Proceedings (Final)

THE NEW WORLD OF ROBUST INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:
What Roles for NATO and Canada?
RCMI RESEARCH PROCEEDINGS
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Joint Research Conference 2004
THE NEW WORLD OF ROBUST INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:

What Roles for NATO and Canada?
Edited by Brian S. MacDonald David S. McDonough
Copyright 2005 Royal Canadian Military Institute All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the Royal Canadian Military Institute.
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
The new world of robust international peacekeeping operations : what roles for NATO and Canada? / edited by Brian S. MacDonald, David S. McDonough.
Issued also in electronic format. Proceedings of a conference held at the Royal Canadian Military Institute, Toronto, Ont., Sept. 22, 2004. ISBN 0-9694714-1-6
1. Peacekeeping forces--Congresses. 2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization-Congresses. 3. Peacekeeping forces--Canada--Congresses. 4. Security, International-Congresses. 5. Canada--Military policy--Congresses. I. MacDonald, Brian, 1939II. McDonough, David S., 1978- III. Royal Canadian Military Institute
UA646.5.C3N49 2005 902831-9
355.3'57
C2005-
Cover design by Atlantic Council of Canada, with David S. McDonough
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
Abbreviations......................................................................................................vii Foreword.................................................................................................................1 Matthew Gaasenbeek III Introduction...........................................................................................................5 Col (Retd) Brian MacDonald THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT The Search for Stability in a Dangerous World.....................................9 Jean-Pierre Juneau Multilateral Stability Operations: An American View.......................19 Robert Hunter LEARNING BY DOING: CANADA, NATO AND THE UNITED KINGDOM The Canadian Experience in Afghanistan............................................31 Col Alain Tremblay The United Kingdoms Experience in Afghanistan...........................53 Gen (Retd) Sir John Deverell
THE 3-Ds: DEFENCE, DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT Coordinating the Diplomatic / Defence Interface in Stability Operations.............................................69 Paul Chapin Civil-Military Cooperation in the Post-Conflict Transition...................79 Sunil Ram MANAGING TRANSFORMATION FOR ROBUST PEACEKEEPING The Role of NATO Transformation Headquarters.........................99 Brigadier Lamont Kirkland The Allure of the Imagined War...........................................................109 Douglas Bland CONCLUSION In Summation.............................................................................................123 Col (Retd) Brian MacDonald APPENDIX Speaking Notes for the Minister of National Defence.........................................................131 The Honourable Bill Graham Contributors......................................................................................................145
ABBREVIATIONS
ABCA ACCS ACM ACT AGS ALLU ANA ATA AU AWACS BPG CCFPD CF CFC-A CIMIC CMA CMCC CRMA DDR DFAIT
America, Britain, Canada and Australia Army Command Control System anti-coalition militia Allied Command Transformation Alliance Ground Surveillance Army Lessons Learned Unit Afghan National Army Afghanistan Transitional Administration African Union Airborne Warning and Control System Bi-national Planning Group Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development Canadian Forces Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan Civil-Military Cooperation Civil Military Affairs Civilian-Military Co-ordination Centre Counter-Revolution in Military Affairs disarmament, demobilization and re-integration Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
viii ABBREVIATIONS
DND ESDP EU FAC FATA FOB GCC GO GOA GRO HIG HUMINT IED IO ISAF JFCOM JOA JWC KFOR LOAC LAV NATO NCM NDHQ NGO NMSA NORAD NRF MOU OEF PRT PVO RCMP
Department of National Defence European Security and Defence Policy European Union Foreign Affairs Canada Federally Administered Tribal Areas forward operating bases Gulf Cooperation Council governmental organization Government of Afghanistan Grassroots Organizations Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin human intelligence improvised explosive device international organization International Security Assistance Force Joint Forces Command Joint Operations Area Joint Warfare Centre Kosovo Force law of armed conflict Light Armoured Vehicle North Atlantic Treaty Organization non-commissioned member National Defence Headquarters non-governmental organization NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency North American Aerospace Defence Command NATO Response Force memorandum of understanding Operation Enduring Freedom Provincial Reconstruction Team private voluntary organization Royal Canadian Mounted Police
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ROBUST INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
ix
RMA SACEUR SFOR SHAPE SWAT TFK UAV UN UNPROFOR WMD
Revolution in Military Affairs Supreme Allied Commander Europe Stabilization Force Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Special Weapons and Training Task Force Kabul unmanned aerial vehicle United Nations UN Protection Force weapons of mass destruction
FOREWORD
By Matthew Gaasenbeek III
he 2004 Joint Research Conference of the Royal Canadian Military Institute, the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and the Atlantic Council of Canada was a unique event which brought the three Toronto based non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with their long shared interests in the study and consideration of contemporary strategic issues and events, together for the first time in a formal joint research undertaking. Since its establishment in 1976, the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies has gained wide recognition as one of Canada's foremost sources of independent and balanced information and research on a broad range of defence and security issues affecting Canada. Founded in 1966 with a mandate to promote a broader and deeper understanding of transatlantic issues, the Atlantic Council of Canada engages Canadians on this country's commitment to transatlantic cooperation, on issues relating to NATO, and on international peace in cultural, economic, and security terms. We are very pleased to be able to work with our two partnering NGOs, both of which brought their extensive experience and enthusiasm to the conference, with respective mandates that very much complements the RCMI's own research into "Contemporary Canadian Security Studies." As the hosting agency, the RCMI would
MATTHEW GAASENBEEK III
like to thank the individual members of all three NGOs who played a key role in the organization of the conference. We are also grateful for the generous financial support provided by the NATO Office of Public Diplomacy, which made the Conference possible, and especially for the ongoing encouragement and support received from Mr. J. P. Ollivier, Executive Officer, NATO Division of Public Diplomacy, as the Conference was being put together. We would particularly like to thank Col (Retd) John McKenna, a Vice-President of the Atlantic Council of Canada, and a member of the RCMI Defence Studies Committee, who acted as the Conference Chair and skillfully ensured that "the trains ran on time!" We are also indebted to our four panel chairs who introduced or speakers, and fielded the animated question periods which followed each. Jesse Flis, a former Canadian Co-Chair of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence and a Director of the Atlantic Council of Canada, chaired the first panel on "The New Strategic Environment." Julie Lindhout, President of the Atlantic Council of Canada, chaired the second panel on "Learning by Doing: Canada, NATO, and the United Kingdom." David Rudd, President of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, chaired the third panel, "Defence Diplomacy, and Disarmament." BGen (Retd) Donald Macnamara, Chair of The Conference of Defence Associations Institute and a Past-President of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, chaired the fourth panel, "Managing Transformation for Robust Peacekeeping." We are beholden to the Hon. Roy MacLaren, a former Minister of International Trade and Industry, and Chair of the Atlantic Council of Canada, for providing the Closing Remarks. We would like to acknowledge the behind-the-scenes work of
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Captain Stephen Roberts and Mr. Eric Morse, both of whom dealt with the media relations aspect of this conference, always a tricky task when the Minister of National Defence is one of the speakers. This conference could not have run so smoothly without the administrative and registration help provided by the staff and interns of the Atlantic Council of Canada. We were particularly impressed with the design work of the Atlantic Council of Canada, which created the brochure design that was subsequently selected to be the cover design for this Proceedings. And we would certainly be remiss if we did not mention the sterling efforts of the hospitality staff of the Royal Canadian Military Institute, whose graceful and efficient service lent such a warm and pleasant tone to the non-academic dimensions of the conference.
INTRODUCTION
By Col (Retd) Brian MacDonald
he period following the end of the Cold War has seen a remarkable set of transformational factors at work in the international security environment that have led to a tragic maelstrom of international security instability, which, in turn, has left the international community scrambling desperately for solutions. At the heart of the transformational maelstrom has been the new phenomenon of "failed states," states whose national governments no longer possess even the slightest credibility as guarantors of the basic human security needs of their citizens. Indeed, they are often themselves among the principal human security threats to those citizens. Often, too, national military forces in such states seem to have as their prime purpose, not the protection of the state from external international threats, but rather the protection of corrupt and brutal governments from their own people. Added to these failures has too often been an explosion of seemingly intractable internal stakeholder group conflict based on ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences. The tragic consequence of these failings has been a consequent deeper descent into the maelstrom of civil conflict and war, characterized by gross crimes against humanity, and extending, even, to the very verge of genocide. A second transformation in the international security environ-
BRIAN MACDONALD
ment has been the consequent demand for the international community to intervene in these "failed states." Such interventions have been forced to move far beyond the "boundary management" patterns of classical peacekeeping interventions, to new intervention modalities, as military forces are required to initially intervene through the use of military force to stabilize and reverse chaos, and then to operate in what is really a paramilitary role to protect and support the work of humanitarian organizations which are providing assistance to the masses of civilian refugees fleeing from conflict, and then to provide the basic security presence necessary to facilitate those refugees' return and to allow the immediate rehabilitation of critical infrastructures necessary to their ultimate well-being. There is, as well, an increasing awareness of the need to accept that interventions in "failed states" must now extend far beyond the immediate military security and humanitarian relief phases, to a process continuum extending to those national development interventions necessary to transform "failed states" into "viable states," states with the capacity to deliver human security to their citizens a process continuum which will require a far deeper intervention over a much longer period than has been the practice before this. Thus there has been an increasing realization that human security interventions into failed states increasingly blur the line between purely military operations and those of a more paramilitary nature, which move beyond the concepts of traditional boundary monitoring peacekeeping, to new modalities of post conflict peace enforcement. Moreover, these new modalities have led to a necessary evolution of hitherto unforeseen patterns of civil and military cooperation, not all of which have yet been developed. This has, in turn, led to an increasing recognition of the necessity of the development of specialized Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) staffs, and the gradual expansion of their mandates, particularly as human security interventions have become, of necessity, much longer in duration. This, then, was the context for the 2004 Joint Research Conference.
THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
THE SEARCH STABILITY IN
FOR A
DANGEROUS WORLD
By Jean-Pierre Juneau
t is certainly a pleasure to be here today. First, because it is a change of weather from what we have had in Brussels for the last few weeks, not to say the last few months. But also because it is going to provide me with the opportunity to discuss with you the issues of peacekeeping, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Canada's role in that organization. The organizers were kind enough to give me quite a broad working title for my presentation "The Search for Stability in a Dangerous World." What I propose is to give you my perspective, as a member of the decision-making body of the Alliance, on three key themes that are likely to enter into the debate on the future of NATO in the months and years ahead. Firstly, NATO's ambition and ability to conduct new missions. Secondly, NATO's diverse relationship with the rest of the world. And finally, in conclusion, I wish to outline some of the challenges ahead for the alliance. NATO Ambition and Ability for New Missions Let me take the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan as the example. Jaap de Hoop, the new NATO Secretary General, has consistently since the start of
10 JEAN-PIERRE JUNEAU
his mandate, stressed that Afghanistan is and should remain the number one priority for the Alliance. This has been very much welcomed by Canada, in particular, given our large scale 2003-2003 military contribution to ISAF. As you may well recall, NATO leaders in Istanbul agreed to continue to expand ISAF in stages throughout Afghanistan, through the establishment by lead nations of additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In the first phase, which is being implemented as we speak, five new PRTs are being brought under NATO command, probably in the north, south and west of the country. Preparations for phase 2, further expansion to the western part of Afghanistan, are also underway. And you may have read in the Globe and Mail this morning that the Prime Minister has indicated again that we would develop a PRT in Afghanistan sometime next year. The successful conduct of nation-wide elections will be a crucial milestone in the democratic development and peaceful evolution of Afghanistan. As you know, presidential elections will take place on October 9th. Parliamentary elections have been postponed until the spring of 2005. In response to President Karzai's request, NATO has agreed to support the Afghanistan authorities in providing security during the election period. This essentially comes down to increasing ISAF's troop strength to about 10,000 during this period. Afghanistan authorities will, however, retain primarily responsibility for security throughout the election process. Let me take you back to the beginning of Canada's involvement in ISAF. The International Security Assistance Force began as a "coalition of the willing"-type of operation, with individual countries rotating as the lead. When Canada expressed its intention to join ISAF in early 2003, we saw the potential to enhance our collective efforts even further, and bring more capabilities to bear on the mission. That solution was to go to NATO. For us, it was a natural and logical option. NATO allies were already contributing more than 90 percent of all ISAF troops. And at the request of Germany and the
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Netherlands, the Alliance had already been involved in supporting the planning and execution of some key elements to the mission. So in early February 2003, Canada engaged NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and some of our key allies to explore the possibility of expanding NATO's commitment into Afghanistan through ISAF's leadership. A few weeks later, the Alliance agreed to take command of the ISAF mission. What NATO involvement brought, and what it continues to bring, is much needed continuity, stability and cohesion to ISAF. It also eases the task of future lead nations such as Canada. Canada is now deployed with some 600 ground troops in Afghanistan and another 200 air force staff in the Gulf region in support of the Canadian contingent. This contingent is due to stay until the summer of 2005. As for the future, Canada is studying the possibility of establishing a PRT, and we got the answer by the Prime Minister in the Globe and Mail this morning. Establishing a PRT would be very consistent with the so-called "3-D Approach" adopted by the Government of Canada in Afghanistan. By closely coordinating our diplomatic, development and defence efforts, we aim to get maximum output for our investments and contribute in the most efficient way to Afghanistan's stabilization and reconstruction. This is the clearest indication that Canada continues to attach high importance to Alliance success in Afghanistan. ISAF is exactly the type of mission that NATO must succeed at, now and in the future, if it wants to become an "Alliance of the First Resort." This brings me to the second aspect of undertaking new missions; namely, NATO's ability to conduct these missions. The first issue here is the link between political decision-making and the ability to deliver. On this point, leaders in Istanbul have tasked us to come sit in permanent session, and to review our planning and force generation procedures in order to strengthen the link between political agreement to commence operations and the provision of the
necessary forces. The Secretary General has already floated some ideas, and discussions will start later this year on that particular subject. This is a very difficult issue to address, and touches on national sovereignty and the national decision-making procedures involved in deployment. There is nothing more sensitive than sending our men and women abroad in harms way. The second issue is more of a military nature. If NATO wishes to perform the full range of missions in a challenging security environment, the Alliance must be able to field forces that can move quickly to sustain operations over distance and time. The overall Alliance record in this respect is not all that good. Canada, however, is doing quite well. In 2003, the Canadian Forces had 5.5 percent of the total troop strength deployed abroad. This put us in 3rd place among NATO allies. And if we limited our analysis to land forces, Canada had 14 percent of its army deployed internationally, second only to the United States among NATO members. To make our forces more useable and deployable, we do require new capabilities. However, with one or two well known exceptions, most allies are not in a position to increase defence budgets in a major way, and to purchase the capabilities required for taking on new missions. Alliance members are therefore more and more looking for multilateral solutions. At the Prague summit in 2002, nations agreed to initiate a series of multinational and cooperative activities, in strategic airlift, sealift, air-to-air refuelling and the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system. Canada is a participant in the AGS system, which is the first major NATO procurement since the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) program of the 1970s. AGS, like AWACS, will be a radar in the sky, but whereas AWACS monitors the airspace, AGS will map movement and activity on or near the ground. Canada, alongside eight other NATO nations, also signed a multilateral sealift agreement with the NATO Maintenance and Supply
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Agency (NMSA), for the purpose of increasing multinational efforts to reduce strategic sealift shortfalls among NATO countries, by using a mixture of fulltime charter and multinational assured access contracts. Lastly, in Istanbul in June, Canada signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding the negotiation of a national access contract for strategic airlift. This shared approach distributes the cost among the participating allies, and thus offers many an opportunity to acquire a critical capability which they could not otherwise individually afford. Partnership and Cooperation Let me now turn to my second subject Partnership and Cooperation. At Istanbul, NATO met for the first time as an alliance of 26 countries, at the level of heads of state and government. Canada has been a strong proponent of NATO enlargement and was very pleased to welcome the new members at their first summit. The enlarged Alliance, including old and new members, is very conscious of the fact that partnerships remain crucial in helping us meet evolving security challenges. Partners have been and continue to be important contributors to NATO-led operations. Today, I would just like to single out two partnerships that I believe are of increasing importance to the Alliance: the NATOEuropean relationship and what we call the "Greater Middle East." Canada has always been very supportive of NATO's evolving strategic partnership with the European Union (EU). We have also, from the start, been strong supporters of the EU developing military and security policy, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Avoiding duplication, pragmatism and transparency all are key concepts for us. In other words, ESDP should be implemented in a way that does not duplicate the capabilities offered by NATO or undermine the Alliance as the primary forum for consultations and
joint action on Euro-Atlantic defence and security issues. Canada is therefore very much in favour of the cooperation model that is currently being put to test in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the EU is set to take over the main stabilization task from the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), by having recourse to NATO's assets and capabilities. This arrangement is referred to as Berlin Plus; in a nutshell, Berlin Plus provides for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance. It avoids unnecessary duplication, and provides for the highest degree of cooperation and consultation between the two organizations. Canada hopes to be in a position to contribute to the EU-led operation ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will be stood up later this year. We are currently negotiating the details of such third country participation with the EU. Canada would also like to see the cooperation between these two organizations broaden to other fields, such as cooperation in the fight against international terrorism and civil emergency protection. No other regional development will affect our common security more strongly in the years to come than what we call the Greater Middle East. It will thus be necessary, as Secretary General Jan de Hoop pointed out, to have a coherent trans-Atlantic approach, to engage this region in a spirit of joint partnership. At Istanbul, our leaders took two decisions. First of all, they decided to strengthen the Alliance Mediterranean Dialogue, which is celebrating its tenth anniversary this year. Its performance, quite frankly speaking, remains somewhat lacklustre. From a Canadian perspective, we identified two key problems that require fixing. First, the dialogue clearly suffered from a lack of commitment and engagement from our Mediterranean partners. Participation remained limited and there was no sense of ownership. At Istanbul, NATO invited our Mediterranean partners to establish a more ambitious and expanded partnership, guided by the principal of joint own-
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ership, stronger practical cooperation and an enhanced political dialogue (hopefully at the ministerial level) as early as later this year, all of which should contribute to regional security and stability. In addition, it had become clear to us that NATO's imagined region was very poor. Our ambitions to strengthen the dialogue will have to be coupled with a much more intensified and jointly elaborated public diplomacy campaign. Secondly, in under the business of the Mediterranean Dialogue, our leaders also launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which aims to offer practical cooperation for countries in the Greater Middle East region, starting with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), in areas where NATO can make a real difference and where it has value added. Members of the GGC have already expressed active interest in engaging in practical cooperation with the Alliance. It is clear that reaching out to this region is not only vital for our common security and for stability in the region, but also widens the pool of potential troop contributors in NATO's peacekeeping missions. Countries from the broader Middle East region, such as Jordan and Morocco, have already participated in NATO-led operations in the Balkans, and there is the potential for even further cooperation. Challenges on the Road Ahead Flowing from what we addressed earlier new missions and new partnerships I would now like to dwell for a moment on some of the challenges that the Alliance will face in the near future. The key issue is no doubt the need to strengthen our capabilities. Former Secretary General Lord Robertson has always said that his priorities were capabilities, capabilities, and capabilities. He was right if we do not get the capability question right, new missions and partnerships will be fraught with the risk of failure.
Highly relevant to capabilities is the question of linkage between political decision-making and ability to deliver, which we have already addressed. It is hard to know what the outcome of this autumn debate will be. Afghanistan remains the Alliance and Canada's top priority and is, as had been said, the litmus test for the Alliance's performance. Then there is the state of trans-Atlantic relations: Have we overcome the pre-Iraq tensions? Is the Alliance in a good state? I think the Alliance is actually quite healthy at this point in time. Of course, there is tension and differences of opinion. But this is unavoidable when 26 democracies work together. Much has also been written of Franco-American tensions in NATO, and about French resistance to US-driven initiatives in the Alliance. I cannot deny that these exist, but their importance can be easily overstated. What is often overlooked is that France is one of the major contributors to NATO-led operations: ISAF in Afghanistan and Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo, two crucial operations in sensitive theatres which are currently led by French generals. In Istanbul, leaders adopted a comprehensive package of measures to further strengthen the Alliance. We are expanding in Afghanistan; the mission in Bosnia is being handed over to the EU; and there was agreement on sending a training implementation mission to Iraq. These are all solid achievements. The Iraq mission remains contentious for some allies, but we believe that this issue can be overcome. The Alliance will play a small but significant stabilization role in Iraq, alongside the coalition forces. It is in the interest of our allies to contribute to the stability in Iraq; it is also in the interest of our allies to foster strong trans-Atlantic relations. One of the major challenges for NATO will be to make a meaningful contribution to the fight against terrorism. Not a day goes by without our deadlines being terminated by terrorist attacks on NATO, our allies and elsewhere. The fight against terrorism has been a constant item on NATO's agenda ever since the horrendous attacks on
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the US on September 11, 2001. At Istanbul, leaders adopted a new set of measures to strengthen our individual and collective contributions to the fight against terrorism. They include: improved intelligence sharing; an increased ability for consequence management, including dealing with the consequences of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks; assistance to protection of major events, such as the Olympic games or the wedding of Prince Philip in Spain; contribution to the fight against terrorism, to our operations mainly in Afghanistan but also in the Balkans; and increased cooperation with NATO partners. Allies are, however, of the opinion that the Alliance should be able to do more. That is why the Secretary General has indicated that he wants to activate thinking on this subject this autumn. The war on terror is without a doubt the biggest challenge our democracies are facing today. It stretches way beyond NATO's traditional domain. Still, it is our obligation to put NATO's huge potential to its best use in the interest of safeguarding our societies and values. In conclusion, this is an organization that is pursuing adaptation in terms of its area of operations and its decision-making process. Our capacity to address successfully the new challenges we are now facing, such as Afghanistan, will obviously be the litmus test for the future of this organization. Thank you very much.
MULTILATERAL STABILITY OPERATIONS: AN AMERICAN VIEW

