MS TMG Add 1.1

Forefront TMG 2010 Common Criteria Evaluation
Guidance Documentation Addendum

Microsoft Forefront Threat Management Gateway Team
Author:
Vladimir Holostov, Microsoft Corp. Nady Gorodetsky, Microsoft Corp. Stephan Slabihoud, TViT GmbH
Version: Last Saved: File Name:
1.1 2010-12-13 MS_TMG_ADD_1.1.docx
Abstract
This document is the Guidance Documentation Addendum of Forefront TMG Standard Edition and Enterprise Edition.
Keywords
CC, TMG, Common Criteria, Firewall, Guidance Documentation Addendum
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Table of Contents
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INTRODUCTION TO THE GUIDANCE ADDENDUM ....................................................... 6 1.1 Scope ......................................................................................................................... 6 1.2 Security functionalities and Associated Chapters ....................................................... 7 1.3 Warnings about Functions and Privileges ................................................................... 8 1.4 Installation of the evaluated TMG 2010 Standard Edition ........................................... 8 1.4.1 Installation Requirements ....................................................................................... 8 1.4.2 Installation Procedures ........................................................................................... 9 1.5 Installation of the evaluated TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition ....................................... 26 1.5.1 Installation Requirements ..................................................................................... 26 1.5.2 Installation Procedures ......................................................................................... 27 2 SECURITY FUNCTIONALITIES ..................................................................................... 45 2.1 SF1 - Web Identification and Authentication ............................................................. 45 2.2 SF2 - Information Flow Control ................................................................................. 47 2.3 SF3 - Audit ............................................................................................................... 47 2.4 Administration-Related Interfaces............................................................................. 48 2.5 TOE User Interfaces................................................................................................. 48 3 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ................................................................................... 49 3.1 Assumptions ............................................................................................................ 49 3.2 Organizational Security Policies ............................................................................... 50 3.3 Security Objectives for the Environment ................................................................... 50 3.4 Requirements for the Operational Environment ........................................................ 51 4 SECURITY-RELEVANT EVENTS ................................................................................... 57 5 TOE INTEGRITY ............................................................................................................. 58 5.1 Integrity of the DVD-ROM content and ISO image ................................................... 58 5.1.1 Steps in order to ensure the integrity of Forefront TMG 2010 (Volume Licensing Standard Edition and Enterprise Edition) .......................................................................... 58 5.1.2 Steps in order to ensure the integrity of Forefront TMG 2010 (Boxed version Standard Edition only) ....................................................................................................... 59 5.2 Integrity of the Package ............................................................................................ 61 5.3 Version Number for the TOE .................................................................................... 62 6 ANNOTATIONS .............................................................................................................. 64 6.1 Authentication methods ............................................................................................ 64 6.1.1 Single Sign On...................................................................................................... 64 6.1.2 Authentication Process ......................................................................................... 65 6.1.3 Client Authentication Methods for Receipt of Client Credentials............................ 66 6.1.4 Methods for Validation of Client Credentials ......................................................... 67 6.1.5 Authentication Delegation ..................................................................................... 68 6.2 Lockdown Mode ....................................................................................................... 69 6.2.1 Affected functionality............................................................................................. 70 6.2.2 Leaving lockdown mode ....................................................................................... 70
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6.3 Configure RPC Filtering ........................................................................................... 70 6.4 Configure FTP Filtering ............................................................................................ 71 6.5 Configure SMTP Filtering ......................................................................................... 71 7 FLAW REMEDIATION GUIDANCE ................................................................................ 73 7.1 How to report detected security flaws to Microsoft .................................................... 73 7.2 How to get informed about Security Flaws and Flaw Remediation ........................... 74 7.3 Installing a remedy ................................................................................................... 75 7.4 Authentication of a Fix .............................................................................................. 76 8 REFERENCES AND GLOSSARY .................................................................................. 77 8.1 References............................................................................................................... 77 8.2 Acronyms ................................................................................................................. 78 8.3 Glossary ................................................................................................................... 78
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List of Tables
Page
Table 1.1 Security functionalities and associated chapters .................................................... 7 Table 1.2 Warnings about functions and privileges ................................................................ 8 Table 3.1 Assumptions for the IT environment and intended usage..................................... 49 Table 3.2 Security policies addressed by the TOE .............................................................. 50 Table 3.3 Security objectives for the operational environment ............................................. 50 Table 4.1 Security-relevant events ...................................................................................... 57
List of Figures
Page
Figure 2.1 Error messages .................................................................................................. 46 Figure 5.1 Example of Integrity check I (successful) ............................................................ 61 Figure 5.2 TMG 2010 Standard Edition (Box) ...................................................................... 61 Figure 5.3 Version number of TMG 2010 Standard Edition.................................................. 62 Figure 5.4 Version number of TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition ................................................ 62 Figure 5.5 Identifying TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition ............................................................ 63 Figure 7.1 Installation Instructions for Security Bulletin (example) ....................................... 75
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1 Introduction to the Guidance Addendum

This document is required by Common Criteria for the Microsoft Forefront Threat Management Gateway (TMG)1 Standard Edition and Enterprise Edition evaluation. The document should be used by any administrator who wants to ensure that the deployed TMG 20102 is the evaluated version (see [ST]). It is an addendum to the manual [MSTMG] which is delivered with TMG 2010.
1.1 Scope
This document extends the TMG 2010 manual [MSTMG] and provides required information for the TMG 2010 common criteria evaluation. The evaluated Guidance Documentation ([MSTMG] and this document) is valid for TMG 2010 Standard Edition and TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition. Its software version is for both evaluated configurations 7.0.7734.100.
1 2
short: TMG TMG 2010 references both configurations TMG 2010 Standard Edition and TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition.
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1.2 Security functionalities and Associated Chapters

The relevant chapters of the security functionality are summarized in the following table. Table 1.1 Security functionalities and associated chapters
Security [ST]) functionality (see Relevant chapters [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Planning and Design > Access design guide for Forefront TMG > Planning for publishing > About publishing Web servers > About authentication in Web publishing see Chapter 6.1 SF2 - Information Flow Control Access Rules: [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Operations > Setting up access to the Internet and corporate resources > Configuring firewall policy > Creating an access rule (Mail) Server Publishing Rules: [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Operations > Setting up access to the Internet and corporate resources > Configuring firewall policy > Creating a firewall policy Web Publishing Rules: [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Operations > Setting up access to the Internet and corporate resources > Configuring firewall policy > Creating a firewall policy System Policy: [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Planning and Design > Access design guide for Forefront TMG > Planning to control network access > About system policy Application Filter: Configure RPC Filtering > see Chapter 6.3 Configure FTP filtering > see Chapter 6.4 Configure SMTP filter buffer overflow thresholds > see Chapter 6.5 Web Application Filter: [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Operations > Protecting your networks > Configuring protection from Web-based threats > Configuring HTTP filtering [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Planning and Design > Protection design guide for Forefront TMG > Planning to protect against Web browsing threats > Planning for HTTP filtering URL filtering: [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Planning and Design > Protection design guide for Forefront TMG > Planning to protect against Web browsing threats > Planning for URL filtering SF3 - Audit [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Operations > Administering Forefront TMG > Monitoring Forefront TMG > Configuring Forefront TMG logs [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Operations > Administering Forefront TMG > Monitoring Forefront TMG > Configuring Forefront TMG logs > Querying the Forefront TMG logs [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Operations > Administering Forefront TMG > Monitoring Forefront TMG > Configuring Forefront TMG logs > Selecting log fields
SF1 Web Identification and Authentication
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1.3 Warnings about Functions and Privileges

