:?':_ :::: ::.".':-.':_._::: :._ ::._:.":': ::_._ ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :_;
Benefits
LJ
those
that
They also permit the user to make predicted and and consistent with the system
of whether
are adequate
operational
requirements
and allocations.
Key Words
Maintainability Parameter, Mean Time To Repair Prediction, Failure Rate, Maintenance Action
(MTTR),
Space
Application
w
International
Space
Station
Program
Experience
Technical Rationale
H
prediction
technique a design
accurate times.
engineers
and maintenance
Contact
Center
(JSC)
Page
AT-7
Mean
Time
to Repair
Predictions, Technique
Page
-w
A T-2
m
Mean
Time
Predictions
remove, component.
repair,
and replace
An interval a lower
estimator limit
I
of a system which
elapsed
time required
to perform consists
data set, one can find with 90-percent that the range mean. 3.2 to 4.2 will contain the exact due to I Unfortunately, can never be found
fault correction interchange, :tasks. generally relatively number would the failed operational difficult mounted to assess the current MTTR
the population dataunce_ainties. Log-Nq_rmal The distribution describe system The is reflects number points. repair short
of a system
The repatr_ime
o-Ta_n-ain_aiffdbl_ti_
consists: of both a large number of_ short-time repair periods and a small of long-time repair periods. usual by a spare occur when The former case where at the diagnosis to the more
D]stn'bution most commonly used to of occurrence because a large grouped about data of it frequencies
correspond
the actual
time is the log normal duration value, is shown repair-time, closely shape
site on detection
of a failure. part is
or removing nuts.
a defective
due to, for instance, Having a co!lection the design Time engineer
To Repair according
getting
involved
as it matures,
or to predict
distribution
equations textbook,
which
to its features
the following
i
=_ m
how MTTR
of a replaceable
unit may
m
parameter
that should
be of a the
stages
in assessing components;
iii
a component where
and replaced.
may also dictate changes in system designs order to meet the turn-around time criteria critical addition, life cycle repair Activity to repair MTTR systems, such as communication on the Space helps which Station. includes spend on a and
life support
systems
In the cost
the parameter
in calculating
is defined
as the average
time necessary
z m m
Page
AT-8
from
a finite observed
set of data.
How
to Implement estimating
Process of a new
Accurately 1: The repair unit (ORU) times t_ for an orbital are observed to be 1.3, the
system is more than applying the derived formulas on field data of any existing systems. The designer concept system; is going must know how With the overall and where maintenance the system the then and operating for example, to be operated out. can proceed procedure system conditions of the new
1.5, 1.7, 1.8, 2.2, 2.6, 3.0, 3.1, and 3.9 hours.
r
to estimate
and how its failed units this background, the exposed to approximate that has been data. After certain
select an existing
w
Utilizing
=
conditions
and that has a the similarity the conversion system data Once this is are
Likelihood estimated
is assessed,
(2)
i
factors needed to make the existing more applicable to the new system. done, the predictions more meaningful and accurate.
Then,
w
t / = 0.79124
Likelihood Estimator of the is: _1 n _ 1_:1 (t/i t/ /2
of MTTR prediction of a system where in order begins at the unit level (RUL) and replaced predictions defines to its original the MTTR's a defective to restore Then the by units.
s/2_
(3)
condition.
Then,
s / 2 = 0.1374
The following
$/2
the elements
used in the
prediction
_t = MTTR
= e
(?, -T)
(4)
0.1374) 2 _
to isolate
(0.79124
w
Disassembly: Therefore, the mean of the log normal is: Interchange: and replacement access during distribution of this example is: and its variability of time to repair
Time
associated
= MTTR
_/(e _'2-
1) (s)
suspected Reassembly:
Time
up
the equipment
after interchange
Page
AT-9
Mean
Time
to Repair
Predictions, Technique
Page
A T-2
==
Alignment:
Time
associated
systems
under
system or replaceable corrected. Checkout: operational. Constant result useful failure rates:
item after a fault has been ...... with the verification and the system is
conditions Level
= m
the product
MTTR's and their corresponding failure rates; the result is then divided into the sum of all The rate of failures or chance predominantly that in the replaceable
llsystem =
rates.
Mathematically,
Causes.
it can be e_pj_d
m B
K factor: performed
For on-orbit
factor
_ 1
)u
),iMT
i=1
I
may be applied environment. derived from from the neutral Ground Rules
to convert
to Micro-gravity
(6)
i= 1
and system
does not which is break1 2
variance:
n i= 1
include the maintenance generally fill out a requisition, time, time waiting Worksite
overhead,
= (-i)
As an example, system have (V), and failure
x,'- a,'
the three (Z,): OR.Us of a Variance MTTR'S,
task time such as time to time to go get tools, for parts, etc. considered.
assume rates
the following
MTTP. V
All equipment rate. a constant failure ORU ORU2 ORU 3 Total: 1 4.5 2.3 11.4 0.5 0.7 0.56 12.7 500.0
MTTP.*;
57.15 1150.00
All tasks are performed sequentially by one crew member unless otherwise noted. Maintenance established appropriately The prediction recorded experience is performed maintenance trained depends in accordance procedures personnel. upon the use of data from and and with
formula
reliability
Page AT-10
Predictions, Technique
Page 5 AT-2
MrrR
_t_
1 514.9
(1232.
+ .0 7_><5002 + 0 56x2 The results" o/the above e_/ampl-e indicate most MTTR
w
that the
otten
failed
drive the
Overall,
L_
set of data,
in the design
derived value should help in shaping a preliminary design guideline for the system. In addition, the prediction can also verify logistics requirements and later stage. maintainability References 1. Lamarre, B. G., MathematicalModelling, &Electronic and J.A. p372 - 373. for Cliffs, Press, by: J.E. Arsenault Science Probability at some
Reliability
w
and Statistics
Engineers, pl16.
w
LA
Page
AT- 11
Ill
il
M
Ill
Technique
Estimate where
or predict availability
availability
function, Availability
for a single
component,
a replaceable
of many replaceable
or a function
performed
by multiple
:'::.. :::: ::.::: ::::_ :::: _.::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::: ._::._.<: ::: .<:::::::.<::.<:::: :: :.::::::,.:
........
:..:...:
...::,_ ...............
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i_,_.iiiii!i!:.,
::: !
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
'::::'i:_:_:!:::::"
"?
"''"
"'"
"
"...........
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i iliiiItili/iii !iiiiii!iiil!lii!iiiiiiii!i?i/ii!
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_:! i_':_.::!ii:_!:
_:i :_ :i:_:_:_ :i:_:_ :_:_: .'?.':_:_ ,'::: _:?_:_i:_:i::'.:: ::_:i :_ _:_:_ i:::::i:_: i:_: ::i_: _: :i:i: _.::_:f." I:._:::::::.'.':::
:_ _:::::
_::::-:. _::::::.: .'.'_.: _.-'.'* ::_,_i_..';_: :_. _:: s_::: .,.-::: .,..::: _:: _-..t.i,,._}:_._'.'._!:i:_:,_i.,.':._:.,::_i::.:!:::_.,:_ _ _g_. __: :_:: :_._ :_._ :_: :._: :_:::_:::::::: .,.:._: s_ :::_.: :.,_ ::::::::::: :_ :_.._ :::_: :_ ::::: :i:_::;. . _: :_::: :.:: :.:_:::: v::_: 1:::: :.:.:.:.:._:_.:.:.:.:_.::.::::.. <. _._... ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: _:_:.::!:_:_:.:_:_:_:_:.:::.:_:_:_:[:_:.:_:.``..._:_:!_:i:!:!_[:_:_:_:_:_:::_:i:!:_:!:_:_:._.:_:_:._:_.`.:_:.:_:::_:_:::_:_:_:_:i:!:!:[:_i:_:!:..`...`.[:!:_:!::`.!:_!:!::`.!:_:!:..`.!_._:_:_`'.:_:_:_:::!.,....[:_:_:_::._:_.:.._.`..:_:[:_::_:!:_:_:._:_:.:_:!:.:!:_:!:.``::_:::_:_._.._:_:_:.._:_:_:_:::::
Benefits
Availability performance to compare technique operational help assess support logistics savings logistics
and assessment
methods
alternatives
the probability
readiness. Analyses based on availability design options and can lead to definition that will increase resource future needs, system based and provide
concepts
availability,
and maintenance
costs
on optimization
=. = = =
Key Words
Availability, Stochastic
Achieved Simulation,
Availability, Maintainability,
Inherent
Availability, Markov
Operational, Model
RMAT,
Application Experience
:
International
Space
Station
Program
Technical Rationale
operating
centers,
system
test facilities,
or flight
systems/facilities. Applying availability techniques is also an extremely valuable development of maintenance concepts
Contact
Center
Johnson
Space
Center
(JSC)
wa_
Page
AT-12
Availability
Prediction
= m
Availability Technique
Prediction ,4 T-3
and Analysis
calculation generally
administrative
the control
Availability using various Availability restorable through reset. restored foundation of reliability parameters parameters prediction estimated but overall system within paths. Availability combinations
designer, and does not include preventive maintenance time. However, effective tradeoffs using possible. the basic times Trade-off and parameters and some 1, in Reference are techniques
and measures.
m m
maintenance,_ec0nIigu_tio_or of how often a unit A Another availability measure of availability, achieved as: and how fast the unit can be both the establishment (R&M) these can be where OT is the total time spent in an operating state, TCM is the total corrective maintenance time that does not include before-and-after or administrative maintenance waiting checks, supply, periods; and TPM preventive directed than the a OT+ between Availability items, system or A_, can be expressed
fails (reliability)
after failure (maintainability). to support and maintainability and trade-offs is created and analyses. for components, spacecraft availability the system estimation that perform
m g
OT
TCM+ TP (3)
l
III
and connectivity
m m
performing
maintenance. Aa is more specifically toward the hardware characteristics Measures of availability, called the A third basic measure only using operational time, support availability, time: corrective time. of availability, considers operational considers availability the operating measure, and logistics
which policies.
il
inherent availability, is useful during design process to assess design characteristics. the as-designed characteristics the estimated (MTBF) parameters. measure
as:
involves
all repair
u
and maintainability
and pi-dveia-tive ma_rttenance delay time, and logistic realistic a This is a more
administrative
(MTTR)
or estimated is calculated
definition of availability in terms providing measure to assess alternative maintenance and logistics It is usually support defined concepts of a system associated or fianction. with the operation
availability
_m
by the equation:
M'TBF Ai = MTBF + MTTR (1) Uptime The MTTR time in the inherent availability
m I
Uptime + Downtime
Upti Total
(2)
!
Page
AT-13
m l
Availability
Prediction
is in
Mean Mean
Value
value estimation
is usually performed by algebraically combining component, LRU, and ORU availabilities When of components, being down, calculated LRU's, the system When using equation (1). the system is composed results of a number the failure is units' item in the system of these involves availability using simple
or ORU's, availability
is broken down into a variety of subcategories such as detection and diagnosis actual
= .
of any one of which parts, the calculated availability. redundancy, estimates Boolean procedures
unit repair
or replacement Table
time, test
and checkout
the availability
to reliability methods.
Availability Measure
i i
of."