By Robert Hunter
t is an honour to be in Canada once again, and an honour to be surrounded by such a distinguished group of people, as a guest of these three extraordinary institutions the Royal Canadian Military Institute, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, and the Atlantic Council of Canada. I am particularly glad to see Minister Roy McLaren, Chair of the Atlantic Council, and Julie Lindout, President of the Atlantic Council (and a stalwart for the Atlantic Treaty Organisation) in the audience today. I believe that the Atlantic Council is more important than ever, not just for what it is doing and will do in Canada, but also for what it does throughout the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It is good to be here today. As you Canadians will understand, perhaps more than our European allies, we are now going through this great circus called the US presidential election, and we will get safely by it on midnight of November 2nd. The world will survive this process it is part of our process for figuring out who we are for the near term, and what we will be doing in the world. And one hopes that the result of this debate is going to come up with policies that are more intelligent than in the past. It is also an honour to be in this building, because it reminds peo-
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ple from your neighbour to the south just how much this country has done and continues to do, not only for peace and security in the world, but also for the promotion of our shared democratic value. One only needs to look at the places that the Canadian Forces have been involved in, like in the two great World Wars, where we (the US) were late, while you were there right from the beginning, protecting us until we came to our senses. Even a casual look at the medal display in the hallway shows the numerous places that Canadian soldiers have served, often like in Champlain where we would as soon forget. The United States has won a lot of wars, has lost one and had a draw at least, that is what we call it in the War of 1812. But if there is one country that we have tried to conquer, but never could, it is this large one to our North. Minister Roy MacLaren will recall the late great Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau once said that living next to the United States is like sleeping with an elephant: no matter how gently it turns over in the middle of the night, you are very much aware of it. We Americans would return the complement by saying that living next to Canada is like having your mother in-law in the next room. It is certainly true that we are often slower in certain areas such as intellectually, policy, and in fighting than our Canadian friends. And one of those areas is, of course, peace support operations, of which we have had a lot to learn from Canada, and from some of those other countries that have been so deeply engaged in this over the years. The current administration came to power by saying that nation building was not something it could possibly contemplate. To put it simply, you don't use soldiers in the services to take children to kindergarten. But it is ending its first term (whether they have a second, we don't know yet) with a clear understanding that shaping the world in which we live is going to be absolutely critical; not only to limit the degree to which our fighting people and volunteer services go out to protect those of us, but also to try to make it less likely that we will have to fight particular wars. We will need to be able to shape
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an environment that is more congenial to all of us. I cannot approve, or even rival, what the permanent representative to NATO has just finished saying. One of the great secrets of Canada is that you have always sent extraordinary people to NATO in all of its capacities, both military and civilian, for many years. I hope that what the ambassador just said will be made available as a written text. There are those in my country that don't know what it is NATO is doing today, and have no comprehension of the second great transformation of NATO, which took place in the last few years. (We know it is such a great transformation because Donald Rumsfeld now takes credit for it.) In fact, one of the remarkable things is about NATO is that the content of what the ambassador said could just have been easily said, if not as eloquently, by any of the other 25 ambassadors. Fortunately, NATO is a bi-partisan or non-partisan issue in my country, and has always been so. And I am confident that this is also true here in Canada, with all your different political parties. The non-partisan, shared viewed of NATO is also clear within the Alliance itself, and can be seen when NATO does make a decision While I have had enough wounds from dealing with the French as anybody, it must be said that the French are fantastic allies. When the French make a decision, they are there on that very day. I do not think that many people in my country will know of or understand that there are 200 French soldiers Special Forces serving under American command in Afghanistan today. Just as there are an extraordinary number from Canada, where you punch way above your weight, not just in the advice you give and the intelligence you bring, but in what the sacrifices, the risks and the equipment of Canadian Forces. And everybody in the Alliance, and in my country, should thank you for that (even though I know that we are sometimes not very good at saying thank you). The security environment has obviously radically transformed. At the end of the Cold War, we found ourselves in my country with
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an awful lot of incipient power, and not much in the way of threats. And in that way, one has to be very careful about hubris. If there is one thing you know about Greek tragedies, if you show some hubris, you will find yourself getting in trouble, as we are (I regret to say) today. To put the US power in perspective, if you add in all the money allocated for combat operations in Iraq, we spend something to the order of 50 percent of all the world's money on military affairs, economic power, etc. But it is still incipient power, because as I've said all the way since the end of the Cold War the only way you are going to turn incipient power into lasting influence is by creating institutions, attitudes, processes, and practices that work for us in the United States, and also work for others. We have gone through a big quasi-debate on these issues, on multilateralism vs. internationalism. I even wrote a line for President Bill Clinton back in 1992 which he still uses we must work together when we can, and alone when we must. And that is, I think, the late motif. We've tried, in the last few years, to go it alone. And one of the tragic lessons properly learned is that this great experiment in going it alone has taught us that that is not a smart thing to do; it is not in our own interest and not in the interest of the rest of the world, for which we and you and others in North America have an awful lot of the stewardship, though in our case probably out of proportion to the mischief that we may sometimes cause in this particular continent. Yesterday I spoke to the Smithonian Institution in Washington, where I saw some 20,000 people marching for the Museum for the American Indian. And I can tell you, a large fraction of those people were carrying, not the stars and stripes, but the maple leaf. People from this country have a lot to teach us in what we need to think about in terms of human qualities and human rights, and what we do together. Well, we in the US have been learning a lesson. As Winston Churchill succinctly put it, the United States can always be relied upon to do the right thing, after it has tried everything else. (Which is bet-
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ter than how Clemenceau put it: that the United States is the only country that has gone from barbarism to decadence, without an intervening period of civilization.) NATO did not end after the Cold War. To borrow what Voltaire said about God, if NATO had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent it to keep the United States and Canada involved as European powers. With you, it was natural. With us, we had to relearn it over and over again. In the end, we have to protect the best of the past, including this extraordinary thing called Allied Command Europe. We are also very fortunate to have here the recently retired General Sir John Deverell, who in his last appointment was Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Northern Region, which has done some extraordinary things. (And thank you for the work that Great Britain has done with the ACE Mobile Force, and now the UK Army Command Control System, or ACCS.) It's an alliance, and it works together as an alliance. Julie can tell you about a remarkable moment we had at the Istanbul summit, where we brought together 270 students from 37 countries, in NATO and the various Atlantic Councils. It is all about the young people, the next generation, renewing itself. If you sit down and close your eyes, to hear them talk, you couldn't tell the difference. In 15 short years, the people coming out of these countries in the former communist world have learned what it means to be democrats, to be Western and to care about this Alliance. Well, we didn't have a lot to do in the 1990s, but we did collectively recreate NATO. We spread into Central Europe the political, military and even economic lessons of our Alliance. What happened during the Cold War in the Western part of the continent, with the assistance of North America, was nothing less than the absolution of war as an instrument of relations among the West European countries. This is a remarkable achievement, especially coming in the wake of the most horrendous century in human history, where more than 50% of people who have ever died in war died of European causes.
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And this what I call the "European civil space" is spreading eastward on the continent and even into the Balkans, where NATO recreated itself in the 1990s. It should be remembered that, by that time, much of the agenda of the 20th century was complete. The United States and Canada were permanently connected to Allied Command Europe; the reach out to the east, through the Partnership for Peace program, improvements in NATO-Russia relations, the founding act with Ukraine, etc. We were able to look around and say "we are able to create a Europe whole and free, and to end the most miserable century in Europe." Then we saw Bosnia. And the temptation was to say: "forget about it, it is not important strategically." But NATO turned 120 degrees from going in that direction, and moved from containing Soviet power to undertaking peace support and other kinds of operations. There was the 20-day air campaign that ended the war in Bosnia. And several years later, we had to do it again in a 78-day air campaign over Kosovo, where remarkably there was not a single Allied casualty. NATO was able to re-create itself over the years, and in doing so, brought peace to that area of Europe. Yes, there is still a long way to go until you have a genuine future for these parts of the former Yugoslavia, but at least people aren't dying there now. Years ago, a lot of people even said it wouldn't be possible. But we were able to act in concert, understand the real problems with building peace and security, and advance the values that we all treasure. At the close of the 20th century agenda, we discovered that a new 21st century agenda opened up to us. Primarily, from at least my country's perspective, the focus is on the Middle East. (Ironically, your country has a much broader perspective, based on your frequent and long-held engagement in UN peace support operations.) It would be an understatement to say that 9/11 shocked my country. It is a constant reminder, and one which is even now frequently seen on television. As Le Monde said the next day, "nous somme tout Americaine," and we appreciate very deeply in our souls, what you and our friends
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and allies did on that day. And in the same way, there was never any divide within the Alliance on the issue of terrorism. There may be some differences about the precise method to achieve a particular goal at a particular moment, and there may be some difference about the relative priority to be put on dealing with the terrorists themselves, as opposed to trying to take away from them their recruiting possibilities or to drain the swamp. But even on this issue, it is something that we have come around to as well. One reason we in the United States (among others) oppose poverty and want to do something about it is because that is a way, in part, to deal with the problem of terrorism. That was the President of the United States who said that, down in Mexico. And I think that was a pretty common proposition. To put it bluntly, the division that we have had is over the conduct of Iraq. I don't want to rehearse that debate here. But one of the regrettable things, which I hope we have learn from, is that we didn't even have a debate in the United States about Iraq before the invasion. That is one of the reasons why we are having such an intense debate now. I do think we all would like to rewind back the clock, maybe everybody, maybe even the president. However, in our individual and collective common interest, whether anyone likes it or not, we are in the Middle East for the foreseeable future, measured in terms of decades and maybe even generations. In some ways, we were already set upon the idea that in our individual and common interest we could not leave the Middle East to its own devices for eternity, not in an area that provides a tremendous amount of energy for the rest of the world. The vocation and responsibility for being in the Middle East was already there, in terms of our relationship with Israel as a democracy, in terms of terrorism, in terms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in terms of stabilization, and in terms of progress of peoples into the 20th century, much less the 21st century. Like it or not, the Iraq War has accelerated that trend; and like it
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or not, we collectively have the responsibility to get it right. A lot of people in my country, your country and elsewhere will point out that the Americans broke it and, therefore, have the responsibility to fix it. Well, unfortunately, we are in it collectively and, to be very candid, we need a lot of help to fix it. We need to do it together in a number of respects, not just the immediate situation in Iraq itself, but also more broadly. It is decisively important that Iran does not develop and deploy nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is decisively important that we do not go to war with Iran. It is therefore imperative that the United States, Canada and its European partners work together on a common strategy, which will start off by reassuring the Iranians on two points. First, that we are not interested in regime change, invading it or in denying it the right to security. And second, we offer it the opportunity to reenter into the outside world. But Tehran has to do two things in return: (i) eliminate its nuclear weapons program, and be satisfied with a clearly peaceful nuclear program; and (ii) stop supporting Hezbollah and other terrorist groups, and to continue its cooperation in the war on terrorism. And I think, to be fair, we actually have had a higher degree of cooperation in Afghanistan and in the war against Iraq than we sometimes acknowledge. But there are certainly elements in Iran that are going in the wrong direction, and I think there are things that have to be sorted out. Regrettably, I don't think we are having that much of a debate on this issue either. You'd think we would have learned our lesson, but we better learn that pretty quick. This is an issue that we will have to face whoever is president. The world doesn't care whether we have a Democratic or Republican President. They care about what America does, and want an America that gets it right; an America that exercises leadership; an America that is committed to standing up for the best in the American and North American tradition. Well, we are going to have to be engaged in creating a new secu-
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rity system for the Middle East. The old one is gone, is shattered; and let us be honest, it was always pretty inadequate anyways. The war against Iraq was not something that sprang out of whole cloth it was the logical extension, or perhaps the hyper-extension of the Clinton administration's dual containment policy, which was in turn the logical extension going all the way back to the collapse of the two pillars strategy with the fall of the Shah in Iran. I think we are going to need to try to build a new security system in the Middle East. There are basically three choices. First, the United States with a few other countries (such Great Britain) can do it all ourselves, for the indefinite future. I don't think this will work, and certainly we don't want to do it the American people are now insisting upon multilateralism and the role of the United Nations. When the president went yesterday to the United Nations and asked for help, it was not just because he thought that that was of strategic important. It was also because 65 percent of the American people think we should get things approved by the UN, except in cases where we are under direct threat. While a country has the right and obligation to act when under direct threat, it is very foolish to act unilaterally when you are not. The second option is, of course, to get through the process of the transformation of Middle Eastern societies, like an extension of what has been done in Europe. But that is a very long term venture, and it will not be the American model of democracy when it does come. The third option is, at least in the interim, to try to create this new security system. We haven't even discussed it yet, and haven't even decided where we are trying to go. Within that, peace support operations must be a holistic concept, to include military action, civilian action in support of the military, shaping the battlefield so you don't have a battlefield, economic progress and reform of government. These are all a common package. But let me tell you something that is not a new idea. What do you think we collectively did during the Cold War? Even before NATO had a military component, we started with the Marshall Plan,
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and with the European movement and the Coal and Steel Community. These economic components were always together. NATO was the shield and the European Union (EU) was the sword. The Soviet Union was done in by ideas, not by Star Wars and military power. And that is our most precious asset. And one of the most important things, and I'll conclude on this point, is the need to recognize that we have to have a holistic approach to national security, which includes the lashing together irrevocably to national and collective values. What we have to sell most of all, is not our power, but the idea that we have an organized principle to the way people conduct international life that is pretty appealing. You don't force them down peoples' throats but you do offer people opportunities. When I was at NATO, it started out it is possible to say that NATO and the EU were two institutions living in the same city on different planets. There were zero institutional connections. So I was most delighted to hear that the ambassador here was also ambassador to the European Union. When I served at NATO, for 4 years, there was only one European permanent representative that ever served at the EU. Now there is significant cross-penetration, and the requirement for NATO and the European to work together. We had a terrorist response exercise in the spring, and at that point, I was helping out Allied Command Transformation with a group of concept developers. So we sat there for 12 days and watched NATO do its business, but one thing that we noticed was that NATO didn't communicate with the UN, the EU or even the Russians, at which point we stopped to point that out. So things are changing. We got to be holistic, we got to work together, we got to learn from one another, and the first country that has to get across that bridge is mine, and I touch wood that the process we are going through will lead us after we've done just about everything else to do the right thing.
LEARNING BY DOING: CANADA, NATO AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

