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FINAL PROJECT REPORT MULTI-AREA REAL-TIME TRANSMISSION LINE RATING STUDY

Prepared for CIEE By: Stuart Consulting

Project Manager: Bob Stuart Author: Bob Stuart Date: October, 2007

A CIEE Report

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DISCLAIMER
This draft final report was prepared as the result of work sponsored by the California Energy Commission. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Energy Commission, its employees or the State of California. The Energy Commission, the State of California, its employees, contractors and subcontractors make no warrant, express or implied, and assume no legal liability for the information in this report; nor does any party represent that the uses of this information will not infringe upon privately owned rights. This report has not been approved or disapproved by the California Energy Commission nor has the California Energy Commission passed upon the accuracy or adequacy of the information in this report.

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thankand express their appreciation for their expert opinions to the following people: Ken Martin, Dmitri Kosterov and Jin Gronquist of BPA; Carl Imhoff, Ross Guttromson, Yuri Makarov and Henry Huang of PNNL; Ed Schweitzer and Armando Guzman of SEL; Pat Ahrens, George Noller, Bharat Bhargava, Armando Salazar and Mike Montoya of SCE; Jim McIntosh and Dave Hawkins of the CAISO; VahidMadaniofPG&E;andArunPhadkeofVirginiaTech.

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Preface
The Public Interest Energy Research (PIER) Program supports public interest energy research and development that will help improve the quality of life in California by bringing environmentally safe, affordable, and reliable energy services and products to themarketplace. The PIER Program, managed by the California Energy Commission (Energy Commission) conducts public interest research, development, and demonstration (RD&D)projectstobenefittheelectricityandnaturalgasratepayersinCalifornia. ThePIERprogramstrivestoconductthemostpromisingpublicinterestenergyresearch bypartneringwithRD&Dorganizations,includingindividuals,businesses,utilities,and publicorprivateresearchinstitutions. PIERfundingeffortsarefocusedonthefollowingRD&Dprogramareas: Buildings End-Use Energy Efficiency Industrial/Agricultural/Water End-Use Energy Efficiency Renewable Energy Technologies Environmentally Preferred Advanced Generation Energy-Related Environmental Research Energy Systems Integration Transportation Scoping Study of Intelligent Grid Protection Systems is the draft final report for the Scoping Study of Intelligent Grid Protection Systems Project, work authorization number BOA153P05 conducted by the PIER Program. The information from this project contributestoPIERsEnergyResearchandDevelopmentprogram. For more information on the PIER Program, please visit the Energy Commissions websiteatwww.energy.ca.gov/pierorcontacttheEnergyCommissionat(916)6545164.

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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................iii Preface ................................................................................................................................................v TableofContents................................................................................................................................vii Abstract................................................................................................................................................ix ExecutiveSummary...........................................................................................................................1 Introduction .........................................................................................................................................1 Purpose................................................................................................................................................2 ProjectObjectives ................................................................................................................................2 ProjectOutcomes................................................................................................................................3 Conclusions.........................................................................................................................................4 Recommendations..............................................................................................................................5 BenefitstoCalifornia ..........................................................................................................................5 1.0 2.0 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 3.1. Introduction..........................................................................................................................6 ProjectApproach..................................................................................................................8 Interviews........................................................................................................................8 Meetings...........................................................................................................................8 Papers...............................................................................................................................8 TASK1REPORT.............................................................................................................9 Background................................................................................................................9 KeyFindings..............................................................................................................9 WECCTransmissionPathsandMajorRAS/SPS..................................................13 ScopeofR&DProject................................................................................................15 August14,2003DisturbanceRecommendation...................................................16

3.1.1. 3.1.2. 3.1.3. 3.1.4. 3.1.5.

Task2Report.................................................................................................................................16 3.2.1Background......................................................................................................................16 3.2.2BasicTheoryofSynchrophasors...................................................................................17 3.2.3SynchrophasorStandards..............................................................................................18 3.2.4Areasofconcernandareasforfurtherdevelopment................................................19 3.2.5SynchrophasorManufacturers......................................................................................20 3.2.6KeyFindings....................................................................................................................22 3.3Task3Report...........................................................................................................................22 3.3.1Introduction.....................................................................................................................22 3.3.2Background......................................................................................................................23
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3.3.3SynchrophasorDataApplications................................................................................24 3.3.4R&DinWideAreaControl ............................................................................................28 3.3.5InfrastructureR&DforWideAreaControl.................................................................28 3.3.6R&DinControlApplications........................................................................................31 3.4Task4Report...........................................................................................................................34 3.4.1Background......................................................................................................................34 3.4.2 IssuesinIntelligentGridProtection.......................................................................35 3.4.3PotentialDemonstrationProjects.................................................................................39 3.4.4Discussion........................................................................................................................41 3.4.5Recommendation............................................................................................................42 4.0ConclusionsandRecommendations ..........................................................................................42 4.1Conclusions..............................................................................................................................42 4.2CommercializationPotential.................................................................................................44 4.3Recommendations...................................................................................................................45 4.4BenefitstoCalifornia...............................................................................................................45 5.0References......................................................................................................................................45 6.0Glossary.........................................................................................................................................48 7.0Appendices....................................................................................................................................48 3.1.6. August14,2003DisturbanceRecommendation...................................................49

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Abstract
This paper explores the state of the art of synchrophasor/pmu technology in the United States,thetransmissionconstraintsofimportedpowerintoCalifornia,thestateoftheart of RAS/SPS schemes in California and recommends appropriate projects to apply synchrophasor technology for a new or improved special protection scheme in California.

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Executive Summary
Introduction In virtually all of the major blackouts dating back to the first big New York blackout in 1965,protectiverelayshaveplayedamajorroleineithercontributingtothecauseofthe blackout or failing to mitigate the speed of the blackout. Ironically, zone 3 impedance relays played a major role in the July 2,1996 blackout on the West Coast, the August 14, 2003blackoutontheEastCoastandintheoriginal1965NewYorkblackout.Inallthree blackouts the zone 3 impedance relays which are intended only as backup to the primary protective relays operated incorrectly under heavy load conditions. Unusual circumstances in terms of weather and configuration of the high voltage transmission grid that was not anticipated or studied by protection and operation engineers also contributedtotheseblackouts. There are a couple of significant trends that have been taking place over the last fifteen to twenty years that have had an impact on the vulnerability of the high voltage transmission grid to withstand major blackouts. All over the United States and in fact the world, utilities have been operating the high voltage transmission grid closer to the margin meaning a smaller difference between reliable and unreliable operation. By and large they have been pressured into doing this because of the rapid growth in large metropolitan areas, the lack of investment in the transmission infrastructure and the reluctance of the general public to allow transmission lines to be built near their neighborhoods. Another trend has occurred at the same time which has been the installation of remedial action schemes (RAS) and special protection schemes (SPS) to protect against multiple contingencies. While these schemes provide a safety net to protect against extreme conditions, they are prescriptive by nature. The protection and operation engineers must anticipate these conditions and set the special protection schemes accordingly. This oftentimes means taking precipitous action and leaving transmissioncapabilityonthetableunderlessstressedoperatingconditions. Theinstallationofglobalpositioningsatellite(gps)technologybythemilitaryinthemid to late 1980s along with the rapid development of microprocessor technology has allowed for more intelligent protective relays and special protection schemes. The smarter technology can accurately measure the phase angle (phasor) and voltage and by applying a gps timestamp to the flow of power between two substations having this smarter technology. By applying this phasor technology over a wide geographic area, the actual stress on the system can be measured very accurately. This allows for more adaptive and flexible protective relay schemes and special protection schemes and wouldleadtoatransmissiongridoperatedbothmorereliablyandeconomically.

The Western United States has led the effort in installing and applying pmu technology for the last ten years. The effort in the West has been termed WAMS which stands for Wide Area Measurement System and is governed by the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC). The Eastern Interconnection started a phasor initiative after the August 14, 2003 blackout called the EIPP which stands for Eastern Interconnection Phasor Project. Recently the two initiatives have been merged under one umbrella organization called NASPI which stands for North American Synchrophasor Initiative Project. BPA, Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL), PG&E and SCE have led the effort in installing synchrophasor (pmu) capability at their facilities. There are a sufficient number of pmus installed on the California Oregon Intertie from Washington to California to have wide area visibility meaning that the actual real time state of the power system is known and application projects could be utilized.FromawestwidestandpointthereisalackofvisibilityintheRockyMountain areawithinsufficientpmusinstalled.

Purpose
Thepurposeofthisprojectistoperformascopingstudytoanalyzetransmissionsystem protection issues, identify stateoftheart technical protection solutions and their value for an intelligent system, and develop stakeholdersupported recommendations for a technologyprogram.

Project Objectives
Thespecificprojectobjectiveswereto: Evaluate system protection issues, needs and opportunities in consultation with the organizationsparticipatingintheTRPPolicyAdvisoryCommittee(PAC); Review the stateoftheart in intelligent system protection technologies for addressing these issues, needs and opportunities with manufacturers and suppliers ofpromisingsystemprotectiontechnologies; Review ongoing system protection R&D, field test validation projects and industry standards activities and explore opportunities to collaborate on RD&D that is synergisticwithCaliforniassystemprotectionissues,needsandopportunities;

Develop prioritized recommendations for intelligent system protection R&D, field testvalidationandotherrelatedtechnologytransferactivitiesthatofferthepotential to yield significant reliability, increased transfer capacity and other benefits for Californiaselectricityconsumers;and Review and obtain feedback on this recommended system protection R&D agenda from the TRP PAC, Technical Advisory Committees, equipment manufacturers and otherindustryexperts.

Project Outcomes
The Western United States has been installing pmus since the early to mid 1990s. BPA hasacceptedtheresponsibilityofbeingtherepositoryformostifnotallofthepmudata at their Ditmer control center in Vancouver, Washington. They have two PDCs (phasor dataconcentrators)attheirsitethatacceptthepmudataonarealtimebasis.Thedatais primarily used for: a) disturbance analysis; b) generation modeling; and c) data modeling.TheBPAreliabilitycoordinatorattheDitmercontrolcenterismonitoringthe data and getting experience with it but they have no operator action available to them becausenoengineeringstudieshavebeendonetocorrelatetheangularrelationshipand thelevelofstressonthesystem. Pacific Northwest Laboratories hasbeen in the forefront of research to provide real time displays and operator screens to enhance situational awareness for operators. They have been doing advanced research into simulating actual real time operating scenarios at control centers to include the trending of data and a RTDM (real time display monitor). The IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers) established the first synchrophasor standard in 1995 named 13441995. The standard was updated in 2005 and renamed C37.1182005. The present standard defines measurement convention, measurement quality and communication protocol and all pmus must meet these requirements to be compliant. Communication latency, performance under dynamic conditions, aliasing and instrument transformer errors are areas that need to be better definedandfurtherresearched. There are over 14 manufacturers of pmus that can be grouped into two categories; 1) manufacturers whose primary product line is disturbance recorders and monitoring equipment; and 2) manufacturers whose primary product line is protective relays. SEL
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(Schweitzer Engineering Labs) and GE are two main stream relay manufacturers that havesomewhatdifferentphilosophies.SELprovidespmuandrelayfunctionalityinone hardware package while GE provides a standalone pmu package. Both manufacturers make quality equipment, however some protection engineers have expressed concern aboutthereliabilityoftheoverallpmuandprotectiverelayinonepackage. Almost all protection and control schemes on the grid today are local in nature. This means that the sensing and tripping take place in one substation typically with some schemes utilizing telecommunications between adjacent substations to coordinate the protection. The primary interest in applying synchrophasors is from a wide area standpointbecauseoftheintelligencetodetectastressedsystemthatisclosetocollapse can only be determined from a wide area. Some potential applications that hold promise are wide area voltage control, small signal stability control and transient/dynamicstabilitycontrol. Special protection schemes (SPS) are the primary means of wide area control today although some are used for local problems as well. SPS schemes today however are prescriptive in that typically load flow and transient stability studies must be done assuming worst case conditions to ensure that there is adequate protection during these times. A step forward in applying special protection schemes will be to develop methods to control transient stability that are less dependent on offline studies and use more on line computation. What is proposed is to develop softcomputing techniques using patternrecognition,neuralnetworksandexpertsystemstodecideuponthebestcontrol action. This type of approach for special protection schemes is unprecedented and would be considered a proactive type of scheme in that action could be taken ahead of timetopreventoutagesfromoccurringinthefirstplace.

Conclusions
Pmu/synchrophasortechnologyhasbeenavailableforthelastfifteenyearsandhasbeen used primarily as a system monitoring and analysis tool. This technology has provided invaluable insight into finding the root causes for major system disturbances including the August 10, 1996 and August 14, 2003 disturbances. There has been a growing trend across the United States that systems are operated much closer to the margin where voltagecollapseandtransientstabilitycouldoccur.

California relies heavily on imported power from both the Northwest and Southwest and many special protection schemes determine how much power can be imported based on voltage and transient stability limits. More intelligent special protection schemesthatwouldtakeactionbasedonactualrealtimeconditionswouldallowpower tobeimportednearerthemaximumlimit. Nooneacrossthecountryhasemployedanykindofpmubasedapplicationyet.NERC hasbeenverysupportiveandhasencouragedtheuseofpmusinarealtimeapplication and sooner or later it will happen. The authors believe it is very important to apply pmus in a real time application as quickly as possible to get confident with the technologyandtowringoutanyoftheconcernssuchastelecommunicationlatencyand dynamicresponse. BothPG&EandSCE(SouthernCaliforniaEdison)haveextensivespecialprotection/RAS scheme applications that impact both power imported into California as well as internal generation in California. PG&E has special protection schemes that impact the California Oregon Intertie, load and generation in San Francisco and Diablo Canyon generation. SCE has special protection schemes for power imported into Southern California and generation at Big Creek. All of these special protection schemes protect against multiple contingencies. Both PG&E and SCE also have installed a significant number of pmus on their bulk transmission system and have extensive high speed telecommunicationinfrastructure.BothPG&EandSCEwouldbegood candidatesfora demonstrationproject.TheauthorsfeltthatSCEhadaslightadvantageintermsoftheir softwareandexpertiseinpmutechnology.

