Megawati and Radical Islamism

Moch Nur Ichwan (IIAS, Leiden/IAIN Sunan Kalijaga)

Paper written for the Third International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS-3) Raffles City Convention Centre, Swisstel, The Stamford Singapore, 19 - 22 August 2003

Megawati and Radical Islamism

Moch Nur Ichwan Their numbers are few, but they could become a pebble in the shoe of the government. --Megawati Soekarnoputri

The horrific terrorist attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 2001 have changed the world order. According to George W. Bush, the world was then divided in two: with us/US or against us/US. The United States waged the global war against terrorism. Megawati Soekarnoputri was the first leader of a Muslim country to visit the United States after the attacks and expressed the support of Indonesia in the US-led war against terrorism. She said that Indonesia strongly condemns terrorism in all of its forms and manifestations and that Indonesia is ready to cooperate with the US and other civilized countries on counter-terrorism and pledged to cooperate with the international community in combating terrorism.1 This paper analyzes Indonesian state discourses on radical Islamism under Megawati Soekarnoputris administration, and their impact on Islamist political discourse in post-New Order Indonesia.

Weak State, Radical Islamism and New Public Sphere

The state oppressive discourse of Islamism in the 1980s was followed by a more tolerant discourse in the 1990s, especially since the establishment of ICMI in 1990. Soehartos cabinet became the so- called green cabinet (kabinet hijau royo-royo), and the parliament green Peoples House of Representative (DPR hijau royo-royo). Hijau royo-royo in this context means fully Islamized. This is due to the fact that
1

The statements were made by President Megawati Soekarnoputri in her address at the gala dinner in Washington DC, held by the United States-Indonesia Society, 19 September 2001. The Jakarta Post, 21 September 2001.

most of the ministries and members of the parliament were ICMI members. A number of governmental lite later joined ICMI either in national or local level. Mosques or mushallas were established in almost each governmental office. More Islamized activities were done. During the Ramadan month, for instance, some ministries and local governmental official conducted the so-called safari Ramadan; and both Ministry of Education and Ministry Religious Affairs obliged the state public and Islamic schools to organize pesantren kilat Ramadan. The political Hajj to Mecca became a new phenomenon among the government elite, especially after Soehartos hajj in 1991. Olivier Roy called this phenomenon conservative Islamization.2

The impact of this policy was tremendous. Unlike in the pre-1990s era, the government did not police and control the Islamic teaching circles ( halaqahs) established in almost all secular universities. These circles were established by and for students by inviting Islamic preachers. The circles were a-political and aimed at satisfying the students religious hunger due to their lack of religious Islamic knowledge gained in previous education. Religious preachers with Middle Eastern background were commonly preferred to those of pesantren, IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies) or Western background. This was related to their search for authenticity: Middle Eastern Islam was regarded more authentic than other kinds of Islam. They regarded that pesantrens do not teach an authentic Islam because they tolerate and even accommodate local culture. Moreover, for them, IAINs taught only Islam as object of study and not Islam as a comprehensive way of life. They regarded the scholars of the IAIN background as having been secularized, like those who were educated in the West. For this reason, a number of scholars of Middle Eastern background were successful in attracting students religious curiosity. These later converted to become Islamist circles.

The late New Order policy that tolerated Islamist circles to grow resulted in the establishment of Islamist parties and movements in the Reformation order. In the beginnings these halaqahs were a-political and established independently. Yet, when both local and national politics disturbed their interests, they moved to be political and established networks among other local halaqahs. The issue of religion was easily played by some politicians to mobilise them against their
2

Olivier Roy, Changing Patterns among Radical Islamic Movements, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. VI, Issue 1, 1999.

opponents. During the Habibie era, for instance, they were organised for pragmatic political interest to defend his position in power. Habibie was represented as a Muslim leader (pemimpin Islam) that ruled and struggled for the sake of Islam. These organisations, containing networks of halaqahs, later organised themselves as Islamist movements, such as Laskar Jihad, Hizbut Tahrir, Majelis Mujahidin, and empowered the existing Islamist political party, such as PPP, or established their own political parties, such as PBB and Partai Keadilan (Justice Party). All of these Islamist parties and movements later tried to dominate the discourse of Islam by attempting to dominate public sphere and mass media. They brought again the issue of Islam as the state basis into the political discourse.