By Col Alain Tremblay
r. President, Ambassadors, Generals it is a pleasure for me to be here. I will try to give you an overview on the reality of what is implied by the new environment in which the Canadian Forces (CF) will have to evolve. This briefing should complement Ambassador Juneau's earlier comments on Afghanistan, particularly on how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sees its involvement and how to move the yardstick in a very complex, geo-strategic situation. My aim will be to report on the mission experience of Task Force Kabul Rotation 1 in Afghanistan, which will touch upon the role of Canada in that country, what we have achieved or accomplished, the lessons learned from a military perspective, and some of the considerations for future operations. The agenda will be as follows. First, I am going to try to give you some more insight into the geo-strategic situation, an environment in which our government is in a unique situation of projecting military power in order to achieve an end-state. Second, the threats that the CF is facing in Afghanistan, which is very different from conventional warfare, will be examined. The third section will examine accomplishments, the lessons learned, and the considerations that this deployment brings to future operations
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Geo-strategic Environment Just to put things in perspective Afghanistan has a similar if still smaller population to Canada, but occupies a much smaller geographical space, similar in size to one of our western provinces (see figure 1). Yes, geography is a factor, but not to the scale that many people may imagine. Nevertheless, from a geographical point of view, it is a country in which it is extremely difficult to move. The centre of gravity is certainly Kabul, but if you require deployments and patrols elsewhere things become very difficult. And ISAF's area of interest, which encompasses the whole of Afghanistan, certainly demands this (see figure 2). Our Joint Operations Area (JOA) is Afghanistan and all neighbouring countries where the force build-up is carried out and support to the force is provided. Forward operating bases (FOBs) consist of Termez (Germany), Dubai (Canada), Manas (Italy), Dushanbe (France) and of course Kabul (ISAF's primary FOB is operated by Germany in Termez). All of these locations are extremely important as there is no established land line of communication to Kabul, and we rely almost exclusively on our Air Bridge into Kabul for personnel and supplies. So from a military perspective, a major issue that NATO forces deployed to Afghanistan are facing is the ability to successfully project military power, to be able to influence the environment. So what has 2000 years of conflict resulted in? A fragmented tribal-like country with numerous ethic groups. Almost half of Afghanistan's people are Pushtuns who live mainly in the southern and eastern areas of the country. The remainder are Tajiks, who are to be found in the north-east and west; Uzbeks, who are predominantly farmers in the region north of the Hindu Kush; and Hazaras, who are nomadic and inhabit the central highlands. Over four-fifths of Afghanistan's population is based in its rural regions, primarily along the rivers, while the remaining fifth is
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Figure 1: Afghanistan in comparison to Canada
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Figure 2: Shown are some distance and the associated travel times. The distances are quite reasonable by European standards, however the terrain and poor state of the road infrastructure make almost all ground travel very challenging and time consuming. The timings shown here are on the optimistic side. The travel to the south is improving with the upcoming completion of the "Ring Road" towards Kandahar.
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nomadic. In addition to the capital of Kabul in the east, major urban centers include the cities of Heart, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz. The primary languages of Afghanistan are Pashtu and Dari, and most people are bilingual. However, strict Taliban rules have left a significant mark on the education of the population, where only 36% of the population can read and write. Following the Bonn Accord, the international community decided that a very robust central government was what was required to stabilize Afghanistan. But you can imagine the cultural shock that the Afghan government and its populace are facing, in trying to unify a country that was basically fragmented for the last 2000 years. This complicates the way of doing business on the ground. Afghanistan remains a patch work of feudal fiefdoms with a weak central government. The regional warlords have achieved some measure of legitimacy by obtaining positions in the federal or provincial government as well as the military. Thus it is impossible to separate warlords from government in any discussion, as they are in many cases one and the same. Moreover, the warlords from both an economic and a military point of view are extremely powerful. For example, we heard last week that Ismail Khan, in the western part of Afghanistan in Herat, was basically removed of power as the governor of the province, and replaced. Nevertheless that warlord is still adding to a private army of over 25,000 well-equipped militia members. So you can imagine the problem and the dilemma that President Hamid Karzai is facing, when he is trying to unify this country, while dealing with its fragmented power-broking tendencies. So in the end, it is a very complex situation, which both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which is a US-led coalition which is also operating in Afghanistan, and the NATO mission in Afghanistan have to reconcile. The US military involvement in Afghanistan, which totals about 16,000 troops (which is on top of deployed NATO troops), is under
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Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A). Its mission statement is to conduct full spectrum operations throughout the area of operations in order to establish enduring security defeats of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and to deter the re-emergence of terrorism in Afghanistan. Its activities include OEF, and combat activity throughout Afghanistan (including within ISAF's area of operation) On the other side, NATO which assumed the leading role in ISAF on 11 August 2003 has a much more toned down mission, to support the Afghanistan Transitional Administration (ATA), the current Government of Afghanistan (GOA) in the maintenance of security and stability in Kabul, the capital, and its environs. This also includes the expansion in the Konduz and Mazar-e-Sharif portions of the north. But compared to the US CFC-A, it is a much more toned down means to achieve the same end state in Afghanistan. It is quite important to see the nuance between the mission statements of the organizations that are operating in the same theatre of operations, because and this is often overlooked there is more than one major entity or power broker involved trying to solve the issue. The end result is a basic fragmentation of our commands (see figure 3). So around Kabul, you got a goose egg, where NATO is basically the lead organization from a military point of view. And more recently in the north, we have the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Konduz, under Germany, and in Mazar-e-Sharif, under the UK. When there is talk of NATO expansion in Afghanistan, what is really talked about is the deployment of PRTs in the country. What has to be understood, though, is that NATO only has 10,000 soldiers in Kabul and in its regional area of command. And not all of these soldiers are declared to NATO there are national troops there that are not necessarily declared to NATO. The combat power of the military troops that NATO has available for its mission is no more than 4,500 to cover its region. In the rest of that country,
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Figure 3: Regional Commands in Afghanistan.
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which is currently under CFC-A , the Americans last summer surged to almost 20,000 (though this has since been reduced to about 12,000 soldiers). But it is not always obvious to create unity of command and unity of approach to try to solve the issue. It should also be remembered that Kabul is a very large city, with a population of 3.2 million people. We have to operate in this complex environment, where we have to deal with urban warfare and an urban jungle. And like any military organization, there has been a fragmentation of the area between the nations. Until only recently, Canada was actually the lead nation from a personnel point of view, with regard to the number of people deployed out there. One should also note that ISAF is its area of operation in Kabul with patrols and civil-military (CIMIC) operations Short of the NATO agenda, there is also a security sector reform from the international community, which is under the auspices of different nations (see figure 4). With regard to counter-narcotics, the UK is leading in counter-narcotics, while Italy is leading judificial reform. The other three reform areas is disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) under Japan; the training of the new Afghan national army under the US; and the training of the police under Germany. While DDR has had little momentum (though there is some attempt to implement a more rapid agenda), policy capability is increasing on a daily basis, and Task Force Kabul is now a participant with a team responsible for the training of the Afghan National Army Battalion. Let me make this clear all these initiatives are under the lead of the specific nation, not NATO (though ISAF does support these reforms whenever possible). But you can imagine the difficulty of coordinating and synchronising efforts to achieve stability and security in Afghanistan, when there is a tremendous amount of people that you have to coordinate with. In order to illustrate the problems that we are facing in creating synergy and unity command, you have three main parties: ISAF under
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Figure 4: The International Community and Security Sector Reform (SSR)
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NATO auspices, the US control CAF-A, and on the other side, the government of Afghanistan. In contrast to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where basically we had a High Representative to foresee the coordination of all activities and key players, such a power broker does not exist right now in Afghanistan. So the UN is there trying to support legitimate elections, while NATO is there trying to create the conditions for successful election by creating a safe and secure environment. The end state of the Alliance is to have a self-sustaining, moderate and democratic Afghan government, without the need of ISAF to help provide security. At the same time, you have the Americans that are there for a very similar end state, but also trying to eradicate the country from the terrorist insurgent bases operating out there, including the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the internal Afghan rogue group Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). So even though everybody agrees on the end state that we are looking for, there is some nuance with regard to the approach and the modus operandi to achieve that goal. The threat to soldiers deployed to Afghanistan is very different from that posed by means of conventional warfare. That is why, from a NATO perspective, the threat is actually assessed to be low to medium, and not the higher level threat that people may perceive. But for the soldiers on the ground when you're shot at, or when you are stuck in an ambush it is still a high intensity activity. Nevertheless, when you look at the number of events that are happening in Afghanistan, certainly in the area under NATO control, it's extremely stable. The alliance's centre of gravity is also a key issue here. We've talked about NATO expansion the fact that we now have 26 members. The coalition in Afghanistan has 34 nations, which we are trying to bring together from a military perspective to create the synergy to achieve an end state. This is not easy nor obvious to achieve, I can assure you, because in NATO and in any other operation (Bosnia, in UN operations), nations remain sovereign. And despite the fact that
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Canada has basically committed to that NATO mission, we are always going to put some interest in the way we want to achieve the end state of the Alliance operation. More so, people have to realize that there are financial differences between UN operations and NATO operations. When we conducted operations under UN auspices, the bulk of the costs of those operations was basically absorbed by the UN. Within NATO, the cost sharing formula is that every member has to pay for itself. So basically, full cost goes to the nation participating. For large nations and medium power nations, it is not a major issue. But I can assure you that some of the nations that are willing to participate in this Alliance endeavour are now struggling to generate and sustain their commitment; their difficulty is only abetted by the distance between Afghanistan and Europe, as well as the country's poor infrastructure. This has brought the cost of this operation to a level that has never been seen by Canada. A full year of conducting operations and maintaining a presence in Afghanistan has cost Canada about $1 billion. So this is a very expensive mission, and one which is totally different in scale from those that we've done under UN auspices. The Threat Environment Identifying belligerents have generally been easy, even in Bosnia. But in Afghanistan, it is a lot different. You have the warlords that one day are working with you, as the governor of a province, and the next day are basically ordering a rocket attack or a car bomb attack on your units. So it is very difficult to understand who is who. There is also the threat of terrorism and the continuing problem of narcotics. The economic base of Afghanistan is right now based on drugs, which the international community is trying to solve. Mines are also a constant danger Afghanistan is the third largest mine country in the world, due in large part from the Soviet occupation. This creates a very asymmetrical environment, where the threat
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to the soldiers is coming from everywhere. Not surprisingly, this environment, where the enemy is so clearly undefined, becomes very difficult to understand, operate in and be able to move the mission in the right direction. As I said earlier, NATO is currently oriented around Kabul, and in the northern regions. And as you can see in figure 6, a large concentration of belligerents and international terrorists are located in very clearly defined areas in the south, around Kandahar, with the Taliban; Al Qaeda astride the border with Pakistan; and the HIG, which is also east of Kabul astride the border with Pakistan. It makes coordination of military operations extremely complex. The military threat in Afghanistan is simply not present. We are not facing a column of tanks, artillery batteries. What we are facing instead is much more subtle could be a civilian with explosives rigged on his chest, could be a car bomb, or it could be a direct attack; and often, it is about being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The central threats to US/Coalition forces in this kind of environments can include: ambushes, rocket attacks, terrorists; suicide bombers and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which can involve bicycles, mines, vehicles and even donkey carts. According to the NATO threat levels, while the military threat is currently rated low and the civil threat is rated as medium, a number of threats are considered high, including: direct and indirect attacks; IEDs; and terrorism. These are the means through which belligerent parties make their point, and try to destabilize the country. In this kind of asymmetrical and non-conventional military environment, passive defence leads to casualties, while an aggressive defence leads to success. The instability which effects AFG and threatens the Coalition's success is embodied in three distinct conflicts in Afghanistan. First, Al Qaeda's senior leadership relies on the coalition's inability to penetrate the tribal society, and therefore ensuring a sanctuary in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region. This sanctuary, alongside
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Al Qaeda's ability to raise and move money, enables them to survive. The centre of gravity for coalition forces is to emphasize intelligence in this conflict area. Second, all three anti-coalition militia (ACM) groups Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and HIG rely on support of the people whether it is in tribal societies or entire regions. This classic battle for the "hearts and minds" of the Afghan people is a cornerstone for their insurgency strategy. The elimination of this popular base for these ACM groups is therefore crucial for coalition forces. And finally, internal squabbling within the different government ministries and general inability of the GOA to project good governance throughout Afghanistan allows for crime, corruption and factionalism to flourish. The centre of gravity is, therefore, to extend the reach and effectiveness of the central government of President Karzai to deal with this fragmentation. Unfortunately, progress has been slow President Karzai's authority is still limited to the immediate vicinity of Kabul. The enemy's tactics have also changed quite dramatically in the last few years. A year ago, the enemy consisted of large units that undertook rural operations that targeted coalition forces or the Afghan authorities personnel. The enemy is now operating in a very different way, with a different modus operandi that has called upon NATO to adjust to a new reality. Small elements are involved in urban and rural operations, and target soft targets the Government of Afghanistan, UN representatives, NGOs. When attacking coalition forces, the ACM groups prefer to use hit and run tactics. And for NATO and the US coalition operating in Afghanistan, trying to provide a security umbrella across the entire country to allow the NGOs and the UN agencies to work on the development side of the issue is almost an impossible task. The number of troops to do such a thing would be ten-fold what is currently deployed in Afghanistan, which is something the international community is unable to afford and sustain. And from an intelligence point
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of view, to be inside the decision loop of the belligerents in order to pre-empt their actions is very difficult. That is why the force structure of the Canadian deployment in Afghanistan was very different from what we have done in the last ten or fifteen years. To be quite honest, coalition forces are a little reactive, because it is very difficult to be pro-active when you can recognize a belligerent from a military perspective, but from a diplomatic point of view, it is not a value added target to eliminate. For example, a major warlord's subordinate was residing about 300 metres from the front gate of the Canadian camp in Afghanistan. We knew very well that the individual had called upon a direct rocket attack on the camp; however, from a diplomatic point of view, we could not eliminate or neutralize this individual. The destabilizing aspect of removing that individual on the political scene of Afghanistan outweighed the military approach of eliminating a direct threat to the military forces. So you can see the dilemma that we are facing now, in trying to reconcile the 3-D approach that Canada now advocates. But things have evolved the theatre is moving in the right direction towards stability. A comparison between July 2003 and July 2004 is illuminating. In 2003, reconstruction stalled; the coalition was dealing with a neutral population; there were only 4 PRTs in Afghanistan; we had only minimal cooperation with Pakistan; the "consolidation for peace" (the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants) was only in its conceptual stages; and the Afghan National Army (ANA) was only being trained. Things have certainly changed in the last year: reconstruction is underway; the Afghan population is generally very supportive; there are 15 PRTs; we have cooperation and engagement with Pakistan; the DDR is being implemented; and the ANA is actually involved in combat operations. But it should be remembered that the notion of time in the western world has no bearing in Afghanistan. Those people have a totally different perception of time and space than us. While the international community may want quick results, this is not something that is
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going to work in Afghanistan. This is one of the big questions that the Afghans are looking into and are concerned about will the international community maintain the effort to stabilize them to the point where they can by themselves, or will they quit before the entire issue can be solved? Canadian Mission Overview The Canadian mission aim is very straightforward, and in line with the NATO end state for Aghanistan. Specifically, Canada's principal goals is to ensure is no longer a haven for terrorists and extremism, and to help improve the quality of life for the Afghan people. The Canadian approach is the 3-D approach, involving diplomacy (UN, NATO, various NGOs), development (humanitarian, transition, reconstruction), and defence (Operation ATHENA). I can assure you that this is a concept that the Department of National Defence (DND) grasped about a year ago. In fact, I'd make the case that the key to the stabilization of Afghanistan is not military and the projection of military power, but is dependent on development and diplomacy the development of the infrastructure and the economy of the country to a viable level, and a government that can being to act as a power broker across the entire country. The military will support this by creating a safe and secure environment, but the key to the issue of Afghanistan is not a pure military one. In an asymmetric threat environment, where the belligerents are so fluid, it is impossible to hit the centre of gravity and neutralize those individuals in a pre-emptive war. The Mandate of Task Force Kabul (TFK), which is the formation that comprises the Canadian Forces (CF) units operating in Operation ATHENA, is to support ISAF for a period of one year starting in August 2004, in the maintenance of a secure environment for the Afghan Transitional Authority in the ISAF area of responsibility. The key tasks for TFK are to: (i) ensure freedom of movement
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in Kabul and the region surrounding the city; (ii) force protection; (iii) provide advice for the Afghan Transnational Authority on security structures and issues; (iv) assist in the operation of Kabul Afghanistan International Airport; and (iv) assist in the reconstruction of the Afghan National Armed Forces. Other tasks for TFK include embedded training teams with Operation Pheonix, CIMIC projects (6 started, 26 proposed, 10 completed), with total funds allocated at $260,187, and fact-finding reference for PRTs. There is a tremendous amount of real estate to cover in Afghanistan but very little troops to do so. And the force multiplier and force enabler in this theatre are not necessarily bayonets, combatants or infantry on the ground it relies much more on civil-military cooperation, humanitarian assistance and intelligence gathering structure (and intelligence gathering sharing within NATO, which is problematic). In Kabul itself, Canada is the primary intelligence gathering and data fusion organization and actually the prime feed for the Americans in that area. But the number and level of forces that were committed for this intelligence gathering, in electronic warfare and human intelligence (HUMINT) was tremendous, and was in fact a significant drain on the Canadian Forces resources. This is one of the reasons why the CF has to take a pause, and basically go down from the second largest NATO troop contributors in Afghanistan to the fifth or the sixth at this point. We couldn't sustain having all the new specialists and force enablers that were necessary in this complex theatre of operations. But intelligence is key we need to get in to the decision loop of the belligerent, and have the ability to influence and shape the environment in the way and the direction that we are looking for. As I mentioned in the beginning of my presentation, infrastructure (or lack thereof) was a significant problem in Afghanistan. This can be seen in the cost of Camp Julian (see figure 5), which is the
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Figure 5: An area photo of the CFs Camp Julian.
largest camp ever built by the military in the last 15 years, and a necessary one given the need that modern military forces have for large infrastructure. This camp cost $16 million, and had to be brought from Canada and Europe, assembled, and sustained in the theatre of operation in order to support the troops in their task. In Afghanistan, and this is not unique to Canada, for every combatant or individual conducting a patrol or CIMIC activity on the ground, there are five people behind him. In other words, out of a force 2,000, you'll get 500-600 people conducting operations on the ground, while the rest act in a primarily supportive capacity. This brings the cost of an operation to a very high level. As can be seen in figure 5, which offers an area photo of the camp, Camp Julian is basically a fully contained city, with its own water-sewage treatement facilities, its own water bottling plant, fuel, maintenance, every that you can think of. But this very small city had to be built from nothing out in Afghanistan in order to support our efforts. The Canadian deployment in Afghanistan is the largest deployment in one single location since the beginning of the Bosnia cam-
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paign under the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1993. This includes a support base Camp Mirage in Southwest Asia. Total personnel is at 2329, with 2037 in Kabul, 347 in Camp Mirage, and the remaining eight in Bagram (5), Qatar (2), and Abu Dhabi (1). Every single day, the Canadian contingent in Afghanistan required 17 tons of goods to be brought in, and every ten days, an additional 70 tons brought in. It is one thing to project combat power, but it is something else to sustain it. You also should understand that, between 2003 and 2004, Canada rotated more than 6,000 soldiers in and out of Afghanistan out of a combatant force of 25,000 (which is the deployable number out of our total force of 60,000 personnel). This has been a very robust commitment. And despite what you hear in the press, the resources provided by the Canadian Forces to their soldiers at this time is second to none. The equipment allocated for Task Force Kabul, which was flown in by air, included 34 Bisons, 35 well-armed Light Armoured Vehicle III's (or LAV III's) and 11 Coyote Reconnaissance Vehicles, which are one of the most sophisticated reconnaissance vehicles currently fielded in the world. This was complemented by Engineer Assets, which is an area that has been enhanced dramatically, largely due to the threat posed by mines and the frequent use of IEDs; Counter Battery Radar, a very sophisticated piece of equipment rented from Sweden and needed to pre-empt rocket attacks; chartered ANTONOV transport aircraft; Hercules CC-130s devoted on a full-time basis; 60 G-Wagons; and 283 other vehicles. We also plan to have an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with initial operating capability planned for November 15th. Canada and Germany would then be the only two coalition countries with this capability in Afghanistan The Department of National Defence has also approved the following additional equipment: 9 LAV IIIs and 2 LAV III Forward Observers, 4 Bisons and NYALA Armoured Vehicle. We have actually been called upon more often to do certain things, because we are the most robust military contingent in
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Afghanistan. This is the new world order, where in an environment as complex as Afghanistan, this is how you have to conduct business in order to be efficient, and achieve the end state given at the strategic level. With our spectrum of forces and resources, we were able to operate at the low end of the violence spectrum up to the high end. Accomplishments One of the achievements that Canada has created is certainly stability. This is not necessarily a glamorous role going after the "bad guys" is what soldiers like to do, but this is not necessarily the primary way to create stability. Stability involves less glamorous issues, like joint patrols with the new Afghan army and police, cooperating with Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the diplomatic world in order to create the conditions for CIMIC and humanitarian assistance activities The demobilization process is working well, but still moving slowly. This connects closely to the need for a unity of effort at the strategic level you cannot demobilize if you don't have an economy to send those individuals to get work. We need to be able to direct some of those activities in the specific regions and specific fields; unfortunately, it is very difficult to create the necessary industry and economy for the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. Heavy weapon containment is another success story, due largely from applying the lessons learned from controlling the heavy weapons of the militias in Bosnia. The embedded training team, a bilateral initiative by Canada to help train the new Afghan Army, has also gone well. The CF has conducted 3800 patrols, 864 vehicle checkpoints, 12 out of area operations, and 9 directed operations to neutralize specific individuals or groups of individuals. This represents a tremendous amount of military activities in order to create the required stable environment.
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Lessons Learned The theatre of operations in Afghanistan is very complex. Regretfully, the new theatre of operations do not fit well with the law of armed conflict (LOAC); the latter does not answer all the issues of being in an asymmetrical threat environment and non-conventional belligerents. In this context, the force used is that found at the law enforcement end of the conflict spectrum, as opposed to the exclusive application of LOAC. Even though the coalition is authorized to conduct operations using "all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate," the vast majority of activities would not be expected to involve operations that would be carried out in the context of an "armed conflict." For us, and for other military personnel, when we are deployed in these types of operations, we talk about it more as robust law enforcement or stability operations rather than armed conflict. And soldiers have to be able to quickly learn how to work across the entire spectrum. In the morning, they will do some social work, distribute some Canadian flags, help a community centre to get on its feet, be an ambassador for Canada and the NATO, work as a peace officer or a Special Weapons and Training (SWAT) member, and in the end, be able to surge and conduct pure military operations. All this in the same day which is extremely demanding on the soldiers. And force structure as evolving, where we require not only soldiers but also force enablers, like intelligence, engineers, and CIMIC personnel. Considerations for Future Operations Our experience in this operation carries some implications for the Canadian Forces. For example, it shows that the force structure is becoming extremely robust and diverse, which is largely why the cost of sustaining a military operation is becoming a major issue. Operating in this kind of complex environment will also have an impact on the soldiers training, which will have to be more complex
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in order to deal with the spectrum of activities that they have to do. Afghanistan also shows that a 3-D approach is critical. However, there has to be further cooperation among DND, CIDA and Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC). The PRT is a good example, where the lead agency is FAC, with DND playing only a supporting role. Lastly, we need to nurture a strategic harmonization of the international community toward a specific issue and mission. Right now, it doesn't exist, which means a lot of resources and efforts are lost, regretfully, by not having this degree of synergy around the theatre.
THE UNITED KINGDOMS EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

