IBN 'ARABI BETWEEN "PHILOSOPHY" AND "MYSTICISM"

"Sufism and Philosophy are neighbors and visit each other" fa-inna at-tasawwuf wa-t-tafalsuf yatajdwardni wa-yatazdwardni* by Franz Rosenthal
Hamden,Conn.

It needs hardly any comment that the terms "philosophy" and "mysticism" require definition in order to realize the difference between them (and between mysticism and religion). There are no doubt many who would deny the existence of suitable clearcut distinctions. In Islam, "philosophy" can be considered as equivalent to what Muslims themselves designated with a loanword from the Greek,falsafah. The curious modern term "mysticism" has no such direct identifying connection between Arabic and a second language. In Arabic, tasawwuf was the label for a diverse and, eventually, all-pervasive religious and societal movement that touched intellectuals and the social elite as well as the masses. It is not always absolutely clear why an individual was considered a faylasuf or a sufi, or into which category he might fall according to our understanding of philosophy and mysticism. Ibn 'Arabi (1165-1240) represented, by general agreement, a Sufi approach to the universe in his thought and attitude. He himself would not have denied it, but such a broad classification would have been unacceptable to him without further modification. He thought of himself as a special kind of SufT, and others tended to follow this view of himself. "Sufism," without further
* AbuiHayyan at-Tawhidi,al-Basd'irwa-dh-dhakha'ir, ed. Ibrahimal-Kaylani,III, 1, 277 (Damascus1364ff.). The followingpageswereoriginally for a colloquium on Philosophyand Mysticism prepared Oaks (Washington, by Giles Constableand IsadoreTwerskyand held at Dumbarton organized in the colloquium to D.C.) on November13-15,1983.My participation gaveme the opportunity spend many monthsjust readingagain through the colossal aeuvreof Ibn 'Arabi and being fascinated by it, evenif the poetryof the languageand the depthof its ideasoften appearto defy whatwe like to thinkof as rationality. not My expositionhereis meantto be purelydescriptive, or historical. The innumerable obviousparallels to earlierMuslimthoughtare not interpretative noted.Thevast amountof recentresearch on Ibn 'Arabiis the subject of an illuminating expressly surveyby J.W. Morris,in JAOS, 106 (1986), 539-51and 733-56.I regretI missedIbn 'Arabi's work on logic, al-Bulghah fj l-hikmah,for which see E. Meyer, in A. Zimmermann (ed.), Aristotelisches Erbe,125-40(Berlin1986).

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qualification, was not enough to characterize his particular position satisfactorily. For him, the "men of God" fall into three classes. In the first place, there were practical ascetics of the highest moral character called 'ubbdd"worshippers." They are represented on the literary scene by men such as al-Muhasibi. In the second, next higher category, there were people who were equivalent to the first group in all respects, but in addition they were concerned only with God, and they achieved states and stations, secrets, revelations (kushufj) and miracles, as well as futiwah status. They are called Sufis, and they also claim leadership of all the people of God and think of themselves as something special. And the third category, finally, encompasses those called Malamiyah.2 They observe all religious obligations most punctiliously, but in no way do they distance themselves from the common pedple. They tend toward blaming themselves and being blamed by others, yet, they are in perfect accord with God's lordship, and they possess that perfect divine and human wisdom (hikmah) that consists in assigning to each phenomenon its proper place.3 The Prophet and Abu Bakr belonged into this third and highest category, as did quite a few of older as well as contemporary mystics.4 Ibn 'Arabi does not indicate into which category he placed himself. It might be assumed that he claimed to belong to all three of them, but, as far as I can see, he does not expressly claim to belong to the third. In other contexts, he speaks of himself as belonging to the Sufis of true insight (muhaqqiqlas-Siufryah).sThe Sufi who combines true insight (muhaqqiq)-in this particular case, insight into the mysteries of letters-with loving concern ranks higher than ordinary Sufis.6 Ibn 'Arabi assumed the existence of two kinds of Sufis, those who are truthful possessors of the truth, and those who make such a claim without having any real understanding.7 Indeterminate numbers of Sufis exhibit the highest standards of ethical behavior (makarim al-akhlaq), and it is said that
terms corresponding in a way to something like divine inspiration were many in Ibn 'Arabi's vocabulary, among them kashf, tajalli, fath, wahb, etc. 2 Ibn 'Arabi considers Malamiyah preferable to Malamatiyah, see Fut., II, 16, 1. 15 (ch. 73). The Futiuht al-Makkryah are quoted here as Fut. according to the edition Cairo 1329, except for the introduction and chapters 1-71 (= I, 665, 1. 7, of the Cairine text), for which the first nine volumes of the edition of 'Uthman Yahya (Cairo 1392/1972-) were available. Yahya's edition is referred to as "Fut. Y." 3 See below, n. 57, and Fut., II, 16, 11.15 ff. (ch. 73), speaking of the Malamiyah: "They are the lords and imams of the people of the path of God, Muhammad being one of them. They are the sages (hukama') who have put matters in their proper places and made them right (ahkamuha)and removed them from improper places... 4 Fut., III, 34ff. (ch. 309). 5 Kitab al-Azal, 8, 11.1 f. (Hyderabad 1948). 6 Fut. Y, I, 325 (ch. 2). See also below, nn. 31 and 32. 7 According to al-Amr al-muhkam al-marbutfit md yalzam ahl tarTqAlldh min ash-shurut, alprinted at the end of the undated (1968?) Cairo edition of Dhakhd'iral-a'ldq (Sharh Tarjumdn ashwdq), 264.

I The

Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

"the more ethicalan individualis, the more of a Sfif he is."8 In Ibn 'Arabi's basic threefold ranking of all knowledge ('ulum),Sufism, which is meant of states"attainable althoughthe wordis not used, appearsas "theknowledge in "taste" the middle between intellectualknowledgewhich yields through resultsthat are partlysound and partlyincorrect,and the highestknowledge, the knowledgeof the secrets,whichhas ties to both the knowledgeof intellect and the knowledgeof states.9 Therecould be Sufis also among the Ash'ariteswho took an intermediate position with respect to the gnosis of God through reason.10As did the ancients (here referringto the philosophers)and the Mutakallimun,some Sufis, too, did that expressly forbidden thing, namely, thinking about the essenceof God. Among them is Ibn 'Arabi'sveneratedexem(tafakkur) In anotherplace,Ibn 'Arabispeaksof "intelligent individplar,al-Ghazzall.11
uals and logical thinkers (al-'uqald' wa-ahl al-qiyds)," among them al-Ghaz-

He even goes so far as to pair Sufis zalI, as being his "colleagues (ashdb)."12 who have no correctinsightwith philosophers of similarstanding.13 Im sum, it is justified,of course, to speak of Ibn 'Arabi as a Sufi, but he tried to break out of the shapelessmold of Sufism,which by his time had indeed become an almost all-inclusiveterm. This no doubt influencedhis attitude toward philosophy and presumablymakes it unrepresentative of Sufismas a whole, at least before the wide spreadof Ibn 'Arabi'sinfluence. Ibn 'Arabi consideredhimself in possession of various forms of personal divine revelation,thus, as a special,highertype of Siufi. Of course,he did not thinkof himselfas a faylasuf,nor did he use the word falsafah in the titles of his works or for describing his own views.14 Throughoutthe centuries,his opponents could not find enough terms of for him, yet, none of them, it seems,went so far as to smearhim opprobrium with the appellationoffaylasuf.l1 It is curiousthat modernscholarship states
8

10 Dhakha'ir al-a'ldq, 236. 1 Fut., IV, 106,11. 12-14 (ch. 473). Cf. also Fut., III, 233,11. 21 f. (ch. 352). See below, p. 8. 12 Kitdb al-Jalalah, 7, 1. 11 (Hyderabad 1948). 13 Dhakhd'ir al-a'l7q, 28, where other examples of inferior kinds of Sufism are given. 14 It seems that none of the very few titles mentioned by 'Uthman Yahya as possibly containing the wordfalsafah did so originally, cf. Osman Yahia, Histoire et classification de l'euvre d'lbn 'ArabT (Damascus 1964), 308, no. 281 (referring to al-I'ldm bi-ishdrdtahl al-ilhdm, published Hyderabad 1948), and 362, no. 415. Falsafat al-akhldq, listed by Yahia, 198, no. 124, printed in Cairo 1332, was not available to me. It has been recognized as a work by Yahya b. 'Adi, cf., for instance, G. Endress, The Works of Yahya Ibn 'Adi, 83 f. (Wiesbaden 1977). For another Ethics, see below, n. 112. 15 The debate pro and con Ibn 'Arabi has produced a large literature, most of it not yet available in print. It may well be that statements such as this one, based upon the absence of evidence, will turn out to be wrong.

9 Fut. Y, I, 139f.

Fut., II, 17, 11.If. (ch. 73).

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that he was referred to as Ibn Afladtn "Son of Plato," presumably to indicate high praise. The origin of the epithet is not known to me. It seems to be unusual terminology. The number of honorifics as well as infamifics applied to Ibn 'Arabi by his admirers and detractors was legion, but even if it should turn out that someone used "Son of Plato," it certainly was not one of the designations commonly applied to him.16 He himself was proudly content with proclaiming himself a "reviver" and "Muhammad," and the one and concrete essence of his time:
It may be mentioned here that some of Ibn 'Arabi's works, though printed, were not available, and others I failed to peruse. The works still unpublished include important texts. Moreover, the question of authenticity often intrudes. I have paid little attention to it here. I have tried, however, to clarify the situation with respect to a unique text contained in the Yale manuscript L-64 (Catalogue Nemoy, no. 1129). It is described as containing Ibn 'Arabi's Jadhwat al-istild' and consists of a collection of statements by old Suifs. Since the work contains chapters on Sifism and tafakkur, it is of some potential interest in our context. Yahia, Histoire et classification, 260, no. 159, has expressed doubt about Ibn 'Arabi's authorship, since the work is obviously different in style and spirit from his other works. It is indeed unusual for Ibn 'Arabi not to inject his personality into a text of this size (but compare his Muhidarat al-abrir, below, p. 17). The first eight folios and the title-page containing the author's name and the title of the work are in a hand later than the rest of the manuscript. At the end, the scribe mentions that he copied the text in a (!) SumaysatT Ribat in Damascus as a "tadhkirah li-sdhibihi, the shaykh, imam, scholar, and ascetic Najib(?)-ad-din Jamal at-ta'ifah, Thaghr (?, hardly Maqarr/Mafarr) alghuraba' al-AbharL."Li-sdhibihfmay mean for his colleague/master/friend, as he refers to him again in the formulas of blessing. Conceivably, it might indicate al-Abhari as the author of the work. It depends on whether the autograph at the end (Catalogue Nemoy, plate VI) is indeed by the hand of Ibn 'Arabi, which I have so far been unable to check by comparison with other at this time located by me is Hujjat-ad-dln-al-haqlqi 'Abd-al-Muhsin autographs. The only AbharT (Muhassin) b. Abi l-'Amid al-Abhari as-Sufi (556-624/1161-1227 in Egypt), who traveled widely, cf. Ibn al-'Imad, Shadhardt,V, 114 (Cairo 1359-51). He could very well have been the author of a work of this type. Ibn 'Arabi's al-Jadhwah al-muqtabasah (Yahia, Histoire et classification, 259, no. 158) can hardly be connected with the Jadhwat al-istilt'. The writer of the title-page of the Yale manuscript is unlikely to have made up the latter peculiar title, but he could easily have added Ibn 'Arabi as the name of the author. 16 This was claimed by M. Asin Palacios, "El mistico Murciano Abenarabl," in Boletin de la Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid), 87 (1925), 99. Asin Palacios was followed by H. Corbin, L'Imagination creatrice dans le Soufisme d'lbn 'Arabi, 18 (Paris 1958), English trans. by R. Manheim, 21 (Princeton 1969. Bollingen Series 91). Corbin repeated himself in Multiple Averroes, 325 (Paris 1978. Actes du Colloque International organise a l'occasion du 8501 anniversairede la naissance d'Averroes,Paris ... 1976). In his preface to R.W. J. Austin's translation of Ibn 'Arabi's Fisuis, The Bezels of Wisdom,xiii (New York-Ramsey-Toronto 1980), T. Burckhardt says that in his day (!), Ibn 'Arabi was given the surname of Son of Plato. His own translation of the Fusus, La Sagesse des Prophetes, 7 (Paris 1955), which had appeared before Corbin's works, had no such reference. No source is given by any of these scholars. If there is one, it may have been one of the numerous commentaries on Ibn 'Arabi's works and, in particular, the Fusus, most of which are not available to me. We can hardly assume that there is here a mixup with as-Suhrawardi al-maqtul. The heretical philosophers who called Pharaoh the "Coptic Plato" used a more appropriate phrase to express themselves, see Ibn Taymiyah, Naqd al-mantiq, ed. M. Hamid al-Fiql, 131 (Cairo 1370/ 1951).

and "Mysticism" Ibn 'Arabibetween"Philosophy" to a place. and no nisbahreferring I am the Muh(y)i.I have no kunyah I am al-'Arabi,al-Hatimi,Muhammad.17

Even though Ibn 'Arabi was not expressly described as a "philosopher," it is true that his writings, or at least some of them, were attacked as tasawwuf alfaldsifah, meaning philosophical mysticism rather than mystic philosophy.18 And although Ibn Khaldun did not mention Ibn 'Arabi by name when he characterized a view of the revelationists (ashab at-tajalll) as "a strange view of philosophical import," he might very well have had him in mind or included him in such a group.19 Modern scholarship has tried to defend the thesis that it is possible to find a system of mystic philosophy or philosophical mysticism20 in Ibn 'Arabi's work. A.E. Affifi's introduction to Ibn 'Arabi published in 1939 was entitled The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din-Ibnul 'Arabi. In the beginning of his preface, however, he issued a slight disclaimer: "... Mystics have no philosophical system or fixed doctrines ... Mysticism is essentially an eclectic subject... but Ibnul 'Arabi is an exception to the rule. He has a definite philosophical doctrine of pantheism, the bearing of which is shown in every part of his system. There is also a formal dialectic which dominates the whole of his thought." There are obvious problems with this statement, the principal one being the term "pantheism." It may conceal antiphilosophy and rejection of the very idea of "system." In the earliest of his many works on Ibn 'Arabi, M. Asin Palacios wished to characterize Ibn 'Arabi's cosmology as an "emanational pantheism" composed of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements unsuccessfully harmonized with Islam, and he spoke of the thought of Ibn 'Arabi as a systematic and harmonious syncretism formed by the juxtaposition of all sorts of philosophical elements and dominated by Alexandrian Neoplatonism.21 Today, it seems still unavoidable to associate Ibn 'Arabi with some vague mystic Neoplatonism or the like22 as if this were a philosophical system of some sort or other. H.S. Nyberg, who wrote what is probably still the most sensible comprehensive study of Ibn 'Arabi, based himself on Ibn 'Arabi's
17 in Muhyiby the meter.See also below, 44 (Biulq 1271).A finalshort i is required DTwan, n. 187.