The administrator guidance contains warnings about functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment. These are listed in following table. Table 1.2 Warnings about functions and privileges
Aspect Warnings Relevant chapters Each chapter identifies and describes the warnings, the assumptions and the security parameters related to that SF when necessary. The identification and description are made in a complete and consistent way. Examples for chapters that contain additional hints: Important ( Caution ( Warning ( marked with a blue sign) marked with a red flag) marked with a yellow sign)
1.4 Installation of the evaluated TMG 2010 Standard Edition

This document provides detailed installation instructions for Microsoft Forefront Thread Management Server 2010 Standard Edition. After installation the server is fully operational.
1.4.1 Installation Requirements

To use TMG Server, you need at least:

A personal computer with a 64bit dual core processor. Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard Edition (English). Also, ensure that no additional software products have been installed on this computer. 2 gigabytes (GB) of memory. 2500 MB of available hard disk space. This is exclusive of hard disk space you want to use for caching. One network adapter that is compatible with the computer's operating system, for communication with the internal network. One network adapter that is compatible with the computer's operating system, for each network connected to the TMG Server computer. One local hard disk partition that is formatted with the NTFS file system.
Please also check Section 3.4 Requirements for the Operational Environment.
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1.4.2 Installation Procedures

TMG 2010 Standard Edition is composed of the following components: TMG Management. The console through which the administrator manages the enterprise. TMG Services. This is the computer that runs the firewall. The computer running TMG services is connected to a Configuration Storage server, which stores the configuration information.
To install the evaluated version, the administrator must install TMG Services and TMG Management. The following pictures show the step-by-step installation process for TMG 2010 Standard Edition.
Start screen
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Starting the TMG 2010 Preparation Tool
Accept the license agreement
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Choose Forefront TMG services and Management
Wait until TMG 2010 has checked the prerequisites on your computer
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After the Preparation Tool has finished call the TMG Installation Wizard
Starting the TMG installation wizard
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Enter your user credentials and the product serial number (example)
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Install Forefront TMG services and Management
Choose the installation path
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Specify the address ranges of your internal network (example)
Click on Next
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Click on Install
Wait until TMG 2010 has been installed
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After the installation has been finished start the TMG Management wizard
Step 1: Configure your network settings
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Click on Next
Choose your firewall template (e.g. Edge Firewall)
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Configure your internal network adapter (values shown are examples)
Configure your external network adapter (values shown are examples)
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Step 1 has finished
Step 2: Configure your system settings
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Click on Next
Change your host configuration if required
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Step 2 has finished
Step 3: Define your deployment options
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Click on Next
Choose to use the Microsoft Update Service
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Click on Next
Choose Customer Feedback settings
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Choose Telemetry Reporting Service
Step 3 has finished
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Ready to use TMG 2010
1.5 Installation of the evaluated TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition

This document provides detailed installation instructions for Microsoft Forefront Thread Management Server 2010 Enterprise Edition. After installation the server is fully operational.
1.5.1 Installation Requirements

To use TMG Server, you need at least:

A personal computer with a 64bit dual core processor. Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard Edition (English). Also, ensure that no additional software products have been installed on this computer. 2 gigabytes (GB) of memory. 2500 MB of available hard disk space. This is exclusive of hard disk space you want to use for caching. One network adapter that is compatible with the computer's operating system, for communication with the internal network. One network adapter that is compatible with the computer's operating system, for each network connected to the TMG Server computer. One local hard disk partition that is formatted with the NTFS file system. Please also check Section 3.4 Requirements for the Operational Environment.
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1.5.2 Installation Procedures

TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition is composed of the following components: TMG Management. The console through which the administrator manages the enterprise. TMG Services. This is the computer that runs the firewall. The computer running TMG services is connected to a Configuration Storage server, which stores the configuration information. Enterprise Management Server. The computer will be used for the centralized management of Forefront TMG arrays.
To install the evaluated version, the administrator must install TMG Services and TMG Management. The following pictures show the step-by-step installation process for TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition.
Start screen
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Starting the TMG 2010 Preparation Tool
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Choose Forefront TMG services and Management
Wait until TMG 2010 has checked the prerequisites on your computer
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After the Preparation Tool has finished call the TMG Installation Wizard
Starting the TMG installation wizard
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Enter your user credentials and the product serial number (example)
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Install Forefront TMG services and Management
Choose the installation path
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Specify the address ranges of your internal network (example)
Click on Next
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Click on Install
Wait until TMG 2010 has been installed
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After the installation has been finished start the TMG Management wizard
Step 1: Configure your network settings
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Click on Next
Choose your firewall template (e.g. Edge Firewall)
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Configure your internal network adapter (values shown are examples)
Configure your external network adapter (values shown are examples)
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Step 1 has finished
Step 2: Configure your system settings
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Click on Next
Change your host configuration if required
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Step 2 has finished
Step 3: Define your deployment options
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Click on Next
Choose to use the Microsoft Update Service
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Click on Next
Choose Customer Feedback settings
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Choose Telemetry Reporting Service
Step 3 has finished
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Ready to use TMG 2010
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2 Security functionalities
This chapter identifies all security functionalities available to the administrator. The security functionalities are derived from the TMG 2010 security functionalities described in the TMG 2010 Security Target (ST). For administration, TMG 2010 includes graphical taskpads and wizards. These simplify navigation and configuration for common tasks. These features are embedded in the Microsoft Management Console and do not belong to the TOE. They are provided by the environment. Warnings The administrator must ensure that TMG 2010 is installed and used with Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard Edition (English). More details can be found in the Security Target of TMG 2010 [ST]. The administrator has to observe the Security Bulletins, to ensure that all possible countermeasures are used. The administrator should check http://www.microsoft.com/security/ regularly for the latest TMG 2010 service packs and hotfixes. The administrator should only use programs that are required to administer and operate the firewall. The administrator should not install additional software which may compromise the security of the TOE or the underlying operating system.
2.1 SF1 - Web Identification and Authentication

The TOE can be configured that only particular users are allowed to access the networks through the TOE after being authenticated by configured front end authentication (e.g. Forms based authentication). Forms-based authentication is one of the standard methods of authentication for Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) transmissions for incoming and outgoing requests. Forms-based authentication sends and receives user information in plaintext. No encryption is used with Forms-based authentication. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption has to be used to secure the transferred user identification and authentication credentials, so these credentials cannot be monitored during transmission to the TOE. The TOE has been evaluated using Forms-based authentication with SSL encryption for incoming HTTP connections. The TOE verifies if the user credentials comply with data stored in the local user database or a remote authentication server using Remote Authentication DialIn User Service (RADIUS).
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Important When trying to connect to a Web site via HTTP (not HTTPS) that is published using TMG 2010, you receive an error message (see Figure 2.1), when all the following conditions are true: The Web listener has any one of the following authentication methods enabled: o Basic authentication o Radius authentication o Forms-Based authentication The Web listener is configured to listen for HTTP traffic. The Require all users to authenticate check box is selected for the Web listener or the Web publishing rules apply to a user set other than the default All users user set. You connect to the published Web site by using HTTP instead of by using HTTPS. Figure 2.1 Error messages
If the TMG Web listener has Basic authentication enabled, you receive the following error message: Error Code: 403 Forbidden. The page must be viewed over a secure channel (Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)). Contact the server administrator. (12311) If the TMG Web listener has RADIUS authentication or Microsoft Outlook Web Access FormsBased authentication (Cookie-auth) enabled, you receive the following error message: Error Code: 403 Forbidden. The page must be viewed over a secure channel (Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)). Contact the server administrator. (12311)
When you use HTTP-to-HTTP bridging, TMG 2010 does not enable traffic on the external HTTP port if the Web listener is configured to request one or more of the following kinds of credentials: Basic authentication Radius authentication Forms-based authentication This behavior occurs because these kinds of credentials should be encrypted. These credentials should not be sent in plaintext over HTTP. TMG 2010 prevents you from entering credentials in plaintext. When you try to do this, you receive an error message.
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Warnings When using Forms-based authentication, depending on the application on the computer which could "cache" the password, the user must ensure that the environment is locked, when it is unattended.
2.2 SF2 - Information Flow Control