Recommendations
TheprojectteamrecommendsthatPIERsponsorasynchrophasordemonstrationproject at SCEs Big Creek project to include the installation of a PDC, centralized programmable logic controller (plc) and the software to program the plc as a special protectionscheme.

Benefits to California

California will benefit in the short term by increased reliability of generation at Big Creek.TotheextentthatBigCreekcanbeoperatedathigherlevelsofgeneration,more costlygenerationcanbebackeddown,savingCalifornianstheincrementalcostbetween BigCreekgenerationandmorecostlygeneration. In the long term the knowledge gained from the demonstration project could be transferred to more complicated special protection schemes such as the California Oregon RAS scheme. The potential for savings is very large assuming that more power couldbeimportedintoCaliforniaatleastpartofthetime.Thecostsavingwouldbethe incremental cost between primarily thermal generation in California and very economic hydroelectricpowerinthePacificNorthwest.

1.0 Introduction
System Protection stateoftheart technology utilizes discreet microprocessor (digital) relays that can be programmed individually or to work in tandem to protect transmission lines, transformer banks and generation. Some of the more advanced digital protective relays incorporate GPS receivers, digital fault recorder capability, and phase angle measurement (PMU) technology engineered into one relay. EHV transmission lines have redundant primary protective relays that utilize highspeed telecommunications at each end of the line to operate in tandem as high speed differential protection (directional/phase comparison, pilot wire and permissive over reaching transfer trip). Additionally there are backup relays on each transmission line thatserveaslocalrelayfailureandremotebreakerfailureprotection.Alloftheserelays are set based on a prescribed set of conditions assuming relatively normal system
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configuration. During abnormal system conditions, however, where voltages, phase angles, frequency and/or fault currents vary significantly from preset conditions, the protective relays can sometimes missoperate, either operating when they shouldnt (no fault, load encroachment or stable swing condition) or not opening when they should (faultconditionsorunstableswingcondition). In virtually all of the major blackouts in the last thirty years, protective relays have played a major role in causing the blackout, exacerbating the blackout or failing to mitigate the spread of the blackout. For example, in the August 14, 2003 blackout on the East Coast and the July 2 and August 10 1996 blackouts in the West, zone 3 impedance relays played a major contributing role as well as many transmission and generation protective relays. In each of these blackouts, due to an unusual and unanticipated set of circumstances, the EHV transmission grid became configured in highly abnormal operational states that were not anticipated or studied by protection and system operatingengineers. One other observed trend that has been taking place at an accelerated rate over the last ten years is the installation of Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) or Special Protection Schemes(SPS).ThereareSPSinstalledintheWECCthatactasafirstlineofdefenseand as a safety net to mitigate the impact of cascading outages in WECC. The most important is the California Oregon Intertie (COI) RAS/SPS, which responds to the initiation of multiple 500 kV transmission faults in California and Oregon by tripping generationintheNorthwest,insertingbothseriesandshuntcapacitorsinCaliforniaand Oregon and ultimately separating the WECC into two major controlled islands under worstcasescenariosastheultimatesafetynet.Thecomplexitycausedbyproliferationof these schemes, particularly in the Western interconnection (WECC), could have unintended consequences, potentially causing major problems and becoming a major trapfortransmissionoperatorsandISOs. There are, however, new, potentially more intelligent, system protection technologies, utilizing phase angle (phasor) measurement and other features, which offer the potential to create a more ductile and adaptive grid system. These new protection technologies can more effectively isolate faults, help generators to sustain their instep operation,andotherwiseadaptivelyrespondtoavoidblackoutsandotherfracturedgrid operatingconditions.Forexample,althoughtheCOIRAS/SPShasoperatedsuccessfully many timesto prevent or arrest cascading outages, there is the potential to use adaptive system protection technologies to allow the COI to operate more reliably and with greaterpostdisturbancetransfercapacity,byadaptingtheoperationofrelaysandother system protection equipment to varying system conditions based on information from wideareaphasormeasurementtechnology.

2.0 Project Approach


2.1. Interviews
Several meetings were held with BPA, PNNL, SEL, CAISO, PG&E and SCE to discuss their applications utilizing synchrophasors and to ask them what their concerns were and vision for the future. A similar list of questions was developed for all companies but some questions were tailored to fit the company personnel being interviewed. The companies were picked because of their leadership and involvement in synchrophasors andimportancetotheCaliforniamarketandWECCgrid.

2.2. Meetings
The authors attended several industry meetings and seminars to learn and interact with industry experts regarding the state of the art of special protection schemes and synchrophasorapplications.Amongthemeetingsandseminarsattendedwere:Western Protective Relay Conference in Spokane; Several IEEE PSRC (System Protection Relay Committee); two protection seminars at PG&E; and one synchrophasor application seminar at SCE. The authors has several phone calls and followup meetings with SCE regardingtheirBigCreekspecialprotectionschems.

2.3. Papers
TheauthorsdownloadedseveralpapersfromtheIEEEdigitallibrarytoreviewwhatthe statedofsynchrophasortechnologywasaroundtheworld.Someofthosepapersare listedinthereferencesectionofthisreport.

3.0 Project Outcome


3.1. TASK 1 REPORT
3.1.1. Background
Therearetwomajorwideareamonitoring(measurement)systemprojectsacrossthe UnitedStates:1)WAMSWideAreaMeasurementSystemintheWECChasbeen developedandinuseoverthelast10years;2)EIPPEasternInterconnectionPhasor ProjectthatwasinitiatedprimarilyasaresultoftheAugust14,2003blackout. ThisresearchprojectofcourseisfocusedonthebenefitsofR&DforCaliforniaUtility customersand,sinceCaliforniaisoneof14statesthatcomprisetheWECC,allofour attentionisonWAMS. AftertheJuly2andAugust10,1996disturbancesintheWECCtherehasbeenagrowing concernaboutimpactsofwideareadisturbancesandasignificantlyincreasedneedto implementabroaderWideAreaMeasurement(Monitoring)System.Today,WAMS hasover60phaseanglemeasuringunits(PMU)installedatvarioushighvoltage substationslocatedthroughouttheWesterngrid.ThesePMUdevicesutilize synchrophasortechnologytomeasurethevoltagemagnitudeandphaseangleofa voltagewaveformthatisreferencedintimebyaGPSsignal.Sinceeverythingis referencedtoacommonGPSsignalthatisveryaccurate,onecanthenmonitorvery accuratelythephaseanglebetweensubstationlocationsregardlessofhowfarapartthey are.Byknowingthephaseangleandvoltagemagnitude,onecancalculatethereal power(MW)andreactivepower(Mvar)betweentwosubstationsassumingthe impedancedata(modeldata)isknown.Thisishugebecauseifbothphaseangleand voltagemagnitudeareknownandcontinuouslyupdated,onecanmeasuretheelectrical stressonthesystemandmakeaccuratepredictionsonhowstablethepowergridwill be.Absolutephaseanglebetweentwomajorsubstationsdoesgivesomemeasureof howmuchpowerisflowingbutevenmoreimportantistherateofchangeofthephase anglebetweenthetwosubstations.Bytrendingthephaseangledifferenceonecanstart buildingaknowledgebaseofthestressonthesystem.Alsobecausesynchrophasors canmonitorphaseanglesaminimumof30timespersecond,onecandeterminethe dynamicstressonthesystem.Itispossibletomeasurethefrequencyofoscillationon thesysteminadditiontodetermininghowwelldampedtheoscillationfrequencyis. Thisisanotherimportanttoolthatsystemoperatorsneverhadavailabletothembefore.

3.1.2. Key Findings

InourdiscussionswithBPA,PNNL,SchweitzerEngineeringLabs,SCE,PG&E,CAISO andVirginiaTechweaskedanumberofquestionsandlearnedwheretheindustryisat thepresenttime. Followingarethekeyfindings:

BPAhasinstalled24PMUsandreceivesdatafromatotalof36PMUsinto2data concentrators.

BPAhasassumedtheresponsibilityofthesuperdataconcentratorsitewherea majorityofPMUdataissenttotheirdataconcentratorsandarchived. Thisdataisprimarilyusedfor:a)Disturbanceanalysis;b)Generationmodeling; andc)Datamonitoring. DataispresentedinthreeformstoBPAdispatchersandPacificNorthwest reliabilitycoordinators;a)streamingdatareaderrealtimeinformationin graphicalformthatiscontinuouslyupdated;b)clockdisplayphaseanglesat variouslocationsareshowninrealtime;c)RTDMrealtimedisplaymonitor. Thisdispatchersandreliabilitycoordinatorsaremonitoringthedataandgetting experiencewithitbutnooperatoractionsaretakenasaresultofthemonitoring ofthedata. MostofthePacificNorthwest,CaliforniaandtheArizona/NewMexicoareas havefairlygoodPMUcoverage.TheUtah,IdahoandAlbertaareashavevery poorcoveragebyPMUs. BPAsdispatchersarecomparingtheresultsofthestateestimatorandPMUdata andfindingveryclosecorrelation. BPAisinterestedinfindingadditionalapplicationsandtheWACS(WideArea ControlSystem)projectisapossibleapplicationthatcouldbeusedinthefuture. DuringtheJune14,2004Westwingdisturbance,WACSwouldhavetakenthe samecontrolactionsastheCOIRASdidalthoughitwasinmonitormodeonly. ItsnotclearwhereWACSisgoinginthefutureasCarsonTaylorhasretired fromBPAandsomeonenewwillhavetopickupwhereheleftoff. ArevaisinvolvedinusingPMUdataintheWECCWesternWideSystem monitoringprojectforstateestimation. BPAindicatedtheydontcalibratethePMUs.Theyreveryaccurateanddont appeartodriftverymuch.Potentialtransformerandcurrenttransformersare anotherstory.Typicallypotentialtransformersare1%accurateandCCVTs particularlyatthehighervoltagesarenotveryaccurateandcandrift.Current transformersareprobablyalittlemoreaccurateandtendnottodriftasmuch. ItsstillnotclearhowaccuratethePMUsneedtobebecausetherearenospecific

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applicationsyet.Iftheyareusedforstateestimation,accuracywithin1to2% maybeOK,butiftheyareusedforsystemprotectionandspecialprotection schemes,theymayneedtobemoreaccurate.Inanyevent,theaccuracyofthe instrumenttransformersispartoftheequation.


IEEEStd.C37.1182005isthepresentstandardregardingsynchrophasors. TherearenospecificalarmsprovidedbythePMUdatabecausetherearenotyet guidelinesontherelativephaseanglesatvariouslocationsversusstressed operatingconditionswherenomogramlimitsmaybeofconcern. BPAisdoingshorttermtrendingonflowsandvoltageparticularlytovalidate modeldatawithactualdataduringdisturbances.Thedatacanbearchivedfora yearormore,howeverthereisnolongtermanalysisintermsofpattern recognitionofrelativephaseanglesduringdifferentseasonsandoperating scenarios. Therewasconcernexpressedaboutthereliabilityandsecurityofthe telecommunicationsystemparticularlyregardingcontrolschemes,system protectionorspecialprotectionschemes.ItisonethingtousePMUdatafor stateestimationpurposeswhereifsomedatadropsoutforacoupleof2second scansitisnotaproblem.Ifontheotherhandthereisevenamomentaryfailure ofthetelecommunicationsystemforaspecialprotectionscheme,itcouldmean thefailureofthespecialprotectiontoeithertaketheappropriateactionortotake ittoolate.Thatmeansthatveryreliableandredundantmicrowaveand/orfiber optictelecommunicationsmustbeused. ThereissomeplannedR&Dintheareaofdataconcentratorswhichtakeinputs frommultiplePMUs.DataconcentratorscoordinatetheamountofPMUdata inputintothembutdoaddsomeadditionaltimedelayintotheprocess. SouthernCaliforniaEdisonandLADWParedoingsomeresearchand demonstrationprojectsforPMUsandspecialprotectionschemes.Bharat BhargavafromSCEhasbeenheadingupthiseffort. AlsoEPRIhasbeeninvolvedinR&DregardingWAMSandWACS.StephenLee fromEPRIhasbeentheprojectmanagerinthisarea. ThelongtermvisionistocontinueinstallingPMUsanddataconcentratorsto obtainbettervisibilityoftheWECCsystembutwhateveryoneislookingisto installanapplicationthatutilizessynchrophasortechnologytotakecontrol actiontokeepthesysteminastableandsecurestate. PNLislookingforapplicationsofPMUtechnologytoimprovesequenceof events,operatorsituationalawareness,andL&Pstateestimation. PNLhasheardfromseveralprotectionengineersthroughoutthecountryabout thereliabilityofincludingsynchrophasormeasurementandprotectiverelaying inonebox.