By Gen (Retd) Sir John Deverell
adies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me it is certainly good to be back. I was very fortunate to speak about reserve issues during a luncheon at the RCMI a couple of years ago. Afterwards, I went to see Gen Ray Henault, Chief of Defence Staff, and told him about that meeting. His reaction was interesting: Bloody hell, he said, what do you mean? Who was there? What did they say? Somebody said this morning about putting the RCMI back on the map, as a key player in the development of defence policy. On that issue, judging by Gen Henault's reaction, I wouldn't worry too much. In order to understand the UK experience with robust peace support operations, one must first define the concept. Can one define peace support operations? Yes, you can pick up a doctrinal pamphlet, and find the definition. But I suppose, if we want to put it in a nutshell, it is the difference between enforcing a peace agreement and creating an environment where a peace agreement is capable of being imposed, rather than merely observing whether a peace agreement is being observed by the relevant entities. It implies taking decisive action to ensure something happens, rather than merely observing whether it is happening and, if it not, whose fault it is. Perhaps I can begin by setting the UK experience in a historical and also current context. The UK experience is rooted in a colonial
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and imperial history, a legacy of 250 years of irregular, small, lowintensity wars, often characterized by a relatively small number of soldiers, with a high premium placed on low casualties and, as ever, low costs. It was highly successful, but had its moments of disaster. And I kept reminding my European colleagues, when they talked about how we are going to get out of Kabul, that we had done it before, in 1842, and it was not a success. And I had no intention of having a withdrawal plan which involved any movement by land at all. We started off in the 1770s, in the Indian Wars in America. Interestingly, the American Revolutionary War which one book described as the first American civil war was an irregular war in many ways. But it was in India where British forces had a consistent requirement for imperial policing. This was followed in the latter half of the 19th century during the scramble for Africa. Perhaps more pertinent, of course, is the retreat from empire, from 1945 to the mid-1960s, a period which actually took this essential legacy and put it into a modern context. And since 1969, we have had operations in Northern Ireland. These operations far outweighed, in terms of the time spent and the number of people involved, the number of times the United Kingdom was involved in major European wars of the Clausewitzean type. More recently, our experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq have only added to that experience. In that sense, we are very different from most of our European allies, apart from the French. This carries political, social, cultural, military implications. For example, Germany deploying soldiers to Kosovo was a very substantial cultural issue for Germany, in a way that we cannot even begin to understand. I can see it, I can read it, but I can't feel it. And my dealings with the German armed forces, in Kosovo and in Afghanistan, made that plainly obvious. The level of political direction from the German Minister of Defence, particularly in the deployment of the German PRT to Konduz, was very high and very stark.
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As an aside, I had a fascinating conversation with a delightful German colonel in Uzkebistan, north of Afghanistan, when I was waiting to go into Kabul. I had commented on how wonderful that we have this challenge in Afghanistan and how this was really going to encourage young people men and women of spirit and adventure in Germany to join and remain in the armed forces. His reaction was different. He said that this was disastrous, and that Germany didn't need 'adventurers' in its armed forces. Now I'm doing Germany a disservice here this is a gross oversimplification. But it is an indicator, and we should understand this in terms of a cultural approach to robust peacekeeping. So what advantages does our experience give us. Well, there is acceptance in the public and in the military that peacekeeping is a proper role for soldiers. And I emphasize that there is an acceptance by the military that peace support operations are a proper thing for us to do. There is a general support within the public for what the armed forces does in a conflict, which is separate from whether they agree with the government for deploying those forces in the first place. The British armed forces have not generally been used as a tool to beat the government, which is an enormous advantage. All our operations are expeditionary even Northern Ireland, we have to go across the sea to get there. So Britain essentially depends on expeditionary operations and forward defence. Our national interest is sorted out in somebody else's country, not our own. Operations are politically risky and physically dangerous, and casualties are a reality. There is also a very interesting statistic only one year since 1945 has a British soldier not been killed in operations, and that was 1968. So casualties are an issue, though they are not a catastrophic cultural watershed needing to be crossed. Experience comes as a disadvantage it can bring a legacy of complacency. It is too easy to stay in the comfort zone. Fail to register that your tried and tested methods, your templates won't work, and that you can't force the situation into your template. But over all, we start at an advantage.
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And I've noticed today that many of those advantages for geographic, historical, and social reasons are shared by Canada, although I also read with interest Professor Sunil Ram's article on peacekeeping and the Canadian myth, which perhaps exposes some of the flaws in that observation. My first deduction is this: if a country wishes to change the way it fights, it has to analyze those things that must be altered in order to achieve that change. Merely changing the military concept of procuring different equipment alone is not going to do it. Well, it is one thing to say that; it is another thing to actually get a government and the intellectual energy to do it. We've talked about the situation that we've been faced with today. The nature of war has always changed and will continue to do so; asymmetry is not new. The Boers in 1899, for example, used an asymmetric approach against the British Army, and gave it a jolly good hiding for the first few months. Indeed, we had to mount a ruthless campaign against Boer families in order to win the war. Fortunately for the world, the pragmatic nature of the British and our distrust of theory has largely meant that we have not generally been capable of the level of intellectual rigor necessary to be really ruthless, in the way that other imperial nations were. Even the Indian mutiny, which was suppressed with enormous violence in 1857, led to such disquiet in England that the East India Company was disbanded and dissolved, and India was brought under the direct rule of the crown from London through the viceroy. Today, we are presented with equal if not greater political and moral ambiguity and military complexity. You've heard about Krulak's three block war. You can't draw a line in time and space anymore, and say war fighting stops tomorrow, peace support starts. It just doesn't work like that. The collapse of the regime in Baghdad demonstrated that very clearly. We still use the language of Clausewitz the language of interstate wars, defeat and victory. I had this vision when I was com-
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mander in chief of northern region that I was going to drag, finally during my victory parade, the man I had defeated behind my chariot. But who is he? How do we defeat terrorism? What are the indicators of the defeat of terrorism? The absence of terrorism we might be very lucky or we might have to wait an awful long time. The capture of Osama bin Laden is that the defeat of terrorism? I doubt it. While we use these, and perhaps I unfairly say Clausewitzean terms, are we actually enabling ourselves to deal with the issue properly? Those Clausewitzean terms, defeat and victory, tend to create impressions in the minds of the public which probably are unachievable, if we are to be honest with ourselves. It's extraordinary how politicians often relish ambiguity (though I know there are some here and I apologize for this comment). That is, until they go to war; and then in the most chaotic and uncertain of all of men's activities, they seek certainty. Partly because they believe the press requires it, in order to convince the public that the politician knows what he is doing. There was an article in a London paper recently, saying it was interesting that at this time of crisis, the population at large seemed to be rather more confident and robust in their response to terrorism than the political leaders who were striking some very uncertain tones. Perhaps the most damaging of all these contextual issues has already been mentioned that the Western society itself is very impatient and seems unwilling to commit itself to the long haul. As a result, those who don't want to see stability perhaps may surmise that all they have to do is wait till we get bored or fed up, and we go away and they can continue the movement. Well, they have been wrong in Bosnia and Kosovo, but it doesn't seem to hold to the general feeling, to a degree encourage by the press and that is not a criticism, that is just an observation that anything but a quick, perfectly conceived, and flawlessly executed victory is in fact failure. There was a fascinating debate during the Iraq War between a young reporter and General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, and this guy stuck his hand out and said "See, it is quite clear
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that this whole thing is collapsing, you are changing your plans all the time." And Gen Jackson said, "Of course we have," which left the guy slightly fazed. The reported replied that this was a disaster, that the planning was flawed, there was a three day delay caused by a dust storm, and this had thrown the plan in complete chaos. To which Mike Jackson replied: "Young man, I am afraid you are confusing strategic planning with tactical planning. The strategic plan remains perfectly clear and is unaltered, and if you don't change the tactical plan on a daily basis, to suite the situation you find yourself in, you will lose." It was a very interesting demonstration of, for no particular fault of the reporter, a lack of understanding as to the nature of planning and the implementation of plans. And the difference between the strategic and the operating and the tactical. The components of warfighting, we all know, are the moral, conceptual and the physical. These are all equally relevant to peace support operations. Sometimes the moral considerations look a little different at the point of a bayonet than in the rather more lofty positions of the great law-making institutions, not necessarily worse, but different. And there was a wonderful story captured on tape before the man died, of a trooper in one of the English cavalry regiments, who took part in the last recorded lance charge against a German patrol in 1914. He went on to recount how they cornered their enemy and started killing them, and while some tried to surrender, it was too late. The cavalry had enough trouble controlling their horses, without controlling somebody walking along the ground. But there was no moral ambiguity it was quite straightforward, this is how it happened, and that was what was accepted by both sides. We might find it a little more difficult to cope with that now. We've seen how easily the moral component fails when those who have power over peoples lives are either not well enough trained to resist the temptation to abuse it or who have not been given the moral strength to resist the influence of others, and here I refer to the
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prison abuse in Iraq. Somebody said to me that this incident just demonstrates that military training is brutalizing. I replied that it was exactly the opposite it demonstrates that these people were not properly trained to take away the innate weakness of people to behave in that way, which they bring from their social and civilian life. I would suggest that it is an absence of training, and not too much training, which often leads to such abuses. It is too easy to regard training as nothing more than telling people what they have to do. If you are a cynic, you might say that the more we tell, the more that goes wrong, we are able to shift the blame, because we told them, didn't we. Process becomes more important than the product. It disregards the fact that the most difficult elements of the training formula but the most important is the bit that teaches soldiers what they have to be, rather than what they have to do. This is a key issue. The British Army had to learn it the hard way in Northern Ireland. Why? Because the press were far more intrusive in Northern Ireland than they had been, for example, when I was in Aiden, literally 18 months beforehand. I think it is true to say, in the UK, that the armed forces must be seen to be the influence of good if they are to retain public support. Proportionality of response is a very important issue in the UK, in a way that it may not be in some other nations. But these are very complex and difficult issues. There are going to be problems if the way that operational concepts are put together, and the way that weapon systems may be used, are out of kilter with public opinion. This is not a new issue. Many of you will know of the Amritsar massacre of 1919, when Gen. Dyer, in a mistaken belief of decisive action, killed over 300 Indians and wounded several thousands in order to stop another Indian mutiny. What was interesting was that there was almost total lack of support in England for his actions. He never apologized, and believed he had done the right thing. And there were people who supported him. But even within a single nation, a supposedly homogeneous nation, that particular act was roundly con-
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demned because it was clearly disproportionate. Now this can cause difficulties with allies. Controversies over the use of landmines and cluster bombs are but two examples. And it is a key issue that nations have to understand when they come together as allies there are political restraints which are immutable. If there are going to be disagreements, it should happen before the battle starts and not come as a nasty shock right in the middle of your operations. Looking at what we are faced with in terms of the future of armed conflict, what are the concept lessons that the UK can draw over the past few years? First, it has to flow from a properly argued set of defence assumptions from the government, which deals with how the armed forces are to be used to support foreign policy and reflect the national interest. And unless you got that bit organized and signed up to, then you go nowhere when you do, you go around in circles. The defence planning assumptions that the government drew up after the elections in 1997 were not perfect, and some of them the military simply doesn't like. But they were agreed and they are workable. And many would not wish to go back to them for the fear that we might get something worse. One of the most important things that the British had done in response to the changes in the world situation is that we have finally grasped the importance of real jointness. The creation of the Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood was absolutely crucial. We could not have done what we've done in the past few years had it not been created. We have also seen the proper training of joint force commanders, so Royal Air Force officers can be the joint force commander in essentially a land-based operation, as in Iraq. Other changes include: the proper training of national contingent commanders; linkages with political crisis response organizations, for both homeland security and expeditionary operations; linkages to alliances and treaties, and the increasing importance of ABCA (America, Britain, Canada, and Australia). Interestingly, ABCA was on
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the backburner for many years people didn't even know what was ABCA. And yet the experience of the deployment of the coalition to Afghanistan in 2002, from the American perspective, showed that we seem to get on better with our Commonwealth relations than with our European allies. This includes not only America, Canada, and Australia, but also Pakistan, India, and the whole Commonwealth package, much of which had quietly been pushed along through the good offices of ABCA over the years. The harmonization of operations requires a campaign plan which takes in all the elements of the political, the military, the civil, the legal and the social. This is something that we didn't do in Bosnia for a long time, something that was hardly done in Kosovo, and sadly at the moment as far as I am concerned has not been done properly in Afghanistan. Colonel Alain Pellerin talked about the lack of unity of purpose and unity of effort. It is absolutely appalling that you have a single problem, Afghanistan, and it appears to be run by several different organizations the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). And we say to the Afghans, take us as the model of good practice, but don't take us too seriously, because we can't actually do it. These are some very simple fundamental things, without which I believe there can be no success, and yet we don't do them. We don't do them partly because there are political sensitivities that get in the way, partly because it is not clearly enough understand for it to be a critical factor. We can simply muddle through. I would suggest that each nation understanding campaign planning in a harmonized way is crucial to the unity of purpose. The need for proper readiness training and standards for evaluation, for a stand-by system, a graduated response where you bring units properly trained and equipped units into their proper graduated readiness cycle, is very important. You also have to have force packaging, and we have this with the NATO response force. The type of operations you are likely to be
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conducting will determine who goes first and who comes second. If it's a humanitarian relief operation, I am not going to have a large numbers of people with black faces and knives in their mouths crawling up a beach. The first people I would want are the medics, the sappers to do the water, the logisticians to start getting the thing working. If it is some form of intervention operation, we are likely to need combat capability, then it reverses. You can't, if you are at five days notice, make this up as you go along. Once you've decided what your tasks are, you then have to do some force packaging, to bring people forward at proper states of readiness and training and insert them in a sequence. There is no point in having a complete battalion standing on a beach, having done its task, and say to them: terribly sorry, you've done well, but it will be another 35 days until the next people arrive. But I am afraid there are times when those who don't understand the dynamics of military operations fail to see that that is what should be achieved, and we sometimes fail to argue coherently and clearly. As ever, a fundamental question is whether you have the soldiers either nationally or internationally to replace those who have already been there for six months. We all know the old military rule of three one on, one in the pack, one in the wash. Well, it doesn't wash anymore. You need at least a rule of five, if you are going to have two years between one operational deployment and another. And if you don't have the two years, you have overstretch, falling training standards, and all those other evils that start to eat away at you. If you are looking at a six month tour, you need a rule of five. This leads to two key questions: Do we have the force structure to enable us to do it, either multinational or independently? And do we have the funding to achieve all of this? The British experience is that we are expected to conduct expeditionary warfare across the complete conflict spectrum. But can we do this anymore? We couldn't do another Falkands, I wouldn't think. We need allies, as does everybody. This is a big issue for allies, because interoperability is getting more and more difficult. Compatibility of
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particularly communications systems and surveillance and target acquisitions systems, the shooter, the sensor to the shooter, to enable network centric warfare is a very demanding and very expensive technical option. And in some ways, the US has not done enough in terms of the transfer of technology to really enable Europe to catch up in this field. It is, I think, inconceivable that Europe is going to have to move faster than America has ever moved in order to catch up. And America isn't standing still, and indeed, why should it. But the bits that didn't work in the Gulf were the patchup bits, the bits that people stuck on and tried to find clever technical fudges. Those were the bits that failed, and failed to actually meet the standards that were required to have a proper network centric operation. One of the conundrums that we are seeking to answer at the moment is that we got too much light roll, lacking firepower, tactical mobility and protection, possibly due to Northern Ireland, but with very good strategic mobility and ability for sustainment. We also have far too much at the heavy end, with excellent firepower, mobility and protection, but very poor strategic mobility, slow response time, very expensive to sustain, and sometimes incapable of the right tactical posture. If you want a tank, you want a tank; if you don't want a take, then you are in trouble if that is all you got. The British are currently seeking to create a medium capability by re-rolling, re-configuring and re-equipping about a third of its force. The issue as ever is costs, and the time it takes to conduct this level of change in an Army that is fully committed at present. It comes as something as a surprise how many units you have to take out of operation in order to make these changes work. And if you got 25 percent of your Army committed, it does not leave a lot of fat to actually conduct the change, let alone afford it. The lessons of the past 10 years is that, whatever the equipment and force structure we had, the key element is soldiers and commanders who are mentally and physically agile and robust enough to move from military assistance to civil community the fireman's
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strike, foot and mouth, clearance operations to stabilization and transformation tasks in Sierra Leone, confronting the militia physically and at the same training of the new Sierra Leone army; peacekeeping in Kosovo and war-fighting in Iraq, all within a five-year time frame. This is an enormous challenge, because it requires such a broad spectrum of skill sets. It requires robust and demanding training, focusing on the high intensity end, but with a comprehensive tactical training package to cope with the particular. I see no contradiction between training the soldier as a warfighter and as a peacekeeper so long as you got what he and she has to be right. What she and he has to be I can't stress that enough. This requires excellent training, imaginative leadership, to teach junior leaders how to think and act independently, and above all else, the system needs to support those junior leaders on the ground so that they feel that they can act independently. Of course, you need a slice of luck. But what a challenge for a young man or young woman. How much better doing that in Mazar al-Sharif, than spending 15 years in Germany going through the same old exercise, time and time again. It is a much more exciting army than the one I joined. Two specific areas that I think need to be highlighted, which are crucial one of which we do well and the other one we don't do very well at all. Intelligence: operations have got to be intelligence led. It gives you the capacity to be selective and precise. It reduces your force structure requirements. The effective and directed gathering of intelligence and information is a crucial part of low-level operations. This is something often poorly understood by some nations, who see intelligence as something done by somebody else, mostly other intelligence assets, both human or technical. And unfortunately, intelligence is often seen to support force protection than offensive operations. Some of the technical capabilities these days are outstanding, but the human side must also never be forgotten. Particularly, the continuity of the intelligence gathering organizations within a theatre. I bet we are still moving our intelligence people around in Afghanistan
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every six months. And every six months, it takes two months for people to learn everything, then a two month period where they are on top of their game, and then a two month period of cooling off a bit, and then the whole thing goes in a cycle again. You only achieve that by having people spend longer than six months there. I can't over-emphasize the value of understanding what is going on, if you are going to run a successful operation. How can you interpret what is happening on the streets of Mazar al-Sharif in northern Afghanistan, if you don't understand what normally happens, and who does what to whom and when? Why should the locals have any confidence in you, if you can't be bothered to take an interest in how the place works? To do that, you got to be amongst the people. This level of understanding gives you real situational awareness, and is far more effective than believing that you know what's happening because you are watching a lot of little blue icons on the screen ten miles away. There is a profound difference between knowing things and understanding them. We haven't traditionally in the UK done very well in civil-military (CIMIC) operations. We haven't put our best and brightest officers into it. Largely, they have been reserve officers nothing wrong with them at all, but we haven't actually backed up those reserve officers, who have very substantial technical understanding and technical knowledge, with regular officers from the mainstream. We have not invested. And if you remember what I've said about harmonization and campaign plan and what we have heard said today, the harmonization of those lines of development the political, social and military are absolutely crucial. This is only effective if it is underpinned by a good and comprehensive understanding of CIMIC and the part it plays, and the implementation of the proper CIMIC policy and capability. I am not going to attempt to pull that together I suspect we will be able to do that in the panel discussion. Suffice to say, the UK sees its armed forces as a power for good. They expect them to be used in
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difficult and dangerous circumstances. They are expected to be relevant, and have utility across a whole spectrum of conflict. They are expected to be able to take and be prepared to take decisive, violent, and offensive action against those who threaten them, but in a proportionate way. Above all, they are expected to risk their own safety to defend others. The public expects the military to train the forces well enough to do this, and government to equip them to be able to achieve all that I have talked about. This is the good news. The other bit of the military experience is the bad news. The public are often very reluctant to part with the money needed to fully fund the process.
THE 3-DS: DEFENCE, DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATING THE DIPLOMATIC / DEFENCE INTERFACE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