18

el mundo isldmico, II, 221 ff. (Madrid 1981).

20 on postWith regardto "philosophical cf., for instance,D.R. Blumenthal mysticism," of a special"philoconsiders themas representatives Yemeniauthors.Blumenthal Maimonidean a Georges to G. Nahon and C. Touati(eds.),Hommage see his contribution sophicalmysticism," 291-308(Louvain1980). Vajda, 21 M. Asin Palacios,"Mohidin," in Homenaje d Menendez y Pelayo, II, 238, 254 (Madrid 1899). 22 As was donemost Historia delpensamiento en for instance, by M. CruzHernandez, recently,

Cf. Ibn Hajar, Lisan al-Mizan, V, 312 (Hyderabad 1329-31); Inba' VII, 329. 19 Cf. Ibn Khaldun, Shifa' as-sd'il, ed. M. Ibn Tfawt at-Tanji, 58, 11.11 f. (Istanbul 1957).

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most "philosophical" works and considered the formation of a system as something in constant flux in Ibn 'Arabi's head.23 He also spoke of "theosophy," which, whatever may be meant by it, is certainly not philosophy. To my mind, "monism" remains a fairly satisfactory term as far as it goes, or better perhaps, "monistic gnosticism." Looking at the problem of Ibn 'Arabi's "system" from inside Islam, Seyyed Hossein Nasr got closer to the truth of the matter. He made short shrift of what he calls the "accusations" raised against Ibn 'Arabi of being a pantheist, panentheist, existential monist, or follower of natural mysticism. "All of these accusations," Nasr says, "are false, however, because they mistake the metaphysical doctrines of Ibn 'Arabi for philosophy and do not take into consideration the fact that the way of gnosis is not separate from grace and sanctity." 24 Nasr is not alone in our time in practicing this sort of agnosticism with respect to a "philosophical system" of Ibn 'Arabi. L. Gardet, for instance, contended that in Ibn 'Arabi's case, there can be no question of "a philosophy that has integrated mystic resonances and experiences. It is a case of wisdom gnosis (gnose sapientiale) which commands a spiritual experience that in its very texture is accessible only through recourse to a certain experience."2 5 Much in all these statements depends on a particular definition und understanding of "philosophy" in order to make sense. It may also be noted that discussions of Ibn 'Arabi's "philosophy" such as that of Affifi read more like discussions of works on Kalam, and there is the general and more fundamental problem of when metaphysics ceases to be part of philosophy. On his part, Ibn 'Arabi, in speaking of the "method (uslib)" of his Futuhdt,26probably had no fixed system in mind, certainly no system that was in the least "philosophical." We can deduce his view of "method (tarTq)"in mysticism as compared to philosophy from his numerous statements on the comparative value of revelation and inspiration as against intellectual/mental speculation (nazar, tafakkur). We shall discuss some of them later. Here, it may again suffice to invoke a few verses of his D Twin:
The sciences of taste have no method Specified by proofs for the intellects, H.S. Nyberg, Kleinere Schriften des Ibn al-'ArabT,156f. (Leiden 1919). 'Arabf, 104 (CamSeyyed Hossein Nasr, Three Muslim Sages. Avicenna-SuhrawardT-Ibn bridge, Mass., 1964). Cf. also his article "Rabiteh-ye bayn tasawwuf wa-falsafeh dar farhang-e Iran," in Iran Nimeh, 1 (1982), 46-56. For the fallacy inherent in all such labels, see now also Morris, in JAOS, 106 (1986), 544. 25 L. Gardet, "Experience et gnose chez Ibn 'Arabi," in al-Kitdb at-TadhkarT. Muhyl-d-dinIbn 'Arabi, 271 (Cairo 1389/1969). Presentations of the "philosophy" of Ibn 'Arabi will appear in the future as they did in the past, cf., for instance, R. Landau, in The Muslim World,47 (1957), 46-61, 146-60. 26 See his Fihris, ed. Kurkis 'Awwad, in Revue de l'Academie Arabe de Damas, 29 (1954), 530.
24 23

Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism" Except working according to the data of the religious law And holding to a worldly law (ndmuzs) accompanied by acceptance. As well as the concern of a stern and proud speaker of truth Providing better guidance (proof) for a weak being than anything else does.27

As we would expect, Ibn 'Arabi is not particularly given to referring to philosophy and philosophers directly. Yet, his works contain a few statements explicitly mentioning falsafah and faylasiuf. He also occasionally quotes persons and opinions which he himself acknowledged as having formed part of "philosophy." This material will be discussed here. It constitues the most important basis for understanding his attitude toward philosophy and its relation to his mysticism. Arabic scholars nowadays are increasingly engaged in attempts to clarify Ibn 'Arabi's indebtedness to philosophy from his own statements,28 Such efforts, in fact, go back to as early as the sixteenth century. In a crudely systematic fashion, some significant passages were collected and discussed by the learned and prolific ash-Sha'ranl (ca. 1495-1565), principally in his Kitab al- YawdqTt fi bayan 'aqd'idal-akabir, which served as a stimulus wa-l-jawdhir for the incipient study of Ibn 'Arabi in Europe near the end of the nineteenth century. Ash-Sha'rani's quotations of passages from Ibn 'Arabi were not always completely literal. He was concerned with accurately rendering the drift of the passages, and that he did. Moreover, it is most difficult to quote Ibn 'Arab! literally and at the same time with the required economy, since his torrent of consciousness flows so wildly that it cannot easily be dammed up into quotable segments. A small example of how reliance upon an ashSha'rani quotation could give a seriously misleading impression occurs in one of his lesser treatises, in which he defends Ibn 'Arabi against the accusation of sharing the heretical belief of philosophers in the eternity (qidam) of the world.29 Introducing one of his proof texts as coming from chapter 293 of the Futiuht, he speaks of the "God-forsaken philosophers (al-faldsifah khadhalahum Allah)" as if Ibn 'Arabi himself had used the phrase. He did not, and as a matter of fact is quite unlikely to have used strong curses directed against the philosophers, even where he disapproved of their views.

cf. the text quoted below, pp. 25f. and n. 134. The Diwdn, 78. For the meaning of ndmtus, "speaker of truth" in the third verse is no doubt meant by Ibn 'Arabi to be himself. 28 Cf., for instance, Mahmud Qasim, Mawqif Ibn 'Arab[min al-'aql wa-l-ma'rifahas-Sufiyah, 15f. (Jdmi'at Ummdurmdnal-IsldmTyah,Mu.hidardt al-mawsim ath-thaqdfi ath-thalith li-l-'am al-jami'T1968-69), or the slightly more detailed study by Muhammad Ghalldb, "al-Ma'rifah 'ind in al-Kitdb at-Tadhkdrf(above, n. 25), 181-206. Ibn 'ArabL," Muhyi-d-dmn 29 Cf. ash-Sha'ranl, Ms. Yale L-266 (Catalogue fi r-radd 'aid MuhyF-d-dTn, al-Qawl al-mubmn Nemoy, no. 1161), fol. 12a. The other subject treated in the work is a defense of Ibn 'Arabi against the accusation of belief in hulul. See again below, n. 70.

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Among the passages in which Ibn 'Arabi speaks explicitly about philosophy and how it compares to mystical concerns is one in the Kitdb al-Isfdr 'an natd'ij al-asfdr. There he divides the "travelers," that is, individuals engaged in the search for metaphysical knowledge, into two groups. He characterizes the one group as those "traveling in God with their thoughts (afkdr) and intellects. They inevitably stray from the road, because they think that the only guide they can accept to guide them is their own thinking. They are the philosophers and those who follow a corresponding course. The other group of those engaged in travel are the messengers and prophets and chosen saints, such as the truly insightful (muhaqqiqun) Sufis like Sahl at-Tustari, Abu Yazid al-Bistami, Farqad as-Sabakhi,30 al-Junayd, and al-Hasan al-Basri as well as other famous men of this kind down to our own time."31 (This statement is followed by an interesting explanation of why mystic revelation is more frequent and quicker in recent times than it had been in the old days.) In the Futuhdt where Ibn 'Arabi refers back to the passage of the Isfdr, the express reference to the philosophers is not repeated. The distinction between the two types of travelers is described as one between "those who travel by means of thought in the intelligibilia and the experiences (i'tibdrat), and those who travel by means of actions, the hard laborers."32 It is basically the same thing. The distinction made here is fundamental for Ibn 'Arabi's attitude and stated by him many times. "The philosophers" are on one side, and "those who follow a corresponding course," meaning the Mu'tazilites and Mutakallimun in general, are on the other. He concedes that there are also some Sufis like them who use reasoning with respect to metaphysical matters. At the end, they are totally unsuccessful in their search for gnosis and the knowledge of God. Different from the mentioned groups are all truly spiritual seekers, including the most elevated elite among human beings. By direct, divinely given revelation and inspiration, they achieve the only true understanding of God and the world. Ibn 'Arabi describes the purpose of the Futuhdt as "not being concerned with the results of proofs derived from thought, but having as its subject the results of divine revelation (kashf)."33 Or, put somewhat differently: "We are not those who would report any statements of the sages (hukamda)34 or the
30 For Farqad, cf. as-Sam'ani, Ansdb, VII, 55 f. (Hyderabad 1962-82, under as-Sabakhi). He alone among the famous Siifis mentioned here is not listed in all the common reference works. 31 Kitdb al-Isfdr, 7 f. (Hyderabad 1948). 32 Fut., II, 382, 11.24f. (ch. 190). "Hard laborers" translates ashlb al-yaamalat (not taammuldt!) "sturdy, hard working camels." The difference between them and those exalted personalities mentioned in the Kitdb al-Isfdr is presumably that the former constitute the more general run of Sufis as against the special muhaqqiqun. 33 Fut., II, 389,11. 6f. (ch. 196). 34 On the sages, cf. below, pp. 14f.

Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

statementsof others (like them). In our book (the Futuhdt) as well as all our set other books, we down only the results of revelationand dictates of the Truth."35"Ourbook," he says elsewhere,"is not meant to presentrelationships establishedby speculativethought, but its subjectis the inspirational,
revelatory sciences (al-'ulum al-wahblyah al-kashfiyah)."36 The well-known

intellectualproofs have no place in the Futuhdt. "The work is built upon the religiouslaw and upon the resultsof revelationand directwitness(shuhud)," somethingthat reasonis unableto attain.37Note here again the inclusionof the religiouslaw. It remainsof fundamental importancefor Ibn 'Arab!in all his thought.Thereare numeroussimilarexpressions of the sameidea. Repetias tious they may appearon the surface,they alwaysexhibitsome individual featuresdependingmainlyon the context in which they occur. 38 Yet, Ibn 'Arabiis keenlyawareof its Thinking(f-k-r)constitutesa "veil." is even it a human,not a divine,attribute.Its role is greatimportance, though to it in the Qur'an: indicatedby the many positivereferences
Thinking is a state, of which I am not unaware, For God has established it(s position) in verses and siirahs. Thought is a natural epithet (na't). It has Control only over human beings.39

A recurrenttheme in Ibn 'Arabi's work is the many limitationsimposed does not suffice upon thought.The powerof thought(al-quwah al-mufakkirah) to achieve a perceptionof the essence of God.40 However,Ibn 'Arab!also constantlystressesthe themethat thinkinghas its definiteuses, providedthat thought and inferentialreasoning(istidldl)are sound and that the thinkers are not led to doubts by proofs whichseem to be proofs but, in fact, (nuzzar) are not.41The intellectis an instrument givenby God to man. He has placedit in man's rationalsoul for moral purposes,and it should thereforealwaysbe