Excludes:
"1.... I
Computer-Aided Simulation Availability prediction using simulation stochastic approach. reliability, modeling simulation Stochastic
computer-aided
Inherent
hardware
design
(A,)
may use either a or a Markov model simulation modeling for the system's and other
uses statistical
distributions
maintainability,
Achieved
L_
hardware design but also includes active, preventative, corrective rnaintenanee downtime and
maintenance and delay time parameters. These distributions are used as mathematical models for estimating individual failure and restoration times and can include failure effects and other operational conditions. A computer program generates random draws from these distributions to simulate when the
_--i
Operational
t
Product
of actual
All inclusive
of
(Ao)
operational environment including ready time, logistics time, and administrative downtime
and output
operational
System
w
Availability fashion
availability value
estimates of the
event
stochastic
by algebraically
estimates
predictions
the space station or large ground systems and facilities. These methods simulate and
Page
AT- 14
Availability
Prediction
status Units
priorities
simulated
RU based on distributions
is simulated
RU reliability
(or
m l m
till
(2) Step through simulated and when failure events evaluate the failure status given encountered. the specific
Groups of maintenance actions may also be packaged into shiRs of work. If the system under activity activity consideration both or EVA) or IVA) is in a space external or internal (extravehicular (intravehicular environment,
impact
can be considered. simulation will yield measure method model a single value on and to as
m I
g ! !
(3) Repair or replace maintenance maintenance criticality system repaired function a future generated. Generation maintenance input distribution policy on the availability
the failed RU using a and procedure of required priority Once or an RU is or and or the current based When used, (called the stochastic an iteration) component many is
m
that depends
status.
the system
that iteration.
is reset
appropriately,
iterations
failure situations a better in the of the and repair required results has simulations variation, may be accurate availability.
and to give the analyst of the variation failure measure availability The number availability measure. on the iteration as a function of iterations
understanding of simulated actions model failures and as resulting variations process. depend for accurate in the output for RUs requires RU time-to-failure parameters and factors
in the random
the estimated
will
u
that define the frequency of other scheduled or unscheduled maintenance. The maintenance failures, environmentally To evaluate particular actions can include maintenance or human-induced the effect point of a simulated capability equipment tasks, and failures. failure at a preventive
to iteration Experience
variation
shown that in system availability with a large iteration-to-iteration 200 to 1000 required estimate iterations or more system and to obtain a statistically
of the average
on the function's
operational
in time, minimal
cut sets of
failure events that define the system or function failure conditions can be used. Minimal generated cut sets of failure from reliability events block can be diagrams or and then
ment Tool
(RMAT)
is
a stochastic computer-aided method like that described at Johnson maintainability Space Center
of the functions,
and availability
characteristics
m I
Page AT- 15
m
Availability Prediction and Analysis, Page 5 Technique A 7"-3 of the Space RMAT specified station function outage RMAT, perform differences configurations Station. The output of the space state as cycle impact resources equipment, concepts availability These the life cycle Station and supporting References 1. The same simulation RMAT) availability
i
costs,
availability
of total (or
analysis
to understanding parts,
of insufficiently
maintenance
of time each defined from functional Using able to the tolerant). that quantify alternative
system
success
analyses
between
Space
or ground
Reliability Analysis
methods
(such
as
maintenance as maintenance
O'Connor,
manpower
and spare
part requirements. With this capability, JSC has been able to estimate the maintenance manpower
_-.--
Engineering, Chichester,
needs,
including
EVA Station
requirements, alternative Markov A Markov to computer complex technique conjunction Reliability Examples analysis assumptions
of various configurations.
Space
Model
process,
a mathematical
w
of the availability the necessary This analysis to use in or Tree Analysis Analysis
systems
(RBDA). 1 or in as
process
in Reference
predictions process
of the as-designed
system reliability and maintainability characteristics. Where operations and support costs are a major portion of the life
Page
AT- 16
U
[]
i
m
[] J
imp
m
| L_Jm L_a
"
T!
ii
Availability,
Allocation
(ACARA) Model
to Support
Maintenance
Technique
statistical
Monte
Carlo
availability, which
life
Research
_!i!_!!_:_!_._:_._!_!!_!_$5i_i_i_._iii:_ii_!_!:_![_!!:_i:i_[:i_i_i:i:_:i_i_:_::;_:_:._.`._:_$`._:_:_:_.``.:_:!:!:_:_!_: _::!::::_ :_:::?.::_i::.,.':.,::i:: _:_ "<:'_ :.`..::_._.`..::::::_$i.`_:_i_!:i_i:i:i:_:._:_:_:_:i:_:>.`..:_:_:i:[:_:_!:_:!:!_:_:_!:[:i:_ i'.-'_: "Y.'.':'_ _:.:" _::_::::: .'::'>.'_?._::: .".:_?.:: .".'?.':?.: :_::!._ :._._::_
_+::: ._/...:: _.::::::,' ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
i_. i!!JlllU_
::::. ::::::::
:::::::::::::::::::::
._: :::::_ :_ _ :.q:: '.:: ,..:
iiiiiIilit!!iil!ili iiii
i_}_!._ i_i:i "_!_. :_}-":: :':::::_:_:_ :..': ._: ::..'.: "::_:::: :i: :._ii_ i_!i
u
::i_i_iI_::i_iii_!_iiIiiii!iii_iIi!i_ii_ii_iiiii?:i::ii_::i_i_::i_::::iii`:iii_`iiI_iiIiiii
iiitiii!}liiliiiiililiiilllt i_:_:_$$_i:_:_:[:i_.:'_:_,_:>:i:_:i: !i_ ""?";':'::iF"$t:?:::: _::::::_::::: :._ :::x ':_::._.:.>_.::.._.:
._.: ...... +._ _,...
_::
'i..... "" ! . "- - ' _::! _:iHH_ _ i_::_ :_i i li_ii:! i!_i_._i_ii!_ _!_._?:_..'._ _:`_i_i?.._.:_?._ii:;i_i!?_i!_!._!:::_I_ii:_:?...?._:!_:_:_:?._i_i:_i:i:i_i:i.`..$i:;_i_i: :_:_: _:::: :.",":: _ :: _?::: .".;-_ .".': _.'.': :!:: "_'>;:
Benefits
maintenance (percentage
over a prescribed
k.d
availability
such as equivalent
of time at a particular
of state occurrences
can be computed.
Key Words
Maintainability
Modelling,
Availability,
Computer
Simulation
Application Experience
International
Space
Station
Program,
LeRC
Micro-gravity
Experiments
Technical Rationale
The development Space Station maintenance understanding time. and resource probability and ACARA system
Station
space
systems
and experiments)
long-term with emphasis a given period availability, and Weibull optimum spares, component
support dictates maintenance planning of the level of support required over is written specifically for analyzing scheduling distribution schedules A combination functions component The scheduling
The program
of exponential
to achieve on-site
performance.
capacity,
Contact
Center
Lewis Research
Center (LeRC)
Page
AT- 17
Availabilite,
Cost,
and Resource
Allocation
(ACARA)
Model
to Support
Maintenance
Requirements, Technique
Page
A 1"-4
m
Allocation
Frequency Lifecycle
of failure cost,
models block
systems diagrams
parallel, blocks.
and M-of-N A hierarchical is needed to contained ACARA Inputs =_ A RBD must be prepared for ACARA simulate depicts blocks RBD a system's a system, depicts availability. and the arrangement function. depict system, physical but rather =:_ to of the
parallel redundan_
The RBD
representation period
a performed
over a specified
connections
failure and repair intervals as a function of exponential and/or Weibull distributions. ACARA following: interprets tables =_ i.e., availability states and the results of a simulation and charts for the and displays
shows the role of each block in contributing to the system's function. The blocks are sequentially numbered as B 1, B2, B3, etc. and subsystems are numbered as S 1, $2, etc, which are defined from the inside out. Figure 1 shows an example blocks of a system with its corresponding Beginning each parallel and subsystems. set of blocks, is
[]
|
II
Performance, reliability
of capacity
set of blocks
[]
4
1 (Var) i
(Bin)
= =
16
Battl
(Vat) I-:]. I
[9" Baet
I0
Bat_
I-i
I
I
11
Bat
I-i
Figure
1: Diagram
of Blocks
and Subsystems
Page AT- 18
Availability,
Cost,
and Resource
Allocation
(ACARA)
Model
to Support
Maintenance
Requirements, Technique
Page
A T-4
partitioned subsystems.
which or
in turn
may combined
blocks
is equal to the Mean Failure (MTBF). failure function. is also modeled The shape new)
Time
shown
in Figure
1 contains
Weibull
factor
1 or more. 1 and 2 are both variable arrangement of batteries. contain 9 through respectively 8 and Blocks M-
If the block
with an initial age is installed, from its first time-toLikewise, if it this period is
subsystems 6 through
undergoes a failure-free period, added to its first time-to-failure. ACARA generates time-to-failure
events models
Subsystem 2 in parallel.
w
3 consists
of Subsystems
1 and
using
one or a combination
of these
and assigns the minimum resulting time for each block as its next failure event. The 4 is a binary of diodes, M-of-N Blocks parallel 3 through early failure model is canceled by assigning probability by an to the block of zero; large of MTBF; type an early failure failure, and wearout large mean also simulates life. redundant pairs of failure,
Subsystem
w
arrangement 5.
random
by an excessively
Subsystem 5 is a parallel arrangement two turbines, Blocks 1 and 13. Subsystem 3 through Modeling 6 comprises arrangement 5 and Blocks Time-toFailure the entire 2 and 12.
excessively ACARA
system
and is a series
= =
of Subsystems
active and standby blocks. A standby block is installed as dormant and its time-to-failure is initially modelled by random failure, in
which the MTBF is multiplied by its characteristic "Dormant MTBF Factor." Then, the corresponding active time-toand is failure is modelled by early, random, wearout failure until the active block replaced. for Modeling part upon resources. i.e., initially spare block Down Time depends and local in of spares Ifa
The ACARA program uses the Weibull distribution function to model the time-tofailure for the system. The shape and scale factors are adjusted to modify the form of the distribution. Uniform random numbers from 0 to 1 are generated the reliability, failure(i.e., and wearout models. R. ACARA mortality), infant These and substituted uses the early random failure, by userfailure)
The downtime
failure
(life-limiting
models
are adjusted
is available
is immediately
will depend Random Weibull shape failure is modelled by the distribution function where factor is equal to 1 (equivalent and the scale distribution) (MTTR). the to the ACARA according quantities
only on the mean-time-to-repair If no local spares a replacement production type, the constraints
to the schedule
exponential
Page
r
AT- 19
Availability,
Cost,
and Resource
Allocation
(ACARA)
Model
to Support
Maintenance
Requirements, Technique
Page
A 7"-4
volume, vehicle.
and delay associated and loading ACARA spares also checks agents
with the to
mE
the manifesting
to the
can be replaced. are met to ACARA the MTTR's then it. The for
[]
conditions
U
il
to replace
II
of maintenance
are crew,
equipment, and robotics. ACARA that the maintenance actions occur simultaneously, so that the block's
time is determined by the maintenance having the maximum MTTR. During simulation, set equal Reference of ACARA data information. the Computer Information University References 1. Stalnaker, Dale K., ACARA 103751, User's February the time-to-repair to the maximum 1 for a complete of graphs stochastically. guide and defined
II
to be determined
i
m
[]
(COSMIC)
of Georgia,
NASA-TM-
W.W.