In his analysis of Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Soeharto Indonesia, Martin van Bruinessen commented on the state position on radical Islamic opposition in Indonesia under four regimes. It is, in this connection, worth quoting him at length:

It has been observed by several scholars that governments of Muslim countries (and perhaps especially the secular governments among them) have often, in order to pre-empt radical Islamic opposition movements, taken policy measures that have served to Islamize the economy, legislation and culture. One might think of Soehartos courting the Islamists as another example in a series of similar accommodations, were it not that Soeharto did not have to fear a strong Islamic opposition movement but rather released such a movement and managed to keep it as his apologists and defenders. Of the post-Soeharto governments, Habibies depended even more on the support of the Islamists than Soeharto did, and it was under him that radical Muslims were given arms and were employed as paramilitary auxiliaries of the police and army. Abdurrahman Wahid had to face these violent radical groups and attempted to bridle them but failed because of his weak control over the armed forces. There was little doubt that the armed groups were sponsored and given free rein by Wahids military and civilian opponents. President Megawati has even less legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim radicals, not only because she is a woman but also because her party is perceived to be dominated by anti-Muslim elements. This has given the conservative Muslim elements in her coalition (represented by vice-president Hamzah Haz) extra leverage, that may result in some Islamizing measures. It has also made her dependent on, if not hostage to, the military. The arrest of Ja`far Umar Thalib in May 2002 and the absence of serious

protests against it suggest that it may well be possible to contain the radical groups but at the cost of the militarys return to power.3

The national crisis that began in 1997 led to the removal from power of the authoritarian Soeharto regime in 1998. But the crisis did not end with the successive regimes of B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and even Megawati Soekarnoputri. As far as the state and Islam are concerned, both the postauthoritarian transitional politics and the long economic crisis had engendered two interrelated developments: first, the weakening of the state and the problematization of almost all statist things; second, the availability of Islam as alternative ideology, especially for Islamist Muslims.

Soon after the collapse of Soeharto regime, Pancasila had been problematized mostly by certain Islamic organizations and groups. Most of the nationalists are the loyal supporters of Pancasila ideology. The Habibie era witnessed the abandoning of the law no. 8 of 1985 concerning the Asas Tunggal, Pancasila as the sole basis of political and mass organisations. Pancasila remain the ideology of the state, but there no longer obligation of political and mass organisations to adopt it as their official ideology. Many Muslim political parties and mass organisations mentioned Islam as the official ideology, some mentioned both Pancasila and Islam.4

The re-emergence of Islamist politics in Indonesian political sphere led to the demystification of Pancasila as Asas Tunggal and the re-emergence of the long suspended discussion of Islamic shariah and the Jakarta Charter. They proposed Islam as state ideology, as in the 1940s and 1950s, and Islamic shariah as state law. They have two main arguments: first, the majority of Indonesian population are Muslims; second, Pancasila ideology, as human-made ideology, is proven incapable of rescuing people from the multi-dimensionaleconomic, political and moralcrises facing Indonesia. Two other important issues in this context were
3

Martin van Bruinessen, Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Soeharto Indonesia, 2002, http.

www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/
4

See Martin van Bruinessen, Islamic state or state Islam? Fifty years of state-Islam relations in Indonesia, in: Ingrid Wessel (ed.), Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Hamburg: AberaVerlag, 1996, pp. 19-34, and Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam. Muslims and democratization in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

the attempt to amend Article 29 on Religion of the 1945 Constitution and the implementation of Shari`a Courts (Mahkamah Syar`iyah) in Aceh. Some Islamic parties proposed to amend the Article on Religion by inserting the seven words of the Jakarta Charter: dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi para pemeluknya (with the obligation for adherents of the faith to carry out Islamic shariah). The proposal was challenged not only by nationalist and Christian parties but also by some other Muslim-based parties. The amendment of the Article on Religion failed.5 The implementation of Shariah Courts (Mahkamah Syar`iyah) in Aceh was based on Presidential Decision no. 11 of 2003, issued on 3 March 2003. The central Indonesian government gave Aceh broad autonomy allowing it, among other things, to implement partial shariah law and have its own shariah police and educational system. But these developments, however interesting, are the subject for a quite separate paper.

Radical Islamic Groups: Local and Transnational

There are radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Laskar Jihad,6 Hizbut Tahrir and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). 7 The other radical movement, which is known by Indonesian Muslims through international media and intelligence reports, is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) a group that is alleged to have connections with al-Qaeda.8 The ignorance of Indonesian Muslims regarding this radical movement (i.e., JI) is due to the fact that they had never seen it in public life. For this reason too, Din Syamsuddin, the secretary of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) and the leader of Muhammadiyah, rejected the existence of this movement. However, gradually they began especially after the Bali blast to believe that this movement really does exist. Unlike FPI, Laskar Jihad, Hizbut Tahrir and MMI that are basically local organizations, JI is transnational and concerned with the international problems. However, by

See Moch. Nur Ichwan, The Seven Word Controversy, IIAS Newsletter #30, March 2003.