The TOE combines several security mechanisms to enforce the security policies at different network layers: a rule base for incoming and outgoing requests, Web and application filters, and system security configuration options. The TOE controls the flow of incoming and outgoing packets and controls information flow on protocol level. This control has to be active before any information can be transmitted through the TOE. Information flow control is subdivided into firewall policy rules that consist of access rules, server publishing rules, mail server publishing rules, Web publishing rules, system policy, Web application filters, Application filters, and URL filtering.
2.3 SF3 - Audit

The TOE stores logging information in different log files which are stored in a SQL Server Express database: Firewall service log The Firewall log contains records of packets that were dropped in the packet filter level as well as connections that were allowed. It is possible to turn on logging for packets that were permitted to traverse the firewall. Access rules can be configured selectively to create or not to create a log file entry when a packet has been blocked or permitted. Web proxy service log The Web Proxy log stores a line per HTTP request that it gets. Each request (incoming and outgoing) is always logged. Windows application event log The Windows application event log stores important system events and failures. Warning It should be assured that there is always enough free disk space. Choosing the right resource and the right parameters for logging is mandatory. Creating logs that are too large or creating too many files can lead to problems. Nevertheless, it is possible to create an alert, which will move or delete old or unneeded log files.
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2.4 Administration-Related Interfaces

The administrator interacts with the TOE via a Microsoft Management Console snap-in. (The Microsoft Management Console is provided by the IT environment.) The application interacts with the local registry and local file system of the operating system (Windows Server 2008 R2) and finally with the TOE. The TMG configuration which is stored in the local registry or the file system (TMG 2010 SE) or stored in ADAM and synchronized with the local registry and file system (TMG 2010 EE) is configured with the MMC. Warning By default, policy changes are applied within a time frame of a few seconds since the relevant configuration data has to be polled. In the Monitoring tab you can check if the configuration has already been synced.
2.5 TOE User Interfaces

There are no user-related manuals provided. (Due to the nature of a firewall product, the filtering process is transparent to the user.) The network interface is the only external interface available for the user. To protect communication between networks, the TOE has an interface to the network layer of the operating system. Traffic from one network to another network is always passed though the TOE using this interface. All network traffic generated by users has to pass this interface.
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3 Operational Environment
The security environment of the evaluated configurations of TMG 2010 is described in the TMG 2010 Security Target [ST] and identifies the threats to be countered by TMG 2010, the organizational security policies, and the usage assumptions as they relate to TMG 2010. The administrator should ensure that the environment meets the organizational policies and assumptions. They are restated here from the Security Target.
3.1 Assumptions
Table 3.1 lists the TOE Secure Usage Assumptions for the IT environment and intended usage. Table 3.1 Assumptions for the IT environment and intended usage
# 1 Assumption name A.DIRECT Description The TOE is available to authorized administrators only. A personnel who has physical access to the TOE and can log in the operating system is assumed to act as an authorized TOE administrator. The TOE stores and executes security-relevant applications only. It stores only data required for its secure operation. Nevertheless the underlying operating system may provide additional applications required for administrating the TOE or the operating system. Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance. The operating system implements following functionality: Local identification and authentication of user credentials used for web publishing (see A.WEBI&A for Radius identification and authentication; in case of a successful authentication the TOE analyses the returned value and allows or denies the access to network resources depending on that value), reliable time stamp (log file audit), file protection (for log file access protection, registry protection, and ADAM protection), cryptographic support (for SSL encryption), administration access control, reliable ADAM implementation (for EE configuration only), Network Load Balancing (for EE configuration only, disabled by default). 5 6 7 8 A.PHYSEC A.SECINST A.SINGEN A.WEBI&A The TOE is physically secure. Only authorized personal has physical access to the system which hosts the TOE. Required certificates and user identities are installed using a confidential path. Information cannot flow among the internal and external networks unless it passes through the TOE. User credentials are verified optionally by a Radius Server. The Radius Server returns a value if a valid account exists or not. Web Identification & Authentication with a Radius Server requires that the Radius server is placed on the internal network, so that data (user credentials and return values) transferred to and from the Radius Server is secured by the TOE from external entities. 9 A.SSL All web publishing rules which support Form-based authentication have to be configured by the administrator so that a secure connection is enforced.
A.GENPUR
3 4
A.NOEVIL A.ENV
Guidance Documentation Addendum # 10 Assumption name A.URLFILTER Description
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TMG queries the remotely hosted Microsoft Reputation Service to determine the categorization of the Web site. The download of the Reputation Service data is appropriately secured with respect to the integrity and authenticity.
3.2 Organizational Security Policies

Security policies to be fulfilled by the TOE are defined in Table 3.2. Table 3.2 Security policies addressed by the TOE
# 1 Policy name P.AUDACC Description Persons must be accountable for the actions that they conduct. Therefore, audit records must contain sufficient information to prevent an attacker to escape detection.
3.3 Security Objectives for the Environment

Table 3.3 lists the security objectives for the operational environment. Table 3.3 Security objectives for the operational environment
# 1 2 3 4 Objective Name OE.DIRECT OE.GENPUR OE.NOEVIL OE.ENV Objective Description The TOE should be available to authorized administrators only. The environment should store and execute security-relevant applications only and should store only data required for its secure operation. Authorized administrators should be non-hostile and should follow all administrator guidance. The operating system should implement following functionality: local identification and authentication of user credentials used for web publishing (see OE.WEBI&A for Radius identification and authentication; in case of a successful authentication the TOE analyses the returned value and allows or denies the access to network resources depending on that value), reliable time stamp (log file audit), file protection (for log file access protection, registry protection, and ADAM protection), cryptographic support (for SSL encryption), administration access control, reliable ADAM implementation (for EE configuration only), Network Load Balancing (for EE configuration only, disabled by default). 5 6 OE.PHYSEC OE.SECINST The system which hosts the TOE should be physically secure. The required user identities (used for user authentication) and required SSL certificates for server authentication (HTTPS encryption) should be stored using a confidential path. That means that created certificates and user passwords should not be available to unauthorized persons (OE.DIRECT ensures that unauthorized persons cannot get these information by accessing the TOE). Information should not flow among the internal and external networks unless it passes through the TOE. Thereby the TOE administrator has to guarantee an adequate integration of the TOE into the environment.
OE.SINGEN
Guidance Documentation Addendum # 8 Objective Name OE.WEBI&A Objective Description
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Optionally a Radius Server should verify provided user credentials and return if a valid account exists or not. Data (user credentials and return values) between TOE and the Radius Server should be transferred in the TOE secured environment, which means that the Radius Server should be placed on the internal network for Web Identification & Authentication.
OE.SSL
All web publishing rules which support Form-based authentication should be configured by the administrator so that a secure connection is enforced. TMG queries the remotely hosted Microsoft Reputation Service to determine the categorization of the Web site. The download of the Reputation Service data is appropriately secured with respect to the integrity and authenticity.
10 OE.URLFILTER
3.4 Requirements for the Operational Environment

