Volume 23, Number 3

Editorial 257 Editorial Research Article 263 Exploratory Evidence for Correlations between Entrained Mental Coherence and Random Physical Systems Essay 273 Scientic Research between Orthodoxy and Anomaly

2009

Stephen E. Braude Dean Radin F. Holmes Atwater Harald Atmanspacher Andreas Sommer Massimo Biondi

Historical Perspectives 299 Tackling TaboosFrom Psychopathia Sexualis to the Materialisation of Dreams: Albert von Schrenck-Notzing (18621929) 323 Marco Levi Bianchini: A Forgotten Italian Supporter of Parapsychology Commentaries 329 Critical Commentary on Ervin Laszlos Paper In Defense of Intuition 330 Comments on Ervin Laszlos In Defense of Intuition 339 Reply to McDaniel and Geisz Letters to the Editor 343 On Duncan MacDougalls Experiment on the Loss of Weight at Death 348 Thematic Analysis of Mediums Experiences 351 Is There Madness in Our Mediumship Methods? A Response to Roxburgh and Roe

Stanley V. McDaniel Steven F. Geisz Ervin Laszlo Carlos S. Alvarado Elizabeth C. Roxburgh Chris A. Roe Adam J. Rock Julie Beischel Gary E. Schwartz Robert Epstein Etzel Cardea Tana Dineen Greg Ealick Richard Conn Henry

Book Reviews 359 The Placebo Response and the Power of Unconscious Healing, by Richard Kradin 363 Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic, by Russell T. Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel 365 Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a Sickness, by Christopher Lane 369 Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness, by Alva No 371 Biocentrism: How Life and Consciousness Are the Keys to Understanding the True Nature of the Universe, by Robert Lanza with Bob Berman 375 Proving Shakespeare: In Ben Jonsons Own Words, by David L. Roper

C. Richard Desper

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381 384 388 390 393

Encounters at Indian Head: The Betty and Barney Hill UFO Abduction Revisited, by Karl Pock and Peter Brookesmith; Captured! The Betty and Barney Hill UFO Experience, by Stanton T. Friedman and Kathleen Marden UFOs and Nukes: Extraordinary Encounters at Nuclear Weapons Sites, by Robert L. Hastings Medical Miracles: Doctors, Saints, and Healing in the Modern World, by Jacalyn Dufn Unbelievable: Investigations into Ghosts, Poltergeists, Telepathy and Other Unseen Phenomena, from the Duke Parapsychology Laboratory, by Stacy Horn The Art of Dying, by Peter Fenwick and Elizabeth Fenwick Life Beyond Death: What Should We Expect?, by David Fontana

Barry Greenwood

John Alexander Michael Grosso Deborah Blum Jeffrey Long Jody Long Michael Sudduth

Journal of Scientic Exploration, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 257261, 2009

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EDITORIAL
The May SSE Conference in Charlottesville, VA was, as Id expected, interesting, informative, and often entertaining. Charlie Tolbert did a superb job of handling the local arrangements; the conference venue was delightful (and Charlie contributed periodic juicy nuggets of information about the campuss rich history); the program was varied and nicely balanced; and there were many opportunities for stimulating conversation, exchange of ideas, and of course reconnecting with old friends, making new acquaintances, and meeting people Ive known only through correspondence. But as I later reected back on the conference, I realized that something troubled me. It concerns some striking differences between an SSE conference and most other scientic or scholarly conferences Ive attended. In particular, in a typical academic or scholarly conference, one can count on speakers sharing a general body of assumptions specic to their eld(s) as well as a general background of knowledge about the history of their discipline and the disciplines key issues and problems. Of course, that wont happen in a group as diverse in its membership as the SSE. One reason, naturally, is that SSE members are drawn from different branches of science (physical, biological, and behavioral) as well as the humanities. And another reason is that what attracts them to the SSE are issues and areas of inquiry that push the received boundaries, or challenge the usual assumptions, of one or more of the familiar scientic or scholarly disciplines. Not surprisingly, this has its good and bad points. The good is that the cross-pollination of an SSE conference (and the JSE, for that matter) works against the insularity to which all of these disciplines are susceptible. It reminds us that concepts arent isolated or isolable entities and that our apparently diverse interests actually have many points of contact. So it encourages healthy communication and exchanges of information, it promotes novel and potentially fruitful collaborations, and it suggests new and sometimes quite daring research agendas. The downside, however, is that speakers at the conference often betray an ignorance of key issues and data bearing on the research the speakers are presenting. Thats not surprising, of course, because despite their relevance to the research under discussion, those issues and data may fall outside the speakers primary mainstream area of expertise. This sort of thing doesnt happen (or at least Ive never seen it happen) in a mainstream academic or scientic conference. In those cases, conference submissions failing to display the minimal background knowledge expected of a professional in the eld simply dont get accepted. Granted, it would be unreasonable to expect SSE conference presenters to have 257

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a professional-level grasp of all the issues and research bearing on their courageousand typically interdisciplinaryefforts to push the boundaries of scientic knowledge. And one of the virtues of an SSE conference is that presenters have an opportunity to learn precisely what the lacunae are in their broader scientic education. Nevertheless, it remains the case that SSE conference presentations are sometimes (and maybe often) weakened or undermined by these gaps in the presenters background knowledge. And as I listened to the presentations at the May conference, it seemed to me that a number of speakers were simply unaware of two related, general, and very important methodological concerns. The rst has to do with the very possibility of conducting a controlled parapsychology (or remote healing) experiment, and the second concerns well-documented experimenter expectancy effects in behavioral research. The parapsychological problem is straightforward, obvious, and surprisingly neglected. In fact, its neglected (or at least underestimated) even within parapsychology, probably because membership in the community of serious psi researchers is as methodologically and professionally diverse as in the case of the SSE. At any rate, the problem is this. If were taking psychic functioning seriously enough to test for it, that is, even if were treating it simply as a working hypothesis, then were testing phenomena which, by hypothesis, can subvert all conventional experimental controls. For example, in the case of PK (including remote healing) theres no way to determine conclusively whos causally responsible for the result (signicant or insignicant). Its not as if we can go around with a PK meter to detect the presence or absence of PK before the presumed effect is detected. But then for all we know, it may be someone other than the ofcial subject whose PK is causally relevant. For all we know, it could be the experimenter, the onlooker, or worse still, someone we consider remote from the experimental set-up. Moreover, if ESP is possible, and accordingly, if interested outsiders (skeptics and sympathizers) can have psychic access to whats going on, that last scenario farfetched as it might seem to somecant be treated as inherently less plausible than the others. For one thing, theres no reason to think that psychic distance corresponds neatly or at all to physical distance. But more generally, given our considerable level of ignorance as to which psychological or other situational variables are causally relevant, and considering our inability even to track, much less modify, the most likely suspects among them, were in no position to rule out any of these options. Similarly, if ESP occurs, then theres no such thing as a genuinely blind or double-blind ESP experiment. The ordinary control procedures in these tests block only normal or recognized channels of information. So as far as we know, psychic functioning might be sneaky and naughty all or much of the time, and theres really not a damn thing we can do about it. This means that process-oriented experimentation, experimentation in which we try actually to learn something about the phenomena under investigation, may well be a methodological pipedream. Nevertheless (as Jule Eisenbud once noted Eisenbud, 1963, 1992), many psi researchers proceed as though everyone

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connected with a parapsychology experiment will adhere to a kind of absurd gentlemans agreement. They act as if subjects will use only the psychic ability being tested, that they will use that ability only after the experiment has begun (and then only according to their appointed role in the experimental design), and that others (experimenters, judges, onlookers, remote ill-wishers) will use no psi at all to inuence the experimental outcome. But in fact, undertaking a parapsychological experiment is opening a Pandoras box of unidentiable and uncontrollable potential inuences. The most we can hope to do with any degree of condence is something we arguably have already done quite enoughnamely, merely accumulate evidence that something ostensibly paranormal has occurred. And heres where the second issue, concerning experimenter expectancy, enters the picture. The possibility of both uncontrollable telepathic leakage and telepathic inuence might go a long way toward explaining some of the more puzzling evidence for experimenter expectancy effects, that is, evidence that the experimenters expectations concerning research results affects the experimental 1 outcome. For example, in one famous series of tests, experimenters were provided with groups of rats that they were told had been bred to be maze (or Skinnerbox)bright or maze (Skinnerbox)dull, and the experimenters believed that their tests were designed to conrm the success of this selective breeding. But in fact, that was false; the rats hadnt been selectively bred for their dullness or brightness. On the contrary, the groups of rats assigned to the different experimenters were selected so as to minimize differences between them, and which groups were to be labeled dull or bright was decided randomly. Nevertheless, the rats believed by their experimenters to be bright outperformed those believed to be dull. Another study compared the performance of brain-lesioned rats to that of rats who received only a sham surgery in which the skull was cut through without damaging brain tissue. The rats were labeled as either lesioned or nonlesioned. But randomly, some of the really lesioned rats were labeled accurately and some were falsely labeled as nonlesioned. Similarly, some of the unlesioned rats were randomly and falsely labeled as lesioned. The results again clearly indicated the effect of experimenter expectancy. In the case of genuinely lesioned rats, those mislabeled as nonlesioned outperformed those labeled as lesioned. And for the genuinely unlesioned rats, the correctly labeled rats outperformed those falsely labeled as lesioned (Burnham, 1966). Rosenthal and Rubin clearly appreciated the importance of this. They noted,
if investigators interested in the effects of brain lesions on discrimination learning had conducted the usual two-group experiment without keeping the experimenters blind to treatment condition, the results would have been seriously misleading. (Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978: 384)

And more generally, they observe,

For investigators interested in assessing, for their own specic area of research, the likelihood and magnitude of expectancy effects, there appears to be no fully adequate substitute for the employment of expectancy control group designs. (Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978: 384)

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Not all expectancy effects noted in the literature are as potentially exotic as these. Needless to say, its an open question how the experimenters expectations were conveyed to (or otherwise inuenced) the rats. (And obviously, if appealing to psychic interactions is one of our explanatory options, then were again faced with the Pandoras box noted earlier.) At any rate, its reasonable to think that some observed expectancy effects will be explainable in terms of relatively mundane interactions between experimenters and subjects. But whether the processes involved are ordinary or exotic, the literature on these effects should be required reading for anomalies researchers conducting formal experiments, as should Rupert Sheldrakes JSE paper on the almost shocking neglect of blind methodologies in most scientic disciplines.2 All scientists, and anomalies researchers in particular, must assume that their interests or expectations might be causally relevant to their experimental outcomes. They certainly cant pretend that, as experimenters, theyre merely neutral participants in an objective search for scientic knowledge. The only truly emotionally or conceptually neutral scientist is a dead one. Like everyone else, scientists are teeming cauldrons of interests, fears, and grubby predispositions. To some extent these are part of our everyday psychological baggage, and to some extent theyre connected intimately and inextricably with the specic research in which the scientists are involved. So its naive to think that the experimental results reported at SSE conferences can be presented as if the experimenters and others intentions, expectations, and interests arent a potentially crucial component of the underlying causal nexus. Im pleased to announce yet another addition to my team of Associate Editors: Michael Ibison. Michael is a senior research physicist at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Austin, and a former member of the PEAR Lab at Princeton. His scientic expertise and familiarity with the data and methods in parapsychology will be obvious assets in this role. Welcome aboard, Michael. Notes
1

Ive discussed the so-called Rosenthal Effect more fully in Braude, 2002. See also Martin, 1977. For the data, the essential sources are Rosenthal, 1976, 1977; Rosenthal and Rubin, 1978. Sheldrake, 1998.

References
Braude, S. E. (2002). ESP and Psychokinesis: A Philosophical Examination (Revised Edition). Parkland, FL: Brown Walker Press. Burnham, J. R. (1966). Experimenter bias and lesion labeling. Unpublished manuscript, Purdue University. Eisenbud, J. (1963). Psi and the nature of things. International Journal of Parapsychology, 5, 245 269. Eisenbud, J. (1992). Parapsychology and the Unconscious. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books.

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Martin, M. (1977). The philosophical importance of the Rosenthal effect. Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior, 7, 8197. Rosenthal, R. (1976). Experimenter Effects in Behavioral Research (Enlarged ed.). New York: Irvington. Rosenthal, R. (1977). Biasing effects of experimenters. et cetera, 34, 253264. Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. (1978). Interpersonal expectancy effects: The rst 345 studies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(3), 377415. Sheldrake, R. (1998). Experimenter effects in scientic research: How widely are they neglected? Journal of Scientic Exploration, 12, 7378.

Journal of Scientic Exploration, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 263272, 2009

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RESEARCH

Exploratory Evidence for Correlations between Entrained Mental Coherence and Random Physical Systems
DEAN RADIN
Institute of Noetic Sciences Petaluma, CA 94952-9524 e-mail: dean@noetic.org

F. HOLMES ATWATER
The Monroe Institute Faber, VA 22938

AbstractAn experiment tested whether mental coherence entrained in groups would affect sequences of data generated by truly random number generators (RNGs) in the vicinity of those groups. Coherence was entrained by having groups listen to a prescribed series of binaural beat rhythms during a 6-day workshop. Two RNGs based on electronic noise and one on radioactive decay latencies were located in the building where the workshops took place. Random data were continually collected from these RNGs during 14 workshops. As controls, the same RNGs generated data in the same locations and times but during 8 weeks when no workshops took place. Other RNGs in two distant locations were run as additional controls. An exploratory hypothesis predicted that uctuations in entrained mental coherence associated with the workshop activities would modulate the random data recorded during the workshops. This was predicted to result in positive correlations between random data streams collected from one workshop to the next. Results showed that during the workshops the overall correlation was positive, as predicted (p = .008); during control periods the same RNGs produced chance results (p = .74). Random data generated in distant locations also produced results consistent with chance. Keywords: eld consciousnessrandom number generatorRNGmindmatter interaction

Introduction Field consciousness experiments study a hypothesized mind-matter interaction (MMI) effect associated with the presence of mental coherence in groups (Nelson et al., 1996, 1998; Radin, 1997, 2006). This idea refers to a felt sense when individual thoughts and actions seem to merge into a single group thought or action. A qualitative sense of coherence or ow is often reported during meaningful religious rituals, emotionally stirring speeches, and team sports 263

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(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1997). At such times the attention of the participants seemingly locks onto the same wavelength, and individuals often report a subjective shift. The MMI hypothesis proposes that such felt shifts are associated with physical changes in the local environment, i.e., that when the mind side of a postulated MMI relationship becomes unusually coherent or ordered, then the matter side also becomes more coherent or orderly. This idea predicts that if mental coherence uctuates from high to low according to a prescribed plan, and that sequence of uctuations is repeated, say N times, then random data streams continuously recorded during those N periods ought to positively correlate with each other because they should have been modulated by mind in approximately the same way. This prediction was tested in the present experiment. To detect the proposed effect, measurements of a suitable physical system are required. Truly random number generators (RNGs) have been used for this purpose because they are physical systems designed to produce maximum entropy, and as such, if negentropic or unexpected periods of order appear, they can be detected in a straightforward statistical manner. In random samples of, say, 200 successive bits, order is postulated to appear either as more 0s or more 1s than one would expect by chance. The statistic most often used to measure this type of order is a shift in sample variance rather than a shift in the mean, because an excess of either 0s or 1s represents forms of statistical order. Note that variance here refers to the distribution of samples, and not to how bits are distributed within samples. That is, the MMI hypothesis predicts that, say, a histogram created out of samples of 200 random bits each, which would ordinarily resemble a binominal distribution, would instead have too many samples in the tails of that distribution. It is the variance of such a distribution that is predicted to be larger than expected by theoretical chance, or as compared with the variance of an empirical control distribution, when modulated by coherent mind. Previous eld consciousness experiments have yet to be evaluated via formal meta-analysis, but the preponderance of evidence provided by previous studies seems to support the existence of an MMI effect. Variation in outcomes across studies is undoubtedly due to differences among groups, contexts, and environments, but some of that variance is also due to uncertainties involved in inferring if and when mental coherence arises. One purpose of the present experiment was to explore whether a more reliable MMI effect could be obtained if mental coherence was specically generated, rather than inferred by context or subjective reports. The coherence-stimulating technique used in this study involved the use of binaural-beat audio tones known as Hemi-Sync. The term binaural-beat refers to a method in which one tone at, say, 400 Hz is played in one ear while another tone at, say, 406 Hz is played in the other ear. These two pure tones are heard along with a subjective beat frequency, or warbling tone, generated by overlapping circuits in the brains audio cortex (Atwater, 2001; Kuwada et al., 1979; Lane et al., 1998; Oster, 1973).

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The beat frequency acts to entrain the brains endogenous rhythms; in this example the binaural-beat would tend to promote a theta rhythm at 6 Hz. Hemi-Sync audio programs combine this binaural-beat technique with standard relaxation techniques, including reduced environmental stimulation, controlled breathing, guided afrmations, and visualization. The audio programs are offered in varieties designed to promote relaxation, meditation, creativity, etc., as well as to facilitate exploration of expanded states of consciousness (Atwater, 1997). During the 6-day workshops known as the Gateway Voyage, developed by The Monroe Institute, groups of 20 to 25 people simultaneously listen to a prescribed sequence of Hemi-Sync programs presented over headphones,1 with each person in a private listening chamber. We anticipated that these group entrainment periods would generate periods of collective mental coherence, similar to the group mind evoked by participating in a drumming ceremony. After listening to a Hemi-Sync program for about 45 minutes, Gateway Voyage groups reassemble and discuss their experiences. This listening-discussing cycle is repeated throughout the day for up to 6 hours a day, and each day of the workshop follows a planned schedule for audio programs, breaks, meals, etc. A second purpose of this experiment was to explore an implication of the MMI hypothesis, namely that uctuations in group coherence ought to be correlated with uctuations in randomness. The Gateway Voyage program was particularly useful in testing this idea because the workshops always began at the same time on the rst day, and then presented the same sequence of Hemi-Sync audio programs at the same time of day, over the next 6 days. If group coherence increased while listening to the programs and declined during breaks, meals, and while sleeping, then similar variations should appear in the random data from one workshop to the next. To test this idea, all cross-correlations between random data collected in repeated workshops were calculated, and we predicted that overall the grand cross-correlation would be positive. By contrast, data collected from the same RNGs in the same locations, starting at the same time and also running continuously for 6 days, but with no workshops taking place, were predicted to not show any systematic cross-correlations. This design was conceptually similar to a previous correlational study by Radin (1997: 168), which examined uctuations in group coherence associated with the inferred mental focus of tens of millions of television viewers watching programs on the four major television channels during an ordinary evening broadcast, versus the outputs of three independent RNGs. That study predicted, and found, a positive correlation (p < .01). It should be noted that the correlation analysis reported here was not preplanned. This analysis was devised in response to referees comments on an earlier draft of this article. The original analysis followed procedures used in previously reported eld consciousness studies, namely to examine shifts in sample variance. Because we planned to collect massive amounts of data, which in turn would provide exceptional statistical power, we knew that if the RNG outputs showed even miniscule deviations from theoretical expectation, then we might

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end up with strong, but spurious, statistical outcomes. So we planned to use the data collected during control weeks to allow for statistics based on empirical means and standard deviations rather than theoretical expectations. The results of that analysis for all RNGs collected near the workshop was a deviation in sample variance associated with a combined Stouffer Z = 3.17 (p = .0007, one-tailed). For RNGs generating data at the same time, but in locations distant from the workshop, the results were associated with Stouffer Z = 3.10 (p = .002, twotailed, as no directional prediction was made for the remote RNGs). The results for RNGs located at the workshop were heavily inuenced by the outcome of the Geiger-counterbased RNG, which resulted in z = 4.45 (p = .000004). The referees felt that the strong deviation observed in an RNG not previously vetted in eld-consciousness studies, combined with unexpectedly strong negative results in the remote RNGs, cast the experimental outcome in doubt. In response to such comments, we developed an alternative (and thus post hoc) analytical way to test the MMI hypothesis without relying on deviations from chance expectation in individual RNG outputs. Methods Design RNGs generate sequences of truly random bits, 0s and 1s, that are independent and identically distributed with p0 = p1 = .5. The two electronic RNGs employed in this experiment had been used extensively in previous MMI research.2,3 The third, a Geiger-counterbased RNG, had also been used in a eld consciousness experiment (Radin et al., 2004). Randomness in one electronic RNG, the Mindsong, was based on electronic noise in a eld effect transistor. In the Orion RNG randomness was based on quantum tunneling effects in two independent analog Zener diodes. The Aware Electronics RM-60 randomness comes from unpredictable latencies associated 4 with emission of radioactive particles. In this experiment, the source of such particles was thorium from a Coleman lantern mantel. All of these devices generate sequences of truly random bits by accessing the fastest moving bit in a clock when a random event is detected. Because computer CPU clocks today commonly run at GHz rates, and random events are generated at much slower rates (typically 10 KHz or less), samples of random bits produced by these devices conform closely to theoretical expectation. The outputs of both the Orion and the RM-60 have passed Marsaglias Diehard suite of tests, which is one of 5 the gold standard tests for randomness. The Mindsong produces distributions of bits with a mean value close to theoretical expectation, but with a slightly elevated sample variance.6 All of the Gateway Voyage workshops took place in the Nancy Penn Center (NPC) at The Monroe Institute. During a few workshops we ran just the Mindsong RNG, in others we ran just the Orion, and in still others we ran all three

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RNGs simultaneously. We also ran RNGs in two distant locations while the workshops were underway. One was located in a laboratory about a tenth of a mile from the NPC, and the other was located about a mile away in a building called the Roberts Mountain Retreat (RMR). The distant RNGs were in quiet locations away from human activity and the workshop participants did not know of their existence. A few members of the workshops did know that one or more RNGs were running in the NPC location, but it was hidden and no feedback was provided about its output either during or after the workshop. To provide control data, the same RNGs were also run continuously during weeks when no workshops were taking place. Data from the electronic RNGs were acquired using custom Windows-based software that recorded all generated bits.7 This included 7600 bits per second from the Orion and 2600 bits per second from the Mindsong. Data from the RM-60 RNG were acquired using Windows-based software provided by Aware Electronics.8 Participants Each workshop consisted of about 20 men and women with an average age of 48 years (range, 1677 years). Approximately 52% of participants were male, 78% were from the USA and Canada, and the others were mostly from Europe. A wide range of professions were represented; 92% had at least some college education. Analysis The basic datum was the sample, dened as 200 contiguous random bits. All non-overlapping samples generated by each RNG were used in this analysis. In the case of the Mindsong and Orion, both devices were connected to a computer via a serial port and bits were generated at predictable times according to a 9 xed baud rate. In the case of the RM-60, bits were generated depending on when radiation hits were recorded, and so samples were not stored at a predictable rate. Regardless of source, each 200-bit sample was rst transformed into a standard z score as z = (x - )/, where x was the sum of 1s in the 200-bit sample, was the theoretical mean (100), and was the theoretical standard deviation 50 . Each z score was squared, and then the sum of 60 successive z2 values was calculated, representing all bits collected in 1 minute of data collection for the Mindsong and Orion. In the case of the RM-60, the sum of 300 successive z2 scores was calculated, representing roughly 2 minutes of data collection. These sums, which were chi-square distributed, were transformed back into a z score as x = 2 z 2 - 2df -1 (Guilford & Fruchter, 1973: 517), where df refers to 2 10 degrees of freedom, which was the number of summed z scores. These nal z scores are convenient measures of sample variance. If z is positive it means the distribution of samples is wider than expected by chance, and if negative the distribution is thinner.

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The MMI hypothesis predicts that the cross-correlations of these z scores from one workshop to the next would be signicantly positive for the RNGs located in the NPC during the workshops. The same analytical procedure applied to the same RNGs run during weeks when no workshops were taking place should be consistent with chance. If the eld consciousness effect extended to distant locations, then a positive correlation might also appear among RNGs running at a distance from the workshop, and no such correlation should appear when no workshops were taking place. A Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 program was used to reduce the raw binary data from the two electronic RNGs into 1-minute z values and approximately 2minute z samples from the RM-60 data. Those data were then analyzed in Matlab (v. R2007) using a randomized permutation analysis based on the following steps: a. Data from the electronic RNGs were formed into a matrix, Me, in which the rows were the z samples and the columns corresponded to data from separate workshops. A similar matrix, Mr, was formed for the radiation-based RNGs. b. All correlations between unique pairs of columns were calculated. With 2 Nc columns in a given matrix, this resulted in (Nc - Nc) correlations for each matrix. c. The number of cross-correlations greater than zero was determined separately for the electronic RNGs and the radiation RNGs, and then summed (call this n). This simple, nonparametric measure was used to avoid any assumptions about the distribution of the cross-correlations. d. The order of samples in each column in Me and Mr was randomly scrambled. e. Steps b through d were repeated 10,000 times to build up a distribution of possible values for n (call these permuted values nr). The number of times that nr > n was counted (call this number count). f. The p-value used to test the hypothesis was then p = count/10,000. The hypothesis predicted that p would be signicant for RNG data collected during the workshops and consistent with chance for data collected by the same RNGs when no workshops were taking place. Results Between April 2003 and December 2006, experimental data were collected in one to three RNGs run simultaneously during 14 separate workshops. The same RNGs were run during 8 weeks when no workshops were taking place to provide control data, and additional RNGs were run in two distant locations during both workshops and in control periods. All together, this resulted in a total of 100 six-day experimental and control recording sessions, during which some 143 billion random bits were collected. Data collected are summarized in Table 1.

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TABLE 1 Summary of Data Collected in the Experiment in the Various Locations and Conditions Nancy Penn Center Mindsong Nancy Penn Center Orion Nancy Penn Center RM-60

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Roberts Mountain Laboratory Laboratory Retreat RM-60 Mindsong Mindsong

Weeks of control data 6 6 7 6 7 8 Weeks of experimental data 14 8 7 7 11 13 Trials = samples/minute 789 2284 300 300 789 789 Bits/second 2630 7613 545 584 2630 2630 Bits/sample 200 200 200 200 200 200 Bits/trial 157,800 456,780 60,000 60,000 157,800 157,800 Control trials 51,798 60,461 32,984 26,974 60,438 69,120 Experimental trials 120,862 60,461 32,984 35,336 94,974 112,320 Total control bits 8.2 billion 27.6 billion 1.98 billion 1.62 billion 9.5 billion 10.9 billion Total experimental bits 19.1 billion 27.6 billion 1.98 billion 2.12 billion 14.9 billion 17.7 billion Note: For the RM-60 radiation-based RNG the bit rate was not xed, and so rather than a trial dened as a specied number of samples per minute, it was dened as a xed number of samples (300).

There were 22 data sets of electronic RNG data collected in the NPC and 7 data sets of radiation-based RNG data. Together this resulted in 462 + 42 = 504 crosscorrelations. By chance we would expect to nd 504/2 = 252 positive correlations; the mean number determined by the permutation analysis was 251.96 (see Figure 1). The observed number of positive correlations was 290; this was exceeded 80 times in 10,000 permutations, so p = .008. The same analytical approach was then applied to the same RNGs in the same locations, but during weeks when no workshops were taking place. In this case there were 174 crosscorrelations, the mean number of positive correlations was expected by chance to be 87, and the permuted mean was found to be 87.08. The observed number of positive correlations in the actual data was 80, and the permutation-based p-value was p = .74. Data collected in the distant RNGs resulted in outcomes consistent with chance. During the workshops in the laboratory location the permutation-determined p-value, combined across electronic and radiation-based RNGs, was p = .93 (one-tailed), and during no-workshop control periods, p = .65. For the RNG in the RMR location, during the workshop p = .36 and during the control periods, p = .42. Discussion In accordance with the eld consciousness hypothesis, random data generated by three RNGs run during workshops and in proximity to the participants showed signicant cross-correlations across multiple workshops. Data generated by the same RNGs run at distant locations and at different times did not.

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Fig. 1.

Distribution of the number (of 504 possible) of positive cross-correlations in RNG outputs based on 10,000 randomized permutations of the original random data. The arrow points to the number of positive cross-correlations observed in data recorded in the actual experiment. This indicates that the RNG data streams collected during the workshops, and in proximity to the participants, tended to be more similar to one another than would be expected by chance (p = .008, one-tailed).

Environmental Inuences Could the RNGs near the workshops have behaved differently due to the presence of human bodies, or to increased variations in local electrical power, as compared with control periods when the environment was quieter? Such an explanation would require that RNG outputs be sensitive to factors such as electromagnetic or electrostatic elds, temperature, power uctuations, degree of ionizing radiation, and/or physical vibration. Such environmental inuences are implausible explanations because (a) the two electronic RNGs were housed in grounded metal boxes to eliminate most electromagnetic inuences, (b) the devices were designed to resist inuences from electrostatic elds, temperature, power uctuations, and physical vibration, (c) they drew power from the computers regulated power supplies to avoid glitches due to power line uctuations, and (d) the RM-60 radiation RNG responded only to ionizing radiation, the bulk of which was supplied by a sample of radioactive thorium, and in any case, the intensity of radiation was not linked directly to the generation of specic random bits. In addition, all of the RNGs in the NPC were concealed in a central meeting room, so even if participants intended to physically inuence the devices in some way, they did not know where the RNGs were located. Moreover, the electronic

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RNGs employed logical exclusive-or (XOR) ltering on their raw binary outputs (against a counterbalanced sequence of 0s and 1s) to ensure that rst-order biases were eliminated. Through the use of an XOR, even if an RNG catastrophically failed and started to produce sequences of, say, just 0s, the resulting mean of the generated bits would not drop to 0 but would quickly stabilize at 0.5. Glitches or momentary failures of any of the RNGs would have been easily detected because the sample variance would quickly decline to 0. Such radical departures from expectation were not observed in any of the data. Thus, through a combination of physical shielding, hidden locations, and logical design it seems unlikely that mundane environmental factors could account for the observed results. Experimenter Effects Another potential explanation is that these results were not due to a real-time eld consciousness effect per se, but rather to the experimenters intentions. This cannot be ruled out because the second author (F.H.A.) was responsible for the data collection, and he was fully informed about the nature of the experiment. However, F.H.A. was also involved in leading the workshops and data were collected automatically for 6 days without intervention, so it seems unlikely that F.H.A. spent much time consciously intending to inuence the RNGs. Unconscious intentions cannot be ruled out. Another source of possible experimenter effect was the data analyst (the rst author, D.R.). This possibility arises because previous retroactive-PK experiments suggest that future observation of previously recorded random bits can result in signicant deviations from chance expectation, indicating that realtime observation is not necessary in mind-matter interaction effects (Bierman, 1998). This retro-PK effect, analogous to Wheelers delayed-choice experiment in quantum mechanics (Wheeler, 1978), was originally predicted based on a quantum observational theory of mind-matter interactions (Houtkooper, 2002). Its import here is that none of the recorded random bits used in this study were observed until D.R. analyzed them. This means the entire experiment could in principle be interpreted as a large-scale retro-PK experiment. To address this explanation in future studies one might ask analysts with different expectations to independently examine subsets of the data. In conclusion, while post hoc, this studys outcome was consistent with previous reports (Radin, 2002) suggesting that uctuations in mental coherence correlate positively with uctuations in random physical systems. This approach to studying the nature of mind-matter interaction appears to be a fruitful one. Notes
1

Audio was played on a Yamaha Natural Sound HDD/CD Recorder, Model CDR-HD 1300. See http://noosphere.princeton.edu/rdnelson/reg.html for details, as of February 25, 2006.

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4 5 6

8 9

10

The Mindsong RNG is no longer manufactured; the Orion is available from http://www. randomnumbergenerator.nl/, as of February 25, 2006. See Aware Electronics (http://www.aw-el.com/), as of May 19, 2008. See http://www.stat.fsu.edu/pub/diehard/ for the software and description. See http://noosphere.princeton.edu/gcpdata.html#normalizing for a discussion of these RNGs. We thank Paul Bethke for writing the core data acquisition program and adding features to the software based on a design by the rst author. AW-RADW.EXE, see http://www.aw-el.com/win.htm, as accessed on May 19, 2008. Named after the French inventor, Jean-Maurice-Emile Baudot, developer of the rst high-speed telegraph in 1877, which was used throughout the world for over 70 years. This estimate, which is actually a t score with df, quickly approaches z as df increases.

Acknowledgments We would like to thank all the anonymous referees for providing valuable comments on this paper as it progressed through a number of drafts and revisions. References
Atwater, F. H. (1997). Accessing anomalous states of consciousness with a binaural beat technology. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 11, 263274. Atwater, F. H. (2001). Binaural beats and the regulation of arousal levels. Proceedings of the IANS 11th Forum on New Arts and Science. International Association on New Science, Fort Collins, CO. Bierman, D. J. (1998). Do psi phenomena suggest radical dualism? In Hameroff, S. A., Kaszniak, A. W., & Scott, A. C. (Eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II (pp. 709714). The MIT Press. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. Harper & Row. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1997). Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention. HarperPerennial. Guilford, J. P., & Fruchter, B. (1973). Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education (5th ed.). McGraw Hill. Houtkooper, J. M. (2002). Arguing for an observational theory of paranormal phenomena. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 16, 171185. Kuwada, S., Yin, T. C., & Wickesberg, R. E. (1979). Response of cat inferior colliculus neurons to binaural beat stimuli: Possible mechanisms for sound localization. Science, 206, 586588. Lane, J. D., Kasian, S. J., Owens, J. E., & Marsh, G. R. (1998). Binaural auditory beats affect vigilance performance and mood. Physiology & Behaviour, 63, 249252. Nelson, R. D., Bradish, G. J., Dobyns, Y. H., Dunne, B. J., & Jahn, R. G. (1996). FieldREG anomalies in group situations. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 10, 111142. Nelson, R. D., Jahn, R. G., Dunne, B. J., Dobyns, Y. H., & Bradish, G. J. (1998). FieldREG II: Consciousness eld effects: Replications and explorations. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 12, 425454. Oster, G. (1973). Auditory beats in the brain. Scientic American, 229, 94102. Radin, D. I. (1997). The Conscious Universe. San Francisco, CA: HarperOne. Radin, D. I. (2002). Exploring relationships between random physical events and mass human attention: Asking for whom the bell tolls. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 16, 533548. Radin, D. I. (2006). Entangled Minds. Simon & Schuster. Radin, D. I., Taft, R., & Yount, G. (2004). Possible effects of healing intention on cell cultures and truly random events. Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 10, 103112. Wheeler, J. A. (1978). The past and the delayed-choice double-slit experiment. In Marlow, A. R. (Ed.), The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (pp. 948). Academic Press.