35 Fut., II, 432, 11.8 f. (ch. 198,fasl 14). Fut., II, 355, 11.5 f. (ch. 291). 37 Fut., IV, 19, 11.2f. (ch. 414). 38 Fut., II, 85, 1. 7 (ch. 73, su'al 67); II, 523, 11.8f. (ch. 226). Cf. also Kitdb at-Tardjim, 12 (Hyderabad 1948): "The veils preventing the perception of the knowledge of the Truth are great, the greatest among them being knowledge... Heraclius (the Byzantine Emperor) possessed knowledge of Prophecy but had no belief, so his knowledge was of no use to him. The Jews knew that Muhammad was truly the Messenger of God... Cf. also Kitab at-TarEjim,57. A very different situation is presupposed in the description of "knowledge" as a veil in Mawaqi' an-nujam (see below, n. 184). The ignorant speak of knowledge in this way. Ibn 'Arabi explains that knowledge is indeed a great veil. But it is a veil that veils the hearts (and thus protects them) from ignorance. 39 Fut., II, 229 f. (ch. 144 beg.). As Ibn 'Arabi explains, "natural" is used here in the sense of "not divine." 40 Fut., II, 319, 11.16f. (ch. 177). 41 Dhakha'ir al-a'ldq, 169 f., 173.
36

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used.42But it must also always be kept in mind that its shortcomingsare numerousand obvious, and what good are the argumentsof reason when what it buildsis demolished Revelationhas a clearcut by revelation (kashJ)43? advantageover it:
O my people! The results of the sciences of revelation (kashf) Enjoy superiority over the science of the hearts. For the intellect cannot roam In the arena of witnessings and absences. How many mistakes and shortfalls are there in thinking! But how much correct insight (nazar) does the discerning eye have! Were it not for the eye, no clear guide would Show itself to the intellect in a man of heart.44

Ibn 'Arab!sees the clearestproof of that superiorityin the disagreement and theirilk. He attempts that he is convincedis endemicamongphilosophers the intellect derived from thinking contain an element of changeability, becausethey follow the temper(mizdj)of the thinkingand intelligentindividual. He considersonly sensible matters which may have existence in his imaginationand accordinglyare his evidence. The result is that theories with respectto one and the same thing differor one and the same (maqalah) investigator(nazir)differswith respectto the same thing at differenttimes, because of differencesin temper and mixture and combinationsin their Thustheirstatements differwith respectto one and the (nash'ah). development same thingand with respectto the basicprinciples upon whichthey construct their details. In contrast, the directly inspired and legislative knowledge possessesone and the same taste (tain), even if the perceptionsof this taste
(matd'im) differ ..."45 In other words, the mystical experience called "taste" to explain the origin of their different views in these terms: "... the sciences of

of metaphysical basicprinciples knowledge,whereasthe providesunchanging is understandable intellectual knowledge-whoseexistence questfor metaphysical becausethe intellectis a divine gift in man, which, however,can go only a limiteddistancebasedas it is on physicalmeansof cognition-is led astrayby its concernwithwidelychangeable detailsand a neglectof the basicprinciples.
Fut., II, 319, 11.13f. (ch. 177); III, 436, 1. 7 (ch. 371, fasl 3). For the right kind of 'aql, see Fut., III, 250 (ch. 355). 43 Fut., III, 31, 1. 25 (ch. 308 beg.), in a poem that starts significantly: I wonder about someone who says, Be! to non-existence When what is addressed was not there. Cf., further, for instance, Fut., II, 174,11.22f. (ch. 90 end); II, 183, 1. 22 (ch. 99); III, 420,1. 18 (ch. 371); IV, 112, 11.15 and 17 (ch. 477 beg.). 44 Fut., II, 628, 11. 23-26 (ch. 285). Both "witnessings" and "absences" refer to direct metaphysical contact. They are not contrasting terms, as the English translation seems to imply. 45 Fut., Y, V, 147f. (ch. 68). Cf. also V, 204 (ch. 68 end).
42

and "Mysticism" Ibn 'Arabibetween"Philosophy"

11

Intellectuals,therefore,constantly falter in their assumptions:"When they and success,the resultis that follow up the evidence(dalll) with thoroughness they obtain knowledgeof what they wanted proved (madlul).But then, at some other time, or when a memberof anothergroup-be it a Mu'tazilite, Ash'arite,Brahman,or philosopher-comes up with somethingto contradict or impugnthe earlierproof which they had fully accepted,theirfirst(view)is
seen as erroneous and not thoroughly proved ..."46

Scholarswho enjoy direct revelation(kashf)find divine guidancethrough This makes them aware of all the differencesand the the Qur'an(furqdn). amountof truthand untruthin the intellectual speculationabout God. Thus, they are able to worshipGod both as commanded throughdirectinspiration, scholars('ulama' However,"thespeculative an-nazar) by Islamand essentially. are distributedover many differentgroups. Each of them has its own idea about God according to the results obtained from speculating on their particularevidenceconcerningthe knowledgeof God. Thus their doctrines Yet, no matterhow much they differfrom concerningGod differgreatly."47 each other, they do maintaincoherencewithin their particulargroup. The Ash'ariteargumentabout knowledgeof God's essenceis true, but it's truthis and vice versa.Inspiteof it, althoughtheirleading doubtedby the Mu'tazilah, scholars have differences,they retain their respective identities as either Ibn 'Arabicontinues,"thephilosophers or Mu'tazilites. Ash'arites "Likewise," beliefs. do not cease to differin theirdoctrinesabout God and theirnecessary Still, each group is united by one and the same position and by one and the same denomination.They differwith respectto the basic principlesof their to the details."On the common school (madhhab), giving no considerations exaltedhumanbeingsas well as all other hand, the prophetsand comparable those individualswho possess revelation(kashf)have neverbeen observedto and they neverhad doubtsabout the differwith respectto the basicprinciples, belief in God.48 In short, "the way of kashf and shuhid bears no discussion."49That of philosophycannot do withoutit. Accordingto Ibn 'Arabi's firm conviction,there could be only one truth about the divine.He would have consideredit absurdto concede,as modern historiansof religionare inclinedto do, that direct experienceof the divine could lead to differing opinionsand beliefs.But if Ibn 'Arabiwas convincedof the unassailability of his position, why then, we may ask, did he botherwith the views of philosophersand other wrongheadedthinkers?The obvious answer,whichalso appliesto the entirerevelation-versus-reason debate,is that
46 47 48 49

8 f. (ch. 289). Fut., II, 645, 11. 4 f. (ch. 369, wasl 20). Fut., III, 402, 11. Fut., III, 82, 11.15ff. (ch. 322). Kitab al-Fana' wa-l-mushahadah,8, 1. 8 (Hyderabad 1948).

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his claims faced strong opposition and had to be defended and proved, and this required attempting to demolish those other views. Ibn 'Arabi's own answer is contained in a remarkable passage from the long introduction of the Futu.hdt.Exhorting the student who is concerned with the knowledge that conforms to the Prophetical knowledge inherited from the prophets, the true metaphysical knowledge, he tells him: "Don't let yourself be turned off, when you come across a problem that was mentioned by a philosopher or a Mutakallim or a speculative scholar in any discipline of knowledge, to such an extent that you would say about the person who mentions it and who is a truly insightful (muhaqqiq) Sufi that he is a philosopher, just because the philosopher (al-faylasJf)50 mentioned that very problem and discussed and believed it. (And don't say) that (the Sufi who discusses it) derived it from (the philosophers), or that he has no religion, because the philosopher who had no religion (and was no Muslim) stated it (earlier). Don't do that, friend! It would be an inconsequential argument. For not all the philosopher's knowledge is untrue, and that particular problem may just involve some truth he possesses. This is particularly so when it concerns the wise sayings (hikam) and moral uprightness5 which (the philosophers) have written about. We must set down the philosopher's statement with respect to that specific problem and acknowledge it to be true. For the Prophet, or a companion (of the Prophet), or Malik, or ash-Shafi'i, or Sufyan ath-Thawri has (also) stated it. If you (attack a truly insightful Sufi by) saying that he heard it from the philosopher (in oral instruction) or read it in the books of the philosophers, it could be you lie and show ignorance. The lie would be your saying "he heard or read it," since you did not observe that directly. The ignorance would be your failing to make a distinction between truth and untruth with regard to that problem. Your statement that the philosopher has no religion does not mean that everything he possesses (in the way of knowledge) is untrue. Every intelligent person would perceive that right away."52 All the elements of Ibn 'Arabi's attitude toward philosophy are to be found here. The intellect has its proper, if limited, role to play. Ethics as taught by the philosophers is by and large not objectionable. Metaphysics as expounded by the philosophers and the speculative theologians-Ibn 'Arabi frequently refers to the Ash'arites by name, not quite as frequently to the Mu'tazilites, with often little clearcut distinction between the two and the Ash'arites being

50 With the definite article. The reference may be to Aristotle, but this is not a necessary assumption. 51 Lit., "freedom from desires and psychological trickiness (maka'id)." 52 Fut. Y, I, 145f. See now E. Meyer, "Ibn 'Arabi begegnet Ibn Rusd," in Zeitschrift fir Geschichte der Arabisch-lslamischen Wissenschaften,3 (1986), 291ff.

Ibn 'Arabibetween"Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

13

of theirviews is concerned-53 is aheadof the othersas far as the plausibility but includesoccasionalpromising on the whole incorrectand unacceptable leads. Religion, which means Islam, even if religion in this passage is used without the definite article, provides the true and binding guidelines for fact that the philosophers lived beforethe coming The undeniable everything. of Islamand thus werenot Muslimsdoes not disqualifythemper se; however, where their views cannot be reconciledwith those of Islam, they cannot be if displayof broadmindedness, acceptedas true.It all adds up to a noteworthy is quiteuncharacteristic of the monotheistic Tolerance not tolerance.54 mystic. of Muslimbeliefs,traditions, Ibn 'Arabiwas a staunch,even fanatic,supporter and practices.Here, however,we find him professingthe need for a kind of whichreflectsthe long traditionof philosophyin Islam. intellectual objectivity It appears to agree well with Ibn 'Arabi's personalityas a determinedly thinker,hardlya "liberal,"but a dedicatedintellectual. independent could The questionraisedby the quotedpassagewhether"thephilosopher" refer to Aristotle requiresa brief discussion of Ibn 'Arabi's view of the In his relationshipof hikmah"wisdom"and hakim"sage" to philosophy.55 mind, words such as fikr or nazar evoked all sorts of human, non-inspired concern Kalam ratherthan philosophy,although endeavor;they preferably the potential distinctionis not always clearcut. Hikmahand hakim,words in the Qur'an,wereexpectedly verymuchusedby him, and in firmlygrounded of connotations.They also servedhim, of course,as quasi-synonyms different a form of To hikmah and him, too, basically signals higher faylasif. falsafah "wisdom" and is hard between intended The difference "knowledge" knowing. to pin down at times in his view of the world. For instance, the divine encountered by him at the Ka'bahtells him: "I am the knowledge apparition
(al-'ilm), the known (al-ma'lum), and the knower (al-'alim)-I am al-hikmah, al-muhkam, and al-haktm."56
53 For a positiveevaluation cf. Fut.,IV, 22, 11.12ff. of a contemporary Mutakallim/Ash'arite, Mu'tazilitefrom his theory of the (ch. 416). For the purportedweaningof a contemporary 2ff. (ch. 98); IV, 179,11.12ff. (ch. 534). creationof humanactions,cf. Fut., II, 182,11. 54 On the strength of the passagesquotedhere,whichhe knewthroughash-Sha'rani, Nyberg concludedthat Ibn 'Arabi had nothing against philosophersand Mu'taziliteswheneverthey offeredsome truth,cf. Kleinere 21, n. 3. Schriften, 55 'Uqala' is occasionallyused by Ibn 'Arabi with referenceto faldsifah but is of little Cf. also below,p. in his work.SeeFut.,II, 619,1.8 (ch. 282):al-'uqald'min al-faldsifah. importance of thefalasifah,"see below,n. 65. 26. For "hukamd' is also not absent, see, for instance,above, p. 3, 1. 10. The 'Uqlatal"ancients" Qudamd' al(in Nyberg,Kleinere Schriften, 76) refersto "the ancientphilosophers (al-qudamd' mustawfiz is missingfromone of the edition,al-faldsifah to the criticalapparatus but, according faldsifah)," of the passage. and only qudamd' appearsin the continuation manuscript, 56 Fut. Y, I, 219,1. 6 (ch. 1). Cf. also below, n. 80. as a variantreadingforfaldsifahin Fut. Y, III, 219, 1. 3 Hukamd' appearsin one manuscript (ch. 28).