The operational environment is a Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard Edition (English). When you scan your computer for available updates, through the Windows Update Web site, the Windows Update Web site displays a number along with the title of the update, for example, "Update for <title> (KBnnnnnn)." This KB number is included in the security bulletin to help identify the corresponding KB article in the Microsoft Knowledge Base. Hardening the Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 operating system reduces the attack surface by disabling functionality that is not required while maintaining the minimum functionality that is required. When you install Microsoft Forefront Threat Management Gateway as part of the installation of Essential Business Server, the setup program automatically hardens the Windows Server 2008 R2 operating system running on the Forefront TMG computer after the installation of Forefront TMG is completed by launching the Scwcmd.exe command-line tool with the following command3: scwcmd.exe configure /p:isa_harden.xml This command applies the security policy defined in the file Isa_harden.xml, which is supplied with Forefront TMG. When this security policy is applied, the startup type of numerous services is configured. The following table lists the services whose startup type is set by the security policy defined in Isa_harden.xml. Service Name AeLookupSvc ALG Appinfo Startup Type Automatic Manual Manual
see http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc995076.aspx
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Service Name AppMgmt AudioEndpointBuilder Audiosrv BFE BITS Browser CertPropSvc COMSysApp CryptSvc CscService DcomLaunch Dhcp Dnscache dot3svc DPS EapHost Eventlog EventSystem FCRegSvc fdPHost FDResPub gpsvc hidserv hkmsvc IKEEXT IPBusEnum iphlpsvc KeyIso KtmRm LanmanServer LanmanWorkstation lltdsvc
Startup Type Manual Disabled Disabled Automatic Automatic Automatic Manual Manual Automatic Disabled Automatic Automatic Automatic Manual Automatic Manual Automatic Automatic Manual Manual Manual Automatic Disabled Manual Automatic Disabled Automatic Manual Automatic Automatic Automatic Manual
clr_optimization_v2.0.50727_32 Manual
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Service Name lmhosts MMCSS MpsSvc MSDTC MSiSCSI msiserver napagent Netman netprofm NlaSvc nsi pla PlugPlay PolicyAgent ProfSvc ProtectedStorage RasAuto RasMan RemoteAccess RemoteRegistry RpcLocator RpcSs RSoPProv sacsvr SamSs SCardSvr Schedule SCPolicySvc seclogon SENS SessionEnv SharedAccess ShellHWDetection
Startup Type Automatic Manual Automatic Automatic Manual Manual Manual Manual Automatic Automatic Automatic Manual Automatic Disabled Automatic Manual Disabled Manual Ignored Disabled Manual Automatic Manual Manual Automatic Disabled Automatic Disabled Automatic Automatic Manual Disabled Automatic
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Service Name slsvc SLUINotify SNMPTRAP SSDPSRV SstpSvc swprv SysMain TapiSrv TBS TermService Themes THREADORDER TrkWks TrustedInstaller UI0Detect UmRdpService upnphost UxSms vds VSS W32Time WcsPlugInService WdiServiceHost WdiSystemHost Wecsvc wercplsupport WerSvc WinHttpAutoProxySvc Winmgmt WinRM wmiApSrv WPDBusEnum wuauserv
Startup Type Automatic Manual Manual Disabled Ignored Manual Manual Manual Manual Automatic Disabled Manual Automatic Manual Manual Manual Disabled Automatic Manual Manual Automatic Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Automatic Manual Automatic Automatic Manual Manual Automatic
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Service Name wudfsvc DNS nfssvc nfsclnt ADAM_ISASTGCTRL AppHostSvc aspnet_state fwsrv IAS IISADMIN isactrl isasched ISASTG MDM MSSQL$ISARS MSSQL$MSFW MSSQLServerADHelper ose ReportServer$ISARS Rqs SQLBrowser SQLWriter W3SVC WAS WMSvc xmonitor
Startup Type Manual Disabled Disabled Disabled Automatic Automatic Manual Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic Manual Automatic Automatic Disabled Manual Automatic Manual Automatic Automatic Automatic Manual Manual Automatic
clr_optimization_v2.0.50727_64 Manual
The security policy defined in the file Isa_harden.xml also configures your Forefront TMG computer as a client of other servers. The following client features are enabled:

MSClient TimeSync DHCPClient DNSClient DynamicDNS
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The remaining sections of this topic assume that you have applied the configurations recommended in the "Windows Server 2008 Security Guide" on the computer running Forefront TMG. Specifically, you should apply the Microsoft Baseline Security Policy security template. However, do not implement the IPsec filters or any of the server role policies. In addition, you should consider Forefront TMG functionality and consider performing manual hardening of the operating system accordingly. Warning The administrator should check http://www.microsoft.com/security/ regularly for the latest Windows Server 2008 R2 hotfixes.
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4 Security-Relevant Events
This subsection describes all types of security-relevant events and what administrator action (if any) to take to maintain security. Security-relevant events that may occur during operation of TMG 2010 must be adequately defined to allow administrator intervention to maintain secure operation. Security-relevant events are defined as events that signify a security related change in the system or environment. These changes can be grouped as routine or abnormal. The routine events are already addressed in subsection Security functionalities. Table 4.1 Security-relevant events
Security function Web Identification and Authentication Security-relevant event Configure Forms-based authentication. The user has a missing permission to access the Internet. A user is leaving the company, so his or her rights have to be withdrawn. Relevant chapters see Chapter 6.1 [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Planning and Design > Access design guide for Forefront TMG > Planning for publishing > About publishing Web servers > About authentication in Web publishing [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Operations > Administering Forefront TMG > Monitoring Forefront TMG > Configuring Forefront TMG logs Information Flow Control An alert occurs, so the administrator has to monitor the alert. [MSTMG] Forefront TMG Operations > Administering Forefront TMG > Configuring alerts > Configuring alert actions
Audit
Log file overflow. If the TMG 2010 Server computer runs out of disk space, the administrator has to configure the maximum number of log files.
[MSTMG] Forefront TMG Operations > Administering Forefront TMG > Monitoring Forefront TMG > Configuring Forefront TMG logs
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5 TOE Integrity
This chapter describes how the administrator can verify that the evaluated version of the TOE is used.
5.1 Integrity of the DVD-ROM content and ISO image