Journal of Scientic Exploration, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 273298, 2009

0892-3310/09

ESSAY

Scientic Research between Orthodoxy and Anomaly

HARALD ATMANSPACHER
Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology Wilhelmstrasse 3a, D-79098 Freiburg, Germany e-mail: haa@igpp.de

AbstractScientic research takes place in the eld of tension between accepted coherent knowledge and not-understood, not-integrated fragments: between orthodoxy and anomaly. Orthodox knowledge is characterized by laws and norms which can be conceived formally (deterministic or statistical laws), methodologically (criteria for scientic work), or conceptually (frameworks of thinking, regulative principles). I propose to classify anomalies according to their feasibility of being systematically connected with accepted knowledge. In this way, one can distinguish anomalies at the frontier of our knowledge, interior anomalies surrounded by accepted knowledge, and anomalies in no mans land. I discuss examples which are intended to exemplify essential characteristics of each of these groups. Anomalies are the salt in the soup of science and dissolve where the domain of accepted knowledge extends or deepenseither by being elucidated or by being abolished. Keywords: anomalyknowledgeprogress

Introduction The etymological origin of the term anomaly is the Greek anvmalia, derived from the adjective anvmaloz, irregular. Thus, there is not a direct connection with nomoz, law, nor with the Latin norma, rule, nor with the related term abnormis, deviating from the rule. All this notwithstanding, the meanings of anomalous and abnormal have to some extent merged in the present-day use of the words. But evolving language practices are not always in line with the purity of philological analyses. Moreover, some relationships between anomalies and abnormities are so disentangleable that a unique assignment to this or that meaning is impossible. Since Kuhns (1962) book on The Structure of Scientic Revolutions, both the history and the philosophy of science are hardly conceivable without the notion of an anomaly. In Kuhns parlance, we speak of an anomaly if something cannot be explained in the framework of a given scientic paradigm. Because the notion of an anomaly is therefore always dened relative to a paradigm, we mustto begin withsay more about what is to be understood by a paradigm, and what Kuhn himself understood by it.1 273

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Kuhns own usage of the notion of a paradigm changed several times. Originally he referred, without further specications, to concrete problem solutions accepted by the world of experts. Later, in The Structure of Scientic Revolutions, the term received more global signicance, indicating essentially all knowledge about which there was agreement in science. In the 1970s Kuhn started to characterize a paradigm as a disciplinary matrix, a hallmark of mature science, while concrete problem solutions were redened as sample examples (also paradigms in a narrower sense). In 1995 he admitted in an interview that Paradigm was a perfectly good word until I messed it up (Kuhn, 2000: 298). What Kuhn wanted to characterize as a paradigm was later, after his early work, renamed in a number of different ways, such as scientic research program (Lakatos, 1978) or established body of knowledge (Elkana, 1981). They all agree by accepting a kind of textbook knowledge as a reference which is understood as a basis for scientic research at a given epoch and in a specic discipline. The notion of orthodoxy, often used in this context, expresses this as the combination of the Greek words orhoz, correct, and doja, teaching.2 In brief, research between orthodoxy and anomaly addresses the tension between accepted knowledge and what happens to be not (yet) included in it. This formulation is certainly quite simplied. Its detailed analysis requires two important questions (among others) to be discussed in depth: (1) What is the categorial relation between anomalies and accepted knowledge? (2) How can it be judged whether or not an anomaly is even accepted as an anomaly? (1) Scientic knowledge is constituted by the two realms of theories and empirical facts that mutually complement one another. In many cases, theories are conceived as compact formalizations permitting the description and prediction of large amounts of empirical facts. Insofar as theories rest on sufciently fundamental principles, exceeding merely algorithmic reformulations, they are deliberately said to explain empirical observations. The residuum that deviates from accepted knowledge, that is not assimilated and thus cannot be described or predicted by it, is a candidate for an anomaly. Such candidates are mostly empirical facts in front of the background of theoretical knowledge. However, there are also examples for theoretical approaches (to be discussed below), which can be called anomalous in this sense. (2) Not every measured result that somehow does not t qualies as an anomaly. Trivial measurement errors are likely to vanish unpublished rather than spread around as big news. Before an observed irregularity catches the attention of the experts in a eld, it has usually passed a series of lters delineating it against possible conventional explanations. These can be inuences due to allegedly irrelevant noise (so-called dirt effects), supercial or corrupted statistical analyses, inadequate experimental design, overlooked explanatory alternatives (so-called loopholes in the interpretation of measurements), or simply premature conclusions. A shift of paradigm or a scientic revolution, according to Kuhni.e., a substantial alteration of the accepted body of knowledge at a given timemay occur

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if the signicance and evidence of an anomaly is regarded as so high that it starts to exert pressure onto representatives of accepted knowledge. If this happens, indications of crisis and instability arisefor instance, uctuations become stronger and even dominant: Intense controversies about alternatives and options increase in the same way as the stubbornness and irreconcilability of opinion leaders and representatives concerned increases. It is not the rule, however, that a body of knowledge changes under the pressure of an anomaly to such an extent that its successor becomes effectively incompatible or incommensurable with its predecessor. At least in the natural sciences many examples demonstrate that one tries to implement extensions or renements in such a way that they both integrate new results and conserve existing knowledge proven of value. This transition can often be formulated in a precise manner, 3 thus rendering the shift less dramatic than a revolution. Changes between fundamentally incommensurable paradigms, as intended by Kuhn, are special cases and typically characterize (always from a retrospective point of view) particular aberrations or the return from them, respectively (compare, e.g., topics such as phlogiston or ether). Orthodoxy: Laws and Rules In order to identify anomalies against the background of a paradigm, let me rst address some points that can serve to characterize a paradigm. Primarily these are (a) formal theoretical kinds of lawfulness, (b) methodological rules, and (c) established styles or frameworks of thinking. Formal Theoretical Laws Examples of kinds of theoretical lawfulness are, e.g., so-called natural laws of physics, such as Maxwells equations for electrodynamics and the Schrdinger equation in quantum mechanics, or so-called phenomenological laws, such as in electrical engineering or thermodynamics.4 In contrast to these strictly deterministic laws, there are also statistical laws, for instance, the probability distribution of properties of particles in a many-particle system, the Boltzmann distribution for the population numbers in excited states of atoms and molecules, and the law according to which radioactive substances decay. The detection of an anomaly is, once the trivial variants listed above are excluded, least difcult if it violates deterministic laws: an electron moving toward the cathode rather than the anode, a levitating stone that does not fall to the ground, etc. So far, there is no convincing evidence for phenomena like this in 5 the framework of the presently established criteria for scientic work. Important for such evidence would be the repeated measurement of a property of the phenomenon with an (unavoidable) measurement error signicantly smaller than the deviation from the value that is consistent with the respective law. The issue of repeatability will be revisited later in more detail. As far as the measurement error is concerned, we obviously need criteria for what should be

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considered as signicant. Sometimes a multiple of the standard deviation s of the distribution of measured values is used (e.g., 3s). Sometimesand mostly for deviations from statistical lawsthe probability p is given with which the measured value could have been found by chance. This does in turn require an appropriate specication of what is assumed as random, etc. Often, events with probabilities of p < .01 are then already considered as candidates for signicant deviations. Deviations from deterministic laws are relatively easy to state because these laws are based on the assumption that precisely one particular value of the measured property is the correct value. But from physics to chemistry and biology, psychology and sociology the air becomes thin for deterministic laws. In the latter areas one nds (at best) statistical kinds of lawfulness, for which the detection of deviations becomes correspondingly more complicated. The variability of measured values in such complex systems includes, in addition to the measurement error itself, a width of variation originating from the fact that there is not only one correct value but a whole class of them6: reaction times in psychophysical experiments, body sizes of living beings, market indices in economy, and many more. For a proper assessment of the signicance of a deviation, thus, the distribution of both measurement errors and correct values needs to be taken into account. Things become even more complicated if (partly) deterministic factors must be included additionally. However, variation in the sense of a distribution of correct values also arises in the most basic area of physics: quantum mechanics. It has to be emphasized, though, that these values are only generated by measurementthe system state before measurement is, briey speaking, a superposition of all possible states. This superposition is very special insofar as it does not consist of the individual measurement values: a superposition is a holistic system state typical for quantum physics. The transition from the superposition to a measured value of a quantum system differs fundamentally from measurement processes in classical (nonquantum) systems. So-called meta-analyses are attempts to group sets of empirical data (usually taken from the literature) together in such a way that a joint signicance of the joint result can be determined. It is obvious thatin view of the distributions of variations to be consideredthis can be exceptionally difcult and tedious. Eventually, one may have to take into account that the search for anomalies can entail a tendency to not publish results without considerable deviation from the expected. As a consequence, such results do not enter a potential meta-analysis. Estimating a probability distribution of such selection effects (a special case of a composite cause for variation) and its combination with the distribution of variations and errors is a challenge even for experienced statisticians. Methodological Rules In addition to anomalies against the background of deterministic or statistical laws, methodological rules represent important paradigms, often implicitly

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assumed and rarely explicitly pointed out. One of these rules, frequently applied for the formulation of scientic models or theories, is the goal of simplicity: A theory should be as simple as possiblebut not simpler (attributed to Einstein). This means to disregard, to begin with, anything that is only tangential for the subject matter consideredeven if this is needed, at a later stage, to enrich an achieved simple framework with details. A metaphor for this situation is Occams razor, an instrument for the elimination of everything dispensable or irrelevant. This can be best illustrated in elementary areas of physics. Details become increasingly less negligible if systems become more complex. In physics, the ideal of simplicity is connected with the idea of universality. The fundamental laws of physics are assumed to be universally valid, independent of the location or the instant at which the described events occur. In other words: universal laws are formulated as context-free as possible. The myth of theories of everything derives from this conception. In order to solve corresponding equations, however, an explicit implementation of contexts is necessary, for instance in the form of initial conditions or boundary conditions. This amounts de facto to derogating the universality strived for in the rst place. In the last 20 years, starting with an inuential paper by Grassberger (1986), it has become clear that a restriction of the idea of universality is inevitable for the understanding of complex systems. Although it is still useful to look for so-called universality classes in the behavior of such systems, already the denition of complexity expresses a clear dependence on the context of the situation to be addressed. The relation between complexity and randomness plays a central role in this problem. For particular aspects it is useful to characterize the complexity of a system as proportional to the degree of randomness in its behavior. However, from the viewpoint of a statistical description it is often meaningful to consider 7 perfectly random behavior as minimally complex. But there is more to it: in many cases the behavior of complex systems cannot be described as usual in statisticsnamely, applying limit theorems, e.g., the law of large numbers. Essentially this means to assume that a determined distribution of measured values will not change considerably after a sufciently large number, N, of values have been considered, so that the limit for N 2 is already reached approximatively. Complex systems can foil this assumption by switching into dramatic instationarities after long periods of benign behavior. Using limit theorems in such systems always bears the risk of awed results due to intrinsic instabilities. Instabilities can be classied and understood only as statistical ensembles. Laws of motion for individual trajectories of systems in the vicinity of instabilities are outside the scope of contemporary science. Therefore, intrinsically unstable behavior cannot be accessed by deterministic laws. If limit theorems are (often) inapplicable for a statistical analysis of unstable phenomena, they cannot serve as bases for null hypotheses against which anomalies must be delineated. In this case, there is the possibility of investigating the behavior of an observable as a function of N rather than its limit for N 2 and of characterizing the system

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by the quantities obtained this way.8 Anomalies would then be context-dependent in the unconventional sense that they depend on the number N of measurements carried out. The criterion of reproducibility mentioned above obviously rests on stability assumptions as well, and can turn out to be inapplicable as soon as these assumptions are violated. In principle, it would still be conceivable in such a situation that the signicance of a result varies according to certain rules rather than completely erratically. For instance, if there were reasons to expect a decreasing signicance for an increasing number of attempts to replicate a result, this would open up the interesting possibility of interpreting a decreasing signicance as an argument in favor of rather than against the corresponding result. From this perspective, the lacking reproducibility of a number of claimed anomalies could turn out to be the key to their proper understanding! However, it must be clear that, given the present state of the art, these are highly speculative dreams of the future. Conceptual Frameworks Another possible source of paradigms is philosophical positions whose inuence extends as far as to cultural styles of thinking and worldviews as a whole. The 20th century comprises a number of examples in this regard, which illustrate a distinct shift from metaphysical to epistemological points of view. Entirely in the sense of the empirically oriented positivism of the Vienna Circle in the early 20th century, the just-developed quantum theory was interpreted clearly epistemically by Bohr, Heisenberg, and the young Pauli: The dictum of the Copenhagen interpretation, due to Bohr, was that it is wrong to think that the task of physics is to nd out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature (Petersen, 1963). Although this standpoint was not left unopposedEinstein, Schrdinger, and others were convinced that it is the task of science to nd out about nature itselfepistemic, operational attitudes have set the fashion for many discussions in the philosophy of physics (and of science in general) until today. Moreover, epistemically dominated directions have taken over in other disciplines as well. The linguistic turn, often ascribed to the inuence of Wittgenstein in the 1930s and 1940s, is of key signicance in this context. It was rst spelled out explicitly by Rorty (1967) in his anthology The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method. It demands, similarly to Bohrs appeal, that we give up on asking how the world is but, rather, concentrate on how it is described. Philosophy of language becomes a central eld in analytic philosophy. In addition, philosophy of mind together with a conceptually inclined cognitive science (as opposed to experimental psychology) developed as offspring, as it were, of the linguistic turn. The corresponding cognitive turn (Fuller et al., 1989) redirected emphasis from language to cognition, and can be traced to the early cognitivism of Chomsky, Minsky, and Simon. Todays implications of the

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cognitive turn are manifest in the study of consciousness, but also have visible repercussions in literature, theater, and lm. This has recently led to the notion of an iconic turn (Maar & Burda, 2004), based on the idea that our interaction with the world essentially relies on images: classical images in the visual arts and in contemporary media, icons in communications with fellow humans and with computer systems. This series of examples demonstrates how far remote present philosophical and cultural trends are from traditional metaphysics and ontology. It also shows the conjoining massive restriction of the scope of discourse from the quest for the fundamentals of reality to language and cognition and eventually to visualization and its ramications. In the resulting environment, a Cartesian substance dualism or the research programs of 19th century science must appear extremely naive. On the other hand, a narrow focus always makes it likely that important things outside of it are unduly disregarded. A comprehensive and sensible account of reality is palpably unachievable by elaborate studies of visual communication alone. This has led to a situation in which metaphysical questions of natural philosophy are either not regarded at all, or are regarded with great skepticism, or even 9 with a clearly pejorative tone. The similarity to other, purely scientic kinds of anomalies is strikingalthough anomalies in conceptual frameworks are often predominantly coined by the sociology of scientic discourses rather than by scientic results themselves. Kinds of Anomalies Different approaches are conceivable for a systematic classication of anomalies. It seems to be most obvious to distinguish them according to the elds of knowledge in which they appear. This may be a suitable approach for historical examples, which already led to changes in the organization of their respective bodies of knowledge. For anomalies not yet claried, however, this is not always possible in a unique waysome anomalies occur due to questions that cannot be assigned to individual disciplines, some can be assigned to several disciplines, and some appear so digressive that they are not even considered scientically relevant. For these reasons I will follow another approach. It is based on the distinction of various kinds of (potential) connectivity, or distance, to accepted knowledge. Such a discussion is meaningful if the body of accepted knowledge does not consist of a patchwork of disconnected fragments, but rather is organized in a consistent and coherent way. For this to be the case, there are typically two factors to be satised: (1) Equivalence classes of facts are all governed by the same (sets of) laws, which serve their description, explanation, or prediction. (2) Different (sets of) laws are related to one another in a well-dened manner, such that ad hoc modications bear the risk of disrupting a whole system of laws, a theory network.

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According to these two factors, both empirical and theoretical anomalies are possible. Empirical anomalies refer to observations that cannot be described, explained, or predicted by accepted theories, and theoretical anomalies are best characterized by their missing coherent relation to accepted theories. So far, this is all that is meant by a lack of connectivity in a heuristic sense discussed here.10 I am not going to address anomalies for which this notion is used in a purely phenomenological sense, for instance with respect to numerous kinds of medical anomalies mostly characterizing anatomical or functional deformities or malfunctions. Such anomalies are often considered simply as deviations in the sense of variation (see above) and rarely imply the power required for a paradigm shift.11 The same applies to some kinds of anomalies in technology. For instance, computer scientists speak of anomalies due to weaknesses of a data model (insert anomaly, change anomaly, delete anomaly), due to awed software or due to incorrectly implemented tests. Such aberrations can, as a rule, be xed if the underlying mistakes are identied. Refraining from these weak anomalies, let me now turn to those that can be regarded as the salt in the soup of science in a more substantial sense. In the following I will refer to three kinds of anomalies, which are distinguished by their (potential) relation to accepted knowledge, and discuss them with selected examples: (1) anomalies at the frontier of accepted knowledge, to be considered, as it were, as an interface to the terra incognita; (2) anomalies surrounded by accepted knowledge, representing gaps that are hard to close within such knowledge (interior anomalies); and (3) anomalies in no mans land, which are so far remote from accepted knowledge that systematic approaches are hardly conceivable. Anomalies at the Frontier of Science This chapter begins with historical cases of anomalies in physics for which, from the viewpoint of today, it is clear how their incorporation into the state of knowledge of the time being could be achieved: the famous water anomalies, the anomalous Zeeman effect, the anomaly of compounds of noble gases, and anomalies of quantum eld theory. Then I describe two anomalies of astrophysics and cosmology, respectively: the mercury anomaly, resolved within the general theory of relativity, and the Pioneer anomaly, not explained yet. Next, I discuss the area of adaptive mutations and epigenetics, issues of intense research in current molecular biology and genetics. These topics evolved from total heresy to an approved forefront of mainstream research within the remarkably short period of about three decades. Eventually, I turn to an anomaly which is not yet developed as far, but whose distance from accepted knowledge is not devastatingly huge. This anomaly became known as cold fusion, but might more carefully be called excess heat of unknown origin. Discussion regarding this anomaly became inamed in 1989 and created an enormous buzz, mainly because of potential technological and economic consequences. Less emotionally

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analyzed, there are a number of empirical results provoking questions that need to be studied and claried. Of course, these examples do not represent a comprehensive list. For instance, a scientically sound investigation of the problem area of homeopathy could be very deserving. Insofar as homeopathic substances are dissolved in water, this verges on the question of insufciently understood properties of water. The investigation of homeopathy and placebos offers room for research that is connected to established knowledge and allows us to explore new scientic territory.12 History of Physics and Chemistry The history of physics offers numerous phenomena that have played the role of anomalies at the frontiers of knowledge. Their integration into an altered body of knowledge, that was extended by their understanding rather than completely revolutionized, documents the role of anomalies as driving forces for the course of science. Good examples are various forms of water anomalies, many of which are today explained by the pronounced dipole structure of H2O molecules and the 13 associated clustering properties. Accordingly, there are a number of properties with respect to which water behaves differently from what one would expect by extrapolating the same properties of comparable hydrides (H2S, H2Se, H2Te, H2Po) as a function of molecular mass. The hydrogen bonds responsible for the clustering of H2O were for the rst time described by Latimer and Rodebush (1920) on the basis of the theory of atomic structure by Lewis (1916). Some years later, Pauli (1925) published the hypothesis that electrons possess a property, unknown at that time, which was later called spin. The electron spin provides a detailed explanation of the splitting of spectral lines of atoms in strong magnetic elds. While the normal Zeeman effect can be explained by the classically treated orbital angular momentum of electrons alone, the anomalous Zeeman effect requires us to include the non-classical electron spin in addition. In the years of the emerging quantum theory, the anomalous Zeeman effect was one of the rst phenomena to exclusively rely on one of the non-classical features of the theory. The electron spin also turned out to be the key to a comprehensive understanding of the periodic table of the elements. Based on Lewiss valence theory and its further development by Heitler and London, Pauling (1931) succeeded in describing the chemical bond in the light of quantum theory in his seminal paper on the nature of the chemical bond. Although it was considered an unshakable doctrine that noble gases are chemically inert, i.e., do not bind with other elements, Pauling (1933) predicted chemical compounds of heavy noble gases. Bartlett (1962) was the rst to synthesize xenonhexauoroplatinate (XePtF6) as such a compound in the laboratory. Today, noble gas halogenides have important applications, e.g., in excimer lasers. Finally, the notion of an anomaly in quantum eld theory means that the quantization of a classical eld breaks one of its classical symmetries such that classical conservation laws are violated. Again, this is a historical anomaly:

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The framework of the extended theory, here quantum eld theory, explains the disappearance of an anomaly that appears as such only with respect to its historically preceding classical theory, here classical eld theory. This is yet another illustrative example of how anomalies can be regarded as obstacles to be overcome by a suitable consistent extension of the body of knowledge. Anomalies in Astrophysics and Cosmology An often-mentioned example for an anomaly refers to the rotation of the perihelion of the planet Mercury, the point of its orbit that is closest to the sun. This so-called precession was discovered by le Verrier in the mid-19th century. In 100 years, the shift amounts to 572 arcseconds, 529 of which can be explained by the gravitational inuence of the other planets. The remaining 43 arcseconds cannot be understood in terms of Newtonian celestial mechanics. In 1916, Einsteins general theory of relativity predicted an effect of 42.98 arcseconds due to the gravitational eld of the sun, in perfect agreement with the (later) measured value of 43.11 P 0.45 arcseconds. For Venus, Earth, and Mars, the relativistic corrections are 8.6, 3.8, and 1.4 arcseconds, respectively. Another anomaly, so far without accepted explanation, is the so-called Pioneer anomaly, observed with the satellites Pioneer 10 and 11 during their motion out of the solar system. Anderson et al. (1998) found a deceleration of the satellites which is greater than can be explained by the gravitational pull of the solar system alone. Data collected since 1987 give an additional acceleration toward the sun for both Pioneer 10 and 11 of (8.74 P 1.33) x 1010 m/s2. This implies that their increasing distance from the sun is 5000 km per year smaller than it should be. A number of possible explanations of this anomaly are currently discussed, ranging from measurement errors over known unconsidered effects to yet unknown laws of physics. In recent years more and more effects of known physics could be excluded as explanations (see Lmmerzahl et al., 2007). As far as new physics is concerned, theoretical ideas of cosmological relevance are primary candidates. Corresponding approaches are supported by the observation that the unexplained acceleration is approximately the product of the speed of light and the Hubble parameter. Among many proposals, those based on a relation to dark matter or dark energy are considered most interesting, two of the big enigmas of modern astrophysics and cosmology. A planned ESA space mission with the working title Deep Space Gravity Probe might provide insight into some of these questions. An alternative cosmological speculation of earlier origin rests on an approach of Weyl and has recently been investigated by Scholz (2008). It amounts to a decrease of the frequency of photons (tired light) purely conditioned by features of geometry, leading to a redshift not depending on the expansion of the universe. Another variant is the so-called steady-state approach, modied several times so far (see Hoyle et al., 1993). In contrast to the standard big-bang scenario, it predicts non-cosmological redshifts as well. Such effects can, as Arp (1998) has

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argued, appear in the spectrum of extragalactic objects whose distance is too small to explain their different redshifts by space-time expansion. Especially in the areas of astrophysics and cosmology, two relatively young scientic disciplines, there is certainly no nal word spoken yet. There are indirect empirical indications for dark matter and dark energy, but both are hardly understood. It is no risky hypothesis to say that both empirical and theoretical anomalies will keep playing a central role in the search for a coherent cosmological worldview in the future. Adaptive Mutations and Epigenetics A particularly interesting chapter on anomalies is an extremely fast development in the last three decades, changing the reception of research on adaptive mutations and epigenetics from wild superstition to an accepted mainstream of genetics.14 Both topics violate central dogmas of modern neo-Darwinism, a picture that evolved in several steps from Darwin to Dawkins. The rst dogma is that mutations of hereditary material are exclusively random, i.e., not governed by deterministic laws (and not directed toward nal goals). The second dogma is that the inheritance of phenotypic changes cannot occur without corresponding changes of the genotype. Today, both dogmas are considered to be conclusively refuted. However, this state of affairs began with anomalies that were harshly savaged at the time of their publication and mostly ignored by peers and experts. A key example of epigenetics can easily be illustrated with the cross breeding of horse and donkey: equine epigenetics. The offspring of a male horse and a female donkey is a hinny; in the opposite case it is a mule. It has been known for 3000 years that hinnies always have a thicker mane, shorter ears, and stronger legs than mules. The two hybrids are, thus, clearly distinguishable phenotypically, though they are genetically identical. Today it is established that this situation violates Mendels laws. How is it possible that this downright conspicuous observation remained disregarded and unexplained by science for so long? A plausible answer is that only in the second half of the 20th century has the mentioned anomaly gotten close enough toward the evolving frontier of extending accepted knowledge. Today, a number of mechanisms are known which can lead to inheritable phenotypic changes without changes in gene material (methylation, etc.). And it is known that mutations of the genome can massively adapt to environmental stimuli, both in a temporally selective manner (as long as the stimulus acts) and locally along the DNA (where special sequences mutate preferentially). At present there is no doubt that inheritance does strongly depend on environmental inuences. It is still remarkable how hesitantly this overwhelming progress in molecular biology and genetics is being received in the theory of biological evolution. For a long time the problem has been discussed that the evolution of complex living beings such as mammals is extremely unlikely in the framework of neoDarwinian evolution. Although the new insights in genetics would clearly entail answers to this critical question, they are not assimilated yet. One reason why

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adaptive mutations and epigenetics still meet resistance is that they are traditionally linked with Lamarckist or even creationist positions. But they entail neither nal causes nor intelligent designthey can be explained by admittedly complex but eventually transparent scientic mechanisms.15 Excess Heat, Vulgo Cold Fusion In spring 1989 two chemists at the University of Utah (Salt Lake City), Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons, declared at a press conference that they had succeeded in fusing deuterium nuclei to helium-4 using a simple electrolysis gadget with palladium electrodes (Fleischmann & Pons, 1989). As their proof of evidence they reported the measurement of so-called excess heat, which could be explained by neither the contributing chemical reactions nor by defective calorimeters. Since the experiment was carried out at room temperature, this became known as cold fusion (originally proposed as early as in the 1920s). The claimed fusion is cold in comparison with the 107109 degrees Kelvin at which nuclear fusion proceeds in stars or is expected in fusion reactors. The news from Fleischmann and Pons was received with overwhelming response to begin with. But bit by bit it turned out that in a series of further experiments the result of excess heat could not be reproduced. In November 1989 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) organized a meeting to investigate the situation. As a main result of this meeting, it was noted that the arising heat could not be traced back to a nuclear reaction. By and large, this conclusion was reluctantly skeptical, while parts of the scientic community quickly started to talk about fraud, pathological science, etc. The following years brought, in addition to many failed replications, occasional results from laboratories in Japan, Italy, France, and the USA which conrmed the original observation by Fleischmann and Pons. Another review panel of the DOE in 2004 nevertheless did not nd sufciently uncontroversial reasons to recommend this direction of research for comprehensive support by public funding agencies. The most recent development, though, has become cautiously positive again. A review of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in 2007 lists about 10 groups worldwide which measured considerable (50200%) excess heat. A review of the Indian National Institute for Advanced Studies in Bangalore (Srinivasan, 2008) stated unambiguously that there are novel scientic results to be understood. A conservative assessment (Beaudette, 2002) suggests that the excess heat, meanwhile repeatedly observed, should be taken seriously, even if the underlying nuclear processes remain unclear so far. It is currently an open question with regard to what theoretical explanations could look like. There are a number of approaches; the most prominent among them is presumably due to Julian Schwinger (1994), an outstanding theoretical physicist. Schwinger argues that the experiments actually show a deuteriumhydrogen reaction leading to helium-3 rather than helium-4. The released energy is absorbed as phonon energy by an emerging palladium-deuterium lattice.

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Schwingers proposal resolves some interpretational problems and has experimental consequences which, to my knowledge, have not been tested so far. Interior Anomalies The term interior anomaly serves to denote anomalies not located at the frontier of our knowledge, but rather those that represent a white spot on the map of knowledge: an anomaly surrounded by accepted knowledge, but not itself belonging to it. Such a situation can emerge if a problem (i) resists all attempts to be solved, and (ii) does not squarely prohibit further progress. This can imply that corresponding problems disappear out of the focus of research after a while and mutate from white spots to blind spots. If a problem resists solutions for a long time without blocking progress in individual areas of science, it is often a substantial, difcult problem at boundaries between different disciplines which cannot successfully handle it individually. Seriously interdisciplinary approaches, as occasionally developed in recent years, represent a chance for progress in these cases. A rst example in this regard is part of the millennia-old problem of rela16 tionships between mental and material states. This can be understood in a quite general sense, but a specic aspect that has recently seen a renaissance in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience refers to the relation between brain and consciousness. Depending on the disciplinary angle, different types of relations are currently favored. The second example, similarly fundamental, is the unsettled relation between (objective) physical time and (subjective) experienced time. It can also be expressed as the relation between tenseless time and tensed time, pointing to the fact that physical time does not contain tenses such as present, past, or future. What it contains are relations such as smaller or greater (t1 < t2 or t1 > t2), which can be interpreted as earlier or later only within tensed time. The longstanding priority dispute between representatives of the two concepts of time is obviously infertileat present there are interesting ideas of how well-dened relations between them might be derivable. Eventually there is, as a third example, the notion of paradox, which represents a paradigm example of an anomaly in the context of classical two-valued (Boolean) logic. Paradoxes are discussed by philosophers (at least) since Epimenides of Crete, and in Zen Buddhism they do even gure, in the form of koans, as a key instrument of spiritual growth. In the specialized sciences, however, paradoxes were long considered marginal. Today they can be investigated both formally and empirically with available approaches and techniques. These examples for interior anomalies are not purely scientic examples, insofar as they stand out against methodological or philosophical norms in addition to touching scientic issues and raising scientically addressable questions. Some of them have been trivialized (such as in physical-reductionist accounts of the mind-brain problem), some have been mostly neglected (such

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as the problem of paradoxes), but they all show a strong tendency of resisting attempts to stash them away from the research agendas of the contributing disciplines. As all anomalies, they are anomalous relative to a particular historical context. In contrast to other anomalies, however, interior anomalies are predestined to be particularly persistent and pertinacious. Brain and Consciousness One reason for the recent upsurge of the neurosciences is that many regard them as a promising candidate to further our understanding of the human psyche. However, the neurosciences are not concerned with the psyche, with mental states and processes, but with the brain. The brain is usually considered as the material substrate without which mental states would be impossible. For many brain scientists there is no question that this necessary condition is at the same time sufcient: brain science, in this case, would be all we need to understand the psyche. Scrutinizing this position, it becomes quickly clear that such a premature reduction is questionable. There are several variants of relationships between brain and consciousness (e.g., emergence, supervenience), some of which are even favored against strong reduction in present discussion. Remarkably, the mind-brain connection has deed a precise formulation throughout the entire history of science. Even if both brain and psyche were perfectly understood per se, the problem of their mutual relations would not even be touched. David Chalmers (1995) expressed this quite strikingly in terms of the hard problem of consciousness, as the explanatory gap between subjective experience (qualia) and neurobiological states. As ever, there is no convincing solution to this problem. Indeed, a reductive scheme would be attractive because it is so simple regrettably it is (presumably) too cheap or even simply wrong. Currently, there is an increasingly intense discussion of ideas, going back to Spinoza, assuming a psychophysically neutral domain that can be examined from the perspectives of the material and the mental: the so-called dual-aspect models.17 An idea that also receives increasing attention presently is the doctrine of panpsychism (see, e.g., Rosenberg, 2005; Seager & Allen-Hermanson, 2005; Skrbina, 2005; Strawson, 2006), adding a radical accent to dual-aspect models. Its essence is that everything possessing material properties also possesses mental properties. A basic form of mentality (not to be identied with human consciousness) pervades everything that exists. With this premise, the problem of how the mental arises would dissolve, but the price to be paid is high. How could, for instance, the mentality of elementary particles be conceived, and how could it be operationalized? What would be a suitable concept for the domain of which matter and mind are aspects? What gives rise to their mutual correlations? Such questions will certainly engage scientists and philosophers for many years into the far future. It is possible that we do still not have the proper notions today to make progress. It is also possible that false implicit assumptions mislead

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us (for instance, the myth of the causal completeness of the physical). It may even be that the focus of discussion is still too narrow, and it is necessary to include psychosomatics or, even more widely, psychophysical correlations in general. It is to be expected that an anomaly of this degree will remain profoundly tenacious for another while. Physical Time and Experienced Time It could also be that the problem of mind-brain relations is in some way conceptualized too broadly to allow progress in detail. In this sense, an attractive special variant could be to focus on an essential aspect of the psychophysical problem, referring to the tension between (objective) physical time and (subjective) experienced time. Modern concepts of time in the fundamental laws of theoretical physics are distinguished by symmetries (i.e., invariances under transformations), namely the invariance under (i) time translation, (ii) time reversal, and (iii) time scaling.18 This means that (i) there is no distinguished point on the time axis, (ii) there is no distinguished direction of time, and (iii) there is no distinguished intrinsic unit for measurements of time. From (i) follows that there is no notion of the present (nowness), and so there are no past and future. From (ii) follows that each process running forward in time could equally run backward (and vice versa). From (iii) follows that processes in time can be rescaled without changing the process itself. In our experience of time, there is a present, the now, which provides a reference point for introducing the relations earlier and later. On this basis, past and future can be dened and distinguished from each other by facticity and contingency. Thus, symmetries (i) and (ii) are broken. Moreover, there are indications that discrete time quanta of a particular extension are relevant for conscious experience (Pppel, 1997). Similar to material constants in physics, they are given by neurobiological properties and x a time scale, thus violating scale invariance (iii). As a further key difference from physical time, the experienced now is a quale; it has a quality of how it feels to be now, which is not part of physics anyway. At least since McTaggarts essay on the unreality of time (McTaggart, 1908), there is a vivid debate about which of the two concepts of time is more fundamental, why this could be so, and which consequences it might have. More recently, there are speculations about a complementarity of the two concepts, partly worked out in a conceptually appealing and formally demanding way. Publications by 19 Franck (2004) and Primas (2008) can be consulted to catch the ideas. A key point for promising approaches is that physical time and experienced time need to be related to each other in a way that claries the transition from one to the other step by step, in minute detail. One the one hand, such a theoretical project contributes to a specic question of the mind-matter problem. On the other hand, it bears fundamental signicance for our understanding of time. The

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fact that successful research in many areas requiring time concepts has been possible points to a typical feature of interior anomalies. Much work based on the notion of time could be and has been carried out without any basic explanation of the nature of time itself. Paradoxes The notion of a paradox is related to the notion of orthodoxy insofar as both derive from the Greek root doja, teaching. Paradoxes are something that stands para, that is, off the mark or even against accepted knowledge.20 Broadly speaking, the core of a paradox is, thus, a conict between a subject matter and a given (accepted) opinion. In philosophical terminology, the notion of a paradox is applied in a narrower sense. Often one speaks of a (semantic) paradox if the three conditions of (i) inconsistency, (ii) self-reference, and (iii) circularity are satised together (see, e.g., Rescher, 2001, or Sainsbury, 1995, for more detailed accounts). Inconsistency touches the criterion of correctness or truth. For self-reference the criterion of identity is crucial. And circularity has to do with causation (not in a temporal sense, but rather in the logical sense of an implication). Inconsistency alone is not sufcient to make a sentence paradoxical: The earth is a globe and it is no globe is inconsistent, contradicts itself, but is not paradoxical. Self-reference alone is insufcient as well: This sentence consists of six words refers to itself, but is not paradoxical. Also, circularity alone is not sufcient: What came rst, hen or egg? leads to a circular pattern which is not paradoxical. Similarly, combinations of two of the given conditions do not yield a paradox. This sentence is false is the paradigm of a paradoxical proposition, which shows with particular clarity how all three conditions are satised. The logician Blau (2008) has devoted a demanding thousand-pages book to it. This sentence is false contradicts itself by its content, refers to itself, and its (serial) analysis leads to its dissolution into a circular oscillation of true and false. There are syntactic paradoxes (mainly in mathematics), semantic paradoxes (in epistemology, literature), and pragmatic paradoxes (e.g., in applied psychology or spiritual practice).21 It is a crucial point of all paradoxes that they cannot be classied in the framework of a strictly Boolean analysis. Paradoxes undermine some of them in delicate waysthe eitheror of a logic with two denite truth values. In this sense, paradoxes are anomalies for Boolean classication systems. It depends on the kind of paradox considered which extensions of such systems are required for its dissolution. Niels Bohr, one of the pioneers of quantum theory in physics, once said that a deep truth is characterized by the fact that its opposite is a deep truth as well. As is well known, this statement of Bohrs referred to the concept of complementarity that he imported into physics from psychology. In simple words, two

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descriptions are complementary if they contradict each other and, at the same time, are both necessary to describe a situation completely. In this sense, one could try to formulate paradoxes as complementarities which can, as in quantum 22 theory, be formulated by non-Boolean structures. Extensions in the direction of such a non-Boolean analysis enable a coherent discussion of paradoxes. But this requires a radical rethinking that can, particularly for the pragmatic paradoxes mentioned above, assume existential dimensions. Non-Boolean systems no longer permit a unique assignment of matters of fact to mental categories, but they permit the assumption of acategorial states (Atmanspacher, 1992). As Freud referred to dream as the royal road to the unconscious, paradox can be understood as a royal road to modes of consciousness beyond stable binary categories. Anomalies in No-Mans Land By anomalies in no-mans land I refer to anomalies for which contact options to accepted scientic knowledge are not visible. Of course, this is a matter of assessment, and without a serious study of such an anomaly and what it might conceal it will hardly be possible to come to a reasonable judgment. Moreover, as mentioned before, there is no authoritative metric which could serve to measure a distance from the frontiers of knowledge. Therefore, any assessment remains an arguable affair and is, at least in part, unavoidably contaminated in a subjective fashion. In the following I will comment on two selected representatives of this genre. The rst example concerns the situation with respect to a class of phenomena usually called psychokinesis (PK). As a rule, this refers to some kind of mental inuence on material processes and is intended to be as general as including volitional alterations of radioactive decay processes (micro-PK) or levitating tables (macro-PK). The other example concerns astrology, the idea of using the constellation of celestial objects to infer statements about human dispositions and destinies. Psychokinesis Usually PK means a causal inuence (intended or unintended) upon the behavior of matter, which is not mediated by known physical interactions. In a sense, this is the psychophysical problem in its most radical form: not only are brain or body and consciousness at stake, but a correspondence of mental and physical processes outside ones own brain or body are addressed. This raises two complexes of questions. How is an inuence to be conceived if physical interactions are excluded? The exclusion condition is, in a sense, already the criterion for a lacking connection to the status quo of physics and opens the door for all kinds of speculation. The crucial issue from a philosophical point of view is to identify a mode of causation that is capable of acting between two

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distinct categorial systems (mentalmaterial). Such a mode easily triggers the suspicion of a category mistake and, thus, requires substantial arguments against this kind of aw. An elegant variant of psychophysical relations, proposed by Carl Gustav Jung under the notion of synchronicity, is so-called meaningful coincidences.23 However, an essential feature of them is that they are to be understood exactly not in the sense of a causal inuence. Rather, the correlative connection is assumed to be a meaningful correspondence between mental and material events arising as particular manifestations of a hypothetical, psychophysically neutral domain.24 This way, both the risk of a categorial confusion of mental and material domains and the problem of the causal completeness of the physical are avoided. The price to be paid is the assumption of a common ground for psyche and physis (Jungs unus mundus), about which contemporary science has nothing to say. A second problem area is the empirical detection of such anomalies. For a number of decades, laboratory studies have tried to provide evidence for deviations from well-dened physical processes by the mental inuence of human subjects. Particular interest in this context has been focused on the investigation of stochastic processes (e.g., radioactive decay) that are determined only statistically. The idea is that any kind of mental inuence might be facilitated in processes that are not governed by strictly deterministic laws. Although there are occasional reports of positive evidence from corresponding experiments, analyses of the entire body of published results (so-called meta-analyses) cause doubts concerning the validity of the claimed evidence of PK. An especially careful und mathematically sophisticated meta-analysis by Ehm (2005)25 yielded no signicant PK effect for a large collection of data from which positive conclusions in favor of PK had been drawn previously with less subtle statistical methodology (Radin & Nelson, 1989). A large-scale empirical replication study (Jahn et al., 2000) of a certain type of micro-PK also yielded no signicant evidence for the effect investigated. An interesting hypothesis in this regard is the idea that PK phenomena under replication might be subject to a systematic attenuation, leading to their decline over a long series of experiments. As a methodological consequence of such a hypothesis, the empirical criterion of the reproducibility of results under identical conditions would be severely challengedor, put the other way around, any repetition might undermine the identity of the conditions. We know that this is plausible in sufciently complex systems (Atmanspacher & Jahn, 2003), but there are no detailed studies of such effects or related effects so far. Another empirical side of PK phenomena is their spontaneous occurrence outside controlled laboratory conditions. Braude (1997) has vigorously advocated the importance of such non-experimental evidence. In this case, reproducibility is not an issue anyway, because spontaneous cases do not have xed boundary conditions. If pertinent reports are taken seriously, there are indications that psychologically and/or socially unstable situations promote the appearance of spontaneous PK effects.

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By and large, the empirical situation concerning PK today is unclear and unsatisfactory. The occasional claim of successful observations beyond all doubt typically meets, probably appropriately, something in between skepticism and rejection. As far as the option to connect to existing knowledge is concerned, the situation looks similarly murky. Although there are interesting speculative ideas (e.g., in the style of Jung), they do not comply with thorough step-by-step scientic work yet. It might be a promising attempt in contemporary discussion to subject the criterion of reproducibility to a profound analysis. This could lead to both intelligent experiments and conceptual progress. Astrology Astrologers try to interpret the relative positions of celestial bodies, moving in front of the background of the xed stars, in such a way that they can infer conclusions about individuals, institutions, or other agent systems. Astrology exists as long as humans exist who observe the sky. Western astrological systems essentially go back to the Babylonians, who named the moving stars according to their gods and goddesses. Their spheres of action were then regarded as the essence of the corresponding planet.26 Moreover, the astrological standard system includes the 12 signs of the zodiac, related to the four elements water, re, earth, and air, and 12 houses positioned in the zodiac with respect to the instance to which the interpretation refers. The rst house begins at that zodiac location which just rises at the horizon at the instance under consideration (hence, this position marks the rising sign). Typical characteristic instances for interpretation are birth dates of individuals, dates of important events in life, founding dates of institutions, etc. Astrology is based on a hybrid system in which astronomically precise data are 27 interpreted psychologically. Stated simply, the planets represent motivations and needs, the signs of the zodiac and their elements stand for general inclinations (intellectual, material, sensible, creative), and the houses refer to areas of experience, such as partnership, profession, social life, property, etc. The resulting 12 x 12 x 10 combinations per se provide a rich variety of potential details of interpretation. This is increased by the important feature of angular relations among planets (aspects) and other particulars. This rough characterization (for a more detailed overview see Fankhauser, 1980) shows how difcult a clear differentiation and analysis of the available room for interpretation must be. For this reason, astrologers keep emphasizing over and over how important experience is for a proper interpretation of astrological charts. Scattered anecdotal reports about astrological success stories (see Braude, 2007) are truly startling, butagainthese cases are distinguished by abstaining from laboratory conditions and statistical analysis. Insofar as particular constellations can favor or block particular inclinations and faculties in particular areas of life, astrologers consider themselves capable

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of predicting partner relations, professional success, etc. Such predictions can be compared with corresponding data, an undertaking for which the French astrologer Gauquelin (1994) spent much time and energy. He did not succeed, however, in a sustained conrmation of certain astrological hypotheses.28 A recurrent problem in such studies is the formulation of suitable null hypotheses, connected with the identication of adequate reference distributions. This decient empirical situation notwithstanding, there are also no promising theoretical ideas of how correlations between celestial bodies and properties of the human psyche could be understood. (The point here is not sleeping problems at full moonthe moon as an astrological planet serves much more specic purposes.) After all, astrology might be another candidate for an anomaly whose value for the progress of science still lies hidden in darkness. It could also be a candidate for rank nonsense. At present it remains undecided which of these options may be the case. Concluding Remarks Many historical examples of anomalies demonstrate that their explanation became possible when they approached the frontier of accepted knowledge sufciently closely. With all necessary caution, one can say that too much distance from the scientic state of the art renders the search for an understanding of anomalies, in the sense of their connection to current research, largely ineffective. Scientic giants on the order of a Newton, Gauss or Einstein conrm this rule by exception. In scientic no-mans land success will be extremely unlikely, even if the commitment to a corresponding problem area is as intensive (or obsessive) as can be. Already at the frontiers of knowledge, progress in science is so subtle and difcult that it is not only justied but absolutely correct to characterize it with the notion of high-risk research (as opposed to what Kuhn, 1962, called scientic crossword-puzzlesolving). There may be differences in detail, depending on the necessity of methodological innovations, the availability of theoretical models, the inevitability of genuinely interdisciplinary approaches, etc. A careful balance of the risk of failure with the chances of success is especially important in highrisk research. If a systematic connection between a purported anomaly and the scientic body of knowledge is incomprehensible, high risk can easily turn into pure hubris. Successful innovative scientic research is always subject to the tension between orthodoxy and anomaly. In this sense, a rigid xation on existing knowledge is as unproductive as an obstinate insistence on anomalies whose coherent relation to such knowledge is written in the stars. Scientic progress arises where orthodoxy and anomaly are balanced as well as possible. It would be a rewarding goal for sustainable research funding to provide suitable conditions for such a balance.