By Paul Chapin
ood afternoon ladies and gentlemen. I will try to be careful in what I say because, as a former boss of mine said one time, anytime a public servant speaks in public, he skirts a fine line between banality and a pink slip. I unfortunately have a tendency to be a little radical in some of my pronouncements, so if you will take what I say with a grain of salt, I think we will all be better off and I may still have a job when I get back to Ottawa. I want to give you a general sense of how the folks in Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) who deal with international security affairs are looking at this new phenomenon of robust international peace support operations. Since we have already covered how the world has indeed changed, I will begin my presentation on the current government's pronouncements of national security issues. The driving force for Canadian public policy in this area is based largely on two questions: What can hurt us? And what do we do about it? On these fronts, there are a number of sources of difficulties out in the world that we have to deal with. For instance, we have some unfinished work from the Cold War, which are sometimes overlooked by those people currently preoccupied with more recent problems in Afghanistan and Iraq. We have various, and often long-standing, situations that must be dealt with, including the confrontation between
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India and Pakistan, the nuclear weapons aspirations of countries like North Korea and Iran (and others), the Middle East, the tense China and Taiwan relationship all these issues require constant attention on our part and the development of strategies relevant to deal with them. By the 1990s (which one famous author compared to the 'low and dishonest decade' of the 1930s), we found ourselves confronting a whole new set of circumstances that were largely not of concern for most of the post-WWII period. Some of these situations of failed and failing states did not in the strictest sense engage our national interests they were just awful humanitarian situations and we couldn't not do something about them. But there are other cases where we felt there were national security interests at stake, where it was realpolitik as much as the humanitarian impulse that droves us to be involved. In either case, there is a need to develop policies to deal with these situations, which can range from the prevention of failed states to the reconstruction of wartorn societies. Thirdly, since the events of 9/11, we have the phenomenon that we are still not fully sure about we are not even quite sure how to define this situation. The government of Canada and officials are hesitant to even talk about the campaign against terror, in contrast to the US declaration of a "war on terror." How you define a problem largely determines the instruments selected to deal with the situation. So we are looking to people who can give us a sense of what they think we are dealing with, a sense of what is the nature of the problem. Is it Islam? Probably not. Is it radical Islam? Well, maybe that's closer. Is it international radical Islam? Or is it not Islam at all, but something else? One way or the other, if we are going to develop long-term strategies to deal with the terror that we have seen in so many places in the world, we are going to have to get a better definition of the "enemy." To deal with this new security environment, the Canadian government first developed a national security policy this document,
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Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, came out in April of this year. Unlike the US national security strategy, this is very much a domestic policy pronouncement, to better capture and reflect the good deal of money and internal reorganization that was initiated after 9/11. Many of these issues had to be dealt with in a more systematic and integrated way. In the past, Canada had never much thought that it was under threat of any kind. This has indeed changed, and while you have people doing the work that you would expect them to do police, borders, counter-terrorism, security, intelligence collection there was no sense of an overall strategy or overall plan, nor the linkages between these programs and operations that one might have expected. In the National Security Policy document, one chapter gives a very brief outline of the international context, and provides a hint of what is coming next in the International Policy Review. This upcoming review is a new venture for government. In the past, we were use to a foreign policy review, a defence policy review, a trade policy review, a development policy review, etc. What the government is trying to do in this circumstances is to convey or capture in a more integrated way what Canada's international policy ought to be. It is a real challenge, and has already encountered all sorts of predictable bureaucratic and policy obstacles. However, it is moving towards some kind of conclusion this fall and, subsequently, the paper would be consigned to parliament and then a parliamentary committee for the public dimensions of the review. I think you can identify with some degree of assurance that there will be five general directions of policy in this review (though you should take my remarks with some degree of skepticism, since you never know in the final analysis what will be in these reviews once completed). The first one relates to reducing our vulnerabilities at home that is largely the theme of the national security policy, and largely under the purview of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
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Canada. Second, there is the issue of the defence of Canada, which is connect to, but a little different from securing Canada. In this area, we are talking about the approaches to Canada (land, sea and air), as well as the defence of Canada in the context of North America. The latter point is based on the sound principle that a country of our geographic makeup and size is impossible to defend alone with our current resources and population, and we therefore have to contemplate a partnership with our much larger southern neighbour to do this properly. The evolution of this bilateral architecture, which has provided for the joint defence of the continent for 30-40 years, is currently being examined. The North American Aerospace Command (NORAD) has already moved a good deal down the road from where it was on the morning of September 11th, when it's eyes and ears were still largely looking outward and where it had some difficulty responding to an attack from within. If you haven't done it already, I would invite you to read at least the first part of the 9/11 commission report, which tells a pretty gripping tale of military efforts to respond to the air attacks. We are also looking at potential Canadian participation in ballistic missile defence, an issue that is the source of much political controversy. As we are still waiting for guidance from the government on this issue, there have been no negotiations with the Americans at the moment. But it is part of the inventory of issues that will have to be dealt with one way or another. There is also the Bi-national Planning Group (BPG), created about 18 months ago (soon to be extended for about another 18 month) and doing some pretty fundamental work in reviewing the collective Canada-US efforts to defend North America. The results of its studies and scenarios are expected to be factored into whatever new joint arrangements come out of that process. Third, there will be a discussion of strategies for taking the war to others, on the sound principle that it is better a defeat in Flanders
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than a victory in Sussex. Our objective clearly has to be our capability to help internationally it is very substantial already, notwithstanding the concerns that people often express, and justifiably so, on the capacity of the Canadian Forces (CF). If the input is not what we like it to be, the output has been absolutely tremendous. We also have to do something about dealing with these 'rogue states' I am prepared to use that word, though elsewhere in the department, people prefer 'states of concern.' I won't go through military capabilities, because I think most of this information is quite familiar to you. But it is useful to take a look at how the world has changed in the last 20 or so years, and what it is we are now confronting. Initially, there was the era of traditional Canadian peacekeeping. This was followed by the reality of the postCold War world, and the requirement to get out there with combat capable forces to deal with situations that were really not anticipated in the past. A cursory look at our role in both these areas, in absolute terms and proportionally to international peace support operations more generally, show how dramatically effective our role has been the deployability rate of CF is something like 6 percent (figure in April), but it has peaked at rather more than that. We also have a major focus in dealing with various international problems at their roots and there is no shortage of money or effort going into it. As one small indicator, the government of Canada has committed $1 billion to the global partnership to dispose of Russia's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) over the next ten years. We are currently spending $100 million in this year alone, while there is an office in the Foreign Affairs Canada that is working closely with the Russians on this issue. I also think that there will be a Prime Ministerial visit to Russia. So we are heavily involved in this non-proliferation effort to cut up Soviet submarines and to secure fissile materials, among other things. Fourth, there is the issue of dealing with failed or failing states in ways that prevent these situations from becoming a menace for
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others. And lastly, there will be an examination of what is necessary for a country to be successful in the international security field of the future. It is here where the real intellectual challenge is and where we have quite readily admitted that we don't have the necessary answers in fact, all Western governments seem to need help in this area. We have institutions that were created in another time and designed to deal with other kinds of challenges. As much as the United Nations (UN) system has come a long way in the last 10 years, the bottom line is still that the UN has a hard time making a decision and a hard time implementing that decision to head off situations like the ethnic cleansing in Sudan's Darfur province. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has to a large extent filled a breach once again, as it did when it was founded. But this institution has its own big concerns on where it is going. The expansion of NATO in the short- to medium-term looks like a positive development, but its impact on NATO as an institution, and on where this institution is heading, is still unknown. The interplay that NATO has with Russia and the European Union (EU), the latter of which has been moving rapidly in the development of a common security and defence policy, is also a concern. I would like to conclude by giving you a sense of who is doing what right now, in departments and government, on these issues. To begin with, I think it is important to recognize that there have been some changes to the machinery of government that is going to dramatically enhance our ability to be responsive to new situations and to engage the Prime Minister and cabinet. It includes the creation of two cabinet committees one on the Canada-US relationship that the Prime Minister himself chairs and one on Global Affairs chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Within the Privy Council, there are Secretariats for both of these committees, which are are headed by senior level people and have 10-14 staff each. There are also four senior officers, whose names you ought to know if you are keen on this subject. The first is the Senior Foreign
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Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister, Jonathan Fried, which is a deputy minister level position in the past, it was one level down from that position. Fried is the first deputy minister-level official to hold that job, and has a Senior Defence Policy Advisor, currently Admiral Jacques Gauvin, who provides direct connections with National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). If I recall correctly, he was J3 or J5 quite recently, and in his present position, ensures that the Privy Council office and the Prime Minister are directly connected to thinking in the Department of National Defence (DND) on a daily and weekly basis. Then you have the two key Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) level officials Phil Ventura, who shares the Canada-US Secretariat, and Anthony Burger, who shares the global affairs Secretariat. And below each of these people, there are integrated operations integrated staffs, FAC officials, DND officials, Canadian International Development Assistance (CIDA) officials, and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). This collection of officials and agencies are all at the centre, helping to make sure that when policy is being developed it is being developed in an integrated way. Let me now briefly go through what we are doing in four places in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti and Sudan and how the 3-D approach (defence, diplomacy and development) is reflected in the integrated nature of these operations. Canada, it should be noted, has never had an embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan until last year it may be a small mission, but with 12 Canadians and 10 locally engaged staff, it is still a fairly substantial establishment in a place like Kabul. This mission has officials from FAC, DND and CIDA, and perhaps from other Canadian departments and agencies. Meanwhile, the CF have been involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and will continue to do so. We are already planning for our next engagement in this country at the NATO Istanbul Summit, we announced the eventual deployment of a
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Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), and a reconnaissance group will be out in October of 2004 to look at likely sites. We are already talking to the Americans, and other members of the NATO Alliance on where such a PRT should be deployed. Meanwhile, CIDA has its largest single country aid program in Afghanistan. It's also got Foreign Affairs officials, DND officials, CIDA, and I think some others as well. Canadian Forces have been involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as in ISAF, and will continue to do so. We are planning already for our next engagement after the current one. We announced at the NATO Istanbul Summit that we will be contemplating a Provincial Reconstruction Team and our reconnaissance group will go out there in October to look at a likely site. We are already talking to the Americans and NATO about where that might be. So we are actively engaged in that. And CIDA has its largest single country program in Afghanistan. In Iraq, one can see the same 3-D effect, though perhaps on a more modest scale (and perhaps it should be 4-D, given the involvement in police operations in that country). We have a political representative in Baghdad. We are not engaged in the coalition, but we are doing quite a lot in some respects, we are doing just about everything else. We have a substantial CIDA program for the country, and are also contemplating the potential involvement in a NATO training program. NATO, one should recall, has sent a training reconnaissance mission out to Iraq, pursuant to the Istanbul Summit declaration and the request from the UN and from Iraq for increased NATO involvement. After a very intensive period of engagement in Haiti in the mid1990s, we had hoped that the problem was sufficiently resolved, and we would not all have to go back there in strength. Unfortunately, this was not the case and Canada has returned to play a major role in the political transition of the country. Our mission is, I think, the second largest in the Port Au Prince. The CF were among the first to be
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deployed to Haiti, alongside the US, France and Chile, and were major participants of the multilateral interim force. CIDA has had an ongoing program for the country and there is every expectation that that is going up to $40-million a year. The RCMP are also involved. For example, Chief Superintendent Dave Beer, an RCMP officer with experience in Iraq, will soon become the effective police commissioner of Haiti. Finally, we have been part of the international political effort to deal with Sudan, both the North-South issue and the recent issue of Darfur. We have a de facto embassy office a sub-mission, so to speak, in Khartoum. We have been very active in New York at the UN, and in discussions with the African Union (AU), including prime ministerial engagement directly with senior African leaders and officials. We are looking at a contribution to the AU efforts to deal with this situation, because people there are determined that this is an African problem, to be solved by Africans. And once again, CIDA is being looked at for a greater contribution than in the past. I would like to conclude by reflecting on the human side of things there are actual people involved in all this. At Foreign Affairs, the key person is James Wright, who is the ADM for Global and Security Affairs. I am his number 2, the Director General (DG) for International Security. I have at least two divisions (i) the regional security division, headed by Janet Graham and her two deputies, Wendy Gilmour and Sarah Fountain Smith; and (ii) the Defence Relations and NATO division, run by Barbara Martin. In our bureau, we have Lieutenant-Colonel Denis Thompson, a representative from DND, working for me. We also have, in turn, a FAC official who works in TGIS. Within DND, you have all the groups that report to the deputy chief, and among them, the international security policy folks that I interface with regularly, headed by Admiral Drew Robinson and his director for peacekeeping operations, Colonel Richard Blanchette. At CIDA, you have the same kind of growing inter-departmental interaction. I would also like to men-
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tioned that we have our NATO staff in Brussels, a very active team in New York at the UN, and Canadian missions virtually every where in the world. Let me just finish with one last thought a message for my department, in some respects, but one that I think has broader applications. What we are dealing with here is not just terrorism it is something bigger, and a little more amorphous and difficult to grasp. In some respects, it is about how you do international security in the 21st century, as opposed to the 20th century. New doctrines are evolving. The Americans have rolled out their doctrine of pre-emption and prevention, while we are advocates of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect. International law and international institutions are struggling to stay abreast of the times and be relevant. In the final analysis, Canada can be influential. We have the resources, but it is going to take effort and, in the final analysis, it is going to take new approaches like 3-D.
CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION

By Sunil Ram
s advocated by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), within the larger context of foreign policy resides the Human Security Agenda. As the then Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, "Canada's human security agenda responds to new global realities. Its goal is to ensure that people can live in freedom from fear."1 In an effort to make the concept a reality, within the overall context of the Human Security Agenda, a key component is Canada's involvement in peace support operations. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and military organizations have already recognized this need for decades both had previously become involved, during peacekeeping and peace support operations, in the processes of post-conflict reconstruction and the rehabilitation of failed states. Also, awareness arose of the interdependence between civilian and military actors in the peace process. By the nature of their respective cultures, in the peacekeeping milieu, the military became involved on a more ad-hoc basis, while the NGOs were more structured and better organized to meet the needs of the aforementioned scenarios. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent multilateral involvement of United Nations (UN) and non-UN actors in the peacekeeping, peace support and peace enforcement environments
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compelled western military establishments to formalize the ad-hoc nature of the support given during these types of operations. This support became known as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), or as it is referred to by the British, Australian and New Zealand military establishments, Civil Military Affairs (CMA). CIMIC had by the late 1990s evolved into a doctrine advocated by most Western militaries. As the British Department of Defence noted, the end of the Cold War brought about a renaissance in the world of CIMIC, "[and] it became a central feature of British Peace Support Operations..."2 This is also now true for most other Western militaries. By the late 1990s the Canadian Forces (CF) had developed its own CIMIC doctrine, codified in the document Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War. What is CIMIC? CIMIC should not be confused (though it is in Canada) with civil-military relations. Therefore, before any discussion on CIMIC as a policy tool occurs, there must be a clarification of the two terms. Although there are numerous models, definitions and theories of what the concept of civil-military relations is and how it works, Douglas Bland has offered what is perhaps the best explanation to date: "civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers."3 CIMIC, on the other hand, is supposed to be the relationship that is developed between militaries, governmental organizations (GOs), NGOs and other agencies involved in peace-support, humanitarian, and aid to civil power operations at both the domestic and international level. The Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre notes that, "CIMIC has generally the same meaning for both international and domestic operations. It includes the resources and the arrangements that support the relationship between commanders and non-military agencies."4 Clearly, CIMIC is not civil-military relations, nor is it intended to be.
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The following figures (see figures 1 and 2) offer some basic conceptualizations of the role of CIMIC, as it is presently perceived by most western military organizations. Figure 1 depicts CIMIC as a tactical activity that overlaps into various operational spheres. On the other hand, Figure 2 offers a view at the strategic level, where CIMIC can be perceived as an all-encompassing activity.
Figure 1: CIMIC depicted as a tactical activity that overlaps into operational spheres.
Source: MULTINATIONAL COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, Cdr Nick Spence Royal Navy Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre.
Figure 2: CIMIC at the strategic level, where it is perceived as an all-encompassing activity.

Source: MULTINATIONAL COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, Cdr Nick Spence Royal Navy Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre.
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Key policy issues that must be addressed in regards to both of the perspectives offered above are definition of roles (who is doing what?), terms of reference (who is supporting whom?), and jointness (can one support the other?). These questions can be addressed in some part by the context of an operation. The Context of CIMIC The use of CIMIC falls into two categories: (i) national emergencies and aid to civil-power operations and (ii) international crises. For the purpose of this discussion, we will only focus on the international aspects of CIMIC. When a crisis occurs internationally, there is a high probability that at some level there are national or international NGOs, private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and other agencies already in place, working on development and/or aid related issues. As the crisis develops and security becomes an issue, some agencies withdraw completely from the region, while others cut-back on long-term initiatives or move towards relief efforts. Should the situation deteriorate completely and the national government asks for outside support, this support generally entails the intervention of security forces in the form of a military peacekeeping or observer force. In general, the military is the last actor to come on the ground, and the one that is the least informed of the general situation. Given that each operation has unique conditions, which create unforeseen problems in planning, coordination, communication and implementation of objectives, the military will always be at a disadvantage at the beginning and possibly throughout the operation. Under these types of circumstances, though the objectives of the military and the NGO organizations are the same stabilization of the situation both have different reasons for becoming involved (see Table 1). The above scenario and the inherently different nature of NGO and military cultures have led to confusion, suspicion and sometimes
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Source: adapted from - Command and Control Research Program (CCRP), US DOD. Witzig-Davidson, Lisa et al., Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency process, NDU Press, 1996, Chap 4, p.7.
conflict over their respective roles and purposes during peace support operations. This in turn has led to an ongoing tension between the military and civilian entities involved in related activities. Part of this tension arises from the fact that the NGO community has generally been involved in relief and development activities long before the mil-
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Figure 3: CIMIC , as it fits into the overall public policy context.

Source: Sunil Ram 2002
itary showed up for support, but with military involvement, the latter is seen as taking over the mission. As noted during the Kosovo operations in 1999, "the view of many aid agencies [was] that the 'seepage' of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] military forces into the humanitarian sphere represented a major problem."5 It has also been argued that the military is not even "an appropriate and legitimate humanitarian actor."6 This has especially become true when dealing with CIMIC doctrines, which are clearly militarily driven concepts. So to understand the relationship between the military and the NGO world, we need to briefly explore what are the perspectives of the military, NGOs and government vis-a-vis CIMIC. Figure 3 offers a perspective of where CIMIC could fit in the overall public policy context. The Lack of a Cohesive Policy Context CIMIC has a low priority within DND. As noted by Captain Ryan Smid, a member of the CF JHQ CIMIC J9 (CIMIC Plans),
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"CIMIC does not receive resources and has a low priority; it is almost an afterthought and is not related to the present peacekeeping standards [of the CF]."7 This view was further reinforced by Captain Dean Trembley, the former S5 (CIMIC) Operations Officer for the 3rd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment (3 RCR) Battlegroup in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He noted that during his tour with the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR), there was a lack of understanding and education amongst CF personnel regarding what CIMIC was and what role it played in operations. This lack of education and training extended "from the non-commissioned personnel to the highest commanders." CIMIC only saw support in the field when an officer or commander had a vested interest in the doctrine.8 This lack of communication extends to the highest levels in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). According to one military writer, "the small size of the CIMIC staff [in the CF as a whole] and their lack of contact with NDHQ is disturbing from an operational perspective."9 Captain Trembley observed that during his pre-deployment training and time-in-theatre there was a "lack of interest at higher levels." He went on to say that there was no validation of the CIMIC role and "nothing from NDHQ, Brigade, or lower command, in terms of guidance."10 This can be reflected by the way co-operation between the CF and civilian agents occurs. It was noted during Operation Kinetic that "co-operation between Canadian Forces, Canadian NGO's and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) happened more by accident than by design."11 It is also interesting to note that CIDA does not specifically mention CIMIC in its policy framework, but looks at the broader ideal of human security.12 At least on paper, there seems to be a clear linkage of the military's CIMIC doctrine and foreign policy, but there is little evidence that the civilian or senior military components of the civil-military relationship are aware of CIMIC and its associated policy linkages. At the ground level, CIMIC is clearly ad-hoc in nature. As Olivia Ward, the European Bureau Chief of the Toronto Star, observed of CF
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troops in the Balkans, "few groups [local populations] dislike the CF as it is associated with peacekeeping operations and small projects initiated by individual units [or personnel]."13 This ad-hoc nature of operations also extends right down to the personnel requirements. In the case of Operation Kinetic in Kosovo, it was noted that "no position in the CIMIC cell is reflected in the Table of Organization and Equipment [TO&E] for the Battle Group."14 Captain Dean Trembley noted that the CIMIC section positions had to be filled within his Battle Group in Bosnia in an ad-hoc manner. Given the low priority of CIMIC, the CIMIC section was used in many cases as "dumping area for non-effective personnel," those who were incapable of fulfilling their actual role in theatre due to lack of predeployment training or a lack of appropriate military skills.15 Another major concern of the way CIMIC doctrine has been implemented is the clear evidence that few personnel are actually formally trained in the doctrine. This harkens back to the accepted "adhoc" nature of CIMIC operations as defined by the CF. Captain Dean Trembley noted that there was "no formal [CIMIC] course within the CF (this was done at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre) and that CIMIC cell members were unaware of the larger policy goals [inherent in the formal doctrine]."16 This is even more problematic when the Army Lessons Learned Unit (ALLU) noted that CIMIC training for CF personnel is conducted at the U.S. Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Centre and School, in Fort Bragg, NC. The course that is taught is the U.S. Civil Affairs Course. Further training is conducted under the auspicious of NATO and UK military CIMIC courses. The only training conducted in Canada is that at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, and this training is not specific to the needs of the CF. The ALLU also acknowledges that all of this training is expensive and does not offer "a uniquely Canadian military perspective."17 This has resulted in potentially hundreds of CF personnel with CIMIC experience, but none with formal training as recognized by the CF. As a result, there is a lack of tracking of these personnel
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by the CF, should they be needed again in the CIMIC role.18 This rather flies in the face of Canada's foreign policy goals. The impact within the CF is a general lack of knowledge about and understanding of CIMIC amongst all layers of CF personnel. Captain Ryan Smid, J9 Plans- JHQ, Kingston, is succinct on the matter. He observed that, "there is generally a negative view of CIMIC amongst those NCMs [non-commissioned members] and Officers who even know it exists, this is due in part to a lack of formal training in the system presently."19 The newest nuance to this situation is that the Reserves are taking over the primary CIMIC roles. The logic is that there is a more diverse background within the Reserve membership that better suits the CIMIC role.20 The CIMIC doctrine manual notes that the Civilian-Military Co-ordination Centre (CMCC)/Civil-Military Co-operation Centres (CIMIC Centres) "would rely on a minimal number of regular cadre and on the Primary Reserve to man, augment and sustain its operational readiness."21 Yet, the Reserves are hardly in position to take over the CIMIC role due to the abysmal condition of the Reserve force as a whole. Given the present condition of CIMIC operational practice and the general lack of knowledge and education within the CF, it is clear that there is a "capacity-capability" gap. The idea is sound on paper, but the reality of the CF does not allow for easy implementation of CIMIC goals. By default, this extends to the higher policy environment, in that if CIMIC as a policy tool is not functional at the operational level then the larger policy goals of the government are not being fulfilled. It should be noted that the doctrinal cell (J7) of the CF has been re-writing the basic content of CIMIC doctrine22 to address some of the issues discussed previously. But, the major issues have not been addressed regarding definitions and roles. The document, however, is very clear that CIMIC is a policy tool for the government and its various departments.23 This is clearly a move in the right direction. CIMIC could become a cornerstone of foreign and by default
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defence policy, but in its present state, it becomes apparent that the theoretical doctrine of CIMIC and the operational reality are divergent. Furthermore, if there is support for CIMIC outside of the military, there is virtually no direct evidence to indicate this. As a policy tool, it is left wanting. The NGO Perspective As noted in Table 1, the general objectives of both NGOs and militaries in peace support operations are the same. However, the respective reasoning behind achieving these goals diverges. This scenario has lead to antagonism between NGOs and the military at the ideological and operational level. The military through its CIMIC doctrine has, with some success, tried to bridge this gap. Nevertheless, there is still much ground to be covered by the larger policy objectives of governments. What is clear from the extraordinary proliferation of NGOs since the end of the Cold War is that the global aid and development environment has dramatically changed. What is also apparent is that the NGO/PVO community is very diverse, with differences that include organizational structures, size, national ties, quantity and origin of resources, focus of activities, availability of technology, and skill and training of personnel. These issues aside, NGOs can clearly bring their strengths to bear in the peace making process through mediation, humanitarian assistance and peace-building initiatives during peace support operations. However, there is a caveat to these strengths, as noted by Sir Alan Munro, the Vice-Chairman of the British Red Cross, in a recent address at Oxford University: "all in all it is difficult to see NGO's playing a significant primary role in the resolution of factional strife."24 In this scenario and given the absence of a formal governmental organizational or international organizational identity, or military protection, there are four fundamental problems that confront NGOs when operating in the field:
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First, there is the disadvantage that an NGO can lack influence, which causes it to have the inability to gain firm commitments from belligerents whom it might be trying to aid or support. Unlike, GOs, IOs (international organizations) or the military, NGOs cannot use economic, political or military sanctions to cause agreements to be made or honoured. Second, many NGO personnel may lack formal diplomatic and mediation skills possessed by their IO or GO counterparts. This situation may be compounded by a lack of adequate physical resources such as administration and infrastructure things that IOs and GOs take for granted. Third, personnel working for NGOs as non-governmental actors are subject to personal danger, risk and manipulation as they lack the usual diplomatic immunity and privileges granted to representatives of GOs and IOs. Conversely, NGO personnel may also face pressure from their own governments, further denying them international protection while conducting their operations. Fourth, and finally, NGOs have no material means of protecting themselves while conducting operations, and are thus subject to blackmail, banditry, and ransom of their personnel as well as their aid support. Given the above issues facing NGOs, it is inherently in their own self-interest (regardless of ideological imperatives) to work under the umbrella of IOs, GOs or the military. Clearly, under the latter premise, the concept of CIMIC can be adapted as a policy tool at the highest levels of government to enhance and ease the relationship between NGOs and non-NGO actors involved in peace support operations. However, in regards to government involvement, NGOs have raised some serious concerns. One of which is the sense that a relationship with a military establishment undercuts their non-governmental status, especially "when NGOs become extensions of government policy and power."25 This by default, leads to the issue of
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"politicization" of humanitarian actions, which in theory, can reduce the effectiveness of NGOs. What is interesting to note is that this line of reasoning is an issue of optics based on the ideological perspective of the NGO. There is little substantive evidence that point to either of these issues as actually being a realistic perspective, although there are individual cases that are exceptions. There certainly have been cases where NGOs have been perceived as "taking sides." Yet, on the other hand, as evidenced during the Kosovo crisis, some NGOs clearly aligned themselves with national military contingents of NATO.26 Another and more important factor in terms of Canadian NGOs and Grassroots Organizations (GROs) is the matter of funding. A vast amount of NGO funding comes directly from CIDA, some estimates are as high as 70%.27 This scenario has developed as funding from private sources has peeked in Canada.28 Consequently, NGOs have little choice but to gain government funding to remain active. This financial reality facing Canadian NGOs clearly undermines the ideological dogma that many of these organizations perpetuate amongst their members, namely those of neutrality and non-governmental influence. Another problem that faces NGOs in the larger aid scenario is a general lack of awareness of the political, economic and social effects of their presence and activities. In fact, some observers have noted that, "even the most experienced of such organizations are often unaware of key issues in these three areas."29 Thus, the much hallowed neutrality argument of the NGOs is very much a straw man. To put the latter point into perspective, one only has to review NGO actions in the field. In many cases NGOs have, either through dogmatic zeal, conscious choice or ignorance, chosen to disregard humanitarian issues in the name of staying neutral, as evidenced by the Red Cross not reporting concentration camps in the Balkans during the early 1990s. In many of the conflicts since the end of the Cold War, there is no perceptible neutral ground for NGOs or the military.
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This point has been made clear by the numerous re-definitions of peacekeeping in such documents as the UNs Brahimi Report, An Agenda for Peace, An Agenda for Peace II and the advent of Human Security. All of which have played a substantial role in changing peacekeeping policy and doctrine around the world. Government policy can go a long way to dealing with the NGO neutrality dilemma through the use of a formalized policy in regards to CIMIC operations. With a transparent and cohesive policy towards the role of NGOs, there would be no issues as to the role and objectives of the government and support from government. It would be up to the NGO to then decide where its organizational priorities lie (i.e. aid and support or ideological goals). This option is more desirable given the problems surrounding the coordination of the profusion of the many small independent NGOs that have come into being since the end of the Cold War. As was noted by the military in regards to operations during the Kosovo Crisis, "smaller agencies tend to assume that international military forces will protect them, but their large number and random behavior present[s] a nightmare for the military."30 This last point, raises the issue of the massive profusion of NGOs since the end of the Cold War. The smaller NGOs suffer the most from the four problems mentioned earlier; consequently, many look towards the military during peace support operations for support and protection. This factor requires a comprehensive policy, on the part of the government, to deal with national and foreign NGOs in such situations. A definitive policy towards CIMIC would clarify this and many of the aforementioned issues in regards to the role of NGOs within the context of Canadian foreign policy. The Government Perspective The greatest incongruity in this discussion is that there is little to no perception of CIMIC within the ranks of other government
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departments other than DND. At the very least, there is no clear indication that senior bureaucrats and Ministers are fully aware of the potential CIMIC holds. Certainly there are references to CIMIC by DFAIT, CIDA and a few other departments. However, this acknowledgment is generally unrelated to policy, but rather consists of passing statements or commentary.31 It should be noted that the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (CCFPD), within DFAIT, has some useful material regarding policy and roles for CIMIC, but it is unclear if this data has been fully understood or acknowledged by elected officials or policy makers in Canada. As Wayne Nelles, the 2002 DFAIT Human Security Fellow, the Canadian Consortium on Human Security noted, "[Human Security] initiatives are still minor, piecemeal, and ad hoc responses to major, fundamental structural challenges [for government]."32 Nelles does point out, however, that DND through NATO, vis--vis concepts like CIMIC, is leading the way in laying a foundation for a solid policy in regards to Human Security.33 Clearly, for CIMIC to be of any real use, there must be awareness of the tool within all departments and government agencies, from the top down. In addition, given that CIMIC is perceived as a military doctrine, there must be an effort to clearly show the linkages between CIMIC doctrine, the Human Security Agenda, and foreign policy. At present, these are at best unclear, ambiguous, and contradictory. As noted previously, most NGOs in Canada have some level of government-based funding. Therefore, there is an imperative for both government and NGOs to engage in dialogue in regards to policy formulation of CIMIC and its role. However, there is one major caveat to this NGOs must respect the reality that they must remain subordinate to government and military dictates, given the policy implications of multiple and differentiated NGO mandates and roles.
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Conclusion: CIMIC offers a valid tool for Canada to become engaged in the pursuit of robust international peacekeeping. However, there must be an honest and concerted effort to use CIMIC as its creators envisioned it. Conversely, the ideologues of the NGO world must accept the reality that their views on neutrality are no longer valid in the types of brush fire war situations that now plague the world. In the case of Canada, the Federal government can be the catalyst for such a venture. Rather than wasting time on ill-conceived and immature ideas such as the "3-Ds" or the "Peacekeeping Brigade," the government can focus its existing military, diplomatic and aid efforts on developing a fully intergraded CIMIC doctrine and policy that allows the NGO and military worlds to work in harmony rather than creating a clash of cultures. As former Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, observed in An Agenda for Peace, "only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation."34 Notes:
This paper is an adapted excerpt from Sunil Ram, "Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC): A Foreign and Defence Policy Tool," which was a Foreign Policy Paper prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Centre for Canadian Foreign Policy Development in 2003. 1 Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security, Available: http://www.dtaitmaeci.gc.ca/foreignp/HumanSecurity/HumanSecurityBooklet-e.asp#P22_3510 [12 Oct 2002], p. 3 (Minister's Introduction). 2 Stuart Gordon, "Understanding the Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)," The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, Available: http://www.jha.ac/articles/a068.htm [11 April 2002], p. 2. 3 Doug Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces and Society, vol 26, n. 1 (Fall 1999), p .9.
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4 "Lessons Learned in Civil-Military Cooperation," Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers, The Army Lessons Learned Centre, vol. 5, n. 3 (February 1999), p. 3. 5 "NATO and NGOs During the Kosovo Crisis," NATO Policy Dialogue VI, December 13, 1999, p. 1. 6 Ibid, p. 2. 7 Phone interview conducted on March 5, 2002, J9 CIMIC Plans, CF Joint HQ, CFB Kingston (Ontario, Canada). 8 Phone interview conducted on April 2, 2002, CFB Petawawa (Ontario, Canada). Capt. Trembley is presently a Battle Captain for the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCDs). He was in Bosnia between March and October 2001 as part of the 3 RCR Battlegroup attached to SFOR. 9 Sean Pollick (Sgt), "Civil-Military Cooperation: A New Tool for Peacekeepers," Canadian Military Journal, vol. 1, n. 3 (Autumn 2000), p. 62. 10 Phone interview April 2, 2002, CFB Petawawa. 11 Doug Delaney (Maj), "CIMIC Operations During Operation Kinetic," Canadian Military Journal, vol.1, n. 4 (Winter 2000-2001), p. 33. 12 CIDA, CIDA's Sustainable Development Startegy 2001-2003: An Agenda for Change, p. 2. 13 Personal interview, July 5, 2001, Landmark Hotel, London UK. 14 Delaney, "CIMIC Operations During Operation Kinetic," p. 31. 15 Phone interview conducted on April 2, 2002. 16 Ibid. 17 "Lessons Learned in Civil-Military Cooperation," p. 36 18 Phone call to Captain Ryan Smid, CFB Kingston, April 9,2002. 19 Phone interview conducted on March 5, 2002. 20 Ibid, and phone interview conducted on April 2, 2000. 21 DND, B-GG-005-004/AF-023, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War, p. 1-22 1-23. 22 Note this is a draft document-- B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, Draft 2 ED 2, Chapter 19: CivilMilitary Considerations.
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23 Ibid, Section 2, pp. 91-1 to 19-2. 24 Sir Alan Munro, "Humanitarianism and Conflict in a Post-Cold-War World," RUSI Journal (December 1998), p. 17. 25 "NATO and NGOs During the Kosovo Crisis," p. 2. 26 Ibid, pp. 3-4. 27 Ian Smillie and Hemlich, Henny, eds., Non-Governmental Organizations:stakeholders for Development (OECD, Paris, 1993), p. 13. 28 Ibid, p. 22. 29 Stuart Sessions, "Civic Action: Towards Best Practice in Humanitarian Interventions," The British Army Review (August 1998), No 119, p. 57. 30 "NATO and NGOs During the Kosovo Crisis," p. 5. 31 Extensive Web-site search and manual document search of government departments conducted between Sept 2002 and Dec 2002. 32 Wayne Nelles, "Military Intervention vs Conflict Prevention," International Journal, vol LVII, n. 3 (Summer 2002), p. 463. 33 Ibid. 34 An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, A/47/277 S/24111, 17 June 1992. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, VI. Post-conflict peace-building, point 57.
MANAGING TRANSFORMATION ROBUST PEACEKEEPING
FOR
THE ROLE OF NATO TRANSFORMATION HEADQUARTERS