Customers can check the DVD content and ISO image by using the publicly available Microsoft File Checksum Integrity Verifier (FCIV) tool4. This tool uses SHA-1 hash values to verify the integrity of the: TMG 2010 Standard Edition (available on DVD-ROM (boxed) and via Web download) TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition (available via Web download only)
The corresponding hash files are available from the Microsoft corporate Web site, as well as a batch file that runs the tool and a Readme file that explains the usage for users that do not have access to this document. The hash file contains SHA-1 values for each of the relevant files that must be verified and is downloadable from the TMG common criteria Web page [WEBTMG]. The FCIV is a command-prompt utility that computes and verifies cryptographic hash values of files (MD5 and SHA-1 cryptographic hash values are possible). To use, the user opens a Command Prompt window and changes to the folder into which the validation files were downloaded.
5.1.1 Steps in order to ensure the integrity of Forefront TMG 2010 (Volume Licensing - Standard Edition and Enterprise Edition)
Please perform the following steps in order to ensure the integrity of your downloads (if not stated the hash values can be found on [WEBTMG]): 1. Download the FCIV tool (see [WEBTMG]) from Microsoft. The SHA1 value of this download is 99fb35d97a5ee0df703f0cdd02f2d787d6741f65 (hex) and shall be verified before executing the downloaded file. This can be done using any tool capable of calculating SHA-1 values. While running the file you have to enter a destination folder where the FCIV executable should be extracted to. 2. Download the CC Guidance Addendum (see [WEBTMG]) to the directory where FCIV has been extracted. Check the integrity of "MS_TMG_ADD_1.1.pdf" by executing the command fciv "MS_TMG_ADD_1.1.pdf" -sha1
Installation instruction and download link on following Web page: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/841290
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and verify that the result is <SHA1 hash> MS_TMG_ADD_1.1.pdf 3. Depending on the downloaded version:
o
If you received TMG 2010 Standard Edition via Web download, type the following fciv.exe -sha1 X16-23051.iso and verify that the result is daae6ed2f61b6474b9f2dfc9bad5e9bf75420295 x16-23051.iso If you received TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition via Web download, type the following fciv.exe -sha1 X16-23004.iso and verify that the result is 5b4c04c4e4eff29e95ed46ff24b9f35802fe1158 X16-23004.iso
4. After the final verification steps have been finished follow the Forefront TMG 2010 CC Guidance Addendum for the installation and configuration of the TOE (Target of Evaluation; for details see Security Target). Important The hash value of the FCIV tool is published on the TMG common criteria web page and should be verified by the customer using a 3rd party tool of his choice.
5.1.2 Steps in order to ensure the integrity of Forefront TMG 2010 (Boxed version - Standard Edition only)
Please perform the following steps in order to ensure the integrity of your downloads (if not stated the hash values can be found on [WEBTMG]): 1. Download the FCIV tool (see [WEBTMG]) from Microsoft. The SHA1 value of this download is 99fb35d97a5ee0df703f0cdd02f2d787d6741f65 (hex) and shall be verified before executing the downloaded file. This can be done using any tool capable of calculating SHA-1 values. While running the file you have to enter a destination folder where the FCIV executable should be extracted to. Download the 3. Integrity Check Validation Data (see [WEBTMG]) and "CC Guidance Documentation Addendum" (see [WEBTMG])
2.
to the directory where FCIV has been extracted. Check the integrity of "MS_TMG_ADD_1.1.pdf" by executing the command fciv "MS_TMG_ADD_1.1.pdf" sha1
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and verify that the result is <SHA1 hash> MS_TMG_ADD_1.1.pdf 4. Check the integrity of "IntegrityCheckTMG2010.zip" by executing the command fciv "IntegrityCheckTMG2010.zip" -sha1 and verify that the result is <SHA1 hash> IntegrityCheckTMG2010.zip Verify that the folder contains the following files: 6. 7. TMGFPPENUSE.xml readme.htm integritycheck_se_ENU.cmd fciv.exe
5.
Insert the Exchange Server DVD that requires validation into the DVD Drive X: (where X: is your DVD-ROM drive). Open a command window and change to the folder where the validation files are located. Then, type the following to validate TMG 2010 Standard Edition (boxed version only): integritycheck_se_ENU.cmd X: If the DVD cannot be validated as an authentic DVD, a message will be displayed, indicating that the DVD is not authentic. The integritycheck.log file, listing the failure details, will be created in the folder with the original files. If the DVD is correctly validated, the following message will be displayed: The ... is an authentic <product name> After the final verification steps have been finished follow the TMG 2010 CC Guidance Addendum for the installation and configuration of the TOE (Target of Evaluation; for details see Security Target).
8.
9.
Important The hash value of the FCIV tool is published on the TMG common criteria web page and should be verified by the customer using a 3rd party tool of his choice.
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Figure 5.1 Example of Integrity check I (successful)
5.2 Integrity of the Package

TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition is available in a volume license only, there is no retail box with certificate of authenticity (COA) label on a box like for TMG 2010 Standard Edition (see Figure 5.2). Nevertheless the end user should check the integrity as described in chapter 5.1 for TMG 2010 Standard Edition respectively TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition. Figure 5.2 TMG 2010 Standard Edition (Box)
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5.3 Version Number for the TOE

The method to examine the TMG version number is included in the Microsoft Management Console. The user can identify the version of the TOE in the Help menu (HelpAbout TMG 2010; see Figure 5.4). The version number presented in the Microsoft Management Console is 7.0.7734.100. That version corresponds to the evaluated version named in the ST which is TMG 2010. From the about boxes it is not obvious which configuration of TMG 2010 is installed. When on the right side of the management console the branch Enterprise is displayed you have installed TMG 2010 EE (see Figure 5.5). Figure 5.3 Version number of TMG 2010 Standard Edition
Figure 5.4 Version number of TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition
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Figure 5.5 Identifying TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition
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6 Annotations
6.1 Authentication methods
This chapter describes how TMG manages authentication. It provides information about authentication and delegation methods supported by the TOE, and how the authentication process is handled.
6.1.1 Single Sign On

Single sign on (SSO) enables users to authenticate once to the TOE, and then access all of the Web servers with the same domain suffix that the TOE is publishing on a specific listener, without re-authenticating. Web servers can include Microsoft Outlook Web Access servers and servers running Microsoft Office SharePoint Portal Server , as well as standard servers running Internet Information Services (IIS). A typical example of SSO is a user who logs on to Outlook Web Access, providing credentials on a form. In one of the e-mail messages that the user receives is a link to a document that is stored in SharePoint Portal Server. The user clicks the link, and the document opens, without an additional request for authentication. Security Notes As long as a user's browser process is still running, that user is logged on. For example, a user logs on to Outlook Web Access. From the Microsoft Internet Explorer menu, the user opens a new browser window, and then navigates to another site. Closing the Outlook Web Access window does not end the session, and the user is still logged on. When enabling SSO, be sure to provide a specific SSO domain. Providing a generic domain, such as .co.uk, will allow the Web browser to send the TMG SSO cookie to any Web site in that domain, creating a security risk. Note There is no support for SSO between different Web listeners. Published servers must share the same Domain Name System (DNS) suffix. For example, you can configure SSO when publishing mail.fabrikam.com and team.fabrikam.com. You cannot configure SSO when publishing mail.fabrikam.com and mail.contoso.com. The DNS suffix consists of the entire string that follows the first dot. For example, to configure SSO between mail.detroit.contoso.com and mail.cleveland.contoso.com, you would use the DNS suffix contoso.com.
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6.1.2 Authentication Process