D.C.,
Probability Wiley
and Statistics
Page
AT-20
Rocket Engine Failure Detection Using an Average Signal Power Technique, Page 1 Technique A 7"-5
Technique
Apply a univariate failure prediction algorithm using technique to rocket engine test firing data to provide indication. variations The predictive in the average maintenance signal power technique over time.
involves
ii/:ili:i:_:ii:i:i:::i:_i..iiiii_i!i..,._ii_%_!i_liiii_
"'":.":!"'_::: ............ "............. :!::" -":::_'"::!""i:!:!_,.:i i_ i_ ::i:i:i:iiiii i:_:::: _: "'i'i'i_'..:'..' _.__' ............ .,.:
__ _'''':'' w
" -.::,....,:..-
..::....
+......:.,.........:::::.%,..: !_i
::
......
_:_::i_i::!::iiii::iiiii_i i_ :: iii_::::::::_ii _ii/_ ii/ii.::3!iii::i_i_i ._.'".'-.:'..: . :::..'_.'.::; '.'.!i ............. __!i!_i_!_i_i_..": i_ii_i..'.._._!i!_i_!_!
reduce
failures
attributed signal
to
power of of
test firing data to provide method to avoid techniques are not capable
redline hardware
Limit monitoring
detecting
modes
with sufficient
and facility
Key Words
Rocket
Engines,
Failure
Detection,
Detectability
Application Experience
W
Space
Transportation
System
(STS)
Technical
E L_ ,
Detection
of anomalous
behavior
is critical
of the
Rationale
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). Increasing the detectability of failures during the steady-state operation of the SSME will minimize the likelihood of costly engine damage and maintenance. The average algorithm because failure indication parameters, thus power signal algorithm is superior to the time series more parameters contribute to the first simultaneous times. This increases the agreement between several
increasing the likelihood that an engine anomaly has occurred. This method also reduces the number of false failure indications that can prematurely
w
shut down
the engine
during
testing
or operation.
Contact
Center
(LeRC)
Page AT-21
w
Rocket Engine Failure Detection Average Signal Power Technique Technique A T-5
using An
average signal power calculations are performed over 2-second, 50-percent overlapping window for nominal test firings at both 104- and a 109-percent-rated power levels. A smaller time increment must be used to improve the failure detection capability of the algorithm. The average plUs three standard deviations of/he average signal poWer _e computed for all the nominal firings at both engine power ievels._ Tiaese Values are combinedto calculate the thresholds (see Reference 1). A safety factor ranging from 1.5 to 3.5 is needed to ensure no false failure indications are computed for the nominal firings. The range of safety factors reflected signal behavior variations that occurred over seven nominal A2 firings. When used in the failure detection mode, failure &the average signal power of a parameter to fall outside its threshold results in a failure indication. Also shown in Table 1 are the thresholds calculated from the SSME nominal test firings based on the average signal power algorithm along with the associated safety factors.
[]
m
For discrete random processes, probabilistic functions are-used to describe the behavirr of the rocket engine system. The Power Spectral Density _SD)is computed to describe how the variation of the random process is distributed with frequency. For stationary=si_ais,- t_e Pg-D is bandi|_nqied to l/(2T), where T is the sampling interval in seconds. Average Signal Power Calculations The PSD is defined as the discrete-time Fourier transform of an autocorrelation function. (The derivation &the autocorrelation function is shown in Reference 1.) When the autocorrelation function is evaluated at zero lag, then an expression for the average signal power (ASP) of a random stationary process results:
+__1
2T
P =
r I0] =
f
1
2T
(1) Table 1: Signal Threshold and Safety Factor for SSME's Average Power Safety Factor
1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
m J w m
Parameter
Threshold
The average signal power for several SSME para_ _ters is determined by calculating the autoc _ elation at zero lag for the parak ers provided in Table 1. The assu_, _ion is made that the signal is stationary over the computation interval. The
MCC Hot Gas Injector Pressure LPOP Shaft Speed LPFP Discharge Pressure IqPFP Discharge Pressure Fuel Preburner Chamber Pressure
Page AT-22
I
Rocket
Engine
Failure
Detection
Using
an Average
Signal
Power
Technique, Technique
Page AT-5
PBP HPOP
Discharge Discharge
1.5 1.5 3.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
one nominal thresholds algorithm shown illustrates parameter, test firing. average the application
tested
using signal 1
the of is power
in Table
PBP Discharge MCC HPFP HPOP HPFT HPFT I-IPOT I-IPOT Pressure Inlet
in Figures
Pressure
signal power
Inlet Pressure Discharge Discharge Discharge Discharge Shat_ Speed Temperature Temperature Temperature Temperature
power, algorithm
as a function
the threshold
I-IPFP
Algorithm
Implementation
A system identification and signal processing software package on a RISC workstation provides the average signal power Simulator number algorithm. data test
7000 G_0 m
b
(CADS) of SSME
the failure
system
Gg00
i!l
to ensure
68OO
a_
propellant tank venting and propellant transfer. detection techniques before, or concurrently, monitoring algorithms
w
and pressurization, Sensor failure with safety in order to eliminate failure problem. sensor being Typically, problems of the are
I _ ! I$1_IIIIIIII_IIIIIIIIRIII
GT_
_ t
must be exercised , I I I I
TI_.
I
I
sic
of a sensor exhibiting
as an engine
Failure
m
indication
thresholds signal
are established power tests. and firings of nominal Figure Power 1: Application Algorithm of the Average Signal
by applying algorithm
anomalous
Discharge
Page
AT-23
Rocket
Using an Average
Signal Power
25OO ........
FAILIII[ INDIr..ATIGII
_._,,..,,.'_-,_, _.,_,_,_,,_.-i.
o 50 Ioo I._ 2oo TI_. zso u _ j_
I
= m
Figure 2: Average Signal Power for Interval with the Failure Indication Threshold
that
i
m
Nomenclature: HPFP HPFT HPFTP HPOP H:POT LPFP MCC high pressure high pressure high pressure high pressure fuel pump fuel turbine fuel turbopump oxidizer pump
high pressure oxidizer turbine low pressure fuel pump main combustion chamber :=
B
H
Reference Meyer, = F_lure 90,!993. C.M., Zakrajsek, Using Techniques, J.F., Rocket System AIAA Paper Engine
Detection
Identification
July 1990.
Page
AT-24
m
caw
Operations
w
7m,_
And Design
This section provides operations operations improvement. system designers engineer or design experience a rich source to support and related
Operational Considerations
of ideas to any organization those field operations. experience The that that is involved techniques can from be reflect used in either actual spaceflight spaceflight continuous hardware they provide to
a mechanism easier,
operators to operate.
=:= = =
on the latest
technology
operations
Iwl
development. process
herein to design
operational
are dedicated
NASA
systems
as maintainable
Page
OP S- 1
mm
mm
I
m
m_m
I
m mm
ii
mm_
IB
m w
L_
m J
Technique
activities (SRB's)
to rebuild after
and prepare
of
Shuttle review
refurbishment
activities
include:
of anomalies acceptance
to specification, part
protection
and prevention,
t L-I
(6) scheduled
to flight
L__ LJ w
Benefits
Key Words
Refurbishment, Galvanic
Maintainability Sealant,
Design Electronic
Criteria,
Salt Water
Protection, Testing
Corrosion,
Component
Vibration
Application Experience
w
Space Motor
Booster
(SRB),
Space
Shuttle
Solid Rocket
Technical Rationale
Through structures
the SRB
the
developed to
practice
can result
scrapping resources,
of unnecessary
Contact
Center
Marshall
Space
Flight
Center
(MSFC)
Page
OPS-2
SRB Refurbishment
SRB
Refurbishment OPS-1
Practices
.
Table
1. SRB Maintainability
Factors
Booster
(SRB)
Refurbishment to return to a
2. 3.
the activities
required
and
SRB component
4.
.
flightworthy condition after SRB ignition, l_off, and flight; separation from the external tank; descent (free fall and and parachute); ocean impact; and retrieval. When the decision was made to recover reuse the SRB hardware, organized criteria Flow Figure to formulate for a reus_le a design the maintainability booster__The design S_K!3_. .................. in team I, ......... as
Thrust Vector Control (TVC) Subsystem Installation and Removal Ordnance Installation and Removal
team was
6. Markings and Color Coding 7. Unitization of Subsystems 8. lrreversibility of Connectors 9. Tool and Equipment Design 10. Spares Provisioning
Ii
is shown
produced the Solid Rocket Booster Maintainab_ilty-Design (_ritei'ia-Document a document that was used by designers .. they conceived each design feature, performed the necessary tradeoffs of the design design design parameters, team included features factors and made other design The as a and product engineering decisions. maintainability
Design Process Condderations Table2Ti]-st-s_]calm_intenanee were water considered impact, during designed the design The SRB was incorporating the parachutes; electrical/electronic Vector Control
. a_ions
that
process.
m
for
I
maintainability Maintainability
considered
is mechanically
___
Test
I
Preflight Storage and Refurbish
Rcgovct
Figure
1. S_
Flow
......
Page
OPS-3
SRB Refurbishment
Practices, Technique
Page OPS-1
Table
1. 2.
w
2. Maintenance
Actions
to some
components
of the TVC
system.
of the first few SRB'S damage. The the addition of rings. of the aft rings and force with the the from 115
3.
4. Repair
experienced water impact corrective action included gusset Foam reinforcements was sprayed components.
assemblies segments
the reinforcement
and then coated steel. and/or being All structural alodined primed
with an ablative components as appropriate, with aluminum are designed intrusion by surfaces, fastened
was reduced
to 75.5 _sec
mph, respectively). 3. During initial teardown water and corrosion were mating correct sealant joining. surfaces of structural were modified to both this problem, to be applied and inspection, found between members. to require surfaces application the before
to be protected applying
w
sealant
between
adjoining
installing the fasteners with sealant, torquing the fasteners, and applying a fillet of sealant along the edge of brackets where they join the main structure. The electronic/electrical
the To
the sealant
specifications
components exposed to salt water and the external surfaces &these components system permit are painted. The TVC system is a closed-loop the intrusion external
4. To modified a.
eliminate skirt,
potential
water
the forward
the following
or redesigned: The aft seal on the forward from a rectangular skirt was
with an epoxy
paint finish,
are protected by the propellant that is bonded to the inside surfaces Areas not protected insulation are grease.
changed
to a "D"
configuration to allow better contact between the forward skirt and the forward dome b. of the SRM. A fillet of sealant was added between
LJ
B_
of the SRB that have been as a result and below: in the aft To team of trouble
or modified
the access door and the surrounding structure after final close-out of the forward skirt.
r--
areas found during recovery refurbishment are discussed 1. Galvanic prevent added corrosion
occurred
c. Sealant was added to the mating surfaces and the installation bolts of the separation parachute nut housing attach fittings. improved for the main
skirt of the first few SRB's recovered. this from recurring a zinc coating and bolted the design metal anodes to selected
components,
(Zinc bars)
5. The following
practices
Page
OPS-4
SRB Refurbishment
Practices, Technique
Page OPS-1
II
III I
El
i gml
z
maintainability, parachute a. parachute deployment,
SRB
Flight
Configuration were being returned to the vendor refurbishment. After refurbishment, acceptance test procedures including (ATP) performed, testing. caused vibration for were
and
inflation: To avoid abrasive during foam damage that material frustum structure.
and thermal
11111
level of these tests life of the component the excessive lifetime components) has been of electronic presents parts of spare a unique effort not be until (except
added
to portions
To prevent components'
for the range safety system to the parachutes are rather pattern pattern. and thermal testing improvement during deployment, the parachutes zig-zag
now packed
in a circular
are redesigned
to use the
Page
OPS-5
SRB Refurbishment
Practices, Technique
Page OPS-1
Table
3.