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PNLisconcernedabouttelecommunicationnetworkissuesandtheroleitplays inreliablecommercialapplications. PNLisconcernedaboutthesparsePMUdataavailablesofar. PNLhasalsobeenactivelyinvolvedintheWACSprojectthatCarsonTaylorand DennisEricksonworkedonfromBPA.JohnHauerandSteveWidergartenhave beenworkingonaprojecttomakethegridmorerigid(robust)andlessimmune toundampedoscillations. PNLhasbeencollaboratingwithTVAonasuperPDCdataconcentratorto improvetheapplicationofPMUdata SEL(SchweitzerEngineeringLabs)areusingsynchrophasorsimbeddedintheir relays.TheSEL421relayhasafullsynchrophasor(GPStimestampedphase angleandvoltage)builtintotherelay.TheSEL451relaysalsohave synchrophasorcapability.Thereare1199SEL421/451relaysinstalledonthe Westerninterconnectionand2664SEL421/451relaysinstalledontheEastern interconnection. TheSEL321and351relayscanberetrofittedwithfirmwaretoenable synchrophasors.Asanindicationofthenumberofpotentialsynchrophasors thatcouldbeutilized,thereareover10,000SEL321/351relaysinstalledin ERCOTalone. SELdoesextensivesimulationtestingintheirlaboratoriesandthePMUsmeetor exceedtheexistingIEEEstandards.OtherthanusingthesameinstrumentPTs andCTs,thesynchrophasorsareisolatedfromtheprotectiverelayfunctions. Thesameconcernwasexpressedyearsagoregardingfaultlocationinthesame packageasprotectiverelaysandhasprovennottobeaconcern. SELisinvolvedinadataconcentratorprojectwithSDG&EandwithTasmaniain alineimpedancemeasuringproject. SELisverysupportiveofPMUdatabeingabletoprovideaccuratedataforstate estimationandmodelvalidation.Theydemonstratedthatonanideal14bus model,2PMUlocationswouldbesufficientdataforastateestimatorto converge.Infactwith30%ofavailabledatafromPMUs,therethestandard deviationwouldbe0%andwith10%availabledatafromPMUs,therewouldbe .1%deviation. SELrelaysarecalibratedfromthefactorytomeetexistingstandardswhichis within1electricaldegree.TheGPSreceiversaregenerallyaccuratewithin100 nanosecondsbuttheyarespecifying500nanosecondstobeontheconservative side.ThebasicrecommendationwouldbetotestthePMUatthesameinterval thattherelayistested.TheymeetIEEEC37.118standard. CAISOusesRTDMdisplaysthatfeaturesynchrophasordataasafurthertoolfor theirreliabilitycoordinators

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CAISOeffectivelydiagnosedsystemoscillationsonthePacificDCIntertiein earlyFebruary2008byusinggraphicaltoolsdevelopedforRTDM. SCEhasinstalled16PMUsthatareconnectedtoonePDC. SCEhaswrittensomeverypowerfulandusefulsoftwaretoanalyze synchrophasordata.FromarchivedPMUdata,theycananalyzemodesof oscillation,frequencydampingandphaseangles. SCEhasusedtheiranalysissoftwaretoanalyzearchiveddatafromtheAugust4, 2000,June6,2002andJune14,2004disturbances. TheirPDCcanhandleupto30PMUs. SCEidentifiedtheBigCreekprojectasapotentialcandidateforsynchrophasor wideareademonstrationproject. PG&Ehasinstalled7PMUswithimmediateplanstoinstall4morePMUs.This shouldgivethemexcellentcoverageoftheir500kVsysteminadditiontoDiablo CanyonandHelmspowerplants. TheyareupgradingtheirArevastateestimatortoincludePMUmeasurements. PG&EwillbeupgradingtheirCOIRASschemeandcommunicationnetworkin 2008. PG&Ehasacouplecandidatesforawideareademonstrationproject:A)Diablo CanyondoublelineoutageSPS;andB)MetcalfSPS.

3.1.3. WECC Transmission Paths and Major RAS/SPS

TheWECChasover70transmissionpathsthathaveplanningandoperatingratings. Thesetransmissionpathsconsistofmultipletransmissionlinesinatransmission corridorthatconnectonegeographicregiontoanotherone.Stabilityandloadflow studiesaredoneundervariousconditionsandseasonstoensurethatthetransmission pathcanbeoperateduptoitsmaximumratingreliablyandsecurely. ManyofthetransmissionpathsinWECCarenotconstrainedandthereforedonothave operationaltransfercapability(OTC)ratingsappliedtothem.Themajorpathssuchas theCaliforniaOregonIntertie(COIPath66),Path15andPath26andEastofRiver (EOR)haveasignificantimpactonthereliabilityoftheWECCgridandallhave complicatedoperatingproceduresandoperatingnomogramsthatmonitorsimultaneous conditionstoensureasafeandreliableoperatingpoint.Thefollowingpathshave operationaltransfercapabilityratingsthathavesignificantimpactimportsinto California:
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Path Name COI PDCI IPP DC Midway Los Banos SCIT Midway - Vincent NJD East of River West of River

Path # Path 66 Path 65 P1th 27 Path 15 N/A Path 26 Path 73 Path 49 Path 46

Max. Rating 4800 MW N-S 3100 MW N-S 1900 MW E-W 5400 MW S-N 18,860 3700 MW N-S 7800 MW 7550 MW E-W 10,000 MW

Op. Proc. Nomogram Nomogram

Sys. Prot. RAS/SPS RAS/SPS RAS/SPS

Nomogram Nomogram

RAS/SPS

RAS/SPS Nomogram

ManyoftheabovementionedpathshaveSpecialProtection/RemedialActionSchemes thatareassociatedwiththem.Withoutthesespecialprotectionschemes,allofthese majorpathswouldbederatedbyasubstantialmargin.Underworstcasescenarios thousandsofMWofgenerationandloadaredroppedtopreventinstabilityandvoltage collapseundermultiplecontingencyconditions. TherearemanyotherRAS/SPSinCaliforniathatimpactinternaltransmissionpathsand localgeneration.Thesespecialprotectionschemeseithertripgenerationorrunback generationand/ortriploadtoassurereliableoperationunderunexpectedmultiple contingencies. Allofthesespecialprotectionschemesareeventdriven(basedon line/transformer/generatoroutages)whichthentakeprescriptiveactionsbasedupona predefinedsetofbasecaseconditions.Theseschemesareconservativebecausethey arebasedonthemoststressedsystemconditions.Undermostoperatingconditions, capacityisleftonthetable(unused)becauseoftheconservativeassumptionsand strategy.Havingsaidthat,thereisnoothergoodoptiontodootherwisebasedon technologythatwasavailableatthetime.Eventhoughmanyoftheseschemesuse faulttolerantlogic(twooutofthreevotingscheme),theystillarereactiveinthatthey mustwaitforaline,transformerorgeneratortorelayandtheybasetheiroutputactions onanalogvaluesflowingacrossthetransmissionpathsorindividualtransmissionlines.

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3.1.4. Scope of R&D Project

Thescopeofthisprojectistoidentifythoseapplicationswhereanadaptivespecial protectionschemecanbeusedtotakecontrolactionsthatwillmaintainsystemstability withoutsacrificingequipmentortrippingtoomuchloadorgeneration.Thereareother controlactionsthatcouldbetakensuchasrunningbackgeneration,controllingSVCs andinsertingseries/shuntcapacitorsthatareaseffective,andlessdraconianthan droppinglargeamountsofloadandgeneration. Synchrophasorsaretheperfectvehicleforaccomplishingthisbecausetheyare monitoringthetwoquantities(phaseangleandvoltage)thathavethebiggestimpacton thetransmissiongrid.Andtheycantakecontrolactionsbeforethereisaneventandso aremoreproactiveandprecisethanexistingspecialprotectionschemes.Regardlessof systemconditionsandeventsbasedconditionsincludingbothscheduledandforced outages,thesynchrophasorsaremonitoringtheprecisehealthofthetransmissiongrid inrealtimeandinfractionsofasecond. Therearestillanumberofissuesthatneedtobeaddressedandironedoutbeforethis technologycanbeputintoservice.ThefollowingaresomeoftheissuesthatanR&D projectcansortout;

Reliabilityoftelecommunicationsnetwork. Latencyoftelecommunicationequipment. AccuracyofPMUs. PerformanceofPMUsunderfaultandstressedconditions. AccuracyneededforCCVTsandCTs. Identifyingwhentotakeaction(basedonstabilitystudies?). Identifyingwhatactiontotakeandhowmuch. MaintenanceintervalsofPMUsandassociatedequipment

Thesearesomeoftheissuesthatneedtobeaddressedbuttheupsidetosynchrophasor technologyishugewhiletheriskscanbeidentifiedandmanaged.

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3.1.5. August 14, 2003 Disturbance Recommendation


OneofthekeyAugust14,2003recommendationswastoEvaluateandImplementDefense inDepthSystemMonitoring,Control,andProtectionMeasurestoSlowDownandMitigatethe SeverityofCascades ThefollowingkeyobservationcameoutoftheAugust14,2003recommendation:An overalldefenseindepthphilosophyandintegratedstrategyisneededtoprotecttodaysbulk powersystemfromcascadingblackouts.Suchasystemwouldhavetointegrateexistingsystem monitoring,control,andprotectionsystemswithnewmeasurement,analysis,andprotection capabilitiesintotheoveralldefenseindepthstrategy.Allsystemelementshavetobe coordinated. Theessenceofthisrecommendationistoensurethatallrealtimemonitoring,control andprotectionoftransmissionandgenerationelementsbecoordinated.While synchrophasorsareplayingalargerpartinthemonitoringofthepowersystem,there areapplicationsinprotectiverelayingandspecialprotectionschemeswhere synchrophasortechnologycouldandshouldbeused.Itistheintentofthispaperto championsynchrophasortechnologyforspecialprotectionschemes,butthereisavast areaofresearchthatneedstoinvestigateanintegratedapproachtomonitoring,control andprotectionthatutilizessynchrophasortechnology.SeeAppendixAfordetailed recommendationfromtheAugust14,2003disturbancereport.

Task 2 Report
3.2.1 Background
Theindustryfirststarteddevelopingsynchrophasortechnologyaround1988.Arun Phadkewasapioneerinthiseffortin1988atVirginiaTechwheresomeofthefirst prototypephaseanglemeasuringunitsthatweresynchronizedtoaninternaltimeclock werebuilt.TheinstallationofGlobalPositioningSatellites(GPS)allowedthe measurementofphaseanglestobesynchronizedtoaveryaccuratetimeclock. Macrodynestartedbuildingsomeofthefirstcommercialpmu/synchrophasorsinthe late1980s.TheWECC(primarilyBPA)startedinstallingpmusintheearly90sandwas thebasisforWAMS.Alotofthatdatawasveryinstrumentalinanalyzingthe1996 systemdisturbancesintheWest.EIPP(EasternInterconnectionPhasorProjectwas formedaftertheAugust14,2003blackout.EIPPandWAMSwerecombinedintoNASPI justrecentlytohaveaconsistentfocusonthesynchrophasortechnology.

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3.2.2 Basic Theory of Synchrophasors


Thetheorybehindsynchrophasors,orsynchronizedphasormeasurements,istoprovide aphasorrepresentationofapowersystemvoltageorcurrenttoanabsolutetime reference.Whenthisisdone,thevoltageorcurrentwaveformcanbedefinedasa complexphasorwithaphaseangle(ascomparedtoatimereference)andmagnitude. Aninternalhighaccuracyclockwhichissynchronizedtocoordinateduniversaltime (UTC)viaaGlobalPositioningSatelliteSystem(GPS)providesthetimetagorabsolute timereference.Asseeninfigure1thenthevoltagewaveformcanbedefinedasa phasorwithaphaseangleandmagnitude.Thephaseangleismeasuredbycomparing thepeakofthesinusoidalwaveformtothetimetag.Figure1ashowsthepeakofthe waveformcorrespondingtothetimetagsotherelativephaseangleis0degrees.In figure1bthepeakofthewaveformcomparedtothetimetagis90degree.Ifforinstance thevoltagewaveformsrepresentedinfigure1aand1bwereatdifferentsubstationsit wouldindicatetheamountofrealpowerthatcouldbetransferredbetweenthe substations.Withoutasynchronizedtimestandardtherelativephaseangledifference betweenthetwosubstationswouldntmeananything.

Byinstallingsynchrophasorsataselectnumberofimportantsubstations,thepower systemengineercanimmediatelyknowtheamountofrealandreactivepowerflowing
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betweenthesubstations.Thedifferenceinphaseanglecausesrealpowerasmeasured inMWtoflowandthedifferenceinvoltagemagnitudecausesreactivepoweras measuredinMvartoflow.Knowingenoughofthesteadystaterealandreactiveflows alongwithvoltageandphaseanglecansubstantiallyaidstateestimationprograms whichisthebasisforalladvancedpowerflowandcontingencyanalysisprogramsin EMS(energymanagementsystem)centers.Knowingtherateofchangeofangleand voltagewilldeterminewhetherthepowersystemisnearinginstabilityandwhetherthe systemwillrecoverfromanoutageofamajortransmissionlineorgenerator.Sothis technologycanbeusedeitherasatooltoestimatethestateofthesystemorastoolto takeremedialactioninthecaseofanoutage.