On Laskar Jihad, see Hasan, Noorhaidi, Faith and politics: the rise of the Laskar Jihad in the era of transition in Indonesia, Indonesia 73 (2002), 145-169.
7

On various radical Islamic movements, see: International Crisis Group, Indonesia: violence and radical Muslims. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2001; in the context of Jakarta, see: Chaider S. Bamualim et al., Radikalisme agama dan perubahan sosial di DKI Jakarta [Religious radicalism and social change in the Special Region of Jakarta], research report, PBB IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah & Bappeda Pemda DKI Jakarta, 1999/2000.
8

Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, New Delhi, 2002, p. 198; Sidney Jones (e.g., 2002).

contrast, the former are concerned with local problems and opposed to the Indonesian secular government.

Terrorist Attacks: September 11, Bali Blast and JW Marriott

Following the September 11th tragedy, Megawati was soon behind the United States war against terrorism. Cooperation between the US and Indonesia was then established within the framework of a joint counter-terrorism program.9 This effort was received positively by most Indonesians, with the limited exception of those in certain Islamist circles, which are actually quite small in number when compared with the total number of Indonesian Muslims. However, the internal political situation was complicated. For instance, several radical Islamic opposition groups criticized her position; and it seems that, as a result of these domestic political developments, Megawati then softened her support for the United States war against terrorism at least publicly.

The Bali Blast of 12 October 2002 convinced Megawati that terrorism perpetrated in the name of Islam existed in Indonesia. Soon after the bombing, most international media especially CNN pictured Abu Bakar Baasyir and the organization, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which is allegedly connected with Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, as the primary suspects in connection with the bombing. By way of contrast, the Indonesian police and intelligence services were hesitant to present such a judgment. Indonesia did not have an adequate legal framework for dealing with terrorism. Since the abandonment of the Anti-Subversion Law in the era of Reformasi, Indonesia had no law or regulation allowing the police to arrest people based solely on information from intelligence reports. Moreover, it was a common belief in Indonesia even until quite recently that most intelligence reports are unreliable.

It was after the Bali Blast that Megawati issued Governmental Regulation in Lieu of Law no 1 of 2002 on War against Terrorist Crimes and the Presidential
9

The United States and Indonesia are committed to assisting each other in this fight against terrorism by undertaking a long-term security and counter-terrorism program valued at a little over $50 million. Of this amount, about $47 million would be spent to upgrade police capability and about $4 million on military training. http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/press_rel/ factsheet_jkt.html.

Instruction no 4 of 2002 that instructs the Coordinating State Minister of Politics and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to take the necessary steps to implement that Regulation. The latter was given the responsibility to formulate comprehensive and integrated policies to annihilate terrorism and control the implementation of these policies. The government then issued the Law no. 15 and 16 of 2003 on Anti-Terrorism in April 2003. However, the formulation of this Law was problematic for a number of reasons: first, some Muslim groups rejected the US bias of this law, which could be manipulated to annihilate the Islamic opposition groups; second, some others, including some Human Rights organizations, associated its content with the New Order Anti-Subversive Law.10 Eventually the main suspects associated with the Bali Blast Amrozi and Imam Samudra were sentenced to death by the courts. The question of Baasyirs involvement in the blast was not yet settled. However, the latter was brought to court in connection with other charges in connection with alleged plotting of a coup, illegal immigration and the church bombings of 2000. The JW Marriott hotel was attacked by terrorists on 5 August 2003. 11 Most international media associated it with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al-Qaeda. However, Megawatis government was very careful in responding this terrorist attack by not giving comment on the possible suspects. The Indonesian Chief of Police, Dai Bachtiar, merely indicated that the modus operandi of the bombing was similar to that of Bali Blast. Moreover, the Coordinating State Minister of Politics and security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, warned the public not to blame any particular group including JI before the investigation was complete.12 The Minister of Defense, Matori Abdul Djalil, suggested issuing the Internal Security Act (ISA), like that in Singapore and Malaysia. But this suggestion was rejected by most human rights organizations and activists. The latter argued that
10

Imparsial (The Indonesian Human Right Watch), for instance, demanded the amendment of this Anti- Terrorism Law because it contains articles that can easily be manipulated to serve the regimes political interests. Kompas, 5 July 2003.
11

Suspicions of foul play were in part supported by reports circulated primarily on the Internet of events that were said to have occurred prior to the Marriott blast including, for instance, that: 1) The US Embassy cancelled the booking of 10-20 rooms in that hotel. The cancellation was datemarked on 8.00 West Indonesian Time, Tuesday, or only 4.5 hours before the explosion; 2) Jakarta police seized documents in July 2003 showing terrorists were planning an attack in the area around the Marriott Hotel; 3) Hotel bosses said staff and guests had been evacuated before the blast. See , e.g., http://www.freedomfiles.org/war/jakarta.htm. It may be noted that similar reports circulated in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001.
12

Kompas, 13 August 2003.