Typical
Structure Flow
water impact
Refurbishment
1. 2.
Tow SRB from Remove water. Place Safe Wash Remove TVC
area
SRB from
ocean,
Rinse
SRB
on transporter. and Hydrazine solution Systems. and rinse. Team with Inspection detergent assembly. facility.
recovered), deploying the drogue parachute. After the SRB is stabilized in a vertical position, descends the frustum is jettisoned and into the ocean. Its descent is held by the drogue the jettisoning portion parachute. of the of the SRB the at water by the onto the
Assessment
aft skirt
to a safe velocity In the meantime, frustum lowering parachutes impact) recovery deploys
refurbishment TVC
Disassembly
the three main parachutes, Once in the ocean, are jettisoned are removed
dimension protection
13.
Inspect,
Visual
and NDE
(XRAY
and
Touch-up
paint
(repaint
everyftfth
recovery vessel. A plug is inserted into the SRM nozzle throat and the SRB is dewatered. SRB allows vertical Removal of the water from the from a position. the SRB to be positioned to a horizontal
15. 16.
Inspect Preflight
and
identify.
storage.
position
The SRB is then towed area dock. At dockside, and placed pyrotechnics
vam_
to the disassembly
routed
procedure
the SRB is lifted from the water on dollies. The SRB the TVC and an assessment anomalies solution Then the are disarmed, and documents with a detergent wash facility.
for refurbishing
system
is depressurized, occurred
during flight.
and routed to the TVC disassembly Table 3 lists a typical flow sequence refurbishment. the remainder After the of the facility. they
rail cars, and transported to the SRM contractor located in Utah. At the contractor's plant, loaded and routed All segments STW7-27443. the segments are offto refurbishment areas. must fall of this is of specification dimensions analysis requirements the effect capability
to the disassembly
meet the requirements outside required structural reusability the acceptable to determine and sealing is determined.
are removed,
specification,
their part number and dispositioned Predisposition List for SRB Flight Hardware 2 . The SRB component
z : .. .-
on the before
All documented
Page
OPS-6
SRB Refurbishment
Practices, Technique
Page 6 OPS-1
NASA/Marshall
AL.
m
of Fasteners on the
J
to Sea Water
Exposure
TVC Components Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), Hydraulic Pump, Hydraulic Reservoir, Fuel Service Module (FSM), etc.
Flight
nonconformances
are
reviewed
to determine 7. NASA/MSFC: Flight Plan, Space Hardware Flight Ground AL. Rocket Booster m Operations NASA/MarshaU
D
if the condition of the hardware has changed. The most critical areas to be reviewed are case membrane port threaded aft segment defects noncrack-like thickness, areas stiffener flaws, stubs. pitting, etc.) vent port and leak and and sealing surfaces,
No surface scratches, deeper than 0.010 are 8. NASA/MSFC: Flight Hardware Requirements, NASA/Marshall Systems 9. Thiokol: Analysis Space Refurbishment SE-019-050-2H, Space Flight Center, AL,
m
(corrosion,
All segments
hydrotested to 1.125 times the Maximum Expected Operating Pressure and magneticparticle inspected.
III
References 1. NASA/MSFC: Maintainability Document, NASA/Marshall 2. USBI: Flight United 3. Thiokol: Refurbished STW7-2744, Operations, 4. NASA/MSFC: Surfaces Subject Soild Rocket Booster ...... Center, AL. 10.
Requirements Refurbishment STW7-2863, Space Thiokol: Finalization Predisposition Hardware, Technologies, Space List for SRB 10PLN-0027, Huntsville, SRM Criteria, Space USBI, AL. 11. MetalHardware, Corporation, City, Utah. Thiokol: Acceptance Case, Space 12. Thiokol: Acceptance Design Space Criteria Flight
Corporation,
Operations, Space
Brigham Shuttle
SE-019-022-21-1,
Requirements Space
STW7-3450, Operations,
Brigham
Shuttle
Space
Shuttle
Case Acceptance
Criteria,
Shuttle
SRM,,
to Sea Water
Exposure
Criteria
for Refurbished
l
Page
OPS-7
SRB
Refurbishment
Practices, Technique
Page OPS-1
Igniter
Chambers
and Igniter
Adapter, Space
STW7-3861, Operations,
=
Thiokol Brigham
13,
Thiokol: Refurbishment Criteria for Redesigned Assembly, Corporation, City, Utah. STW7-3888, Space
Operations,
14.
w
Space
Motor
TWP,- 10341 (CD), by Thiokol City, Utah. Solid Rocket United Technologies,
Representations
16.
USBI: FrustumAft Skirt Disassembly Requirements, 10REG-0032, USBI, United Technologies, Huntsville, AL.
17.
USBI: Refurbishment Engineering Specifications For Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Assembly Project, 10SPC-0131, USBI, United Technologies, Huntsville, AL.
Page OPS-8
mm
II
m M
II
m m
i mm
mm
II
qm
Electrical
Connector
Protection, Technique
Page 1 OPS-2
|i
Technique
connections caps or if
with
by manufacturer
or with generic
position.
iliiiiiili!ii/i_iii_ii_ii!i!iii!ili!i_ilil/_/i/ii/fiii
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: :"' : ":" "':: ,'," : ::_: :::_i:'_: ! :::':" ':':::':':':':':'i: : :>.:::::>.;::;.<')_::: i_ :?: : >.::::':':'
_ : ::_:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: "!_ !:_ i t._: :_ i i_ iii_ _ i.:!ii: ......... F"! :i_-_''"i:: ............................... _i"_ : .5:?.._::..5:_: :::'i".'.".'(' :'<" ""
II iil i
::_.'.::1 _:_ ::: : :::::::::::::::::::::::: I
:::::::::::::::::::::
itl/i
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::
.............................. '::::::!i:_"""':::
lilil!lllililiili;iliiiiii iliii!iii_i
_:::_::_::_`_.:================================================================================== = =
Benefits
collects
method caps or
is
or possible
electrical
is reused
thus alleviating
Key
Words
Connector,
Electrical
Application Experience
Space
Transportation
System
(STS)
Technical Rationale
= :
method
of protection
are rate
is the possibility
surface
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page OPS-9
Electrical
Connector
Electrical Technique
Connector OPS-2
Protection
of Ground
can be implemented
in two
D
instructions
in operations
an__d
_ ' " II
be included to inspect the c_ofs for corrosion/debris and provide: direction for corrosion/debris removal,
_i : _ "'
_
I
necess_i) if E-S-D--_-ac-once-rii, do not Use generic plastic_cal_"_i_'(he=y can be ESD generators. be used. ESD-approved _ ..... caps should Provide connector, connector
.:._::
L_
Page OPS-IO
===_l m
II
Robotic
Removal
and Application
of SRB Thermal
Technique
When
designing
robotic
systems optimum
materials, positioning,
pay close
to support By integrating
cell environmental
conditions.
and software practices with equipment and facility the effectiveness of robotic systems is ensured.
=
#"_i _:_liii_ii_i_'.-"ii-'.'i
::!!_:::::::::_ii::::_!!i::_i_il
z m
;.q.>._:::::::::::::: ::2_ : :_:>.::_. ::" ::_ ::.::::.-*_.-::::::::_: ::_.:.:._::_:i:::i::!:!._:_::3 :.'.':::._ _.::.'::_._:!:::_!ii_'," !!_!.>-_!i_i_i
Benefits
Adherence
to proven
robot
cell design
and operational
practices
will
semi-automated
= :
processes.
Key
Words
Robot, robot
robotic
removal
of insulation, operational
robotic
application
of insulation,
cell design,
and robot
practices.
Application Experience
s
Space
Shuttle
Solid Rocket
Booster
(SRB)
Technical Rationale
SRB refurbishment robotic other shows under insulation SRB elements. removal.
operations removal
resulted depicted
and application
environmentally
insulation
Contact
Center
Marshall
Space
Flight
Center
(MSFC)
Page OPS-11
Robotic
Removal
and Application
of SRB Thermal
Systems, Technique
Page 2 OPS-3
and Application
of SRB
were equipment)
d
IW1 l
A technician
was required in the spray cell during actual spraying to take thickness measurements, When the SRB is recovered for refurbishment, Space Shuttle from the ocean, and reused flights , several assist in unplugging remove specifications. meet a flatwire pounds delivery in S_ requirement. the spray gun, and disassembled on subsequent the wet insulation, if it did not meet
gi
N
layers of insulating materials and protective coatings must be removed and then reapplied. of robotic Experience systems has shown for insulation by a factor that the use removal of 10
The cured insulation had to tensile test of 50 to 100 thickness were made to the reapplied of the required Adjustments
IB
will improve
productivity in excess
until it met specifications. structure for spraying many man-hours. After automating
Preparation
was a semi-automatic
measured by hand, placed in a large and mixer, and mixed to a uniform consistency mixture required for spraying. was pressurized and delivered
mixed,
is mounted
Table
1. Ingredients
robot. The gantry robot allows spraying inside the structures without the need to rotate effector sanding, spraying, the structure to perform cleaning, for access. the following inspection, The robot attach masking, of operations: is programmed to automatically an end-
=__ u
parts A & B*
3. Glass Ecco Spheres 4. Phenolic Micro Balloons 5. Chopped Glass Fibers 1/4 inch long 6. Milled Glass Fibers 1/8 inch long 7. Bentone 27 8. Ethyl Alcohol 9. Methylene Chloride/per Chloroethylene shell
and thickness
measurements.
i
Automating and robotizing the application insulation eliminated the need for a technician in the spray cell and eliminated many of man-hours of hand work. At the start of the SRB refurbishment program, the insulation was removed manually. manually This required hold a hydrolaser psi. of 72 pounds every a technician pressurized a force that the using to to
[] [81
spray gun, which mounted structures sanded, structure turntable, operation robot were cleaned,
This created
by hand, The
had to overcome
rotated
15 minutes.
insulation.
was mounted on a portable which was cooidinated with the of the robot and spray gun. Then
removed by hand using nonmetallic chisels and mallets. Manual removal of the insulation from the two aft skirts required
[]
Page
OPS-12
m i
Robotic
Removal
and Application
of SRB Thermal
Systems, Technique
Page 3 OPS-3
m i
=-
/
_ Robot Arm Position for External Insulation Removal (MSA-2) Robot Arm Position for External Insulation Removal (MSA-2) Robot Arm Position for Internal Insulation Removal (Insta-Foam)
Figure
1. Example
Robot
FaciBty:
SRB Insulation
Removal
Page
OPS-13
Robotic
Removal
and Application
approximately 400 man-hours. Procedures for Robotic Removal Robotzing the removal of the insulation reduced the man-hours for two aft skirts to approximately 64 man-hours. The hydrolaser is mounted on a gantry robot which is located in the removal cell. The pressure to the hydrolaser has been increased to 12,000 to 15,000 psi. Technicians have been eliminated from the hazardous environment. The robot is controlled by computer. A turntable (also controlled by computers) is mounted flush with the floor. ARer removal of the insulation, the robot is programmed the hydrolaser cell. to clean
considered in areas where the water has a high mineral content. Since the water used in the insulation removal process is recycled, the water must be filtered prior to reuse to
m m
il
[]
4.
to be activated
5.
the event of excessive flow, pressures, temperatures, or inadv_nt ingress of personne& Consider the use of visinn systems for alignment, completion menxur_. Provide delicate status, inspex_n, and thickness and tao_la feedback for
Table 2 lists typical reasons for using automated robot cell to apply and remove SRB insulation. Table 3 is a list of the 13 best practices in the design of robotic systewg for removal and application of insula:.on. The most predominant consideration was the high pressure water spray and debris environment encountered in the hydrolaser insulation removal process. Operational maintenance, as well as design, is important in maintaining a safe and
7. 8. 9. 10.