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Hikmah is definedby Ibn 'Arabias God's systemof orderingthe worldand everythingin it. Hikmahin this sense, however,is also applicableto human sages and may well be comparedto philosophy. With a numberof slight Ibn 'Arabirepeatsthis definitionover and over again.The dividing variations, if not non-existent, in line betweendivineand humanhikmah appearsblurred, in his so also of and is as conceived him.57 writings, reality manypassages by
The common equation of hikmah with falsafah, and hakim with faylasuf, is

statesthat by hukama'he also verymuchalivein his works.Oncehe expressly

meant the faldsifah.58 In his at-TadbTrdt al-ildhiyah, he refers to al-hakTmas

in his Fihris,he suppliesthe name of the authorof the Secretum Secretorum; Aristotle.59Hakim stands indubitablyfor philosopherwhereverIbn 'Arabi uses the word in connection with the sciences (even at times including "In relationto what we have mentioned," he informsus, "there metaphysics): who betweenspeculative do not belong to is much difference sages (hukamd) has nothingto do with our way (tariq).For the Mutakallimqua Mutakallim This word standsfor the scienceof (physics).This is in contrastto the hakTm. the combinationof metaphysics,physics, propaedeutics (riyddt),and logic, All of them, of course, and there are only those four ordersof sciences."60 belong to what was taken to be "philosophy." In fact, Ibn 'Arabi acknowledgedthat "most of the speculativesciences and practical61crafts wereinventedby the souls of sageswith pureand strongmindsand thoughts, comes as a gift of although,needlessto say, real wisdom(haqiqatal-hikmah) forces(al-'ilmal-ladunnt).62 God from supernatural Still, it must always be kept in mind that ordinarily,Ibn 'Arabyreserved for a higher order of consciousness.The Malamiyah,as we hikmah/hakTm

57

33f. (ch. 144);II, 269, 1. 16 (ch. 38, 1.20; Fut., I, 665, 1. 1; II, 16, 1. 16; II, 230, 11. 1948);DTwan, 6f. (ch. 342);III, 210,1.22 (ch. 166beg.);II, 332,1.22 (ch. 178);II, 668, 1.21 (ch. 193);III, 168,11. 349 end);III, 455, 1.7 (ch. 372 end);III, 455, 1.26 (ch. 373);IV. 258, 1. 10; IV, 324, 1. 13 (ch. 558 end). See also above,n. 3.
58

instance, at-Tadbirat al-ildhiyah, 194, 11. 12f.; Kitdb al-jaldl wa-l-jamdl, 13, 11. 11 f. (Hyderabad

of this idea, cf., for Fut., II, 471, 1. 26 (ch. 198,fasl 42). For the varietyof expressions

59 Fihris,528 (above,n. 26). 60 Fut. Y, IV, 161 (ch. 47), and 343 (ch. 60). See also below,p. 22. Ibn 'Arabialso complained whojust thoughtthat theywerehukamd' that therewerehukama' who (just)claimedwisdom, (Fut.,III, 508, 11.10f. [ch. 381])and that therewerethinkers (nuzzdr) of what cf. Kitdbal-Fana'wa-l-mushdhadah, 8, 1.2. In general,scholarswerefew, and ignorance mattersreallymeantwas prevalent, cf. Fut.,II, 185,1.3 (ch. 101)-a complaint commonlyheard. See also below,n. 184. 61 Read al-'amallyah. 62 "Lapsicologia Risalahfi n-nafs wa-r-ruh,ed. M. Asin Palacios, segunMohidinAbenarabi," in Nendeln 1968). (reprinted
in Actes du XIV"CongresInternationaldes Orientalisles (Alger 1905), Troisiemepartie, 163 and 165

Fut., III, 456, 1. 7 (ch. 373).

Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

15

have seen, wereacclaimedas true sages.63The sages rankedbetweenprophets of thefaldsifah"65 The expression"greathukamd' denotes and messengers.64 those who possessedtheirparticular no doubta specialgroupof philosophers, of Ibn 'Arabi'scautiousapproach shareof trueknowledge.It is characteristic to the equation of hikmah with falsafah. He felt that such caution was necessaryin order to avoid giving the wrong impressionthat he was identiviews found in philosophy. metaphysical fying with objectionable This becomesclear in anotherfamous and much quoted passagefrom the Futuihdt-tomy knowledgethe only one in the entirework in whicha Greek philosopheris cited by name.66Ibn 'Arabi's discussionhere starts from the that both thinking(fikr)and taste (dhawq) have theirdefinite usualassumption in the of The process gainingexperience(i'tibdr). people of the path of place God acceptthis to be so. It is deniedonly by scholarswhoseexclusiveconcern as ahl ar-rusum) is with materialphenomena(designated and who use speculation and inferential reasoningbut have no taste of mysticalstates."It is rare," Ibn 'Arabicontinues,"that one of them does have a taste of mysticalstates. Plato. His Among the sages (hukama'),one of those was the divine (ildhT) psychologicaldispositionis found to be the same as that associatedwith the Some Muslimsdislike him. people of revelationand existence(kashf/wujfud). him with connect do so because they falsafah. Their attitude is only They are in causedby ignoranceof the meaningof the wordfalsafah. The hukamd' prophethood.Faylasif means 'lover of wisdom' becausesophiain Greek is wisdom or, accordingto another opinion (!), 'love.'67Thusfalsafah means 'love of wisdom.'Everyintelligentindividualloves wisdom.However,people who think, whether they are philosophers,Mu'tazilites,Ash'arites,or any other kind of thinker,are wrong'withrespectto metaphysical questionsmore often than they are right. The philosopherswere assumedto be deservingof
truth the knowers of God and of everything ... Hikmah is the knowledge of

See above, n. 2. Cf. also Fut., III, 234, 1. 12 (ch. 352). 65 Fut., III, 37,11. 7 f. (ch. 309),also Fut., II, 677,1. 8 (ch. 295), and hukamd'al-falasifah in Fut., himselffromthe II, 469, 1.23 (ch. 198,fasl 38). In the last passage,however,Ibn 'Arabidistances sages"and theirview on the originof the world. "philosopher 66 The in the Futuhdt is Galen,cf. Fut., III, 113,1. 6 (ch. only otherGreeknamementioned 330). 67 Ibn 'Arabiwas interested in languageand traveledin countriesof manydifferent tongues. 9-11 On threeoccasions,he mentionsthe wordfor "God"in variouslanguages: Fut., II, 360, 11. 29-31(ch. 297); and III, 300, 11.17f. (ch. 361), and he even refersto several (ch. 178);II, 683, 11. See Asin Palacios,"El mistico in at-Tanazzuldt words for "horse,"apparently al-Mawsiliyah. on the etymologyof in Boletin(above,n. 16), 88 (1926),583f. However,the remark Murciano," It standsto reasonthat wa-qllais a distortionof isa-fTl(i) is strictlytraditional. "philosopher"
63 64

"and phil(e)."

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blamejust becauseof their designationas philosophers. Theirmistakeswith to matters were for their revelarespect metaphysical responsible contradicting tions receivedby the messengers,since in their thinking, they applied the the basicprinciple and correctsignificance of prophecy wrongideasconcerning and messengership and therebybecameconfused.Had they, upon falling in love with wisdom, sought it from God, and not by means of thinking,they would have been right throughout.Muslimthinkersother than the philosoand Ash'arites, livedafterthe comingof Islam. phers,such as the Mu'tazilites By then, Islamhad gainedcontrolover them,and they now startedto defend it in accordancewith their understanding of it. They are basicallyright (in theirviews). They are wrong only in some details of interpretation which, in the light of their thinkingand the intellectualevidencethey possessed,they about God's truth.Understood appliedto certainstatements by the Lawgiver those statements seem absurd and not literally, provableby reason. In their
view, they therefore constituted unbelief (kufr) ... This, then, is wisdom, and

the people of God, such as messengers and saints, are the true sages."68 of rationalism and philosophy Again,Ibn 'Arabidisplaysa certaintolerance for the effortsof those who thoughtthat they could rely and an understanding on philosophicalreasoning.It was not uncommon in Islam to excuse the Greek philosophers-and thus to a certain degree philosophy itself-on account of their having lived before the coming of Islam and consequently havingbeen unableto know the full truth.Ibn 'Arab!definitelyacceptedthis line of defense.He was readyto admitthat the philosophers, both ancientand recent, possesseda good deal of true insight, if not the full truth, even in metaphysical questionswhereeven Muslimtheologianswereapt to misunderstandand misinterpret the full truththat could easily have been theirs.When Ibn 'Arabi referredto philosophersof his own time, he used no derogatory although he was chagrinedby their negativeattitude toward his epithets,69 own visionaryapproachwhich they did not hesitate to brand as a kind of In one of his poems, he even went so far as to claim that madness(hawas).70 both Aristotleand al-Ash'ariwould have agreedwith him and that all he did In general,it can be said that and arguments.71 was to rectifytheirprinciples he possesseda historicalunderstanding of the importance of philosophy.His attitude toward its representatives may be described as condescendingly
Fut., II, 523 (ch. 226). 9 See above, p. 7. 70 Fut., II, 591 bottom (ch. 275). The passage was quoted already by M. Schreiner from ashSha'rani, see his "Beitrage zur Geschichte der theologischen Bewegungen im Islam," in ZDMG, 52 (1898), 527, n. 1, reprinted in his Gesammelte Schriften, ed. M. Perlmann, 428, n. 1 (HildesheimZiirich-New York 1983). Ash-Sha'rani expands the quotation at the end with an attack upon the philosophers as being ignorant. 71 Diwan, 466, 11.17ff.
68

Ibn 'Arabibetween"Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

17

as was properfor someonewho believedthat he was divinely compassionate, chosen and privy to the one true knowledge.This then can be said to have beenIbn 'Arabi'sattitudetowardphilosophyand philosophers as expressed in his own statements. His numerousfurther referencesto philosophers,their works, and their views seem to confirmthis impression.It comes as no surprisethat a work such as the collectionof significant sayings,whichhe publishedunderthe title of Muhddarat is much less reticentwith respectto the use of names al-abrdr, attributes themto such famousnamesas Hippocrates, Aristotle,his pupil,the great Alexander,and even Pythagoras,Socrates, and Plato. Some of these without attribution.72It may not be sayings are repeatedin the Futiuhdt accidentalthat the celebratedMuslimsgenerallyknown as philosophersare not mentioned The beginningof the poem on by nameevenin the Muhddarah. the soul by Ibn Sina is presentedsimply as belongingto "the poem famous to its authorship.73 among scholars,"with no explicitreference who is knownto us principally Ibn Bajjah, as a philosopher, is mentionedin the Fututhdt in a storyinvolvinghim and Ibn Zuhr.The story'sonly concernis with theirrespective but in the telling expertisein botany and pharmacology, of it there is a whiff of Ibn Bajjahas a philosopher.Ibn Bajjahsupposedly imaginedthat he knew more about plants than Ibn Zuhr. This, in fact, was not the case. He was betterthan Ibn Zuhrin physics(al-'ilmat-tabT'7).74 For Ibn 'Arabi, such "physics"was a part of falsafah. On anotheroccasion, he compares the shuyukh,the Sufi masters, who are not lawgivers but the guardiansof the religiouslaw as well as the guardiansof humanheartsand morals, to physiciansas contrasted with physicists. The physician knows about "nature"only in as far as it governs the human body, whereasthe physicistknows it outright,even if he is not a physician.75 When speakingof al-Batalyawsi, Ibn 'Arabiwould hardlyhave thoughtof him as a philosopher,although he refers to his only known philosophical work.76And his contactswith a great contemporary, Fakhr-ad-din ar-Razi,
See below,n. 125. Muhadarat al-abrar,I, 362 (Cairo 1972). A footnote of the editor refersto Ibn Sina's authorship. 74 Fut., II, 442, 1. 30 - 443, 1. 2 (ch. 198,fasl 21), trans. M. Asin Palacios, "Avempace 5 (1940),257f. Ibn Bajjah's botanico,"in al-Andalus, gravein Fes was nearthat of Ibn 'Arabi's see Ibn Abi Usaybi'ah,'Uyunal-anbd', 29f. (Cairo-K6nigsberg grandfather, II, 63, 11. 1882-84). 75 Fut., II, 365, 11. 3-5 (ch. 181).The use of tabT'ah in the pluralin connectionwith medicine often refersto the four humors,but this is hardlymeanthere. 76 Fut.Y, III, 195(ch. 25 end).As pointedout by the editor,the reference is to al-Batalyawsi's in particular the fourthchapter.In his introduction Hada'iq, to the editionand translation of the work (in al-Andalus, 5 [1940],cf. ObrasEscogidas, II-III,496 [Madrid1948]),M. Asin Palacios wouldbe classified as a philologist saysthat but for the Hada'iq, and in no way as a al-BatalyawsT
72

than the Fut.uhit. The Muhadarah often quotes wise sayings (hikam) and

73

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were clearlywith ar-Razias a Mutakallim.77 Ibn Rushd'slasting fame rests upon his philosophicalwork, but young Ibn 'Arabi's encounterswith him were,as far as we know, strictlyon the mysticallevel. Ibn 'Arabi'sreporton those encountershas the aura of an edifying,as well as tantalizing,mystical anecdote.It is hardto take the reportat face value.Ibn 'Arabimay havebuilt but was carriedaway by his fertileimagination.78 upon an actual occurrence worksof Ibn Rushd, We have no indicationthat he studiedthe philosophical but it would seem a safe assumptionthat he had at least some knowledgeof them.79 with technicalphilosophical Ibn 'Arabi'sactualacquaintance writingscanIt is no longeracceptable, as it was in the time of not be reliablydocumented. to referto the Liberde causisor the Theologyof Aristotleand M. Schreiner, thus intimatethat Ibn 'Arabihad readthemwhen he spoke of the PureGood or the identity of knowledge,the knower, and the known.80All this was Ibn 'Arabiconstantly generalknowledgein his time sharedby all intellectuals. no of He his view on the three aspects knowledge. made practically repeated use of the term "Pure Good," but it is clear that he was aware of it. It is as pureevil,81or that of the of non-existence behindhis incidental description He may as "puredarkness."82 truthas "purelight"and of the absurd(muhadl)
also in his commentary on alinterest considerable He shows,however, philosophical philosopher. 5 (1984),15-31. Ma'arri (see below,nn. 92 and 170).Cf. now E. Torero, in al-Qantara, 77 in Fut.Y, III, 54f. (ch. 17),and IV, 118(ch. 46), as well as the epistleon Cf. the references on the to ar-Razi(Fut.Y, IV, 55f. [ch. addressed ethicsandfutuwah 22]). See also the discussion n. 98. for him written of God below, 1948), (Hyderabad knowledge 78 Fut. Y, II, 372f. (ch. 15). Recenttranslations creatrice, appearin H. Corbin,L'Imagination 23 f. (London1971); 34-36,Englishtrans.,41-43(above,n. 16);R.J.W.Austin,Stifisof Andalusia, and E. Meyer, op. cit. (above, n. 52), 281ff. The famous episode is generallyreferredto in as well as s.v. Ibn Rushd. connectionwith both men, cf., for instance, EP2,s.v. Ibn al-'ArabT
79

emendinghis reading"Ibn Sabil" to "Ibn Rushd,"states that Ibn 'ArabistudiedIbn Rushd's works.However,the editionof the Autobibliography Badawiin alby 'Abd-ar-Rahmfn juridical withIbn Rushd,inspiteof the 20 (1955),116,reads"IbnShibl"andmakesno connection Andalus, of the forms.Evenmorestrangeis the fact that the titleof thejuridical close similarity seemingly of edition.Theidentity in Badawi's workmentioned by Nybergdoes not agreewiththeindications to be established. remains if it is not Ibn Rushd(or his grandfather?), the individual,
80