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Kuhns analysis was inuenced by Flecks (1935) monograph Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (English translation: Origin and Evolution of a Scientic Fact), in which Fleck coined the concepts of a thinking style (Denkstil) and of a thinking collective (Denkkollektiv). Kuhn mentions Fleck in the introduction to his book. Kuhns theses were critically discussed in Hoyningen-Huenes (1993) Reconstructing Scientic Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhns Philosophy of Science. Further interesting information is contained in two long letters (undated, probably 1960) found in Feyerabends estate after his death, in which he responds to a draft of Kuhns book (Hoyningen-Huene, 1995). An alternative approach is described by Hbner (1983) in his Critique of Scientic Reason (Kritik der wissenschaftlichen Vernunft, German original 1978). Here, the intention is not to understand accepted knowledge in the sense of orthodox belief like in theology. Rather than a xed and unchangeable canonical dogma, correct teaching is intended to refer to a correct reproduction of a body of knowledge that serves as a starting point for further developments. Einsteins development of special relativity is a most illustrative example in this respect. Its key idea is an extension of the Galilei-invariant (Newtonian) mechanics to the Lorentz invariance of electrodynamics, such that Newtonian mechanics can be regained in the (hypothetical) limit of an innite speed of light. This simple picture does, of course, not do justice to the revolutionary impact that Einsteins theory had on science and technology. But the famous-infamous equation E = mc2 is nothing more than a by-product, a spin-off as it were, of the conceptual extension that he was able to formalize. Evidently, such laws exist also in chemistry (Nernsts equation for the dependence of the concentration of the electrode potential of a redox pair), in biology (Mendels law for the inheritance of properties), or in psychology (Weber-Fechner law for the relation of the intensities of subjective sensual perceptions and objective stimuli). This is not to say that there is a canonical set of clearly dened and obeyed rules for sound scientic work. It is well known that different standards are dominant in different disciplines and that they are applied in different ways. However, it is fair to say that some criteria are, in one or another way, regarded as relevant in many disciplines throughout science. An example is the issue of reproducibility, which will be critically discussed in detail below. In the statistical modeling of such situations one speaks of xed effects versus random effects. See Wackerbauer et al. (1994) for a review of complexity measures and Atmanspacher and Wiedenmann (1999) for a conceptual account of basic problems with complex systems. In the eld of large deviations statistics, which has acquired an important role in statistical physics, the so-called large deviations entropy is used for this purpose. For an introduction and further references see Amann and Atmanspacher (1999). There are indications, though, that this tendency becomes attenuated more recently: in recent debates in the philosophy of science, for instance, the question for ontological dimensions of reduction, supervenience, and emergence is of proliferating signicance. See, e.g., Esfeld (2009). The requirement of a well-dened metric or similar elaborated concepts to address distances in the space of accepted theories or in the space of equivalence classes of empirical results remains disregarded here.

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Interestingly, such anomalies are sometimes regarded as important for biological evolution (rather than the evolution of paradigms) insofar as they represent signicant mutations. Blumberg (2009) has given an in-depth account of such freaks and monsters in biological development. A review of anomalies at the frontiers of contemporary science under the title 13 Things That Do Not Make Sense was published by Brooks (2008). For an earlier, condensed version see the New Scientist of March 19, 2005. For example, critical point, boiling point, melting point, latent heat, density, melting heat, entropy of vaporization, molar volume, volume change at the melting point, viscosity, surface tension, specic heat, etc. Some authors list up to 40 water anomalies. An extensive and very readable account of this development, with numerous original references, can be found in Jablonka and Lamb (2005). Insofar as epigenetics turns against weak points of neo-Darwinism in a scientically intelligible way, it does in fact counteract creationist propaganda that attacks those weak points with nonscientic criticism. This topic gures under a number of terms emphasizing different viewpoints, respectively: mind-matter problem, soul-body problem, psychophysical problem, rst-person versus third-person perspective, etc. For instance, related approaches have been proposed by Fechner, Wundt, Whitehead, Russell, Feigl, Jung, Bohm, Chalmers, dEspagnat, and Velmans, to name a few. They typically combine an ontic monism with an epistemically dualistic view. Davidsons (1970) anomalous monism moves this picture from type identity to token identity and draws basically physicalist conclusions from it. An interesting twist on dual-aspect models results by tightening the duality of aspects by the concept of complementarity (in the sense of quantum theory), as suggested by Pauli (1952) and developed by Primas (2008). Phenomenological theories of physics, such as thermodynamics, typically break these symmetries. An empirically conrmed model of time perception by Wackermann and Ehm (2006) is interesting in this context, and a recent proposal by Franck and Atmanspacher (2008) sketches a possible way to characterize the intensity of the mental present by its duration measured in terms of physical time. The related notion of an antinomy is of similar etymological origin: anti = against, nomoz = law. Particularly well-known examples in psychology are Batesons concept of the double bind (Bateson et al., 1956) and Watzlawicks therapeutic instrument of paradoxical intervention (Watzlawick et al., 1967). Paradoxical koans in Zen Buddhism and the paradoxes of Christian mysticism, e.g., Meister Eckhart, are key examples for the usage of paradoxes in spiritual frameworks of thinking. This does not mean to use the notion of complementarity as an excuse for everything that sounds inconsistent. A formal approach called generalized quantum theory, which avoids this, has recently been developed and applied to non-physical examples (Atmanspacher et al., 2006). See also Primas (2007) for an alternative formulation. The notion of synchronicity was rst mentioned by Jung in an obituary for Richard Wilhelm in Neue Zrcher Zeitung, March 6, 1930. After years of hesitation to publish his corresponding ideas, Pauli encouraged him to write them down as a comprehensive

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account. The nal version (Jung, 1952) was the result of several revisions inspired by Paulis numerous comments. See the Pauli-Jung correspondence between June 1949 and February 1951 in Meier (1990). The correspondence is meaningful if meaning is attributed by a subjects mental state and, thus, becomes a feature of the correspondence relation. Note the similarity to reference relations for intentional states. A main merit of this metaanalysis is a combined assessment, known as corrections metaanalysis (Copas, 1999), of target effects (xed as well as random) and selection effects. A technically simpler meta-analysis by Bsch et al. (2006) includes more recent data not contained in Ehm (2005). Both studies found no signicant target effect, mainly as a consequence of signicant selection effects. Notably, Ehm (2005: Sect. 7.4) discovered that a major subset of close to 50% of the total sample of 597 studies analyzed by Radin and Nelson (1989), stemming from the Princeton Engineering Anomalies Laboratory, showed no signicant selection. Moreover, the signicant selection that Ehm (2005: Sect. 6) detected for the total sample is not necessarily restricted to publication bias and could be due to any unknown systematic effect in addition to the target effect (Ehm, 2005: Sect. 5.3, 7.5). Various speculations have been raised about the possible origins of such additional effects (see, e.g., Jahn et al., 2000). But in view of the complexity of the situation it is arguable whether tedious follow-up searches for specic and robust effects within the bunch of possible interdependent candidates would produce more insight or more confusion. The overall situation is clearly inconclusive and might support Braudes (1997) arguments that experimentally well-controlled laboratory studies are of limited relevance in the eld. In addition to the planets in our current understanding, astrologers count the sun and moon as moving stars as well. Thus, the geocentric system of classical astrology comprises the 10 planets sun, moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto. Due to the precession of the earth, the positions of the signs of the zodiac on the sky are displaced by 30 degrees every 2000 years. Therefore, present actual astronomical positions lag behind the ctitious astrological positions by approximately one sign. See, e.g., the criticism raised by Ertel and Irving (1996); see also Eysenck and Nias (1982). As an interesting side remark, Jungs (1952) article about synchronicity also uses astrological data, also without convincing results.

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Journal of Scientic Exploration, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 299322, 2009

0892-3310/09

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Tackling TaboosFrom Psychopathia Sexualis to the Materialisation of Dreams: Albert von Schrenck-Notzing (18621929)
ANDREAS SOMMER
Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine University College London, London, UK e-mail: a.sommer@ucl.ac.uk

AbstractAlbert von Schrenck-Notzing, M.D., is one of the most controversial gures in the history of medicine and science. A pioneer of hypnotism and sexology in late 19th century Germany, he was to become the doyen of early 20th century German psychical research. Supported by the philosophers Hans Driesch and Traugott Konstantin Oesterreich and the psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler, his work was attacked by psychologist Max Dessoir and, most ercely, psychiatrist Mathilde von Kemnitz (later Ludendorff) and sexologist Albert Moll. This essay traces the career of this unusual character from his early work in hypnotism and sexology to his study of even more contested areas, such as poltergeist cases and the experimental study of alleged materialisations and telekinesis. Finally, it analyses the rhetorical structure of charges of fraud, gullibility, and scientic incompetence, which Schrenck-Notzings name is still associated with. Keywords: Albert von Schrenck-Notzingparapsychologyphysical mediumshiphistory of hypnotismfraud

Early Years: Sexology and Hypnotism Baron Albert von Schrenck-Notzing (Figure 1) was born in Oldenburg, Germany, on 18 May 1862. After entering Munich University to study medicine in 1883, together with the then unknown Sigmund Freud, he spent some time in Nancy to study hypnotism under Bernheim. According to his biographer and secretary, Gerda Walther (a philosopher who had studied under Edmund Husserl), his interest in hypnotism was triggered as a student when he jestingly tried to mesmerise some of his fellow students, three of whom fell into a trance, to his alarm (Walther, 1962: 11; on this anecdote, also see Peter, 1922: 242). In 1888, he obtained his M.D. with a thesis on the therapeutic application of hypnotism (published as Schrenck-Notzing, 1888). One year later, inspired by the works of Richard von Krafft-Ebing in sexology and August Forel in hypnotherapy, he practiced as a physician in Munich, specialising on the hypnotic treatment of what just had been re-conceptualised from criminal into psychopathological behaviour by Krafft-Ebing, namely sexual deviations. 299

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Fig. 1. Baron Albert von Schrenck-Notzing. From the frontispiece of the Schrenck-Notzing memorial April issue of Zeitschrift fr Parapsychologie, 4 (1929).

In 1892 he joined the editorial board and became a regular contributor of the German Zeitschrift fr Hypnotismus, and in the same year published an internationally acclaimed book on hypnotism as a treatment for psychopathia sexualis, which he dedicated to August Forel in respect and gratitude (SchrenckNotzing, 1892).1 He also published on the phenomenology and psychology of dissociation and, as a proponent of the Nancy school of hypnotism, which argued for the possibility of hypnotically induced crimes, became an expert in

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forensic problems of hypnotism (Schrenck-Notzing, 1896, 1902; on the courtroom as a place of debate between the rivalling schools of Nancy and Paris, see Harris, 1985). Schrenck-Notzings works in sexology and hypnotherapy were respected by Krafft-Ebing, Forel, Havelock Ellis, and Morton Prince, who considered his sexological contributions as en par with those of Krafft-Ebing and 2 Albert Moll (Prince, 1898). Alan Gauld, in his seminal History of Hypnotism, acknowledges Schrenck-Notzing as a noted hypnotist (Gauld, 1992: 298; see also Ellenberger, 1970: 290301). Schrenck-Notzings main interest, however, was in studying and understanding reported supernormal phenomena. While still a medical student, together with philosopher Carl du Prel (Sommer, 2009) and other scholars and artists, he founded the Mnchener Psychologische Gesellschaft (Munich Psychological Society) in 1886, whose research programme was modelled after that of the British Society for Psychical Research (SPR).3 The question of the occurrence of telepathy and clairvoyance in hypnotism was a theoretical and political bone of contention among early researchers, and the even more controversial physical phenomena of spiritualism had divided German academia since the public debate between astrophysicist Friedrich Zllner and the founder of academic psychology, Wilhelm Wundt (see, e.g., Kohls & Sommer, 2006; Staubermann, 2001; WolfBraun, 1998). In Germany, Schrenck-Notzing had been one of the rst researchers to argue for the occurrence of telepathy in the waking state and in hypnotic trance ([Schrenck-]Notzing, 1886; Schrenck-Notzing, 1891), and according to Alan Gauld (1992: 465), he was the one investigator who conducted most experiments on that matter (for a summary of Schrenck-Notzings and du Prels Munich experiments see Moser, 1967). The Munich Society attracted scholars frustrated with the reductionist approach of nascent university psychology and focused on the study of phenomena Wundt had categorically excluded from its research agenda, that is, hypnotism and altered states of consciousness, telepathy, clairvoyance, and the phenomena of spiritualism. Due to the works of some of its members, such as Schrenck-Notzing and Max Dessoir (1888, 1896) in hypnotism and psychology, the Munich Society became an important early centre not only of psychical research, but also of international psychology, which was yet to assume a reductionist Gestalt. This is documented, for instance, in its co-organising the Third International Congress of Psychology, held in Munich in 1896, with Schrenck-Notzing serving as General Secretary (Alvarado, in preparation; Ellenberger, 1970: 775). Poltergeist Phenomena, Teleplasm, and the Psychology of Unconscious Fraud Inspired by the empirical ethos of the British SPR, Schrenck-Notzing sought to establish supernormal phenomena empirically beyond reasonable doubt rst and to worry about philosophical and metaphysical implications later. This eventually led to a clash between him and his former teacher Carl du Prel in 1889, whom

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Schrenck-Notzing had accused of prematurely basing his philosophical system embracing telepathy, clairvoyance, supernormal physical phenomena, and postmortem survival on insufciently secured empirical data. Schrenck-Notzing deemed the spirit hypothesisentangled and associated with fraud and superstition as it wasimpeding the progress of psychical research politically. Siding with critics of spiritualism like Wundt, he repeatedly stressed potential public moral dangers and risks for mental health related to occult practices. His main priority was therefore to disentangle and isolate the alleged physical phenomena of spiritualism (telekinesis, levitations of objects and persons, and materialisations of human limbs and even full human forms) from their ideological milieu in order to study them under controlled conditions.4 To achieve this goal, Schrenck-Notzing pursued a double strategy. First, he tried locating non-professional (i.e., unpaid) mediums who would be willing to gradually adapt towards performing under controlled conditions in SchrenckNotzings and other researchers laboratories, as in the case of his later series of experiments with the young Schneider brothers (see, e.g., Schrenck-Notzing, 1923b, 1924, 1926b, 1933). After witnessing anomalous phenomena in private sances at the home of Rudi and Willi Schneider, he obtained permission from their father to systematically investigate them in his Munich laboratory and elsewhere. In 1892 he had gained the nancial independence to build his laboratory, reimburse mediums, and travel to nd suitable subjects in Germany and abroad, through the marriage with Gabriele, daughter and heir of the industrialist and politician Gustav Siegle. A secondary strategy was the study of spontaneous physical or so-called poltergeist phenomena, typically involving anomalous movements, appearances and disappearances of diverse objects, loud noises, re outbreaks, and stones ying from outside the premises and sometimes penetrating windows 5 without damaging them, etc. Often causing a stir in the press, and commonly attributed to either hoaxes or the agency of spirits, these cases typically occurred spontaneously in family households, factories, barnyards, and other places of everyday life. Schrenck-Notzing argued that they usually centred around and were unwittingly caused by an emotionally instable person, usually an adolescent, and were to be understood as psychodynamic discharges, or externalised hysteria, acted out telekinetically by these unwitting mediums (SchrenckNotzing, 1921, 1922a, 1926a). In 1928, he acknowledged explicitly psychoanalytic views on poltergeist phenomena by authors such as Alfred Winterstein: In certain cases, emotionally charged complexes of representations, which have become autonomous and dissociated [abgespalten], seem to press for discharge and realisation through haunting phenomena [Spukerscheinungen]. . . . Hence, the 6 so-called haunting occurs in place of a neurosis (Schrenck-Notzing, 1928: 518). Schrenck-Notzing found that several physical mediums, such as the Polish medium Stanislawa Tomczyk, the main subject of his study Physikalische Phnomene des Mediumismus (Schrenck-Notzing, 1920b), had started their careers as focus

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persons in poltergeist cases. Hence, he aimed at identifying focus persons of poltergeist outbreaks to transform them into physical mediums available for controlled experiments, a strategy which however yielded only little success. It is likely that Schrenck-Notzings attitude to physical mediumship codeveloped with that of his friend Charles Richet, the French pioneer of hypnotism and, in 1913, Nobel laureate for medicine and physiology. His life-long friendship and cooperation with Richet, who also had argued for the reality of supernormal phenomena in hypnosis, began in 1888, when Schrenck-Notzing asked Richet for permission to translate one of his experimental studies in telepathy and clairvoyance to German (Richet, 1888, 1891; for a personal appraisal of the friendship between the two men, see Richets obituary of Schrenck-Notzing in Richet, 1929). In the early 1890s, Richet invited Schrenck-Notzing to attend sittings with the famous Italian physical medium Eusapia Palladino, whose alleged materialisation of the deceased mother of the famous criminal psychologist and former archsceptic Cesare Lombroso converted Lombroso to a belief in life after death (Lombroso, 1909: 69, 122). Among other eminent scholars experimenting with Palladino in the 1890s were the astronomers Camille Flammarion and Giovanni Schiaparelli, the psychiatrists and psychologists Enrico Morselli, Max Dessoir, Thodore Flournoy, and Frederic Myers, the philosophers Henri Bergson and 7 Carl du Prel, the physicist Sir Oliver Lodge, and Marie and Pierre Curie. By 1898, neither Richet nor Schrenck-Notzing had publicly declared their conviction of the reality of the physical phenomena of mediumship (see, e.g., the rather sceptical statement in Schrenck-Notzing, 1898a), and it was only after Richet won the Nobel Prize in 1913 that Schrenck-Notzing dropped a bomb, supported by Richet, by publishing Materialisations-Phaenomene, one of the most challenging 8 works in the history of psychical research (Schrenck-Notzing, 1914b). The book describes Schrenck-Notzings sittings with the French medium Eva C. (pseudonym for Marthe Braud), who had been studied previously by Juliette Bisson, widow of the dramatist Alexandre Bisson. Madame Bisson had published the results of her investigations of Marthe in French simultaneously with Schrenck-Notzing (Alexandre-Bisson, 1914), with Richet being an occasional co-investigator and vouching for both authors credibility. In anticipation of allegations of fraud, Marthe was observed outside the sittings by detectives. Before the sittings, she was undressed and thoroughly searched. Schrenck-Notzing and Bisson, as well as occasionally other investigators, inspected her hair, nose, mouth, ears, and armpits, and also occasionally conducted rectal and vaginal examinations to rule out that the medium hid materials to fake her phenomena. To make sure that the medium hadnt swallowed fabrics she could present as materialisations, she was given an emetic, and after throwing up (Schrenck-Notzing had her vomit analysed by an independent laboratory) ate blueberry compote which would inevitably colour any gauze or other materials that could be used to fake the phenomenon. She then was sewn into a black net tunic, and in some sittings her head was enveloped in a net veil, which was sewn to the neck of the tunic.

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Marthe was then hypnotised by Bisson and placed on a chair in a cabinet, a compartment of the laboratory created by curtains, which Marthe insisted she required to accumulate the light-sensitive spiritual energy or uid necessary for her performances. The phenomena observed often started off with the emergence of a white, light grey, or sometimes black substance from the mediums orices, usually from her mouth, but also from other body parts like her breasts, navel, ngertips, vagina, and the crest of her head. This initially often gauze-like substance, called teleplasm by Schrenck-Notzing and ectoplasm by Richet and his French colleague Gustave Geley, was photographed by Schrenck-Notzing, Geley, Bisson, and other researchers, using stereoscopy and sometimes up to nine cameras both in and outside the cabinet. Schrenck-Notzing was able to take small probes, whose microscopic and physical-chemical analyses are published in Phenomena of Materialisations (Schrenck-Notzing, 1920a: 246250). Cell detritus was identied that was unlikely stemming from the mediums saliva, vaginal secretion, or other body uids, as well as epithelium cells, isolated fat grains, and mucus. As reported by the investigators, the teleplasm moved like an autonomous animate living structure, responding to touch and particularly exposure to light, with the entranced medium displaying signs of pain and discomfort. The substance was reported to develop into rudimentary limblike forms (Figure 2), such as hands and human heads, often assuming two-dimensional form rst and nally threedimensional shapes, occasionally changing from one form to another. Fully formed limbs and heads would appear lifelike and responsive to the environment. The objects would then either gradually dissolve, with the teleplasm being absorbed by the mediums body, or suddenly disappear. There is a vast literature claiming the same effects in other mediums investigated by Schrenck-Notzing and others, such as the Polish mediums Stanislawa P. (Figure 3) and Franek Kluski, the Austrians Willi and Rudi Schneider and Maria Silbert, the Dane Einer Nielsen, and the Irishwoman Kathleen Goligher, all of whom were studied by various researchers over the course of several years (see, e.g., Carrington, 1920; Crawford, 1921; Geley, 1920, 1922, 1927; Gruber et al., 1926; Grunewald, 1920; Schrenck-Notzing, 1923b). The hypothesis put forth by Schrenck-Notzing to account for these bizarre phenomena was that of ideoplasty. According to this assumption, teleplastic processes had their origin in the unconscious mind of the medium in terms of materialised dream-images, that is, ephemeral, externalised precipitates from the mediums psychical impressions, imagination, and memories (for a similar proposal, see also Morselli, 1908). For instance, certain two-dimensional materialisations were recognised as imperfectly reproduced photographs from magazines and other sources the medium had previously been exposed to. Others, such as Richet and Flournoy, had suggested that memories of forgotten impressions are sometimes restored in altered states of consciousness, such as hypnotic and mediumistic trance. Schrenck-Notzing himself refers to Jungs treatment

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Fig. 2. Alleged materialisation of a rudimentary nger in a sitting on 16 May 1913. From plate 95 of Schrenck-Notzing (1923b).

of cryptomnesia (i.e., the emergence of forgotten or not consciously recorded impressions) in his doctoral thesis on the psychology of mediumship (Jung, 1902; Schrenck-Notzing, 1914a: 116; the classic study on the conservatory and mythopoetic features of mediumistic trance is by Flournoy, 1900). Another feature of physical mediumship Schrenck-Notzing tried to account for was the often observed transguration, i.e., the unconscious impersonation of spirits by mediums, which he considered as a developmental transition stage. The entranced medium, following her spiritualist interpretation of the phenomena, would unconsciously assume and dramatically represent the role of the materialising spirit, get up and sleep-walk, sometimes clad in allegedly materialised 9 fabrics (such as robes, facial hair, or in the case of Marthe, a helmet). Much to the outrage of his critics, Schrenck-Notzing tried to explain a large number of instances of exposures of fraudulent mediums in terms of transguration, pointing

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Fig. 3.

Stanislawa P. producing teleplasm in a sitting on 23 June 1913. From plate 135 of SchrenckNotzing (1923b).

to the circumstance that materialised fabrics suddenly disappeared when the medium was seized and afterwards could not be found anywhere on the medium or in the room (early authors cautioning against confusing transgurations, i.e., unconscious impersonations of spirits by entranced mediums, with deliberate

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fraud were, e.g., du Prel, 1888; Hare, 1855). He also tried to account for sometimes all too obvious attempts at trickery observed in most mediums (most notoriously in Eusapia Palladino) by reverting to unconscious acting-out of suggestions induced by the sitters expectations, and psychological pressure of the medium to produce phenomena no matter how. He considered mediums as highly sensitive psycho-biological instruments rather than mere machines generating effects on demand and in any setting: For these phenomena have their origin in the life of the unconscious mind and arise from an instinctive impulse in the medium, who for her part can yield herself up completely to this impulse only upon the condition that her conscious attention is not brought into play by psychological resistances, or by doubt of her honesty on the part of the observers. The frequent ignoring of this most important consideration, especially in scientic investigations, is a cause of negative sittings even in the case of mediums who in other circumstances give good results (Schrenck-Notzing, 1923a: 672). While Schrenck-Notzing has naturally been accused of employing a selfimmunisation strategy by psychologising and thus belittling fraud, it might be worthwhile pointing out that a similar argument had been put forth by SchrenckNotzing decades before, though in terms of a methodological criticism. When Krafft-Ebing and others reported hypnotically induced blisters and other vasomotor effects (e.g., Krafft-Ebing, 1888), Schrenck-Notzing was one of the main critics of these experiments. He argued that the experimental control was often insufcient to rule out that the patients had induced blisters and other marks by conventional mechanical means (e.g., using hairpins) in response to the hypnotic suggestion to develop the effects in question (Gauld, 1992: 461462; SchrenckNotzing, 1895, 1898b).10 Also, regarding his investigation into alleged poltergeist cases, he conceded that apparent focus persons are often caught trying to cheat, which usually results in a case being declared as a complete hoax. SchrenckNotzing, however, argued that many such exposures, often motivated by the wish to dispose of unsettling and intrinsically frightening facts, are far too rash and psychologically supercial. He held that in many poltergeist cases where the focus person was caught cheating, fraud failed to explain instances which are inexplicable in themselves (such as apparently well-documented cases of passing of objects through matter, or the appearance and disappearance of large quantities of water or heavy objects), and that on other occasions phenomena had been observed when the suspect was closely observed and the hypothesis of an accomplice seemed far-fetched in terms of practical feasibility (e.g., Schrenck-Notzing, 1928). For similar reasons, he cautioned against rashly accepting confessions and self-allegations of poltergeist and physical mediums, who rarely possess the psychic stability and integrity to resist the external pressure to free the world from the necessity of dealing with certain deeply disturbing phenomena by a false confession (Schrenck-Notzing, 1927). On the other hand, Schrenck-Notzing had occasionally levelled complaints of insufcient control and thus implicit suspicion of fraud in other mediums, such as Lucia Sordi and Linda Gazerra, whom he had caught cheating (Schrenck-Notzing, 1911, 1912).

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The Outcry of Science: Allegations of Fraud and Scientic Incompetence It is hardly surprising that the publication of Materialisations-Phaenomene in 1914 and subsequent works by Schrenck-Notzing and colleagues were not exactly greeted with enthusiasm by the scientic and medical community. Naturally, Schrenck-Notzings pragmatic exploitation of mediums ideological idiosyncrasies to catalyse the phenomena, that is, their beliefs in the necessity of cabinets and their conviction of being amanuenses of spirits of the dead, increased suspicions, as did the observation that teleplasm was sensitive to light and that probes usually evaporated. Reactions ranged from outrage or downright hostility to apparent indifference. Sigmund Freud, for example, in reply to a survey on the sensational book of his former fellow student of hypnotism at Nancy, merely stated: I have paid no particular attention to the work of v. Schrenck-Notzing (Maier, 1914: 416). At the forefront of those aspiring to systematically debunk Schrenck-Notzing, Madame Bisson, and their medium Eva C. were the young psychiatrist Mathilde Kemnitz and Schrenck-Notzings former colleague in hypnotism and sexology, Albert Moll. Kemnitz, a psychiatrist trained by Emil Kraepelin, had approached SchrenckNotzing about attending one of his sances, which had become an attraction for the crme de la crme of the Munich society. These demonstrations by invitation only, which served as a strategy to win the much needed sympathy and condence of important public gures, might have reected both a thoroughly calculated PR strategy and the bohemian snobbishness of the wealthy Baron.11 Immediately after the publication of Materialisations-Phaenomene, Kemnitz launched an aggressive attack on Schrenck-Notzing by publishing Moderne Medienforschung (Modern Mediumship Research), a small brochure containing the reconstructed protocol of a single informal sitting with Stanislawa P. and general criticisms of Schrenck-Notzings book, accompanied by a letter to Kemnitz from another sceptic, Count Gulat-Wellenburg (Kemnitz, 1914). A yer accompanying the book announced: Illuminates the dark room of the mediumship researchers with dazzling light and impeccably demonstrates the hoax. An enthralling protocol of a sitting. Kemnitz and Gulat-Wellenburg argued that the phenomena were clearly fraudulent and, obviously distrusting the veracity of Schrenck-Notzings reports of allegedly employed control procedures, claimed he was duped by the mediums who had produced the alleged teleplasm and materialisations by the rumination of gauze, draperies, and other materials swallowed previous to the sittings or hidden in their vaginas. In Der Kampf um die Materialisationsphnomene (The Battle for the Phenomena of Materialisation), a reply to Kemnitz and other critics published in the same year and containing supporting statements by the now Nobel laureate Richet and other medical and scientic colleagues, Schrenck-Notzing protested against what he saw as a breach of collegiality, that is, to publish such devastating claims unannounced and without previous consultation with him as the criticised author, and held that the accusations were simply untenable and downright fabricated.

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He criticised Kemnitz for falsely pretending that the sitting she attended was representative and showed the methodological and medical invalidity of the rumination hypothesis and other claims levelled against his ndings by Kemnitz and others, revealing that they had not read the published protocols in detail. Not impressed by Schrenck-Notzings reply, Kemnitz continued her witch hunt against Schrenck-Notzing and colleagues, with fatal consequences for German psychical research years later (see below). The public debates were also blurred by defences of Schrenck-Notzings work by spiritualists who, ignoring his anti-spiritualist position, demanded the phenomena of materialisations to be the work of spirits, thus unwittingly reinforcing the public image of Schrenck-Notzing as an enemy of reason and science who deserved to be compromised. Schrenck-Notzings personal and professional battle was interrupted by the outbreak of World War I, during which he was able to continue his researches with other mediums. To avoid another public outrage like the one provoked by his previous reports, he sought to deliberately limit the scope of the phenomena. Using hypnosis, he instructed the mediums to produce telekinesis (i.e., the alleged manipulation of objects on a distance) rather than the more spectacular phenomena of materialisation. In 1920 he published his second comprehensive study of physical mediumship, this time on the telekinetic phenomena of another Polish medium, Stanislawa Tomczyk (Schrenck-Notzing, 1920b). Maintaining his theory of ideoplasty, he viewed telekinesis as different in degree rather than in kind from the phenomena of materialisation observed in Eva C., Stanislawa P., and others. The achievement of the telekinetic movement, Schrenck-Notzing believed, was anticipated or dreamed by the entranced medium, whereupon her creative imagination evolved thread-like ideoplastic structures and pseudopodia, which nally produced the effect mechanically (teleplastic pseudopodia were also observed in sittings with Palladino, Willi Schneider, and Kathleen Goligher): Schrenck-Notzing argued that the lively wish of lifting an object from a distance leads to the associated idea of a thread, by which the experiment might be performed; the objective phantom of a thread is brought into being by a hallucination that realises itself in matter (Schrenck-Notzing, 1920b: 3). The book, also for the rst time containing the protocols of Schrenck-Notzings previous experimental sittings with Palladino and observations of phenomena in anonymous private mediums, displays photographs of the ideoplastic threads as well as plates of the magnied structures, which were claimed to differ from any known natural bre. Again, Schrenck-Notzing stressed the importance of the investigators psychological approach and sensitivity to obtain phenomena. In her altered state, Tomczyk would display a secondary personality, a child of 10 to 12 years, which had to be tricked into delivering the telekinetic phenomena as part of a game. To elicit a demonstration of telekinesis, Schrenck-Notzing states, this rstly requires a sympathetic response to the playful character of the childlike personality, analogue to the psychiatrists approximation to the delusions of a psychopath (Schrenck-Notzing, 1920b: 17).

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Schrenck-Notzing sought to minimise and eventually eliminate the human element in his experiments, that is, perceptual errors and conscious and unconscious fraud. With the help of Karl Krall, the animal psychologist who had presented, in the succession of Wilhelm von Osten, the thinking horses of Elberfeld to the world (Krall, 1912), and the electrician Karl Amereller, he began to construct electrical devices for the automatic control of his mediums. SchrenckNotzings next book, on sittings with Willi Schneider held at the Psychological Institute of the University of Munich and the Barons private laboratory, is a collection of protocols of sittings where electrical controls in addition to human control were introduced. As previously, the mediums hands and feet were carefully controlled by the experimenter and sitters. In addition, a device was employed consisting in a circuit of lamps, the current for which passed through the medium and controller by means of metal contacts on their hands and feet. If control was relaxed the circuit was broken and the location of where the loss of control had occurred was revealed.12 Still, levitations, telekinetic writing on a typewriter, manipulations of objects in sealed containers, rudimentary materialisations and other phenomena were reported by sitters such as biologist and philosopher Hans Driesch and the novelist Thomas Mann and more than four dozen mostly scientic witnesses, who, to avoid protocol contamination and rule out problems of eyewitness testimony (i.e., distortion of perception by expectations, prior beliefs, etc.) were asked to give their statements independently from each other (Schrenck-Notzing, 1924).13 Apart from Driesch, further important allies entered the stage, such as the Tbingen philosopher Traugott Konstantin Oesterreich and the eminent Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler. Realising the importance of the support by neo-vitalist Driesch, Schrenck-Notzing, who had previously avoided metaphysical speculations and presented his working hypothesis of ideoplasty in rather descriptive terms, now embraced the vitalist philosophy of Driesch and Bergson, as did his French collaborator Gustave Geley, who had written a treatise on the importance of the ideoplastic phenomena of mediumship for philosophy and psychology (Geley, 1925). Schrenck-Notzing now framed the importance of the rapport between investigator and medium thus: The main task of the experimenter and the circle that supports him is [. . .] to bring the vital entelechy out of its latency in the mediums organism, to eliminate the psychical inhibitions, the deterring unconscious complexes; that is, to give the medium the necessary lan vital (Schrenck-Notzing, 1926b: 204).14 However, critics continued consolidating their networks as well. While Albert Moll, largely eschewing a scholarly dialogue with proponents of supernormal phenomena, fought his public crusade against the occult in general and SchrenckNotzing in particular in popular pamphlets, magazines and newspapers, other sceptics tried to demolish the Barons and others work on a seemingly academic basis. In 1925, Max Dessoir compiled a volume with attacks by three authors who had crossed swords with Schrenck-Notzing before (Gulat-Wellenburg et al., 1925). At the British SPR, these authors were supported by in-house sceptics

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such as Eric Dingwall and the Russian Michael Perovsky-Petrovo-Solovovo (see, e.g., Dingwall, 1922, and Schrenck-Notzings reply, 1923a). These authors concluded that the alleged phenomena of physical mediumship did not constitute a genuine scientic problem as all reports could be sufciently explained in terms of fraud and the Barons scientic incompetence. Schrenck-Notzing immediately reacted and invited six of his supporters, such as Oesterreich, the ophthalmologist Rudolf Tischner, and the biologist Karl Gruber, to respond to the charges (Gruber et al., 1926). The tenor of the book was that the authors of the Dreimnnerbuch (the Three-Men Book as the attack was later referred to), who had only sporadic or no experience in the research of physical phenomena and were thus largely condemning Schrenck-Notzings work ex cathedra, deliberately distorted his and others reports. Through omission of crucial details in the original publications and discussion of details and pictorial material out of context, they re-constructed the ndings and effectively increased suspicion in readers not familiar with the original publications. In sum, the authors of the Siebenmnnerbuch (Seven-Men Book) argued that the Dreimnnerbuch looked like just another large-scale exercise in debunking, steered by scientic dogmatism rather than the spirit of constructive scholarly criticism. Driesch and Bleuler continued to supported Schrenck-Notzing and his colleagues. Prior to the publication of the Siebenmnnerbuch, Bleuler published a critical review of the Dreimnnerbuch, in which he accused the authors of being dogmatic negative-believers (Negativ-Glubige) rather than informed sceptics, who would accept no evidence for the occurrence of physical phenomena regardless of the empirical quality demonstrating their reality (Bleuler, 1926). One year later, in a talk on 19 January 1927 before the student council of the University of Zurich, he confessed his involvement in a successful series of experiments, in the investigation of a poltergeist episode at the lunatic asylum Rheinau, and in experimental sittings with the Schneider brothers, all of which converted him from scepticism to a belief in the reality of the phenomena in question (Bernoulli, 1927).15 In 1930 he published an article on the psychology of fraud, drawing interesting analogues between the psychology of mediums and certain behavioural patterns in psychiatric patients. Clinical experience, Bleuler held, was as indispensable for a valid evaluation of the psychological pitfalls inherent in the study of mediums as were years of rst-hand experimental experience in mediumship (Bleuler, 1930). Another interesting response to Schrenck-Notzings work was a booklet by Christian Bruhn (1926), a follower of Albert Moll. To explain the consistency of reports by almost 60 sitters in Experimente der Fernbewegung and other positive testimonies of respectable scholars supporting Schrenck-Notzing, Bruhn reverted to hypnosis. The only explanation that men of such intellectual calibre could vouch for clearly impossible phenomena was that Schrenck-Notzing, like an evil magician, had induced their experiences hypnotically, an explanation accepted and promulgated also by Albert Moll (1929; see also Wolffram, 2006). According to Bruhn, this dangerous inuence spread not only through verbal hypnotic suggestions by Schrenck-Notzing himself, but also through lectures and even

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writings of victims of the dangerous Baron. For Bruhn, therefore, belief in supernormal phenomena was sufciently explained through hypnotic infection. The nal phase of Schrenck-Notzings work focused on his experiments with Rudi Schneider, which entailed further developments of automated control in the experimental design. As in the sittings with Willi, the mediums hands and feet closed electrical circuits that caused lamps to stay lit. Metallic gloves were sewn onto the sleeves of Rudis sance tricot, with the hands of the person controlling Rudis limbs also being electrically controlled. Also, a double oor was built into the cabinet, and a circuit so arranged that a red light would reveal the intrusion of any accomplice, with the medium, however, mostly sitting outside the cabinet. In front of the cabinet was a table with small luminous target objects on it. The table was enclosed by a four-sided gauze screen and controlled by a red light controlled by a rheostat. Sitters such as Driesch, Bleuler, and Carl Jung16 conrmed the Barons reports of movements of objects on the table and other phenomena previously observed in Rudis predecessors. The publication of a book on Rudi was thwarted by Schrenck-Notzings death on 12 February 1929 by cardiac arrest following an appendicitis surgery. Protocols of the sittings with Rudi were compiled by Gerda Walther after his death and published by his widow (SchrenckNotzing, 1933; on Rudi see also Gregory, 1985; Price, 1933). In his preface to the book, Bleuler announced that Schrenck-Notzings experimental design was now so fraud-proof that even Nein-Glubige must give in (Bleuler, 1933). Hardly surprising, they did not. When alive, the Baron and his supporters had characterised the structure of pseudo-sceptic arguments as employed by his most fervent opponents. Thus, critics such as Max Dessoir and Albert Moll would abuse their scientic authority by demolishing straw men, i.e., by criticising undisputed methodological shortcomings, most of which Schrenck-Notzing had admitted himself in his writings, but which were still presented as the critics own discoveries. Despite the frequent pretension of sympathy and admission of the theoretical importance of the phenomena in question, they would often demonstrate that they had not even bothered to read the material they criticised. Also, breach of copyright was the norm, with photographic material, usually discussed isolated from context of the original protocols, reproduced illegally from SchrenckNotzings work. Journalists and other opponents of psychical research, relying on the scientic authority and integrity of respected sceptics, would promulgate errors in their own writings without checking the allegations rst. Also, SchrenckNotzing complained, a major weapon of the opponent blinded by scientic superstition [. . .] is to ridicule the phenomena in question and to hush up unassailable results (Schrenck-Notzing, 1922b: 92fn). Schrenck-Notzing and colleagues protested that such strategies were unworthy of men of science and a violation of the ideal of intellectual freedom: Such a position, which unfortunately has become a rule in the German antagonistic literature, lacks the basic requirement of any objective investigation and judgment, which demands that the scholar free himself of subjective emotional inuences as well as of any bias pro et contra (Schrenck-Notzing, 1922b: 109).