ISA could be misused and abused by the government to suppress its opponents, including human rights activists.13

Reflections
Why has Megawatis government seemed so slow in responding terrorism? First, since the Soeharto era, Indonesia has witnessed a number of such terrorist attacks, done both by Soehartos opposition groups and by alleged intelligence operations, including that during and soon after Soeharto resignation in May 1998. During the Soeharto era, most of the attacks were not traceable, and only innocent suspects were brought to court. Second, the Indonesian police and intelligence services are weak (and this has been the case even until recently), so that they are not capable of overcoming terrorism. Third, Megawati was aware of the possible politicization of the terrorist issues by some of her opposition groups, especially from certain Islamic parties and groups. There are other factors that might also have influenced Megawatis position. First, some radical Islamic groups are very sensitive when it comes to the issue of terrorism which has long been associated with Islam so that the war against terrorism is perceived as a war against Islam. Second, the interference of foreign states, including the USA and Australia, triggered criticisms among both the people and politicians of Megawatis dependency on those states. They suspected that this interference could not be separated from their political and economic interests in this country.

Unlike the previous governments (Habibies and Abdurrahmans), the closeness of Megawatis government with military forces and the police have given it more power in fighting terrorism. In fact, the latter had good experience in facing radical Islamism during the Soeharto era. They have good relationships with nationalists rather than with Islamic groups (including liberal Islamic groups). That is why, during his presidency, Abdurrahmans order to fight against radicalism was not heard by the military and police elite. In the beginning of the Megawati era, radicalism was actually given more room to articulate its ideological discourse and activities.

13

Kedaulatan Rakyat, 14 August 2003.

The question faced by Megawati and indeed by other governments is whether radicalism should be fought even it does not bring about any terror. Soeharto, especially before the 1990s, answered positively. But Megawati as well as Habibie and Abdurrahman responded negatively, because not all radical movements or organizations lead to violence and terror. Some Islamic radical movements even condemned terrorism, including the attacks of September 11th, the Bali Blast and the JW Marriott terrorist attacks. They would be crushed only if they provoke others to commit violence and terror, or they do so themselves. Will Megawati adopt Soehartos approach in the war against terrorism? We shall have to wait and see.

To conclude, the move toward radicalization within Islam should be challenged by Muslims themselves, as any effort from external forces would be seen and easily manipulated as an effort against Islam. Moderate and liberal Muslims should articulate and be given wider room in articulating their ideas, even if they are often condemned by the radical groups as being agents of the West. Any terrorist act is an attack on humanity that is strongly condemned by the Quran as fasad (disordered deeds) and as an act against Islam itself. Like others, Muslims should also participate actively in this war against terrorism. Nonetheless, in this radicalIslam centered analysis of terrorism, we should not blind ourselves to the possibility of other more hazardous terrorisms.

Yogyakarta, 18 August 2003

Bibliography Articles and Books Bamualim, Chaider S. et al., Radikalisme agama dan perubahan sosial di DKI Jakarta [Religious radicalism and social change in the Special Region of Jakarta], Jakarta: PBB IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah & Bappeda Pemda DKI Jakarta, 1999/2000. Bruinessen, Martin van, Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Soeharto Indonesia, http: www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/; 2002. Bruinessen, Martin van, Islamic state or state Islam? Fifty years of state-Islam relations in Indonesia, in: Ingrid Wessel (ed.), Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Hamburg: Abera-Verlag, 1996, pp. 19-34. Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al Qaeda, New Delhi, 2002, p. 198; Sidney Jones (e.g., 2002). Hasan, Noorhaidi, Faith and politics: the rise of the Laskar Jihad in the era of transition in Indonesia, Indonesia 73 (2002), pp. 145-169. Hefner, Robert W., Civil Islam. Muslims and democratization in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Ichwan, Moch. Nur, The Seven Word Controversy, IIAS Newsletter 30 (March 2003). International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2001 Roy, Olivier, Changing Patterns among Radical Islamic Movements, Brown Journal of World Affairs 6: 1 (1999). Newspapers and Internets The Jakarta Post Kompas Kedaulatan Rakyat http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/press_rel/factsheet_jkt.html. http://www.freedomfiles.org/war/jakarta.htm.

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