There are three components of the authentication process in the TOE:
Receipt of client credentials. Validation of client credentials against an authentication provider. Delegation of authentication to Web servers that are behind the TOE, such as servers running SharePoint Portal Server. Note The first two components are configured on the Web listener that receives client requests. The third is configured on the publishing rule. This means that you can use the same listener for different rules, and have different types of delegation.
The authentication process for forms-based authentication is demonstrated in the following figure. Note that this is a simplified description of the process, presented to describe the primary steps involved.
Step 1, receipt of client credentials: The client sends a request to connect to the corporate Outlook Web Access server in the Internal network. The client provides the credentials in an HTML form (Frontend authentication). Steps 2 and 3, sending credentials: The TOE sends the credentials to the authentication provider, such as a domain controller for Integrated Windows authentication, or a RADIUS server, and receives acknowledgment from the authentication provider that the user is authenticated (Gateway authentication). Step 4, authentication delegation: The TOE forwards the client's request to the Outlook Web Access server, and authenticates itself to the Outlook Web Access server using the client's credentials. The Outlook Web Access server will revalidate those credentials, typically using the same authentication provider (Backend authentication). Note The Web server must be configured to use the authentication scheme that matches the delegation method used by the TOE. Step 5, server response: The Outlook Web Access server sends a response to the client, which is intercepted by the TOE.
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Step 6, forwarding the response: The TOE forwards the response to the client. Note
If you do not limit access to authenticated users, as in the case when a rule allowing access is applied to all users, the TOE will not validate the user's credentials. The TOE will use the user's credentials to authenticate to the Web server according to the configured delegation method. We recommend that you apply each publishing rule to all authenticated users or a specific user set, rather than selecting Require all users to authenticate on the Web listener, which requires any user connecting through the listener to authenticate.
6.1.3 Client Authentication Methods for Receipt of Client Credentials

The TOE Web listeners accept the following types of authentication from clients:
No authentication Forms-based authentication
6.1.3.1 No Authentication
You can select to require no authentication. If you do so, you will not be able to configure a delegation method on rules that use this Web listener.
6.1.3.2 Forms-Based Authentication

Forms-based authentication in TMG 2010 can be used for publishing any Web server. One type of forms-based authentication is available in the TOE (Passcode form and Passcode/Password form have not been evaluated):
Password form. The user enters a user name and password on the form. This is the type of credentials needed for Integrated and RADIUS credential validation. Notes
The HTML forms for forms-based authentication can be fully customized. When the TOE is configured to require authentication, because a publishing rule applies to a specific user set or All Authenticated Users, or a Web listener is configured to Require all users to authenticate, the TOE validates the credentials before forwarding the request. By default, the language setting of the client's browser determines the language of the form that the TOE provides. The TOE provides forms in 26 languages. The TOE can also be configured to serve forms in a specific language regardless of the browser's language. When you configure a time-out for forms-based authentication, we recommend that the timeout be shorter than that imposed by the published server. If the published server times out before the TOE, the user may mistakenly think that the session ended. This could allow attackers to use the session, which remains open until actively closed by the user or timed out by the TOE as configured on the form setting.
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You should ensure that your Web application is designed to resist session riding attacks (also known as cross-site-posting, cross-site-request-forgery, or luring attacks) before publishing it using the TOE. This is particularly important for Web servers published through the TOE, because clients must use the same trust level for all of the Web sites they access through the publishing TMG firewall.
6.1.4 Methods for Validation of Client Credentials

You can configure how the TOE validates client credentials. The TOE supports these providers and protocols: No authentication (allows the internal servers to handle authentication) Local user database RADIUS Note A publishing rule with a Web listener that uses a specific form of credential validation must use a user set that is consistent with that form of validation. For example, a publishing rule with a Web listener that uses LDAP credential validation must also use a user set that consists of LDAP users.
6.1.4.1 Configuring Receipt and Validation of Client Credentials

You can configure the receipt and validation of client credentials on the Web listener for a publishing rule. In the New Web Listener Definition Wizard, use the Authentication Settings page, and in the Web listener properties, use the Authentication tab. Important When you use the same Web listener to publish more than one application in the same domain, a user who is authenticated for one application will also be able to access the others, even if single sign on is not enabled.
6.1.4.2 Integrated
The TOE checks if the user is a member of the local user database.
6.1.4.3 Radius authentication

RADIUS is used to provide credentials validation. When TMG is acting as a RADIUS client, it sends user credentials and connection parameter information in the form of a RADIUS message to a RADIUS server. The RADIUS server authenticates the RADIUS client request, and sends back a RADIUS message response. Because RADIUS servers authorize client credentials in addition to authenticating them, the response that TMG receives from the RADIUS server indicating that the client credentials are not approved might actually indicate that the RADIUS server does not authorize the client. Even if the credentials have been authenticated, TMG may reject the client request, based on the RADIUS server authorization policy.
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6.1.4.3.1 Configuring the TOE for RADIUS authentication When you configure the Web listener on TMG, select RADIUS Authentication as the authentication provider. When you add a RADIUS server, you must configure the following: Server name. The host name or IP address of the RADIUS server. Secret. The RADIUS client and the RADIUS server share a secret that is used to encrypt messages sent between them. You must configure the same shared secret on TMG and on the Radius server. Authentication port. TMG sends its authentication requests using a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port on which the RADIUS server is listening. The default value of 1812 does not need to be changed when you are using the default installation of TMG as a RADIUS server. 6.1.4.3.2 Security considerations The RADIUS User-Password hiding mechanism might not provide sufficient security for passwords. The RADIUS hiding mechanism uses the RADIUS shared secret, the Request Authenticator, and the use of the MD5 hashing algorithm to encrypt the User-Password and other attributes, such as Tunnel-Password and MS-CHAP-MPPE-Keys. RFC 2865 notes the potential need for evaluating the threat environment and determining whether additional security should be used. You can provide additional protection for hidden attributes by using Internet Protocol security (IPsec) with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and an encryption algorithm, such as Triple DES (3DES), to provide data confidentiality for the entire RADIUS message. Follow these guidelines: Use IPsec to provide additional security for RADIUS clients and servers. Require the use of strong user passwords. Use authentication counting and account lockout to help prevent a dictionary attack against a user password. Use a long shared secret with a random sequence of letters, numbers, and punctuation. Change it often to help protect your TMG. When you use password-based authentication, enforce strong password policies on your network to make dictionary attacks more difficult.
6.1.5 Authentication Delegation

After validating the credentials, you can configure publishing rules to use one of the following methods to delegate the credentials to the published servers: No delegation, and client cannot authenticate directly No delegation, but client may authenticate directly Basic
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6.1.5.1 Configuring Authentication Delegation

Delegation of client credentials is configured on the publishing rule. In the Publishing Rule Wizard, configure this on the Authentication Delegation page. In the publishing rule properties, the authentication settings are on the Authentication Delegation tab.
6.1.5.2 No Delegation, and Client Cannot Authenticate Directly

Credentials are not delegated. This is intended to prevent the unintentional delegation of credentials into the organization, where they might be sniffed. This is the default setting in some TMG publishing wizards, so that if you want to delegate credentials, you must change the default.
6.1.5.3 No Delegation, but Client May Authenticate Directly

When you select the delegation method No Delegation, but client may authenticate directly, the user's credentials are passed to the destination server without any additional action on the part of TMG. The client and the destination server then negotiate the authentication.
6.1.5.4 Basic delegation

In Basic delegation, credentials are forwarded in plaintext to the server that requires credentials. If authentication fails, TMG replaces the delegation with the authentication type used by the Web listener. If the server requires a different type of credentials, an TMG alert is triggered.
6.2 Lockdown Mode

A critical function of a firewall is to react to an attack. When an attack occurs, it may seem that the first line of defense is to disconnect from the Internet, isolating the compromised network from malicious outsiders. However, this is not the recommended approach. Although the attack must be handled, normal network connectivity must be resumed as quickly as possible, and the source of the attack must be identified. The lockdown feature introduced with TMG combines the need for isolation with the need to stay connected. Whenever a situation occurs that causes the Microsoft Firewall service to shut down, TMG enters the lockdown mode. This occurs when: An event triggers the Firewall service to shut down. When you configure alert definitions, you decide which events will cause the Firewall service to shut down. Essentially, you configure when TMG enters lockdown mode. The Firewall service is manually shut down. If you become aware of malicious attacks, you can shut down the Firewall service, while configuring the TMG computer and the network to handle the attacks.
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6.2.1 Affected functionality