3.2.3 Synchrophasor Standards

TheIEEE(InstituteofElectricalandElectronicengineers)definesmanystandards throughouttheindustry.Theydefinedstandard13441995whichwasapprovedin1995 tosetstandardsforsynchrophasormeasurementsandcommunicationprotocol.They recentlyupdatedthestandardin2005underanewstandardC37.1182005.Thisnew standarddefinesmeasurementconvention,measurementaccuracyandcommunication protocol.InorderforPMUstobecompliantwiththestandard,theymustmeetthe synchrophasoraccuracystandard,conformtomeasurementconventionandconformto communicationprotocolforreportingmeasurements. ThenewstandardspecifiesthatPMUsmustbelessthan1%errorconsideringthe aggregateoftiming,magnitudeandangleerror.Forinstanceiftherewerenotimingor magnitudeerrors,themaximumallowangleerrorwouldbe.573degrees. Theconventionformeasuringphaseangleisdepictedinfigure1above.Alsotomeet thestandard,aPMUmustprovideasamplingrateof10reportsperseconduptohalf thenominalfrequencywhichinthiscountryis30reportsorsamplespersecond.PMUs mustalsoprovideestimatesoffrequencyandrateofchangeoffrequencyaspartofthe PMUoutputdatastream.Eventhoughthereisnostandardonhowthisistobe calculated,thePMUshouldbeabletodothisveryaccurately. Thestandarddefineshowcommunicationishandledbetweenasynchrophasordevice andaPhasorDataConcentrator(PDC).APhasorDataConcentratorarchivesand presentsdatatovariousapplications.Thisprotocolcanbeusedtodefineexchange informationbetweenPDCs. Tobecompliantwiththestandard,PMUsmustmeettheminimumrequirementsbut thereisnothingtopreventthemanufacturerfromaddingadditionalfeaturessuchas
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noisesuppression,filteringandbetteraccuracy.DatafromPMUsmadebydifferent manufacturersshouldbecompatible.

3.2.4 Areas of concern and areas for further development

Communicationlatency,performanceunderdynamicconditions,aliasingand instrumenttransformererrorsareareasthatneedtobetterdefinedandbetter understoodwhenapplyingsynchrophasorbasedprotectionschemes. Dependingontheapplication,communicationlatencymayormaynotbeamajor concern.Ifsynchrophasorsarebeingusedtoenhancestateestimatorsortoprovide alarmordatatrendingtotheoperators,thenthedelayincommunicationsignalsisnota bigconcern.IfontheotherhandsynchrophasorsarebeingusedinSpecialProtection Schemes,outofstepschemesorforapplicationswheredynamic/transientinstabilityis involved,thencommunicationdelaysareamajorconcern.Communicationdelayscan becategorizedintothefollowingareas:

Fixedtimedelayinstrumentationtransformers,analoganddigitalfiltering, signalprocessing,dataconcentrators,etc. Propagationdelaytheinherenttimedelayoflinkandphysicaldistancewhich thedatahastotravel. TransmissiondelayAmountofdatatotransmitandthedatarate.

Thetimedelaycouldaddanywherefrom100to300microsecondsbasedonthe communicationmediumandphysicaldistancethatthedatahastotravel. SynchrophasorstandardC37.1182005intentionallydoesnotaddresstheperformanceof PMUdevicesduringtransientconditions.Thenextupdateofthestandardwilladdress thisbutfornowitissomethingthattheindividualmanufacturersmustdecideonthey addressit.Highspeedprotectionschemesthatprotectagainstinstabilitywouldhaveto addressthisonanadhocbasisfornow. C37.1182005addressesinterferingfrequenciesandphasoraliasingbriefly.Itaddresses theNyquisttheoremwhichstatesthatinordertoproperlydetectanddisplayadesired frequencythesamplingfrequencymustbeatleasttwicethedesiredfrequency.Soifa

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frequencyof15Hzwastobemonitoredthesamplingfrequencywouldhavetoatleast 30Hz.TheWECChasstandardizedonasamplingfrequencyof30timesasecondso detectingfrequenciesbelow15Hzshouldnotbeaproblem.Sincetheoscillation frequenciesintheWestvaryfrom.25to.7Hz,thisisnotamajorissue.Thestandard alsoaddressesinterferingfrequenciesbysuggestingthatappropriateantialiasing filteringbeusedtoaddresstheconflictingfrequencies. CurrentandpotentialtransformersintroducesomeerrorsintoSynchrophasor measurement.Themoreheavilyloadedacurrenttransformeris,themoreerrorcurrent intermsofexcitationcurrentthatisproduced.Asmostmoderncurrenttransformers aredesignedtoproduceaccuratesecondarycurrentsduringfaults,thereisagreater percentageoferrorcurrentproducedduringlightloadconditions.Generallya measurementerrorgreaterthan.3%wouldnotbeexpected.Agreaterconcerninterms ofperformanceispotentialtransformers.AttheEHV(extrahighvoltage)levels, potentialtransformersaremostlycouplingcapacitortransformersandcanproduce errorsof1%orhigher.Duringtransientconditions,potentialtransformersarealso pronetoproblemsandthisshouldbetakenintoaccountifSynchrophasorapplications arebeingusedfortransientstabilityapplications.

3.2.5 Synchrophasor Manufacturers

ThefollowingcompaniesmanufacturePMUs:

Ametek Metatech USI NextPhase ZIV RFL GE ABB Siemens Schweitzer Arbiter Hathaway/Qualitrol Macrodyne
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Hitachi

ThePMUmanufacturerscanbeputintotwogroups:Thosewhoseprimarybusinessare protectiverelaysandthosewhoseprimarybusinessisdigitalfaultrecorders,metersand monitoringequipment.Fromatechnologystandpointitdoesntmakeanydifference butitisinterestingtoseethedifferentapproaches.Theprimaryrelaymanufacturers suchasGE,ABB,Schweitzer,SiemensandHitachiallmakePMUssomeasstandalone unitsandsomethatareintegratedintotherelaypackageitself. ForinstanceSchweitzerEngineeringLabsphilosophyistoprovidePMUcapability integratedintoalloftheirmodernrelays.TheSEL421and451relaysareprimaryline andbusprotectiverelaysthathavePMUcapabilityintegratedintotherelaypackage. SELofferscustomersfirmwareupgradepackagesfortheSEL311,321and351relays thatprovidefullPMUfunctionality.Mr.SchweitzersvisionistoprovidePMU capabilityinalloftheirrelaysatnoextracostsothattheendusecustomerwillbeable toutilizesynchrophasorsforanyapplicationincludingstateestimation,realtime meteringandspecialprotectionapplications.Manyprotectionengineershave expressedconcernaboutincludingPMUsaspartoftheprimaryrelaypackage.Their concernisthatthePMUdesignwillcompromisetheperformanceoftherelay.Thereis notechnicalreason,however,whythereshouldbeanylossofaccuracyorqualityinthe relayasthePMUandrelayaretwoseparatepackages.SELhasbeenverysuccessfulin thepastintermsofpackagingfaultlocationfunctionalitywithprimaryrelayfunctions andthereiseveryreasontobelievehecandothesamethingwithPMUtechnology basedontheirtrackrecordofthoroughlytestingtheirproduct.PresentlySELhas15,000 relaysinstalledwithPMUcapabilityacrossthecountrywithapotentialfor80,000relays withPMUcapabilityifthealloftheolder300seriesrelayswereupgradedbythe customers. GEisanothermajorrelaymanufacturerthatoffersfullrelayandPMUfunctionalityin theproductlineofMultilinrelays.GEprovidesstandalonecapabilityintheirN60as partoftheUR(universalrelayfamily).ItfullymeetstheC37.1182005standardand providesabroadrangeofcapabilityinadditiontherequiredfeaturesofthe Synchrophasorstandard.PG&EhasplanstoutilizetheN60relayaspartoftheupgrade tothePacificIntertieRAS/SPS. Arbiter,MehtaTech,MacrodyneandQualitrolarePMUmanufacturerswhoseprimary focusisondigitalfaultrecorders,monitorsandPMUs.Someofthemmaymake ancillaryrelaysandassociatedequipmentbuttheyarenotviewedprimarilyasrelay manufacturers.
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3.2.6 Key Findings


Ofthemajorrelaymanufacturers,Schweitzer,ABB,SiemensandGE manufacturePMU/sychrophasorproducts. Arbiter,MacrodyneandHathawaymanufacturePMUsaspartoftheirproduct line. SchweitzerhasadoptedthephilosophyofprovidingPMUtechnologyintegrated intohislatestdigitalrelayssuchasSEL421and451.Yearsearlierheprovided thesamefunctionalitywithfaultrecordersthatwerewellreceivedbythe industry. ProtectionengineersareskepticalaboutusingthePMUfunctionalitywhen incorporatedintothesamerelaybox. ExistingIEEEstandardC37.118doesnotaddressthedynamicperformanceof pmus. InordertoutilizePMUsoverawidearea,communicationlatencyisamajor issue.Thetimedelaytocommunicatephaseanglefromdifferentlocationscan notbegreaterthanthetimeittakesforinstabilitytooccur. AllRASandSPSschemestodayareprescriptive.Inotherwordsforagivenset ofconditions,theSPSwilltakespecificactionregardlessofhowstressedthe systemis.MoresophisticatedRAS/SPSschemesincorporatetablesthatmonitor actualsystemconditionsandtakeactionaccordingtothetable. Amajornextsteptotakewouldbetoapplycomputerlogicbasedonsignals fromPMUstotakeactiontoavoidareliabilityproblem. Therearedataerrorandaliasingissueswithexistingpmus.Notallpmus performthesame. Instrumenttransformeraccuracyimpactstheaccuracyofthesynchrophasor. C37.118doesdefinetheperformanceofpmusduringoffnominalfrequencies. C37.118allowsfordifferentsamplingrates.IntheWECC,thesamplingratehas beenstandardizedat30samplespersecond.

3.3 Task 3 Report


3.3.1 Introduction

Thissectiondescribesvariousresearchanddevelopmentactivitiesintherealmof IntelligentGridProtectionSystems.Atthispointintimewhenvarioustechnologiesare
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beingintroducedintothegrid,thereisnocleardefinitionofeitherIntelligentGridor IntelligentGridProtectionSystem.ItisgenerallyunderstoodthatSpecialProtection Schemes(SPS)orRemedialActionSchemes(RAS)thathavebeeninstalledinvarious systemsaroundtheworldareIntelligentGridProtectionSystemsbecausetheysurpass thefunctionalityofthemorecommonProtectionSystemswhoseonlypurposeisto protectcertainspecificpiecesofequipmentfromharm. SPS/RASusuallyhasacoupleoffeaturesthatdistinguishesitfromsimpleprotection schemes:(1)itusuallywillhavemorethanoneinputoroneoutputsignaloftenfromor tomorethanonelocation(substation),and(2)itusuallywillhavealogicthatwillbe morecomplexthanusedforsimpleprotectionschemes.Becauseofthesefeaturesthe boundarybetweenprotectionandcontrolisnowquitefuzzyandthereisnoclearline betweenSPSandwideareacontrol(WAC). AspointedoutintheTask2Reportamajorevolutioninthegridtodayistheavailability ofrealtimedataacrossthegridatmuchfasterratesthataretimesynchronized. AlthoughuniqueSPShasbeenimplementedforsometimeutilizingspecificrealtime datapointsandspecificlogic,theprospectofuniversalavailabilityofsynchrophasor dataacrosstheinterconnectionhasbroughtaboutaqualitativechangeinthepotential forintelligentgridprotectionandcontrol.InthisTask3Report,wetrytosummarize allthevariousR&Dactivitiesthatintendtoutilizesuchsynchrophasordataforthe operationandcontrolofthegrid.

3.3.2 Background

Almostalltheprotectionandcontrolsystemsonthegridandthesenumberinthetens ofthousandsalmostallarelocal,i.e.theinputvariablesandtheoutputvariablesof eachprotectionorcontrolschemearelimitedtowithinonesubstation.Allcommon formsofprotectionfallintothiscategoryandallcontrolssuchasgovernors,voltage regulators,powersystemstabilizers,transformertaps,reactorbankswitching,various FACTSdevices,etc.areinthiscategoryaswell.Onlythefollowingexistingcontrolscan beconsideredtobewidearea: SpecialProtectionSchemes(SPS)Thisisaclassofprotection/controlthathasbeen usedaroundtheworldtoalleviateparticularlimitationsinthegrid.(Theaccepted genericnameforthisclassisSpecialProtectionSchemes(SPS)butbecausetheyhave beenutilizedmoreextensivelyintheAmericanWestthananywhereelse,thelocalname RemedialActionSchemes(RAS)isstillcommonlyused.)

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AutomaticGenerationControl(AGC)Thesecondaryportionofthiscontrolutilizesall generatoroutputsandalltielinepowerflowsforthecontrolareaasinputstocontrol thegovernorsettingsatthegeneratorssothatgenerationandloadarealwaysin balance.Theprimaryportionisthelocalgovernorcontrol.(Nomenclatureisagaina problemforthiscontrolfunctionasithasbeencalledLoadFrequencyControl(LFC), LoadFollowing,andmorerecentlyLoad/GenerationBalancing.) SecondaryVoltageControlThisisasecondaryvoltagecontrolschemetocontrolthe voltagesinalocalregionandissuperposedontheusuallocalvoltagecontrollerslike voltageregulators,transformertapsandshuntreactorswitchings.Ithas,sofar,only beenusedinEurope(France,Belgium,Italy).Thefirstoneisknownasprotection becausetheactiontakenisfastofteninmillisecondswhichisintheprotectiontime scale.Moreover,itusesrealtimeinputdatathatisupdatedatfast(protectiontype)time rates.Alsotheoutputsignaloftenistheopeningorclosingofbreakerswhichiswhat protectionsystemsnormallydo.Finally,theSPSistriggeredonlywhensomething happens,likeaprotectionsystem,andisdormantotherwise.Theothertwoarecalled controlbecausetheyworkcontinuallytoadjustoutputsandtheyworkatslowspeeds utilizingrealtimedataatSCADAspeeds.Whatisbeinganticipatednowisfast protectionandcontrolofmanydifferenttypes,i.e.controllersthatwouldoperateatfast speedsutilizingsynchrophasordata.WedescribesomeoftheR&Dthatisbeing conductedtodevelopvariousapplicationsutilizingsynchrophasordata.