By Brigadier Lamont Kirkland
am delighted to have been invited to present a paper at this conference on the Role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Transformation Headquarters, or as we know it Allied Command Transformation (ACT). My Canadian Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Michel Maisonneuve was very disappointed that he was unable to attend this conference, but I was a very willing deputy to make my first ever visit to this fine city. The founding of ACT was part of a remarkable series of changes that took place in NATO last year, which were set off by the far reaching decisions taken at the Prague summit in 2002 to create a more effective organisation for the 21st century. In addition to the ground breaking commitment to meet challenges "from wherever they may come," which has resulted now in a global concept for crisis response, and which was operationalised by NATO's deployment in Afghanistan, Alliance leaders also called for the 'Transformation' of NATO's structures and its capabilities. This decision led directly to the establishment of a new expeditionary force to be held at high readiness the NATO Response Force able to deploy immediately to deal with crisis and conflicts, and to counter the threat from terrorism. You will hear more about the NATO Response Force (NRF), shortly, and about the way in
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which it will represent the embodiment of a transformed NATO. It also led to the streamlining of the military command structure, with a simultaneous rebalancing of the relationships at the strategic level. In short, we reduced NATO's command structure by closing a large number of HQs, and placed all operational matters in the hands of the European based strategic HQ at Mons, better known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). At the same time, we created an entirely new strategic command, with purely functional responsibilities, based in Norfolk, Virginia, at the site of the old SACLANT. The Transformational Command is charged with the ambitious remit of improving the military effectiveness of the Alliance, both now and in the future. The rapid pace of these changes caused Ian Brezinsky, the US Undersecretary of Defencs, to declare recently that NATO has changed more in the past 12 months than in any previous 10 year period. Or to put it another way, as former Secretary General Robertson was fond of saying, "This is not your Daddy's NATO". Drivers for Change So why did this large, normally ponderous, change resistant, and overly bureaucratic organisation manage to move so quickly? There were several drivers for change in a dynamic strategic and military environment. First, there was a recognition that the nature of NATO's mission had changed and that they would continue to evolve as the Alliance adapted to the new security environment. The global threat of terrorism, the increasing sophistication of asymmetric warfare, and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are the significant security challenges of the new century, and combating those threats will change the nature of conflict, and as we have seen, the nature of peacekeeping, as well. Furthermore, globalisation has made Alliance nations much more dependent on broad stability elsewhere
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in the world, and regional instability, failing states, and unresolved conflicts outside the Euro-Atlantic area can no longer be ignored. So in the future, the core Alliance mission of protecting the security interests of its members will be carried out in a wider strategic environment, and in very different circumstances than before. In business terms, we could say that we have departed from our domestic market and gone offshore. Second, on the military side, there was a recognition of an urgent need to close the gap between the US and the Euro-Canadian Allies. Events in Kosovo clearly showed the divergence in current capabilities, but, with the US engaged in a fast moving transformational process, there would also be a growing future divergence in technological, intellectual and cultural terms. In short, our militaries were beginning to talk different languages and the military effectiveness of the Alliance was becoming starkly at risk. And of course, this was greatly accentuated by the ghastly events of 9/11, and the initial US response to that profound global event, which was essentially unilateral. Third, the US had meanwhile established a new 4-star command, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), to drive its own transformation. And recent operations in Afghanistan and the Gulf have shown the early benefits of this transformation allowing operations to be conducted with unprecedented tempo, and to seek a quick victory with fewer forces and minimal casualties. Its hallmarks are truly integrated joint forces, accelerated decision making and overmatching power, all resulting from the application of speed, precision, knowledge, and lethality, and from relying heavily on precision firepower, special forces, psychological operations, and networked communications. The Transformation Process So in modelling the US experience, NATO established its own transformation command, alongside US JFCOM, to be the engine of
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change for the Alliance as a whole, and to establish a dynamic ongoing process that would evolve and adapt as events and circumstances unfolded. Transformation is more than the simple application of new technology, it involves cultural and intellectual development as well, all aimed at allowing the military to harness new ideas, new doctrine, and new technological advances, to gain overwhelming advantage on the battlefield. It means promoting innovation, conceptual development, and experimentation, and rewards risk taking. Transformation for NATO will therefore bring changes to our organisation, policy, processes, doctrines, training and education, and changes will be much more frequent than in the past. The proximity of ACT to JFCOM, and the appointment of a single US commander to head-up both organisations, currently Admiral Ed Giambastiani, allows us to make the most of the US experience, and the technological development ongoing in the States. But I must stress that it is a 2-way street; and the US military acknowledge that they can also learn from the European Allies in certain fields. For example, the latest US doctrine on Urban warfare owes quite a lot to European experience, and it is also fair to say that the US are currently making special efforts to learn from UK experience in the conduct of robust peacekeeping operations. Leading Transformation. Let me turn to our role. ACT's mission is to lead transformation within the Alliance; to act as the focus and motivating agent; and to stimulate the process. We will also assist the process of transformation in national forces, and in those of NATO's Partners but this needs resolve and commitment from those nations. We will set the framework for long term development by describing the vision for the way in which future Alliance operations will be conducted. We will ensure the infusion of research and technology
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to address shortfalls in capabilities, and we have the authority to coordinate scientific research through a number of NATO Agencies. We will develop new concepts and doctrines and deliver transformational thinking through our training and education programs, and we will coordinate the curricula of the various NATO schools. We will also conduct leading edge experimentation to test and develop new capabilities. In many ways, experimentation is the intellectual engine for the entire transformation process, and can range from a major exercise involving troops, to a wargame to test new ideas, to the laboratory development of a new capability, to a field trial of new equipment. All of this utilises the NATO Response Force as a transformational test-bed to force the pace for change. Command Entities The Command was established in June 2003, only 8 months after Prague and over a year ahead of the original schedule. We will eventually have about 600 staff members in the Headquarters, including scientists and civilian contractors. The whole command is now fully joint, and quite small about one tenth of the size of Allied Command Operations. Our small size is actually a strength, as we can remain much more agile and responsive to new ideas. We also have a number of entities throughout Europe to give us a footprint near the nations. We will have a staff base in Mons, alongside SHAPE, to ensure the closest possible relations with the operations command, whom we regard as our key customer. The major centre for implementation of transformation is the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, which was activated in October last year. Here we now train NRF commanders and staffs in the latest techniques for the full spectrum of operations, including post-conflict operation and peacekeeping. We are also establishing a
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new centre in Poland, the Joint Force Training Centre, which will focus on tactical training of NRF forces, with an emphasis on stitching the seams between the joint elements. And the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre based in Portugal will quickly capture lessons from operations and training. Altogether, this group of centres will change the entire basis of NATO training, allowing the rapid assimilation of new ideas, and feeding back lessons learned from recent operations, while simultaneously incorporating innovative concepts from our experimentation efforts. On this basis, we can begin to respond to crises with tailored rehearsals and training in effect, fighting the battle before operations ever begin. Delivering Transformation In order to develop momentum as a new command, we focussed on delivering results in training, experimentation, and wargaming. Last July we hosted a seminar which examined the observations from the Iraq conflict, and we have now produced a set of lessons applicable to future NATO planning, and the development of capabilities. We have also created a dynamic process to learn lessons from the Afghanistan experience, by deploying a team in country to capture contemporary data from first hand experience in ISAF and to feed it back into training for successive NATO HQs. We have conducted mission rehearsal training for the NATO HQs deploying to Afghanistan. General Hillier conducted the work-up training with his HQ in Stavanger before deployment. One quarter of our budget is devoted to experimentation, and we have over 30 programs on the go. One of these focuses on the development of a force tracking device which will record the movements and location of our forces on operations, in order to increase situational awareness, and reduce the possibility of hits from friendly fire. Meanwhile nearly half of our budget goes on research and devel-
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opment through various agencies, a clear demonstration of our commitment to invest in the future. A Transformed NATO And we have recently produced a vision for the future conduct of Alliance operations titled Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge, which looks out 15 years and describes how NATO can effectively wield its hard and soft power the coordination of diplomatic, military, and information campaigns to achieve desired effects. It sets out the capabilities that will be required to maintain a competitive advantage in the information age and to prevail in any future crisis or conflict. And it describes what changes will be needed to be made to forces and concepts. It also points to the need for nations to make their forces more deployable and usable though reinvestment, rather than through downsizing militaries. The paper acknowledges the significant challenges that arise in post conflict operations, demanding robust peacekeeping methods. Operations will be more complex and multi-dimensional. It recommends that a fresh approach be taken to prepare for and execute Alliance operations one that concentrates more directly on the ultimate ends we wish to achieve. Driven by political constraints, legal influences, and the availability of new technological capabilities, the focus of that new approach will increasingly be on the effects that need to be created in order to achieve strategic campaign objectives. We will need forces that are agile, joint, and expeditionary in character and design, that are technologically superior, and that are capable of operating a networked environment. Forces will need to be rapidly configurable, and capable of interacting seamlessly with civil authorities and non-government organisations. In short, all Alliance forces need to be able to conduct '3 block' operations.
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The NATO Response Force But much of our energies are focussed on delivering the NRF as a genuine trained and ready force. It was formally activated in October 2003, in a limited prototype capacity. It will not be at full capability until 2006. It is designed to be a joint, multinational force, at high readiness, with an expeditionary focus and a global reach, and able to conduct a full range of missions. It is also designed to be the catalyst for promoting improvements in Alliance capabilities, and act as a test-bed for experimentation with future concepts. Missions of the NATO Response Force The range of potential NRF Missions is as follows:
z z z z z z z z z
Force Package; Crisis Response; Support Counter-Terrorism Operations; Consequence Management; Peace Enforcement; Embargo Operations; Initial Entry Force; Non-Combatant Evacuation; Demonstrative Force Package.
This list is not exhaustive, for the NRF could deploy to any mission that Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) recommends and which is authorised by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Composition of the NATO Response Force The full force will be around 20,000 troops, made up of 4 components land, air, maritime, and special force working under a
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deployable HQ drawn from one of the Joint HQs. The commander will tailor the force size and composition, depending on the mission in hand. The Allies will rotate different force elements through the NRF cycle every 6 or 12 months, so that as many forces as possible are exposed to the training and new concepts involved in NRF operations. This rotation will ensure that the NRF is both the product of a transformed NATO, and of the process by which it is achieved. Delivering the NATO Response Force Deploying and employing the NRF is the responsibility of SACEUR. ACT's role is to support SACEUR by providing the doctrines, concepts, and training for the NRF, as well as by focussing on the improvements to capabilities that the force will need over time. We run training education programs for the NRF HQ at the JWC in Stavanger. We also helped run the study-seminar for NATO Defence Ministers in Colorado Springs Ex Dynamic Response. This was the first event of its kind, and focussed on the political and strategic decision making issues to be faced in a future crisis set in 2007, and highlighted the political/military aspects of deploying and employing the NRF. The study underlined the unpredictable nature of the threat from global terror, and the defences needed against a terrorist threat involving weapons of mass destruction. We followed up this event with a wargame for senior NRF commanders Ex Allied Reach using the same material, but focussed on the strategic military decisions that they would face. The aim was to turn the NRF vision into reality and to establish a common understanding of the military challenges involved in fielding a force of this kind. The culture of expeditionary operations will be new to most NATO officers, and warrants a new approach. Finally, we conducted a multinational experiment in February, the
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third in a series, which examined the capabilities of the NRF HQ to conduct battle planning in a virtual collaborative information environment harnessing the latest developments in information technology made available by Microsoft. ACT Vision It has been an ambitious program for this new command, but we had no alternative. It took the US a decade to complete the creation of Joint Forces Command from its original incarnation we established a similar organisation inside 8 months and are still 2 years short of full operating capability. We believe we have already lived up to our Vision statement that of being a forcing agent for change, but there is much left to do. The NATO nations have been fully supportive of the project, and clearly recognise that transformation is absolutely necessary to overcome the new security challenges we will face in the future.
THE ALLURE OF THE IMAGINED WAR