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Richet, in his obituary of Schrenck-Notzing, graciously stated that the only criticism he had to utter about the deceased colleague was that he was too eager to satisfy even the dogmatic sceptic, by employing ethically questionable measures such as hiring detectives, conducting rectal and gynaecological investigations, or administering emetics prior to the sittings to rule out fraud (Richet, 1929: 244). Albert Moll, on the other hand, continued his mission after the death of his nemesis. When Schrenck-Notzing was still alive, he called him and his colleagues morally deranged dimwits and ratnks [Dummkpfe and Schweinehunde] and claimed they entertained sexual relationships with their mediums (Krner, 1921: 442). A man who accepted carnival jokes [Fastnachtsscherze] as science, Moll wrote in his study of the psychopathology of belief in supernormal phenomena published shortly after the Barons death, who wanted to impose the carnival masquerade [Faschingsvermummungen] of hysterical shrews and other mediums as transguration or teleplasm and as the product of the worlds unconscious, must be truthfully scrutinised even after his death (Moll, 1929: 4; other bashings of parapsychology by Moll are Moll, 1911, 1922, 1925, 1928). Molls autobiography, written in 1936, concludes with a depiction of a scenario of him meeting Schrenck-Notzing and Palladino in the afterlife, with Palladino mocking the gullibility of those testifying to the reality of her phenomena and praising Molls level-headedness (Moll, 1936: 277282). Like Dessoir, who writes in his autobiography that the very good looking man was greatly successful with women; but I doubt that he was ever moved by love: with pleasure, he devoured women like oysters (Dessoir, 1947: 130), Moll also portrays the late Baron as a ruthless philanderer. In a section on hypnotism in Molls autobiography, headed Introduction of hypnotic treatment to Germany by Moll (Moll, 1936: 3046), no reference is made to Schrenck-Notzings pioneering work in hypnotism, nor is he mentioned in the chapter on psychopathia sexualis. Moll also afrms that the widespread opinion of Schrenck-Notzing as the great doyen of psychical research in Germany is a fairy tale, and he assures the reader: In the evaluation of occultism, he employed methods that bestowed upon him the opposition of all sober-minded (Moll, 1936: 116). In 1937, Mathilde Kemnitz, the early and most fervent critic of SchrenckNotzing, meanwhile married to General Erich Ludendorff, published a reprint of her pamphlet under the title A Look into the Dark Room of the Spirit-Seers (Ludendorff, 1937). With the support of her inuential husband, she became largely instrumental for the Nazis dislike of parapsychology, which was abolished after Rudolf Hess, whose own interest in fringe areas of science had prevented parapsychologists and practitioners of astrology and other occult sciences from persecution, surrendered to England in 1941 (Walther, 19501951; on the Ludendorffs ideological background involving a mixture of anti-Semitism and vlkisch occultism, see Treitel, 2004: 219220). Conclusion The case of Schrenck-Notzing invites approaches from a variety of different angles. While his photographs of Marthe Braud and Stanislawa P. have recently

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been rediscovered by artists (e.g., Cheroux et al., 2005),17 historians of medicine and science have, with very few exceptions, shunned discussions of this unusual character who struggled to put two major taboos of civilised societysex and the occulton the agenda of science. While sex has apparently become less of a taboo today, the idea of a serious scientic assessment of supernormal phenomena is still out of the question in the mind of most academics. Science and the occult pose more or less blurred concepts located on extreme ends of the spectrum of rationality, the latter being a semantic vehicle to dene what science is not. Hence, while the emergence of sexology in Schrenck-Notzings time suggests an increasing interest in sexuality as a scientic problem, his works in parapsychology, and particularly Phenomena of Materialisation with all its talk not only about female orices, the obvious analogues between the painful and exhausting process of materialisations with the process of birth, but also teleplasm, telekinesis, and materialisations, might just have been too much for early 20th century Germans.18 At any rate, a sympathetic reading of Schrenck-Notzing, whom his British colleagues called Shrink-at-Nothing, suggests a remarkable lack of squeamishness in terms of his discussion of scientic questions as well as sexual matters. Alan Gauld, for example, acknowledges his notably modern criticism of the condemnation of male and female non-marital sexual intercourse (Gauld, 1992: 483). Society, Schrenck-Notzing believed, should provide conditions for expressing sexuality and pursuing intellectual freedom safely, and as frank as he was in his sexological writingsaccording to Gauld, he always called a spade a spade, or at any rate a rutrum (ibid.)so was his demand of the freedom to investigate phenomena considered as intellectually obscene by orthodox science. Also, the case of Schrenck-Notzing might be approached as a prime example of a medic who strived to understand the enigma of the efcacy of mental contents on the body. Hence, his methodologically pushing the boundaries of mind and matter to the utmost extremes in his experiments with teleplasm and telekinesis may be interpreted in a medical context. Schrenck-Notzings ideas on the power of thought to imprint matter were far from new and on a conceptual line with previous studies involving attempts at photographing thoughts and other subtle energetic efuences, for example, in Germany and Austria by Baron Karl von Reichenbach, and in France by Hyppolyte Baraduc, Louis Darget, Albert de Rochas, and Jules-Bernard Luys (Alvarado, 2006). That these concepts wont go away either is shown in the work of the Russian Semyon Kirlian in the 1940s and 19 the thoughtography of the American Ted Serios in the 1960s (Eisenbud, 1967). In Schrenck-Notzings days, the importance of bodily efcacious mental states had been increasingly disregarded by the mechanistic framework of science and medicine. It was no accident that Driesch welcomed Schrenck-Notzings researches as further empirical evidence for his vitalist philosophy, while the Baron, on the other hand, could thoroughly use the public support of an intellectual gure such as Driesch (on Drieschs involvement in parapsychology, see also Wolffram, 2003).

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Obviously, the example of Schrenck-Notzing also feeds into the wider question about the role of controversies around psychical research for the making of nascent university psychology. The issue of how exactly Wilhelm Wundts rebuttal of hypnotism and mediumshipelds Schrenck-Notzing was particularly concerned withas legitimate areas of scientic psychology steered the making of university psychology still waits to be addressed in detail. Mnsterbergs strategic debunking of Eusapia Palladino and its signicance for the professionalisation of experimental psychology in the USA relates to the same question (Mnsterberg, 1910; for an assessment of this episode, see Blum, 2007), as does the episode of the deliberate compromising of William James medium, Leonora Piper, by Stanley G. Hall (on William James, Mrs. Piper, and S. G. Hall, see Blum, 2007; Coon, 1992; Lang, 1911). Also, the case of Schrenck-Notzing, and psychical research in general, offers rich historical material for students of the sociology of science. According to magician James Randi, one of the celebrated spokesmen of reason and media experts on all matters occult, who is also supported and cited by academics, Schrenck has to be remembered as an undistinguished German medical doctor, and a dilettante without peer. Attendants to Schrenck-Notzingss sittings were people who could afford the heavy fees demanded by the performers. He itted blissfully from medium to medium and pompously declared them all to be absolutely genuine. Despite Schrenck-Notzings obvious lack of expertise and his consummate, willful gullibility, Randi complains, his observations were quoted by others and accepted as positive evidence of the phenomena he 20 was presenting (Randi, 1995). Interestingly, sociologists of science, usually unfamiliar with the historiography of psychical research, have identied the same characteristics of argumentation that Schrenck-Notzing and colleagues had bemoaned almost a century ago, in Randi and his fellows at the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry (CSI) and similar organisations, who continue to inform the public image on what science is and is not (Bauer, 2001; Collins & Pinch, 1982; Hess, 1992, 1993; Pinch & Collins, 1984). Finally, given the range and calibre of men and women of late 19th and early 20th century science connected to Schrenck-Notzing, new avenues in the history and historiography of science might open up. A systematic study of the international network Schrenck-Notzing was part of might yield surprising insights about what we still tend to think are xed and rigid boundaries of science. Notes
1

C. G. Chaddock, who had translated Krafft-Ebings Psychopathia Sexualis into English, was also responsible for the translation of Schrenck-Notzings book, published as Therapeutic Suggestion in Psychopathia Sexualis (Schrenck-Notzing, 1901). Unlike Krafft-Ebing and Moll, Schrenck-Notzing held that sexual perversion, rather than being a congenital pathology, was a cultivated instinct, with the pathology only consisting in a weakness of the will to resist deviant urges.

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On the history of the SPR, see Gauld (1968), Hamilton (2009), and Oppenheim (1985). On the Munich Psychological Society and its rival, the Berlin Gesellschaft fr Experimental-Psychology (Society for Experimental Psychology), see Kaiser (2008), Kurzweg (1976), Tischner (1960), and Treitel (2004). Forerunners in the study of physical mediumship were eminent Victorian scientists such as Sir William Crookes and Cromwell Varley. See, for example, Crookes (1874), London Dialectical Society (1871), and Noakes (2004, 2007, 2008). More recent historically informed discussions of hauntings and poltergeist phenomena are F. Moser (1950), which includes a contribution by Carl G. Jung on a haunting episode witnessed by himself (pp. 253260), and Gauld and Cornell (1979). Hans Bender, the most important proponent of German parapsychology after SchrenckNotzing, favoured a psychodynamic Jungian approach to poltergeist phenomena; see, e.g., Bender (1979). On Marie and Pierre Curies sittings with Palladino, see Richet (1923: 413, 496497). Important studies of Palladino are Feilding (1963), Feilding and Marriott (1911), Feilding et al. (1909), and Lodge (1894). For useful summaries of the Palladino case, see Alvarado (1993), Braude (1997), and Richet (1923). I am citing from the enlarged English edition, Phenomena of Materialisation (SchrenckNotzing, 1920a). Translations from original German sources are mine. When the mediums split personalities, or spirits, attempted to lecture on spiritualism in Schrenck-Notzings sittings, however, he would ask them to leave (Walther, 1929: 200). For an excellent recent discussion of hypnotically induced bodily effects and other controversial psychophysiological phenomena, see Kelly (2007). A previous example of Schrenck-Notzings awareness of the importance of involving a wider audience and inuencing public opinion was the performance of the hypnotised dream dancer Magdeleine G. at the Munich Schauspielhaus from February to April 1904, a well-attended public event organised by Schrenck (Schrenck-Notzing, 1904). Magdeleine G. delivered her celebrated dramatic performances in hypnotic trance, thus serving as an object of study for artists as well as psychologists. Electric controls had already been employed by William Crookes and Cromwell Varley in their sittings with Florence Cook, D. D. Home and other mediums in the late 19th century. See also the ingenious devices built by Schrenck-Notzings colleague Fritz Grunewald (1920, 1925), which, however, mainly served to objectify the effects rather than to rule out fraud (I am grateful to Peter Mulacz for pointing out this distinction). Mann detailed his experiences with the Schneider brothers in his essay Okkulte Erlebnisse (Mann, 1924) and used them for his novel Der Zauberberg (The Magic Mountain). See also Mulacz (2008). Hans Driesch had used the Aristotelian term entelechy to name the teleological formative principle behind biological development, while lan vital was borrowed from Drieschs French vitalist comrade-in-arms, Henri Bergson (1907/1931). Driesch welcomed parapsychology in general, and the phenomena of materialisations in particular, to bolster his vitalist philosophy. See, e.g., Driesch (1923, 1925a,b). Driesch and Bergson were also members of the British SPR and served as presidents. Bernoulli, a close friend of Schrenck-Notzing, continued research in physical mediumship after the latters death. See, e.g., Bernoulli (1931), on a series of sittings attended by Eugen Bleuler and Carl G. Jung.

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On Jungs interest and involvement in parapsychology, see, e.g., Jaff (1960, 1968: 1553). See also Mulacz (1995) for interesting details on a rather unknown medium investigated by Schrenck-Notzing, Bleuler, and Jung. Schrenck-Notzings photographic approach might have been inspired by Charcots colleague and PR man Paul Richer, who was largely responsible for the photographic construction of hysteria as a scientic fact at the Salptrire (Didi-Huberman, 2003). Among the recurring correlates of teleplastic phenomena (apart from physical and psychical exhaustion, weight loss, strong aberrations of the pulse, extreme respiration rates without hyperventilation, pain when teleplasm is touched, shock and nose bleeding after sudden exposures of the substance to light, decrease of room temperature, clonic spasms), were erections and ejaculations in male mediums, and the impression of giving birth in female as well as male mediums. Now largely forgotten important discussions of the relationship between occultism and sex are, e.g., Freimark (1909) and Mattiesen (1925). See also Laurent and Nagour (1903/2001). I am grateful to Peter Mulacz for this reference. See also the Jule Eisenbud Collection on Ted Serios and Thoughtographic Photography at the University of Maryland, USA, http://aok.lib.umbc.edu/specoll/Eisenbud/ index.php (accessed on 21 February 2009). I was using the online edition available on Randis homepage at http://www. randi.org/encyclopedia/Schrenck-Notzing,%20Dr.%20Albert%20Freiherr%20Von.html (accessed on 22 Jan 2009).

Acknowledgments I am grateful to Carlos Alvarado, Mary Rose Barrington, Eberhard Bauer, Stephen Braude, Gerd Hvelmann, Peter Mulacz, and Sonu Shamdasani, whose thoughtful feedback on the original manuscript signicantly improved the nal article. References
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Marco Levi Bianchini: A Forgotten Italian Supporter of Parapsychology

Massimo Biondi
Gestioni e Servizi Editoriali via Corridoni 14, 00046 Grottaferrata, Rome, Italy e-mail: massimo_biondi@fastwebnet.it

AbstractFor different reasons, many of the past Italian psychical researchers are only half known or are completely forgotten today. This is the case of the neuropsychiatrist Marco Levi Bianchini, who worked in the rst half of the 20th century. Beside his conventional clinical activity, he was engaged in a lot of different topics, but at present he is remembered rst of all to have been the rst, or one of the rst, professionals to introduce and promote psychoanalytic doctrine in Italy. Levi Bianchini was very interested in, and looked with favour on, metapsychical issues, and in particular psi cognitive phenomena. He published a few papers on telepathic and precognitive dreams, and he adhered to the ideas that Cazzamalli was developing about some asserted brain radio-emissions that should be able to explain effects such as dowsing, telepathy, and precognition. More than his original contributions to the parapsychology literature, an undoubted historical merit of Marco Levi Bianchini was his job as a book reviewer, which he performed during all his life, introducing to the academic and psychiatric circles in Italy hundreds of international and national books on parapsychological topics, therefore greatly promoting this culture in the country. Keywords: Marco Levi Bianchinihistory of parapsychologyItaly

Italian psychical research comprises many interesting gures who have been forgotten from the historical record (Biondi, 1988; Biondi & Tressoldi, 2007: 6879). One of these individuals is psychiatrist Marco Levi Bianchini (M.L.B., 18751961). I present here a brief overview of his contributions to psychical research. M.L.B. is generally credited to have been one of the rst scholars who introduced psychoanalytic themes in Italy.1 He became familiar with Freudian works in the early 1910s and published a monograph about hysteria and sexuality in which he discussed psychoanalytic concepts (Levi Bianchini, 1913). In 1920 he initiated a psychiatric journal, the Archivio di Neurologia e Psichiatria [Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry]; in the following year, he added the expression e Psicoanalisi [and Psychoanalysis] to the title. Other journals that he later founded had similar designations. In 1922 M.L.B. participated in the Berlin 323

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Meeting of Psychoanalysis, where Freud was present (Levi Bianchini, 1922a,b), and in 1925 he established and directed an Italian Society of Psychoanalysis. In subsequent years, he translated into Italian and published some works of Sigmund Freud. He defended psychoanalysis from attacks originating from Catholic and philosophical (idealistic) circles, and continued to promote it incessantly until 1938, when newly introduced racist laws forced every activity related to this discipline to be stopped. Psychoanalysis was considered to be too closely connected to Judaism and, therefore, many Jewish psychoanalysts and psychiatrists were forced to ee Italy (as Edoardo Weiss, Cesare Musatti, and Emilio Servadio) or to retire (Gustavo Modena) (Accerboni, 2002; Micela, 1979; Prodi, 2002; Rocca, 2003). M.L.B., who had been a fascist but was of Jewish descent, decided to resign as chief of the Asylum of Nocera Inferiore (a little town in the south of Italy) and to halt his scientic activities, including his involvement with psychoanalysis. He devoted himself to the private practice of neuropsychiatry. After World War II, he asked to be reinstated as chief of the Asylum, but because another psychiatrist had been named chief in the interim, he was appointed only as second chief. This state of affairs created serious difculties for him, so he left the Asylum and, until his death, dedicated himself mainly to writing scientic papers and paying less attention to psychoanalytic issues. It appears that he never practiced psychoanalysis, and that he barely used its concepts in his therapeutic activity (Ceccarelli, 1999; Galiani & Cotrufo, 2007). In the relevant number of studies regarding this gure recently published, almost nothing has been discussed about another one of M.L.B.s lifelong concerns, i.e., his involvement in psychical research or, as it was preferentially named in Italy at that time, metapsychics, from the term proposed by Charles Richet in 1905 (Alvarado, 2008). It seems that he never performed experimental research in this area, even though he claimed to be a supporter of this line of inquiry, nor was he engaged in committees or societies devoted to parapsychology. Instead, he published texts and showed much interest toward topics in this eld. These interests included mediumship, spontaneous psi phenomena, dowsing, and research on brain neurophysiology during exceptional experiences, as well as spiritic ideas (which he never had), and theories based on another physics. During the years 19201938, M.L.B. authored in the Archivio di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi, and subsequently in other journals, more than 10,000 (10,000!) book reviews about a lot of topics that he classied under areas. One of these was Area 3: General and Experimental Psychology, Development Psychology, Psychophysiology, Pedagogy, Psychotherapy, Psycho-pedagogy, Applied Psychology, Philosophy, Metapsychics. Here, he introduced to Italian academic circles many books published all over the world (M.L.B. knew many languages and wrote reviews of books published in French, German, English, and Spanish). These reviews, for the most part brief, usually contained a synthesis of the books contents and ended with a concise judgement about the value of the work, and the possibility that it may promote further research and progress in the involved eld. As well as obscure and neglected books, he also considered many

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famous ones, like Flammarions La mort et son mystre (19211922, reviewed 1923), Schrenck-Notzings Phenomena of Materialization (1923), Rhines Extrasensory Perception (1934) and New Frontiers of the Mind (in Italian as Le frontiere della mente, 1950), Richets Trait de Mtapsychique (1922, reviewed 1935), Palms Metapsiquica y Espiritismo (1950), Emile Tizans Sur la piste de lhomme inconnu (1952), and so on. Among the more distinguished Italian authors he reviewed, there were scholars such as Ernesto Bozzano (various monographs published between 1929 and 1937), William Mackenzie (Metapsichica Moderna, 1923), Emilio Servadio (La Ricerca Psichica, 1930), and Cesare Vesme (A History of Experimental Spiritualism, 1931). Furthermore, as editor in chief of his journals, M.L.B. opened their pages to contributions by other authors about psychic, or occult, issues. Among the papers specically addressing the eld, some were particularly relevant, such as those authored by the engineers L. Batoni and Nicola Brunori proposing that, because the human body acts as a radio, supernormal experiences could be explained in this way (Batoni, 1932; Brunori & Torrisi, 1930). There were also papers by the Hungarian physician A. Funk, discussing hypnosis (Funk, 1935); by the Argentinian physician and parapsychologist Orlando Canavesio, discussing his studies on electroencephalographic records during metapsychic experiences (Biondi, 2009; Canavesio, 1955a,b); and by the psychologist Ettore Patini, reporting on the phenomena of a famous Italian psychic (Patini, 1953). The psychoanalyst and parapsychologist Emilio Servadio, author of a lot of book 2 reviews, wrote about paranormal dreams (Servadio, 1961), a subject that the physician Giuseppe Marulli, of the Nocera Asylum, also dealt with more than one time (Marulli, 1951 [republished in 1953], 1965). The dowser and agronomist Luigi Caccia published some papers on water dowsing, a phenomenon that national political authorities viewed with great interest in those years when the Italian forces were engaged in the conquest of desert territories in Africa (Caccia, 1933, 1934, 1935). In 1930, Levi Bianchini published a short paper (the abstract of a lecture addressed to the rst International Congress on Mental Health in Washington, DC) on the possibility that radiations emanating from the human body could be used for therapeutic aims (Levi Bianchini & Moriondi, 1930). In this proposal, he referred to the ideas and experimental research of another Italian neuropsychiatrist, Ferdinando Cazzamalli, in those years working on the possibility to instrumentally show brain radio-emissions during abnormal states of the mind, a theory Brunori also supported (Brunori, 1927, 1952; Brunori & Torrisi, 1930; Cazzamalli, 1929). From the inception of the Italian Society of Metapsychics, established by Cazzamalli, M.L.B. followed its activities, but it is dubious if he ever attended local or national meetings organized by that Society. The fact is that in the rst issue of Metapsichica, the ofcial journal of the Society, there is a paper by M.L.B., reporting a few cases of clairvoyant and precognitive dreams experienced by different subjects (Levi Bianchini, 1946). After a detailed report of these

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experiences, the author tried to answer some questions, and in particular, What, if any, is the difference between normal, neurotic, and metapsychic dreams? From where do the metapsychic dreams originate? About the rst problem, M.L.B. noted that the clairvoyant dreams he reported possessed the same features as the ordinary ones. They were clear and had a direct meaning, without the changes and distortions claimed by psychoanalysts. In other words, they had a manifest sense, but not a hidden content. Similar to the dreams of neurotics, however, the metapsychic dreams occurred to subjects in a strong emotional state. All of this, M.L.B. concluded, points to the midbrain, the seat of instincts and emotions, as the place where supernormal dreams originate (Levi Bianchini, 1946). Three years later, a shorter version of this paper was published in the medico-parapsychological journal Canavesio established in Argentina (Levi Bianchini, 1949). In 1950, another paper appeared, again in Metapsichica, relating new paranormal dreams M.L.B. had recently found. Different from the previous ones, these dreams were mostly symbolic and obscure, so M.L.B. had been compelled to resort to psychoanalytic tools to understand and clarify their dynamics. In the references of the paper, other than many metapsychic works, psychological and psychoanalytic texts were cited, including books and articles by S. Freud, E. Servadio, H. J. Urban, N. Fodor, J. Eisenbud, and G. Murphy (Levi Bianchini, 1950). It was probably to promote knowledge of metapsychic topics in the psychiatric community that M.L.B. published the same paper in the journal he directed at the time (Levi Bianchini, 1951). There, also, he communicated the case of three precognitive dreams that occurred during the same night to various members of one family (Levi Bianchini & Marulli, 1951). M.L.B. died abruptly in 1961, due to a cardiac crisis. No obituaries, articles, or papers about him appeared then or later in the specialized or popular press, discussing or remembering his low-key interest in parapsychology. After having contributed widely to propagating parapsychological culture in Italian academic circles, in particular between psychiatrists, neurologists, psychologists, and psychoanalysts, Marco Levi Bianchini was suddenly forgotten and his name never surfaced again as regards parapsychology. Notes
1

Among the Italian professional people that were rst fascinated by Freudian theory, and authors of papers and books on the issue (not necessarily practicing psychoanalysis with therapeutic aims), historians remember the physicians Edoardo Weiss and Luigi Assagioli and the psychiatrists Sante de Sanctis (the rst one to become professor of psychology), Luigi Baroncini, and Gustavo Modena. Of these, Baroncini and Modena were the rst authors in Italy to publish scientic papers on psychoanalysis, in 1908 and 1909. Weiss was the only one to become a psychoanalyst (Accerboni, 2002; Micela, 1979; Prodi, 2002; Rocca, 2003). It may be interesting to note that during the 1930s Servadio published short papers and book reviews about psychoanalysis in M.L.B.s journal. After World War II, when he

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came back to Italy, he collaborated with another journal directed by M.L.B., Annali di Neuropsichiatria e Psicoanalisi, where he published papers and dozens of book reviews, many of which were about psychology, psychoanalysis, and parapsychology. Servadio was a polyglot, so he could review works in French, English, and German.

Acknowledgment The author wishes to thank Carlos S. Alvarado for his useful editorial suggestions. References
Accerboni, A. M. (2002). Fatti e personaggi negli esordi della psicoanalisi in Italia [Events and people at the beginnings of psychoanalysis in Italy]. Rivista Sperimentale di Freniatria, 126(1/2), 125136. Alvarado, C. S. (2008) Aspects of the history of parapsychology: II. Charles Richet (18501935) work in psychical research. Parapsychology Foundation. Available at: http://www.pyceum.org/447. html. Accessed March 13, 2009. Batoni, L. (1932). Sulla possibilit di produrre e di utilizzare nel campo psichico, a scopo diagnostico e terapeutico, determinate manifestazioni dellenergia radiante [On the possibility of stimulating and using some of the bodily radio emissions for diagnostic and therapeutic aims]. Archivio Generale di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 13, 58. Biondi, M. (1988). Tavoli e Medium: Storia dello Spiritismo in Italia [Tables and Mediums: History of Spiritism in Italy]. Rome: Gremese. Biondi, M. (2009). Orlando Canavesio en Italia: una nota bibliograca [Orlando Canavesio in Italy: A bibliographical note]. Available at: http://www.alipsi.com.ar/publicaciones_ipp.asp. Accessed February 24, 2009. Biondi, M., & Tressoldi, P. (2007). Parapsicologia [Parapsychology]. Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino. Brunori, N. (1927). La Medicina e la Teoria Elettronica della Materia [Medicine and the theory of electricity]. Milano: Istituto Editoriale Scientico. Brunori, N. (1952). I fenomeni umani di ricezione e le irradiazioni umane [Human perception and radio-emissions]. Metapsichica, 7(4), 193207. Brunori, N., & Torrisi S. (1930). Il corpo umano considerato come un circuito di radio e come un oscillatore ad alta frequenza [The human body as a radio machine and a high frequency oscillator]. Archivio Generale di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 11, 149165. Caccia, L. (1933). Il fenomeno rabdico un fenomeno oscillatorio [Dowsing is an oscillating phenomenon]. Archivio Generale di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 14, 323325. Caccia, L. (1934). Radiazioni della materia in rapporto ai poteri rabdici dellorganismo umano [Radio-emissions from matter and dowsing powers]. Archivio Generale di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 15, 131133. Caccia, L. (1935). I vari orientamenti degli studi sul fenomeno rabdico [Many ideas regarding dowsing]. Archivio Generale di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 16, 426429. Canavesio, O. (1955a). Elettroencefalograa negli stati metapsichici [Electroencephalographic records during metapsychic states]. Annali di Neuropsichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 2, 2132. Canavesio, O. (1955b). Metapsicologia o parapsicologia [A different psychology or parapsychology]. Annali di Neuropatologia e Psicoanalisi, 2, 141170. Cazzamalli, F. (1929). Esperienze, argomenti e problemi di biosica cerebrale [Research, issues and problems of brain bio-physics]. Quaderni di Psichiatria, 16, 81105. Ceccarelli, G. (1999). Alle origini della psicoanalisi in Italia: Marco Levi Bianchini [At the beginnings of psychoanalysis in Italy: Marco Levi Bianchini]. In Soro, G. (Ed.), La psicologia in Italia: una storia in corso (pp. 205249) [Italian psychology: A history in progress]. Milano: Franco Angeli. Funk, A. (1935). Ricerche critiche intorno ai concetti fondamentali dello ipnotismo [Analysis and research about the basic concepts of hypnosis]. Archivio Generale di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 16, 253260. Galiani, R., & Cotrufo, P. (2007). Les ches mdicales de Marco Levi Bianchini: premiers tmoignages crits dune histoire de la psychoanalyse italienne? [The case sheets of Marco Levi Bianchini: First written evidence of the presence of psychoanalysis in Italy?]. Topique, 98, 99112.

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Levi Bianchini, M. (1913). Listerismo dalle Antiche alle Moderne Dottrine [Hysteria: Old and new ideas]. Padova, Italy: Drucker. Levi Bianchini, M. (1922a). La dinamica dei psichismi secondo la Psicoanalisi e lo stato attuale di questa scienza in Italia. Comunicazione al VII Congresso Internazionale di Psicoanalisi, Berlino, 2527 settembre 1922 [Psychological dynamics, as viewed by the psychoanalysts, and the state of psychoanalysis in Italy]. Archivio Generale di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 3, 4058. Levi Bianchini, M. (1922b). Il VII Congresso Psicoanalitico Internazionale (Berlino, 2527 settembre 1922) [The VIIth International Congress of Psychoanalysis]. Archivio Generale di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 3, 7376. Levi Bianchini, M. (1946). Sogno metasico: psicobiosica e mesencefalo [Metapsychic dreams: Psycho-bio-physics and the midbrain]. Metapsichica, 1(1), 2845. Levi Bianchini, M. (1949). Sueo metapsquico, psicobiofsica y mesencfalo [Metapsychic dreams: Psycho-bio-physics and the midbrain]. Revista Mdica de Metapsquica, 2, 149163. Levi Bianchini, M. (1950). Ulteriori contributi al problema dei sogni metapsichici e della psicobiosica [New contributions to the issue of metapsychic dreams and to psycho-bio-physics]. Metapsichica, 5(4), 2335. Levi Bianchini, M. (1951). Ulteriori contributi al problema dei sogni metapsichici e della psicobiosica [New contributions to the issue of metapsychic dreams and to psycho-bio-physics]. Rivista di Psicopatologia, Neuropatologia e Psicoanalisi, 19(2), 1631. Levi Bianchini, M., & Marulli, G. (1951). Sopra una rarissima forma di sogno collettivo premonitorio avente per obbietto due statuette di metallo della Vergine Maria e di Ges Cristo. Contributo allo studio e alla letteratura dei sogni metapsichici [A rarely occurring collective dream, of precognitive-type, regarding two metal statuettes portraying Mary and Jesus Christ. A contribution to the literature and the study of metapsychic dreams]. Rivista di Psicopatologia, Neuropatologia e Psicoanalisi, 19(3/4), 135137. Levi Bianchini, M., & Moriondi, C. (1930). Le radiazioni dellatmosfera umana in rapporto alla diagnosi precoce della personalit psichica e psicopatica ed alla prolassi ed igiene mentale. Nota preventiva e comunicazione al 1 Congresso Internazionale di Igiene Mentale, Washington, 510 maggio 1930 [Human radio-emissions are possibly useful for the early diagnosis of normal and pathological states of the personality, for prevention, and in mental hygiene]. Archivio Generale di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 11, 4142. Marulli, G. (1951). Telepatia e sogni premonitori. Alcuni casi storici [Telepathic and precognitive dreams. A few historical cases]. Rivista di Psicopatologia, Neuropatologia e Psicoanalisi, 19(3/4), 131133. Marulli, G. (1953). Il sogno telepatico di Giuseppina Perlasco. Contributo alla documentazione dei fenomeni metapsichici [A telepathic dream of Giuseppina Perlasco. A contribution to the materials regarding metapsychic phenomena]. Rivista di Psicopatologia, Neuropsichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 21, 419422. Marulli, G. (1965). Telepatia e sogni premonitori. Alcuni casi storici. Contributo alla documentazione dei fenomeni metapsichici [Telepathic and precognitive dreams. A few historical cases. A contribution for the archives of metapsychic phenomena]. Annali di Neuropsichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 12, 200202. Micela, R. (1979). Gli albori della psicoanalisi in Italia (19081938). Il fascismo, la chiesa cattolica, la cultura ufciale di fronte alla nuova scienza [The inception of psychoanalysis in Italy. Fascism, the Catholic Church, and the main culture face to the new science]. Psicoterapia e Scienze Umane, 4, 114. Patini, E. (1953). Al di l della scienza. Osservazioni di un psicologo neuropsichiatrico sul Mago Achille DAngelo [Beside science. A neuropsychiatrists study on the psychic Achille DAngelo]. Rivista di Psicopatologia, Neuropsichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 21, 365413. Prodi, M. P. (2002). Lingresso della psicoanalisi in Italia letto attraverso la Rivista Sperimentale di Freniatria (19061938) [The coming of psychoanalysis in Italy, as it can be viewed through the journal Rivista Sperimentale di Freniatria]. Rivista Sperimentale di Freniatria, 126(1/2), 137154. Rocca, G. (2003). Limpossibile anormalit, limpossibile integrazione. Gustavo Modena e le origini della psicoanalisi in Italia [Impossible abnormality, impossible combination Gustavo Modena and the beginnings of psychoanalysis in Italy]. Psicoterapia e Scienze Umane, 41(1), 97111. Servadio, E. (1961). Sogno normale e sogno paranormale [Normal and paranormal dreams]. Annali di Neuropsichiatria e Psicoanalisi, 8, 111122.

Journal of Scientic Exploration, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 329342, 2009

0892-3310/09

COMMENTARIES

Critical Commentary on Ervin Laszlos Paper In Defense of Intuition

Dr. Laszlos hypothesis (2009) is in my opinion appealing on many levels. He proposes that phenomena of apparent transpersonal communication between human beings are due to the intermediary of information-carrying holograms in the reactive quantum vacuum produced by human brain activity. He also suggests that valid information regarding the world in general is available through the same mechanism, on the grounds that all material objects excite the ground state of the [zero point] eld and produce further such holograms. On this hypothesis we are literally immersed in a sea of information, with the capacity for accessing that information as well as producing more of it by our own thought processes. To cite just a few areas in which his hypothesis would in theory have considerable relevance, I would mention the concept of instinct as a generic behavior trait of populations of animals, the relation between instinct and psychological archetype as theorized by C. G. Jung, the theory of morphic resonance proposed by Rupert Sheldrake, and of course ESP phenomena and telepathy. His theory also could impact the phenomenon of group coordination such as team behavior and the coherence found in a jazz ensemble or a symphony orchestra. Thus some, like myself, might heartily wish that Laszlos theory might be subject to verication. That said, I nd the present paper, as well as its background in Laszlos other publications, problematic in at least one crucial respect. In his seminal work on the logic of inquiry, John Dewey made this still-cogent observation: Whatever is offered as the ground of a theory must possess the property of veriable existence in some domain, no matter how hypothetical it is in reference to the eld in which it is proposed to apply it (Dewey, 1938: 3). If this condition is not met one must consider the hypothesis to be ad hoc. It is my opinion that despite the attractiveness of Laszlos theory, in its current state it is fundamentally awed for the reason that the phenomena the hypothesis is invoked to explain, appears to be the only evident means of verifying the hypothesis. If human brains and nervous systems, or even the entire human organism, are offered as the only means of detection of Laszlos hypothetical informationcarrying quantum holograms, then it would appear to be theoretically impossible to achieve independent verication of the existence of such holograms. It does not matter how many cases one may cite of apparent coherence of, e.g., brain activity between members of a meditation group or between a focusing healer and the person to be healed, because these instances of coordination or coherent psychic or brain phenomena are what is proposed to be explained. 329

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To take one example, Laszlo cites the experiments by Nitamo Montecucco nding that EEG patterns become synchronized over a group of meditators with 50 to 70 percent coordination without sensory contact. Laszlo precedes this citation with the at out assertion that, A transfer of information through phaseconjugate quantum resonance allows . . . nonlocal, so-called transpersonal communication. In other words he gives the appearance that the cited experiments are in fact cases supporting his hypothesis. But surely he is here committing the ad hoc error. Although his hypothesis is proposed as an explanation of such phenomena there is no verication that it is in fact the causal factor. Aside from the fundamental problem of verifying the existence of quantum holograms, there could be other explanations for such 50 to 70 percent agreement, including simply the fact that all subjects are engaged in a similar activity whose physiological/ psychological nature is not entirely known. None of his subsequent discussion of entanglement and quantum coherence does anything to support the initial hypothesis. The putative holograms constitute, I should think, a radical step beyond types of coherence phenomena and quantum eld characteristics currently identiable by physics. In my view therefore the onus for Laszlos theory is that he must identify some independent means of verifying the existence and nature of the inferred quantum holograms and of independently verifying the supposed causal relation between the hypothetical information carried by such holograms and human cognition. I see nothing in this paper to indicate how such a program of research might be carried forward. STANLEY V. MCDANIEL Professor of Philosophy Emeritus Sonoma State University Rohnert Park, California stanmcd2@sbcglobal.net References
Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Henry Holt & Company. Laszlo, E. (2009). In defense of intuition: Exploring the physical foundations of spontaneous apprehension. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 23, 5158.