3.3.3 Synchrophasor Data Applications

Obviously,amajorapplicationofthesynchrophasordataisthevariouspossible engineeringanalysesthatcanbeconductedwiththisdata,nottheleastofwhichisthe postmortemanalysisofsmallandlargedisturbances.Thepostmortemanalysisofthe 2003Northeastblackoutwouldhavebeenaloteasierifmoresynchrophasordatawere availableandthelittlethatwereavailableturnedouttobeinvaluable.However,the focusofthisreportistheoperationandcontrolofthegridinrealtime,soonlythose applicationspertainingtooperationandcontrolarementionedhere.Theseapplications canbebroadlycategorizedintothreetypes:

Monitoringapplications

Theoperativephrasetodayisthesituationalawarenessofpowersystemoperators.All thealarmsanddisplaysinthecontrolcenteraredrivenbySCADAdatawhichis updatedrelativelyslowlyeveryfewsecondsandthedataisnotsynchronized.The

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synchrophasordatacanthenbeutilizedtobetterthesedisplaysandalarmsinmany differentways. Themostobviousmonitoringthatsynchrophasordatacanprovidenotavailabletoday ontheSCADAisthatofphaseangledifferencesacrosskeytransmissionlinesor corridors.Thisisalreadyavailableinmanycontrolcentersalthoughthedisplaysare oftennotyetintegratedwiththeSCADAdisplays.Obviously,manytypesofdisplays andalarmscanbegeneratedfromthesephaseangledifferences. Anextensionofthisistoobtainphaseangledifferencesbetweennodesthatarein differentcontrolcenterjurisdictions.Theproblemhereisnotoneofsynchronizationas allsynchrophasordataeverywherearesynchronizedtoauniversalclock,butoneof datatransferbetweenonejurisdictiontoanother.Usuallycontrolcentersexchangedata ataveryslowrateslowerthantheSCADAsamplingratesandareuselessforthis purpose.However,boththeWesternandEasternInterconnectionshavesetupdata transfermechanismsbetweenthesynchrophasordataconcentratorsandthesedo providedatatofarflungcontrolcentersinnearrealtime. Asecondapplicationhasbeenthedetectionandidentificationofslowoscillations.The SCADAdatasamplingistooslowtodetectsuchoscillationsbutsynchrophasordatais fastenoughforthispurpose.Moreover,aPronyanalysisofthisdatacanactually calculatethefrequencyanddampingofsuchoscillations.Ifanoscillationofknown modeisdetectedandidentifiedandithaslowdamping,operatorinitiatedcontrol actionscanbeusedtodampouttheoscillations.Thistypeofsituationalawarenesstools arealreadybeingusedatSouthernCaliforniaEdisonandBonnevillePower AdministrationusingtheWAMS.IntheEasternInterconnectionPSERChasaresearch projecttodevelopsimilartoolsforEntergyandTVAalthoughtheproblemof oscillationsintheEasternInterconnectionisrelativelynew. Athirdapplicationforthismonitoringdataisvisualization(whichhasbecomealmost synonymouswithsituationalawareness).Thephaseangledifferencescandrivedisplays thatinsomeinstancescanprovidemoreanddifferentinformationthanpowerflows. Butmorethanthat,thefastsamplingofotheranalogdataalsoprovidestheprecise sequenceofevents(breakeroperations),informationonfaults,andothertransient conditionsofthegrid.Moreover,thesecanbeobtainednotjustfromthecontrolcenters ownjurisdictionbutfromacrosstheinterconnectionifnecessary.Suchvisualization researchworkhasbeensupportedbyPSERCandbyUSDOEthroughtheCERTS program.

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EMSapplications

TheexchangeofSCADAdataoverICCPlinksbetweencontrolcentershasmadeit possibleforthesystemoperatorsinoneregiontomonitorhappeningsintheir neighborssystems.Thisprovidesgoodinformationaboutthepresentconditionsofthe interconnectioninnearrealtimetotheoperators.However,thisdoesnotinitselfallow theoperatortoassesstheabilityofthegridtowithstandthenextcontingency.Todothis theoperatorneedsthelocalcontrolcentertohaveastateestimatorthathasitsreach beyonditsownboundaries. Thetraditionalstateestimatorinacontrolcenterlimiteditsmodeltoitsown jurisdictionalboundarybecausetheSCADAdatawereavailableonlyfromthose substationswithinitsownboundary.Therestoftheinterconnectionwasrepresentedas anexternalmodelwhichwasagoodrepresentationofthestaticnetworkbutwashighly erroneousbecauseoftheabsenceofrealtimedatafromthisexternalsystem.These errorsinthestateestimatoraffectedtheresultsofthecontingencyanalysisespeciallyif thecontingencywastohappenoutsidethelocaljurisdictionorevenneartheboundary. Thisproblemwasparticularlyhighlightedinthe2003Northeastblackoutasmostofthe operatorsintheoutagedsystemwerenotawarethatthenextcontingencyseveral jurisdictionsawaywouldblackoutsuchavastarea. InterconnectionwidemonitoringandEMSfunctions(contingencyanalysis)havebeen recommendedbyaDOE/FERCreportfromlastyear,andvariousR&Dand implementationeffortsareunderway.Intheimplementationarena,mosteffortsare usingtheSCADAdatathatarebeingexchangedbetweenneighborstowidenthereach ofeachstateestimator.IntheEasternInterconnectionthereareeffortsbetweentheISOs intheNortheast(NEISO,NYISO,PJM),betweenPJMandAEP,betweenEntergyand TVA,andmanyothers.ProbablythemostambitiousistheeffortintheWestern Interconnectionwhereonestateestimatormodeltorepresentthewholeinterconnection isbeingdeveloped(knownastheWesternorWECCmodel). Theuseofsynchrophasordatainthesestateestimatorsishelpfulintwoways.First,the datafromthesynchrophasorsinsteadystateisusuallymoreaccuratethushelpingstate estimatoraccuracy;unfortunatelythenumberofsynchrophasormeasurementsinNorth Americaisstillsominisculecomparedtothesystemmodelsthattheimpactonaccuracy isnegligible.Second,thisdataissynchronizedunliketherestoftheexchangedSCADA

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datawhichhassignificantandunknowntimeskewsandthishelpsthestateestimator accuracyaswell.

Thereare,ofcourse,majorissueswiththesevariousimplementations.Theseexchanges ofdataareusuallybetweentheReliabilityCoordinatorandmanyoftheReliability CoordinatorsgettheirSCADAdatathroughdatalinksfromtheirlowerlevelBalancing Authorities.Thusthetimeskewsbetweenthesedatasetscanbesignificanttothe solutionofthestateestimator,whoseaccuracy,ofcourse,affectsthecontingency analysisresults.R&Disbeingconductedontheseissuesundervariousdifferenttopical namesdistributedstateestimator,hierarchicalstateestimator,externalmodel,wide areamodel,etc.butthemainissueishowtoprovideastateestimateofthewhole interconnectionsuchthatcontrolcenterscanhaveaccesstoarealtimemodelofalarge enoughsystemthatwillgiveaccuratepredictionsofitsabilitytowithstand contingenciesanywhereontheinterconnection.Suchresearchisbeingconductedat severaluniversitiesundersponsorshipofNSF,DOEandPSERC.Inaddition,theEMS vendorsaretiedtomanyoftheseR&Dprojectsastheyareallupgradingtheirstate estimatorstoincorporateexchangedSCADAdataandsynchrophasordata. Controlapplications TheseapplicationsarequalitativelydifferentthanthemonitoringandEMSapplications becauseboththosetypesoftoolsareadvisorytothehumanoperatorwhereascontrol impliesactualchangemadeautomaticallytothesystem.Thusthedemandsforaccuracy andcorrectnessarefarhigherasnonoperationorfalseoperationscouldhavedrastic consequences. ObservationofthevariousSPSimplementedaroundtheworldmakesitclearthatad hocwideareacontrolapplicationsarenotonlyfeasiblebutalsoverybeneficial.Wesay thattheseareadhocbecauseeachSPSimplementationisuniqueinitsdesign, implementationandtheproblemitaddresses.Asaresult,eachimplementationisalso expensiveandbecauseitsolvesaparticularsystemproblem,theSPSusuallybecomes obsoleteinafewyearsasthesystemchangesandtheproblemdisappears.Anexample maybeanSPStohandlearegionalvoltageproblemwhichdisappearswhennew generationsourcesbecomelocallyavailable. ThusR&Dinthisareafollowstwodifferentbutparalleltracks:oneistheneedforthe upgradingofthepowersysteminfrastructurecomputers,communicationsand controlsthatwillmakeiteasierandmoreflexibletodevelop,designandimplement wideareacontrols;theotheristheneedtodevelopcontrolapplicationsforspecific

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phenomenathatlimittheoperationofthegrid.Inthefollowingsection,thesetwotracks areexploredinmoredetail.

3.3.4 R&D in Wide Area Control

Therearesignificanteconomicincentivestoincreasethetransmissionlimitsofexisting systems.Infact,themajorconstraintsofthederegulatedpowermarketsarethe transmissionsystemlimits.Todaygenerationcompaniessellpowertodistribution companies(ordirectlytolargecustomers)throughbilateralagreementsorauction markets.Thesetransactionshavetoflowoverthetransmissionsystemandifthe transmissioncapacitywashigherthanallpossiblepowerflowssuchtransactionsmay produce,thenthemarketwouldbeideal.This,however,isnotthecasebecausethe transmissionsystemwasbuiltwhenthepowercompanieswereverticallyintegrated andtheyweresizedfortheexpectedpowerflowsresultingfromplannedoperationof thegenerators.Thetransmissionsystemwasnotdesignedtoaccommodateallbuysell agreementsbetweengeneratorsandconsumers. Thusallpowertransactionsmustbecheckedbeforehandtoensurethattheflowsare withinlimits.Astheremaybehundredsofsimultaneoustransactionsbetween generatorsandconsumers,andbecausetheeffectsofthesetransactionsontheflowsare notlinear,allsimultaneoustransactionsmustbestudiedtogethertocheckwhether transmissionlimitsareviolated.Ifcongestionisexpected,allthetransactionscannotbe allowedanddifferentISO/RTOhaveworkedoutproceduresabouthowandwhich transactionswillhavetobecutback.Theprocedureshavetobefairtoallpartiesand agreeduponbeforehand.ThereliabilityoftheregionrestswiththeReliability Coordinatorwhohasthefinalsayoncongestionmanagement. Sothetransmissionlimitsaretheconstraintsthatalsolimitthepowermarkets.For systemsthatarethermallylimited,theonlywaytoraiselimitsistobuildmore transmission.Forthosesystemsthatarestabilitylimited,bettercontrolscouldincrease thestabilitylimit.Thusourinterestinthispaperisonbettercontrolofstability.

3.3.5 Infrastructure R&D for Wide Area Control


Essentially,therearethreeclassesoftechnologiesthatarerelevant:

Faster,cheapercomputers,

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Broadband,cheapcommunications,and Betterpowerelectroniccontrols(alsoknownasFACTSflexibleAC transmissionsystemswhichcoversthisclassoftechnologyspecifically developedtocontroltheACpowersystem).

Someofthesetechnologiesarealreadyinuseinthepowersystemsasmentionedin Section2.Whatweareproposinghereisthedevelopmentofnewcontrolsutilizinga combinationofthesetechnologies.Thesecontrolswillbesignificantlydifferentin conceptthantheexistingones,andwillbefastandsystemwidetodramaticallyincrease stabilitylimits.

Computers Computers(ormicroprocessors)areembeddedineverythingmeters,protectiverelays, dataconcentrators,communicationswitches.Theyareprogrammable,thatis,the functionsofthegadgetinwhichtheyareembeddedcanbechangedbysoftware.Thus controlsthatutilizethesecomponentscanbeadapted,throughchangedsettings (simple)orchangedlogic(moredifficult),providingflexibilityinthedesignofthis software. Workstationcomputersarealsomuchfasterandcheaper.Thusverylargeamountsof calculationscanbedoneveryquickly.Suchanalysiscanthenbepartofthecontrol bringingevenmoreintelligenceintothecontrolloop.Forexample,ifacontrolisdevised toshedloadtoavoidinstability,anoptimalpowerflowcoulddeterminewhichloads aretobeswitchedoff.

Communications Electricpowercompanieshavealwayshadtheirowncommunicationsystems.Thishas mainlybeenmicrowavechannelsthatconnecteverysubstationandgeneratingstation. Theuseofopticalfiberisnowincreasingatatremendousrate.Atfirst,theopticalfiber hasbeenusedwithinsubstationsandgeneratingstations,especiallythenewer installations,buttheolderonesarebeingrapidlyretrofitted.Thisisbeingdonetogather morerealtimedataatfasterratesatthesubstationssothatfastappearingemergency conditionslikerightafteralightningstrikecanbebetterprotectedagainst.Thedata canalsobecapturedbuthastobestoredlocallytobelatertransmittedover communicationnetworks.