Nyberg, Kleinere Schriften, 24, quoting Ibn 'Arabi's Autobibliography and apparently

had for the PureGood andfor knowledge, Fut.,III, 315,1.9 (ch. Schreiner etc., were,respectively, all too facileidentifications similar n. For also 82 Fut. and above, Y, II, 56]. 3) [see 2,fasl (ch. 364), see also below,n. 96. of "sources,"
81

Cf. M. Schreiner, op. cit. (above, n. 70), 526; Gesammelte Schriften, 427. The references

and light:'The good on darkness witha stop(mundzalah) in connection us in a lengthystatement know that the Truthhas absolute We (however?) is in existence,and the evil in non-existence.' He is the puregood that containsno evil. His oppositeis existencewithoutrestriction (taqyTd). whichis the pureevil that containsno good. This is the meaningof their absolutenon-existence is pureevil.'" that 'non-existence statement 82 28 f. (ch. 360). Fut.,III, 274, 11.

Fut. Y, I, 212, 1. 14, continued on 1. 17 to 213, 1. 3: "One of the travelers of the Truth said to

Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

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very well have read those works, if they were accessibleto him and he had been looking for them, but unless he indicatesthat much, proof that he did identification of accuratequotations.No such would requirethe unambiguous identification of passagesfrom philosophicalworks such as the Theologyor the Liberde causishas, to my knowledge,as yet been made.83 Ibn 'Arabi tells us that he once saw a book with the title al-MadTnah alin in someone's Marchena. He noticedin it the statement: fddilah possession "We must speculateon how to posit a god in the world,"using ilah, and not Allah.Immediately, he returned the book to its ownerin disgust,and he never came across it.84 No such statementis to be found in al-Farabi'sArd' again ahl al-madTnah where "The First" is referredto. Nor, for that al-fadilah, in that work (or, it seems,in matter,does eitherilah or Allahoccuranywhere Unless it can be provedthat someoneelse was the al-Farabi'spoliticalFusuil). author Ibn 'Arabi had in mind, thus eliminating al-FarabT, it might be assumed that he was incensed by al-FarabT's omission of any referenceto Had he returned to God, and he distortedthis fact in his restlessimagination. later in his life, he might not have been so averseto alal-MadTnah al-fddilah Farabi'swork. At any rate, the quoted passagedoes not tell us much about the extent of Ibn 'Arabi's acquaintancewith the available philosophicalpoliticalliterature. work quoted by Ibn 'Arabi is indeed a work on The one "philosophical" It is the Secretum secretorum,which formed the basis of his politics. at-TadbTrdt He considered it a genuineworkof Aristotleaddressed al-ildhTyah. More will be said about it below, p. 25. Ibn 'Arabi to King Alexander.85 his purely metaphysical appearsto have regrettedlater that he interrupted and occupying of the time on the TadbTrat writing pursuits by spending them. himselfwith man and man'sworldlyaffairs,even thoughhe spiritualized He felt that it was wrongfor him to neglectthe discussionof largerconcerns such as the figureof the Mahdi and the Seal of the Saints, and he tried to
make up for it in his Kitab 'Anqd'mughribfi (ma'rifat) khatm al-awliyd' washams al-maghrib.86 The Secretum secretorum, incidentally, also fueled Ibn
83 Exact identifications of possible sources of Ibn 'Arabi are hard to come by. A good example is the discussion of his relationship with Ibn Masarrah by R. Arnaldez, see El2, III, 871 f., s.v. Ibn Masarra. Nyberg's contention that Ibn 'Arabi had the Rasd'il Ikhwdnas-safa' as his direct source for the cosmic scheme of God, the first intellect, etc., plausible as it is, is also hard to prove, see Kleinere Schriften, 145. 84 Fut., III, 178, 1. 11 (ch. 344). For "came across it," another possible but less likely translation would be "studied it." 85 See above, n. 59. 86 This is stated in the introduction of the work. In my translation of Ibn Khaldiin's Muqaddimah,II, 189, n. 960, I doubted, probably incorrectly, the existence of the editions of the work, but they have remained inaccessible to me.

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'Arabi's keen interest in other magical subjects such as letter magic and physiognomy; presumably, he did additional reading in monographs on the latter subject.87 Another supposed direct quotation of a philosophical title remains doubtful. We are hampered again by that vagueness generally preferred by Ibn 'Arabi when speaking about philosophy. In the introduction of the Futuhdt, he refers to differences among the physicists, the scholars who defined the building blocks of the world, with respect to a fifth existent (mawjud), the basis and origin (asl) of the four elements (arkdn). This fifth element, he says, was mentioned by al-hakrm The preposition fThere is ambiguous. ff l-ustuqussdt.88 to Asin it introduced the title of a book.89 In the context, Palacios, According this is possible, for Ibn 'Arabi goes on to explain that he learned about the matter from a medical student who read "it" (the book?) to him and asked him to comment on it from his specific mystical revelatory (kashf) point of view. The theory of the existence of a fifth soma or fifth ousia90 was commonly ascribed to Aristotle, who himself never mentions it explicitly,91 and no Aristotelian peri stoicheion could have been intended here (unless, in sheer desperation, we assume the meaning of "letters" for stoicheia and assume that Ibn 'Arabi had in mind Kitdb al-Huruf "Book of letters" as the Arabic title of the Metaphysics, an assumption that would not be much to his credit). In the Muslim world, the fifth element was usually referred to as the The differences of the philosophers with respect to the fifth nature (tabFlah).92 number and the kind and hierarchyof the elements were known and recognized as being of ancient origin.93 Since Ibn 'Arabi's informant was a student of medicine, one might think of a physician who wrote a Kitdb al-Ustuqussit, and the name of Ishaq b. Sulayman al-Isra'ili (Isaac Judaeus) comes to mind, but at least what is preserved and known of his work happens to disregard the theory of the fifth nature.94 All in all, it appears to be more likely that the
Cf. the discussion offirdsah in Fut., II, 235-41 (ch. 148). Fut. Y, I, 250. 89 Cf. M. Asin Palacios, "El mistico Murciano," in Boletin (above, n. 16), 87 (1925), 161 f. 90 For soma, cf. Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita, I, 3, 22, and II, 20,11; Plotinus, Enneads, II, 1, 2. The Arabic translation of Placita, II, 20, 11, has 'unsurfor soma, cf. H. Daiber, Aetius Arabus: Die Vorsokratikerin arabischerUberlieferung,156 f. (Wiesbaden 1980). For ousia, cf. the commentaries on the Physics by Simplicius, ed. H. Diels, 1165,11.21 ff. (Berlin 1895. Commentariain Aristotelem Graeca 10), and Philoponus, ed. H. Vitelli (Berlin 1887. Comm. .., 16). 91 Aristotle, De cae!o 270b21-22, speaks of the four elements and the ether in the uppermost region. Ibn 'Arabi also refers to sphere and ether, see below, n. 95. Cf. Daiber, 106f. 92 Cf., for instance, Rasa'il Ikhwdn as-safd', II, 39 f. (Cairo 1347/1928); al-Baqillani, TamhTd, ed. R. J. McCarthy, 45 (Beirut 1957); al-Batalyawsi, Sharh al-mukhtdrmin LuzumfydtAbTl-'Ala' ed. Hamid 'Abd-al-MajTd,I, 189 (Cairo 1970). Cf. also Paul Kraus, Jabir Ibn Hayydn, II, 152f. (Cairo 1942-43. Memoires de l'Institut d'Egypte 44-45). 93 See below, n. 96. 94 Cf. Salomon Fried's edition of the Hebrew text (Drohobycz 1900) and Jacob Guttmann, Die
88 87

Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

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fJ does not introducethe title of a book but ratherindicatesthe preposition subjectunderdiscussionby the Sage, namely,the elements.It shouldbe noted that Ibn 'Arabi showed himselfsurprisedat learningsomethingthat was no doubt generalknowledgein his environment, and he must have been awareof its familiarity his surprise and triviality; mighthavebeenfeignedand prompted by his tendencyto dramatize. Later on in the Futiauht, Ibn 'Arabi returnsto the concept of the fifth nature.He now considersit self-evident and does not attributeit to anyonein "We would not have known at all that there is the natureof the particular: sphereswhich is a fifth nature, had we no previous knowledgeof the five mothers. When we noticed that the spheres outside (?) these natureswere not inherentin thesemothers,we realizedthe existence subjectto rules(hukm) of a fifthnaturefromthe atmospheric motion that is in the ether,as ('ulwlyah) motion that is in the waterand the soil."95He well as the terrestrial (suflTyah) to the subjectof the four elements(arkdn) of the physicalworld againreturned in a passagein which he distinguishes betweensix differenttheoriesheld by variousschools. He maintainsthat in his opinion('indana), the correctview is that of a fifth basic principles (asl) to be called "nature(abT'ah)" formingthe basis of the four elements (arkin).96 It is not clear whether Ibn 'Arabi's informationcame from the same source in all these passages.Howeverthis may be, it seems most unlikelythat he had in mind a specificphilosophical work we could lay our hands on. The situation is not much differentwith respect to all of Ibn 'Arabl's statementson philosophical topics. All the acceptedpartsof philosophywere It was almostinevitablefor him to touch alive in his educationalbackground. on them.97The ambiguityof his attitudewith regardto them as well as other in the epistlewhichhe addressed fieldsof worldlylearningis well expressed to individual must studyall those sciences Fakhr-ad-din ar-Razi:"Theintelligent that serve to perfecthis essenceand move along with him whereverhe goes. The only science (that serves perfectionand moves along with him) is the
philosophischenLehren des Isaak Ben Salomon Israeli (Miinster 1911. Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 10,4). See also A. Altmann and S.M. Stern, Isaac Israeli, 47 f. (Oxford University Press 1958); A. Altmann, "Isaac Israeli's 'Chapter on the Elements,"' in Journal of Jewish Studies, 7 (1956), 31-57. 9s Fut. Y, II, 86 (ch. 2, fasl 3). On "mothers" and "pillars," see below, n. 138. 96 Fut. Y, II, 309 f. (ch. 11). Greek names to go with the prime element were supplied by M. Asin Palacios, "Mohidin," in Homenaje (above, n. 21), II, 252, on the basis of Fut., II, 677, 1. 23 (ch. 295), and Muhammad Ghallab, in al-Kitib at-Tadhkdar(above, n. 28), 190 f. On the "fifth nature" in Islam, see also, briefly, S. Pines, Beitrige zur islamischen Atomenlehre,43, n. 1 (Berlin 1936). 97 Cf. the summary statement by M. Asin Palacios, "Mohidin," in Homenaje, II, 254: "Nuestro mistico habla de todo: de fisica y de l6gica, de metafisica y de religi6n, de astronomia y de moral, sin order ni concierto..." (!) See below, p. 34.

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04 Everything has a mlzdn, and "the are not governed by a scale (mTzdn)."

knowledge of God obtained as a gift and derived from direct witness For instance,medicineis neededonly in the world of sickness (mushdhadah). or disease.When you move on to a world in which there is no sicknessor disease, whom could you cure with medical knowledge?The intelligent individualshould make no effort to learn about it (?), even if he were to obtain it by way of a (divine) gift as the medicine of the prophets (was obtainedby them as a divinegift). The same appliesto geometry(handasah). It is neededin the worldof measurement. Whenyou move on, you leaveit in its world, and the soul continues on unburdened with anything.The same to the with science the soul leaves when it which applies occupation every moves on to the world beyond.Therefore,an intelligentindividualmust not seize any knowledgeexceptwhat is absolutelyneeded.Rather,he must make an effort to achieve what moves on with him when he moves on. This, in is two sciences,the knowledgeof God and the knowledgeof the particular, of the other world."98The sages, he adds elsewhere, homesteads(mawdtin) wereignorantof the scienceshe himselfhad brought.99 The philosophicalcanon of logic, mathematics,physics, and metaphysics was acknowledgedby Ibn 'Arabi, but he viewed all of it as subordinateto metaphysicsand consideredas bliss only the knowledgeof God, and not Technicaltermshave theirspecialand arithmetic, geometry,or astronomy.100 necessaryrole to play in every science;Sufism,too, has its specialterms.'01 The terminology of a sciencehas to be learnedfromits seasonedpractitioners. Thisis truefor philology,102 the mathematical grammar, arithmetic, geometry, sciences(ta'7llm), Kalam,and philosophy.However,the truenovice(al-murld as-sddiq)among the people of God needs no instructionin the technical terminologyof his scienceto begin with. He knows it throughdirectinspiration.'03 Although Ibn 'Arabi'sentirework has epistemologyat its core, logic and It is important for him to stressin logiciansare not often mentioned expressly. so many wordsthat the knowledgeof God and the Qur'an,limitlessfieldsof and knowledgethat they are, "do not follow a logicalcanon (qdnun mantiqT)

98 Risalah ila l-imdm ar-Razt, 6 (Hyderabad 1948). Cf. also Fut. Y, III, 83, 11.11 f. (ch. 19). 99 Diwdn, 97, 1. 20. 100 Fut., IV, 11.11f. (ch. 533). 101 Fut., II, 636, 11.21 ff. (ch. 287). This passage presents a slightly different list of sciences including grammar, arithmetic, geometry, medicine, Kalam, and jurisprudence, but not philology (see n. 102). 102 Mantiqi, used next to nahwi also in Fut. Y, II, 58, 11.7f. (ch. 2, fasl 2), appears to be intended here by Ibn 'Arabi in this sense and does not refer to logicians. 103 Fut. Y, IV, 276 (ch. 54). 104 Fut., III, 200f. (ch. 348).