Retain manual capability for emergency and backup ot_rations. Establish precise automatic indexing of fi._ur_ with workpiece and robot to minimize setup time. Provide electrical grounding of all system elements. Purchase over-rated equipment Use only 75% or less of the capa_ in the _ design to provide grovteh potential and operatlonal/maintenance margins. Protect robot e2ements from solvents in the environment to ensure continued robot iubricatlOrL Train and use dedicated operations. penonnel for robotic
|
i
Establish preveutive maintenance requirements during the design phase based on designed-in of maintenance features (t _, proper panel calibration test ports, eq_meut clearances,
ease
access, ct_).
1. 2. 3. 4.
for hazardous
and
Eff'wien_" robot does not get tire& Will do whatever it is programmed to do and will do it repeatedly. WHl handle various end effectors for sanding, cleaning, inspection, spraying, and thickness measurements.
of pumping
efficient operation. Potable water is used to reduce corrosion in thepumps, valve_,_ and lines. The use of de-ionized water should be
For the SRB insulation system removal, the water is filtered tc, contain particles no greater than 5 microns. On a quarterly basis, or every 100 operating hours, high pressure water pumps are inspected and overhauled if necessary to repair or replace the pump head, pistons, dr brass _s[eeves. Preventive maintenance is performed regularly.
U
U
Page OPS-14
u
Robotic
Removal
and Application
of SRB
Thermal
Systems, Technique
Page OPS-3
Requirements facility removal design of the type used for SRB and application for personnel During must of the process safety and are after the noisy removal Operators
be considered operations. Special Robotic effective emergency changeout, feedback, features system robot Design
for material
removal
visibility
Considerations lend themselves of automated automatic sensing, override. end-effector These of the tactile into the robotic to the
systems
provisions. personnel
entering the area during or immediately spray operations are required to wear protective suits with self-contained inhalation apparatus to prevent with toxic fumes. Facility or contact
be designed Setup
breathing
with participation
vendor.
time can be minimized or automatic between systems the or equipment, should positioning tooling
and relative
and robot.
mechanical
A concurrent engineering is desirable in the design of robotic to ensure use of the correct designed A team of representing be assigned design and of the (1) through all full robot, facility, in an optimally application. and technicians disciplines Three
be over-designed for extra margins of safety against wear and malfunctions, Care Should be taken not to grossly overdesign control system memory, memory is used. robot control particularly This could if a bubble result in slower
system
operation.
References 1. Rice, Automated Company, NAS8-36300, Robert: Hydro Process Removal USBI January Report on the # Production contract #
of drawings
complex system
representing: proceed
of TPS, Report
USB-ATG-003,
Booster 1986.
Inc., NASA/MSFC
i W
techniques will dramatically speed up the design process. (See the MSFC Guideline titled, "Concurrent Systems," Preferred and Test"). equipment, storage, dressing attention Sloped Engineering in NASA The facility pumping control stations, Reliability Guideline TM 4322, for must contain Practices systems, and for Aerospace "NASA Design support
2. Loshe, Thomas: Hydrolyzing in High Pressure Wash Facilities, Maintenance Document Center, Manual Prepared October # B8598, for Kennedy
-_-__
material personnel
[J
Removal
System USBI,
and clean-up. should concrete be paid to debris subfloors provide and clean-up. techniques should
Guide,
Document
United
Technologies,
Particular handling.
4. Babai,
Majid:
Robot Aerospace
Simulation
and
Manufacturing,
Engineering,
Page
OPS- 15
Robotic
Removal
and Application
of SRB
Thermal
Systems, Technique
Page OPS-3
1992, pp 11-13.
Alan R. and Tony S. Humble: Space Shuttle Societies Hardware, Huntsville (HATS),
tim I
Proceedings,
Association
of Technical 1987.
Goyermn.
_,_ Gantry
_:
Preventive Preventive
and Controller End Effectors Manufacturing Assembly) Manual Tunnel STP 513, ...........
m g
Validation Robot
(Forward
SRB Insulation
TPS Operations
Cleaning
Sprayable MSA-2 Insula_o n Spray _ ___ STP 621, MSA Control Room Operation STP 622, Installation End Effector Control Room Adapters MSA-2 System Insulation Preparationand Mix Spray Operations STP 634, Sprayable TP 741, MSA-2 and Removal of Robot
|
m I
ARF
SESP Robot (Safety Systems Engineering Safety Standard Requirements for Procedure) 23405,
[]
L_
Ill
Page OPS- 16
GHe Purging
of Hz Systems, Technique
Page 1 OPS-4
Technique
a hydrogen purge
to evacuate
After
or check
low or
=_-= r w
Benefits
w
Key Words
Purge,
Hydrogen,
H_, Helium,
GHe
L_.
Application Experience
National
Space
Transportation
System
(NSTS)
Technical Rationale
venting
explosive
gases
such as hydrogen
Mixtures of H2/I-Ie do not become mixture is 91% He. For "fuel rich" hydrogen/helium limit increases is obtained. with increasing
non-flammable
until the
mixtures He content,
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
OPS- 17
GHe Purging
of H_ Systems
Reference H. Hannah, LSOC Purge 32-30, Study, FCSS Hazardous dated September
J
This technique
recommends
initiating
a GHe
sweep purge to evacuate air from a vent line prior to venting a i-i2_s-ystem. After the initial venting operation is complete, a second GHe sweep purge_should be_ conducted to ;_ evacuate the Ventsystem o_re_duaiH2. The upper _ure Figure flammability iS lower limits of a gaseous _th'no GHe_r_sen_(_g/_ or check low or valve ---:_ ....
-;2; ZZS
Ill
......
II
H2/ai r _-....
!
used on the vent line will prevent_ air_....... intrusion into the line during intermittent flow conditions. This practice systems should _
IB
be included
i
aim
operating
procedures
initiated to applicable existing procedures. System design should be reviewed to include the following TM X-52454 as recommended (Lewis
......
by NASA Center):
i .
Research
|
m
N I m
Include a check valve/flapper valve or other suitable mechanism to exclude air from vent stacks flow conditions. Extend building vent stacks roof. use of ordinary which a H2 flame. a minimum (pulse of a 3-volume to sweep system
u
at low or intermittent
15 tL above
II
hydrocarbon of
are incapable
purges)
to introducing
exchanges
is a commonly
acceptable
industry
ull
Page OPS-18
GHe Purging
o
w
"Iw
r_
Figure
1.
Limits
of Flammability-Mixtures
of H2and
He
Page
OPS-
19
r.
mm
Z_
I
.ram
H
g!t
DE_
I
mw
Programmable
Page I OPS-5
Technique
Logic
(PLC's) systems
in and processes.
to control
......
.-.,.,:?_i:%qiliiiiiiiiiiSitii!!iiiiiiiiSiill /
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: II_!iiiii/liiliiiii/ili_i_iqiililii_iiiii/i!iiiliiil_!i_ !!i_ lil_i$!i!ii/_/i/itii i$/il!i!_/!I !!!_iiiql is!il_iiit_!_!! _!i!_i_i_$!@!i_t!li!i!!! _i !_ !!! !_! !ii! l/_ii !_!/_!i_i
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:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
..::::
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Benefits
System/equipment design using PLC's is a prime example of the application of maintainability design objectives. PLC's are designed with ease of maintenance and troubleshooting When virtually all components are solid state, as a major function. maintenance is reduced detection to
the replacement of a modular, plug-in type component. Fault circuits and diagnostic indicators, incorporated in each major
component, can tell whether the component is working properly. With the programming tool, any programmed logic can be viewed to see if input or outputs are on or off.
w
Key Words
i
Controller,
Programmable
Application Experience
w
System
(STS),
Facilities
and Ground
Support
Technical Rationale
Conventional relay-based control systems are more and cannot handle complex processing as efficiently PLC's in system design will reduce failure rates downtime, ultimately saving a program money.
and subsequent
Contact
Center
Kennedy
z
Page OPS-20
w
Programmable Logic Controllers, Page 2 Technique OPS-5 Programmable Logic Technique OPS-5 Controllers Table 1. Typical Programmable FeaturesBenefits .,,
High
Logic
Benefits
I reliability
PLC'S
provide
control
capabilities
not are
Solid
systems controllers
Programmable Memory
now able to operate machines and processes with an efficiency and accuracy never before achievable with conventional relay-based control systems. Usually, PLC architecture is modular and flexible, allowing and software elements to expand hardware as the
Small Size
Ill
Microprocessor Based
application requirements change. If an application outgrows the limitations of the PLC, the unit can easily be replaced with a unit having greater memory and input/output can be reused capacity, and the old hardware for a smaller application. PLC attributes cost effective. make Their
Communications capability Higher level of performance Higher quality products Multi-function capability Eliminate hardware Easily changed presets Reduced hardware wiring
COSts
Software Timers/Counters
I installed purchases
u i
II
to be located conveniently, often in less than half tt_ pace required by an equivalent relay contro: _,anel. On a small scale changeover from relays, the PLC'S' small and modular construction allows it to be mounted near the relay enclosure terminal strips. and pre-wired to existing Actual changeover can be
|
w
made quickly by simply connecting the input/output devices to the pre-wired terminal available slrips. Table 1 lists some and benefits of PLC'S. features Diagnostic Indicators
Eliminates long wiring conduit runs Reduced troubleshooting time Proper operation of signal
Neat panel Easily Easily maintained wired
i
In large installations, remote input/output stations are placed at optimum locations. The remote station is connected to the processor by a pair of twisted wires. This configuration results in a considerable reduction of material and labor cost that would multiple have been associated and conduits. and Operation of size, complexity, set of parts. others Some with running wires
appearance
of control
or of
Figure
1, identifies
a basic
_-I I
of the PLC.
In addition
to a power that is
are hardware;
are software
and a housing
II
Programmable
Logic
Controllers, Technique
Page OPS-5
--[PARTS
OF A PROGRAMMABLE
CONTROLLER]--
Signals
From
Process
INPUT INTERFACE
. w
PROGRAMMING TOOL
z s
1
PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE
Signals
to Process
Figure
1. Parts
of a Programmable
Controller
provide
the main as
an input
central
information
unit (CPU), language, interface. The Input the machine The principal receive
working groups called words. Each word stored in memory is either an instruction or piece of data. The data may be reference data or a stored signal from the process that has been brought in through the input interface. The operation of the processor and memory fairly_simple of the PLC can be described repetitive sequence: as
Interface function
provides being
connection controlled.
to is to
or process
of the interface
and convert
field signals
Page
OPS-22
Programmable
Logic
Controllers, Technique
Page OPS-5
Ig
Look
at the process
being
controlled.