When in lockdown mode, the following functionality applies: The packet filter driver applies the firewall policy. The following system policy rules are still applicable: Allow ICMP from trusted servers to the local host. Allow remote management of the firewall using MMC (RPC through port 3847). Allow remote management of the firewall using RDP. Allow access from trusted servers to the local Configuration Storage server This system policy rule allows the use of Microsoft CIFS (TCP), Microsoft CIFS (UDP), MS Firewall Control and MS Firewall Storage protocols from all array members and Remote Management hosts to the Local Host.
Outgoing traffic from the Local Host network to all networks is allowed. If an outgoing connection is established, that connection can be used to respond to incoming traffic. For example, a DNS query can receive a DNS response, on the same connection. No incoming traffic is allowed, unless a system policy rule (listed previously) that specifically allows the traffic is enabled. The one exception is DHCP traffic, which is allowed by default system policy rules. The UDP Send protocol on port 68 is allowed from all networks to the Local Host network. The corresponding UDP Receive protocol on port 67 is allowed. VPN remote access clients cannot access TMG. Similarly, access is denied to remote site networks in site-to-site VPN scenarios. Any changes to the network configuration while in lockdown mode are applied only after the Firewall service restarts and TMG exits lockdown mode. For example, if you physically move a network segment and reconfigure TMG to match the physical changes, the new topology is in effect only after TMG exits lockdown mode. TMG does not trigger any alerts.
6.2.2 Leaving lockdown mode

When the Firewall service restarts, TMG exits lockdown mode and continues functioning, as previously. Any changes made to the TMG configuration are applied after TMG exits lockdown mode.
6.3 Configure RPC Filtering

To configure RPC filtering 1. In the console tree of TMG Server Management, click Firewall Policy. 2. In the details pane, click any access rule that applies to remote procedure call (RPC) traffic.
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3. On the Tasks tab, click Edit Selected Rule. 4. On the Protocols tab (for an access rule), click Filtering, and then click Configure RPC protocol. 5. On the Protocol tab, select Enforce strict RPC compliance, if no RPC protocols should be allowed. Important
When you publish an RPC interface where there is a route network relationship between networks, port overriding is ignored. The publishing rule will use the original IP address or port. When you disable the Enforce strict RPC compliance option, DCOM traffic and other RPC protocols will be allowed. After you click Apply in the details pane, the policy is updated. The new policy applies only to new connections.
6.4 Configure FTP Filtering

To configure FTP filtering 1. In the console tree of TMG Server Management, click Firewall Policy. 2. In the details pane, click a server publishing rule or access rule that applies to FTP traffic. 3. On the Tasks tab, click Edit Selected Rule. 4. On the Traffic tab (for a server publishing rule) or on the Protocols tab (for an access rule), click Filtering, and then click Configure FTP. 5. On the Protocol tab, select Read Only, if FTP uploads should be blocked. Important

You cannot upload FTP content from a Web Proxy client. Remote directory and file management actions also fail. After you click Apply in the details pane, the policy is updated. The new policy applies only to new connections.
6.5 Configure SMTP Filtering

To configure SMTP filter buffer overflow thresholds 1. In the console tree of TMG Server Management, click Add-ins. 2. In the details pane, on the Application Filters tab, click SMTP Filter. 3. On the Tasks tab, click Configure Selected Filter. 4. On the SMTP Commands tab, click the applicable command, and then click Edit. 5. In SMTP Command Rule, select Enable SMTP command.
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6. In Maximum Length, type the maximum length of the command line for the commands. Important

To add a new command, click Add and type the command name in SMTP Command Rule. When a client uses a command that is defined but disabled, the filter closes that connection. When a client uses a command that is unrecognized by the SMTP filter, no filtering is performed on that message. Only commands on incoming traffic are filtered by the SMTP filter. Only simple SMTP commands can be added. If a client uses the TURN command, all e-mail messages will be dropped by the filter. The RFC considers the AUTH command as part of the MAIL FROM command. For this reason, the SMTP filter blocks MAIL FROM commands only when they exceed the length of the MAIL FROM and AUTH commands issued (when AUTH is enabled). For example, if you specify a maximum length of MAIL FROM as 266 bytes and AUTH as 1,024 bytes, the message will be blocked only if the MAIL FROM command exceeds 1,290 bytes.
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7 Flaw Remediation Guidance

7.1 How to report detected security flaws to Microsoft
Microsoft has established a single internal organization, the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC), to investigate and remedy security vulnerabilities involving Microsoft software or services. The MSRC is staffed 7 days a week, and investigates every report it receives of suspected security vulnerabilities in Microsoft Products. There are three ways for a Finder to contact the Microsoft Response Center (MSRC) to report a detected or assumed security flaw. 1. A web page, located at https://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/alertus.aspx provides an easy way to provide all the information needed to begin the investigation. The form requests information about: Reporter contact information (name and email; optionally) Information about the reporters computer (manufacturer and model, additional hardware, operating system, system service packs, operating system security patches) Affected product information (product name, product version, service packs for the product, security patches for the product, vulnerability information) Description of the flaw in the product (general description) Product configuration (default/customized, required settings to make the flaw appear) Description how to reproduce the problem (step-by-step instructions that demonstrate the flaw, program that demonstrates the flaw) Description how someone might mount an attack via the flaw Additional information that might be helpful in investigating this issue.
Data submitted via this page is encrypted using the Secure Sockets Layer protocol. 2. Alternatively, an email address, secure@microsoft.com can also be used. Mail to this address can be encrypted using PGP5. 3. The customer can contact Microsoft Services for additional (http://www.microsoft.com/services/microsoftservices/default.mspx ). support
Regardless of the method used to initially contact the MSRC or Microsoft Services, subsequent communications typically take place via email, using the secure@microsoft.com email address. When requested, MSRC can also conduct these communications via telephone or other methods.
The MSRC's PGP key is available at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/MSRC.asc
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7.2 How to get informed about Security Flaws and Flaw Remediation
A security update that is issued by the MSRC is always accompanied with a bulletin. The bulletin contains the information that Microsoft makes available for the customers so that they can take a decision whether to install the fix and on what systems. Every bulletin comes with a rating to reflect its criticality (four levels). A KB is also provided but it is mostly a pointer to the bulletin article. The public page with Microsoft bulletins is located at http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/default.mspx The original finder of the problem is kept in the picture throughout the process, if he chooses. MSRC manages the communication with the reporter throughout the process. Security updates typically can be installed on the current service pack and the previous one. However, this is only a general rule. If the previous service pack is more than two years old, the patch may be limited to only the current service pack. Conversely, if several service packs have been released in short order, the patch may install on additional ones. The security patch will be included automatically in the next service pack. Service packs, and patches, are generally available for the previously released service pack. The security bulletin will always provide specific information on the service pack requirements for the patch. All security bulletins for Microsoft products are available at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/current.aspx , and newly released bulletins are highlighted on http://www.microsoft.com/security , http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security , and http://www.microsoft.com/isaserver Web sites. In addition, Microsoft offers a free service through which customers can receive a technical or non-technical bulletin synopsis by email. Customers can sign up for mailer at https://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/notify.mspx. Microsoft digitally signs the technical synopsis, and the PGP key located at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/MSRC.asc can be used to validate the signature. Microsoft security bulletins always discuss the risk the vulnerability poses, the software it affects, and the steps customers can take to eliminate it including, in the case of patches, specific locations for obtaining them. In addition, security bulletins also frequently include a public thank-you to the Finder, subject to the qualification criteria discussed at http://www.microsoft.comtechnet/security/bulletin/policy.mspx . Microsoft strongly encourages customers to sign up for the security bulletins. So the steps to be always informed of security flaws and how to install them are: 1. Signing up for security bulletins (registering for receiving bulletins by email) 2. Checking for security bulletins (if not registered) 3. Deciding, whether to download and install a remedy 4. Downloading the fix, authentication of the fix 5. Installing the fix/remedy (follow bulletin description, see above)
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7.3 Installing a remedy