Ibn 'Arabibetween"Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

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scale of the meanings in the hand of the intellect is called logic, and there are two plates to the scale, called premises." 105 Somewhere in the Futuhat, it may be added, Ibn 'Arabi includes an example of wrong premises yielding a correct conclusion, such as "Every man is a stone-every stone is an animal--ergo, every man is an animal, which, of course, is correct."106 The ten categories are included among the things that for all times to the Day of Resurrection apply to "every order in the world of lights and darknesses, subtle and coarse (matters), simple and composite (matters), substances, accidents, times, places, relations, qualities, quantities, positions, activa, and passiva." 107 However, the ten categories-in this instance referred to by their proper designation of maqult-do not subsume the essence of truth.108And, since according to the fundamental Qur'anic statement pondered by Ibn 'Arabi innumerable times: "There is nothing like Him (42:11)," no positive but only true negative statements can be made about God, the first eight categories, those of "how, where, when, position, relation, accident, substance, and how much, do not apply. Of the ten there remain only truly realized activity (fi7 muhaqqaq) and a concretely substantial agent (fa'il mu'ayyan) or, in other words, visible activity (fi'l zdhir) in an unknowable agent (fd'il majhul) whose influence (athar) is seen but whose predicate (khabar) is not recognized, whose concrete substance ('ayn) is not known, and whose mode of being (kawn) remains unknown."109 In sum, we may fairly say that Aristotelian logic was unquestionably accepted by Ibn 'Arabi up to the point where his metaphysical presuppositions take over. Ethics was even more firmly acknowledged by Ibn 'Arab! to be an unobjectionable part of philosophy.110 Metaphysical concerns do not intrude here to any noteworthy degree, apart from the often stressed fact that proper morals are the hallmark of Sufism.111In a general way, and often with his customary vagueness, he fully subscribes to theories about parts of the soul inherited from Greek philosophy."2 The rational soul, as, he says, it is called by the sages and for which the Qur'an and the Sufis have different but equivalent
105 Fut., III, 6, 11.16f. (ch. 300). Fut., III, 353, 11.9f. (ch. 367).

106

107 with 33f., in connection 14-18(ch. 177).Cf. also Nyberg,Kleinere Fut.,II, 304,11. Schriften, inshd'ad-dawd'ir. 108 Or "theTruth,"Fut., II, 319, 1.25 (ch. 177 nearend). 109Fut., II, 211, 11. 29-33(ch. 127).Cf. also below,p. 31. 110 Cf. above, n. 51. "1 Cf. above, n. 8. 112 If the Risalat al-Akhldq,listed by Yahia, Histoire et Classification, 493, no. 745, is in Damascus,n. y., whichappearsto be different by the work of this title published represented to Ibn 'Arabi's discussed fromthe Falsafatal-akhldq above,n. 14, it wouldbe the best testimony to ethicsin this respect. traditional approach

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designations,113 was created for the purpose of making it possible for man to oppose natural desires threatening to take over control of the soul."4 It is also the right instrument for deriving the proper pleasure from the beauty of man and nature through sense perception."5 In contrast to the corporeal animal soul, the rational soul means happiness in both this and the other world. 16 Popular ethics as represented by wise sayings was ubiquitous in medieval thought and could hardly have been absent from Ibn 'Arabi's work. Favorite topics of practical ethics such as the usefulness of silence appear in the long concluding chapter of the Futihat dedicated to "exhortations in the form of wise sayings (wasayd min manthur al-hikam wa-maysur al-kalim)," ' 7 as, for instance, "Nothing deserves imprisonment more than the tongue."'18 Ibn 'Arabi remembers having heard the four statements on silence ascribed to the four kings of the world, the rulers of, respectively, Persia, India, China, and Byzantium. This happened in Fes when he was in his early thirties. He reports the saying in this form: "Four kings made four statements as if shot from one bow. Kisra said: 'I am better able to reject what I did not say than what I did.' The king of India said: 'When I make a statement, it owns me, although I owned it (before).' Qaysar, the king of the Rum, said: 'I have no regrets about what I did not say, but I had regrets about what I did say.' And the king of China said: 'The consequences of what was said were more severe than regret about what was not said.'"119 Attributions are rare,120even general ones such as "one of the sages." For the latter, see, for instance, the saying quoted in the Muhadarah: "One of the sages said: 'Don't talk about what you don't know, lest you be considered ignorant of what you do know!'""12 The Platonic "I know that I don't
Risalahfi ma'rifat an-nafs wa-r-ruh,ed. Asin Palacios, "La psicologia," 153 (above, n. 62). Fut., II, 319, 11.13f. (ch. 177 near end). 115 Fut. Y, 61,11. 5 f. (ch. 65). Ibn 'Arabi also follows traditional lines on the comparatively few occasions he discusses pleasure and pain. 116 Fut., III, 262 bottom (ch. 358). A hymn in praise of the rational soul, in the first person, appears in DTwan,37 f. 117 See Fut., IV, 549, 11.23 ff. 118 Fut., IV, 450 bottom. 119 Fut., IV, 549, 11.25-29. The remark of the Byzantine emperor is ascribed to Simonides in Plutarch, de garrulitate 515A. For various forms of the saying of the four (three) kings, cf., for instance, al-Bayhaqi, Mahdsin, ed. F. Schwally, 424 f. (Giessen 1902), indicating the historian alHaytham b. 'Adl as his source = Pseudo-Jahiz, Mahdsin, 21 (Beirut [1955]); al-Washsha', Muwashshd,ed. R. E. Briinnow, 10 (Leiden 1886); al-Mubashshir, Mukhtdral-hikam, ed. 'Abd-arRahman Badawi, 299 (Madrid 1958) = F. Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam, 126 (London 1975); Ibn Hamdun, Tadhkirah,75 f. (Cairo 1345/1927); al-Ibshlhl, Mustatraf, I, 101 f., ch. 13 (Bulaq 1268). 120 See above, for instance, n. 66, and below, n. 125. 121 Muhddaratal-abrar, I, 480 (Cairo 1972).
114 113

Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

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know" appearsin such forms as a referenceto the fourfolddefinitionof the sage, which includes: "The man who knows but does not know that he in the discussionin the form: "A thing is not knows."'22It is also integrated ignorant(j-h-l)of its self but does not recognize('-r-f) that it recognizesits
self." 123

Politics,anotherimportant partof philosophyand ethics,is also represented in Ibn 'Arabi by wise sayings. "A sage wrote to Alexander," we read in the in exhortations the "Know that time on affects Futuhat, chapter everything, it, wearsit out, and killswhathas beendone, exceptfor whatis firmly replaces anchoredin the heartsof men. Therefore deposein theirheartsan everlasting love which will preservefor you a good memory, the generosityof your '24 Politicalcontrol of activities,and the nobility of your accomplishments." others beginswith control of oneself, a favoritetopic of ethicaland political wisdom literature.Plato said: "He who begins with himself and controls himself(sdsahd)achievescontrol (siydsah)of people," and Aristotleadvised the aspiringpoliticianto "improve yourselffor your own sake,and peoplewill into contact with a fiirstenspiegel possessingall the ingredientsnecessaryto mixedrealpolitik fascinatemedievalman. The Secretum with science,superstition, and magic. It also elaboratedon the theme of man as a microcosm, which embodied a way of looking at the world that was considered a characteristic part of philosophy and firmly believed in by Ibn 'Arabi. In works on politicalutopiasmay also have contribuadditionto the Secretum, reconstruction of the "trueearth (ardal-haqTqah)," ted to his imaginative an enormousidealland with a fantasticadministrative setupand locatedbetween the earthand Paradisebut superioreven to the latter.127 An importantdistinctionof a political-philosophical characterconstantly made by Ibn 'Arabi is the one betweenthe divine religiouslaw on the one and "wisdom hand, and what he calls "wisdompolitics (siydsahhikmTyah)" laws (nawdmlshikmlyah)"on the other. In his view, the laws of good governmentwere provided by God in two forms: "One of them, called wisdom politics, is implantedby naturein the souls of great men, who then
Fut., III, 22, 11.12f. (ch. 305). Fut., II, 84, 1. 11 (ch. 73, su'al 65). 124 Fut., IV, 551, 11.8-10. 125 Muhadarat al-abrar, II, 320 (in the edition Cairo 1282). The sayings of the Muhadarah reappear in Fut., IV, 540,11. 16 ff., together with other sayings on politics, but without attributions, see above, n. 72. 126 See above, p. 19. 127 Fut. Y, II, 257ff. (ch. 8).
123

follow you." 25 Ibn 'Arabi's acquaintance with the Secretum secretorum126 brought him

122

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established norms and laid down laws by means of a (special) power they found in their souls. (They provided them for) each city, location, and clime according to the requirements of the temper of each region and their (!) natures, because of their knowledge of the gift given by wisdom. Property, lives, families, relations (arhdm), and pedigrees were thus preserved intact. They called them nawdmfs.The word means "reasons for the good," because in customary technical usage, an-ndmius is what brings the good, while al-jdsus is for These are the wisdom laws set down by evil.'28 employed "spy" individuals under divine inspiration (ilhdm), of which they intelligent ('uqala') were not conscious, for the purpose (of establishing and preserving) wellbeing, order, and a cohesive structure (irtibdt) in places where people had no revealed (munazzal) religious law (shar'). Moreover, these lawgivers had no knowledge of the fact that those matters are something that brings (them and other human beings) near to God. They do not lead to Paradise or Hell nor anything else concerned with the other world. They did not know that there was another world and a sensible (mahsus) resurrection after death in natural bodies... Therefore, their laws (nawamTs)and rules for the public interest (masalih) were based upon a perpetuation of well-being (salah) in this world..." Those men then proceeded to speculate about God and the soul, until a messenger arose among them with a divine revelation concerning all those matters.'29 Secular laws based upon philosophical speculation continued to exist, but for Ibn 'Arab1, they were surpassed and superseded by the divine law. In contrast to the religious law of the prophets which is proven to come from God, the conventional law (an-ndmuisal-wad'T)required by wisdom has no such proof. The Exalted Truth takes it from His name(s) al-bdtin al-haklm130 and places it into the hearts of the sages of the moment (hukamd'al-waqt)131 without their being conscious of it. They add that thrust (?) to their speculation, not knowing that it is from God specifically ('aid t-ta yTn),but they see that the basic principle is from God; so they establish it as law for their contemporary followers, since they had a prophet whose prophethood was proven. If they execute on their part the norms of that law (ndmus)and do not transgress but observe it, God rewards them according to their dealings with Him in this world and the other world, as does the established religious law... God declares the words of the giver of the wisdom law (ndmus hikmT)to be
Cf. Majd-ad-din Ibn al-Athir, an-Nihayahfigharlb al-hadith, I, 191; IV, 188 (Cairo 1322), quoted in Listn al- 'Arab,VIII, 130 (Bulaq 1300-8); Ibn Sayyid-an-nas, 'Uyunal-athar, I, 90 (Cairo 1356). 129 Fut. Y, V, 97ff. (ch. 66). 130 Al-bdtin here refers to one of the names of God.
128 131

Of divineillumination.