Alternative
languages control
use as
This is accomplished by examining the information from the input interface. Compare information program. 3. Decide needed. Execute the control signals action by to the output whether any control action is the information supplied with control in the
schemes
representation.
IB
m
The Progr.amming between concepts particular selected symbols, of electrical programmer devises program PLC. letters, signals
provide
connection The
i
by and stored
in the version
Ill
the program
that is used
Process Improvements The use of control and monitor with the benefit ofa PLC could Increased system availability
Decreased downtime requirements recover from a failure Decreased hours cost in materials
to
il
processor
are appropriate to produce external devices. The Pjo_am program the PLC. the actions desired process sections and Pro_am The program output control
Increased Increased
The in of the Reference National Technology Transfer Inc. (PLC Seminar, Aurora, Colorado, 1992) flexibility requirements.
is written
by the user
and stored
for a given
condition. The program includes that d_e_t_h - bfi_nging_the - prgccss memory, making, sections and sections into decision action.
data into the controller that represent physical output that deal with converting
languages have many forms. Early versions were restricted to mat_ch the conventions of relay logic which that consisted of ladder closure types a _ are diagrams specified contact
and coils. This type 0fprogramconsistsgf representation of a relay logic control scheme. The relay ladder language
types
Page
OPS-23
Page 1 OPS-6
Technique
During drives,
the design of new (or upgrades to) motor generator consider the use of solid state assemblies for control
i:._:_:._::i:i:: : :_:_:.'.: _ __:-':.'.,: _._::_i:_._. _:,':.:_::..:._: _._:: :A_:_:_:_ ." _:'._,:: _:.,'_:.<:: :-'.:':_:_:.: :_ -,.'::: _i..-. _:_.:_i:-: :?.i:-_ _.,.':_:_:_._ i_ii:i:ii_i_::i:_:.::,._._ _._i_.__'i:,,.'..'i::_:::.:i.:::_-,:.'_:i.,:?:_._.,:.-.':_ _ _..': ?_::_.:: :__::_:_::_ :_.'..:::_:._: _,_i:i.,.',<_: .:.::_5::.;_ _: ._:_" _'.-_ _._:$:_::.:.::::.z_.:>..::._:_:::_:_:"_ _::_...._.._:..%%_.._.__.'.2_'__'"<'" _._::'::_'_:+:_"_'. +_':'.'._':_'-':':'-':':'::_'::_:::-_::_'. .,._.,,._:.:.li_ .:-._..:,._ _':'_':_.:::::_'_":_ _:::_ _.."._i_ _._:_:::i_::__<:_:_:i::".".:_"-':_:_::_:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
w
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:_:_:
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Benefits
instead
of magnetic
amplifiers
can improve
Features such as fault can be easily employed. resolution can result can also be in improved
Diagnostics for system health status and problem readily provided. Incorporation of these features system performance and availability.
Key
Words
Restoration,
Maintainability,
Application Experience
National Systems.
Space
Transportation
System
Shuttle
Ground
Support
Technical Rationale
-:_._:
At KSC the 175- and 250-Ton Bridge Cranes in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) were using metadynes (electromechanicai rotating amplifiers) for control function. The metadyne had a long history of maintenance problems because of brush wear, contamination and corrosion. It required extensive pre-operation maintenance attention to support Shuttle processing. In addition, the metadyne units often required maintenance during processing operations impacting processing schedules. KSC replaced the metadynes with solid state controller units resulting in decreased maintenance actions including pre-operation maintenance and improved system performance and availability. Fault isolation and removal and replacement of failed components is easier and less time consuming. Since failures occur at a less frequent rate, the need for numerous operating spares is reduced. Furthermore, the "off equipment" in-shop maintenance of failed units requires much less time and money to effect a repair. Reduced maintenance and downtime allow for the crane to be ready and operating to support Shuttle processing in a more timely manner.
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
OPS-24
I1
DC Drive Technique
- Solid 0P5-6
State
Control
response operation.
rate.
However, reliable
they
and highly
once in
m I
improvement
or SCR is
I
over previous control methods. Historically, the first methtd-tfob_taml"_figadjustabl_ ..... speed using DC motors was the constant fie! d adjustment._, of adjustment. by the rotating potential I)(2 supply using
tube. drive
current
c_cuits enable=the SCR to and reverse readily. Larger and SCR's have extended the
less expensive
M-G system of Ward Leonard patented in the 1890's. This drive used an AC motor driving a DC generator to convert AC to DC
range to well over 1000 HP. Figure 2 illustrates a controlled rectifier drive. Note that the gateing replaced reduced Solid of rotating State control and SCR bridge have in the M-G set of Figure machinery. 1, resulting
power. The motor and generator may be combined in a single frame and use a common controlled shaft, 1). or separate The output coupled units is (See Figure DC voltage
by adjusting
Figure 3 shows
El
solid state control system for DC drives. Single phase thyristor power conver(e-tsupplies up to 200 volts controller for armature speed control positive (speed voltage at 20 amperes closed-loop provides feedback compensation acceleration to the generator field. A
or negative
in a closed loop system. An important aspect of this drive is that power flow reversible. driving drives power The motor the generator the AC motor as a motor, which which
or AC/DC
and deceleration.
_isa useful feature !n inertias or holding back This is a very replacing important with a the M-G
circui t prov!des an isolated gate drive to the power converter. A bi-directional adapter used in conjunction assembly provides with the fuing bi-directional circuit current to
conventional packaged rectifier (SCR) drive. In the late 1940's, began to replace vacuum, thyratron, tubes for armature limited ratings. replace acceptance cooling and water
silicon-controlled
for contactoriess
reversing or to regulate to zero output voltage in the presence of residual tube drives These used had magnetism circuitry of the DC generator. includes a voltage sensing Protective relay for
w m
excitron, or ignitron circuit control. They because 1960's requirements on larger the tubes
safety interlocking and an isolator for isolated armature current feedback. References 1. KSC Electrical Drawing for VAB 250 Ton Cranes, 250-69-K-L-11388.
state thyristor
Magnetic amplifier drives were developed in the mid-1950's when silicon diodes became popular. because They were never as widely used and of difficulties of reactor design
175
I
Page OPS-25
Page 3 OPS-6
3-Phase AC Supply
-I-
I, x I c,cer
i I....looenora'orl I
Figure 11 Rotating M-G System
Supply
u r_ t_
DC MOTOR
Armature
Voltage
Feedback
Figure
2.
Controlled
Rectifier
Drive
Page
0PS-26
I lUnum
11
+6V
-6V
SIGNAL ISOLATOR
Figure
3. M-G
Control-Reversing
Simplified
Schematic
Motor
Generator
Page
0PS-27
AC - Variable
Frequency
Technique
to existing control.
systems current
requiring (AC)
control,
b.'_:
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Benefits
frequency devices
for motor
speed
control
over systems
with mechanical
motor
advantages system
resulting
maintainability,
of preventive system
and corrective
maintenance
of mechanical
i..;
iJ
Key Words
AC Variable
Frequency
Drive,
System
Performance,
Availability
Application Experience
I I
Launch
Complex
Propulsion
System,
Liquid
Oxygen
Subsystem
Technical Rationale
r
pads
and gaseous
the clutch
Contact Center
Kennedy
Page
w
OPS-28
AC - Variable
Frequency
AC - Variable Technique
Frequency
Drive
Systems
The control
circuitry
the
SCR's on 60 times per second to obtain the desired current flow. Each time a new SCR is gated, off. it then forces a previous one to shut
I
If it is necessary
speed control than mechanical devices with DC or AC motors. AC variable frequency drive systems allow for direct coupling and eliminates the need for mechanical devices= such as clutches these mechanical maintenance Adjustable advantages simplicRy, maintenance motors. adverse explosive locations. speed and pulleys. Elimination of devices results in decreased and repair because costs. of i AC drives also offer many andi0w 7
SCR's, all gate signals are removed and the SCR's then turned off naturally when the AC input
7=
voltage
is reversed. is so called the inverter Electronically that filters and provides because and it is an of
i
The DC link module a device converter inductor u_f0rm module. a constant that connects modules. or choke module
it is
downtime
the output
the converter
a more
capability,
of induction
flow Of current to the inverter Since the inductor tries to maintain flow of current through it, this
I
These motors are suitable for conditions such as dirty air, atmospheres, and inaccessible
allows the=voltage source converter to function as a current source to the inverter module. The inverter module Here takes the filtered and converts are gated, the SCR's DC it one
frequency
drive
from the DC link module back to AC. after the other, steering
for an AC induction motor will of a converter module, DC link and inverter The module. configuration The following frequency shown and the of an adjustable
of each of three input lines to the motor. The faster the SCR's are fired, the faster motor turns. Since
the type of control scheme used classify drive as a current source inverter type. Figure 1 illustrates three fundamental used in converting the AC input variable AC output. The converter programmable module into a
here, external commutating capacitors are used to ensure that each time a new SCR is fired, an old or previously shut off. Drive Operation The following paragraphs some of the characteristics a. Output voltage conducting one is
steps
of as a the
DC voltage
where
three AC input lines are rectified by silicon controlled rectifiers (SCR's) to provide a variable DC output. An SCR can be thought of as a controlled rectifier or switch that lets current gated again flow in the forward or opened. Then until the flow reverses the SCR regains capability until gated direction or ceases. its forward again. when At it cannot shut off
and current
delivered to a motor are both sinusoidal. operating inverter the motor (see Figure
from the AC input line This is not true when from a current voltage The source 1). The
[]
lid
waveform is closely sinusoidal with disturbances called commutation spikes. output current is a high quality quasi-square
m_ wml
Page OPS-29
II
m
g
AC - Variable
Frequency
Page 3 OPS-7
ConveNer
Inverter
Inductor
or
=_ r_
Typical Commutation
Spike
Figure
1. Simplified
Adjustable
Speed
Drive
source
Since which
during implies
normal a large
no attempt a result
to define
the shape
The output
of the current
and rotation
discussing
The shape of the current is def'med and its level is increased to obtain the required voltage.
or output
drive be suddenly disconnected. The inductor would normally develop whatever voltage is needed to maintain the constant flow of DC. To mitigate damaging voltage levels, are incorporated are based within a path for this DC. the danger of these protective circuits the drive to provide schemes
Stated more simply, the control circuitry contains an inner current regulator loop with an outer supplied voltage regulator current loop that ensures are that the proper and voltage
to the motor.
The protective
on the capability
of both the
Page OPS-30
A C - Variable
Frequency
inverterandconvertermodulesto providea pathfor this currentby firing two series SCR'sin the converterandinvertermodules, thusgenerating a directshortcircuit path throughwhich the currenttrappedin the inductormayflow. The process of firing theseSCR'sto providea currentpathis called"crowbar." c. Outputclamp: With anabmpt lossof load,the protectivemechanism operates as follows. The inverteroutputleadsto the motor areequippedwith a devicecalledan "outputclamp." If the motoris abruptly disconnected, the outputcurrentfrom the inverterwill transferto this clampcircuit until its level hits 950volts DC. At this point, thecontrolcirc_uitrywflIforcea"crowbar"andshut off the converter
module. performed. d. Commutation: by which conducting types power Commutation is a process Two in the This prevents any further increase is in output voltage; an orderly shutdown
very low speeds, in discrete two-pole complete reduced connected disappears References 1. KSC Electrical Drawing steps machine rotation depending load. At a frequency
appears
to move rotate. a
[]
in six distinct per second. The visual above on the inertia effect
at a is
i
completely
I
at speeds
a few Hertz.