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Opticalfiberhasalsobeenstrungalongtransmissiontowers.Powercompaniesmainly didthistobecomecommunicationsprovidersbecauseoftheprojectionsofever increasingdemandforbandwidth.Althoughthisventureintonewbusinesshasnot pannedoutbecauseoftheglutofunusedbandwidth,abroadbandnetworkisnow easilyavailabletothepowercompanies.Ifthisnetworkbandwidthisbroadenough, thenallthedatabeingcollectedatthesubstationscanbetransmittedinrealtimeto otherlocationslikethecontrolcenter.Infact,anetworkcanbeenvisionedsuchthatthe realtimedatawouldbeavailabletodifferentcomputersdependingontheirfunction. Thisopensupthepossibilityofdecentralizingthecontrolcentersothatfunctionscanbe putindifferentplacesdependingonwhereitisneeded.Withanetworklikethis,the starkdifferentiationtodaybetweencentralizedcontrolandlocalcontrolwouldgoaway andcontrollerscouldusethemostappropriatedataneededforcontrol. Acommunicationnetworkthatcanmeetthevariedneedsfortheoperationofthepower systemwouldbemuchmorecomplexthanthesimplestarnetworkusedtodayforthe controlcentertopollsubstationRTUs.Moreover,thecontrolfunctionswillnotbeall concentratedatacentralcomputerinthecontrolcenterbutwouldbedistributedover numerouscomputerswhethertheyareinsubstations,generatingstationsorengineering offices.Suchdistributedcomputercommunicationisbeingdevelopedtodayforvarious applications.Insuchacommunicationsnetworksomeofthefunctions(measurements orcalculations)willbepublishersofdatawhileotherswhowillusethisdata (applications,controls)willbesubscribers.Thenetworkwillbecontrolledbyother computersthatwillbequalityofservice(QoS)managers.Suchmiddlewarearebeing developedforotherapplicationsandwillhavetobedevelopedforthearchitecture appropriateforthepowergrid.Itshouldbementionedthat,giventheconcernforthe securityofsuchcriticalinfrastructuresasthepowergrid,suchcomputercommunication systemsforthepowergridmustbesecurefromexternalintrusionsandhastobebuilt intotheQoS. FACTS FACTSdevicesavailabletodaywerediscussedinSection2.Althoughtheyaredifferent indetailbymodelandmanufacturer,buttheyfallintothreeclasses:

DCtransmissioncontrols, SVC(staticvarcontroller),and PFC(powerflowcontroller).

Inaddition,specialcontrollerscanbebuiltforspecificpurposesusingthesame principles.Onemajoradvantagetothesecontrollersistheirspeedwithcontrolactions takingplaceinmillisecondswhichisinthesametimeframeasprotectionactions.


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3.3.6 R&D in Control Applications

Theproposedcontrolconceptsdescribedhereareallwideareacontrols.Althoughlocal controlscontinuetobeimprovedusingnewertechnologies,theconceptualfunctionality oftheselocalcontrolswillremainthesame.Thewideareacontrolspresentedherewill oftentakecareofthelocalcontrollersbutthemainobjectiveistoimprovetheoverall stabilityofthepowersystem.Theconceptsarepresentedintheorderofincreasing complexity,alsoimplyingthattheonespresentedfirstwouldbeeasiertoimplement.

FrequencyControl Asnotedbefore,frequencyiscontrolledbybalancingloadwithgeneration.Theprimary governorcontrolatthegeneratorsislocalwhilethesecondaryAGCcontrolthatadjusts thegovernorsetpointsisareawide.Theprimarycontroliscontinuouswhereasthe secondarycontrolisdiscreteusuallyusing24secondsampling. Giventhatallgeneratorsinaregionarenolongerownedbythesameorganization,this areawideAGCcontrolwillbecomemoredecentralized.TheFederalEnergyRegulatory Commission(FERC)ancillaryserviceregulationsdoallowthirdpartyAGCbutanew communicationcomputationcontrolschemeneedstobedeveloped.Asthiscontrolis quiteslow(24secondsampling),feasibilityofcontrolisnotaproblem.Themore complexcommunicationschemerequiredisalsonotaproblem;althoughameshed communicationnetworkisrequiredratherthanthepresentstarnetwork,thebandwidth requirementremainsmodest.However,suchanetworkintroducesothermodesof failureslikesignaldelaysandthecontrolhavetoberobustenoughtohandlethem. RegionalVoltageControl VoltagecontrolinNorthAmericahasalwaysbeenlocal,althoughEuropeistryingsome regionalcontrolschemes.FERCrecognizesvoltageVARcontrolasanancillaryservice. Controlschemesforsuchregionalcontrolneedtobedevelopedbuttheschemeshaveto besuchastoensurethatsuchservicecanbequantifiedandpaidforasanancillary service.Thistypeofcontrol,likefrequencycontrol,isrelativelyslowandsothe feasibilityofthecontrolandcommunicationisnotanissue.Themainhurdlehasbeen theselectionofinputandoutputvariablesofthecontrollerthatcanhandleallthevaried operatingconditionsthatthepowersystemendures.Thusthischallengeisaclassical oneofdevelopingapracticalrobustcontroller.

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Smallsignalstabilitycontrol Smallsignalinstabilityoccurswhenasystemperturbation,evenasmallone,excitesa naturaloscillatorymodeofthepowersystem.Theseoscillationsareslow,usuallyunder 1Hz.Themainmethodusedtodaytoguardagainstsmallsignalinstabilityistheoffline tuningofpowersystemstabilizers(PSS).ThesePSSarelocalcontrollersonthe generators.Thuslocalcontrollersareusedtomitigatesystemoscillationmodes,a procedurethatisrecognizedtohavesignificantdisadvantages.Newcontrollersneedto bedevelopedthatcanusesystemwideinputs(notnecessarilymoreinputsper controllerbutinputsignalsfromfurtheraway).Suchremotesignalinputswill obviouslyrequirecommunicationchannelswhichcouldbededicatedorcouldusea moreflexiblecommunicationmeshnetwork. AnothercontrolconceptistoadaptivelychangethePSSsetpointsaccordingtothe powersystemoperatingconditions.ThiswouldbeanalogoustotheAGCcontrolby introducingasecondarycontrolschemethatwouldperiodicallyadjustthesetpointsof thelocalPSScontrollersasthesystemchanges.Thechallengehereisthatthecalculation ofPSSsetpointsrequireslargeanalyticalcalculations,whicharetodaydoneofflinebut willhavetobedoneonlineinthiscase.Thespeedofcalculationisnotamajorconcern aschangingthesetpointscanbedonequiteinfrequently,probablyminutes. Voltagestabilitycontrol Voltageinstabilityoccurswhenachangeinthepowersystemcausesanoperating conditionthatisdeficientinreactivepowersupport.Guardingagainstsuchinstability requirestheanticipationofsuchcontingenciesthatcancausevoltageinstabilityand takingpreventiveaction.Newpreventivecontrolschemesareneededthatcanalso includespecialprotectionschemesthatcouldisolatethoseareaswithvardeficiencies. Thisisnotastabilitycontrolinthetraditionalsensethatrespondstoadisturbance.This isanactionplantoensurethatthesystemoperatingconditiondoesnotstrayintoan areawhereaperturbationcancausevoltageinstability.Thecontrolofthetransient conditionafteradisturbanceoccursishandledinthenextsection. Transientstabilitycontrol Thedevelopmentofsuchacontrolschemeisbyfarthemostdifficultbecausea disturbancethatcancauseinstabilitycanonlybecontrolledifasignificantamountof

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computation(analysis)andcommunicationcanbeaccomplishedveryrapidly.This conceptisapproachedinthreeincreasinglydifficultlevels:

thefirstistouseofflinestudiestomanuallyadjustprotectiveschemeswhich wouldoperateonlyifthedisturbanceoccurs; thesecondistoautomaticallyadjusttheseprotectiveschemeswithonline calculations; thethirdandfinalwouldbetodirectlyoperatethecontrolactionsafterthe disturbanceoccurs.

Softwiredremedialactionschemes Astepadvanceinthisdirectionwillbetogeneralizeremedialactionschemes(RAS), alsoknownasspecialprotectionschemes,tocontroltransientstability.TheseRAStoday aredevelopedfromtheresultsofvoluminousofflinestudiesandareimplementedwith ahardwiredcommunicationsystem.Thus,thesystemvaluesandstatusesmonitored andthebreakerscontrolledcannotbemodified.Whatisproposedhereisthe developmentofageneralizedcommunicationsystemthatcanenablethe implementationofnewremedialactionschemesbysoftwaremodification.Althougha comprehensivecommunicationschemewillberequiredinthistypeofcontrol,the computationrequirementswillbemodestasthecontrolschemesarelargelydefinedoff line. Onlinesettingofremedialactionschemes Astepforwardwillbetodevelopmethodstocontroltransientstabilitybutwithless dependenceonofflinestudiesandmoreuseofonlinecomputation.Themainideahere istousemorerealtimedatatodeterminewhatcontrolisneeded.Whatisproposed hereisthedevelopmentofsoftcomputingtechniquesusingpatternrecognition,neural networks,expertsystems,etc.toprocesstherealtimedatatodecidethebestcontrol action.Ofcourse,muchofflinetrainingofthesoftwaremaystillberequiredofflinebut theexpectationisthatthecontrolactionwouldbemuchmoreefficientthanthosepurely decidedoffline. Realtimecontroloftransientstability Theobjectivehereistodevelopaglobalcontrolfortransientstability(withnooffline assists).Forthistobefeasible,thecomputationneededtodeterminethedisturbance scenarioandthencomputingthenecessarycontrolsforstabilization,hastobeinthe sametimeframeastodaysprotectionschemes(milliseconds).Whetherthisisindeed possiblewithtodaystechnologyisnotknown.However,thegoalherewouldbeto

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determinewhatkindofcommunicationcomputationstructurewillbeneededtomake thisfeasible.

3.4 Task 4 Report


3.4.1 Background

Allthreeinvestorownedutilities,PG&E,SCEandSDG&EuseRAS/SPSschemesto mitigateoverload,voltageandstabilityproblems.PG&EandSCEutilizespecial protectionschemestomitigatereliabilityviolationsastheresultofmultiple contingencieswhenitisimpracticalandveryexpensivetobuildtransmissionand/or generationprojects.Insomecasesthespecialprotectionschemesbuytimebeforea transmissionorgenerationprojectcangetinstalled.Onvirtuallyallofthemajor transmissionpathsimportingpowerintoCaliforniasuchasPath66(CaliforniaOregon Intertie)orfacilitatinginterareatransfersbetweenNorthernandSouthernCalifornia (Path26andPath15)specialprotectionschemesareusedtoprotectagainstunlikely contingenciesthatcouldresultinasystemwideblackout. Thesespecialprotectionschemesusearangeofcontrolactionstomitigatetheimpactof thecontingenciesbutunderworstcasescenariostheyalldropsomecombinationoffirm loadandgenerationtopreventinstabilityandtomaintainareasonableload/resource balance.Theinherentproblemwithalloftheseschemesisthattheyaredesignedtobe prescriptiveinthatworstcasescenariosmustbeassumedtopreventcatastrophicresults underheavilyloadedconditions.Thismeansthattherearearangeofconditionswhere moreloadandgenerationistrippedthannecessarytopreventthecatastrophicoutages fromoccurringunderverystressedconditions.Underavastmajorityofconditions whereloadsarelighter,theremedialactionsareeitherunnecessaryorfarlessloadand generationwouldneedtobetripped.Converselytheremaybetimeswhenmore capabilityisavailablethananticipatedbecausethesystemislessstressed.Conventional specialprotectionschemesdonothavetheintelligencetodetectthis,butsynchrophasor basedspecialprotectionschemeswillhavetheintelligencetodeterminethereismore capabilityinthesystemandtakeadvantageofthis.ItshouldbenotedthatTotal TransferCapability(TTC)cantbeexceededbutadditionalcapabilityundernomogram operationcouldbeutilized. Giventhetechnologyoftenyearsagotherewasnochoicebuttodesignthese prescriptivetypesofschemes.TodaySynchrophasor(pmu)technologymakesit possibletodesignschemesthattakeappropriateremedialactionbasedonactualsystem conditions.WhilesomeatPG&EandSCEhaveplanstoutilizethisnewSynchrophasor

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technology,itisstillaleapoffaithtodosowhentherearenoprovenschemesin serviceintheUnitedStatesusingthistechnologyinapracticalapplicationsuchasa specialprotectionscheme.

3.4.2 Issues in Intelligent Grid Protection


InthisTask4ReportwerecommendanR&Dplan.Theplanstartsoutwithgeneral R&DissueswhichwillrequirelongertermR&Dtoproperlydevelopthiswholeareaof IntelligentGridProtection.Italsolooksatpossibledemonstrationprojectsand recommendsaparticularoneinCalifornia. OnecanessentiallythinkofthefirstSPS/RASschemesasthestartofIntelligentGrid Protection.Althoughtheearliestsuchimplementationswerequitesimple,conceptually theyweredifferentfromthetraditionalprotectionofindividualpiecesofequipment.In additiontoisolatingtheshortcircuitlocally,othercontrolactionswereneededto protectasmuchofthegridoperationaspossible.TheseSPS/RASschemeshavebecome moresophisticatedovertimeandcanuseavarietyofinputsfromseveralsubstations andcansendcontroloutputstoseveralcontrolequipmentinmorethanonesubstation. ItisfairtostatethatallthehardwaretechnologiesneededforIntelligentGridProtection arealreadyhere.Theseincludevarioussensorsandmeasurementtechnologies,the latestbeingthesynchrophasorsorPMUsthatarenothingbutthemeasurementsofac valuesathighratesofsamplingthataretimestampedwiththeabsolutetimestandard. Theyalsoincludehighspeedcommunicationsthatareneededtomovemeasurement andcontrolsignals.Finally,theyincludefastcircuitbreakersandothercontrollers (mainlyFACTSdevices). Thus,astandarddesignprocessforsuchintelligentprotectionschemeshasdeveloped thatgoessomethinglikeasfollows:

Haveagoodidea Testonsimulations Designtheprototype: Measurementsneeded Pointtopointcommunicationsneeded Controlsneeded Installandtestonrealtimedata


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Closetheloop

EachSPS/RASschemeisauniqueimplementation,separatelydesigned,testedand implemented.Asistrueforanyuniquesystem,implementationsofSPS/RASsystems areexpensive.Inadditiontheyarenoteasilymodifiedasmodificationshavetofollow thesamedesignprocessastheoriginaldesign.Thisissignificantbecausethelifetimeof aSPS/RASschememaybelimitedbythefactthatthepowersystemisbeing continuouslyupgradedwithnewtransmission,generationandotherprotectionand control. Certaininfrastructuralimprovementinthepowersystemcouldmakethisdesign processsimplerandhence,overthelongrunwhensuchintelligentsystemsproliferate, thecostofimplementationwouldbemuchless.Suchinfrastructureimprovement consistsofhardware,softwareandmethodsasfollows: Communicationsinfrastructure