Comments on Ervin Laszlos In Defense of Intuition

Ervin Laszlo (2009) makes two central claims. First, he says that human experience includes spontaneous apprehensions that have cognitive contents that are about the world but do not reach us via anything we might think of as ordinary sense perception. Though Laszlo wants to avoid disputes about extrasensory perception by stipulating that he will not use the word perception to

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refer to these purported spontaneous apprehensions, the experiences he discusses are obviously what many people call ESP. Second, he says that these spontaneous apprehensions might very well result from space- and time-transcending transfers of information made possible by nonlocal quantum entanglement effects of various sorts. According to Laszlo, there is good reason to suspect that we receive information about the world via a process that involves cytoskeletal structures in our brains receiving quantum-resonancebased information, and this information is what gives spontaneous apprehensions their vague, difcult-to-verbalize contents. In effect, Laszlo is suggesting that parts of the brain itself act as a sense organ, albeit one that receives information via a means of transmission that is arguably much stranger than those involved in our other sense modalities. If Laszlos account is correct, then it has profound implications. One important upshot of Laszlos paper is that if he succeeds in identifying a plausible means by which the extra-sensory information transfers required for spontaneous apprehensions could occur, he thereby makes the claim that there are spontaneous apprehensions in the rst place more palatable to skeptics, since a plausible explanation of how they get their contents would make the available evidence that there are any such spontaneous apprehensions much more epistemically respectable. Laszlo says that spontaneous apprehensions seem to convey information on the world beyond the subject regardless of time and distance. It sometimes appears as if he is thinking of spontaneous apprehensions as experiences that seem to the very people who have them to involve content that must have reached them via a mechanism that involves faster-than-the-speed-of-light transfers of information. If soand assuming for the moment that this is supposed to be a dening feature of spontaneous apprehensionsthe range of experiences in question is quite narrow. After all, while some people certainly do have experiences that seem to them to convey information that could not have been obtained via normal channels of perception, most of these experiences do not also seem from the rstperson perspective to convey information that has reached them in a way that exceeds the speed of light. (Indeed, it is not fully clear what it would mean for it to seem to a person that she has received information that has reached her via a faster-than-the-speed-of-light process.) Thus, in an important way Laszlo does his project a disservice by sometimes appearing to build in to his characterization of spontaneous apprehensions themselves the notion that these experiences contain information that is somehow space and time transcendent. I suspect that what he really has in mind are simply experiences that seem, to the person who has them, to involve cognitive content that could not have reached the mind via any known, scientically respectable channels. Laszlos proposed mechanismor, better yet (given the strangeness of quantum entanglement), his proposed meansby which spontaneous apprehensions get produced involves quantum entanglement, and this means does transcend space and time in important ways. Importantly, however, Laszlo could be correct (although I am skeptical) about the space and time transcending nature

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of the means of producing spontaneous apprehensions without the spontaneous apprehensions themselves seeming from the rst-person perspective to involve any content that transcends space and time. Lets now consider Laszlos proposed explanation of the occurrence of spontaneous apprehensions in more detail. Suppose that quantum entanglement does in fact serve to get information of some sort from remote regions of the world into the brain in ways that bypass normal sensory inputs. Assume for the sake of argument that quantum entanglement is as robust a phenomenon as Laszlos account needs it to be, and that the microtrabecular lattice structures in our brains in fact are informed in some way via this quantum entanglement. Even if all that occurs in the way Laszlo describes, we are still a good distance away from a workable account of how purported spontaneous apprehensions could get the contents they are supposed to have, for reasons I will spell out in what follows. Laszlo invokes a concept of information drawn from quantum theory, and he speaks in grand terms about information embedded in nature. It is not clear exactly what is gained by talking of information being embedded in nature in the ways he does, nor is it clear that the same concept of information is at stake when theorists of quantum entanglement talk about information and when cognitive scientists talk about information when discussing mentality.1 Is this quantumresonancebased information some sort of merely physical, structural property of the world, such that saying that this information has been transmitted from one location to another is merely saying that there is some sort of causal connection between the two locations, or that some sort of physical isomorphism has been created? If so, then the mere transmission of information between one location and another does not give us even prima facie reason to think that there must be any conscious awareness at either end of the transmission, nor does it give us reason to think that the medium through which the transmission occurs must be active in any interesting way. Alternatively, it may be that Laszlos notion of information is much richer, and that the transmissions of information he discusses are supposed to involve something more than is conveyed by a mere causal connection or by the creation of a physical isomorphism between one location and another. It is not obvious what this something more would be, but Laszlos talk about quanta behav[ing] in a curiously informed manner, appearing to make choices of their own . . . and about such informed quanta either hav[ing] a form of consciousness of their own or being embedded in a complex informational environment that is somehow active rather than passive seems to indicate that he has something much more in mind than a bare-bones conception of information-as-physical-structure or information transmission as creation of a structural isomorphism. On a bare-bones, minimal conception of information and information transmission, claims about information being present throughout nature are interesting and provocative, to be surebut they are not claims about anything that would really resemble full-blown, conceptually-laden, language-like communication occurring either between parts of the inanimate world or between the inanimate

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world and a human mind. On the other hand, on a richer conception of information the claim that such information is present objectively in the world would indeed be the sort of claim that many scientists would dismiss as a problematically metaphysical proposition (regardless of whether those scientists are wedded to a widely-discredited view of science that sees proper science as being clearly distinguishable from metaphysics). Insofar as Laszlos concept of information is not perfectly clear, he is in that respect in good company: Many theorists invoke a concept of information that is potentially ambiguous between what I have described as a minimal, bare-bones notion and a richer notion, and this sort of ambiguity is not problematic in all cases. Indeed, in many contextsscientic, philosophical, etc.such ambiguities in the notion of information do not cause trouble. There is a potential danger in this case, however. Insofar as the notion of information at work in Laszlos project is minimal, then it seems plausible to think about information being objectively in nature and to think about there being unusual information transfers from the world-at-large to portions of the human brain. However, such bare-bones information in the world and such transfers of bare-bones information between the world-at-large and brains do not give us any specic reason to think that the information being received by the brain will show up in the cognitively accessible contents of mental states in the way in which information received by successful symbolic communication between two language users will be cognitively accessible to the person who has received such communication. On the other hand, insofar as the notion of information at work is a richer, more communication-like notion, then claims about information transfers between the world-at-large and the brain might lead us uncritically to think that receiving such information from the world will make it likely that the information will appear in cognitively accessible ways in a persons mental states. There is a risk that the ambiguities in the notion of information might be doing illicit work in making the account seem plausible.2 Nevertheless, however minimal or rich the concept of information is that is at work in Laszlos account, merely identifying a means by which such information is present in a persons brain is not the same as showing that the information in question plays any role in the cognitively contentful mental states the person has. Since Laszlos spontaneous apprehensions are contentful states (however vague and difcult to verbalize they may be), more needs to be said to establish that Laszlos quantum entanglement theory of spontaneous apprehensions is plausible. Consequently, the link between having the information present in the microtrabecular lattice networks in a persons brain and having that information show up in a persons mental states is one that I hope Laszlo focuses on as he further develops his account of spontaneous apprehensions. To see why merely getting information into the brain is not enough to give us reason to think that such information is cognitively or (if this is different) experientially accessible to the person, consider the following. In whatever relevant sense of the word we might wish to use information, all kinds of information is

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in every human brain. There is information about the physical structure of the brains synapses, for instance, contained in the very physical structure of those synapses. There is information about the molecular structures of the myriad proteins and other organic compounds located in the brain contained in the molecular structures of those proteins and compounds. There is information about the microtrabecular lattices in the cells of the brain contained in those very microtrabecular lattices. Ditto for any other physical feature of the brain or anything it contains that we might wish to pick out. There is also information in each human brain about the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens, about the toxicants and nutrients to which the particular brain has been exposed over time, about the history of personal relationships had over the course of a lifetime of the individual whose brain it is, etc. However, the mere fact that this information is, in some sense, in the brain does not give us even prima facie reason to think that it is cognitively accessible to the person whose brain it is. But perhaps the problem is with the kind of information I have just discussed; perhaps the examples I have just discussed all involve only what I above called bare-bones information. If so, suppose instead that the kind of information we are talking about is richer, such that there are information transfers between the world and the brain that are more obviously analogous to whatever it is that occurs when two people successfully communicate with each other using natural language. Even in this kind of case, the mere presence of such information in the brain is not sufcient for us to think that the information is going to show up in the contents of any mental states in any way. To see why, imagine that we want to tell someone who is a literate speaker of some natural languagesay, modern Mandarinthat it is currently raining, and (for whatever reason) we decide not simply to communicate it to her by uttering a sentence aloud, writing her an ordinary ink-on-paper note, or sending her an email to that effect. Instead, we decide to write the expression (xianzai xia yu le, meaning it is raining) in her brain. Specically, we decide to inscribe the Mandarin expression directly into the microtrabecular lattices in her neurons. Imagine we have some means of dyeing portions of the microtrabecular lattice networks in her neurons some bright, glow-in-the-dark color without doing our message recipient any signicant harm. We inscribe the expression in her brain, in such a way that a literate Chinese speaker looking at her brain in the right way (presumably under a microscope or scanner of some sort) would be able to read the expression. To cover all our bases, we inscribe the expression multiple times, at varying scales: In some cases, we inscribe the expression in very tiny font inside a single lament. In other cases, we inscribe the expression in a slightly larger font across multiple laments of the microtrabecular lattice network of a single neuron. In still other cases, we inscribe the expression in still larger fonts, such that to read it one would need to look across multiple neurons. Imagine further that the ink we have used shows up on whatever yet-to-bedeveloped brain scan we wish to use, such that we can look at displays of various brain scans and pick out the inscriptions of that we have produced

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in her brain. (I am surely glossing over technical details here, but none of these details is relevant to the point I wish to make.) Once we have written the message in her brain in all of these multiple ways, the information that it is raining is thereby in some sense in the persons brain. Suppose we then ask her to tell us what we wrote. Even without performing the experiment, we have good reason to believe that she will have absolutely no idea what the message saysat least not on the basis of what has been dyed into her microtubules. (Perhaps she will be savvy enough to guess the content of the message, given her knowledge of what the mornings weather report was and her further knowledge of what kinds of things people who would perform such an experiment would be likely to write.) The mere fact that some linguistic expression that otherwise could be successfully used to make a statement and convey richly conceptual information is now written in her brain does not in itself give her any access to the informational content of the statement we wished to make, even if she would be able to understand the message if she were to see the same inscription written in normal-sized font on a page in front of her. Of course, it need not be a linguistic expression that is written in her brain. The same problem would arise for any kind of sign or symbol we might inscribe in her brain in this way. Imagine that instead of inscribing in the persons brain, we use our special ink to draw various pictures of rain falling. We might even (somehow) embed a short video clip somewhere in her microtubules. (Here we would need something more sophisticated than our special inkthink of an InnerYouTube for the brain itself.) In each of these cases, the richly conceptual information about the weather would somehow be in the persons brain, but the mere fact that this information is in there in some way or other does not give us reason to think that it is cognitively accessible to the person, even in the form of vague, difcult-to-articulate mental states that are similar to the spontaneous apprehensions that Laszlo describes. Thus, even if Laszlo is correct when he suggests that quantum entanglement can somehow get information about the world into the microtubules of human brains in a way that bypasses all normal sensory channels, we do not thereby have good reason to think that such information could explain the contents that spontaneous apprehensions are supposed to have. Admittedly, it might seem as if information received via quantum entanglement at the microtrabecular lattice is somehow different in relevant ways than the information discussed in these extreme hypothetical cases of writing, drawing, or embedding video clips directly in a persons brain. For one thing, if Laszlo is right, such quantum-resonancebased information is actually in the microtrabecular lattice much of the time, and it is presumably a natural state of affairs. Still, that does not undermine the point just made: The mere presence of information in the brain, no matter how minimal or richly conceptual that information is, does not by itself give us any reason to think that that information is available to the person whose brain it is. It would have to be present in the brain in the right way. Thus, even if we accept Laszlos claim that quantum entanglement can get

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information (in some interesting sense of information) from the world-at-large into the brain of a human being, that is a long way from accepting that quantum entanglement provides a good explanation of the purported occurrence of extraordinary experiences that are supposed to have cognitive content that is in no way derived from ordinary sense perception. Of course, it is possible that merely having information about the world present in the microtrabecular lattice would make it, somehow, cognitively accessible to the person in whose brain that microtrabecular lattice resides. But that is not obvious, and the most prominent theories in the cognitive sciences that give importance to that microtrabecular lattice in accounts of consciousness and/or cognitive content are (I think it is safe to say) not yet widely accepted. More work needs to be done here. Laszlo is not completely silent about these issues, but what he says about the possible link between quantum-resonancebased information about the world being present in the microtrabecular lattice networks of a brain, on the one hand, and the cognitive contents of the spontaneous apprehensions that are supposed to be had by the person whose brain it is, on the other hand, is quite sketchy. Drawing on personal communication with E. Frecska, Laszlo discusses a directintuitive-nonlocal way of perceiving the world that involves communication between micro-lattices in the brain and the holographic inference patterns in the vacuum. He writes, Apprehension [including spontaneous apprehension] occurs when the frequencies are synchronous: then the quantum-level lattices resonate with the corresponding quantum holograms. In phase-conjugate resonance information is transferred from quantum holograms to the brain. If that actually happens, that is fascinatingbut we still will not thereby have an account that gives us reason to believe that the information from the quantum holograms is at that point cognitively accessible to the person whose brain it is. All we will have is reason to believe that portions of the micro-lattice networks are somehow receiving information from quantum holograms in the world-at-large. Laszlo goes on to cite work by Walter Schemp that might possibly be helpful in explaining how such quantum-resonancebased information in the microtrabecular lattice networks might make its way into purported spontaneous apprehensions, but the relevance of Schemps work is not clear from what Laszlo writes in this article. Much more attention to this particular problem of why we should expect that the mere presence of quantum-resonancebased information in the microtrabecular lattice of a persons brain would make it likely that such information would show up in any sort of mental state the person has would go a long way toward making Laszlos project more appealing. Laszlo concludes his article with a rather modest proposal, saying, [S]ustained research on the spontaneous nonlocal mode of apprehending the world beyond the brain and body would be justied and meaningful. Along the way, he talks about a reductionist-materialist culture inspired by classical science that rejects spontaneous apprehensions as hallucinations or fantasy. According to Laszlo, The materialist-reductionist paradigm of mainstream science discourages

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attempts to investigate spontaneous apprehensions . . . , and scientists who adhere to that paradigm [f]or the most part . . . content themselves with assuming [3] that evidence for such perception is illusory, or at best anecdotal. Given Laszlos self-conscious positioning of his proposal in opposition to a mainstream scientic community that is at best uninterested in investigating what he calls spontaneous apprehensions, has he not succeeded in lowering the bar of credibility at least to some extent by offering us a preliminary account of a means by which spontaneous apprehensions could get their contents? Doesnt the mere availability of an explanation in terms of quantum entanglement, sketchy though it may be, both lower the epistemic bar to believing that spontaneous apprehensions occur and point the way toward further research? Andinsofar as skeptics about spontaneous apprehension base their skepticism in a belief that there is no way in which spontaneous apprehensions could get their contentsdoesnt Laszlos preliminary account of these potential, nonlocal quantum information transfers at least undermine a key basis of such skepticism? Finally, is it not problematic to criticize Laszlo for failing to provide an account of why quantum information in the microtrabecular lattice networks would be expected to show up in mental states, when the cognitive sciences in general are still trying to understand completely how information taken in by any of the more standard sense modalities makes its way into the mental states a person has? To be fair, the account Laszlo has offered probably should lower the epistemic bar a little bit for claims that spontaneous apprehensions occur. Insofar as even a sketchy, incomplete account of a means by which purported spontaneous apprehensions could get their contents has been provided, it does make it more plausible that spontaneous apprehensions occur at all. However, we should keep the following in mind when trying to decide just how far Laszlos account lowers that bar and serves to justify further research. First, none of the examples Laszlo himself introduces in his article that purport to show that spontaneous apprehensions occur seem to require that the transfers of information involved themselves transcend the speed of light. Rather, his specic exampleseven if accepted at face valueseem to show only that some sort of as-yet-unknown but possibly slower-than-the-speed-of-light connection may be obtaining between two people. Nothing about the particular cases he mentions demands that space- and time-transcending transfers of information are involved. Thus, the fact that Laszlo is offering an explanation that would give us space-time transcending transfers of information does not in itself do special work in explaining the kinds of examples he himself offers as being in need of explanation. Second, although there are many unanswered questions in the cognitive sciences about how the causal processes involved in normal sensory perception of the world result in cognitive contents being available in conscious and nonconscious mental states a person has, these accounts typically focus on transfers of information that at some point are channeled through patterns of neural ring. Of course, there are still many unanswered questions about how the information gathered via the exteroceptive and interoceptive senses makes its way into

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mental states and conscious awareness more generally, but standard theories of ordinary sensation and perception involve patterns of neural ring of some sort or other at a crucial early stage in the process. Laszlos proposed account of spontaneous apprehensions involves information that is gathered via micro-lattice networks within neurons, and there is no obvious way in which that information would ever make its way into signals sent via neuron rings. Thus, even if Laszlos suggestions about the robustness of quantum entanglement at the level of brain structures turn out to be entirely accurate, his account will still stand or fall on the plausibility of the claim that information in micro-lattice networks can make its way into mental states without at some key point being entered into the system via patterns of neuron rings. If Hameroff-Penrose inspired accounts of the importance of microtubules for consciousness pan out, then perhaps this will not be an insurmountable problem for Laszlo, but the fact that his account seems to be so dependent on these dark horse accounts of consciousness turning out to be right puts his overall account in a different, epistemically weaker class of theories than standard theories about sensation and perception in the cognitive sciences. In conclusion, I suggest that before even Laszlos modest call for further research into the spontaneous nonlocal mode of apprehending the world beyond the brain and body will be particularly compelling, the following will need to happen. First, we will need to have better evidence that quantum entanglement effects of the sort Laszlo discusses actually occur on the scale and in the sorts of environments required for there to be important amounts of information in the brain produced by such entanglement. Perhaps that evidence is forthcoming, but I think there is no special reason to try to gather such evidence as part of an investigation that is specically trying to prove that quantum entanglement can account for extraordinary mental states, since there is not much reason yet to think of that as a viable research project. Second, we will need to have better account of why the mere presence of information of some sort in the microtrabecular lattice of a brain would have any interesting relationship with contentful mental states. STEVEN F. GEISZ Department of Philosophy & Religion The University of Tampa Tampa, Florida sgeisz@ut.edu Notes
1

I have in mind here the information-theoretic accounts of mental content and consciousness developed by people such as Fred Dretske. See Dretske (1981, 1988, 1997), as well as relevant essays in Dretske (2000). For a short overview of Dretskes theories, see Dretske (1994).

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There are those who would argue that any legitimate conception of information (or of cognitive content or of meaning in general), no matter how rich, must be able to be analyzed in terms of what I am here describing as a minimal, bare-bones, merely structural notion of information. Indeed, Wittgenstein (1921/1961) presents a conception of how that might work (albeit by using quite different terminology), and there are more recent analogues in the philosophical literature. If that is correct, then it might seem as if any apparent ambiguity that does not distinguish between a bare-bones conception of information and a conceptually richer conception of information would be unproblematic, since there is not ultimately a signicant difference in kind between what is picked out by the two conceptions of information. A proper assessment of the merits of attempts to reduce information and content to structure would take us too far aeld; I will simply say that I am skeptical of such projects (and, in that respect, I side with Wittgensteins later criticisms of his early project). In any case, it is far from obvious that richer notions of information can be reduced to a bare-bones structural notion, and Laszlo himself does not take any explicit stand in his article on the matter. Though Laszlo uses the word perception at this place in the text, he must really mean to write experience instead, given his commitment to reserving the term perception for ordinary sensory perception. . . .

References
Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. MIT Press. Dretske, F. (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press. Dretske, F. (1994). Dretske, Fred. In Guttenplan, N. (Ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (pp. 259265). Blackwell. Dretske, F. (1997). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press. Dretske, F. (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lazslo, E. (2009). In defense of intuition: Exploring the physical foundations of spontaneous apprehension. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 23, 5158. Wittgenstein, W. (1921/1961). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, Trans.). London: Routledge.

Reply to McDaniel and Geisz

I am pleased to have the opportunity provided by the editors of the JSE to reply to the discussion papers by Professor McDaniel and Dr. Geisz. My own paper was designed to open up a new hypothesis for discussion and exploration, in the exploratory spirit of the Journal. This is the spirit in which I am framing my reply. Let me address rst Professor McDaniels critical commentary. I am pleased that he has grasped the meaning of the hypothesis I put forward (although I should remark that I do not maintain that material objects excite the ground state of the zero-point eld: I maintain that they excite the ground state of the unied eld that carries inter alia the zero-point energiesan important distinction). But

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McDaniel does not object to the meaning and logic of the hypothesis, he questions its validity. His criterion is an observation by John Dewey stemming from 1938: the ground of a theory must possess the property of veriable existence in some domain, no matter how hypothetical it may be in reference to that theory. This is a rather classical requirement in that we now know that veriable existence is not a condition that can be fullled in regard to a large variety of scientically postulated entities, from the Big Bang (now believed to be a Big Bounce) to black holes and myriad entities and processes in-between. The requirement for such level of verication is particularly overstated in regard to fundamentally novel phenomena. Here reasoning by extension of what has been previously veried seldom if ever works. If it did, scientic knowledge would grow by accretion; but it grows (also, and perhaps mainly) by innovation. A new paradigm is an instance of massive innovation. As Thomas Kuhn has shown, the old and the new paradigms are generally incommensurable. Reasoning from the old (putatively veried) to the new (yet to be veried) phenomena is seldom possible, and attempting it is likely to fail. With regard to the history of scientic thinking, especially in the natural sciences, observing the Dewey criterion in the strict way McDaniel proposes would have blocked the revolutions that had occurred in the last 100 years. There is another way of coping with new (or newly investigated) phenomena, and that is through the creative leap that Einstein claimed is imaginationand that I maintain is evidence for the role of intuition in scientic research. Had Einstein been asked, as McDaniel asks in regard to the quantum holograms that are part of my hypothesis, what independent veried evidence do you have for the existence of spacetime as a four-dimensional continuum? Einstein would have been constrained to respond, none: I have invented it (as physics theory, that is, for it had already existed as pure mathematics in the work of Poincar). Inventing a theory is entirely legitimate, however. In science, as Einstein (1940) himself pointed out, we are seeking for the simplest possible scheme that can tie together the observed facts. If we cannot derive such a scheme uniquely in reference to received scientic knowledge, we must invent it. In accounting for physical phenomena in nature the simplest scheme that can bind together the observed facts is a four-dimensional matrix, and in the case of spontaneous apprehension it is phase-conjugate resonance between quantum holograms in the unied eld and sub-cytoskeletal structures in the complex macroscopic quantum system we now come to recognize as a proper characterization of the brain. But the above hypothesis, though partly invented, is by no means ad hoc. Its elements have been independently postulated (veried, as just remarked, would be overstating the case); I give a fairly large number of references in the paper. And the hypothesis itself does not stand only by itself: it is based on other pertinent hypotheses that I note in the text and also in the references. (Six of my own books are listed in the references, and they contain a host of additional references.) The criterion applicable to assessing the validity of my hypothesis concerns its internal consistency: its ability to explain the observed facts (through

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the simplest possible scheme that can do so), and its consistency with other hypotheses in the relevant domains of scientic inquiry. I now turn to Dr. Geiszs detailed analysis. At issue here is a dialogue between different conceptual schemes, indeed, paradigms, and addressing that issue requires either an entire tomeor series of tomesor focusing only on the crux of the issue. I elect to do the latter. The question posed by Geisz is, how does cognitive content appear in the mind based on spontaneous apprehension? He cannot nd in my paper a convincing answer to this, but his question has no convincing answer even in reference to sensory perception. How does a wavelength of light in the visible spectrum translate into the perception of a red dot in ones consciousness? And how does that become meaningful cognitive content? And is such content limited to the more sophisticated kind of information that Geisz associates with signs or symbols language in general? Besides the problems of linguistic philosophy, here we encounter the classical body-mind problem. We have brain events, and we have mind events. How are they related? This is the hard question, but I am not concerned with it in this paper. I am not trying to explain how information received from the world beyond the brain and body is translated into cognitive content. I am merely trying to explain how information that does not come via the senses can be received in the brain. My claim is that experiences that do not reach us via our sensory organs can be just as real as those that do. In both cases information from beyond the brain and body produces sufcient effect in the brain to trigger conscious experience. Information that does not come through the senses often triggers conscious experience, but within the space of a single article I cannot offer convincing examples as evidence of this. Keeping an open mind, this is not even required. In any case, I recently published The Akashic Experience (2009), a good-sized book where 20 well-known and highly credible individuals, among them scientists, describe such experiences in the rst person. And the great majority of people, if queried and not particularly narrow-minded, admit that they have had experiences they cannot account for in terms of sensory perception. Thus the questionat least for meis not whether nonsensory experiences exist, but how they exist: how the particular kind of information that originates beyond the brain and the body and is not conveyed by the senses can result in some variety of conscious experience. It is not my intention to limit spontaneous apprehensions to those that involve the transmission of information beyond the speed of light. I only claim that such apprehensions are not limited by the bounds of space and timethey can convey information from any point in space, and from any time in the past (I am sceptical about whether they can convey information also about the future, but thats another matter). A vast number of experiences testies to this, in addition to experiences that involve persons, things and events within the perceptible range. Yet in that range how can we be sure that they didnt come through some perceptual means? The truly interesting and pertinent kinds of experiences are those that transcend space and time.

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There is more to the concept of information than bare-bones physical effecttransmission on the one hand, and linguistically expressible sign- or symbol-based information on the other. The in-between is the warp and woof of art and poetry, of mysticism, and religion. There are ordinary experiences that are ineffable as well. Shall we dismiss them as unreal? Or shall we try to see if there is a way we can account for their presence in terms no morebut also no lessmysterious than experiences resulting from sensory signal transmission? To conclude, I am much more modest than Geiszs analysis asks me to be. I start with the fact that there are experiences that cannot be explained by means of sensory signals triggering neuronal rings in the brain, and conclude that such anomalous experiences stem from quantum-resonance between substructures in the brain and information present in the world at large. I do not presume to explain how quantum reception in the brain can produce cognitive contentbut this is not explained in the case of the transmission of neuronal signals from the senses either. I also do not go into great detail on how information can be present in nature in a space- and time-transcending holographic mode: I wrote several books on this subject and they are accessible. I merely claim that some information present as conscious experience derives from direct reception by the brain, and that the experience that resultshowever it resultsis just as bona de as the cognitive content that can result from sensory perception. This is a modest claim that, in view of its lowering the barrier to some extent in regard to the scientic acceptance of intuition, is perhaps not so modest after all. Let me conclude my response by emphasizing the importance of seeking an explanation of the phenomenon of spontaneous apprehension, popularly known as intuition. This phenomenon is as old as human culture and consciousness, but in Western science it has been largely dismissed as beyond the ken of legitimate scientic inquiry. Thus I welcome its discussion within the context of such inquiry as an important development. It has major importance in regard to our understanding both of our ability to gain information about the world (epistemology), and for our understanding of the nature of the world (ontology). ERVIN LASZLO ervinlaszlo@libero.it References
Einstein, A. (1940). The World As I See It. London: Watts & Co. Laszlo, E. (2009). The Akashic Experience: Science and the Cosmic Memory Field. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions International.

Journal of Scientic Exploration, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 343357, 2009

0892-3310/09

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

On Duncan MacDougalls Experiment on the Loss of Weight at Death

Ishidas (2009) recent article in the JSE has reminded us of the often repeated idea of the weight of souls and of attempts to establish their weight. Regarding the latter, it is interesting to read a story by writer and historian Josiah Phillips Quincy that appeared in the June 1887 issue of the Atlantic Monthly (Quincy, 1887). The main character of the story was hoping to perform an experiment with a man who was expected to die. In his words: I hope to be able to show that approximating the time when the soul leaves the body, there is an alteration in its weight which is capable of registration. I have caused the bed to be supported upon an exquisitely poised balance which will show any remission of the downward pressure (Quincy, 1887: 733; see also Quincy, 1888: 114). Unfortunately for our ctional experimenter, the man in question did not die. In his paper, Ishida also mentioned Duncan MacDougalls often-cited article, Hypothesis Concerning Soul Substance Together with Experimental Evidence of the Existence of Such Substance. The paper, published both in American Medicine and in the Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research (MacDougall, 1907a,b), has been repeatedly cited from its publication in 1907 to more recent times (e.g., Fisher, 2003: chap. 1; Parks, 2008: 90). MacDougalls article includes reports of weighing experiments with six persons, but only four produced reliable results. These were losses of half an ounce for two patients, and three-eighths and three-fourths of an ounce for the other two. Those interested in the issue of informed consent and in ethics should notice that MacDougall wrote: The subjects experimented upon all gave their consent to the experiment weeks before the day of death. The experiments did not subject the patients to any additional sufferings (MacDougall, 1907b: 238239). There were also tests conducted with 15 dogs. It is stated that the dogs were drugged to control for movements and that they were not dying from any sickness, so I assume they were put to death for the sake of weighing the soul. But there was no loss of weight with the dogs. MacDougall corresponded with psychical researcher Richard Hodgson (MacDougall & Hodgson, 1907). The rst letter published is from MacDougall and is dated November 10, 1901, and he states that he had conducted tests as early as April 10, 1901 (MacDougall & Hodgson, 1907: 267) but that the initial idea occurred to him in the winter of 18961897 (MacDougall & Hodgson, 1907: 273). 343

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Some newspapers said that MacDougall was working with other doctors (The Ponderable Soul, 1907). He was quoted as saying: Four other physicians under my direction made the rst test . . . (Soul Has Weight, Physician Thinks, 1907). One of the reports mentioned Dr. John Sproul of Haverhill and Dr. William V. Grant, of Lawrence (Doctors Say Dogs Have No Soul, 1907). It was said that the studies were conducted in the Cullis Free Home for Consumptives (Soul Weight Puzzles, 1907). Originally MacDougall wanted to publish his work with no reference to psychic aspects. As he wrote on May 22, 1902, to Hodgson: I want to rst publish the discovery as a fact in the physiology of death, stripped, as a good friend of mine has said, of its psychical signicance, because to insist upon the latter might raise prejudice in the minds of many of our present day scientic men, and prevent repetition of the experiment by others (MacDougall & Hodgson, 1907: 275). But the newspapers got hold of his work, resulting in what Hyslop (1907) referred to as unauthenticated publication of his attempts, with the usual distortion that everything gets in the papers (p. 259). In addition to the already mentioned newspaper reports, other headlines read: Doctors Weigh a Soul (1907), The Human Soul (1907), Pertaining to the Weight of the Soul (1907), Plan to Weigh Souls (1907), Soul Weighs an Ounce (1907), The Weight of the Soul (1907). While MacDougalls article is generally discussed regarding the validity or lack of validity of his claims, his work is also interesting in a broader historical way. MacDougalls attempts to see if humans and animals lost weight at death may be considered to be part of a variety of conceptual traditions. One of them is the long history of ideas about the soul and subtle bodies, some of which have some physicality (Mead, 1919; Poortman, 1954/1978). MacDougall believed in a soul substance because, as he wrote: It is unthinkable that personality and consciousness continuing personal identity should exist, and have being, and yet not occupy space. . . . The essential thing is that there must be a substance as the basis of continuing personal identity and consciousness, for without space occupying substance, personality or a continuing conscious ego after bodily death is unthinkable (MacDougall, 1907b: 237238). Richard Hodgson was skeptical of the need for a material substance for mind to exist. Hodgson added: You may perhaps admit the possibility that there may be a physical correlate of consciousness, which physical correlate may nevertheless consist not of what is known as gross ponderable matter, but of the ether. It is thinkable that there should be some kind of ethereal body, and there is apparently a general consensus of opinion among physicists that the ether is imponderable (MacDougall & Hodgson, 1907: 279). MacDougall restated his view that the container of the totality of the psychic functions, including consciousness and personality, and still persisting after the death of our bodies, is much more likely to be a material, organically linked with the body than the hypothetical,

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yet necessary ether-substance . . . (MacDougall & Hodgson, 1907: 271). He further said that the soul substance was different from the ether. In addition, he wrote:
If we admitted your proposition that consciousness and personality might exist in a body of ether, then we would still be fullling one of the principal parts of my thesis, because ether is a space occupying body. . . . Going back to your theory of ether substance having consciousness and personality for its content, while I cannot conceive, yet it may be that there is a middle substance which is the soul substance, and which resembles the ether in being non-gravitative and therefore not weighable, but which resembles ordinary matter in being discontinuous or capable of existing in separate masses, which is a necessary condition for the existence of individual consciousness or separate consciousness having personal identity. . . . (pp. 271272)

In addition to ideas of subtle bodies, MacDougalls concepts were related to the ether. This concept has a long tradition in physics theory (Cantor & Hodge, 1981), and one that permeated 19th-century physics. It was still current when MacDougall and Hodgson were corresponding (Lodge, 1909). The concept already had a history in writings about the spiritual world and psychic phenomena (e.g., Jung-Stilling, 1808/1834), and of the idea of the spirit (e.g., Jamieson, 1884). MacDougalls work was also part of attempts to show that some aspect of human beings survive death by an emphasis on observations of emanations from the body at death, such as lights and spirit forms, a topic discussed in the past by such authors as De Morgan (1863) and Bozzano (1934/1937). A small part of this tradition includes the few attempts to take some form of instrumental measurements around the time of death (Baraduc, 1908; Watters, 1935). The concepts developed by MacDougall could also be seen as part of the history of concepts of force related to mesmerism, spiritualism and psychical research (Alvarado, 2006) and to vitalism (Mayr, 1998: 816). The latter is represented in the following statement that links the topic with the issue of weight: If . . . life is a form of matter, the life must weigh something, and every living thing on the earth must weigh more immediately before death than it does immediately after (Hibbert, 1904: 17). Another interesting area to consider is the reception of MacDougalls work when it rst appeared. In one of the newspaper reports mentioned above it was said: Deaths mysterious freeing of the human soul has been solved with a pair of scales . . . (Soul Weight Puzzles, 1907). There were many opinions about the work, as seen in Plan to Weigh Souls (1907), in which one commentator remarked: I cant see how an ounce of matter can get away from the body unless it has wings or feet. This jestful attitude was also expressed by Singleton Waters Davis in his book A Future Life? (1907), in which he stated that the report that the soul weighs only an ounce or two seems to conrm common observation that many people, if they have any at all, have very small souls! (Davis, 1907: 158). Another person confessed that the report

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produced a considerable shock to our sensibilities (The Weight of the Soul, 1907: 647). It was also said that the loss of weight may be explained by air coming out from the lungs (Weighing Human Souls, 1907). In a quote reprinted from the magazine London Opinion, it was stated that MacDougall claimed that the soul weighed around half an ounce, and that the intelligence of those who believed it weighs about half an ounce less (Imported Jokes, 1907). A writer in the Dallas Morning News said that MacDougalls opponents have been weighing numerous beeves, porkers, dogs, etc, immediately before they were slaughtered and immediately afterward, and that all of them weigh something more while alive (Pertaining to the Weight of the Soul, 1907). There were also interesting critiques, and debates, in the journals that published MacDougalls paper. This was the case of American Medicine (Clarke, 1907a,b; MacDougall, 1907c,d, 1908; OMalley, 1907, 1908) and the Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research (Carrington, 1907a,b; MacDougall, 1907e). I will not discuss this material in great detail. In American Medicine Austin OMalley (1907), an ophthalmologist at St. Agnes Hospital in Philadelphia, wrote a critique entitled Is the Vital Principle Ponderable? in which he questioned MacDougalls assumption of the materiality of the soul. In his view: That Dr. MacDougall or I cannot explain the loss of weight he noticed when his patient ceased to breathe means absolutely nothing more than that we are ignorant in this case; but the loss of weight has no necessary connection whatever with the souls departure (OMalley, 1907: 655). He also questioned the assumption that there had to be a substance, a material and measurable principle. On the other hand, Carrington (1907a) pointed out the several mysterious losses of weight in other conditions, suggestion there was much mystery in MacDougalls ndings (see also Carrington, 1908: chap. 13). Representing the psychical researcher interested in the issue of survival of bodily death, James H. Hyslop (1907) argued that MacDougalls studies had no direct bearing on the subject. He wrote as follows:
One might . . . contend that success in proving the loss of weight by death in some way not ordinarily accountable by physical theories would not prove that the residuum was a soul. It might be some vital energy, and the soul yet remain an imponderable form of substance. It might even be that vital force, if such there be other than the orthodox chemical theory of life, is also imponderable, and that the residuum of such experiments as Dr. MacDougalls would be some form of matter not yet known. All that successful experiments would prove would be that there was some form of energy unaccounted for by known agencies, and not necessarily that this residuum was the subject of consciousness. (p. 259)

One writer from the San Francisco Call had some concerns about the callousness of the experiments. This anonymous journalist wrote: Having sentenced the patient to death without inconvenient delay they put him on one end of the scales to weigh his soul as he gives up the ghost. . . . The dying man was so much

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material for research and nothing more. . . . But as of these doctors, it is doubtful if they have an ounce of soul among . . . them (The Ponderable Soul, 1907). CARLOS S. ALVARADO Division of Perceptual Studies Department of Psychiatry and Neurobehavioral Sciences University of Virginia Health System 210 10th St. NE, Suite 100 Charlottesville, VA 22902 csa3m@virginia.edu References
Alvarado, C. S. (2006). Human radiations: Concepts of force in mesmerism, spiritualism and psychical research. Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 70, 138162. Baraduc, H. (1908). Mes morts: Leurs manifestations, leurs inuences, leurs tlpathies. Paris: P. Leymarie. Bozzano, E. (1937). Les phnomnes de bilocation (G. Gobron, Trans.). Paris: Jean Meyer. (Original work published 1934) Cantor, G. N., & Hodge, M. J. S. (1981). Conceptions of Ether: Studies in the History of Ether Theories, 17401900. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Carrington, H. (1907a). On Dr. MacDougalls experiments. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 1, 276283. Carrington, H. (1907b). Dr. MacDougalls reply. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 1, 346347. Carrington, H. (1908). The Coming Science. Boston: Small, Maynard. Clarke, A. P. (1907a). Hypothesis concerning soul substance. American Medicine, 13, 275276. Clarke, A. P. (1907b). Correspondence: Hypothesis concerning soul substance. American Medicine, 13, 675676. Davis, S. W. (1907). A Future Life? Los Angeles, CA: Humanitarian Review. [De Morgan, S.]. (1863). From Matter to Spirit. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green. Doctors say dogs have no soul. (1907). Evening News, 10 May, p. 5. Doctors weigh a soul. (1907). Nashua Reporter, 11 April, p. 3. Fisher, L. (2003). Weighing the Soul: Scientic Discovery from the Brilliant to the Bizarre. New York: Arcade. Hibbert, W. (1904). Life and Energy. London: Longmans, Green. The human soul. (1907). Washington Post, 6 July, p. 5. [Hyslop, J. H.]. (1907). Editorial: Weighing the soul. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 1, 259260. Imported jokes. (1907). Dallas Morning News, 4 April, p. 6. Ishida, M. (2009). A new experimental approach to weight change experiments at the moment of death with a review of Lewis E. Hollanders experiments on sheep. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 23, 528. Jamieson, G. (1884). Profound Problems in Theology and Philosophy. London: Simpkin, Marshall. Jung-Stilling, J. H. (1834). Theory of Pneumatology. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longman. (First published in German in 1808) Lodge, O. J. (1909). The Ether of Space. New York: Harper & Brothers. MacDougall, D. (1907a). Hypothesis concerning soul Substance together with experimental evidence of the existence of such substance. American Medicine, 13, 240243. MacDougall, D. (1907b). Hypothesis concerning soul Substance together with experimental evidence of the existence of such substance. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 1, 237244. MacDougall, D. (1907c). Hypothesis concerning soul substance. American Medicine, 13, 395397. MacDougall, D. (1907d). Hypothesis concerning soul substance. American Medicine, 13, 677678.

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MacDougall, D. (1907e). Mr. Carringtons criticism. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 1, 343346. MacDougall, D. (1908). The vital principle; its character. American Medicine, 14, 278282. MacDougall, D., & Hodgson, R. (1907). Correspondence. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 1, 263275. Mayr, E. (1998). This Is Biology: The Science of the Living World. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Mead, G. R. S. (1919). The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in Western Tradition. London: J. M. Watkins. OMalley, A. (1907). Is the vital principle ponderable? American Medicine, 13, 653658. OMalley, A. (1908). Sensism and cognition: A reply to Dr. Duncan MacDougall. American Medicine, 14, 415421. Parks, R. L. (2008). Superstition: Belief in the Age of Science. Princeton University Press. Pertaining to the weight of the soul. (1907). Dallas Morning News, 10 May, p. 8. Plan to weigh souls. (1907). Washington Post, 12 March, p. 3. The ponderable soul. (1907). San Francisco Call, 12 March, p. 6. Poortman, J. J. (1978). Vehicles of Consciousness: The Concept of Hylic Pluralism (Ochema) (4 vols.). Utrecht, The Netherlands: Theosophical Society in the Netherlands. (Original work published 1954) Quincy, J. P. (1887). A crucial experiment. Atlantic Monthly, 59, 721750. Quincy, J. P. (1888). The Peckster Professorship: An Episode in the History of Psychical Research. Houghton, Mifin. Soul has weight, physician thinks. (1907). New York Times, 11 March, p. 5. Soul weighs an ounce. (1907). Charlotte Daily Observer, p. 4. Soul weight puzzles. (1907). Washington Post, 18 March, p. 3. Watters, R. A. (1935). Phantoms. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 29, 6881. Weighing human souls. (1907). Metaphysical Magazine, 20, 377. The weight of the soul. (1907). Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, 156, 647648.

Thematic Analysis of Mediums Experiences

Recent investigations into mental mediumship have tended to use a proof-oriented approach (e.g., Beischel & Schwartz, 2007; OKeeffe & Wiseman, 2005; Robertson & Roy, 2001) intended to demonstrate whether an explanation in terms of discarnate survival is tenable. Consequently, there is a distinct shortage of systematic qualitative studies that have explored the process and nature of mediumistic experiences. The relatively few studies that have gathered qualitative data (e.g., Emmons & Emmons, 2003; Leonard, 2005), for example by interviewing practising mediums, have been unsystematic in their design or have not adhered rigorously to formal methods of qualitative analysis, particularly in reducing their ndings to quantitative summaries in the form of percentages. Thus, they have been unable to provide any deep phenomenological insight into mediums lived experiences, and only serve to highlight the need for a more in-depth exploration of mediums own accounts of their path to becoming a medium and their understanding of the mediumship process as they experience it. It is against this backdrop that we welcome Rock, Beischel, and Schwartzs (2008) contribution to our understanding of the mediumship process. In reporting on a thematic analysis of mediums experiences, Rock et al. should be praised for recruiting practising mental mediums, for adhering to guidelines for good

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qualitative research (cf. Elliott et al., 1999), such as providing quotes to ground their themes in participants accounts, and for conducting checks of the credibility of their themes with participants. Unfortunately, there are a number of shortcomings to the study design they adopted, which severely constrain the validity of the claims they make concerning their data. We should like to briey outline those shortcomings here in the hope that those interested in taking a qualitative approach might avoid those errors. First, an important step in qualitative data collection is to ensure that participants feel empowered to give a full and candid account of their experience safe in the knowledge that theirs is a privileged perspective relative to the researchers and that their personal impressions rather than some abstract right or wrong answers are of most interest. In order to fulll this, interviews are often considered to be the most exemplary method of data collection as the researcher has the opportunity to establish rapport with participants (cf. Kvale, 1996; Morse, 1994; Smith, 1995; Willig, 2001). Unfortunately, by conducting their data collection in the form of an email, which was essentially an Internet questionnaire survey, Rock et al. have eschewed these important checks and balances and so they undermine their claim to validity for their data. It is acknowledged that other methods of data collection are increasingly being used in qualitative research due to the increase in Internet-mediated communication; for example, Mulveen and Hepworth (2006) explored individuals experiences of participating in a pro-anorexia Internet site and Murray (2004) used semi-structured email interviews and email discussion groups to investigate the embodiment of articial limbs. However, there is every possibility that participants in the Rock et al. study might have felt encouraged to give appropriate responses given the heavy emphasis on qualifying as an integrative research medium by virtue of achieving certain targets, including giving two email and two phone readings and in particular requiring participants to have read Schwartzs own book on mediumship, The Afterlife Experiments. This seems to us very likely to impose upon the participants clear denitions of what can and what cannot be considered legitimate in the context of describing authentic mediumistic experiences and modus operandi. In this respect, they could be regarded as anathema to qualitative approaches that have their roots in phenomenological inquiry, which aims to gain insight into the psychological and social world of the individuals of interest, and rightly values participants as experts on their own life experiences (cf. Giorgi, 1995; Smith & Osborn, 2003), unfettered by the researchers own beliefs or expectations. Another advantage of direct interactions with participants is that it allows the researcher to tailor the interview to reect the participants values and emphases (Smith, 1995)it is common with semi-structured or unstructured interviews for the interviewer to reorganise the set of questions, adding or removing elements in response to the participants. This was not possible with Rock et al.s favoured method of data collection, which severely constrains the range of topics that the participant could consider to be legitimate in that context. In coming to the specic questions asked of participants in this study we are disappointed to note that much of their analysis seems to be derived from

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straightforward answers to just one fairly direct question. With thematic analysis it is more likely that valid themes will emerge if questions are framed in a nonleading, open manner, following a funnelling format in which participants are encouraged to share their beliefs, perceptions, and experiences with as little prompting as possible before probing more specic queries (cf. Smith & Osborn, 2003). Furthermore, it is essential in qualitative research to include detailed excerpts from participants accounts that allow the reader to appraise how the themes have been developed and to allow the experiences of participants to be represented in their own words. Although Rock et al. include original quotations from participants, the majority are merely sound-bites of one sentence or less, which do not provide any context for the mediums experiences or allow the reader to conceptualize their own interpretations. Finally, our reading of Rock et al.s reections on the limitations of their study design suggests to us that they have yet to fully embrace a qualitative approach to their research questions. Issues of experimental control and validity of the participants claims to mediumship are singularly unimportant within a qualitative framework and would not be classed as limitations; rather, such a method promises to give an insight into the participants lived experiences by providing them with an opportunity to articulate that perspective in their own words and on their own terms. In this respect, it is disappointing that Rock et al. propose that future research could use the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory to quantify the intensity and pattern of phenomenological elements experienced by a medium, which in our opinion, would serve to restrict mediums expression of their experiences rather than give them a voice. In summary, although we commend Rock et al.s intention to address an omission in the mediumship literature by setting out to explore mediums experiences, there are several methodological shortcomings that seem to restrict the informativeness of the ndings. In our view, the study is disappointing in its ability to resonate with the reader and does little to clarify or expand our understanding of mediumship. It seems pertinent to address these issues in any future research with mediums where the focus is on the phenomenology of their experiences. ELIZABETH C. ROXBURGH The University of Northampton Elizabeth.Roxburgh@northampton.ac.uk CHRIS A. ROE The University of Northampton Chris.Roe@northampton.ac.uk References
Beischel, J., & Schwartz, G. (2007). Anomalous information reception by research mediums demonstrated using a novel triple-blind protocol. EXPLORE: The Journal of Science and Healing, 3, 2327.