Ibn 'Arabibetween"Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

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true, as He declares the giver of the religious legal law (ndmus shar'l hukmT). As to his reward in this world, there is no doubt about it. It is no secret that it serves the (continued) existence of the public interest with regards to family, property, and goods (?).132 The same is the case as regards the other world, even if the person in charge of (sahib) the wisdom law does not concern himself with it, as is the case with the law (ndmus) of the divine order (al-hukm al-ildhi). In the other world, we have 'what no eye has seen and no ear has heard nor has it occurred to any human being,' 133 and it comes to us with no previous knowledge of it. The same results in the other world for the activity of the law (ndmus) required by wisdom for the one who originated it for the sake of the public interest (maslahah) ..."134 Politics as a branch of philosophy was thus recognized by Ibn 'Arabi as a valid concern. What is more, he tolerated the study of it. Being a product of intellectual speculation, it was, however, naturally inferior to the divinely revealed religious law. While sage lawgivers saw in it a prelude to metaphysical understanding, it fell far short of the truth, and understandably so, because the boundaries of the human knowledge of metaphysical truth were clarifiable only by mystical revelation. Ibn 'Arabi subscribed to the basic data of the scientific knowledge of mathematics and medicine which were the general property of the educated of his time. Infrequently as he cites such data, he shows originality only in applying them to his metaphysical preconceptions, at times in a somewhat bizarre manner. His views on physics also depended on scientific assumptions developed on the basis of ancient philosophy. Specific attributions by name to scholars or the sages are again infrequent, nor are the statements reported as starting points for his discussion anything more than vague paraphrases. Numbers speculation, it may be added, is called Pythagorean, as usual.'35 He refers to some medical opinions. Thus he mentions in passing the efficaciousness of drugs native to the patient's own country,'36 and states that it is advisable for women during intercourse to look at pictures of the great ancient sages.137
132 133

or siydsahhikmlyah wad'T occur,for instance,in Fut., I, 608, 1. 1 (= Fut.Y, IX, 132,ch. 71); II, 27ff. (ch. 338);III, 231, 1.21 (ch. 351);III, 170,11.16f. (ch. 90); II, 260,1. 3 (ch. 160);III, 153,11. 480, 1. 17 (ch. 373). 13S Kitdb al-Mim wa-l-waw wa-n-nin, 8 (Hyderabad 1948).References by Ibn 'Arabito music are not entirelylacking,but they are infrequent. (Cairo 1282).Cf., for instance,Abu Sulaymanas-Sijistani, 4f. Siwdn,ed. D.M. Dunlop, 75, 11. (The Hague 1979);ed. 'Abd-ar-Rahman Badawi,209,1. 3 (Teheran1974).
137

Indices de la tradition musulmane, I, 47a, 183a (Leiden 1936-69). 134 Fut., II, 117, 11.25ff. (ch. 73, suil 125). Further references to ndmus hikmi (hukml?) or

to a hadfth(related to I Cor.2:9), see A.J. Wensinck andothers,Concordance et According

'Arad, not 'ird "(family) honor."

136 In the name of Hippocrates, see Muhl.darat al-abrar, II, 309-11, ch. on hubb al-watan

Fut., II, 378, 11.13-15 (ch. 187).

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His reflections on the material cosmos start from theories about the elements, often designated as mothers (ummahdt)and pillars (arkdn)'38-both terms used by, among others, the Ikhwan as-safa', especially arkdn, which also occurs in the Secretum secretorum-, and they are pervaded by other terms and ideas common in Muslim theological and philosophical literature. We have already seen how Ibn 'Arab! dealt with the fifth element.'39 He appears to have found an overarching element more appealing to him in the concept of hayild "hyle, primordial matter."140 We cannot be absolutely certain whether he was aware of the Greek provenience of hayiuld;he probably was because of the strange form of the word and its philosophical origins. On the disputed problem of matter and form, he stated that "the sages call (every thing that accepts forms in its essence) hayul." l141 "The universal hayiul accepts every form." 142 It is to be equated with the substance of the "primary habd'," the speck of dust which together with 'amd' "cloud" constitutes the code words for the transitional stage between God and the material worlds in Ibn 'Arabi's which mystical terminology.'43 The "hylic substance (al-jawharal-hayuldnT)," includes the elements, is the inferior equivalent in nature to the "divine breath (an-nafas al-ildhl)" that has accepted the forms of the universe.'44 Among the beginnings (sadr) peculiar to each thing in the vast interval between God and man, "the beginning of time (zamdn) is the time of the acceptance of form by the hayula."14s Time as well as space and motion have remained fundamental problems of physics ever since Aristotle gave them a prominent place in the discussion. For Ibn 'Arabi, "formal substance, accident, time, and place are the moth~ersof existence." 146 He wrote extensively on time, space, and motion, and, in particular, on time.'47 Time played a much larger role in his thought than space.'48 He came back to time over and over again in his works. It clearly
See above, n. 95. Above, p. 20. 140 Cf. L. Gardet's informative article "hayula" in El2. 141 Fut., II, 432, 11.6 f. (ch. 198,fasl 14). The continuation of the statement has been discussed above (n. 35). Cf. Rasd'il Ikhwdn as-safd', II, 4. 142 Fut., III, 195,1. 26 (ch. 347). Cf., further, the schematic presentations of hayula in Fut., III, 421 ff. (ch. 371), and Insha' ad-dawc'ir, in Nyberg, Kleinere Schriften, 24 f. 143 Fut., II, 647 f. (ch. 289). Cf. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah,trans. Rosenthal, III, 88. 144 Fusis al-hikam, ed. Abu l-'Ala' al-'Afifi, 144, 1. 1 (Beirut, n. y.). 145 Fut., II, 652, 1. 30 (ch. 291). 146 Fut., III, 404, 1. 22 (ch. 369, wasl 21). 147 The three monographs on time, space, and motion mentioned in Autobibliography,ed. Badawi, 125 (above, n. 79), and Fihris, in RAAD, 30 (1955), 53 f. (above, n. 26), are apparently not preserved. They may have covered the same ground with respect to these subjects as does the Futuhdt. Cf. the quotations in Fut. Y, II, 320, 1. 9 (ch. 11); VII, 261, 11.8f. (ch. 69), and Yahia, Histoire et Classification, 285, 354, 530 f. 148 This, of course, does not count waqt as moment of divine illumination.
139 138

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was a most basic concept for him, and his attitude toward time requires a larger treatment than can be given to it here. Philosophical conceptions of time intrude even into his discussion of the prayer times 149 and are mentioned in connection with the pilgrimage.150 The difficult notions of past, present, and future engaged him very much, especially, as we would expect, the present moment, the now (waqt), so important in mysticism.'15 It should be understood, however, that the mystical moment of illumination does not concern us here, but it is time (zamdn) as a physical phenomenon, although the two cannot always be separated from one another and certainly were not always strictly kept apart in mystical thought. Ibn 'Arabi's definitions of "time" are consistent but vary slightly from case to case. As defined by the hukamd', he says, time "is an imagined duration segmented by the motions of the spheres (muddah mutawahhamahtaqta'uha harakdt al-afldk)."152 Using the Aristotelian terminology of counting/number in connection with time he speaks of "time that is numbered by the motions of the spheres."153 The question prominently raised by Aristotle (Physics 216b31) whether time was an existent or non-existent dominates Ibn 'Arabi's reflections. Time has no substantive existence,154 but belongs to the corporeal possibilia.155 It is a relationship, imagined to have existence but non-existent,'56 or a relationship in the mind that has neither existence nor nonexistence.'57 One of the Futuhdt's chapters dedicated to "time" starts with

149

150 Fut., I, 677, 11.11 f. (ch. 72).

Fut. Y, VI, 54 (ch. 69), on w,aqtand zaman.

151 Fut., I, 554,11. 27 f. (= Fut. Y, VIII, 238f., ch. 70); III, 189,11. 33 ff. (ch. 346); III, 547 (ch. 238, on waqt). 152 Fut. Y, IV, 336, 1. 2 (ch. 59), continuing with definitions by the Mutakallimun and the "Arabs." The connection of time with the imagination does not appear in Aristotle in this manner, but it comes up in commentaries on Physics 219b2, cf. the old glosses published by 'Abd-arRahman Badawi in his edition of the Arabic translation of the Physics, 423 (Cairo 1384-85/1964-65). 153 Fut., II, 4, 11.16f. (ch. 73), cf. also II, 456 bottom (ch. 198), In the Kitab at-Tarajim, 12 (Hyderabad 1948), the argument runs as follows: "He who says that time is the motion of the sphere (has to be countered by the observation that) there were things when there was no sphere. He who says that time is the connection between two matters by means of "when" (has to be countered by the observation that) time has never ceased accompanying things." The Arabic translation of Physics 223b21f. (ed. Badawi, 479) uses kurah instead of falak. 154 Fut. Y, VI, 61, 1. 10 (ch. 69); VII, 261,1. 9 (ch. 69), speaking of waqt. Time (dahr) "has no concrete substance (ayn), but it is something intellected by the intellect," cf. Fut., II, 652, 1. 17 (ch. 291 beg.). Cf. also Fut., II, 606 (ch. 278). 155 Fut., II, 55, 1. 3 (ch. 73, su'aI 22). 156 Fut. Y, IV, 335 (ch. 59); Fut., II, 4,1. 18 (ch. 73). Cf. also Fut., II, 458 (11.1 f. (ch. 198, fasl 31). 157 Fut., II, 64, 11.5 f. (ch. 316). In connection with the material existence or non-existence of time, reference may be also made to St. Augustine's view of time as a mental state, see R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum,29ff. (Ithaca, New York, 1983).

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verses exalting time's basic power and stressing its imaginary nature and its lack of any perceivable material form:
If the result of time is thoroughly understood, it becomes thoroughly understandable: It is known as the result of imaginings. Its influence shows that its power is like nature. Substance from (nature) as well as from it(self) is non-existent in it. Through it, things take on substance, while itself it has no substance that would allow it to determine it(self). The mind is unable to perceive its forms. Therefore we say that time (dahr) is something imagined. But for abstract immateriality (tanazzuh) God would not have named His158 existence for it. It is revered in the heart. If you are fair, (you will recognize that) its origin is from eternity. It is determined as possessing the character of eternity (azalT). Like the void, it is an extension without limit (on either side) in something incorporeal provided with corporeality through imagining.'59

In the Sufi spirit, Ibn 'Arabi succinctly describes time as "the ruler (sultan)," adopting, it seems, an old saying without explaining it.l60 The knowledge of time ('ilm az-zaman) also belongs to the highest type of inspired knowledge for the spirituality of night and day.161 Time, he (al-ma'arif al-mawhufbah) contends, is comparable to eternity (azal) in that it is imaginary and has no existence, just as eternity is a negative description (wasf salbl) and has no existence.161a Time, he states further, "is for what is created (muhdath) what 162 Time thus is inseparable eternity (azal) is for what is uncreated (qadTm)." from metaphysics,'62a and in the view of Ibn 'Arabi, this applies also to all the basic data of physics, since there is no definite boundary between the material world and the metaphysical structure. The views on metaphysical questions ascribed expressly to the philosophers by Ibn 'Arabi are of special interest in our context, since it is here that his attitude toward philosophy most closely interlocks with his mysticism. Direct attributions are again rare and held intentionally vague. Expressing his
158

Hardly "its," but God as dahr. See F. Rosenthal, "Sweeter than Hope," 10 (Leiden 1983). 159 Fut. Y, IV, 330f.
160 Istilah as-Sufiyah, 9 (Hyderabad 1948). For the secular meaning of the remark, which sees the ruler as the determining influence on conditions (cf. F. Rosenthal, "Sweeter than Hope," 41), see Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyiun al-akhbdr, I, 5 (reprint Cairo 1963-64): "When Ziyad (b. Ablhi) heard a man slander the time(s), he said: "If he knew what time (az-zamdn)is, I would have punished him. Time is the sultan."' 161 Kitab al-Isfdr, 32, 1. 6 (Hyderabad 1948). 161a Fut.Y, VI, 61, 1. 10 (ch. 69). 162 Fut., II, 4, 1. 19 (ch. 73). For Ibn 'Arabi's understanding of azal in relation to time, cf., further, his Kitab al-Azal (Hyderabad 1948). 162a S. Pines points out that Abiu -Barakat al-Baghdadi deals with place in connection with physics, but with time (to which most of Pines' investigation is devoted) only in connection with metaphysics, see his Nouvelles Etudes sur Awhad al-zamdn Abu-l-Barakdt al-Baghdadi, 21 (Paris 1955).

Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

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with an interpretation of timeand space,he refersto a statement disagreement of al-hakTm: "Fromthe One (al-wihid)comesforthonly one (wahid)."63This is supposedlydirectedagainst Aristotelianism; it may have somethingto do with Ibn Rushd's comments on the oneness of the given matter made in Ibn 'Arab!no doubtvaguelyhad in connectionwith Metaphysics1016b3-5.'64 mind the unendingdiscussionof the questionif, and how, multiplicity could resultfrom "the one." A point of agreement was the existenceof God to whichmost philosophers and thinkerssubscribed.It was consideredgenerallypermissible to raise the of the of it existence but was considered not only (hal) God, question improper but also by "the group"to raise the questionof by the philosopher-sages165 His what, how, and why. "Thegroup(at-ta'ifah)" appearsto referhereto the Muslimtheologians.66 The philosophers are usuallymentionedwhereIbn 'Arabiwishesto register disapprovalof their views. This is the case where he states that al-faylasuf deniesdivineknowledgeof the particulars in the sensibleworld.'67Becauseof their mentallimitations,philosopherand Mu'tazilitealike deny any vision of God,168 and the philosophersare also deniers of (divine) actions.169A is established tentative,and immediately retracted, relationship by Ibn 'Arabi betweenhis view of the imaginednature(mutakhayyal) of the entiresensible
world and the general outlook of the Sophists (as-Sufista'l 'ah). In the context

of his interpretation of Qur'an8:17, he maintainsthat neitherthe philosopher nor do peoplewho cling to externaldata (ashabaz-.zhir). "Onlythe Sophists come close to this intuitiveinsight(mashhad). Ibn 'Arabiconcludes, However," "the distinctionbetween us and them is that they say that all that has no
163 Fut. Y, IV, 155, 1. 10 (ch. 47); Fut., II, 458, 11.19f. (ch. 198,./asI 31). The reference to alhakrmoccurs only in the second passage. In citing the first passage, M. Asin Palacios comments that the reference is to the Muslim Aristotelians preferringthis view to that of the Neoplatonists of Alexandria, see his "Mohidin," in Homenaje (above, n. 21), II, 231, n. 1. Cf. also E. Meyer. in Oriens, 27-28 (1981), 247, n. 42. Professors Richard Frank and Dominic O'Meara refer me as a possible parallel to arithmetic theories of the unit remaining unchangeable, as expressed by Jamblich, Theologoumnena arithmeticae, ed. de Falco, pp. 1 f. 164 Cf. M. Bouyges' edition of Ibn Rushd's Commentary on the Metaphysics, II, 540, 1. 17 (Beirut 1938-52). 165 See above, n. 56. 166 Fut. Y, III, 218f. (ch. 28). According to Fur., III, 12, 11.29-32 (ch. 302), agreement also existed between the sages and a group of "our colleagues" who mairntainedthat the spirits were permanently affected by their connection with the bodies as water might be in tainted vessels. 167 Fut., III, 536, 11.16f. (ch. 387). 168 Fut., III, 401,1. 20 (ch. 369, wtasl 20): III, 465, 1. 1 (ch. 374). The mental limitations of the sages also lead to failure with respect to the problem of the divine attributes, cf. Ftt.. III, 495. 11.28ff. (ch. 379). 169 Fut. Y, II, 389, 1. 17 (ch. 16).