Networked,highbandwidth Userfriendlyapplicationslevelmiddleware Detection/identificationalgorithmdevelopment

Controllerdesignprocess

Determiningbestinputs,outputs Developingoutputcalculations

Offlinetestingmethods

Nonlinear,digitalsimulations

Obviously,theavailabilityofnetworked,highbandwidthcommunicationswilleliminatethe needforleasingpointtopointcommunicationlinksforeachSPS/RASscheme. Althoughtheinitialcostofsuchacommunicationnetworkishigh,itcanbeamortized overmany,manyapplications.Thiscanbelookeduponasthesuccessortothe microwavenetworkinstalledbythepowercompaniesinthe60s.Inanycase,fiberoptic cablesexistalongmanytransmissioncorridorsandcanformthebackboneofsucha network.Thebiggerexpenseistheapplicationslevelmiddlewareneededtorunsucha networkinaflexiblewaythatwillmaketheimplementationofSPS/RASschemesvery simple. Thetriggeringmechanismsfortheseintelligentschemesareimportantandnew methodsneedtobedeveloped.Ofcourse,shortcircuitsareeasilydetected(becauseof
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thehighcurrents)andhavebeenusedroutinelytotriggerrelaysbutforthenew intelligentschemesothertriggeringmechanismsmaybemoreimportant,e.g.phase angledifferenceorvoltagemagnitude.Thusdetectionofvarioustriggeringconditions andtheidentificationofwhichconditionisdetectedrequiremethodological development. AmajordrawbacktothedesignofanySPS/RASschemeisthatthereisnostandard designprocess.Eachphenomenonthatrequiressomespecialprotectionactionis consideredaspecialproblemthatrequiresanengineeredsolution.Itishopedthatfor certainclassesofphenomena,saylowfrequencyoscillationsorvoltagedips,somebest practicesforadesignprocesswillemerge.Suchadesignprocessmayconsistof determiningwhichinputvariablesand/oroutputcontrolvariablesworkthebestundermost circumstances.Also,bestalgorithmstocalculatetheoutputvariablesneedtobedeveloped. Amajorstepindesigningsuchintelligentschemesisthesimulationstep.Infact, simulationisthemaintoolthatdeterminestheeffectivenessofanyschemebeforeitcanbe triedoutontherealsystem,whichisalwaysariskystep.Theproblemisthatsuch simulationtoolsarenotreadilyavailable.Thebesttoolavailabletodayasproduction gradesoftwareisthetransientstabilityprogram,whichhastwomajordrawbacks.One isthatitisdifficulttomodelalltheexistingprotectiverelayswhichisveryimportantto dobecausetheintelligentsystemsoperateinthesametimeframe.Theotheristhe absenceofthemodelofthesubstationstructuretransientstabilityandpowerflow programsusethenodebranchmodelandnotthebusbreakermodelofthesubstation whichisusuallyimportantinrepresentingprotectionschemes.Thusbetterandmore appropriatetoolsareurgentlyneededfortheencouragementofsuchintelligent protection. Inthefollowingsectionswediscussseveraloftheseinfrastructuralissuesthatrequire significantR&Dbeforeintelligentgridprotectionbecomescommonplace. Measurementdataissuesatthesubstation Everyhighvoltagesubstationtodayhasaverylargenumberofinstrumentsthat measureandgatherdata.Theyaremicroprocessorbasedandareusedforprotection, faultdetection,recordingsequenceofeventsandamyriadofotherpurposesandare genericallyknownasIEDs.Unfortunately,theyallmeasureatdifferentsamplerates,at differentaccuracies,andstorethedataatdifferentratesindifferentstoragedevices.A fewaretimestampedbyusingaGPSconnectionandmostarenot.Someofthisdatais
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availableovercommunicationchannelstoremotelocationsandsomearenot.Although therearenowcommunicationstandards,therearenooverallstandardsforsampling, accuracy,storage,etc.R&Disneededtodeterminehowbesttoconsolidatethisdataso thatitcanbeflexiblyaccessedbyvariousapplicationsincludingintelligentgrid protection. Dataissuesattheregionalandinterconnectionlevel Thegridspansmanyjurisdictions.Forexample,intheWesternInterconnectionthere arethreeReliabilityCoordinatorsthatlookafterthreeregionsoftheinterconnectionand undertheseReliabilityCoordinatorsareabout40BalancingAuthorities,eachgathering datafromtheirsubstationsintotheircontrolcenters.Thusdataisbeingmovedfromthe substationstotheBalancingAuthoritiesanduptotheReliabilityCoordinators. However,thisdataistheSCADAdatawhichiscollectedatarelativelyslowsampling rateaboutseveralsecondsandarenottimestamped.Whatwillbeneededfor intelligentprotectionisdatacollectedatmuchfastersamplingratesatthesubstations andthenmovedatmuchfasterrates,withsmalllatencies,acrosstheinterconnection. Theneedforhighspeednetworkedcommunicationbetweensubstationsisobviousbut theactualdesignofsuchacommunicationsystembotharchitectureandmiddleware requiresmuchR&D. DesignprocessfortheIntelligentGridProtectionSystem Asintelligentgridprotectionreferstoalargeclassofprotectionsystems,itisunlikely thatasingledesignprocesswillemergethatwillbeabletoproducesuchaspecial protectionschemeforanyparticularproblem.However,somebestpracticeswill probablyariseforparticularclassesofphenomena.Forexample,lowfrequency oscillationsareaproblematicphenomenoninthewesterninterconnection.However, detectionandidentification(offrequencymodeanditsdamping)inrealtimehasnot beenparticularlyeasyeventhoughitisrelativelyeasytodosousingpostdisturbance storeddatainanofflinecalculation.Butvariationsoftheofflineanalysistoolshave beentriedwithreasonablesuccess.MuchR&Disneededtocontinuedevelopingsuch bestpracticealgorithmsforvariousphenomenathatcanbecontrolledbyintelligent protectionschemes.

Input/outputsignalpathissues

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Unliketraditionalprotectionschemeswhichuselocalinputsandlocaloutputs,i.e.the inputsignalandthecontrolsignalarewithinthesamesubstation,intelligentgrid protectionimpliesinputsignalsandoutputsignalsthatmaytravellongdistancesfrom andtomanysubstations.Sincethesearenecessarilydigitalsignalstravelingover communicationchannels,theirsamplingrateandlatencyimpacttheeffectivenessofthe controlaction.Thusthedesignprocessfortheschememustalsotakeintoaccountthe samplingrateandpossiblelatencies,bothofwhichcanhaveuncertainties(i.e.theyare notfixedandareaffectedbyotherdataflowonthosechannels).R&Disneededto handlesuchdataflowissuesaspartofthedesignprocess. Simulationtesting Noneoftheproductiongradesimulationpackagesusedtodaytosimulatethegrid transientstabilityandpowerflowprogramsisquiteadequateforsimulatingthese intelligentprotectionschemes.Amajordrawbackinthesesimulationsisthatthe modelingofthegridismuchsimplified:(1)thebalancedphasesinglelinemodeldoes notpickuptheimbalancesthatmayaffectprotectionschemes,and(2)thenodebranch modelmissesthedetailedsubstationconfigurationthatalwaysaffectsprotection. Althoughmostofthenonlinearitiesarewellmodeledinthepresentsimulations, discretecontrolsaredifficulttomodel,butanyprotectionschemeusingdatafrom remotelocationsmustbeabletorepresentsampled(ratherthancontinuous)dataand possiblelatencies.R&D(especiallyD)isneededindevelopingsuchsimulationtoolsso thatthetestingofintelligentprotectiveschemesbecomesmorereliable.

3.4.3 Potential Demonstration Projects

The project team has had extensive discussion with both PG&E and SCE regarding the scoping of a potential project demonstrating Synchrophasor/pmu technology. PG&E has installed several new special protection schemes such as the San Francisco, Metcalf andDiabloCanyonSPSinthelastseveralyearstoprotectagainstunlikelycontingencies that would have serious consequences should they occur. All of these schemes involve local area generation that is dispatched economically and that also has an impact on the localareareliability. ForinstancePG&EsSanFranciscoRASprotectsagainstlossofanentiresubstationwith multiple buses and two different voltage levels which goes beyond NERC level D* planning.TheSanFranciscoRASusesGEsuniversalrelayatmultiplesubstationstodo distributed processing and also communicate with centrally located fault tolerant
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programmable logic controllers. Even though SF RAS is a very sophisticated and state of the art scheme it still is somewhat prescriptive in that remedial actions are taken assuming heavily loaded conditions. Both the Metcalf and Diablo Canyon special protection schemes protect against multiple contingencies where there is a surplus of generation that either cause emergency overloads and stability problems. The Diablo Canyon special protection scheme was installed recently and incorporates pmu technology in the detection of the contingencies but it still takes prescriptive action in that a Diablo Canyon unit must be tripped under a wide range of conditions to protect againstinstability. PG&E has plans to utilize pmu technology in the next generation special protection schemefortheCaliforniaOregonIntertie.Itsnotclearwhatthespecificplansarebut thereisanopportunitytotakeremedialactionsbasedonactualsystemconditionsrather thanprescribingaremedialactionbasedonworstcaseassumptions. The project team has met with Southern California Edison (SCE) a number of times and had several conference calls with them regarding the application of pmus and special protection schemes. While SCE has several special protection schemes, the focus of the discussionshasbeenaroundSCEsBigCreekproject. TheBigCreekprojectisa1010MWhydroprojecteastoftheFresnoarea.Therearefour 230 kV outlet lines that connect the Big Creek generation to the Southern California Edison system at Magunden and there are five 230 kV lines that connect Magunden to the SCE bulk transmission grid. The 230 kV lines and towers are original equipment built around 1912 and are small conductor high impedance lines. There are several substationsalongthewaythatserveloadintheVisalia/Tularearea(EasternSanJoaquin Valley)andhaveanimpactonthestabilityoftheBigCreekgeneration.Theloadinthis area has been growing at a substantial rate and exacerbates transient stability and voltage collapse in the area. There is an existing contingency based RAS scheme that either runs back (ramps down) or trips generation in the Big Creek area depending on whether stable or unstable swings are detected. There also is an overload scheme that primarily protects the lines south of Magunden. The RAS scheme incorporates discreet relays to detect the presence of an unstable swings (Schweitzer 68 relay), whether there is a three phase fault at Magunden or whether there are overloads on the Magunden south 230 kV lines. The RAS scheme arms generation runback and generation tripping if loads are above 650 MW at Rector (major load station between Big Creek and Magunden). There is no generation limitation at Big Creek for loads below 650 MW at Rector.

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In our discussions with SCE, they have indicated they have near term plans to replace theexistingBigCreekRASschemewithmoremodernrelaysandtoupgradethe230kV transmission by adding a fifth 230 kV line between Big Creek and Magunden. Even withaddingthisline,theywillstillhavestabilityproblemsinthefutureandwillneedto install an updated Big Creek RAS as early as next year. SCE also has plans to consolidate their high voltage intertie RAS schemes into a centralized RAS which they are calling their CRAS. Their vision is to incorporate synchrophasor technology into thatapplication. SCE has installed a pmu at Big Creek and has substantial bandwidth in their telecommunication infrastructure to allow high speed telecommunication between Big Creek and remote substations for RAS control. SCEs R&D personnel have developed innovativesoftwarecalledSMARTthatdoessynchronizedmeasurementandanalysis in real time. They have been able to review past WECC system disturbances and identified accurately the percent damping of the disturbance as well as the various oscillation frequencies. SCEs operation, R&D, planning and system protection personnel have indicated their support for a synchrophasor application project in the BigCreekareathatwoulddemonstratesynchrophasortechnology.

3.4.4 Discussion

BothPG&EandSCEhavetheinfrastructureandpersonneltodoasuccessfulproject demonstratingsynchrophasortechnologyinaspecialprotectionschemeapplication. PG&EandSCEhaveinstalledasignificantamountofpmusalongwith telecommunicationinfrastructureforthehighspeedsnecessaryforspecialprotection schemeapplications.Thereislittleperceiveddifferencebetweenthecapabilityofthe PG&EsandSCEsoperationandprotectionpersonnel.SouthernCaliforniaEdisonhas anedgeintheR&Dareaastheirpersonnelhaveinvestedsignificanttimeandeffortin developinguniquesoftwarethatcananalyzeanddetectgridoscillations.Also,SCEs planningpersonnelhaveanexcellentvisionforhowtobenefitfromthesynchrophasor technologyasdemonstratedbytheirvisionforCRAS.Theiroperations,system protection,planningandR&Dpersonnelareallalignedinsupportingsynchrophasor technologyandapplicationstandpoint. WhilebothPG&EandSCEhavepotentialprojectsfordemonstratingsynchrophasor technology,BigCreekhastheinfrastructure,rangeofRASactionsandneedtobea nearlyidealprojectforapplyingsynchrophasortechnology.ThereisanSVCatRector thatcouldbeswitchedontoimprovestabilityandanumberofgeneratorsatBigCreek thatcouldeitherbetrippedorrunbackasmitigatingactionsforstabilityproblems.To
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differentiatebetweenanexistingspecialprotectionschemeandasynchrophasorbased specialprotectionscheme,softwaremustbewrittentotakeadvantageofthetechnology. Forinstanceinasychrophasorbasedapplicationtheactualsystemconditionsare knownincludingactualphaseanglesbetweentwospecificsubstationlocations,percent dampingandmodesofoscillation.Takingadvantageofthiswouldallowforlessdrastic actiontobetakenduringlessstressedsystemconditionsandfastermoreappropriate actiontobetakenduringstressedsystemconditionsthatcouldallowformore generationtobeexportedintothesystem

3.4.5 Recommendation
TheprojectteamrecommendsthatPIERsponsorasynchrophasordemonstrationproject atSCEsBigCreekprojecttoincludetheinstallationofaPDC,centralized programmablelogiccontroller(plc)andthesoftwaretoprogramtheplcasaspecial protectionschemefortheBigCreekproject.Wefurtherrecommendthatthisbedonein parallelwithSCEsRASupgradeproject.Thedemonstrationprojectwouldbeinthe monitormodeanddatacouldbeanalyzedfrombothprojectstounderstandand improveupon.Itisproposedthata2008budgetitembeestablishedforthispurpose.