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Elliott, R., Fischer, C. T., & Rennie, D. L. (1999). Evolving guidelines for publication of qualitative research studies in psychology and related elds. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38, 215229. Emmons, C. F., & Emmons, P. (2003). Guided by Spirit: A Journey into the Mind of the Medium. New York: Writers Club Press. Giorgi, A. (1995). Phenomenological psychology. In Smith, J. A., Harre, R., & Langenhove, L. V. (Eds.), Rethinking Psychology. London: Sage Publications. Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews. London: Sage Publications. Leonard, T. J. (2005). Talking to the Other Side: A History of Modern Spiritualism and Mediumship. New York: iUniverse. Morse, J. (1994). Critical Issues in Qualitative Research. Thousand Oakes, CA: Sage Publications. Mulveen, R., & Hepworth, J. (2006). An interpretative phenomenological analysis of participation in a pro-anorexia internet site and its relationship with disordered eating. Journal of Health Psychology, 11, 283296. Murray, C. D. (2004). An interpretative phenomenological analysis of the embodiment of articial limbs. Disability and Rehabilitation, 26, 963973. OKeeffe, C., & Wiseman, R. (2005). Testing alleged mediumship: Methods and results. British Journal of Psychology, 96, 165179. Robertson, T. J., & Roy, A. E. (2001). A preliminary study of the acceptance by non-recipients of mediums statements to recipients. Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 65(863), 91106. Rock, A. J., Beischel, J., & Schwartz, G. E. (2008). Thematic analysis of research mediums experiences of discarnate communication. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 22, 179192. Smith, J. A. (1995). Semi-structured interviewing and qualitative analysis. In Smith, J. A., Harre, R., & Van Langenhove, L. (Eds.), Rethinking Methods in Psychology. London: Sage Publications. Smith, J. A., & Osborn, M. (2003). Interpretative phenomenological analysis. In Smith, L. A. (Ed.), Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Research Methods. London: Sage Publications. Willig, C. (2001). Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology: Adventures in Theory and Method. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Is There Madness in Our Mediumship Methods? A Response to Roxburgh and Roe

The comments formulated by Roxburgh and Roe (2009) seem to be leveling two primary criticisms at Rock, Beischel, and Schwartz (2008): (1) Rock et al.s methodology compromises the validity of the data and (2) Rock et al. have yet to fully embrace a qualitative approach to their research questions. Each of these attempted criticisms will be discussed in turn. Criticism 1: Validity of Findings Roxburgh and Roe have attempted to identify various ostensible methodological limitations of the study by Rock et al. (2008), which they suggest severely constrain the validity of the claims they make concerning their data. For example, Roxburgh and Roe specically lament the fact that Rock et al. did not collect data using face-to-face interviews. This lamentation seems somewhat redundant in light of the fact that Rock et al. have already discussed this methodological issue in the original peer-reviewed work. Nevertheless, the important concern is whether the method of data collection used by Rock et al. compromised the

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validity1 of their ndings. Ultimately, whether the comprehensive constituent themes Rock et al. identied are valid can only be determined by the Integrative Research Mediums (IRMs) who provided the data that were thematically analyzed during the study. In this context, it is noteworthy that in Step 6 of Rock et al.s thematic analysis, Each of the participants [i.e., mediums] were contacted via email and invited to provide feedback and verication with regards to the comprehensive constituent themes (p. 185). In the Results and Discussion section of the original peer-reviewed paper, Rock et al. reported that,
All IRMs stated that the comprehensive constituent themes captured the essential aspects of communication with a discarnate. For example, one IRM remarked: Perfect! This is how I feel about your Comprehensive Constituent Themes. I like how you listed each and then described what you meant. Great job! Similarly, another IRM stated, I verify the seven comprehensive themes that you have listed. I believe you have covered the most common ways a medium experiences communication with a discarnate. (p. 188)

Indeed, it is noteworthy that Roxburgh and Roe concede that, Rock et al. should be praised for . . . conducting checks of the credibility of their themes with participants. It is, of course, arguable that the IRMs simply veried the themes that Rock et al. identied because, as Roxburgh and Roe suggest:
. . . there is every possibility that participants in the Rock et al. study might have felt encouraged to give appropriate responses given the heavy emphasis on qualifying as an integrative research medium by virtue of achieving certain targets, including giving two email and two phone readings and in particular requiring participants to have read Schwartzs own book on mediumship, The Afterlife Experiments.

However, it is noteworthy that while Step 1 of the screening procedure used by Rock et al. invites the claimant mediums to provide information regarding their phenomenology concerning ostensible communication with discarnates, no aspect of the screening procedure imposes phenomenological criteria that a claimant medium must satisfy to qualify as an IRM. That is to say, there are no appropriate phenomenological responses that the individual may provide during the screening process. It might be noted here that Roxburghs own research (2007, 2008) involves medium participants who are members of the Spiritualists National Union (SNU) and, thus, are ostensibly very likely to frame their experiences of mediumship in any phenomenological investigations within the context of the education, training, and religious belief system prevalent within the SNU culture. It is also possible that participants in Roxburghs research would feel encouraged to give appropriate responses given the heavy emphasis on training and qualifying as an accredited SNU medium. Additionally, the participants in the Rock et al. study had rather obviously completed the Step 1 questionnaire prior to embarking on any of the other screening steps: the Step 5 test readings and the Step 6 reading of The Afterlife Experi2 ments mentioned by Roxburgh and Roe, or the Step 3 and Step 4 interviews in

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which the claimant mediums are asked about some very specic aspects of their experiences (e.g., Can you tell when communicators switch?). Thus, the participants provided the phenomenological data prior to any of the latter steps that could have primed them regarding appropriate experiences. Regardless, Step 5, which included the two blinded email and phone readings, was solely concerned with the veridicality of the claimant mediums statements as judged by the absent sitter; it did not address the claimant mediums experiences during the readings. Furthermore, Schwartzs (2002) The Afterlife Experiments text does not consider the phenomenology of mediumship; it also was primarily concerned with the veridicality of mediums information. Thus, it seems reasonable to assert that the content of this text did not function as a demand characteristic that shaped claimant mediums phenomenological responses in the Rock et al. study if, in fact, a claimant medium had read the book prior to beginning screening. Roxburgh and Roe also state:
an important step in qualitative data collection is to ensure that participants feel empowered to give a full and candid account of their experience safe in the knowledge that theirs is a privileged perspective relative to the researchers and that their personal impressions rather than some abstract right or wrong answers are of most interest.

During the participant consenting process and prior to beginning the screening steps, the mediums in Rock et al.s study read a document describing the opportunities, responsibilities, and requirements for 1) the mediums and 2) the researchers involved in integrative mediumship research. That document stated:
The focus of the Laboratory is on integrative research designed to be scientically comprehensive while honoring spiritual integrity. Being scientically comprehensive refers to examining various philosophies and approaches to mediumship; that is, comparing the similarities and differences of different mediums explanations, opinions, and techniques in a scientic manner. Honoring spiritual integrity involves doing so in a fair, ethical, honest, responsible, and compassionate manner.

Thus, the participants had been specically notied that their unique perspectives were valued; this created an environment in which they were ostensibly empowered to give a full and candid account of their experience throughout the screening process. Additionally, we contend that the anonymous situation of participants responding by themselves to a questionnaire item might, in fact, elicit a more full and candid account of their experience than face-to-face interviews with an investigator who might appear to the participants to embody the role of an imposing and critical scientist. Roxburgh and Roe list one advantage of face-to-face data collection as allowing
the researcher to tailor the interview to reect the participants values and emphases. . . . This was not possible with Rock et al.s favoured method of data collection, which severely constrains the range of topics that the participant could consider to be legitimate in that context.

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This suggested steering of the interview by the researcher is arguably no more or less advantageous than Rock et al.s use of a standard set of questions. The use of the consistent question set across participants controls for response variance and encourages greater consensus among the data. Variability between responses makes analysis difcult as it only highlights differences in experiences. In that respect, constrain[ing] the range of topics discussed by the participants may be viewed as an advantage. This may, of course, be regarded as anathema by qualitative researchers who subscribe to a purist position. However, researchers who acknowledge that the qualitative-quantitative dichotomy is spurious (e.g., Crawford et al., 2002; Foss & Ellefsen, 2002; Risjord et al., 2002) also understand that, as Allen-Meares and Lane (1990) argue, one must view data collection techniques and methods as not irrevocably linked to one paradigm or the other (p. 458). In addition, the aim of the study was to elucidate the mediums specic sensory experiences versus their entire lived experiences, and so a limited question set was necessary. Roxburgh and Roe also state that
Although Rock et al. include original quotations from participants, the majority are merely sound-bites of one sentence or less, which do not provide any context for the mediums experiences or allow the reader to conceptualize their own interpretations.

The listed quotations from the IRMs were extracted signicant statements from the IRMs original protocols which, in turn, were used by Rock et al. to formulate comprehensive constituent themes. The nature of the IRMs responses was generally such that a succinct statement more appropriately captured the fundamental essence of the theme than would more lengthy quotations from the original protocols. Furthermore, it would be redundantand indeed misleadingto include quotations that consisted of material other than extracted signicant statements to illustrate comprehensive constituent themes. Moreover, it is our view that Rock et al.s commentaries serve the function of creating the context for each extracted signicant statement in terms of the comprehensive constituent themes. Criticism 2: Fully Embracing a Qualitative Approach Roxburgh and Roe assert that Rock et al. have yet to fully embrace a qualitative approach. The tacit assumption underpinning this remark is arguably a purist position whereby a qualitative-quantitative dichotomy is supported. However, the qualitative-quantitative debate is currently characterized by the position that this dichotomy is spurious, and that the two approaches can be reconciled (e.g., Abussabha & Woelfel, 2003; Baum, 1995; Bolden & Moscarola, 2000; BurkeJohnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Calderon et al., 2000; Caracelli & Greene, 1993; Coyle & Williams, 2000; Howe, 1992; Malterud, 2001). If qualitative and quantitative approaches are reconcilableand thus not mutually exclusivethen it seems reasonable to suggest that the approaches may inform one another. In this case, it may be edifying to invoke one approach to elucidate the limitations

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of another approach as Rock et al. have done when considering possible methodological shortcomings of their study. Roxburgh and Roe also expressed disappointment regarding Rock et al.s suggestion that future research might adopt a quantitative approach (i.e., the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory or PCI). Interestingly, researchers who argue that the qualitative-quantitative dichotomy is false advocate the notion of choosing research methodology on a case-by-case or research projectby research project basis (Baum, 1995; Coll & Chapman, 2000). Consequently, if one conducts a qualitative study, then one is not necessarily precluded from suggesting a quantitative avenue for future research. Indeed, it is arguable that future research methodologies should be determined by the research questions or hypotheses that one wishes to address, not an ideological or fundamentalist commitment to either qualitative or quantitative research as Roxburgh and Roe have demonstrated in this instance. Pekala and Cardea (2000) state a full understanding of a phenomenon will require different perspectives and methodologies (p. 72). We, in fact, further addressed studying mediums experiences using both quantitative (Rock & Beischel, 2008) and qualitative (Rock et al., in press) methods in our subsequent studies where the focus [was] on the phenomenology of their experiences. For example, in the quantitative study (Rock & Beischel, 2008), we used the PCI as we had suggested in Rock et al. (2008). The PCI has been demonstrated to be a valid and reliable measure of phenomenology (Pekala, 1991; Pekala et al., 1986). Roxburgh and Roe complete their comments by stating that the study is disappointing in its ability to resonate with the reader and does little to clarify or expand our understanding of mediumship. One might, of course, wonder on what grounds Roxburgh and Roe feel qualied to determine what does, or does not, resonate with all readers. In any event, the focus of the Rock et al. (2008) paper and our other published scientic research manuscripts involves providing a discussion of the data collected; our intent is not to resonate with the reader but to accurately portray our methods, data, and conclusions. In addition, it seems improbable that any systematic peer-reviewed analysis of mediums descriptions of their experiences would contribute little to the elds understanding of mediumship. This is especially the case for Rock et al.s study as it included an elite population of mediums unique in their abilities to report accurate information about the deceased. That is, Rock and colleagues were not concerned with the experiences of claimant mediums, but rather were specically investigating the experiences of mediums whose abilities have been repeatedly demonstrated under controlled conditions in a laboratory. In contrast, it is noteworthy that Roxburghs (2007, 2008) own research is concerned with self-classied spiritualist medi3 ums whose purported mediumistic abilities have not been veried scientically. Rock et al.s study, therefore, clearly claries and expands our understanding of the experiences of scientically veried mediums. To suggest otherwise is frankly insulting to the authors as well as this Journals editors and reviewers and offers no criticism of merit for informing future studies or manuscripts.

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There is a paucity of information within the literature regarding scientically veried mediums and their experiences. The comprehensive constituent themes identied by Rock et al. (2008) were independently veried by the very individuals who wrote the original protocols that were thematically analyzed. Clearly, the authors of the original protocols are in the best position to comment on the validity of Rock et al.s ndings. Furthermore, the chronology of the screening steps as well as the investigators philosophy regarding the importance of each mediums experiences eliminated priming issues and removed any pressure on the participants to provide appropriate responses. Finally, it is our view that Roxburgh and Roe have adopted a purist position and, thus, failed to acknowledge that, as Pekala and Cardea (2000) assert, phenomenological inquiry may be undertaken in different ways and no laws exist regarding which methods should qualify. ADAM J. ROCK adam.rock@deakin.edu.au JULIE BEISCHEL beischel@windbridge.org GARY E. SCHWARTZ gschwart@email.arizona.edu Notes
1

Validity is a term often used to describe the results of quantitative methodologies. The term credibility, conversely, is normally used to describe the extent to which the results of qualitative research resonate with the participants lived experiences (Patton, 2002). For the purpose of this response, the term validity is used to maintain congruency with Roxburgh and Roe. It is important to note that this popular text is no longer used in the similar screening of prospective research mediums that now takes place at the Windbridge Institute because it was written a number of years prior to the development of the mediumship research methods currently used. Instead, a lay-friendly description of the research methods now used (Beischel, 2007/2008) is employed during Step 6 of the screening procedure. It should be noted that Roxburghs participants have won awards for mediumship demonstration from the Spiritualist [sic] National Union (SNU) (Roxburgh, 2007), a non-scientic organization. The SNU Training and Awards or T&A committee organises quality training and assessment for SNU members and issues awards to successful candidates (Spiritualists National Union, 2009). No specic description of the training or assessment procedure is given.

References
Abussabha, R., & Woelfel, M. L. (2003). Qualitative vs quantitative methods: Two opposites that make a perfect match. Journal of the American Dietetic Association, 103, 566569.

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Allen-Meares, P., & Lane, B. A. (1990). Social work practice: Integrating qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques. Social Work, 35, 452458. Baum, F. (1995). Researching public health: Behind the qualitative-quantitative methodological debate. Social Science and Medicine, 40, 459468. Beischel, J. (2007/2008). Contemporary methods used in laboratory-based mediumship research. Journal of Parapsychology, 71(Spring/Fall 2007/published August 2008), 3768. Bolden, R., & Moscarola, J. (2000). Bridging the quantitative-qualitative divide: The lexical approach to textual data analysis. Social Science Computer Review, 18, 450460. Burke-Johnson, R., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come. Educational Researcher, 33, 1426. Calderon, J. L., Baker, R. S., & Wolf, K. E. (2000). Focus groups: A qualitative method complementing quantitative research for studying culturally diverse groups. Education for Health, 13, 9195. Caracelli, V. J., & Greene, J. C. (1993). Data analysis strategies for mixed-method evaluation designs. Educational Reevaluation and Policy Analysis, 15, 195207. Coll, R. K., & Chapman, R. (2000). Qualitative or quantitative? Choices of methodology for cooperative education researchers. Journal of Cooperative Education, 35, 2534. Coyle, J., & Williams, B. (2000). An exploration of epistemological intricacies of using qualitative data to develop a quantitative measure of user health care. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 31, 12351243. Crawford, M. J., Weever, T., Rutter, D., Sensky, T., & Tyrer, P. (2002). Evaluating new treatments to psychiatry: The potential value of combining qualitative and quantitative research methods. International Review of Psychiatry, 14, 611. Foss, C., & Ellefsen, B. (2002). The value of combining qualitative and quantitative approaches in nursing research by means of method triangulation. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 20, 242248. Howe, K. R. (1992). Getting over the quantitative-qualitative debate. American Journal of Education, 100, 236256. Malterud, K. (2001). Qualitative research: Standards, challenges, and guidelines. The Lancet, 358, 483488. Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Pekala, R. J. (1991). Quantifying Consciousness: An Empirical Approach. New York: Plenum Press. Pekala, R. J., & Cardea, E. (2000). Methodological issues in the study of altered states of consciousness and anomalous experiences. In Cardea, E., Lynn, S. J., & Krippner, S. (Eds.), Varieties of Anomalous Experience: Examining the Scientic Evidence (pp. 4782). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Pekala, R. J., Steinberg, J., & Kumar, C. K. (1986). Measurement of phenomenological experience: Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 63, 983989. Risjord, M. W., Dunbar, S. B., & Maloney, M. F. (2002). A new foundation for methodological triangulation. Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 34, 269275. Rock, A. J., & Beischel, J. (2008). Quantitative analysis of research mediums conscious experiences during a discarnate reading versus a control task: A pilot study. Australian Journal of Parapsychology, 8, 157179. Rock, A. J., Beischel, J., & Cott, C. C. (in press). Psi vs. survival: A qualitative investigation of mediums phenomenology comparing psychic readings and ostensible communication with the deceased. Transpersonal Psychology Review. Rock, A. J., Beischel, J., & Schwartz, G. E. (2008). Thematic analysis of research mediums experiences of discarnate communication. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 22, 179192. Roxburgh, E. C. (2007). The psychology and phenomenology of mediumship: An exploratory survey. 50th Annual Convention of the Parapsychological Association, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, August. Roxburgh, E. C. (2008). The psychology of spiritualist mental mediumship. 51st Annual Convention of the Parapsychological Association, Winchester, England, August. Roxburgh, E. C., & Roe, C. A. (2009). Thematic analysis of mediums experiences [Letter to the editor]. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 23, 348351. Schwartz, G. E. (with Simon, W. L.). (2002). The Afterlife Experiments: Breakthrough Scientic Evidence of Life After Death. New York: Pocket Books (division of Simon and Schuster). Spiritualists National Union. (2009). Training and Awards Committee. Available at: http://www.snu. org.uk/awards/committee.htm. Accessed 23 May 2009.

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BOOK REVIEWS
The Placebo Response and the Power of Unconscious Healing by Richard Kradin. Routledge, 2008. 296 pp. $40.00 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0-415-95618-5. The placebo effectroughly speaking, the effect a treatment has simply because people believe in ithas probably accounted for the positive outcomes of most medical treatments throughout history. According to one estimate, the vast majority of more than 20,000 ancient remedies catalogued and used by Asian and European cultures for roughly 2 millennia workedwhen they worked at all entirely because of the placebo effect (Shapiro & Shapiro, 1997). The creation of modern scientic medicine in the mid-19th century eventually gave rise to the search for empirical evidence that interventions really worked as advertised. Nevertheless, the placebo effect still plays an enormous role in medical intervention today. But how can a belief determine the outcome of a physical intervention? Thats a question posed by medical researcher and clinician Richard Kradin of the Massachusetts General Hospital and the Harvard Medical School in a new book called The Placebo Response and the Power of Unconscious Healing (Kradin, 2008). As it happens, its also the question raised in a number of other recent books, most notably one by neuroscientist Fabrizio Benedetti of the University of Turin (Benedetti, 2008; also see Evans, 2004; Guess et al., 2002; Harrington, 1997; Moerman, 2002; Peters, 2001; Thompson, 2005). Although there are a few skeptics out there (see Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, 2001), there is strong consensus these days that the placebo effect, long ignored by serious scientists and practitioners, is something we need to understand and perhaps even employ deliberately to improve clinical practice. Indeed, to ignore the role that belief plays in clinical interventions would seem to be folly. Hundreds of studies have now conrmed the power of the placebo in a variety of contexts, some demonstrating outcomes quite extreme and almost bizarre. The placebo response has been estimated to account for at least 75% of the effectiveness of major antidepressant drugs, for example (Kirsch & Sapirstein, 1998; cf. Kirsch et al., 2008), and occasionally placebo pills appear to outperform both prescription medications and herbal remedies (Davidson et al., 2002). Researchers have also found that simply stabbing a patient with a scalpelthat is, performing sham surgerycan produce benets similar to that of real surgery (Cobb et al., 1959; Diamond et al., 1960; Mosely et al., 2002). Perhaps most impressive of all, placebo procedures also work with animals, even though animals presumably lack both the imaginations and belief systems some say are essential to placebo effects in humans. In a landmark study published in the 1970s (one of the rst to put the placebo effect on the map with hard-headed bench scientists), Ader and Cohen (1975) showed that rats that had learned to associate 359

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a saccharin-avored liquid with the nausea-inducing effects of an immosuppressive drug had immosuppressive (and ultimately fatal) reactions to the saccharin water alone. Its no wonder that a recent national survey of physicians in the U.S. found that about half of them use placebo treatments regularly with their patients, with only 5% of them informing their patients that theyre doing so (Tilburt et al., 2008). Kradins approach to the placebo effect, exemplied by the rst two-thirds of his book, is largely straightforward. He begins, as one might expect of a member of the mainstream medical establishment, by admitting that he had paid little attention to the placebo effect for most of his career. When he began to run clinical trials, he recognized that placebo effects could confound the interpretation of therapeutic results (p. xii) and began to wonder why one of the most important topics in medicine has for centuries been systematically neglected (p. xiii). His belated exploration of this important subject is subsequently summarized: Yes, the placebo response is quite real in the treatment of depression, even producing measurable brain changes. Yes, alternative explanations can often be found to account for placebo effects. Yes, placebo pills can increase antibody levels and reduce symptoms. Yes, as Norman Cousins reminded us, healing is a holistic phenomenon, and state of mind can play a role. Continuing his journey of discovery, Kradin deftly summaries hundreds of ndings of this sort for the reader, weaving together readings from medicine, psychology, and other elds, demonstrating placebo effects in the treatment of anxiety, headaches, arthritis, ulcers, cancer, and other maladies, showing the role that context plays in the magnitude of the effects, and expressing concerns when he has them. The problem is that except for his skepticism and growing awareness, theres virtually nothing new or unique about his journey. At times, one wonders what took him so long, or why, presumably already having gained a full awareness of the phenomenon when he began writing his book, he presented his views with so much apparent angst. That said, Kradin does what needs to be done: He gently chides modern medicine for its single-minded obsession with physics and linear causation, for its failure to see the person as a whole, and for the hubris routinely practiced by clinicians, who in fact often know very little:
Many lay people harbor the erroneous notion that physicians know how most treatments work. Truth be told, there is hardly an effective treatment in which the mechanism of action is well known, and in some cases, physicians have absolutely no idea as to how their prescriptions actually work. (p. 66)

Continuing his journey, Kradin reminds us of the power that shamans and magic hadand often still haveto alter health and well being. Discovering Morton Smiths (1978) book Jesus the Magician, Kradin nds it remarkable to consider the possibility that the placebo response may be basis of the dominant religions of the Western world (p. 38) and perhaps even more remarkable that the rst demonstrably effective drugquininewasnt identied until the 18th century. He wonders why its taken so very long for modern medicine to look with

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proper humility and awe at the real mysteries and complexities of healing and properly blames drug companiesobsessed with recouping their investment and making a prot (p. 75)for trying to turn attention away from the power of placebos, even going so far as to exclude placebo-responders from their drug trials (p. 76). With few exceptions, when Kradin is rehashing what most experts on the subject already know about placebos, he does it well, and the exceptions are generally minor. One thats somewhat troubling is that he implies several times that the commonly used research design that evaluates a drug or other treatment by comparing characteristics of a treatment group to those of a placebo control group is adequate for identifying the placebo effect. In fact, the placebo/treatment comparison is only adequate for identifying the differential effectiveness of the treatment over the placebo. The placebo effect itself cant be identied unless a third groupa no treatment groupis employed. When improvement in the placebo group exceeds that of the no treatment group, the difference is likely due to the placebo effect. On a more trivial note, in discussing behavioral conditioning studies with rats, Kradin incorrectly identies Richard J. Herrnstein, my advisor in graduate school, as Robert Hernstein. Kradin gets into more serious trouble when, increasingly, he reveals his struggles with the classic mind-body problem, or, as he calls it, the mind-body conundrum. Ren Descartes was correct, he says. Mind and brain are categorically different, even if they are inextricably linked (p. 171). His dualistic thinking never subsides, even when, at one point, he uncharacteristically asserts that the idea that mind and body are distinct is patently absurd (p. 147). Reviewing studies demonstrating that placebos produce changes in brain chemistry and activity, as a dualist, Kradin has no choice but to think that there must be something mysterious about this, and his solution is to take us into the murky world of psychoanalytic inquirya realm that doesnt easily connect with brain research, no matter how faithfully or exuberantly one spins those Freudian yarns. Borrowing from the ideas of neo-Freudians such as John Bowlby, Donald Winnicott, and Joseph Sandler, this is where, in the latter part of his book, Kradin says things that the other recent books on the placebo effect generally do not, such as: the placebo is a protosymbol for things such as early dynamics with caretakers. Just how does one prove such an assertion? Ill spare you further details of his ideas on the nonlinearity of brain processes and the emergent properties of mind (nothing surprising here) and instead make some assertions about the mysterious placebo effect that just need to be made. Yes, indeed, placebo effects in humans seem often to be mediated by cognitive processes; perceptions and beliefs about authority gures, for example, can make all the difference. But placebo effects occur in animals, for goodness sake, and virtually every experience we haveeverything from copulating to getting a trafc ticket to getting a back rubproduces changes in the brain. Why do we suddenly need to worry about the mind-body conundrum or psychoanalytic

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inquiry when we discover that a sugar pill, under specic environmental conditions and with certain individuals, can produce changes in health or behavior, along with corresponding changes in brain structure or activity? Why do weor at least Kradinfeel so compelled to resort to the muddy and mystical when the facts themselves speak so plainly? ROBERT EPSTEIN Department of Psychology University of California San Diego repstein@post.harvard.edu References
Ader, R. A., & Cohen, N. (1975). Behaviorally conditioned immunosuppression. Psychosomatic Medicine, 37, 333340. Benedetti, F. (2008). Placebo Effects: Understanding the Mechanisms in Health and Disease. Oxford University Press. Cobb, L., Thomas, G. I., Dillard, D. H., Merendino, K. A., & Bruce, R. A. (1959). An evaluation of internal mammary artery ligation by a double blind technique. New England Journal of Medicine, 260, 11151118. Davidson, J. R. T., et al., the Hypericum Depression Trial Study Group. (2002). Effect of Hypericum perforatum (St Johns wort) in major depressive disorder: A randomized controlled trial. Journal of the American Medical Association, 287, 18071814. Diamond, E. G., Kittle, C. F., & Crockett, J. E. (1960). Comparison of internal mammary artery ligation and sham operation for angina pectoris. American Journal of Cardiology, 5, 483486. Evans, D. (2004). Placebo: Mind over Matter in Modern Medicine. Oxford University Press. Guess, H. A., Kleinman, A., Kusek, J. W., & Engel, L. W. (Eds.). (2002). Science of the Placebo: Toward an Interdisciplinanary Research Agenda. BMJ Books. Harrington, A. (Ed.). (1997). The Placebo Effect: An Interdisciplinary Exploration. Harvard University Press. Hrobjartsson, A., & Gotzsche, P. C. (2001). Is the placebo powerless? An analysis of clinical trials comparing placebo with no treatment. New England Journal of Medicine, 344, 15941602. Kirsch, I., Deacon, B. J., Huedo-Medina, T. B., Scoboria, A., Moore, T. J., & Johnson, B. T. (2008). Initial severity and antidepressant benets: A meta-analysis of data submitted to the food and drug administration. PLoS Medicine, 5, 260268. Kirsch, I., & Sapirstein, G. (1998). Listening to Prozac but hearing placebo: A meta-analysis of antidepressant medication. Prevention & Treatment, 1(2), Article 0002a. Kradin, R. (2008). The Placebo Response and the Power of Unconscious Healing. New York: Routledge. Moerman, D. E. (2002). Meaning, Medicine and the Placebo Effect. Cambridge University Press. Mosely, J. B., OMalley, K., Petersen, N. J., Menke, T. J., Brody, B. A., Kuykendall, D. H., Hollingsworth, J. C., Ashton, C. M., & Wray, N. P. (2002). A controlled trial of arthroscopic surgery for osteoarthritis of the knee. New England Journal of Medicine, 347, 8188. Peters, D. (Ed.). (2001). Understanding the Placebo Effect in Complementary Medicine: Theory, Practice and Research. Churchill Livingstone. Shapiro, A. K., & Shapiro, E. L. (1997). The Powerful Placebo: From Ancient Priest to Modern Physician. Johns Hopkins University Press. Smith, M. (1978). Jesus the Magician: Charlatan or Son of God? Berkeley, CA: Seastone. Thompson, W. G. (2005). The Placebo Effect and Health: Combining Science and Compassionate Care. Amherst, NY: Prometheus. Tilburt, J. C., Emanuel, E. J., Kaptchuk, T. J., Curlin, F. A., & Miller, F. G. (2008). Prescribing placebo treatments: Results of national survey of U. S. internists and rheumatologists. British Medical Journal, 337, a1938.

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Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic by Russell T. Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. viii + 322 pp. $34.00 (hardcover). ISBN 978-262-08366-9, 0-262-08366-3. Trying to go beyond the usual academic practice of having a dialogue between the deaf, this book is the collaboration between two individuals holding quite different views about the possibility of obtaining valid and reliable (although by no means perfect) accounts of conscious experience. On the cautiously yes side is psychologist Russell T. Hurlburt, who created his Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) methodology and has tested it in programmatic research spanning many years now (e.g., Hurlburt & Heavey, 2004). On the cautiously no side is philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel, who has written extensively about his distrust of introspective reports. After the two authors met in a conference on consciousness they initiated a discussion that included Schwitzgebel trying the DES method himself. They then decided to write a book in which they would intersperse points and counterpoints among new DES data collected from participant Melanie. The initial chapters of the book are devoted to the authors laying out their territory, followed by a section of the book devoted to the sampling and analysis of Melanies conscious experience. The book ends with reections by both writers. In his initial chapter, Hurlburt reviews the literature on introspection as a research method, showing that some of the received wisdom about the limitations of introspection are wrong, including the usual account of why it was abandoned (i.e., that competing laboratories were getting dissimilar data, instead of the fact that they got similar data but interpreted them differently), and the famous critique by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) of introspection (pertinent to reporting about the causes of ones experience rather than to the experiences themselves; see also Wilson, 2003). Hurlburt describes methods to sample the contents of consciousness, although he does not discuss other relevant methods such as phenomenological approaches and questionnaires (cf. Pekala & Cardea, 2000). He describes the DES method, which includes random beeping as a signal for the participant to pay attention to his/her experience at the time of the beeping, to write some notes about it, and to meet with the experimenter within 24 hours to participate in an interview to explicate the experience. This is an iterative process and Hurlburt mentions that it takes some practice and a skilled interviewer before the participant can provide good reports. He concludes that, albeit imperfect, this is the best introspective method and that it produces valid and reliable data, giving examples from research with individuals with borderline personality disorder and Aspergers disorder. In his chapter, Schwitzgebel provides a philosophical critique to positions that treat introspection as either being infallible or useless, and briey summarizes the refried positivist approach of Dennett as incoherent (p. 44). Schwitzgebel considers that introspective data must be treated with great caution and

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throughout the book advocates using multiple methods to establish the validity of introspective data. I nd it difcult to argue against his position as the literature in many areas, including hypnosis, shows that subjective reports and objective data can supplement each other. For instance, PET research shows that the brain areas responsive to color in highly hypnotizable individuals become more active after they are given a hypnotic suggestion to see a black-and-white pattern as if it were in color, in agreement with the verbal report of their experiences (Kosslyn et al., 2000). A neurophenomenological approach (e.g., Cardea et al., 2007; Lutz & Thompson, 2003) that considers introspective reports as essential to the understanding of related brain activity can yield results that go well beyond simplistic use of brain imaging techniques and of the limitations of any method of research, whether about introspection or about objective matters (cf. Pekala & Cardea, 2000). About half of the book is devoted to an analysis and discussion of the sampling of Melanies experience. To give a taste of this section, on the fourth sampling day Melanie reports feeling a yearning about scuba diving, feeling bobbing at the top of the water, and so on, at the moment of the beep. Then Hurlburt seeks to clarify if those were two different sensations, which one was the central one, and proceeds to seek clarication and analysis of the experience. Schwitzgebel dialogues with him and Melanie about a number of issues he is skeptical of, such as whether some of Melanies report is more inference than recall. This then goes on for about 27 pages, with some boxed asides to discuss more general issues in depth. To what extent the reader will be interested in more than 150 pages of this will depend, I suspect, on how much she/he cares about DES practical and theoretical nuances. For my part, I noticed that after reading a number of pages in this section, my interest in the book started to wane. The nal section of the book includes reections by both authors on what they learned during this process. Although they became subtler in their evaluation of the others position, there was no real revelation or change of hearts by either. It is clear that Schwitzgebel respects Hurlburts work, but he does not agree that the DES is the best or only way to study conscious experience. I agree with this assessment even though I have admired Hurlburts work for a long time. Some of my research involves comparing more global aspects of the stream of consciousness such as consciousness alterations following a hypnotic procedure. Although taking a less atomistic approach than the DES will miss many details, I think that alternative introspective methods provide a better sense of states of consciousness as a whole (Cardea et al., 2007). And even the maligned armchair approach of introspection yielded what is probably the most signicant analysis of the stream of consciousness when it was used by someone of the caliber of William James (1890). Thus I would also be less skeptical of introspection than Schwitzgebel, or perhaps better said, as skeptical of introspectionism as of other methods in psychology and the sciences in general, all of which offer at best limited perspectives. Tolerating uncertainty is a skill demanded

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by science (and life), or as James put it, the true philosopher (or scientist) should have the habit of always seeing an alternative (1876). ETZEL CARDEA Thorsen Professor Department of Psychology Lund University P.O. Box 213 SE-221 00 Lund, Sweden Etzel.Cardena@psychology.lu.se http://www.psychology.lu.se/Personal/e_cardena/ References
Cardea, E., Lehmann, D., Jnsson, P., Terhune, D., & Faber, P. (2007). The neurophenomenology of hypnosis. Proceedings of the 50th Annual Convention of the Parapsychological Association (pp. 1730). Hurlburt, R. T., & Heavey, C. L. (2004). To beep or not to beep: Obtaining accurate reports about awareness. In Jack, A., & Roepstorff, A. (Eds.), Trusting the Subject? Volume 2 (pp. 113128). Exeter, UK: Imprint Press. James, W. (21 September 1876). The teaching of philosophy in our colleges. The Nation, 178179. James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology. New York: Holt. Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L., Costantini-Ferrando, M. F., Alpert, N. M., & Spiegel, D. (2000). Hypnotic visual illusion alters color processing in the brain. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157, 12791284. Lutz, A., & Thompson, E. (2003). Neurophenomenology: Integrating subjective experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. In Jack, A., & Roepstorff, A. (Eds.), Trusting the Subject? Volume 1 (pp. 3152). Exeter, UK: Imprint Press. Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231259. Pekala, R., & Cardea, E. (2000). Methodological issues in the study of altered states of consciousness and anomalous experiences. In Cardea, E., Lynn, S. J., & Krippner, S. (Eds.), Varieties of Anomalous Experience: Examining the Scientic Evidence (pp. 4781). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Wilson, T. D. (2003). Knowing when to ask: Introspection and the adaptive unconscious. In Jack, A., & Roepstorff, A. (Eds.), Trusting the Subject? Volume 1 (pp. 131140). Exeter, UK: Imprint Press.

Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a Sickness by Christopher Lane. Yale University Press, 2007. 272 pp. $27.50 (hardcover). ISBN 9780300124460. Referring to the current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), a tome revered as the nal authority on psychiatric disorders, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) states that
As the number of psychiatric diagnoses has grown over time, researchers and clinicians have been able to share their knowledge of mental disorders with greater precision. An increased number of diagnoses does not mean, however, that more individuals are being diagnosed with mental illnesses. The diagnostic pie has not gotten larger; rather, the pieces of that pie have gotten smaller and more precise. More precise diagnoses signicantly aid the advance of research and treatment. (1997: 2)

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Psychiatrists it seems, would like us, the general public, to believe that their intentions are magnanimous. We are supposed to accept that the pie is not getting bigger; that each new psychiatric diagnosis serves only to advance scientic research and improve the lives of those suffering from the identied malaise. We are to believe that the recurrent explosion in psychiatric illnesses and the simultaneous discovery of seemingly miraculous drugs to cure them signals nothing other than benevolent progress. For some time people have been expressing doubt, suggesting that the relabeling of human experiences has gone too far, and wondering whether the urry of diagnosing and medicating is not more about prot than it is about making us mentally healthy. Shyness is, to the extent that it puts substance to these concerns, a valuable book. First, Lane briey describes the conict, dating back to the 19th century, between psychoanalytic and physiological psychiatry over the nature and cause of mental problems. This struggle culminated in victory for the latter and, as the biological model took hold of the profession, it became progressively easier to reposition human characteristics as pathologies requiring treatment. Common, garden variety behaviors and emotions that earlier might have been considered annoying or unpleasant became redened as an array of mental disorders. Then, in intriguing detail, drawing on previously classied material, Lane weaves a readable story about the inner workings of the APA committee charged with the task of rewriting the DSM. Focusing, as he does, on the role played by its long-term chairman, Robert Spitzer, is tting as it was primarily under Spitzers direction that the DSM doubled from 180 categories in 1968 (already up from the 106 found in the rst DSM published in 1962) to over 350 by 1994. Lane documents, with the support of fascinating, internecine correspondence, the quarrels and compromises that resulted in taskforce members dropping by the wayside as Spitzer undauntedly pursued his belief that mental ailments were really medical disorders (p. 56). For instance, Richard Schwartz of the Cleveland Clinic took exception with DSM-III (and with Spitzer) for classifying abnormalities of thought, emotion and behavior as illnesses while he considered them to lie outside the domain of psychiatry (p. 64). He is quoted as writing that my quarrel with DSM-III is that for many of the disorders listed therein, the social consensus that they are true diseases and should be managed by the psychiatric profession is lacking (p. 76). Despite such opposition, Spitzer got his way on this and many other occasions. Chapter 3 focuses on shyness, chosen by Lane to illustrate how a generally (and historically) normal characteristic can be turned into a diagnosable disease. Shyness as a concept catches public attention and, given the head scratching response to shyness being elevated from a familiar human trait to a serious psychological condition, he chose well. Lanes take on the transmogrication of shyness makes for an interesting read. Shyness isnt shyness anymore. It is a disease that Henderson and Zimbardo, of the Shyness Institute in Palo Alto, warned is a public health danger that

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appears to be heading toward epidemic proportion (p. 5). From Lanes perspective, the DSM-IIIR was instrumental in turning an apparently relatively rare problem into one that could afict almost everyone on the planet (p. 100). Shyness, social phobia, avoidant personality, introverted personality disorder, all disappeared as a new disorder, branded with a new name, was createdsocial anxiety disorder. And here the plot thickens. In an engrossing fourth chapter, the author describes how pharmaceutical giants began ringing the public alarm bells while, at the same time, they retained public relations rms to reposition their existing drugs, such as the antidepressant class of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), to meet the anticipated (and created) demand. Paxil was one of these drugs and the one on which Lane focuses the readers attention. The initial goal. . . he writes, was less to promote Paxil than to educate reporters, consumers, and in some cases, physicians, in an effort to encourage diagnosis and treatment (p. 122 ). Targeted consumers, television commercials, magazine ads, bus shelter posters, and celebrity endorsements carried the message. By the early years of the 21st century, almost everyone knew that social anxiety disorder was the problem and that Paxil was the answer. But this answer, like most authoritatively expressed answers, had its qualiers. In this instance, these qualiers were signicant ones that for an unacceptably long time were ignored. Their uncovering is the focus of Lanes fth chapter. As Paxil, its generic version and other SSRIs continued to be strongly promoted, upwards of 20% of users found that the drugs either did not work or produced disturbing side effects. For those individuals, and for others who just failed to follow the regimen, withdrawal was often difcult, leading to serious harmful reactions. Along with the identication of these reactions as a rebound syndrome (p. 139), came a noticeable public, and legal, backlash against the drugs. In one case, a judge ordered a stop to advertisements that claimed Paxil was not habit-forming. Numerous lawsuits were initiated asserting that physicians and consumers had been mislead regarding the severity of withdrawal, and thousands of reports were submitted to the FDA reporting serious withdrawal issues. Lane is strongest in these rst ve chapters, especially when he relies on the following: (1) His knowledge of the history of psychiatry, (2) The fruits of his investigative work in unearthing the fundamental problem with psychiatric diagnostic labels in the DSM, and (3) The literature he accessed on the role of the pharmaceutical industry in this drama. Regarding this literature, it is obvious that Lane relied heavily on the writings of David Healy, the well-versed and prolic neuropsychologist who has long been the pre-eminent thorn in the side of the pharmaceutical giants. Lane effectively weaves Healys work into his book and, in doing so, echoes much of Healys own controversial and well-articulated warning.