The security bulletins contain the affected product versions, links to download the security patch, and guidance for manual (as well as automated) installation of the patch. As an example (see Figure 7.1) from a security bulletin called MS04-035 that contains installation instructions. The bulletin itself is at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS04-035.mspx and not TOE relevant. Figure 7.1 Installation Instructions for Security Bulletin (example)
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7.4 Authentication of a Fix

For a product released via the web, digital signatures are used to identify the source download as coming from Microsoft. When files are downloaded from the web using Internet Explorer (or another browser), the Authenticode mechanism is used to inform users of whether the download did indeed come from Microsoft. Authenticode, the formal name for the encryption technology Microsoft uses for digital code signing, is based upon an encryption algorithm called public key technology. Authenticode is based upon specifications that have been used successfully in the industry for some time, including CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax), PKCS #10 (certificate request formats), X.509 (certificate specification), and SHA-1. Authenticode provides two important features: time stamping and the ability to revoke a publishers digital certificate. When a user downloads the code from the Internet, the browser uses a Win32 function called WinVerifyTrust. If the user does not already trust the publisher, it displays certificate information, such as the name included in the digital signature, an indication of whether it is a commercial or personal certificate, and the date when the certificate expires. If the piece of software has been digitally signed, it can verify that the software originated from the named software publisher and that no one has tampered with it. A verification certificate is displayed if the software meets these criteria. The user should confirm the source of the certificate to be the Microsoft Corporation. When a digital signature fails the verification process, the browser will report the failure, indicate why the signature is invalid, and prompt the user about whether to proceed with the download (only in the cases the user does not trust the publisher or trusts only the certifier of the publisher).
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8 References and Glossary

This section provides references and a glossary.
8.1 References
General Common Criteria Documents [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 3, July 2009 Part 1: Introduction and general model, CCMB-2009-07-001, Part 2: Security functional requirements, CCMB-2009-07-002, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements, CCMB-2009-07-003
TMG 2010 Administrator Guidance and Publicly Available Evaluation Developer Documents [MSTMG] Microsoft Forefront Threat Management Gateway Help, Microsoft Corp., Version 2010 Standard Edition / Enterprise Edition This help file is installed during TMG 2010 setup (isa.chm). TMG 2010 SE/EE Common Criteria Evaluation - Security Target, Microsoft Corp. Website: Microsoft Forefront TMG - Common Criteria Evaluation,
[ST] [WEBTMG]
http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=49507
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8.2 Acronyms
CC EAL FCIV PP SFP SSL ST TOE Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level File Checksum Integrity Verifier Protection Profile Security Function Policy Secure Sockets Layer Security Target Target of Evaluation
8.3 Glossary
application filters Application filters can access the data stream or datagrams associated with a session within the Microsoft Firewall service and work with some or all application-level protocols. Authentication is "A positive identification, with a degree of certainty sufficient for permitting certain rights or privileges to the person or thing positively identified." In simpler terms, it is "The act of verifying the claimed identity of an individual, station or originator" [Schou, Corey (1996). Handbook of INFOSEC Terms, Version 2.0. CD-ROM (Idaho State University & Information Systems Security Organization)]. Basic authentication is the standard authentication method for Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Although user information is encoded, no encryption is used with Basic authentication. A feature pack contains new product functionality that is distributed outside the context of a product release, and usually is included in the next full product release. A firewall service log contains entries with connection establishments and terminations. Identification, according to a current compilation of information security terms, is "the process that enables recognition of a user described to an automated data processing system. This is generally by the use of unique machine-readable names" (Schou, Corey (1996). Handbook of INFOSEC Terms, Version 2.0. CD-ROM (Idaho State University & Information Systems Security Organization)). The Microsoft Management Console is a configuration management tool supplied with Windows that can be extended with snap-ins. NTLM is an authentication scheme used by Microsoft browsers, proxies, and servers (Microsoft Internet Explorer, Internet Information Services, and others). This scheme is also sometimes referred to as the Windows NT Challenge/Response authentication scheme or Integrated Windows authentication. A packet filter log file contains records of packets that were dropped or allowed.
authentication
Basic authentication
feature pack
Firewall service log identification
Microsoft Management Console NTLM
packet filter log file
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port number publishing rules
A port number identifies a certain Internet application with a specific connection. Using publishing rules, you can publish virtually any computer on an internal network to the Internet (see Web publishing and server publishing). SSL is a protocol that supplies secure data communication through data encryption and decryption. SSL enables communications privacy over networks. Server publishing allows virtually any computer on an internal network to publish to the Internet. A service pack contains a cumulative set of all hotfixes, security updates, critical updates, and updates created and fixes for defects found by Microsoft since the release of the product. Service packs may also contain a limited number of customer requested design changes or features. In this document, TMG Server refers to Microsoft Forefront Threat Management Gateway, except where it explicitly states otherwise. Web publishing publishes Web content to the Internet. W3C develops interoperable technologies (specifications, guidelines, software, and tools) concerning Web technology (http://www.w3c.org).
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) server publishing service pack
TMG Server Web publishing World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)

MS TMG Add 1.1

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MS TMG Add 1.1

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Forefront TMG 2010 Common Criteria Evaluation

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Version: Last Saved: File Name:

1.1 2010-12-13 MS_TMG_ADD_1.1.docx

Guidance Documentation Addendum

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Guidance Documentation Addendum

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Guidance Documentation Addendum

1 Introduction to the Guidance Addendum

Guidance Documentation Addendum

1.2 Security functionalities and Associated Chapters

SF1 Web Identification and Authentication

Guidance Documentation Addendum

1.3 Warnings about Functions and Privileges

1.4 Installation of the evaluated TMG 2010 Standard Edition

1.4.1 Installation Requirements

Guidance Documentation Addendum

1.4.2 Installation Procedures

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Starting the TMG 2010 Preparation Tool

Accept the license agreement

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Choose Forefront TMG services and Management

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Starting the TMG installation wizard

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Accept the license agreement

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Install Forefront TMG services and Management

Choose the installation path

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Specify the address ranges of your internal network (example)

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Wait until TMG 2010 has been installed

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Step 1: Configure your network settings

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Choose your firewall template (e.g. Edge Firewall)

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Configure your internal network adapter (values shown are examples)

Configure your external network adapter (values shown are examples)

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Step 1 has finished

Step 2: Configure your system settings

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Change your host configuration if required

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Step 2 has finished

Step 3: Define your deployment options

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Choose to use the Microsoft Update Service

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Choose Customer Feedback settings

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Choose Telemetry Reporting Service

Step 3 has finished

Guidance Documentation Addendum

Ready to use TMG 2010

1.5 Installation of the evaluated TMG 2010 Enterprise Edition

1.5.1 Installation Requirements