4.0 Conclusions and Recommendations


4.1 Conclusions
Toutilizesynchrophasortechnologyinspecialprotectionschemes,thefollowingissues mustbeaddressed:

Reliabilityoftelecommunicationsnetwork Latencyoftelecommunicationsnetwork AccuracyofPMUs PerformanceofPMUsunderstressedconditions AccuracyofCCVTsandCTs Identificationofwhatactionandwhentotakeit MaintenanceneedsofPMUs

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Thefollowingisthestateoftheartinintelligentsystemprotectiontechnologies:

IEEEstandardC37.1182005addressestheperformanceofPMUsincludingoff nominalfrequencies,accuracyandsamplingratesbutdoesnotaddressdynamic performance. Bothmainstreamrelaymanufacturersandinstrument/monitoringmanufacturers makePMUs. SchweitzerEngineeringLabs(SEL)manufactureafulllineofprotectiverelays thatincludePMUcapabilityinthesamerelaypackage. SomeprotectionengineersareskepticalaboutthereliabilityofusingPMUs whenincorporatedintothesamerelaypackage. ToutilizePMUsoverawidearea,communicationlatencyisamajorissue.The timedelaytocommunicatephaseanglefromdifferentlocationscannotbe greaterthanthetimeittakesforinstabilitytooccur. AllRASandSPSschemestodayareprescriptiveinthattheytakespecificaction foragivensetofconditions. ThenextmajorstepistoapplycomputerlogicutilizingPMUtechnologytotake actionbasedonrealtimeconditions.

FollowingareongoingsystemprotectionR&Drelatedtowideareacontrol:

Transmissionsystemconstraintsarethemajorconstraintstoaderegulated powermarket. Virtuallyallofthosetransmissionsystemconstraintsareeithervoltageor transientstability. StateoftheartcontroltodayinvolvesFACTSdevicesthatcontrolDClines, providehighspeedvarcontrol(SVC)orcontrolpowerflowcontrol(PFC). Europehasbeenexperimentingwithregionalvoltagecontrolaswidearea controlofvoltage.TypicallyinNorthAmerica,voltagecontrolisdoneonalocal levelonly. Smallsignalstabilitycontrolisanotherarearipeforwideareacontrol.Presently, powersystemstabilizers(PSS)aretheonlymeansofcontrollinglowfrequency oscillations(lessthen1Hz)intheWesternUnitedStates.Theselocalcontrollers areoftentimestunedforlocaloscillationfrequenciesandnotintertieoscillation frequencies..25HzoscillationsexacerbatedconditionsthatledtotheAugust10, 1996blackoutontheWesternUnitedStatestransmissiongrid.

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Voltagestabilitycontrolfromawideareaperspectiveisanotherarearipefor R&D. Remedialactionscheme(RAS)alsoknowasspecialprotectionschemes(SPS)are usedtomitigatetransientinstabilityafteraninitiatingoutagehasoccurred.The authorsofthispaperbelievethatthisisamajorareaofresearchtoexploitPMU technologytoproactivelymanagetransientstabilityfromawidearea perspectivebeforeamajoroutageoccurs.

Thefollowingarepotentialprojectsandareastodemonstrateintelligentsystem protection:

PG&EsSanFranciscoRASprojectisalreadyanintelligentprotectionscheme thatcouldbefurtherenhancedbyPMUtechnology. PG&EsMetcalfandDiabloCanyonspecialprotectionschemesarealso candidatesforanintelligentprotectionscheme. TheCaliforniaOregonIntertieremedialactionschemeisanothercandidatefor ademonstrationproject. SCEsBigCreekprojectoffersagoodchoiceforanintelligentprotectionscheme.

Thetechnologytodemonstrateintelligentsystemprotectioniswelladvancedand availablebutthereareseveralareasthatneedtobefurtherevaluatedasalludedto earliersuchasPMUaccuracyandtelecommunicationlatency.Itisalsowell documentedthattransmissionintertiecapabilitytoimporteconomyenergyinto CaliforniaisdependentonSPS/RASschemesthatareprescriptiveinnature.Because theseprescriptiveSPS/RASschemesmustassumeworstcaseconditions,thereis substantialcapabilityleftonthetableunderawiderangeofoperatingconditions. Applyingintelligentsystemprotectionschemesthatareadaptiveandbasedonactual realtimesystemconditionswouldallowhigheramountsofenergytobeimportedinto California.Theauthorsofthisreportconcludethatitisveryimportanttodemonstrate intelligentsystemprotectionschemesnowonlessimpactfulprojectssothatthewaycan bepavedforutilizingtheseintelligentschemesonmoreimportantapplicationssuchas intertieapplications.

4.2 Commercialization Potential

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Itmaybepossibletocommercializeintelligentgridprotectionsystems,howeverthe authorsbelievethattheapplicationsareprimarilylimitedtolargeutilitiesand independentsystemoperatorsandnotlikelytobecommercialized.Manyofthe componentsofanintelligentgridprotectionsystemsuchasPMUsaremadebyseveral manufacturersthatareeitherimbeddedindigitalrelaysormadeasstandalonedevices, andthereforelikelytoremaintheprimarycommercialopportunity.

4.3 Recommendations
TheauthorsofthispaperrecommendthePIERsponsorasynchrophasordemonstration projectatSCEsBigCreekproject.WhilePG&Ehasverygoodpotentialdemonstration projects,theauthorsbelievethattheBigCreekprojectoffersthebestopportunity becauseitistransientstabilityandvoltagestabilitylimitedandthereareseveralcontrol actionsthatcouldbeusedtoproactivelypreventamajoroutage.

4.4 Benefits to California


CaliforniawillbenefitintheshorttermbyincreasedreliabilityofgenerationatBig Creek.TotheextentthatBigCreekcanbeoperatedathigherlevelsofgeneration,more costlygenerationcanbebackeddown,savingCalifornianstheincrementalcostbetween BigCreekgenerationandmorecostlygeneration. Inthelongtermtheknowledgegainedfromthedemonstrationprojectcouldbe transferredtomorecomplicatedspecialprotectionschemessuchastheCalifornia OregonRASscheme.Thepotentialforsavingsisverylargeassumingthatmorepower couldbeimportedintoCaliforniaatleastpartofthetime.Thecostsavingwouldbethe incrementalcostbetweenprimarilythermalgenerationinCaliforniaandveryeconomic hydroelectricpowerinthePacificNorthwest.

5.0 References
IEEE Standard C37.1182005 (Revision of IEEE Std 13441995) IEEE Standards for SynchrophasorsforPowerSystems

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J. Depablos, V. Centeno, A. Phadke, M.Ingram, Comparative Tesing of Synchronized PhasorMeasurementUnitsFeb.,2004 J. Hauer, N. Bhatt, K. Shah, S. Kolluri, Performance of WAMS East in Providing Dynamic Information for the Northeast Blackout of August 14, 2003. Power EngineeringSocietyGeneralMeeting R.Wilson,C.Taylor,UsingDynamicSimulationstoDesigntheWideAreastability andvoltageControlSystem(WACS),IEEEPSCE04 C.Taylor,D.Erickson,K.Martin,RWilson,V.Venkatasubramanian,WACSWide AreaStabilityandVoltageControlSystem:R&DandOnlineDemonstration, ProceedingsoftheIEEE,Vol.93,NO.5,May2005 Yang, Qixun; Bi, Tianshu; Wu, Jingtao; WAMS Implementation in China and the Challenges for Bulk Power System Protection, Power Engineering Society GeneralMeeting,2007.IEEE,428June2007Page(s):16 Xiying Chen; Weixing Li; He Chen; Zhizhong Guo; Research of OutofStep Protection System Based on Wide Area Measure System Power, System Technology, 2006. PowerCon2006.InternationalConferenceonOct.2006Page(s):15 Martin, K.E.; Phasor measurement systems in the WECC Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 2006. IEEE 1822 Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 2006.IEEE1822June2006Page(s):7pp. Fahid, K A; Gopalakrishnan, Prasanth; Cherian, Sushil; PhasorNet A High Performance Network Communications Architecture for Synchrophasor Data Transfer in WideArea Monitoring,ProtectionandControlApplications,BulkPowerSystem Dynamics and Control VII. Revitalizing Operational Reliability, 2007 iREP symposium1924Aug.2007Page(s):14

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Dagle, J.E.; North American SynchroPhasor Initiative, Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Proceedings of the 41st Annual, 710 Jan. 2008 Page(s):165 165 Bonian Shi; Xiaorong Xie; Yingduo Han; WAMSbased Load Shedding for Systems Suffering Power Deficit, Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition:AsiaandPacific,2005IEEE/PES,2005Page(s):166.0Glossary

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6.0 Glossary
CAISOCaliforniaIndependentSystemOperator COICaliforniaOregonIntertie CCVTCouplingCapacitorVoltageTransformer CTCurrentTransformer EIPPEasternInterconnectionPhasorProject EMSEnergyManagementSystem GPSGlobalPositioningSatellite NASPINorthAmericanSynchrophasorProjectInitiative PTPotentialTransformer SCADASupervisoryControlandDataAcquisition SVCStaticVarCompensator WACSWideAreaStabilityandVoltageControlSystem WAMSWideAreaMeasurementSystem WECCWesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil UFLSUnderfrequencyLoadShedding UVLSUndervoltageLoadShedding VARVoltAmpereRecative RTDMRealTimeDisplayMonitor AGCAutomaticGenerationControl SPSSpecialProtectionScheme RASRemedialActionScheme PSSPowerSystemStabilizer PMUPhaseAngleMeasuringUnit PDCPhasorDataConcentrator OTCOperationalTransferCapability

7.0 Appendices

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3.1.6. August 14, 2003 Disturbance Recommendation


EvaluateandImplementDefenseinDepthSystemMonitoring,Control,and ProtectionMeasurestoSlowDownandMitigatetheSeverityofCascades ActionPlan NERCPC/OCexecutivecommitteesshouldreviewtheRecommendationbelow,and TechnicalReporttobeissuedthissummer.PriortoNERCPC/OCwintermeeting,by 11/18/05completeNewRecommendationreviewandestablishproposedscopeofwork includingvendorparticipation.AtwintermeetingNERCPC/OCtoreviewandapprove proposedscopeincludingassignmentstoPCforoverallplan,Protectiontaskforce,and OCtaskforceforimplementation. Observation Duringtheblackout,anumberofgeneratorcontrolandprotectionsystems,and transmissionsystemcontrolsandprotectionssystems,includingUFLSsystems, interacted,notalwaystothebettermentoftheoverallsystemhealthandresiliency. Systemmonitoring,control,andprotectionsystemsarecurrentlyappliedmostlyona transmissionoperatororcontrolareabasis.However,eachInterconnectionofthebulk powersystemis,infact,averylargesinglesystemandshouldbeanalyzed,controlled, andoperatedassuch. Anoveralldefenseindepthphilosophyandintegratedstrategyisneededtoprotect todaysbulkpowersystemfromcascadingblackouts.Suchasystemwouldhaveto integrateexistingsystemmonitoring,control,andprotectionsystemswithnew measurement,analysis,andprotectioncapabilitiesintotheoveralldefenseindepth strategy.Allsystemelementshavetobecoordinated1. Defenseindepthshouldincorporateelementssuchas:

Wideareaandlocalmonitoringofsystemoperatingconditions Widearea,highspeed(phasor)measurementsofoverallsystemindicatorssuch asrelativephaseanglesacrosstheinterconnectionandacrossmajortransmission interfaces Monitoringofinterarea,slowspeedoscillations

There is a lack of overall coordination of Special Protection Schemes with primary protection systems, plant control systems and EMS. This is an area where further research needs to be done to identify primary areas where this is crucial.
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Prioritybasedalarmprocessingandcomplete Stateestimationofexistingsystemconditions,ensuringtheoperatorsviewof thesystemisunencumberedbymonitoringdiscrepancies Earlywarningcontingencyanalysisoftheexistingandpotentialsystem conditionstoensureadherencetolimitingsystemconditions Patternrecognitionofoperationallydangeroussystemconfigurations Emergencyoperationsplansforseverecontingencies Operatortraining,includingsevereconditionscenarios,toenhancesituational awarenessduringemergencies CoordinatedUVLSandUFLSsystems Systemrestorationplansthatareadaptabletoconditionsexistingafteranoutage Suchasystemshouldbeconstantlyupdatedtoreflectsystemtopologychanges, andtotakeadvantageoftechnicaladvancesinmonitoringequipment,computer calculationcapabilities,stateestimation,contingencyanalysis,anddigitalrelays. Stimulationofresearchintothisareaisabsolutelyimperative.

Recommendation ForeachoftheInterconnections,adefenseindepthphilosophyandintegratedstrategy shouldbedevelopedbasedonthecharacteristicsofthatinterconnectiontolimitthe impactsofpotentialcascadingoutages.


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