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Lanes nal two chapters are comparatively weak, making for a disappointing ending to what had up to that point been an impressive book. In Chapter 6, A Backlash Forms: Prozac Nation Rebels, Lane fails to get across what he means by a backlash and to support the notion that Prozac Nation is, in fact, rebelling. He draws primarily on a body of ctional literature that is not widely enough known to get across a coherent message. For example, writing about the consequence of a neurochemical reshaping of personhood, he draws on the relatively obscure ctional writings of Jonathan Franzen and Will Self as well as the generally unfamiliar cinematic works of Zach Braff to illustrate that shyness, introversion and other common emotions are aspects of human nature and not a medical disease. This diversion is likely attributable to the nature of Lanes primary academic work that lies not in psychiatric or pharmaceutical territory but rather in the area of literary criticism. While it may be interesting material for another book, it does not contribute to the theme of this book and I would be inclined to skip this chapter. Unfortunately, the next chapter, the nal one, entitled Fear of Others in an Anxious Age, reads like a hodge-podge of ideas that too often are poorly, or incompletely, presented. Lane warns of other emotions and behaviours (apathy, compulsive buying, Internet addiction, etc.) that he sees destined to be pathologized and medicateda reasonable concern given recent history. He talks about a variety of strategies being used to expand the DSM and the pie, including what he calls switch and bait, presumably referring to bait and switch, the marketing strategy that is applied when the failure of one solution to an identied problem is dealt with by redening the problem and selling another solution. When he refers to the notion of lowering the threshold so that mild negative emotions are still viewed as symptoms of disease, Lane quotes one Harvard University psychiatrist but makes no mention of the literature on this topic or even of the term shadow syndromes that, when it was coined in the late 1990s, drew enormous public reaction (pro and con) (Ratey & Johnson, 1997). Then he talks about the need to have more professional sceptics like Satel and Sommers (p. 202), quoting from their book One Nation Under Therapy as if it stands alone as a serious critique penned by a mental health professional. Unfortunately, he seems unaware of a large body of work examining psychiatry (and psychology) as an out-of-control industry, much of it written by equally, if not more, sceptical professionals (see, e.g., Caplan, 1996; Dawes, 1994; Dineen, 1996, 2001; Kramer, 1997; Sarnoff, 2001; Smail, 1984). Then Lane appears to enjoy exposing a bizarre plan of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) involving secretly commissioning a thriller novel whose aim was to scare the living daylights out of folks who might want to buy cheap drugs from Canada (p. 204). While somewhat off the topic (or, perhaps, just misplaced in the book), these pages make interesting reading and show the depths to which Big PhRMA is willing to go. But beyond these pages is only an abrupt ending that includes an ambivalent remark to the effect that the pharma-psychiatry business may win out

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(or human nature may), a brief discourse on how suffering is part of life and, nally, a one-line reminder of what the book was about. Despite the weak ending, Lanes book is worth reading because in the rst ve chapters, he does such an admirable job of exposing how the psychiatric profession and the pharmaceutical industry together manage to develop and popularized new mental diseases and the accompanying treatments apparently designed to increase prots. Since 2007, when Shyness was published, shyness has endured as an anxietybased treatable illness and the sale of psychiatric drugs for shyness and an array of other normal behaviors remains lucrative. We are 2 years closer to the 2011 release date of the next revision of the DSM. Not much has happened to slow the impetus. Almost certainly, DSM-V will contain new disorders that reect how intertwined the profession of psychiatry and the pharmaceutical companies remain. Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a Sickness reveals how the pie is growing, and why we should care. It is a solid book and one that is likely to remain current for several years, if not decades, to come. TANA DINEEN Hamilton, Ontario, Canada td@78mountain.com References
American Psychiatric Association (APA). (1997). Fact Sheet: Psychiatric Diagnosis and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Fourth Edition), DSM-IV. Washington, DC: Author. Caplan, P. J. (1996). They Say Youre Crazy: How the Worlds Most Powerful Psychiatrists Decide Whos Normal. Da Capo Press. Dawes, R. (1994). House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth. The Free Press. Dineen, T. (1996). Manufacturing Victims: What the Psychology Industry Is Doing to People. Studio 9 Books and Music. [Reprinted in 2001 by Robert Davies Publisher.] Kramer, P. D. (1997). Listening to Prozac: The Landmark Book About Antidepressants and the Remaking of the Self. Penguin. Ratey, J. J., & Johnson, C. (1997). Shadow Syndromes: How to Overcome Mild Forms of Common Psychological Conditions in Order to Reach Your Fullest Potential. New York: Bantam Press. Sarnoff, S. K. (2001). Sanctied Snake Oil: The Effect of Junk Science on Public Policy. Praeger. Smail, D. (1984). Illusion and Reality: The Meaning of Anxiety. Dent.

Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness by Alva No. Hill and Wang, 2009. 214 pp. $25.00 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0809074655. Out of Our Heads is a book about the location of minds. A long tradition in the mind sciences has it that this is an easy matter. Since minds wholly are products

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of brains, they are located, if they have locations, entirely in brains. This tradition, No argues, is mistaken. No, in constructing his claim, ably and accessibly presents a line of argument very well known to contemporary philosophers, though rarely fully appreciated. The general view, roughly, is that thoughts are not located in the brain because thought is itself a relational notion. Since a thought is a relationship holding between an agent and the world, thought extends quite literally from the agent to the world. Thought occurs in the world fully as much as it occurs in the brain of the agent. One way to get clearer on this claim is to understand what it is not. This is not the tired old nature/nurture debate. Nos claim is not that we have the thoughts we have as a result of environments acting on brains (though theres no need for him to deny that, so far as it goes). His is the much subtler, more radical and more interesting claim that so much as distinguishing between environment and thought is articial and misleading. His point is to call into question the very construction under which thoughts are about the world rather than in the world. This is in contrast to now-standard intuitions under which thoughts are divorced from the structures about which they are thoughts. The standard argument here proceeds through appeal to the logical independence of thought and object. I might have a pain in my leg absent any real stimulus causing itor absent even a leg. The pain would be the same in any case. Similarly, I might dream of my brother or even have an experience as of a brother downloaded into my head from some matrix-like computer. What this shows, the argument runs, is that my thoughts are representations of the world. They occur (or at least logically could occur) in either the presence or the absence of the things that they represent. So, to have a pain in my leg, or to think of my brother, just is to have my brain arranged into some particular structure; actual legs and actual brothers are not necessary for me to have thoughts about them. This view, No argues, is mistaken. Consider language as a special case of thought. The production of noise is, to be sure, independent of any particular thing being named. I can make the sound WAH tur in either the presence or absence of actual H2O. The production of that sound, though, is not language; it is a mere apping of the glottis. Noise-making becomes language proper only in light of a particular past history of producing and hearing that sound and in light of a present purpose in making it. History and intent, then, are necessary not for sounds but for the sounds to count as language. Similarly, causal history and logical connection are not necessary for brains to have structures, but they are necessary for those structures to count as thought. This, in turn, points to a second important thread in the book. Language is a shared enterprise. If I ask you to pass me the water, I am engaged in a project. That project fails if the ideas bound in the sentence remain resident in my head only (or, for that matter, only in your head or bilocated). The project succeeds only if what I am thinking gets connected in the right way to what you are thinking. Meaning, then, ends up not being a thing stored in my head and moved to yours, but rather an undertaking. Learning a language does not consist of storing a set of meanings

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for sounds but rather of developing a certain sort of skill, an ability to affect ones listener in certain ways. The point is that that language is dynamic, an action and not a thing. This in turn tells us that locating meaning requires showing full respect to the tendency of actions to range over the world. A baseball game can take place in a park, to be sure. But the game is not some simple sum of the motions of the players. There might be meaning in our exchange of words, but that meaning is not found in individual productions of noise. These, then, are Nos two main arguments: thought takes place in a world, and it consists of acting a certain way in that world. Of course these ideas are far better elaborated and far better defended in the book itself. The book does have some weaknesses, both in rigor and in manner of presentation. No refers to the view he opposes, for example, sometimes as the Platonist view, sometimes as the Cartesian and sometimes as the intellectualist, computational or even standard view. Conversely, we get, on the positive side, that something is extended out into the world, but that something sometimes is the mind, sometimes meaning, sometimes thought, consciousness, language, cognition, the agent or even the animal. There are real differences in these notions, differences worth attending. Similarly, one might wish that rather less weight were placed on generalizations and on analogy. This book articulates a tradition over 50 years old. Most of the arguments presented are well known, as are the responses to the arguments. No does not always do justice to opposing views, tending towards mere dismissal. The combination of the above tends to give the book a tone both casual and polemical. That said, it is not clear that the above could be repaired without substantial damage to what makes the book valuable. It was not intended as an epitome, and pushing it farther in that direction may well have made it less enjoyable and less accessible than it is. I can say that I was teaching an advanced class in the philosophy of mind when I read this book. When it came time to lecture externalism, I cribbed from it shamelessly. That, surely, is a sort of applause. GREG EALICK Department of Philosophy University of Maryland Baltimore County Baltimore, Maryland ealick@umbc.edu

Biocentrism: How Life and Consciousness Are the Keys to Understanding the True Nature of the Universe by Robert Lanza with Bob Berman. Benbella Books, 2009. 212 pp. $24.95 (hardcover). ISBN 978-1933771-69-4. Let me be so very unkind as to start off this review by laughing out loud at Robert Lanza and Bob Berman: their Appendix 1, entitled The Lorentz

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Transformation, features a single equation (which is reproduced below, with the correct version for comparison): DT = t 1-v 2 / c 2 (Biocentrism version) DT = Dt 1-v 2 / c 2 (corrected version) Like me, you at rst (perhaps) think that their problem is merely that of having chosen a bad typesetter: but, nothey go on to say t should be multiplied by the meat-and-potatoes of the Lorentz transformation, which is the square root of 1, from which we subtract. . . . No, neither Robert nor Bob is at home with this simple element of physics. They bollix it! (In their acknowledgements, they thank Ben Mathiesen for his help with the material in the appendix, so I must mention poor Bens name as well.) Lets go on now to Appendix 2, Einsteins Relativity and Biocentrism. Here the news is much better! I did not go through the details of their exposition, but their theme is one that is dear to my heart: rejection of Einsteins two postulates, followed by the substitution of Minkowski space. Score one for Robert and Bob! In fact, score a big one! From the quagmire of physics, they have, this time, pulled out a brass ring! Who is to blame for the farce of Appendix 1? Not Robert or Bob (or even Ben for that matter). I am the person to blame. I teach freshman physics, and I teach it just as badly as the next professor. Our freshman text (regardless of which one we choose) presents the two postulates. These are so unintuitive that anyone learning relativity that way could never be expected to recognize a wrong version of the Lorentz transformation of time intervals. No, Robert and Bob are to be commended for pursuing their underlying thesis despite having been taught physics so wretchedly badly by me and my physics friends. And what is their underlying thesis? They present it as a long list of Principles of Biocentrism that have no individual value, in my opinionbut the heart of it, collectively, is correct. On page 15 they say the animal observer creates reality and not the other way around. That is the essence of the entire book, and that is factually correct. It is an elementary conclusion from quantum mechanics. So what Lanza says in this book is not new. Then why does Robert have to say it at all? It is because we, the physicists, do NOT say itor if we do say it, we only whisper it, and in privatefuriously blushing as we mouth the words. True, yes; politically correct, hell no! Bless Robert Lanza for creating this book, and bless Bob Berman for not dissuading friend Robert from going ahead with it. Not that I think Robert Lanza could be dissuadedthis dude doesnt dissuade! Lanzas remarkable personal story is woven into the book and is uplifting. You should enjoy this book, and it should help you on your personal journey to understanding.

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Well, that is my review. What shall I do now? Let me continue with comments on items in the book that seemed to me, as I read, worthy of attention. Page 4, bottom: particles seem to respond to a conscious observer. Because that cant be right, . . . Well, it is right, but, there are no particles. Observations (which we often misinterpret as particles) most certainly do respond to a conscious observer. Page 8: God did it. Now, this book is not going to discuss spiritual beliefs nor take sides on whether this line of thinking is wrong or right. Well, this line of thinking is right, or else you are stuck with solipsism (which I for one reject). Page 16, bottom: photons of light from the overhead bulb bounce off the various objects and then interact with your brain. . . . This is undeniableits basic seventh grade science. But it is in fact dead wrong. There are no photons. Quantum mechanics deals with nothing but observations; photons are a useful engineering concept and nothing more. Page 36: (we each have in our brain) as many neurons as there are stars in the galaxy. Your own head contains what is probably the most complex thing in the entire universe. (However, it does annoy me that with all those neurons I am not better at math.) Various places: the authors are on their toes in suggesting unreality for space and time. String theorists (the last I looked) talk of space and time being perhaps emergent properties, rather than fundamental ingredients. Lanza and Bermans discussions of special relativity (despite Appendix 1) are very good, and expanded my own appreciation. And while I am at it, their presentation of the mysteries of quantum mechanics is capable and familiar, but is totally unnecessary, as quantum mechanics is almost trivial in its origin from the assumption of space and time plus a few simple symmetries. No mysteries there! Page 58: obviously there is no possible rebuttal to a suggestion that an unknown variable is producing some result. Oh yes there is! Hidden variables has been refuted decisively by experiment. Page 88, top: mention of Fred Hoyle and carbon (and mention elsewhere of the ne tuning of the universe to allow life). The Hoyle example is refuted decisively by David Gross, who points out that quantum chromodynamics is a xed structure, so the nuclear resonance that is required to make carbon is there, Fred Hoyle or no Fred Hoyle. Once you understand that the universe is purely mental, you are hardly surprised at the ne tuning. But, if you dont understand that the universe is purely mental, your awe at the ne tuning is foolish: anyone can catch you out, simply by postulating a multiverse. Dont waste your time on this silly game! Page 92: the authors make the interesting remark, by reminding us of its great successes at guring out interim processes and the mechanics of things, and fashioning marvelous new devices out of raw materials, science gets away with patently ridiculous explanations for the nature of the cosmos as a whole. So very true! And yet the notion that the universe exists only in our minds

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also seems patently ridiculous. I dont mind the patent ridiculousness of explanations, for that reason: what I care about is truth or falsity, as judged by experiment. And the answer, by experiment, is, that the universe exists only in our minds. Page 154, second line from top: the authors draw attention to the muchneglected hula theory. Page 163, bottom: A Big Bang means the universe was born, and that therefore it must someday die. . . . Not socurrent cosmology detects a birth, but clearly indicates endless accelerating expansion. Page 167: the authors appeal to science ction (and to lmsbut they dont mention Groundhog Day!) as laying a groundwork for acceptance of their thesis. With the authors, I hope for some kind of Malcolm Gladwell tipping point for the excellent ideas that they advance. Their book, I hope, will be a big step in the right direction. Acceptance would be of immense value to society, through placing humankind once again at the center of the cosmos. Page 170: the authors kindly knock Daniel Dennett, for which I thank them. It was while reading a review of a Dennett book explaining consciousness that I got so disgusted that I sent my essay, The Mental Universe, to Nature (it appeared on 7 July 2005) for publication. Page 174, bottom: I greatly enjoyed reading . . . must feel like the nature of the sun did to the ancient Greeks. Every day a ball of re crosses the sky. How would one begin to ascertain its composition and nature? Until Id read those simple words, that obvious thought had never crossed my mind. It is both glorious and humbling: we have accomplished so astoundingly much, and yet we still know nothing of the ultimate reason for our existence. On page 182, the authors briey discuss dreams. This is useful: the best I can come up with is that we are dreams in the mind of God. Pages 191192: the authors end their book by speculating, feebly, on life after death, pointing to conservation of energy. Well, energy doesnt existit is simply a conserved quantity (due to time-translation symmetry). No, your hope for life after death does not come from physics. Your hope comes from the astounding fact that that you exist. NOTHING could be more improbable than THAT, and yet . . . you DO exist! You are a true miracle that has actually happened, and being granted one more (and much smaller) miracle is not too much to ask for, in my opinion.

RICHARD CONN HENRY Professor of Physics and Astronomy The Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, Maryland henry@jhu.edu

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Proving Shakespeare: In Ben Jonsons Own Words by David L. Roper. Orvid Publications, 2008. 556 pp. $49.94 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0-55701261-9.

Roper has, in this book, provided primary new evidence relevant to an enigma of over 400 years standing: the actual identity of the author William Shakespeare. While orthodoxy has held to the traditional attribution of these monumental works to a gentleman from Stratford-upon-Avon, the evidential proof for this has been much more lacking than we are led to believe. A strong case can be made, and has been made since rst proposed in 1920, that the author was actually Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford. Oxford was recognized in his own day as a poet and playwright of notable talent, but one who published little under his own name. A massive amount of evidence has been advanced in his cause but the question remains disputed. David Roper of Cornwall, England, has published what may be denitive proof for the Oxfordian cause in the form of decryption of a message inscribed four centuries ago in a plaque on the wall of the Holy Trinity Church at Stratford-upon-Avon. This reviewer is not wont to defer to the voice of authority but rather has sought to follow the facts on this subject. Ropers evidence seems quite denitive in favor of Oxford. He has subjected to critical analysis the English language portion of the inscription and extracts from it the following: SO TEST HIM I VOW HE IS E DE VERE AS HE SHAKSPEARE ME I B. (The initials are those of Jonson, Ben; the J was not in use and I was commonly used in its place.) Ropers decryption method is Equidistant Letter Sequencing, or ELS, a method rst proposed by Giordano Cardano in 1550 and known as the Cardano Grille. The method involves placing the letters (without punctuation or spaces) in a rectangular array and identifying words then appearing in vertical sequences, varying the width of the rectangle until intelligible material appears. (Cardano was a 16th century Italian doctor and mathematician, and his method was used by European governments for coded messaging at the time.) Roper also tested the inscription for possible reference to Bacon and Marlowe and founded no possible coded references to them. The interpretation also passes tests for uniqueness and deliberate intent. In several instances, a word is used twice, but with different spellings, e.g., WHOM vs. WHOME, THIS abbreviated as YS, and THAT abbreviated as YT. If in one or more instances the versions of a word were swapped, the decryption would be destroyed. Roper closes his book with the rebuttal of arguments set forth by Stratfordians as the basic cornerstone of their position: the Stratford Monument (refuted by the decryption), Greenes Groatsworth of Wit, the First Folio introductory material, and the dating of plays such as The Tempest and Titus Andronicus. In all, Ropers book is a concise and encompassing study that illuminates a nearly fourcentury-long controversy.

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C. RICHARD DESPER 250 Main Street Hudson, Massachusetts desper4oxford@gmail.com dickdesper@gmail.com (Richard Desper is a chemist specializing in polymer microstructure, retired. He has researched the Shakespeare authorship question for 20 years.)

Encounters at Indian Head: The Betty and Barney Hill UFO Abduction Revisited by Karl Pock and Peter Brookesmith. San Antonio, TX: Anomalist Books, 2007. 312 pp. $17.95 (paper). ISBN 978-1-93366518-4. Captured! The Betty and Barney Hill UFO Experience by Stanton T. Friedman and Kathleen Marden. Franklin Lakes, NJ: New Page Books, 2007. 320 pp. $16.99 (paper). ISBN 156-414-971-4. In 1998, planning began for a unique symposium. It was not to be a large, well-attended one to guarantee a prot. In fact there would be no audience aside from the participants. The topic of the symposium would be just one UFO story. That story was the Barney and Betty Hill UFO abduction, said to have happened on the night of September 19, 1961. And the symposium would be a discussion of the merits and drawbacks of the Hills claims. Planned also at this time was the production of a book based upon the discussions. It was hoped that a publishers advance for the book would defray costs of running the whole affair. Unfortunately, the advance didnt come, nor did publisher interest. Nevertheless, with the assistance of Joseph Firmage, a wealthy supporter of UFO research, the plans did nally come to fruition. It would be 2007 before the book would appear due to a variety of delays, not the least of which was the passing of one of the authors, Karl Pock. The symposium took place back in September 2000 at the Indian Head Resort in New Hampshire, close to the site where the close encounter phase of the Hills experience allegedly took place. The participants covered a spectrum of attitudes towards UFO abductions in general and the Hill case in particular. Representing

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somewhat of a pro side were Karl Pock, Dr. Thomas Bullard, Walter Webb, who was the original investigator of the Hills for NICAP, the National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena in Washington, D.C., and to a lesser extent Greg Sandow. More skeptical were writers Marcello Truzzi, Hilary Evans, Peter Brooksmith, Martin Kottmeyer and arch-UFO skeptic Robert Sheaffer. Dennis Stacy wrote a chapter on the straightforward facts of the case. All were given the task of addressing the question as expressed on the back cover of the book, Was the rst UFO abduction the result of a genuine alien encounter or the product of some well-primed imaginations? In answering this question the harder task, or burden of proof, would be on the proponents of the notion that the Hills met alien creatures from another world. The rst thing this reviewer wanted to know as an outside observer of the Hill sighting was whether there was any physical evidence during the alleged encounter that would set it apart from the usual run-of-the-mill alien abduction claim of encounter, capture, experiment and release. Thousands of such reports exist, the details of which most UFO researchers could recite in their sleep. Several references to possible physical evidence appear in the book. One involves a pink residue, which Betty found on her dress after they arrived home in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, from their encounter. Betty said it was a powdery substance that she at rst dismissed as being nothing of importance. But she subsequently had second thoughts and kept the dress and shoes she wore stored in her closet from then on. The powder had long since vanished but it seemed to have left a persistent stain in the fabric of the dress. More physical evidence was reported in the form of scrapes on the tops of Barney Hills shoes, trouser cuff burrs on his pants, a circle of warts on Barneys groin, and a binocular strap broken by Barney while reacting to the close-up view of the UFO. Both of the Hills wristwatches had stopped and peculiar shiny spots were noted on the truck lid of their 1957 Chevy Bel Air. It was an interesting variety of items to ponder. What did the books contributors think of all this? Karl Pock called this physical evidence interesting, suggestive, and consistent with the Hills testimony (p. 217). But did it directly verify any suggestion that the Hills met aliens? He said that except for the warts and cars shiny spots we only know of it from the Hills themselves (p. 217). The warts, he said, were likely psychosomatic. Pock drew from these ndings that while he subjectively endorsed the Hill story as genuine, he had to admit that objective proof of this remains just beyond our grasp (p. 236). Walter Webb commented on the shiny car spots, saying he thought Bettys description of the spots may have been somewhat exaggerated (p. 244). He attributed her claim about the spots to her excitement following the encounter and a desire to offer proof of the experience by connecting the spots to the beeping noises she heard before the abduction event. If I read this correctly, Webb doesnt ascribe much importance to the shiny spots. Yet he concluded that the probability is high that the Hill report was genuine.

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I was beginning to become confused. I had thought perhaps that the one arbiter of the difference between a seemingly unlikely narrative report and a genuine factual experience, physical evidence, might tilt the conclusions in a direction where that evidence pointed. But here the opposite was occurring. Despite the lack of physical evidence as admitted by all chapter contributors, there was still a tendency to entertain the reality, or alien abduction nature, of the Hills sighting. In her retelling of the story under hypnosis, Betty was not oblivious to the need for some kind of concrete proof. When she was on the alien ship after her and Barneys alleged medical probing, Betty had wanted to take what appeared to be a book with her as she left the alien ship. At rst it seemed she would be allowed to keep it as evidence. But of course, inasmuch as we have come to wearily expect this sort of situation, the book was snatched away from Betty at the last minute before she was ushered off of the ship. Another consideration of evidence, though not physical, was how the authors dealt with the famous Hill star map, that which was seen by Betty on the ship and later recalled under hypnosis. Only two of them, Sheaffer and Pock, addressed it in some detail with Sheaffer criticizing it and Pock supporting it. Such a debate would depend upon the accuracy of the map. Considering the way it was recalled, during a hypnosis session by a non-astronomer, Im not sure this is the kind of accuracy that many analysts would prefer to see. Nevertheless this is what we are left with by Betty to ponder. The potential for a detailed positional map of stars as seen on an alien spacecraft would be at least worthy of investigation. Sheaffer pointed out numerous problems with interpretation of the maps stars by UFOlogists through the years. Oddly in his criticism he cites another star map interpretation, a study by Charles Atterberg, who determined that three core stars of his map decipherment were a better match for Bettys sketch that the oft-cited Marjorie Fish star map, constructed in the 1970s as a three-dimensional model so that numerous nearby star systems could be viewed from many perspectives. Sheaffer suggested, Surely this is more remarkable than any of the evidence supporting the Fish map (p. 198). If I didnt know better this almost sounds like Sheaffer thinks there might be something to the map after all. Pock was careful to avoid suggesting that the Fish interpretation was proof of anything but he agreed that the map was nonetheless provocative. In 2005, author William McBride published Interpretations of an Alien Star Map in which he cited no less than ve interpretations of Bettys star map. With the innumerable possibilities of pattern matches in our stellar neighborhood to the Hill star map, the scale of which we dont even know, we might expect this list of map views to increase with newer theories based upon rened stellar positions. With the lack of physical evidence, the issue becomes whether or not Betty and Barney Hill are believable. No one in this volume suggests a hoax was committed. Both of the Hills were highly regarded in their community. There seems to be little doubt that the Hills believed what they said happened to them. But it is clear from Encounters at Indian Head that this is where the battle lines are drawn. Just

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about everything you would want to know about the ne pro and con details of the Hill story has been put on display by the various authors. Having both sides presented under one cover was a refreshing take on an incident that has become part of the popular culture, and this presentation translates very well to the reading public. Another fresh look at the Hill abduction narrative is Captured! The Betty and Barney Hill UFO Experience by Stanton Friedman and Kathleen Marden. Friedman, a nuclear physicist by trade, has become the premiere advocate of ying saucers as extraterrestrial spacecraft for the last 40 years. Marden serves on the Mutual UFO Networks Board of Directors and is its Director of Field Investigation Training. Most importantly for this book, though, is that Marden is Betty Hills niece and the trustee of her records. This means that the book gives previously unprecedented insight into the personal life of Betty and Barney in the form of diaries, personal les and family recollections and photographs. For those who have followed the Hill story through the years, it is a treasure trove of detail about the Hills as people, their interests and their ways of thinking. I was especially curious about how the Hills met after Bettys rst, and unhappy, marriage, a chance encounter at a boarding house where Betty had stayed temporarily while having her own home remodeled. As fate would have it Barney was a genuinely good person, a family man and a stable personality, lifting Betty out of the gloom of her divorce. It was an unusual dichotomy how their backgrounds in community activism and a normally evolving life would take on such a strange, and now iconic air into the world of the unexplained. Barney particularly was reminiscent of the Roy Neary character in the lm Close Encounters of the Third Kind, where an ordinary man becomes embroiled in an extraordinary situation and simply wants to know what is going on. Neither Betty nor Barney were the typical odd ball, wild-eyed saucer contactees who dominated the UFO scene in the late 1950s with peculiar tales of encounters with angelic aliens and their space philosophies. They came across as much more sincere. This reviewer met Betty Hill a few times and found her to be a charming woman who knew from where she came. I missed the opportunity to meet Barney. I began my rst employment at the same postal facility where he had worked, South Postal Annex in Boston, which was the largest mail sorting facility in New England. Occasionally I would work in the outgoing secondary section where Barney up to a year before had been stationed, throwing mail into pigeon holes for dispatch. Many who had worked there remembered Barney as a hard-working, easy-going man. No one had an ill word to say. Like Betty, he was someone who people wanted to believe. However, being decent, hard-working and sincere people does not necessarily make such an experience a literal fact. There still exists in the report the lack of concrete proof of a meeting with space beings. That is unless you want to consider Bettys stained dress from the time of the abduction, as described in the book. The authors say that several analyses were performed. A 1978 report didnt reveal anything overtly extraterrestrial. Neither did a 1980 report by an

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anonymous scientist. The most recent study, by chemist Phyllis Budinger of Frontier Analysis, Ltd. (a small rm devoted to UFO physical evidence study), was performed between 2001 and 2003 and showed the presence of an anomalous biological substance that permanently altered the physical characteristics of Bettys dress (p. 268). The authors conclude that it seems to be an indirect result of her UFO encounter (p. 268). Unfortunately the anomalous substance is not explained in further detail, nor is further analysis of this reported since 2003. And how would this lead to it being an indirect result of the encounter (whatever that means)? This to me seems a stretch as an explanation. Budinger has since said that while no alien substances were identied, the chemical analysis supports Bettys account of the events, according to a Budinger-authored page at The Black Vault Encyclopedia Project on the Internet. How can a no-alien nding support an alien encounter? This statement was reiterated at a lecture she gave at the Cleveland Ufology Project meeting on April 16, 2005. The stretching of conclusions continues. The oddest remark came from Pinelandia Biophysics Lab, which said that the pink-stained dress material induced a higher degree of energy in water. It also added that water in which the dress material was soaked caused wheat seed samples to germinate at an unusually fast rate. Pink powder, permanent stain, a dress swatch soaked in water aiding seed germination? Perhaps this was from some sort of fertilizer? Instead of resolving this issue of physical evidence, these analyses introduced confusion. There is a tendency in UFO research opinions to practice a God of the Gaps notion that is prevalent in the debate about evolution and intelligent design, where ambiguities in research results are explained as undened inuences of extraterrestrials rather than potential lapses and omissions in the research. This is too close to how critics of evolution plug in a creative god to explain incomplete elements of the fossil record instead of granting that those gaps in knowledge may have other, or as yet undiscovered, more or less conventional explanations. Some of the UFO history presented in the book could have been more careful. MJ-12, the alleged government investigation into the now-famous Roswell saucer crash, is offered as fact when it is not. It said that it had been established under a special classied executive order when there is no such tool used by the president. But one of the supporting documents for MJ-12, the Truman-Forrestal memo of September 24, 1947, is called infamous. The last time I saw a denition of this word it said, having a reputation of the worst kind, a rather peculiar choice of wording in a book co-authored by Stanton Friedman, the single most ardent supporter of MJ-12 reality on all of planet Earth. I thought Dr. Benjamin Simon, the Hills psychiatrist and hypnotist, took a bit of undue heat on p. 181 when it was said that Barney was angry with him because he felt Simon assured him that the truth would be revealed by his and Bettys hypnosis, then felt deceived that Simon expressed his clinical conclusion that the Hills experience was the result of a shared dream with Betty. There was no way

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that Dr. Simon could have assured a physically real event without some type of independent corroboration, a.k.a. physical evidence. All of the story came from the Hills verbal recounting. Much of it was offered under hypnosis, the credibility of which we now know must be viewed cautiously. Furthermore, truth to everyone is in each individuals minds eye. A perceived truth can be different from reality. For example, I had a dream much like the Hills. To me the dream was real. I have a memory of it and can recount it in detail. Even colors and smells can be part of the event. The existence of this detail was genuine to me. But it wasnt a real event outside of my minds eye. It was a phantom of my senses. The authors themselves explained Dr. Simons position on his two patients. The book says, He made it clear to them that hypnosis is not a magic bullet or necessarily a pathway to objective truth. Rather, it is the truth as the subject perceives it, and may or may not be consistent with objective reality (p. 182). But after saying this, the authors labeled Dr. Simons suggestion of a shared dream as nonsense. That is ne as a personal opinion, but in the absence of hard evidence of alien contact, upon what is this label based? It can only be based upon a belief that the story is literally true, which then becomes not science but an emotional assessment. I would like to think that the Hill abduction is real to nally settle the issue of whether there is intelligent life in space. Yet the clash between hard and soft evidence offered up in all such narratives forces a suspension of the will to believe in them as proof of those events. Inevitably the cases must go on the shelf until more information is available. This is something I trust the authors recognize when confronted with reasonable contrary questioning. Aside from such loose ends, I would recommend a reading of both Encounters at Indian Head and Captured! The Betty and Barney Hill UFO Experience for putting many little-known facts about the Hills between their respective covers. They provide the most up-to-date, comprehensive background available on the Barney and Betty Hill experience, the rst for story balance and the second for witness depth regardless of what you may believe about UFO abductions. BARRY GREENWOOD Stoneham, Massachusetts uhrhistory@comcast.net

UFOs and Nukes: Extraordinary Encounters at Nuclear Weapons Sites by Robert L. Hastings. Self-Published, 2008. 602 pp. $23.95 (paper). ISBN 978-1-4343-9831-4. Researchers in the Unidentied Flying Objects (UFO) eld have long noted an apparent afnity between sightings of these mysterious craft and things nuclear. The most celebrated of all UFO incidents, the alleged crash at Roswell, New

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Mexico, offers a clear demonstration of this arcane relationship. In July 1947, the time of that event, Roswell Army Air Field was home to the only nuclear weapons equipped unit in the world. In fact, some people believe that it was our detonation of atomic bombs at the end of World War II that caused extraterrestrial visitors to begin to actively monitor development of nuclear energy here on Earth. Of course, attributing any motive for alien intrusion would be highly speculative, almost to the point of irresponsibility. Fortunately, Hastings does not make such leaps. What he has done is to assemble a vast array of material that strongly supports the notion that UFOs have observed closely, and even interacted with, our strategic weapons systems. Given the number of intense interactions that have occurred, including interruption of vital systems in our nuclear triad (intercontinental ballistic missiles, B-52s, and nuclear submarines with sea-launched ballistic missiles), there can be no doubt about the seriousness of those actions. What seems to be most amazing is the apparent lack of concern displayed by senior ofcials of the U.S. Government in general, and the Department of Defense in particular. He also informs the reader about similar incidents that took place in the former Soviet Union. In conducting his research, Hastings made very smart moves in alerting military ofcers to this issue, and inviting them to participate by providing him information about their personal experiences. That was accomplished by publishing information in journals, including the newsletter of the Association of Air Force Missileers, read by military personnel, both active and retired. That effort proved to be quite successful and many previously unknown cases were documented. While a group of observations, collectively known to UFO researchers as the Northern Tier Incursion, had been discussed for years, many more people from missile units stationed across northern America came forward. The result is that Hastings book is undoubtedly the best collection of UFO incidents, as they relate to nuclear sites, that has ever been assembled. While the book focuses on military interactions, Hastings does note that UFOs were seen around many other nuclear facilities as well. Sightings at U.S. national laboratories such as Los Alamos and Oak Ridge are cited. Then there were observations made at commercial nuclear power plants including Indian Point (New York), Palo Verde (Arizona), Surry (Virginia) and Yankee (Connecticut). Also included was mention of sightings following the well-known accident at Chernobyl near Kiev, in the former Soviet Union. Hastings does a good job of reporting the incidents from the perspective of those military personnel who came forward and talked to him. Worthy of note are the number of emails, letters, and direct quotes that are included. Unless a person specically asked to have his/her name redacted, the author has done an excellent job of identifying individuals, and the relative position they were in at the time of their observations. The vast majority of them held very responsible positions, regardless of their rank. At times Hastings does make speculation, but he generally identies that the information is his conjecture. That is an admirable trait as many reporters slip in their own suppositions without so notifying the reader. He obviously is partial to

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what is popularly known as the extraterrestrial hypothesis. As an example of his speculation, he addresses issues raised by skeptics, such as why aliens are often reported to be humanoid in appearance. His possible explanations include the following: That the humanoid form is a universally-distributed, highly-successful, evolutionary form of sentient beings Because we are them (meaning the aliens seeded Earth) Time-travel allows future generations to come back and make observations As with many other UFO writers, Hastings addresses the skeptics in general, and the Condon Report in particular. He correctly notes that most of the skeptics are in reality debunkers, who make pronouncements unbounded by facts and little, if any, research into the issues they attack. In his commentary he quotes a review of former SSE president Peter Sturrocks book The UFO Enigma: A New Review of Physical Evidence, stating, Sturrock assiduously dissects the Condon Report and makes it clear that the study is scientically awed (p. 287). An area on internal incongruence comes when discussing ofcial secrecy by the U.S. Government regarding UFOs. It is clear that in the early period of UFO sightings, much of the material was classied. We were at the height of the Cold War, and the very notion that some other country (especially the Soviet Union) might have weapon technology that exceeded our own capabilities was very frightening. Many reports that were previously classied as Top Secret are cited appropriately. Some of those reports even speculated that UFOs were, in fact, of extraterrestrial origin. Studies conducted at the time raised concerns about the ability of the civilian population to assimilate such an announcement, and the impact that might have on public condence and social order. Unfortunately, and despite signicant evidence to the contrary, that anachronistic perception lives on in many sectors of society today. However, what Hastings has clearly detailed is a classication process that lacks any semblance of centralized control. While seemingly missed by the author, this may be one of the most important ndings in the book. At times mysterious, and questionably identied, people did appear and interrogate witnesses. On numerous occasions these were described as CIA agents, though there are several other agencies that might have reason to be interested in these events. Yet, at other times, and in some of the most signicant cases, no interviews were taken, nor ominous warnings given. That is certainly true for Bob Salas, a launch control ofcer for the infamous Malmstrom case in which their missiles came off line, and for COL Chuck Halt, then-deputy commander of the Bentwaters Air Force Base in the United Kingdom. Both cases are highly important to national security, yet no adverse actions were taken or admonitions given. What these collective observations suggest is that imposition of security strictures regarding UFOs was conducted by lower level intelligence operatives, and not by a centralized, hierarchical system driven by a formal national edict. Probably based on good

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intentions, and supported by a commonly held belief systems that UFOs must be highly classied, Id suggest that the operatives who did impose secrecy sanctions were simply winging itdoing what they thought best at the time. Worth noting are the comments by many people in the Personnel Reliability Program, better known as simply the PRP. For military personnel associated with nuclear weapon systems, being in the PRP involved both unscheduled physical testing (for drugs) and constant mental evaluations. One could be removed from the program for almost any reason, and therefore, participants became extremely risk aversive. The near-universal perception was that reporting UFOs could cause supervisors to question ones mental stabilitythus loss of job assignment. Also, in the U.S. Air Force, there was also the strong feeling that interactions with the Ofce of Special Investigations were to be avoided at all costs. The message was clear. Unless absolutely necessary, dont report sightings of high strangeness or that could not be explained. Ironically, the unintended consequence of the action of overly aggressive interrogation was to weaken national security. Hastings implores people with specic knowledge to come forward. Despite the wide-spread belief that reporting UFO activity will result in adverse consequences, he notes that, over the past 35 years, not one of my ex-military sources has had agents from the FBI, or any other agency, show up at his door (p. 577). That is a strong statement and it parallels my own experience over several decades and clearly indicates that it is safe to speak out. While Hastings does make a good case for a relationship between nuclear weapons and UFOs, this should not be taken as the only relationship that might exist. There have been many UFO observations and even critical incidents that have no relationship to nukes. The book would benet greatly if an index was included. Currently it is difcult to cross reference names and data for research purposes. Self-published, UFOs and Nukes is only available through the authors Web site at www.ufohastings.com. JOHN ALEXANDER U.S. Army and Los Alamos National Laboratory, Retired Las Vegas, Nevada apollinair@aol.com

Medical Miracles: Doctors, Saints, and Healing in the Modern World by Jacalyn Dufn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 285 pp. $29.95. ISBN 978-0-19-533650-4. The author of this book is a physician and historian of medicine at Queens University, Ontario. Drawing on Vatican archives and texts from the Vatican library, she has critically reviewed 4 centuries of testimony that bear on the topic of medical miracles. The idea of this research came to her after she was invited

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to examine the medical records of a patient in remission from acute leukemia. Only later did she discover this patients story was part of the canonization process of the rst Canadian-born saint, Marie-Marguerite dYouville. Unlike previous studies of miracles, this book focuses on the truth value of miracle claimsin this review, a term referring to a paranormal event in the context of religious belief. To be canonized, the saint must prove his or her miracle-producing prowess. The range of miracles reported throughout Church history is wide (see, e.g., the writings of Herbert Thurston, 1952). But there is a good reason for focusing on medical miracles; they can be ratied or rejected in light of modern science. The phenomenon of miraculous healing is stable across history, although there are changes of emphasis; for example, in modern times more doctors are brought into the process of certifying the miracle. Dufn observes that healing miracles speak to something universal in the human condition, the struggle against death. The process of certifying who is a saint keeps evolving and has kept pace with the modern world. The thinking of the popes and the physicians has become more rened; nevertheless, i processi (examinations of testimony) continue to bear miraculous fruit. So it appears, according to Dufn, that we have a robust phenomenon worthy of study; among the 1400 cases she collected from 1588 to 1999 were people of 48 countries from Australia to Uruguay. In saint-making, science and religion embrace temporarily, uniting in their submission to evidencethe positios (bound testimonies), dubios (doubts, questions), and riti processi. The physician does not pronounce a healing as miraculous. His only duty is to give the best scientic account of it; if he gives a credible explanation of the miracle, it will be discarded or laid aside. If he does confess genuine epistemic wonder about the healing, the door remains open for the Church to acknowledge its miraculous status. The author devotes a chapter to the supplicants. Who are the people who plead for and receive miracles? Of the 4 centuries of cases studied, the majority were common people of all classes and ages, not elites; one notes the catholicity of miracles. The miracle-happening is a product of many contingencies. A potential saint can be invoked only by those familiar with her deeds and reputation (p. 36). Miracle-making, in these accounts, is a by-product of tangible localities and experienced intimacies. The chapter opens by describing a woman in agony, supplicating a being she believes, begs, and hopes will heal her. Its a powerful image of what religion is about at its wrenching core: the soul in extremis crying out for helpon a wing and a prayer. The woman in this story had a huge, hard tumor in her left breast. For twenty days and nights, Maria prayed to the uncanonized Paolo, witnessed by the woman who shared her bed (p. 37). The pain continued but by morning the tumor had vanished. In looking at the data in support of the cause of the saint, Dufn is laying the groundwork for a different way of theorizing the origin of religion. For surely such experiences are bound to generate strong religious or spiritual beliefs.