(al-faylasuf) nor those who use rational proofs (adillat al-'uqul) believe that,

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reality (haqTqah).'70We do not say that. We say that it is reality, thus disagreeing with all the groups but agreeing with God and His Messenger by virtue of intuitive insight given us by Him." 17 Prophecy obviously exists, but it is naturally something that philosophers do not understand. Ibn 'Arabi therefore feels compelled to exhort his readers to "leave aside the rules (ahkdm) of philosophical books."172 In this context, he contrasts the philosophers with the Ash'arites, as he does again in verses which express his own understanding of the reason why the ultimate goal of any true human endeavor, the knowledge of God, cannot be reached through philosophical thought. Indeed, he concludes that the famous Qur'anic word ummr"illiterate" applied to the Prophet indicates the absence and superfluousness of thinking:
The knowledge through 173 God provides ornate embellishment. and error. The knowledge through thinking leads to doubt (tashbTh) The knowledge through thinking is summary generalization and mistakes. The knowledge through God is verification and specification.174 The knowledge through thinking is abstract labels (a'ladn). The knowledge through God provides states and saintliness (?).175 Don't be led astray by specious statements! For what they prove is ignorance and diversion/causalization (ta'l7).176 The philosopher holds that God can be denied through The result of his causality. That is atheism.'77
170 The common description of the Sophists speaks of them as "those who declare the realities (pl.) false (yubtilunal-haqd'iq),"cf., for instance, Ibn Hazm, al-Fisalfil-milal, I, 8 (Cairo 1317-21); al-Batalyawsi, Sharh, I, 220 f. (above, n. 92). The formulation was no doubt familiar to Ibn 'Arabi. With his customary independence, he changed it slightly. 171 Fut., III, 525, 11.26-29 (ch. 384). 172 Fut., II, 595, 1. 32 (ch. 276). The reference to "books" is not gratuitous. Ibn 'Arabi claims that his knowledge is based on revelations (tajalliyat) and does not derive from books, see, for instance, Kitdb al-Masa'il, 6 bottom (Hyderabad 1948). He faults scholars concerned with the material world ('ulama' ar-rusum)for habitually deriving their knowledge "from books and orally from men of their own kind," cf. Fut. Y, IV, 267, 11.9 f. (ch. 54). 173 The preposition bi- in this connection would ordinarily yield the meaning of "knowledge of God," but the context shows that it must be translated as "by means of, (obtained) through." Words conveying a double meaning by making them mean something they would not normally mean abound in these verses. 174 Cf. Fut., III, 456, 1. 7 (ch. 373) [see above, n. 58]: "(The philosophers) do not know specification in generalization (at-tafsll fi l-ijml)." See also above, p. 11. The gnosis of God, and allows of no specification, cf. Dhakha'ir al-a'laq, 174. however, is generalized (ijmdlTyah) means 175 TahwTl-tabdTl "change and alteration," but the deviation from normal normally usage, as indicated in the translation, appears to be intended. 176 Diversion/entertainment and causal explanation would be the normal meanings of ta7Tl, but, as the following verse shows, Ibn 'Arab! wants it to refer to his view of divine causality. Note his playing with the double meaning of 'illahas disease and cause in his chapter on 'illahin Fut., II, 490ff. (ch. 297). 177 God cannot be conceived as cause, as is done by the philosophers, since this would in reality mean a denial of God. A better translation might be "through assuming him to be a cause."

Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism" Al-Ash'ari holds (that God is) a multiple concrete substance. That is knowledge, but it involves anthropomorphism (tamthl1).178

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It would be possible to go on and investigate everything Ibn 'Arabi says page by page, line by line, and find that there always is a close connection with ideas "philosophical" in origin. This is so even if nothing is said about philosophy, wisdom, or thinking and even where philosophy, wisdom, and thinking appear to be rejected explicitly or implicitly through competing notions that are contradictory to them. Philosophy, whether in the Muslim or the classical meaning of the term, constitutes the frame of reference for Ibn 'Arabi's view of the world. The religious and historical traditions of Islam, its religious law and jurisprudence were untouchables but they had to be fitted into that frame-rather, the frame had to be cut to fit them. A constant problem for us, and for Ibn 'Arabi himself, had he been worried about it, is separating philosophy as such from philosophy embedded in Kalam. In fact, this cannot be done. An exceptional example is provided by that constantly repeated theme song of the Futuhdt as well as Ibn 'Arabi's works and thought in general: "He who recognizes his soul/himself recognizes his Lord." Ibn 'Arab! cites the statement in its basic form and in quite a few minor variations. C.A. Nallino was of the opinion that it was impossible to ascertain its provenience in the thought of Ibn 'Arabi. It could have come from Neoplatonism or reached Islam through patristic writings.179 In this case, it can be stated unequivocally that the Church Fathers were responsible for the coining and the ultimate spread of the statement in its Islamic form familiar to Ibn 'Arabi.180 Usually, we cannot be so sure. A comprehensive assessment of Ibn 'Arabi's scintillating personality and thought seems almost impossible. On the basis of the facts assembled in this paper, a few general remarks suggest themselves. Although we have very little
God is neither cause nor caused but the creator of the causes (Fut. Y, II, 223, 11.4 f. [ch. 6]) and the cause (!) of the existence of the world (Fut. Y, IV, 171, 1. 7 [ch. 48]). The theologians may speak of God as the Cause of causes (Fut., III, 212, 1. 2 [ch. 350]). However, essentially He does not accept 'illTyah,cf. Fut. Y, I, 195; Kitab at-Tajalliydt, 31, also Risalah adyu'awwal ilayh, 13, 1. 1. (Hyderabad 1948). Fusus, 220 (above, n. 144), refers to ashdb al-'illah who make the Truth a cause for the existence of the world. If it is this passage to which T. Izutsu refers, his slightly disparaging remarks about "the philosophers who blindly follow Greek philosophy" do not reflect Ibn 'Arabi's expressed view, see Izutsu, A Comparative Study of the Key Philosophical Concepts in Sufism and Taoism, I, 195 (Minatoku, Tokyo 1966). Cf. also M. Schreiner, (above, n. 70), 525; GesammelteSchriften,426, or A.E. Affifi, The Mystical Philosophyof Muhyid Din-Ibnul 'Arabi,27 f. 178 Fut., II, 644 (ch. 289 beg.). 179 C.A. Nallino, Raccolta dei scritti, II, 339 f. (Rome 1940). 180 Cf. F. Rosenthal, "On the knowledge of Plato's philosophy in the Islamic world," in Islamic Culture, 15 (1941), 397 [addendum to Islamic Culture, 14 (1940), 410, n. 4]. A. Altmann, in his comprehensive study of "The Delphic maxim in Medieval Islam and Judaism," does not specifically deal with Ibn 'Arabi, see Altmann (ed.), Biblical and Other Studies, 196-232 (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

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in the formof evidenceto go on, he may verywell havereadthe workslabeled 8 He certainly in his environment.1 was acquainted with some "philosophical" of the works of the speculativetheologians.He mentionstheir names rather if only a selectedfew among them, but he is also as hesitantto be frequently, when he refers to their works, as he is in the case of the philosospecific What is more important,he was acquainted with all the philosophiphers.182 cal thought and ways of looking at the world that had mergedinto Muslim civilization.If he used a bit of everythinghaphazardly, it was not mindless eclecticism on his part but the naturalway to proceedfor a thinkersteepedin the vast culturethat was his heritage. It seems Next to nothingis known about Ibn 'Arabi'searly development. likely that he early on acquiredhis mystical conviction that direct divine with whateverArabic term he might call it, was availableto a "revelation," and nothingelse, man might be able chosen few. Throughsuch "revelation," to gain the only worthwhileknowledge,consistingof metaphysical insights and preferablystyled the knowledgeof God. Ibn 'Arabi became more and more convinced that he was the chosen recipientof such revelationwhich His way of communicahelpedhim to collect and set down his thoughts.183 full of the ignorantand was in ting his insights to those this world-which free flowingmeditation.It centered,in the first non-comprehending184-was and words on phrases of the Qur'an. Then it took for its texts place, terms and propositions of earlier mystics and other commonly accepted in his cultural background.Finally, his most current appealingstatements eccentric and striking procedurewas to reflect on words which he chose becausethey struckhis fancy,and to meditateon themwith a ferventintensity verbalassociationswhichcontinueto and constant outpouringof surprising He nevercompromised, reader. astonish and impresseven today's however, with respectto his basicbeliefs.Apartfromthis mysticand largelyunsystematic bend, he saw the metaphysicalworld in terms that were ultimately philosophical.The great problemsof time, space, and motion occupiedhim as philosoworldwas to be seenand understood constantly.The metaphysical phy saw and understoodthe physicalworld-only he would have put it the other way round. The true order of the world resulted from assigning its properstation.That was "wisdom,"mysticaland divineas well everything with ultimatelyno distinctionbetweenthe two.185Mystical as philosophical,
See above,pp. 19ff. in Fut. III, 398, 11.10f. (ch. 369, observation Ibn 'ArabY's incidental Note, in particular, restsuponthe transmitter to al-Baqillani ascribed forsomeinformation wasl18)thatresponsibility
181

182

(wa-l-'uhdah 'all an-ndqil).

183 An an-nujim.In the absenceof the example,among others,may be found in Mawdqi' Yale ar. 480, p. 76. printedtext, I used the modem manuscript 184 P. 29 of the mentioned See also above,nn. 38 and 60. of Mawdqi' an-nujim. manuscript

185

See above, p. 13.

Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

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revelation was thus logically transformedinto a long series of "sciences ('ulum),'186 mysticalpropositionson the one hand, and philosophicaland epistemologicalproblems on the other. This breakup of knowledge into innumerableindividual pieces, incidentally,constituted a victory for the methodof exposition ancientaphoristical way of thinkingover the systematic in "philosophy." Ibn 'Arabiexhibitsa palpablehesitationwith regard inherent and "wisdom to decidingwhether"knowledge('ilm)"or "gnosis(ma'rifah)" in In the scheme of was more (hikmah)" things. spite of protestaimportant tions to the contraryon his part, the balancealwaysappearsto be in favor of "knowledge."This marks the final stage of a mysticismwhich, in order to in thesurrounding intellectual hadbecome wedded to philosophy. survive climate, Ibn of that which had started the time 'Arabi, process, early in Islamic By history, had been completed. Ibn 'Arabi's great immediatemodel was alAs is clearfromthe overallplan of the Futuhat whichstartsout with GhazzalT. a thoroughdiscussionof the meaningof the principalMuslimritual obligations, he aspired to replacingal-Ghazzal's revival of Islam with his own renewal of it in a purer, mystical language.187 More determinedthan alGhazzalTto accord absolute preeminenceto a monomaniacmysticism to he succeededin becomingthe hero whicheverything had to be subordinated, of an extremist mysticism never really to be surpassed in its kind and remainedthe guiding light of a more moderate effectiveness.Al-GhazzalT center.This made him eventuallya more powerfuland influentialhistorical
force.

Even more than other mysticsand intellectuals, Ibn 'Arabishowedhimself fond of the combinationof contraries for the purposeof drawingattentionto his ideas. Knowledge is at the same time ignorance,188 being might be conceived as non-being,189 right guidance implies both bringingnear and It would seem to be fair to describe freedomis slavery,191 keepingaway,190 him in this manner.The attemptmadehereto let his own statements speakfor themselves and to see him as he might have seen himself leads to his characterization as both broadminded and intolerant,both liberaland conservative, both extremelylearned and narrowlyfocused, both extraordinarily both a thinkerand beyondthinking-in short, originaland totallytraditional, both a philosopherand a mystic.
186 Cf., in particular, the long lists of such 'ulum at the end of chapters in the Futuhat, beginning with ch. 293. 187 See also above, n. 17. 188 For instance, Fut., I, 728, 11.18f. (ch. 72). 189 Fut., III, 362 (ch. 369). 190 Fut. Y, IV, 262 (ch. 26 beg.). 191 Al-I'ldm bi-ishdrat ahl al-ilhdm, 8; F. Rosenthal, The Muslim Concept of Freedom, 115 (Leiden 1960).