Advanced
Schematic
[] i
of commutation circuit,
e. Regeneration: two-quadrant
is a it to
of accepting
-'-=_ i
power from the DC bus and returning the line when the DC bus potential is
negative. This capability makes the current source inverter one of the few inverter types that are inherently excessive circuit regenerative complication.
7
without
am
cogging: module
Each causes
to be abruptly
one phase and started in another. forces the motor to turn one-sixth rotation 4-pole on a 2-pole machine, etc. machine, This explains
one-half
[]
Page OPS-31
[]
2
Technique
new design
or upgrades
to existing systems
transmission of metallic
systems, cable
in place
:!'_.':.'." !:!?.!._:_:_ i:!:_:'.:."_:::i/::_: ::'.::: .'.':: _::.".':i: _!_:! _ !_i ::__.._-._.-....:..::_ . _ ......... ::_.:: _......_ 4...:::... ".:/_::::_ _::":::_:."._:..: _::::')_-'.'::::!:!_:.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: _:_.'." _:_.".'._ __i:_:_.'.'::_::':""" """":::::,_ ::_ ::_::.'." _:._ .'._: :."J: :_:_::
================================
: ._:_ ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: _ :::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::: : _ .5_.'..':_:_.'.:_.'.::':.':: _::_:.:'..,:._::: .:::::_:_._::. :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: _:!:!:i:!:!:i:!:!:'_:!:':_:!:i_ [_:_: .'._::::_: :_: :.'._:::::: :.',:::__ :::::: ::: ?._.<:::: :_: ::_:?.:.'.':_:: ::,: :._ :::::::: _:_ :_:_:::::::: :_-'.':: ::::: :_:::::::: :_:::: :::::: _::_,'::') _:_:._:_:[: _!:_?.':_:_:!:i:i:!:!:3:i:_:i:i:i:'::!::::': _:::_ _:_ ?:::' "._ :.)!:i:?.!:i:_i:i_:!:i:!:i:!!i:!_?..!_:_!_:_!_!_..`._?.._:_i[_i_!_!-...:ii_:_:i_ii:_i_i_i_:_:_:_:_:_:_:::_:_:_:_:_::_:_:::_:_:_:_:_[_::_:_:_:_:_:i_i:_:!:!_:'..i:_:_.:_!:_:_:!:_:_::......:[:.::_:.::_:_:[:_:_:.``_:_..`..:_i.`..:[:!.`..:i:i:_:::_:_
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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,: ======================== ", ii:", :"":!i!:i:':_:!:::_! :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: "!i:::" '!i:::..'.::::: i _::_:i:::_:::_:::"._ _:_:::_:::::_ ' !:::::i:_::?" ::::::::::::::::::::: "!:::::_::"!:::".i:" ':::::::i .".::::_" !:.".'" '" "i ":'::i:::_ ._[__ i _i_.".. _ ...... :.....:...,.._... . . ;_:_.:::: ..,_ .:. :-.., ..:.....-::.... ,.: :::::_:;:,_!. !:: ..... :::i: _:?-_::::: ":
._............_..._
:`.i:!_!:!:_:!:!:i:..`._:_:!:_:_:i:._:.._..i:_:_i?:_i:_:_:!:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::_::::_:_:_!:!:::!:!:_:_:._'.!_:!:_:_:!:.::_:.:_:_:!:_:!:_:_:_>..:_i:i:i_:i:._i:i:.:i:i:i:i:_:!_i:_:?.!_:!:!:_:_:_.`..:_:_:_:_:_:_:i:_:_.`_:_:i>..:_:._5!_!:i:!:i:!
t.....
Benefits
designed maintenance
of time without
any preventive
transmission interference,
-i,
lines and couplers are relatively immune to electromagnetic adverse temperature, and moisture conditions and can be cable. control An optic fiber can be 20 times electrical isolation lighter energy. for safety and smaller than copper wire and still carry far more provides
used Using
five times
r
circuits
in hazardous environments. Because optical they are safe to use in explosive environments of short circuits in metal wires and cables.
Key
Words
Fiber
Optics,
Maintainability
Application Experience
w
Kennedy Processing
Space
Center
Ground
Support
Systems
(e.g.,
Launch
System,
Ground
Communications
System).
Technical Rationale
Fiber
optics
can enhance
the transmission
quality,
capacity,
and safety
environment of the system. The system designer should carefully weight the pros and cons of fiber optics vs. copper, microwave, or satellite installed system repair for the transmission properly, availability, costs. Reliability medium. Optical without cable fiber, if cabled any preventive and will enhance and reduce and will last for years of optical minimize
maintenance.
downtime
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
OPS-32
Page 2 OPS-8
m Z
in
the fiber as
l
much. A fiber has a lower temperature coefficient th_most cable elements, Components and Operation found in fiber optic flf_er 0_ti_cable, Figure 1 illustrates ' This construction provides impac-t reS_s_anCeihowever, protect better crush and it does not of meaning that it expands and contracts directly less. appfied The basic elements receiver, The tight buffer has a plastic
over thefiberc0ating
|
i
the main parts of a fibe r optic system. The following is a brief description of these' elements and their function: The Transmitter signal consists equipment converts _ electrical The transmitter The circuit
temperature variations. Because the plastic expands and contracts at a different rate than the fiber, contractions temperature microbends. caused by variations in can result in loss-producing Tight buffers are more flexible tight
l
i
and a source.
chang_es=the input signal int_a'form required to operate the source. The source, either a light-emitting diode (LED) or laser diode, does the actual conversion. The Fiber Optic Cable is the medium for
and allow tighter turn radii. Therefore; tube i:;u-ffers are useful for indoor applications where temperature variations to make are minimal and the capability turns inside walls is desired. Strength members to the fiber cable. strength steel, members and fiberglass
| |
m
tight
carrying the light signal. The main parts of a fiber cable are the optical fiber, cladding, buffer parts fiber jacket, buffer, Figure two strength 2 illustrates concentric part. The members, the main The optical layers called The inner core surrounding and jacket. contains
add mechanical strength The most common are Kevlar epoxy Aramid yarn, and rods. During
[]
m
after installation, the strength members handle the tensile stresses applied to the cable Kevlar so that the fiber is not damaged. is most commonly fibers are placed used when within their own find better
[]
is the light-carrying
individual
provides the difference in index that allows tOtal internal of light through the core. coating The applied to the
jackets. Steel and fiberglass members use in multi-fiber cables. Steel offers strength cable. than fiberglass, for maintaining also attracts Steel best choice
lighting,
whereas
fiber does not. Cable buffers are one of two types, loose or tight. The loose buffer uses a hard plastic tube having an inside diameter that of the fiber. One or more within the buffer forces tube. acting fiber from mechanical becomes the rest of the cable the load bearing several times fibers lie the and the The Receiver converts
The choice
of jacket
As the
it back to an electrical
Page OPS-33
=== :
Fiber Optic Systems, Page 3 Technique OPS-8 receiver an output contains section. a detector, The amplifier, and with conventional hauls current, control of less than necessary. components electronics. are reduced of fiber
w
systems
and for short are of electrical system's life of the and the costs costs
amplifier
enhances
10 km, no repeaters
the attenuated
signal
The output section functions such as: and data, shitting ECL, etc.) pulse to ensure
the life of a fiber optic the useful system, the light source,
reshaping
and timing,
optic
are lower
than metal
Connectors various
components
of a fiber optic
cables because the shipping and handling costs are about one-fourth and labor costs one-half that of current metal cables.
system, are vital to system performance. connector is defined as a disconnectable device detector,
w
References
fiber.
be easily connected and disconnected many times. A splice is a device used to connect one fiber to another permanently. and connectors to power Connection couples another by splices
1.
of Fiber
Optics
Reliability
Maintainability, 2. Fiber
light from one component with as little loss of optical is precise alignment
Rates 1980.
for
The key to a fiber optic of the (or spots in single-mode all the light is coupled 3. AWP, Technician's Optics, 1987. for Fiber
fiber cores
so that nearly
from one fiber across the junction to the other fiber. Contact between the fibers is not required. precise
w
However,
the demands
of a
alignment
to the designer
features
that should
be
and isolation,
Improvements Fiber optics systems offer many benefits. In sensing systems, sensitive electronics can be isolated
_z
L F_
from shock,
vibration,
and harsh
environments,
resulting
in more economical
packaging. The number of repeaters required for low attenuation cable is less than
Page
OPS-34
Page 4 OPS-8
--
t - - -- __em..,_r....
I SIGNAL IN I I I , i = I DR_VER I--I = SOURCE I---II I I [ I
',
SOURCE I -TOF_BER I--I 'OP _CALI-[ I FIBER / -[ CONNECTION I I
_,
=
.....
I" ....................
R_Zve7 - I
I
I1[ OUTPUT . I ........
I _.,,I KI_U
i
[ [ I-.,,--I AMPLIFIER [ I I--IDETECTORI--I I [ FIBER TO DETECTOR
" i
[]
_.
S,GmAL, I
OUT I
I/
I i
m m m m m _ m
I I
m m m m m _
I
m
I CONNECTION
=1
m
,
_
,
i
8LACK
POLVU_Er.ANt OUTEa.JACCEV _
STRENGTH x MEM /
Page
0PS-35
Pneumatic
Systems
-- Pilot-Controlled
Pressure
Regulator
Loadingo Technique
Page 1 OPS-9
_m_
Technique
vented
regulator
in
system pressure
to provide
pressures
in system/equipment policies
requirements
mm_.m
Benefits
r . z tl
Design
of a pneumatic
systems
pressure
regulators
offers circuit is
the following Requirement eliminated. Logistics decreased System components Elimination reliability.
requirements is increased
by elimination
of additional
by elimination
maintainability
Key Words
r _
Pneumatic,
Regulator,
Pressure
Application Experience
Apollo, Ground
National Support
Space Systems
Transportation
System
(STS),
Pneumatic
Technical Rationale
When pressure
system
requirements
mandate pressure
reference count
and associated
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
w
OPS-36
Pneumatic
Systems
-- Pilot-Controlled
Pressure
Regulator
Loadinb Technique
Page 2 OPS-9
- Pilot-Controlled Loading
Pressure in Pneumatic systems must be controlled. Primary points of control are downstream the pressure of the source (compressor) :_2on_trol of downstream of the _ _ :: : -: :: .... ::_:i -::,:_ :: _ and
I
system_eceive_ank). is required
"
_=_
= ........
compressor downstream
for system safety and ................... of the receiver to m_aintai_na _-_ .... _--:: :: _: ::: source for efficient operation .....
steady pressure
of other system components. Pneumatic : ....... systems use pressure regulators to provide this control. For those systems using ::
standard dome-loaded (pilot-operated) regulators, this practice requires use of separate regulator A venting pressure upstream event vented system type regulator regulators. regulator for loading Figure the pilot operated 1 shows
-_ -_-_:/- -:: :
with separate
relief valves.
limits downstream than that of the It also acts as in the _ _ This method Figure system 1 also which
a relief valve for its leg of the circuit of pressure eliminates the need for a separate circuit.
relief valve
in the dome-loading
of Pneumatic 2.