By Douglas Bland
hat changes warfare or does it change at all? The assumption in many defence establishments seems to be that warfare is being transformed through a dramatic change in shape and form. But this is a problematic assumption not often examined critically. Many who believe warfare is being transformed also appear to believe or assume (the words are mostly interchangeable) that there is a high degree of inevitably in this process. Furthermore, they declare that transformation can be precisely defined and its characteristics and consequences can be predicted. Because this transformation is inevitable, then true believers feel confident in advancing defence policies and force development programs that reason tells them governments must follow. Reality is much different. One is safe to say that warfare tomorrow will be in some ways different from warfare today. But it is also safe to say that warfare tomorrow will be much like warfare yesterday. The definitions in current debates implicitly carry images of the future and suggest that preparing for this imagined future ought to be the aim of present policies. Look, for instance, at the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The RMA is the future and, therefore, defence policy and force development plans ought to be directed to coincide with the arrival of that future as we can see in the Department of National Defence
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(DND) Strategy 2020. But the RMA is no more than an idea it is not a fact. What is missed, however, is the fact that to achieve the benefits of the RMA, we must count on the cooperation of those we oppose the enemy has to play the game as we see it. One could argue credibly that in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2004, modern forces are confronted by the counter-revolution on military affairs and having a hard time of it. A second confusion arises from assumptions that warfare is definable as an activity. Wars in the particular are often very different from each other. Wars in most cases are composed of campaigns and battles within campaigns, each very different from the other even in a common theatre of operations. Warfare might indeed be transformed in general, but not in the particular. Much of the discussion takes on a determinist perspective human action determined by causes regarded as external to human will. But how can this be if warfare in its essence is a human activity directed usually by political intervention? Does the transformation of warfare, so-called, have a mind of its own? On close examination, much that is promoted as an inevitable, rationally directed transformation more commonly expressions the interests of institutions acting to enhance and protect their partisan domains. Many err because they "underestimate the complexity of [warfare] with which they deal and the value of traditional knowledge they inherit."1 The grand error is to forget that warfare is played out in an uncertain environment where the effects of our decisions and actions are dependant on the unknowable responses of others. Those who argue that warfare is being or can be transformed mainly by technical innovation and that policy ought to aim to produce the results that technology promises miss the deeper context that underpins warfare as a human activity. Scholars and soldiers when thinking about warfare and the future ought to ask themselves, how do we know what is actually happening now before they declare what will happen next? Understanding as
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best we can what is happening in a broad context now is different from declaring what we image will happen in some abstract future. Clear-headed assessments of the reality at hand are always surer guides to prudent policy. Many defence technocrats and rationalists who speak of the transformation of warfare sometimes confuse imagined scenarios for inevitable realities but they have hardly left the Cold War at all. They merely transferred what was planned for the specific needs of the cold war (Land/Air Battle 2000) to an imagined battlefield in some distant future. In the meantime, actual soldiers in the field and diplomats in conference began in early 1990 to experience warfare transformed or from the perspective of weaker states and impoverished dictators, warfare reformed. Is it possible then to understand what is happening in warfare? Yes, but not precisely. So, what ought we talk about when we talk about the transformation of warfare? What are the most useful indicators of what is happening and which of these are the most prudent guides to what we ought to do today to be ready for tomorrow? When we look for answers, we must accept first that there is a difference between the nature of warfare and the environment of warfare (though they are closely linking in the circumstances). A useful beginning flows from this rule: take an empirical look at what is occurring; compare apples to apples (like wars to like wars) and then look for patterns of behaviour and responses beyond the immediate event and then draw careful conclusions appropriate to the circumstances. This method of examination can be illustrated by recent research of Canadian operations during the 1990s and this century. It suggests that the transformation of warfare has in important respects already occurred and that the "lessons" of this period ought to guide defence policy and force development over at least the next ten years.
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Warfare Transformed, In Fact. The transformation of warfare is evident in a pattern of linked operations in various theatres which Sean Maloney termed "stability campaigns." Together in a new work, Campaigns for International Security, we have identified these campaigns as elements of a new era of warfare and diplomacy or of international relations generally. Since 1989, leading nations have been engaged admittedly imperfectly in political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and military activities aimed at bringing order a situation in which laws, rules, and consensual authority prevail to specific regions of the world. We are in what Sean Maloney and I have termed "the world order era" And warfare has been transformed from Cold War precepts to meet its demands. Unlike conventional military operations in the Cold War era (but not completely unlike colonial wars of another time), conventional battles within campaigns in the world order era aim not so much to defeat an opponent in the total war meaning of the term, but to return or establish order to a situation of conflict. Commanders of world order forces characteristically seek a cessation of operations on their own terms, avoiding the costs of victory if possible, as a stage in achieving order and stability. In the world order era, stability campaigns and battles within campaigns aim first dominate the local situation, then to sustain a controlled environment supported by enforced order. Stability campaigns aim to modify behaviour leading eventually to a situation where disputes will be settled more or less peacefully or at least according to agreed norms and rules. On this basis, warfare in 2004 has been transformed and exhibits several defining characteristics which we can observe in the midst of the world order era. The Multilateral Dimension. Stability campaigns, because they arise mostly from within the international community, are inevitably multilateral affairs and this fact is reflected in the political and military direction of campaigns. Stability campaigns are invariably directed by a loose triad: a civil authority, either directly by heads of states or their
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emissaries; an international, institutional authority representing the mandating forum; and a command element, usually in the form of a national officer supposedly acting as a disinterested international commander of the multinational formation. Unlike the Cold War period, few of these coalitions of the moment have, as the term suggests, any lasting shape or authority. Political Objectives. The normative purpose of every campaign in this era has been and will be in the future to establish an ordered, reasonably safe environment to allow and enable political and civil authorities to work with the local population toward building a harmonious society of "peace, order and good government." Whatever their actual motives, nations and international institutions determined to impose order always confront three sets of problems. First, they must credibly demonstrate to their citizens, allies (actual and potential), and to the international community a continuing disorder and, at the same time, convincingly argue that intervention is the most appropriate way to respond. Second, states must explain the degree of force necessary to bring the disturbance under control and show a willingness and the capabilities to produce the means and bear the costs to redress the situation. Finally, motivated states must display to opponents their determination to see the issue through to a reasonable conclusion and reinforce continually public and allied support for what are often operations without traditional frameworks or definitions of success. Military Purposes. Armed force is the central factor in stability campaigns. Every force deployed, including those sent out for essentially humanitarian purposes in a "non-permissive environment," carry an implicit threat and authority to use force over and above the laws and regulations of the subject state. Dominance is the key military concept in these stability campaigns. Military operations, therefore, are premised on two cardinal assumptions the purpose of armed forces is to impose and maintain order on the local populations by all necessary means and second, violent confrontations are to be
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expected and defeated at anytime during any operational period. The End of Cold War Peacekeeping. Peacekeeping, like Monty Python's Parrot, is dead. You can nail it to its perch, but it is dead nonetheless. Stability campaigns and operations are not peacekeeping as the term and concept have been understood throughout the Cold War era. Stability campaigns are not policy free; that is to say, forces are deployed in most instances to achieve goals openly related to the interests of the contributing nations even though at times their policy motives may be shaded by egalitarian rhetoric. Neither the civil authority nor their force commanders intend that stability campaigns be neutral or impartial, as is the case in United Nations-mandated peacekeeping operations. In every campaign and all operations mounted since 1989, the convening authority has identified a party or parties, if not as belligerents, then as the group to be controlled. This conceptualization has significant implications for the way military forces conduct operations. Military commanders leading stability campaigns do not consider themselves or their subordinates as referees between contenting parties to a dispute. Rather, they tend to operate on the assumption that their soldiers' duty is to impose, reinforce, and maintain order by force of arms if necessary. If in doing so they must apply force disproportionately against one faction, then that is a decision that will be made after an assessment of the circumstances they confront; but they are not inhibited, as traditional peacekeepers usual are, by the notion that they must apply force, if at all, evenly no matter the situation. True believers, scholars, and others have tried to rescue traditional peacekeeping by attempting to modify its doctrines while holding to its ideological roots. They speak, for instance, of "muscular peacekeeping"3 and use other terms meant to place stability operations in a collective security harness. Such arguments, however, soon become entangled in a web of conflicting concepts incompatible with
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the realities of the world order era. Military Means & Capabilities. The physical intervention and even the invasion of a state's territory and attacks on its military units by the forces of order are defining characteristics of the world order era and stability campaigns. Armed forces given a typical world order mission will use tactical methods not to "winning the nation's wars" as traditional military doctrine demands. Rather, commanders will try to establish an orderly community more or less controlled by rules enforced by military actions or the threat of such action leading to predictable and controlled social and political behaviour. Military commanders typically employ concurrently several related techniques to deter and contain violence, to defeat outbreaks of unrest or criminal activities, and to impose order in selected areas and occupied communities. Armed force and at times deadly force is always a certain component of these techniques. Actual missions and these tactics are transforming modern armed forces. For example, the armed forces of NATO member states are being forced to evolve into smaller, professional, highly technical, and more lethal, general purpose forces not just by the RMA, but by operational circumstances. National defence policies today are developed to build forces that can be deployed rapidly, worldwide and sustain them nearly indefinitely in logistically difficult environments. The application of military means in the world order era is fundamentally different, arguably the antithesis, of the means that characterized in essence the entire Cold War era. As Cold War armed forces were defined by nuclear weapons, so world order era armed forces are defined by the modern infantry soldier. It is the contemporary infantry soldier, as in many other periods of military history outside the Cold War anomaly, who provides the indispensable necessity of the stability campaigns, a visible presence "a foot on the ground." Areas of Operation. France has a large, sophisticated, nuclear-capa-
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ble armed force, but its 2003 deployment into the Democratic Republic of Congo to secure a small region in that state was deemed by French officers as "highly risky." Their worries underscore the asymmetry between military capabilities developed for the Cold War and those needed for the world order era. The stability campaigns of the world order era have been and predictably will continue to be conducted near the edge of most nations' deployment capabilities. They present significant complications for the usual contributing nations, including the United States, forcing significant realignments of national military capabilities and resource allocations. The transportation of forces and their sustainment in Africa and some other regions is a complicated matter of great expense made more so by the fact that, except for the United States, most nations have few long-range military transportation systems. As a result, force options tend to be limited to small, "light" formations. Often such units are adequate for the task at hand. This limitation however does impose mission limits on the objectives of the convening authority and a high degree of risk to the deployed force that might not be necessary if transportation systems were more capable and the operating environment less forbidding. Distance is not the only or most limiting factor in past campaigns. In many areas, and even in the Balkans in some respects, the climate and the terrain pose significant operational problems for troops and commanders and, ironically, degrade the technical capabilities of equipment that supposedly gives modern forces their advantage over native forces in these campaigns. Inadequate transportation networks, inferior or non-existent infrastructure, primitive communications systems, miserable economies, dangerous, endemic diseases, and the lack of potable water, local sources of food, and shelter for high-tech military communications and medical units impose significant costs on the deployment and sustainment of forces and their safety during operations.
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These factors tend to limit the number of states that can contribute to missions and to increase the resources that more capable states must provide to less capable coalition armed forces to ensure their effective participation in stability campaigns. These samples of observable changes in armed forces are derived from what these forces are doing and the conditions in which they are doing them. These are not imaged futures, but rather the real transformation that is taking place before our eyes. Moreover, they are changes conditioned by operational factors that will extend into the far future. The experience gain in past stability campaigns ought to provide the basis for fundamental decision-making on defence policy, strategy, doctrine, and force structure. Of all the underlying factors, few are as important as the assumption that the campaigns of the future will be fought in faraway places of which our leaders, commanders, and troops know very little and where our technical advantages may not provide the returns hoped from technical innovations suited to other more familiar places. The Transformation of Warfare or Whatever Two observations seem appropriate. First, one should approach much of the (mostly in western) discourse and literature about the transformation of warfare with caution. The debate such as it is, is too abstract, too closely linked to Cold War scenarios and ideas of "proper soldiering" and too deterministic to withstand close scrutiny in the light of what we can observe empirically. Second, scholars and soldiers ought to think very carefully about the nature of warfare as well as its environment whenever they try to define the "transformation of warfare." Change in warfare brought about by political and technological innovation is not new. The techniques for fighting have always been evolving and likely always will. The inevitability of changes has never been entirely linear nor as obvi-
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ous as some might suggest. Old methods and answers are sometimes as appropriate and applicable to new situations as ever. "Progress" may well be transforming the environment of warfare, but it is not necessarily changing the nature of warfare. While the environment of war always changes depending upon political aims and limiting technology; types of forces employed; and the relative sophistication of combatants, the nature of war is more constant. The environment of warfare can be managed by scientists and engineers using modern technology, but the nature of warfare demands a clear head and the steadying hand of military tradition and custom derived from experience. War is a human social activity. To paraphrase John Keegan, war is about "the behaviour of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self preservation, their sense of honour and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them." War is, therefore, "always a study of fear and usually of courage; always of leadership, usually of obedience; .... it is always a study of solidarity and usually also of disintegration."4 These are things "drained of life and meaning by the laboratory approach"and by consultants' studies and the managerial approach as well. The confusion about the environment of war and the nature of war tends to encourage wishful and imprecise thinking. It may be leading policy planners in Canada to the denigration of the military way in favour of concepts derived from institutions concerned with bureaucracy, making money. On the political left, policy may be confounded by those intent on saving the peace, sometimes at the expense of liberty. Misunderstanding the dynamics of the transformation of warfare can lead easily to planning for an imagined war or an imagined future without war at the expense of planning for evident realities. Societies that believe they live in fireproof houses may be permitted such errors, others are not.5
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Notes:
1 John Kay, as quoted in National Post, January 24, 2004, p. RB5. 2 Douglas L. Bland and Sean H. Maloney, Campaigns For International Security: Canadian Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century (Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 2004). 3 See Morrison, Alex, et al. Peacekeeping With Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution. (Cornwallis Park: The Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Centre, 1997). 4 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (Guildford, Surrey, 1976) pp. 297-298. 5 Douglas Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy In Canada 1947-1985 (Kingston: R.P.Frye Co., 1987) p. 210.
CONCLUSION
IN SUMMATION
By Col (Retd) Brian MacDonald
hen I set out to organize a major conference, I usually find myself faced with the implicit task of saying to myself "I have a whole bunch of really interesting questions, to which I would really like to know the answers. I really don't care about the rest of the people in the room, but if I select the people whom I know are capable of providing those answers, and posing new ones I, at least, will go away very pleased with the results." I certainly find myself in that condition today, because, as is the case with all the really good conferences, there were as many good questions posed as there were good answers given during our conference. These new questions will become the substance and the wherewithal for follow-on conferences, and after a while, if one organizes enough of these conferences, one begins to become somewhat educated in the issues that are at play or at least I do! This conference was an especially intriguing one for me, because I realized, at the end of the day, that I organized two panels incorrectly. I began with a panel consisting of Ambassadors Hunter and Juneau, but really should have included General Deverell in it, because the sequence of those three presentations knit together so nicely, in terms, particularly, of the role of ongoing and future roles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the evolving contemporary period.
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Chris Donnelly, who was at that time the special advisor to the Secretary General of NATO with respect to Central and Eastern Europe, spoke at the Atlantic Treaty Association meeting in Istanbul two years ago, of the profound transformation of the strategic environment and the development of a "Great Arc of Instability," stretching from Morocco to Lake Baikal. He suggested that the key problem for NATO would be to shift intellectually, from an east-west orientation looking at the problems coming from Moscow to an orientation that was now north-south, or even more widely spread in this expanding Great Arc of Instability. Ambassador Juneau picked up Donnelly's image with his stagesetting opening presentation, which contained the key insight that we have been confronted with a reality in which NATO is no longer the "Agency of Last Resort," but rather the "Agency of First Resort," as other international institutions including the Security Council have proved to be less than adequately capable of dealing with the issues in the time frame that they must be dealt with. Ambassador Hunter followed with the perceptive comment that whereas NATO, in its original context, had achieved the success of "abolishing war as a policy option in Europe," the Alliance was now faced with the challenge of having to reconstitute itself so as to achieve an equal success in the extended Middle East, that "Great Arc of Instability," and that we would likely be there for the foreseeable future a future which will require a campaign potentially as long as the campaign that NATO conducted during the Cold War. At the end of that day, perhaps, we will have been able to create another area of the world in which war has disappeared as a legitimate international policy option. But that process will be long, complex, difficult, and expensive. The remarks of the two Ambassadors laid the groundwork for General Deverell's key operational insight that, in order to achieve NATO's second great victory, it will be necessary for us all to realize that there is a crucial difference between the Cold War and this new
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campaign. During the Cold War, the majority of NATO's European members had forces in Europe structurally designed to fight in place, since the Alliance did not require any significant expeditionary capability, beyond that of the comparatively small forces of France and the United Kingdom, and the much larger and critically important strategic expeditionary capability of the United States. But now, General Deverell noted, we are in a period in which there must a structural transformation, a reconstitution of forces, where those who wish to be able to play a significant role in organizing the world order will have to restructure their forces to create legitimate expeditionary capabilities. General Deverell then moved into the realm of moral philosophy when he touched upon the requirement for nations now to meet the demands of public opinion to make sure that the actions taken in robust peacekeeping operations are proportionate actions. Those echoes of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas, and the concepts of "Just War" theory, provided a most interesting intellectual transition to the practicalities of dealing with the events on the ground, which were the subject of Col Tremblay's lucid presentation, about what was, in effect, a Canadian "Action Research" project, in Kabul, in learning how to conduct these operations. Here the "Just War" concept of "Proportionate Response" becomes critical, not only in terms of developing and maintaining productive relationships with the people whom we are trying to help, but equally, in maintaining the confidence of our own domestic public opinion that the actions we are taking are proportionate, are legitimate, and are consistent with what Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas have spoken of. In retrospect, if I had reorganized the conference, I would have put Col Tremblay and Professor Ram on the same panel, because both spoke about the dual practical necessities of robust peacekeeping operations the fact that, on the one side, there was a need to create a peacekeeping force, which had at its heart a counter-mortar radar and a troop of 105 mm howitzers to deliver fire support at any
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point where it might be required, and, on the other side, the fact that there was a need to deal with the very interesting, but frequently awkward, interface between military forces and non-governmental organizations, which is increasingly the task of the civil-military (CIMIC) elements of the military. In retrospect again, I might have added a third speaker to that panel, to talk about the increasing need now to develop an understanding of how to integrate both the military and the NGOs with those agencies, which are primarily international organizations and government organizations, which are heavily involved with the task of post-conflict reconstruction, especially given the reality that when a military intervention force deploys, and must make quick operational decisions, those decisions are often taken on the basis of an immediate appreciation of the need, and may, in fact, be sub-optimal in the long run, in terms of the requirements for post-conflict reconstruction and development. Paul Chapin brought us back from Kabul to Ottawa, with a revealing insider's insight into the policy development process now taking place, and of the key stakeholder influences at work. We were interested to find that the leading edge of the International Policy Review, which of course includes the defence review, was being driven by the Department of Foreign Affairs, with close consultation (may we say "direction by"?) with the Privy Council Office. We have not in the defence analytic community paid nearly enough attention to the interface between the advisors in the Prime Minister's Office, the Assistant Secretaries of the Privy Council Office, and the line Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs; the impact of these interfaces upon policy development would be an interesting area for academic analysis in the future. We had also had the objective of introducing our audience to the existence of the new Allied Command Transformation (ACT), which has taken the place of Allied Command Atlantic as the NATO Headquarters located on the North American continent, and of
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learning something about what this new creature, which has a Canadian Three Star LGen Michel Maisonneuve as its Chief of Staff, actually does. Brigadier Kirkland, provided us with precisely that understanding with a series of cogent inside views of the transformation process that NATO has established as the purview of Allied Command Transformation, and of the practical contribution that it is already making, as in the example already cited, of LGen Hillier's workup of his headquarters before deploying to Kabul, illustrates, to developing the modalities necessary to the success of robust peacekeeping operations. And finally, Professor Douglas Bland, who always produces fresh ways of looking at things, coined his most interesting new term, the "Counter-Revolution in Military Affairs" or "CRMA." This is something that we will, perhaps, have to look at more closely in the future, because as he quite correctly points out, we seem to have accepted the catch-phrase "The Revolution in Military Affairs," or "RMA," as an intellectual shorthand to describe everything that is currently going on, without, perhaps, recalling an older idea that actions cause reactions, that the RMA may well be followed by the CRMA, and that we might do well to spend some time in prediction of what the latter is likely to look like. And so, in a very practical sense, Professor Bland's contribution of "CRMA" to the acronym set brought us back to the thoughts of General Deverell, Col Tremblay, and Professor Ram, and the need to understand the distinction between the "imagined reality" of the high policy makers and the academic world, and the "actual reality" on the ground that is being experienced by the Private Soldiers, and the Corporals, and the Sergeants and Warrant Officers, who have to deal with the incidents that face them on a daily basis in the real world of robust peacekeeping operations, and to deal with them in a fair, impartial, and proportionate way that would satisfy the tests of the two Saints who framed the basic shape of "Just War" theory.
APPENDIX
Appendix:
SPEAKING NOTES FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AT THE 2004 JOINT RESEARCH CONFERENCE
By The Honourable Bill Graham, P.C., M.P.
I. Introduction Thank you for that kind introduction. Winston Churchill once said that his idea of a good dinner was, first to have good food, then to discuss good food, and after the food had been elaborately discussed, to discuss a good topic and we all have no doubt who would be the chief conversationalist! While I'm certainly looking forward to good food and discussion, it's not my intention to be this evening's chief conversationalist. In fact, I'd like to keep my comments as brief as possible so that I have more time to listen to the ideas that have come out of your discussions around today's timely topics. The issues you tackled in this conference the new strategic environment, the changing nature of peacekeeping operations, the diplomatic, defence and development interface in stability operations these are the very issues that are having a profound impact on the Canadian Forces, on Canada's contribution to global peace and security, and on our planning for the future. So I'm pleased to join you here this evening, once again in this impressive setting, to discuss these matters with such a distinguished and informed group.