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Chapter 3 deals with the types of miracles covered in the authors database. Most are inexplicable, often very rapid cures of diseases ranging from cancer to tuberculosis. This sort of thing goes back to the Christian gospels where Jesus is repeatedly said to have made the blind see and the lame walk and even the dead rise. The tradition continues on through Medieval times (when the cult of Mary inspires new waves of miraculous performance) and increasingly into the 20th century, in spite of the growing sophistication of medical science. The miraculous extension of human performance occurs in ways other than healing people, e.g., healing animals, expelling demons, escaping from captivity, converting souls, and levitating. Dufn notes that in the latter part of the 20th century there was a spike in miracles of iatrogenic disease and death, a creative response to risk of fatal error in our medicalized society (p. 99). Some of the nonmedical miracles like the multiplication of foodSai Baba is known for this practical talent (Haraldson, 1987)will doubtless drive some readers beyond their boggle-thresholds. There is also the bizarre, transcendently grotesque business of incorruptibility. The dead bodies of saints speak to us in queer ways: by remaining in an unnatural state of non-decay; by emitting unexplained fragrances; by occasionally retaining the warmth of living bodies and exuding fragrant oils; and by sometimes ejecting warm blood from different orices and sometimes by moving limbs (Cruz, 1977). I am not aware of any systematic medical research into these necrological wonders; the eld is open for the intrepid explorer, though one hopes the Church would permit hands-on scrutiny of saintly incorruption. Chapter 4 reviews the key player in the drama of miraculous certication: the doctor. I quickly learned, writes Dufn, that the Vatican does not and never did recognize healing miracles in people who eschew orthodox medicine to rely solely on faith. The alleged miracle needs to be tested by reason, observation, and the whole web of customarily justied beliefs; only in light of these do we have standards for calling something transcendent or paranormal or miraculous. Dufn documents the growing importance of the physician in the miracleattributing process. The number of doctors involved has gradually increased over the centuries. The maximum number of physicians involved in assessing a single miracle was 19 in 1926, as part of testimony for the cause of Joaquina de Vedruna, who was beatied in 1940. Gradually, the testimony of physicians begins to override that of the person to whom the miracle occurred (p. 121). In some of Dufns cases, doctors themselves were recipients of a miracle. She documents in detail the growing use of technology in the diagnosis and therapeutics of miracle cases, emphasizing the scientic credentials of the process. Miraculously cured patients were treated with the best modalities available, be it drugs or surgery (p. 127). In a curious ex-voto painting (reproduced on p. 128) we observe a man obtaining radiation therapy as he invokes the Virgin, looking over him from a cloud formation in a corner of the room: nice kitsch proclaiming the marriage of science

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and the miraculous. But other examples are cited of drugs and surgery being rejected by supplicants who are then miraculously healed (p. 129). The doctors dont have to be believing Catholics; many have been Jewish or nonbelievers. Disagreement among doctors over an alleged case in effect falsies the miracle claim (p. 135). Sometimes there are rivalries between doctors, which adds to the democratic lan of the process. Some doctors resist the whole idea of miracles; but in the end doctors are key players in the saint-certifying process. Personal differences must be laid aside in forming medical opinions; for . . . doctors serve as essential witnesses from science, observes Dufn, the polar opposite of religion (p. 140). So the attempt to certify miracles is willy-nilly an attempt to unite science and religion, a happy coincidence of opposites. What about the criteria for a miracle? The physicians nd three things indicative; the healing must be complete, durable, and instantaneous (p. 140). The extraordinary speed of recovery was frequently encountered. The astonishing speed of the healing is what makes the physician throw up his hands, and say, I cant explain this; its beyond the reach of scientic thought. Dr. Dufn offers a fascinating chapter on the dramatic nature of miraculous healings. For example, the doctors had given up on the infant whose death they said would occur in moments, and indeed the child seems to have expired. The mother in desperation swifts the child away in her arms to the tomb of the nearest saint. Then she fell on her knees, sobbing and praying fervently to the spirit of the man inside, asking him to intercede with God to spare the childs life (p. 145). An hour or so later the child revives and is restored to health, and the communityand witnesses of the miraclegive joyful thanks. All this is intensely dramaticthe agony, the invocation, the miracle, the joy, the communal celebration. Invocation transcends solitary prayer; it embeds itself in corporeal performances, e.g., the whole family prays for intercession near the entombed body of a saint. Spiritual transcendence is rooted in and nourished by the concrete, the sensuous, the particular: it is this lock of saints hair that is coveted for its spiritual power. Sometimes the supplicant went so far as to press the aficted parts of her body on the marble of the saints tomb or its incorrupt corpse (or part thereof) if possible. The journey to the tomb of the saint was often arduous, thus intensifying the felt appeal for help. The tomb of the saint, the pilgrimage there, the relics, novenas, images, vigils, sacred lamps, anointing with oil, all served to focus and heighten the drama of miracle-making. Miraculous power is pragmatic and pluralistic, and Dufn details the role of dreams and visions, and ends by discussing the importance of thanksgiving in the miracle drama. The conclusion summarizes the reasons and specic sense in which Dufn accepts the reality of unexplained healings, and I leave her nuanced argument to the reader to consider in detail. Perhaps the most striking conclusion of the book concerns the stability and durability of extraordinary healings through the last 4 centuries.

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One thing the author wisely leaves open: given that a healing is miraculous in the sense of being unexplained, to what shall we ascribe it? God or some unknown human, some purely natural capacities? Or . . . ? She leaves this to her readers to decide if they feel they must; it is a matter of interpretation, an act of faith. The book contains a valuable Appendix on the authors sources and methods, charts and tables summarizing numerous data, and reproductions of artworks by ne artists and ordinary people expressing thanks and vows. This is pioneering research with great theoretical and practical interest; it should engage anyone curious about the unknown limits of human capacity. MICHAEL GROSSO Division of Perceptual Studies University of Virginia Charlottesville, Virginia grosso.michael@gmail.com References
Cruz, J. C. (1977). The Incorruptibles. Rockford, IL: Tan Books. Haraldson, E. (1987). Miracles Are My Calling Cards. London: Century. Thurston, H. (1952). The Physical Phenomena of Mysticism. London: Burns Oates.

Unbelievable: Investigations into Ghosts, Poltergeists, Telepathy and Other Unseen Phenomena, from the Duke Parapsychology Laboratory by Stacy Horn. New York: Ecco, 2009. 289 pp. $24.99 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0061116858. I started reading Stacy Horns book, Unbelievable, which concerns the famed ESP-researcher Joseph Banks Rhine, shortly before a visit to my parents home in Georgia. My father had been ill and I was pondering gentle but interesting forms of entertainment. Inspired by Rhines work, I decided to design a telepathy experiment. Upon arrival, I corralled my father, mother and one of my sisters into participating. On the rst day, I must tell you, we were brilliant. My test had a very simple design. Each of us held a notepad and pencil. We sat around a table, facing away from each other. One person then drew a picture. The other three were then expected to draw that picture on their own notepad without being able to see the original drawing. No laughing, I said sternly, in advance. And no talking either. But once we sat hunched over our tablets, it didnt matter. All I could think about was a boat. I drew one that resembled a small ocean liner, with little portholes dotting the sides and a smokestack pufng out gray curly loops. I sketched in some waves underneath it. When my father put his tablet down for comparison, hed drawn a boat. It was bigger. It had more smokestacks. But it was startlingly

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close. My mother had also drawn a ship. My sister had drawn a bird but then she had found the whole idea ridiculous anyway. Over all, we were slightly dazzledor maybe unnervedby that rst result. Of course, it marked our only real success. In the other seven tests, I drew owers when it should have been houses, little birds instead of roaring bonres. By the end of the experiments, my fatherbored, I deducedwas simply doodling more boats with shark-ns circling around them. All of which illustrates (in an admittedly amateur-time way) some of the challenges that confronted J. B. Rhine in his years of trying to explain telepathy. He wanted to build an indisputable scientic case for extra-sensory perception. But even carefully controlled studies of telepathy often yield inconsistent results. The most talented subjects appear to wax and wane in their aptitude. The scientic explanation for such erratic ndings remains elusive even today. A method for reliably predicting success or failure, which would give a major boost to the elds credibility, has yet to be developed by paranormal researchers. Nevertheless, Rhine, described by Horn as the Einstein of the Paranormal (p. 4), probably came closer to achieving that credibility than any other scientist in the history of the eld. From 1930 to 1980, Rhine gained national eminence as the driving force behind Duke Universitys parapsychology laboratory, along with his wife, Louisa, an equally driven researcher. Rhine rst caught the countrys attention with the publication of his 1934 book, Extra-Sensory Perception, which detailed his methodical experiments with telepathy. His central method involved asking one participant to mentally send images from a series of picture cards to another participant. It was during this period that he discovered a young man who apparently had an exceptional gift for receiving the images. Hubert Pearce, a divinity student, routinely identied at least 10 cards out of a deck of 25, and once correctly named every card in the stack. Probability theory indicated that anything above ve could be considered signicant. Huberts abilities were astounding (p. 36), Horn writes. The experiments also taught Rhine that a participant who was invested emotionally in the work tended to perform better. Pearces highest scores occurred when Rhine bet money that the student couldnt get the correct answers. And eventually it taught him, as psychical researchers of the 19th century had also concluded, that such abilities are usually transient. And, again, possibly affected by emotion: Pearces ESP successes ended when his then-girlfriend ended the relationship. They did not return. Years later, the British physicist Freeman Dyson would cite this emotional connection as one of the issues that made telepathy research so antithetical to the standard model of research. Scientic studies strive for cool objectivity, he said, and The experiment necessarily excludes the human emotions that make ESP possible (p. 45). And without emotion, he suggests, the experiment is bound to fail.

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The book is most engaging as it explores the simmer of excitement surrounding the Rhines work, and the deepening frustration of having nding after nding dismissed by the scientic community. The Duke experiments were good enough to gain the laboratory some inuential allies; even Albert Einstein raised the possibility that physics might one day explain telepathy. But they were never quite enough to move supernatural research out of the fringes of science. It was the parapsychology critics themselves who nally convinced me that the labs work was sound (p. 243), Horn writes. In investigating the criticisms, she concludes that although Rhine successfully countered almost all the complaints, the other scientists refused to acknowledge that publicly. By simply ignoring him, his critics neatly made his best research invisible. Shes less successful at providing any real insight into the Rhines themselves. The descriptions are supercialintensive concentration always dened Rhines character (p. 35)and both J. B. and Louie Rhine appear as two-dimensional overachievers throughout the book. The book would have been better for some humanity and, frankly, for some more focus. The catalogue-like survey of the Duke laboratorys interestsfrom ghosts, to poltergeists, to mediumstends to give the book a list-like feeling far too often. But, in the end, it made me think, which is my favorite end to any book. It led me to design the ESP-experiment, which kept my family busy for four nights in a row. We also spent plenty of time discussing and wondering about the results and telepathy in general. And that rst night, the night of the boat drawings? Were still trying to explain it. DEBORAH BLUM Journalism and Mass Communication University of WisconsinMadison dblum@wisc.edu (Deborah Blum is the author of Ghost Hunters: William James and the Search for Scientic Proof of Life After Death.)

The Art of Dying by Peter Fenwick and Elizabeth Fenwick. New York: Continuum, 2008. 251 pp. $16.95 (paper). ISBN 978-08264-9923-3. The authors are a husband-wife team. Peter Fenwick, MB, BChir, FRCPsych, is a neuropsychiatrist who directed the neuropsychiatry epilepsy service at Maudsley Hospital in London for many years. He is well known for his writings on a variety of topics, including consciousness and near-death experience (NDE). Dr. Fenwick serves on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Scientic Exploration. Elizabeth Fenwick has written many books on health, family issues, pregnancy and child care.

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The rst part of this book explores end-of-life experiences (ELEs). These experiences include deathbed visions, perceptions of something leaving the body around the time of death and deathbed coincidences. ELEs are outside of the life experience of most people. The ELE terminology is likely to be unfamiliar to many. Lest this lack of familiarity lead to doubt about the books ndings, several points should be remembered. It is a basic scientic principle that what is real is consistently observed. The Fenwicks nd remarkable consistency in the classes of ELEs presented. This consistency is evident both in their meticulous analysis and in the case reports presented. In addition, this books reviewers have amassed scores of experiences from all around the world with striking similarity to the ELEs described in this book. ELEs certainly are consistently observed. ELEs are usually not frightening and may be profoundly meaningful to those experiencing them. Deathbed visions are the most common type of ELE. These are the visions of the dying that are generally comforting, may include visions of deceased individuals and generally help the dying individual through the dying process. They are not explainable as hallucinations or the effects of medications. There have been multiple reports of perceptions of something leaving the body around the time of death. This rarely discussed phenomenon is the observation of a form leaving the body, usually at the moment of death. It may be associated with a sensation of love or visible light. Deathbed coincidences are an awareness that someone has died, even though they may be geographically far from the dying person and not even know they were ill. Deathbed coincidences may include a sense of awareness of their death, a sense of presence of the deceased, and may include apparent auditory or visual communication from the deceased. Other types of deathbed coincidences are inexplicable occurrences, such as a clock stopping at the moment of death. Scores of people who had ELEs were interviewed for this book. Research participants sharing these experiences were often professional caregivers who commonly encountered death among those they were caring for. Scores of illustrative case reports are presented. These accounts are fascinating and help clarify the range of experiences in each ELE category. There have been recent scholarly reviews of some of these subjects (Kelly et al., 2007), but the Fenwicks study adds important new understandings. It is interesting how many of their research subjects had not shared their experiences with others until this study. Hopefully this book will encourage more people to be comfortable sharing their ELEs in the future. Following discussion of ELEs, there is a chapter devoted to the concept of the soul. A discussion of belief systems about the soul from around the world is presented, followed by a very short section documenting the paucity of scientic pursuit of the soul. The Fenwicks succinctly, and in our opinion quite accurately conclude:
Listening to people who are dying, or who have been with the dying and have reported these soul sightings, is probably the nearest any of us are going to get to a proof that we are more than just mechanical automatons. (p. 183)

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The next chapter is devoted to consciousness, an area of notable expertise of Dr. Peter Fenwick. ELEs and related experiences are a tremendous challenge to reductionist views that consciousness can only exist in, and only be a product of, the physical brain. The evidence presented for the inter-connectedness of the mind comes from ELEs and a host of other credible scientic studies. Converging lines of evidence support the Fenwicks conclusion:
In my view, a satisfactory explanation of consciousness must include a detailed role for brain mechanisms, an explanation for the action of mind both inside and outside the brain, and an explanation of consciousness held in common, or the way we seem to be linked together. It should also give an explanation of wide mental states, including transcendent experiences in which the experiencer claims to see through into the structure of the universe. (p. 200)

The next chapter is a fascinating discussion of consciousness and the NDE. The Fenwicks are authorities in this area; they previously co-authored a book about NDE (Fenwick & Fenwick, 1995). Evidence is mounting that NDE is medically inexplicable and may provide among the strongest evidence that consciousness can exist apart from the body (Holden et al., 2009). This book concludes with some excellent insights on dying a good death. This is especially relevant in our current society, where it is uncommon to openly discuss death. Ars Moriendi (The Art of Dying) were two texts written about 1415 and 1450 following the Plague (Black Death) that killed about half of Europes population. People living in this era knew death, and there were few priests available to comfort the dying and bereaved. The Fenwicks state:
Ars Moriendi (The Art of Dying) was a blueprint, illustrated by a number of woodcuts, setting out the protocols and procedures of a good death and on how to die well, according to Christian precepts of the late Middle Ages. It was very popular, was translated into most Western European languages, and was the rst in a Western literary tradition of guides to death and dying. It included advice to friends and family on the general rules of behavior at the deathbed and reassurance that death was nothing to be afraid of. We need a new Ars Moriendi now for the twenty-rst century. (pp. 213214)

We couldnt agree more. The Fenwicks present an excellent discussion on what should be considered to die well in our time. This is an especially timely topic given the all-too-common practice of treating terminally ill patients with invasive medical care at a cost of many billions of dollars per year. This book is very readable and would be very informative to both the casual reader and scholars. The Fenwicks present a very logical classication and description of ELEs that are likely to be used by future researchers. We were especially pleased with the multiple quotes from those who experienced ELEs and other experiences. These quotes helped clarify ELEs and related experiences, not only by demonstrating their content, but also how they affected the individuals who experienced them.

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Much of the Fenwicks research is truly pioneering. This book is highly recommended. It would be of great interest to those interested in death and dying, those with an interest in consciousness, and those interested in new material on exceptional experiences during the process of dying and following death. JEFFREY LONG Houma, Louisiana nderf@nderf.org (Founder, Near-Death Experience Research Foundation (nderf.org).) JODY LONG Houma, Louisiana blueheron78@gmail.com (Webmaster, Near-Death Experience Research Foundation (nderf.org).) References
Fenwick, P., & Fenwick, E. (1995). The Truth in the Light. New York: Berkley Books. Holden, J. M., Greyson, B., & James, D. (Eds.). (2009). The Handbook of Near-Death Experiences: Thirty Years of Investigation. Westport, CT: Praeger. Kelly, E. F., Kelly, E. W., Crabtree, A., Gauld, A., Grosso, M., & Greyson, B. (2007). Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleeld.

Life Beyond Death: What Should We Expect? by David Fontana. Watkins Publishing, 2009. 214 pp. $17.95 (paper). ISBN 978-1906787080. David Fontana has now given us a sequel to his earlier Is There an Afterlife: A Comprehensive Overview of the Evidence (2005). In his earlier work, Fontana presented a case for postmortem survival based on a broad range of empirical evidences, with a particular emphasis on the data of mental and physical mediumship. In Life Beyond Death, Fontana continues where he left off in the nal chapter of his earlier work, the nature of the afterlife. Given that we survive death, what might the next world be like? What kind of existence can there be for persons without their physical bodies? Fontana addresses these questions by comparing the data of psychical research and the testimony of some of the Western and Eastern religious traditions of the world. He argues that these diverse sources express a compatible and shared vision of what the afterlife is like. Overview of Fontanas Book Fontana begins his book (Chapter 1) by providing his reasons for embarking on this particular study, the limitations of science in handling the topic, and the importance of psychical research (especially mediumship) and the testimony of the worlds spiritual traditions to informing us about the character of the afterlife.

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He tells us, Much of what is said adds up to a coherent and consistent view of the afterlife based on sources that may make sense to all those who do not on principle dismiss any possibility that we live on after death (p. 6). So Fontana does not aim to present a conclusive, denitive, or compelling case for what the afterlife is like. Rather, he says, My aim is to present a selection of the information available to us, and then leave it to the readers to make their own assessment of its value (p. 7). Chapters 2 and 3 provide an account of the experience of dying and the initial phase of the afterlife based largely on the data of near-death experiences (NDEs). Patients near death, or who were pronounced dead, report continuing experiences during their down time: an out of body experience, traveling through a dark tunnel with a light at the end of the tunnel, entering into a pleasant landscape, review of their life, and meeting beings of light or deceased relatives or friends. Some of the features of NDEs are corroborated by apparitional experiences, mediumship, and the testimony of the ancient Greeks, Egyptians, and religious traditions such as Buddhism and Christianity. These otherwise diverse traditions seem to converge on a basic theme, a theme reinforced by the phenomenon of deathbed visions (pp. 2433). Chapter 4 deals with the possible implications of sudden death and suicide for the afterlife experience. Fontana draws on the testimony of ostensible communicators in various cases of mediumship, such as the mediumship of Wellesley Tudor Pole. The results are corroborated by an appeal to religious traditions, for example Tibetan Buddhism, that emphasize how ones state of mind at death can inuence ones experience of an afterlife. The consensus reached by examining these sources is that sudden death or suicide leads to an at least initially unpleasant and disorienting afterlife experience, a fact that may also explain negative NDEs (pp. 2021, 52). Chapter 5 covers earthbound spirits, that is, those who have died but for various reasons fail to move on into the afterlife. Based on the data of mediumship, reasons for remaining earthbound include sudden death, emotional ties, desires, or disbelief in an afterlife (pp. 6263). Fontana also uses earthbound spirits to provide an explanation of poltergeist phenomena (pp. 6467). As in his earlier chapters, Fontana appeals to Buddhism to show that the evidence from mediumship is similar to what religious traditions have taught. Here Fontana cites the Tibetan Buddhist belief in a realm of hungry ghosts, reserved for those whose lives were characterized by greed and selshness. Spirits trapped in this realm see the world of the living and are consumed by their desires for what they see, but their desires cannot be satised. Earthbound spirits also have the power to possess people, as is exemplied in trance mediumship (pp. 6875). Chapters 6, 7, and 9 develop a conception of three different planes of afterlife existence: the plane of Hades, the plane of illusion, and the plane of color. Together with the earthly plane of existence, these planes constitute the four planes of form. These planes of existence resemble life on earth to varying

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degrees. They are the abode for people still attached to their earthly existence in some manner. The plane of Hades is the lowest level of the afterlife, and it is described as a state of mind rather than a location (p. 90). What one experiences in Hades is relative to ones state of mind, especially at the time of death. For some it may be a restful or peaceful state. For others, it may involve a sense of remorse for wrongs done on earth. For others yet, it may be a place of punishment. Hades includes purgatory, and so it includes experiences of cleansing and renewal, as well as punishment. The planes of illusion (Chapter 7) and color (Chapter 9) involve experiences of an idealized conception of the present world, complete with the people, objects, places, and events experienced in our ante-mortem state. Here Fontana makes use of H. H. Prices conception of the next world as a mental projection (pp. 106109, 148149, 153154), an idea corroborated by the Tibetan conception of Bardo. These planes of existence, analogous to the dream world of our ante-mortem state, are shaped by our desires and thoughts. These worlds are, in the words of H. H. Price, image-worlds, built up from our desires and the content of our antemortem memories. Consequently, individuals experience objects and places with which they were familiar in their ante-mortem state. Desires determine activities as expressions of wish fulllment. While this explains the diversity of afterlife experiences (within the planes of illusion and color), it doesnt follow that we are conned to our own solipsistic worlds. Fontana says that like-minded individuals will experience a common environment in which they may interact with each other (pp. 106107). So these worlds are more properly speaking products of corporate minds. Furthermore, communications between discarnate spirits will be telepathic in nature (p. 169), and travel to other locations may be immediate or mediated by imagery of travel acquired before death (pp. 169170). These features of the planes of illusion and color are drawn largely from the data of mental mediumship. Chapter 8 covers the topic of reincarnation. Reincarnation is said to occur typically to people who are in one of the planes of form, since these planes of existence indicate continuing attachments to earthly existence. Fontana returns again to the Tibetan Buddhist doctrine of Bardo and the correlated Tibetan teachings on rebirth (pp. 132142), which include rebirth in realms other than earth. The discussion dovetails with Fontanas emphasis on multiple planes of postmortem existence. Chapter 10 sketches three formless planes of existence: the plane of intellectual harmony, the plane of cosmic consciousness, and the plane of contemplation of the Supreme Mind (p. 87). These planes are planes of increasingly pure and raried consciousness (p. 86) and represent the higher levels of postmortem spiritual and moral evolution. In the formless realms a person has to varying degrees transcended individual, limited existence and is brought into a greater unity with all other things.

396 As Fontana says:

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the formless planes mark a major departure from the four lower realms in that they are said to be no longer illusory but to approach successively closer to an ultimate reality in which consciousness is not limited by the need to accommodate to a physical body and to time and space, whether actual or illusory. (p. 176)

The different planes of existence are correlated with different degrees of spiritual and moral development (pp. 8687, 106, 143). Fontana is clear that not only does ones degree of moral and spiritual development at death determine the plane at which one enters the afterlife, but there can be movement between different planes of existence based on moral and spiritual development in the afterlife. So processes of moral and spiritual development that began in our earthly existence continue into the afterlife. Strengths of Fontanas Book There are three useful contributions Fontanas book makes to the topic of the afterlife. First, Fontanas inclusion of religious conceptions of the afterlife sets his work apart from many other treatments of the afterlife in parapsychological literature. In this way his work is bound to capture the interest of a broader audience whose ideas about the afterlife are shaped, at least in a general way, by their adherence to a particular religious tradition. In weaving together insights from Christianity and Buddhism, Fontana has provided a tapestry of the afterlife that rises above the sectarian aspects of many religious conceptions of the afterlife. He shows us how these traditions provide compatible and even complementary visions of the afterlife. Second, Fontanas emphasis on different planes of existence can be seen as a way of harmonizing the Western religious emphasis on personal or individual survival and the Eastern emphasis on survival that transcends our individuality and separateness from things, for example, in the form of absorption into a higher or universal consciousness. The different levels of the afterlife move increasingly away from individual survival to a more universal mode of existence in which ones individuality has been modied to accommodate a greater unity with other things. Finally, the diversity of afterlife views and their sometimes apparently contradictory nature is often presented as a reason to dismiss such accounts and perhaps reject the notion of an afterlife altogether. Fontana has to some degree addressed this concern. He has provided a way to reconcile very different accounts of the afterlife, for example, by conceptualizing the afterlife as involving different planes of postmortem existence correlated to a persons level of spiritual development. The idea seems to be an important point of convergence between the various traditions Fontana discusses.

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While Fontanas work has the above merits, there are some disappointing features of the text, presentation, and argumentation. (1) Fontana is unclear about how the case for survival (developed in his earlier book) relates to the epistemic status of beliefs about the nature of the afterlife articulated in his latest book. Consequently, its hard to know where Fontanas exposition of other viewpoints ends and the presentation of his own beliefs begins. Although Fontana is clear in both books that there is strong support for survival (p. 4), he expresses greater reservation about ideas concerning the nature of the afterlife. He says that his discussion of such ideas does not necessarily imply a belief [on Fontanas part] in all the things for which they stand, but it does not imply that the book is based on mere conjecture (p. 6). He goes on to clarify that much of what he says constitutes a coherent and consistent view of the afterlife (p. 6). Later in the text he reminds the reader that his discussion of the seven planes of existence should not be taken as an attempt to be denitive (p. 87). So the tone is considerably more reserved than in Fontanas earlier book. Now this is surely a sensible approach as far as it goes. Since some of the evidences for survival are not informative about the nature of an afterlife, we cant maintain that simply because theres a strong case for survival theres an equally strong case for what the afterlife is like. Ostensible past life memories, for example, do not typically inform us about the intermediate state between death and rebirth. But something should nonetheless be said about the connection between the case for survival and the case for what the afterlife is like. After all, and this point goes unacknowledged, some strands of evidenceif genuinely evidence for survival are also evidence for some of the ideas of the afterlife Fontana discusses. This is true of many of the NDEs Fontana cites, and its true of some of the data of mental mediumship Fontana cites. In these cases, its difcult to separate the evidence for survival and evidence for the nature of the afterlife. To the extent that belief in an afterlife is reasonable given these evidences, beliefs about the character of the afterlife based on the same evidences will also be reasonable. So Fontanas tone is too reserved at this juncture. Moreover, Fontana says that in his book he will only draw on mediumistic material whose information is likely to be informative on the afterlife (p. 5, emphasis mine). This suggests a more positive stance toward at least some of the afterlife ideas Fontana discusses, but this is never directly addressed in the text. He says his aim is to present a selection of the information available to us, and then leave it to readers to make their own assessment of its value (p. 7). Fair enough, but the reader may want to know how strong of a case Fontana thinks there is for the truth of at least some of the afterlife claims in his text, even if this is contingent on the success of the project he carried out in his former book. Related, the reader might like to know what Fontana himself actually believes with respect to the array of ideas he develops in the text, however less than certain

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these beliefs are. This is only natural given that the case for his belief in survival (presented in his former book) relied heavily on the data of mediumship, which he says here is likely to be informative on the afterlife. Again, it looks as if Fontanas stance in his current book is too reserved. (2) Fontana is quite explicit that he wants to show that the data of psychical research regarding survival and religious testimony about the afterlife are similar at crucial points, that there is a shared core of afterlife beliefs. This includes the Western religious traditions, especially Christianity (pp. 5, 3940, 43, 4749, 57, 9399, 112113, 183). But there is a signicant unacknowledged discontinuity between the Western religious traditions and the afterlife ideas discussed by Fontana. While human persons may exist as disembodied spirits or souls immediately after death, they are in their nal or ultimate postmortem state physical beings. There is a future day of corporate judgment of the human race. At this time human persons are physically raised from the dead by the power of God. Souls are reunited with their physical bodies. They dont exist as astral bodies in nonearthly realms. The redeemed enjoy eternal life on a renewed earth. This eschatology is a logical implication of a holistic conception of the human person. God creates the human person as a psycho-physical unity. Immortality is not a matter of transcending our physical existence but of perfecting it. What is most disappointing here is that Fontana doesnt as much as mention this widespread and deeply entrenched Western religious narrative of survival of death. This casts considerable doubt on Fontanas claim that the Western religious traditions are consistent with the other traditions he examines, at least as far as the essential features of the former are concerned. (3) As a special case of the above, Fontanas treatment of bodily resurrection in Christianity (pp. 43, 112113) at best marginalizes the view that the resurrection body is a physical body. Fontana acknowledges that Christianity afrms bodily survival but he takes this to mean the possession of a non-physical body, an astral or soul body. He acknowledges that for centuries it was assumed that the resurrection body was a physical body but that now it is generally believed to refer to a non-physical body of some sort (p. 43). While some theologians hold to a spiritualist interpretation of bodily resurrection, the physicality of the resurrection (of Jesus and the human race) is still a widely held belief, even among prominent contemporary Christian philosophers (e.g., Richard Swinburne, Peter van Inwagen, Stephen Davis, William Lane Craig, Kevin Corcoran, Dean Zimmerman). Contemporary Christian philosophers disagree of course as to whether this physical body is the original body reconstituted, revivied, or a newly created replica body, but the physicality of this body is not in doubt among such thinkers. Fontanas account is particularly unfortunate since physicalist conceptions of the resurrection body potentially resolve philosophical issues concerning personal identity and survival. They also provide a model of survival that is consistent with supposing that consciousness depends on a functioning brain. In this way, Fontanas discussion is isolated from relevant mainstream discussions in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion.

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(4) In Chapter 8 Fontana raises the well-known population argument against reincarnation (p. 122). This argument claims that the increase in population on earth is incompatible with reincarnation models. Fontana is unimpressed by what he calls the standard reply to this objection, namely that people reincarnate more rapidly these days than at earlier times. Fontana says that we really dont know that this is the case, so this population objection to reincarnation remains effectively unanswered (p. 122). But as David Bishai has persuasively argued, it is the population-argument objector who is saddled with an unwarranted metaphysical assumption, namely that the mean duration of stay in the afterlife has been constant throughout human history (Bishai, 2000: 419). The population argument needs this assumption, but the assumption certainly seems unwarranted, or at least no more warranted than assumptions built into rebirth models that allow them to be compatible with population growth. So the population objection carries considerably less force than Fontana supposes. (5) Fontanas defense of survivalist interpretations of the data is at crucial points disappointing and inadequate. For example, as in his earlier work, Fontana dismisses appeals to living agent psychic functioning, the so-called Super-ESP hypothesis (pp. 147148; cf. 79, 166), to explain the veridical data of mediumship. Fontana simply says that this view involves so many debatable assumptions and suppositions as to put it outside the bounds of serious credibility . . . (pp. 147148). Nothing more is said. Fontana just refers the reader to his more detailed discussion of the Super-ESP hypothesis in his earlier book (p. 148). Among other things, the Super-ESP hypothesis challenges the survivalist interpretation of the data of mediumship,1 one of Fontanas main sources, which he says is likely to be informative on the afterlife (p. 5). Given the space afforded to refutations of various other non-survivalist interpretations of afterlife evidence (pp. 1115, 7071, 73, 78), its disappointing that Fontana doesnt say more about this rival hypothesis and cite his specic reasons for rejecting it, for example, that it is allegedly unfalsiable and postulates a degree of living agent psi for which there is allegedly no independent support.2 This would benet those who havent read Fontanas very large earlier book or who are unacquainted with the super-psi debate in parapsychology. It is also peculiar, if not ironic, that Fontana dismisses the Super-ESP hypothesis on the grounds that it is based on debatable assumptions. This may or may not be true, but it requires further explanation because there is hardly a point in Fontanas own presentation that isnt based on debatable assumptions broadly construed. Indeed, given Fontanas own cautionary disclaimers throughout his book, it would seem that Fontana is very aware of the conceptually problematic and evidentially limited nature of his project. So what sort of debatable assumptions does the Super-ESP hypothesis involve? And how are these assumptions signicantly more debatable than the assumptions at work in Fontanas account of the afterlife? These are two important questions Fontana does not address. Consequently, Fontanas treatment of the evidence of mediumship, as well as

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other survival evidences, suffers from an important inadequacy. The super-psi hypothesis seems unfairly dismissed, a dismissal that is unfortunately all too characteristic of much of the literature on survival. (6) Theres an interesting philosophical problem raised by Fontanas presentation of afterlife ideas. Fontana presents the idea that there can be movement between different planes of existence caused by ones spiritual or moral development (p. 143). Although at death some people enter immediately into the formless realms, others reach such realms from lower planes of existence. But according to Fontana at least two of the lower planes of existence amount to mental projections based on the desires and memories of postmortem individuals. So whats the problem here? The difculty stems from the plausible assumption that moral and spiritual development is actualized in worlds with some objective features, not worlds that are, in the words of John Hick, plastic to our human wishes (Hick, 1994: 273). The idea here is that objective features of a world generate genuine conicts and challenges that are responsible for character formation. Now if afterlife worlds were solipsistic worlds, it would be clear that such worlds would not be conducive to any sort of spiritual or moral development. However, Fontana does not believe that afterlife worlds are solipsistic. He incorporates the idea of interaction and shared experiences between really distinct discarnate spirits that exist in a common mind-produced environment. Fontana says, for example, that individuals gravitate towards locations where there are individuals of a like mind to himself (pp. 106107). So, as he says, each community builds up its own little world (p. 107). The problem here is that worlds that are projections of a corporate mind are not signicantly more conducive to the moral/spiritual development of its members than solipsistic worlds fashioned by a single persons mind. Both kinds of worlds will lack genuine character-forming conicts and challenges. Moreover, Fontana doesnt suggest any constraints on what kinds of desires will group people together in the afterlife. Do people, for example, whose lives were characterized by an overwhelming desire to shop, gather and spend their time roaming around in afterlife malls? Are they sufciently funded for persistent purchasing? For them, perhaps money does grow on trees. Their world is plastic to their collective wishes. Its very hard to see moral and spiritual development in such wishfulllment worlds. Fontana says, for example, that people in the plane of illusion can only progress once they recognize the illusory nature of their existence. But is this the sort of thing a person would recognize given that his world has been fashioned from his own thoughts and desires? It is difcult, I think, to see people moving from these lower realms of form to the higher planes of formless existence. One resolution to this difculty is to emphasize rebirth into the earthly realm or some realm that is not plastic to our wishes, individually or collectively. Fontana suggests rebirth on earth from the planes of form (p. 143) but he doesnt utilize it to alleviate the unacknowledged difculty of positing worlds that are both

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mental-projection/wish-fulllment worlds and also conducive to moral and spiritual development. Consequently, Fontana misses an important opportunity to give his discussion some philosophical sophistication. (7) Finally, although Fontana provides author-text references when quoting source material, no page numbers are provided for any of these. Fontana doesnt even provide page numbers for important references to his own earlier publication, for example, when referring readers to his refutation of the Super-ESP hypothesis (p. 148). While the editor(s) may have felt this acceptable given the books popular orientation, it is unfortunate for the reader who wishes to locate Fontanas quotations in the cited sources, or who wishes to follow up on Fontanas references to his own earlier publication. Despite these weaknesses, Fontanas book is a helpful contribution to reections on the possible nature of the afterlife. Hopefully it inspires similar future projects. MICHAEL SUDDUTH Department of Philosophy San Francisco State University San Francisco, California 94132 michaelsudduth@comcast.net Notes
1

For an account of how the super-psi hypothesis challenges the survival of hypothesis, see Stephen Braude (2003). Fontana (2005: 103112) raises these particular criticisms. For a defense of the super-psi hypothesis against these criticisms, see Michael Sudduth (2009).

References
Bishai, D. (2000). Can population growth rule out reincarnation? A model of circular migration. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 14, 411420. Braude, S. (2003). Immortal Remains. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleeld. Fontana. D. (2005). Is There an Afterlife: A Comprehensive Overview of the Evidence. O Books. Hick, J. (1994). Death and Eternal Life. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press. Sudduth, M. (2009). Super-psi and the survivalist interpretation of mediumship. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 23, 167193.