Equipment. 0225-
Parker-Hannifin Power.
Corp., Bulletin
B 1, Fluid
Page
OPS-37
Pneumatic Systems-
NON-VENTING
(VENT)
PNEU. INPUT __ REGULATED
[ : w
LT_IJ
PILOT OPERATED (DOME LOADED) REGULATOR
:>OUTPUT
VENTINGPNEU. INPUT _
t
[VENT) _ "
=--
= I.,,#
Figure 1. Examples
of Non-Vented
Systems
(Schematics)
Page
OPS-3 8
r._
ii
m
BB
L m
Ul
N m
BB
.m m
m
m i ND
L_J
iil
L=
IB
r_
H mm
Modular
Automated
Power
Switching
Device,
Page
Technique OPS-IO
Technique
modular, specifications,
power
switching
devices
in new policies
designs
and system
Specify
application
in system/
documents,
and design
and practices.
a_
Benefits
Miniaturizing
of conventional
electronic
components
and assembling
them in convenient groupings provides the following benefits: More efficient base of maintenance can be achieved. Logistics stocking Keeping support modules modules requirements as opposed at lowest (materials, to piece parts. level of maintenance for sophisticated in improved (throw-away) will and highly the test equipment parts, etc.) are reduced by
will result
by isolating loads.
Key Words
Power,
Switching,
Modular
Application Experience
National
Space
Transportation
System
Technical Rationale
!
Incorporation
of the technique
will achieve
high
maintenance costs from premature or sand intrusion and other severe program device operations has been detrimental around extremely reliable
failure of hardware due to moisture environmental conditions. Shuttle have shown that this switchover that are even under equipment. conditions
the world
normally
to electrical
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
OPS-39
ModularAutomated
Automated OPS-I O
Power
Switching:
recommends tolerant,
single-fault devices
that e_ance
and expedite
system
i
ii
of lighted
visual Landing
Aids
the Ball/Bar lights for the Inner Glideslope ....must be powered by a p_rim_ary/rod 5acku_ _ power source with automatic source switchover failure. Engineers The had to fail in the event of primary
R.eliability/Maintainability
ensure the system would not prematurely and that the switchover mechanism was relatively effort, inexpensive, self-contained, automated 1). could instead. to Shuttle and power and easy to install/maintain. the modularized device (see Figure switching implemented Failure Transfer Ball/Bar As a result of this
was developed
to utilize Switches
result The
Ill
in excessive
cost if commercial
Automatic
g
light system
systems prior
must be
& Ground
Specification,
Au!omatic for
Page OPS_0
Modular Automated
LI
L2
L1
L2
START SWITCH
K2A
--
--K1A
KIB
--
sl I- !
T
K1 AUX
-_-
7'
L_
_LT1
=4
, ,' oo, o,
L1 L2
MODULE
ENCLOSURE
IF K1A OR KIB FAILS OPEN - K2 DROPS OUT CAUSING SUPPLY TO COME ON LINE.
THE BACK-UP
POWER
IF THE PRIMARY POWER SUPPLY FAILS - K2 DROPS OUT CAUSING POWER SUPPLY TO COME ON LINE.
THE BACK-UP
S1 IS USED TO SUPPLY THE PRIMARY LINES AND IS ALSO USED TO BY-PASS K2A & K1 AUX TO ACTIVATE AND LOCK ON K1.
Figure
1. Modularized
Automatic
Power
Source
Switching
Device
Page OPS-41
_m
IB
IB
I_
ii
u_B g
II
m_ r m
i um
I m
m m
Pneumatic
System
Contamination
Protection,
Page 1
Technique OPS-11
Technique
Install filters immediately upstream of all interfaces systems to control dirt and water contamination.
in pneumatic
ii_iiiiiiili tiiii_i/iii_iii_ii_i_iiilitit_!i!lii_
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::_. ::':::_.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: _:: .'.':_:_::::::: _ _:_:._ _:?-:: .'.'_.::: _ :..'._:: :_::_::: :i:i:_:_: :_:_:_:_ _:i:_:_:i:i:i:i:i:_:_:_:i_:_:i:i:_:?..:_:_:i:_:i:i:i:i:i:_::: :i:i:i:!:i:::i:!:::i:i_: ::::i:_i_;::i: :!:': :: :i:_:: _:_: :..'.:,_:: ,_:_: _: ::: :::: _:.'...':::_::: :i_'_::
..%.._._.::_-_ _ __
+._- ..... _..,: _: _:.::_:: ::,
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :_:.". _: _..'..:'._: : ::::::_.:::_. :_::'__:: .":::::: : :_ : ::'.-"::::::: :: : :: :_:::."..'.'_:::: ::: ::: :_:::: : _:::: : : :.:: :i::::: ::: ::: :_ _: :: : ::: :::: :_.":_:_:.:_:: :_i: :i:i:!:_:i_._:_:i:_:_:_:_: "_::. _::" ::_:::: :_.:'_:::::-_ :'_._: _::: : ::'):: ::: ::: :::-'.':.::::-:: ::::::,'.'::::_:'::_:_: :::_.'.':_:::_:?.: _: :_::_: ::::i_::::::i::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :._:: ::::.':::::: _:._:: : :::._:_ _:l_:_._,_ ............................... _:_,..:::._.:.:._
_:_'_
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
j"
...
::
.': :_.:::..:::.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.,.::." _.....:.._+..:_ .... :..::_:.._..::: ,..:..::::_:........:...; ....... :..:....:..:.....:. : .,.: ..... :_..:_ ........ ::...: ....... :::::::::::::::::::::::::: ....: ...-.. :.....:.. :.......: .:..,.:.....::::...,.:.. :.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : ._:::::_::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: __:it_: .:'_'"_ ........ __'"' "_'_ ......... ".":_ _ ':" "'_'"" _"":':: """'" '_'_i!i_ "" """"_" """:+"<""""":':_:::":_:'_:_':''_"_"" "" "_" " "" "" ".......... _'" " "_"'_"' "" _'_ _'............... "_'"" _'" _"" __:::_..:!2{ '_ ....... :::::_:::::_:::' _:._::.::::. _:::::'.'::::' ............ _::: _:_ :::: _::_ ............. .'.::::::_ _......... :_ _:::::_ ::._ ........... ::::_._:_::: : ::..-: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::_: _::_._ I_ : _.,. _:: .,.': _ i:_i_:L.'.,_..'._:_:.::..'i
:::::::::::::::::::::::::: L_ w
.: : :,_...,_.:,,..::....... :.:.+...+:
:,,...:.:
Benefits
Proper
use of filters,
prevents
with
component
E
Decreased Efficient
and effective
of servicing
by
filter cleaning
Key Words
Pneumatic,
Protection,
Contamination
Application
iml
Apollo, Support
National Systems
Space
Transportation
System,
Pneumatic
Ground
Experience
Technical Rationale
-:!
before
to enter
of interfaces contamination
this objective
with component
Contact
Center
Kennedy
Space
Center
(KSC)
Page
OPS-42
Pneumatic
System
Contamination
System OPS-11
Contamination
clogged
to its maximum
iii
capability).
=,_
is designed
or gas
system
expensive,
interferes
operation. System gas must be conditioned; it must be decontarninated before it is =-:_:_::_ allowed KSC defines Filters upstream particulate appropriate particulate Selection analysis protection minimal drop). Filter housings and elements shall be constructed of 300 series stainless steel to reduce particulate contamination due to corrosion. Seal materials shall conform to manufacturer's requirements construction recommendations specified herein. should be welded and the The element instead of to enter a pneumatic system. The systems for filters:
maintenance from
design
standard
problems
the following
contamination.
I
Decreased References
system
availability.
is critical as required
requirements.
Bulletin
components
l i
performance
soldered whenever possible to simplify cleaning. Where 300 series stainless steel is specified, type 303 and other austenitic stainless possible corrosion should steels because cracking. be the deciding should be avoided However, factor. filtering in any way system flow rate whenever to stress of susceptibility
overall
cost
design
Page
OPS-43
=
Q8-1@-1995
15:14
P.@2
""
F_.
App+ow_
REPORT DOCUMENTATION
Dlriloforlll for Infm, mut}an C _lrltllml ind Papm'tw. I | 1 li J/|flrlMI DIVII Mlgrlwly,
PAGE
UiJI_i 1 ;[_, AfllrloTorl+ YA Z++u;I-6.3uz, Erie
oMlNo,
118 lirlW _ilTItgl UI[ IMlrlalilmmln[
Public mportl_+; b_+--_o_ thll collection of Informetlqn le o_Jfn, I t_l to mverfg9 I ho'ar Fm.rrmupnn.H, I.,,alud!nll _ t.kl_ f_ revle.wlng Ingtm_/onm, _,L_I+n__ IXll_k'lU dl_.l SOUPINg0glt._ll IrlE .nd r_..mlntalnlns the alike nomclml, el+_l oompllUl'_l ins rlv+lWll_ _ .oo_i+i.._:lOnIs T M11.o,rm, ITlOfi, .Imlna ol._rmlnll mjlmmmg 'mew burd,n **tim,t, or ,my omit iipem of _1, oollemlon _ Inform,tiroL In .dudln _ luOgp_nn+ f,r ,_ly.m,g Im.*..numpntp .w_l_*_nm0_n .m.,uq_ul_e_, u e_r__1. _. NK_01t. P+l_vMk 1. AOENCYUiEON_ Rodu_Jo | PrOJl(X (0704_1U). _ b_n_ WNhlngton, DATE December 4.7_LEANDSUBTffLE 1994 DC 20503, 2. RI_ORT TYPE AND DATE8 COVERED Technical Memorandum 8, FUNDIN tu NUM|ERE
|.REPO_
_.AUTHO_(B)
NASA Reliability
and Maintainability
Steering
Committee
1 I. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE8
Iaa. DISTNBUTION_VAI_LITYETATEM_T
Igb. DISTNBU_ON
CODE
Unlas_ified
Unlimited
Subject 13, ABSTRACT (MaximUm 200 wwdal This manual presents operational effeetlvness of tools that minimizes It Restoring conducting Sustaining a
Category
38
series of recommended techniques of both flight and ground based risk associated wi_h; fllgh_ the of an
that NASA
It
overall provides
set
failed functions (both ground and co_plex a_d highly vlsiblemaintenance a technical capability to support or facilities program Rangement key elements
using
agin_ effort;
main_alnability
{2) design and developmen_ - techniques that have benefited previous programs; (3) analysis and teS_ - qu_tltative _d qualitative analysis processes and testing techniques; and (4) operations and operational design techniques that address NASA field experience. This d_cument is a valuable resource for continuous improvement ideas in executing _he systems development process in accordance with the NASA "better, faster, ,_aller, end cheeper" goal without +om_omlalng _afety.
14. su_Ec'r_[_| maintainability, yet_me engineering, space effectiveness, ground-based cost 7. SECUR_r_ CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified NON 7540-01,2E0_51S00
I1.
and
test, life-cycle
1 E, NUMBER OF PAGES
104
10, PNCE CODE
A05
IiCuRrrf CLAEEIFICA'rlON
OF THIS PAeE
20.
LIMITATION
OF
ABE'TRACT
Uncleselfled