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The Royal Canadian Military Institute, the Atlantic Council of Canada, and the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies all play a critical role in raising awareness and understanding of important strategic issues in Canada. In fact, this is my first major opportunity to speak since my appointment as Minister of National Defence and, in my view, it's more than appropriate that I do so before this audience. Tonight, I'd like to provide you with some cursory thoughts on some of the issues that were discussed during the conference, particularly those that are having such a significant impact on what we do at Defence. With your indulgence, I'd also like to spend a few minutes discussing my priorities for Defence over the next twelve months. It's certainly going to be an interesting year ahead! II. Role as Defence Minister Before going any further, I'd like to say how very proud I am that the Prime Minister asked me to be the Defence Minister. I've always considered Defence one of the most critical portfolios in government. What could be more important for a government than protecting the safety and security of its citizens? Or securing the nation's sovereignty? These are not abstract notions to be debated by philosophers or theorists. They are fundamental responsibilities of government, and today they must be met in extremely complex and uncertain conditions. As Foreign Minister, I always subscribed to the maxim that, while defence policy is, in many respects, derivative of foreign policy, the effectiveness of our foreign policy is very much dependent on the quality and strength of our defence capacity. And I firmly believe the place of respect that Canada occupies in the world is one that is due, in large part, to the role that our armed
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forces have played, and are continually called upon to play, in world events. I was fortunate to get to know George Robertson well through my days at NATO and he was good enough to write me to congratulate me for, in his words, being "promoted to the most important post in government." He made what was perhaps a characteristically Defence Minister's distinction between my past and present roles as follows: "Maybe briefly you will miss the honeyed words of the diplomatic world but the rewards of Defence are great and enjoyable. Putting foreign policy into practice is no small task, but there is great satisfaction in doing it." Defence and security are certainly key components of this government's forward-looking agenda for Canada and Canadians. Since December, we've invested significant new resources to protect our country and our citizens. We've introduced Canada's first National Security Policy. We've created the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. And we're now in the process of conducting an International and Defence Policy Review. We also recognize there's more to do. In my role as Minister of Foreign Affairs, I had the opportunity to meet with many members of the Canadian Forces. I've also had the opportunity to visit them abroad and witness the absolutely amazing work they do throughout the world. I have seen first-hand the dedication, the spirit of self-sacrifice and the professionalism of our men and women in uniform. And I can say, without exaggeration, they are the best in the world at what they do. I have also seen first-hand the difference they are making in the lives of people in need. I've seen the real and significant impact they've had on the people of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Haiti to name but a few recent examples. I often think of an encounter I witnessed between a Canadian
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Forces member and a little Afghan girl on a crowded, chaotic street in Kabul. While the soldier's job was to provide stability and security in a hostile land, I was genuinely struck by his willingness to bring a few moments of humanity and humour into the girl's life. I was also struck by the obvious pride he took in doing this and the warmth with which he was received by that child and her entire family. So I've had the opportunity to become quite familiar with many of the issues now facing Defence. This is not to imply that I don't face a learning curve. I just like to think that I bring to this new task some useful insights from my previous experience and a real appreciation of the importance of Defence and all that it stands for. III. Current Security and Defence Context Changing International Security Environment As you discussed today, Canada faces a complex array of defence and security challenges. Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War and it's obvious the world is an unpredictable and perilous place. It's also obvious that the peace dividend we so eagerly sought in the West was an illusion. As we begin the 21 st century, we face significant new and evolving threats such as global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the dangers caused by failed and failing states. At the same time, threats of a more traditional nature such as intrastate or inter-state conflicts now exist alongside newer destabilizing factors such as environmental crises on a global scale, civil strife and pandemics. Simply put, the lines between security and defence have blurred, if not disappeared altogether. I think the Prime Minister captured the challenge that this presents when he said: "Today's front line stretches from the streets of Kabul, to the rail lines in Madrid, to cities across Canada."
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And this is having a fundamental impact on how we approach our domestic and continental security, our relations with our closest allies and partners, and on how we protect and project our interests and values abroad. High Operational Tempo The increased volatility of the international security environment has also produced greater demands on the Canadian Forces. The statistics are well known but also very telling: since the end of the Cold War, the number of operations in which our military has participated has tripled compared to the period between 1945 and 1989. At the same time, the Canadian Forces have been called upon here at home on an unprecedented number of occasions over the past decade. We know this unforeseen demand has had an impact on the men and women of the Canadian Forces and their families. What is less obvious to the casual observer is the impact it has had on the broader organization: on our ability to train our uniformed members, on our equipment, and on our capacity to deploy troops domestically and internationally. Changing Nature of Operations Of course, as you've discussed at length today, international operations are not only increasing in number but they're also changing in nature. The days when peacekeeping operations meant deploying static observers along a cease-fire line have, for the most part, passed. As a nation, we can and should be very proud of the role our country played in developing, and putting into practice, this traditional form of peacekeeping. But equally, as a nation, we must be prepared to play a leadership
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role in the next generation of peace support operations that have become more common over the past decade. Today's operations, as you've heard from Colonel Tremblay and others, are more dangerous and demanding, frequently taking place in regions where tensions are still strong or where there is little peace to keep. Today's operations are also much more complex. In a grey zone between war and peace, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between friend and foe, especially when dealing with terrorists and suicide bombers who seek shelter among civilians. Our militaries often find themselves working alongside international organizations, humanitarian workers, the media, and non-governmental organizations, and are often called upon to fulfill a much wider array of responsibilities. Our mission in Afghanistan is an excellent example. As part of their duties, our troops have conducted security patrols, assisted in the disposal of unexploded munitions, delivered medical supplies and coordinated numerous humanitarian projects, such as the construction of schools and wells. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, our soldiers have played a central role in helping to establish stability and security. But when I travelled there a few weeks ago, I was also impressed to learn from our truly impressive commander there, General Beare, that under his initiative SFOR established a radio station geared toward the local youth so that they have some sense of a very necessary civic engagement. And I'm assured that it's popular and effective! Reaching out to Bosnians, sharing our views and values all of this is absolutely critical to securing long-term peace in that country and that region. To be successful in today's robust peacekeeping operations, it's clear that our troops must be part warrior, part diplomat and part aid worker. Some argue this diminishes the "warrior ethic" or renders our troops less effective on the battlefield. Frankly, I disagree. Because in
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today's world, our soldiers must be capable of not just winning wars, but also of contributing to conditions which make it possible for us to secure the peace. Warriors first but not warriors only . And I'm proud to say that, with the experience and skills they've acquired throughout the years, the men and women of the Canadian Forces are better at this than anyone in the world. The image of warrior-diplomat-humanitarian is certainly consistent with the government's "3-D" approach to international affairs that is the integration of our diplomacy, defence and development efforts. With this approach, Defence is working much more closely with other departments and agencies, such as Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency, in order to maximize the effectiveness of our involvement on the international scene. This "3-D" approach has been an unqualified success in Afghanistan: Canadian diplomats are assisting the Afghan people rebuild their country's institutions; Canadian aid workers have undertaken numerous humanitarian projects; and our troops are in Kabul contributing to the stability needed for the other two groups to succeed in their work. Afghanistan has served and will continue to serve as a model for our future international interventions as it also serves as an example of the dimension and complexity of these new operations. Domestic and Continental Operations While I've focussed my remarks thus far on Canada's role and contribution internationally, which I appreciate was the focus of today's discussions, I'd be remiss if I didn't say a few words about Defence's domestic and continental responsibilities, bearing in mind that we do live in a world of limited resources and that increased responsibilities at home do impact on how we engage abroad.
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With the lines between domestic, continental and international security now blurred, the government has taken aggressive action to protect Canadians here at home. For Defence, this means enhancing our contribution to maritime security, improving our defences against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and better understanding, and responding to, the dramatic changes that are occurring in the Arctic. It also means working more closely with our American neighbours to protect our citizens and our shared continent. When I visited NORAD headquarters last year, I can't tell you how impressed I was by the level of professionalism and cooperation that I saw between our two militaries. Canadians working side-by-side with their American counterparts, separated only by the colour or style of their uniform, to protect our skies, our sovereignty and our citizens. This is exactly the seamless cooperation that is required to address today's security challenges. And it is precisely why we have established the Bi-national Planning Group and are in the process of discussing Canada's possible participation in the ballistic missile defence system. We have a fundamental responsibility to protect Canadians. We also have a fundamental responsibility to contribute to the defence of our continent. Ballistic missile defence might assist us in doing this. One thing is certain: our American colleagues are determined to pursue it and it will become a part of the defence architecture of North America whether we participate or not. And so, we are exploring it as a responsible government, conscious both of the need to protect Canada and maintain a close working relationship with our American neighbours, should. This doesn't mean that we're going to compromise our interests or values in the process. We will not, for example, join any system that involves the weaponization of space. The Prime Minister and I have been very clear on this issue and, I can tell you, the United States
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understands our position. Discussions are ongoing, after which time we will make a decision on the way ahead. But I can assure you that, whatever decision we take, Canada's interests and values will be protected. IV. Ministerial Priorities So continental defence will be one of my key focuses over the coming months. But it certainly will not be my only priority. As we look to position the Department and the Canadian Forces to meet the challenges of the future, I will be concentrating on three things: first, completing the Defence Policy Review; second, ensuring the Canadian Forces have the modern equipment they need to do their job safely and effectively; and third, ensuring that we look after our people. Complete the Defence Policy Review I'd like to start with the Defence Policy Review because of the impact it will have on my other two priorities. As you know, we're now in the process of completing the Defence Policy Review in conjunction with the government's overall review of Canada's place in the world being led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I know that some critics have accused us of conducting the review process in a vacuum, but nothing could be farther from the truth. First of all, the Defence Policy Review builds on the examination that was conducted in the fall of 2002 an examination that featured extensive consultations with a variety of stakeholders. Canadians from around the country also had the chance to express their views. We're also making use of the work done over the last few years by a number of distinguished security and defence organizations, as well as
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the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, and other relevant parliamentary committees. As former Chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, I'm absolutely committed to working with my fellow Parliamentarians in charting the way ahead for Defence. We expect to complete our review in the fall. After which, we intend to seek the views of Parliament through the committee process. This should permit ample opportunity for public discussion and input. And, while all of this is taking place, I will continue to consult personally with key defence stakeholders. I certainly recognize that organizations such as yours have much to contribute to the discussion. The process we've selected is meant to strike the most appropriate balance between allowing time for consultation and moving ahead on decisions that are needed. I can't tell you exactly when our review will be submitted to Parliament, but I can tell you some of the issues that it will address. Broadly speaking, the Defence Policy Review will identify Canada's key defence priorities. It will, in the most basic sense, help us determine what kind of military Canada will need in the future. The review will also establish the most appropriate balance between our continental and foreign responsibilities. It will look at ways that we can enhance the safety and security of Canadians here at home. Some of the options we're now exploring include expanding our surveillance and counter-terrorism capabilities and increasing the size and capabilities of the Reserves to deal with domest ic crises. The review will also look at working with the United States in new and innovative ways to protect North America against emerging threats. On the international level, the review will build on our "3-D"
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approach to global intervention. It will look at how the Canadian Forces can continue to participate in a wide range of international operations. As part of our Peace and Nation-Building Initiative, the government will increase the size of the Canadian Forces by 5,000 Regular personnel. This will allow our military to assume an even larger role in bringing peace, security and democracy to troubled nations. We're also moving forward on our plan to increase the Army Reserves by 3,000 personnel. This will give Canada badly needed capacity to respond to domestic crises, including natural disasters and chemical, biological and nuclear emergencies. Taken together, these are the most significant increases to Defence in more than a decade. And they are a very clear demonstration of this government's commitment to building a revived and robust military. I would like to make one point very clear. Expanding the size of the Canadian Forces will not be done at the expense of our existing capabilities. This will not be a case of 'robbing Peter to pay Paul'. The additional troops will be funded through new investments by the government. And I'm working to have these new resources feature in the next federal budget. Given the global context in which we now live, I firmly believe that the status quo is not an option. Defence must adapt to new conditions and it must have additional resources to enable it to do so. I am confident that the government will respond to this new imperative. Continue to Modernize our Equipment Once we determine, through the review, what our key defence priorities and requirements are, we will turn our focus to ensuring the Canadian Forces have the modern equipment they need to do their job.
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Modernization does not mean that we're looking to completely re-equip the Canadian Forces. Like many of our allies and partners, we're combining existing and emerging systems to enhance the capabilities we'll need in future missions or to create new ones that would give us greater flexibility and versatility. Of course, we have a very solid foundation on which to build. Since last December, this government has committed more than $7 billion for new equipment for the Canadian Forces, including the Maritime Helicopter Project, Mobile Gun System, Joint Support Ship and Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft. I think you'll agree this is all very good news for Defence. But I want to stress that the modernization of our military is not complete. For example, we're now experimenting with unmanned aerial vehicles and looking to enhance our defences against nuclear, biological and chemical attacks. Pending the outcome of the Defence Policy Review and building on the Strategic Capability Investment Plan we're committed to investing in the most relevant mix of capabilities to ensure the Canadian Forces can meet their commitments. Continue to Look after our People Regardless of how modern our military equipment is, we will not be able to meet our commitments if we can't count on quality people. Our people military and civilian alike remain our most valuable resource. And ensuring we take care of them is an important priority for me. The high operational tempo that I discussed earlier has had an impact on our men and women in uniform and their families. And, as I've said before, they need and deserve a break. This is why we're now moving to reduce our operational commitments and begin a period of regeneration. For example, the improving situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has
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allowed us, over time, to reduce our presence from around 1,200 personnel to 650 personnel. And it will soon be reduced even further to 80 troops. We've also reduced the number of people we have committed to the Afghanistan mission to about 1,000. Taken together, this means we now have slightly less than 1,900 personnel deployed on operations, as opposed to the 3,300 we had in the spring. These reductions will allow us to do some much-needed training, professional development and equipment repair. More importantly, it will allow our uniformed members the time they need to recharge their batteries both at the personal and professional level. Although the Canadian Forces have always delivered when called upon, we're committed to doing a better job in balancing operational deployments with family life and training needs. So, ladies and gentlemen, these are my three main priorities for Defence over the coming year: complete the Defence Policy Review, continue the modernization of our equipment, and ensure that we look after our people. V. Conclusion In concluding, I would just say that the government has placed Defence at the forefront of its overall agenda over the next twelve months. And we are absolutely committed to providing the Department and the Canadian Forces with the policy guidance, people, equipment and funding they need in order to meet the challenges of the future. I could not think of a more interesting and critical time to be at Defence. I can think of no portfolio in government whose challenges are of such significance to our country, and I am certainly aware of the challenges and great responsibilities that this job entails. And for that reason, I will particularly appreciate your informed support and advice as we work to shape Defence for the coming decades.
CONTRIBUTORS
Dr. Douglas Bland is Professor and Chair of the Defence Management Studies Program in the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University. His research is concentrated in the fields of defence policy making and management at national and international levels, the organization and functioning of defence ministries, and civil-military relations. He has published books, articles, and reports and lectured in these fields in Canada, the United States, Europe and South Africa. From 1999-2001 he was a visiting lecturer at the Center For Hemispheric Defense Studies, Washington, D.C. Paul Chapin is Director General of the International Security Bureau at Foreign Affairs Canada. Mr. Chapin joined the Department in 1969, and served in Tel Aviv, Moscow, Brussels and Washington, D.C. He also had various appointments in Ottawa, such as the Chief of the Soviet Affairs Section; the Director of the Political and Strategic Analysis; Director General of Security Policy and Operations in the Department of the Solicitor General; and Chair of the Task Force on Modernizing the Foreign Service. General Sir John (Jack) Deverell, is the former Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Northern Region based in Brunssum, the
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Netherlands. His previous appointments included Commandant RMA Sandhurst; Deputy Commander in Chief, Land Command and Inspector General Territorial Army; and Deputy Commander Operations SFOR in Bosnia. He has served in a variety of appointments in Aden, Germany and Northern Ireland as well as Norway, Belize and Canada, and is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts and a Fellow of the Institute of Continuing Professional Development. Matthew Gaasenbeek is the Chairman of Northern Crown Capital, and the President of the Royal Canadian Military Institute. He is a member of the Advisory Council Army Cadets, Senate Grey and Simcoe Foresters, past Chairman of Ontario Development Corporation, Federation of Ontario Naturalists, Quetico Park Foundation and volunteer with the Canadian Executive Service Overseas. He also spent two years with CIDA as Special Advisor. He was a director of many Government and private sector corporations and was past Senior Vice-President of Midland Walwyn. Bill Graham is the Minister of National Defence. He was first elected to Parliament in 1993, and was re-elected in 1997, 2000 and 2004. On Jan. 15, 2002, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. He served as Chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade from January 1995 to January 2002. He also served as Chair of the Liaison Committee of the House of Commons. In 1997, he was elected Vice-President of the Parliamentary Association of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and was elected its treasurer in 1999. In 2000, he was elected Chair of the Inter-Parliamentary Forum of the Americas. From 1996 to 2000, Mr. Graham served as treasurer of Liberal International. He was the first North American parliamentarian to join PD Burma, an organization of legislators around the world concerned about democracy in Burma, and is a member of the InterParliamentary Council Against Antisemitism. Prior to being elected to
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Parliament, he was a professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, where he taught international trade law, public international law and the law of the European Community. From 1986 to 1988, he was director of the Centre of International Studies at the University of Toronto. He holds bachelor of arts (honours) and bachelor of laws degrees from the University of Toronto and a doctorate (sciences juridiques) from the Universit de Paris. He and his wife, Catherine, have two children. Robert Hunter is Senior Advisor at RAND in Washington, D.C. He is also President of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Chairman of the Council for a Community of Democracies, Associate at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Senior International Consultant to Lockheed Martin Overseas Corporation. Previously, Ambassador Hunter was Vice President for International Politics, Director of European Studies, and Senior Fellow in Middle East Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has also served in a variety of governmental posts, including as U.S. Ambassador to NATO; Special Advisor on Lebanon to the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and as a member of the Carter administration's National Security Council Staff. Jean-Pierre Juneau is the Ambassador of Canada and Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (NATO) in Brussels. Mr. Juneau joined the Department of External Affairs in 1969 and served abroad in Havana, Washington D.C., and again in Paris as Minister-Counsellor from 1985 to 1988. His subsequent appointments include being the Ambassador to Spain, the Ambassador to the European Union, and the Ambassador to Brazil. In Ottawa, Mr. Juneau held a number of positions, including Director General, Western Europe Bureau and Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe Branch.
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Brigadier Lamont Kirkland is the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff Strategic Concepts, Policy and Interoperability at Allied Command Transformation. He completed tours in North Ireland, the Falkland Islands, Belize, Sierra Leone, Kenya, and New Zealand, and Bosnia, where he commanded an Armoured Infantry Battle group in SFOR in 1996/1997, and was awarded the OBE for his service. A graduate of the British Army Staff College and the Australian Defence College, where he earned an MA in Strategic Studies, he also served as Chief of the Strategic Policy Branch at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Colonel (Retd) Brian S. MacDonald is the President of Strategic Insight Planning and Communications, Chairman of Defence Studies and Acting Executive Director of the Royal Canadian Military Institute. Previously, he has has been President of the Atlantic Council of Canada an NGO which is the Canadian constituent of the international Atlantic Treaty Association, Vice-Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations, President of the Royal Canadian Artillery Association, an Honorary Aide-de-Camp to the Governor General of Canada, an Honorary Governor of the Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, and a Member of the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament to the Ambassador for Disarmament. David S. McDonough is the Communications and Programmes Officer at the Royal Canadian Military Institute. Prior to that, he was the Research Officer at the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, funded by the DND Security and Defence Forum Internship Award. He holds a BA (Hons.) from Simon Fraser University and an MA in Political Science from the University of British Columbia, and has had a number of articles published, including in the CIR Working Paper series, the CISS Strategic Datalinks series, SITREP, and International Journal.
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Sunil Ram is a Professor of Military History, Tactics and Land Warfare at American Military University in West Virginia. As a former military advisor to the Saudi Royal Family, including involvement in the 1991 Gulf War and the 1993/4 Yemeni War, he has extensive experience in the Middle East region and has consulted to many of the regional governments. He is an internationally acknowledged expert in the field of peacekeeping, military affairs, and the Middle East, and appears regularly in the national and international media. Prof. Ram has also served in the Canadian Forces as both a soldier and officer between 1980 and 1999, and is an active member of a number of Canadian think tanks. Colonel Alain Tremblay is a Special Project Officer at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), Land Staff. He is the former Task Force Commander for all Canadian military personnel deployed in Afghanistan under Operation Athena, and has been previously posted in National Defence Operations Centre; as a military advisor to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, in the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Group; and the Canadian Forces Recruitment Group in July 2001.

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THE NEW WORLD OF ROBUST INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:

What Roles for NATO and Canada?

RCMI RESEARCH PROCEEDINGS

ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

Joint Research Conference 2004

THE NEW WORLD OF ROBUST INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:

Edited by Brian S. MacDonald David S. McDonough

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

UA646.5.C3N49 2005 902831-9

Cover design by Atlantic Council of Canada, with David S. McDonough

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RMA SACEUR SFOR SHAPE SWAT TFK UAV UN UNPROFOR WMD

MATTHEW GAASENBEEK III

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THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

THE SEARCH STABILITY IN

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MULTILATERAL STABILITY OPERATIONS: AN AMERICAN VIEW

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LEARNING BY DOING: CANADA, NATO AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

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Figure 1: Afghanistan in comparison to Canada

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Figure 3: Regional Commands in Afghanistan.

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Figure 4: The International Community and Security Sector Reform (SSR)

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Figure 5: An area photo of the CFs Camp Julian.

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THE UNITED KINGDOMS EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN