I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITSA. In GeneralB. Pre-Spanish Times b.

1 The Sumakwel Code In 1212, after fleeing from the oppressive regime of Datu Makatunaw in Borneo, 10 datus set up their own tribalcolonies in the Visayan Islands. One of them, Datu Sumakwel, established on the Island of Panay the Confederation of Madiaas and its constitution, the Code of Maragtas or the Code of Sumakwel. The Code of Sumakwel was consideredamong the first Filipino laws enacted before the Pre Hispanic times. It consisted of 10 articles, mainly focusing on punishment for laziness.An American historian, Paul Morrow debunks the Sumakwel Code as nothing more than the product of GuillermoCuinos imagination. Cuino was the first person to write about the Code Sumakwel in an essay in 1858 wherein heclaimed to have translated the Code from an ancient Filipino document. However, Cuino presented no other proof other than his dubious essay. Nevertheless, Paul Morrow laments, much of the Filipino education s ystem to this day stillpreaches the Sumakwel Code as gospel historical truth. b. 2 The Code of Kalantiaw Datu Kalantiaw was among the ancient Visayans who built a kingdom with its own tribal code known as the Codeof Kalantiaw, supposedly around 1150. It contains 1 8 articles, which consists mainly of punishment for criminal acts ranging from the traditional ones such as homicide, theft and nonpayment of debts to the bizarre and superstitious suchas disrespect for revered trees or killing black cats during the new moo n. The Code of Kalantiaw also has feudalistic overtones such as obligating those with the beautiful daughters to give them up to the sons of chiefs as well as providingspecial punishment for those who commit particular crimes against the tribal headmen as stated in the Code.Punishments for the crimes stated in the Code are cruel by todays standards; for example, those who sing while traveling by night are beaten for two days while those who commit homicide and theft are condemned to death by beingdrowned in the river or in boiling water.In 1968, W illiam Henr y Scott, another American historian revealed the Code of Kalantiaw as an outright hoaxperpetuated by forger Jose Marco. Marco gave the Philippine Library and Museum as ancient document claiming to bethe Code of Kalantiaw in 1912. The supposed Code and Marcos claims on how he obtained the ancient document hadtoo many discrepancies and anomalous reference to historical facts that could not have existed during the time of the Codes supposed existence. Only recently have a few historians such as Sonia M. Zaide regarded the Code as a fraudbut, as Paul Morrow says, the lie still lives on. C. The Spanish Erac. 1 Harty v. Mun of Victoria 13 Phil. 152Facts : Monsignor Harty, an archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church based in Manila, claims that his parishowns the plaza located in the municipality of Victoria, Tarlac, claiming to be in peaceful possession of it for more than 60years up to 1901. The defendant municipality replied that Victoria was constituted into a town in 1855 and that the parishof Tarlac was established many years afterwards; therefore the latter cannot claim title to the plaza. Evidence seemed toshow that the original owner, Casimiro Tanedo, of the land wherein the plaza is located, donated said land to the church ingeneral and not to the town curate, since a permanent curate was not appointed in Victoria until 1867. However, from themoment the town was created, both the town curate and the townspeople have enjoyed free access of the plaza. Still,Monsignor Harty claims the parish of Tarlac owns the plaza on the grounds of 1) prescription and 2) that the act of thecurates and the gobernadorcillos of planting fruit trees and plants on the plaza constituted private ownership. Held : Monsignor Hartys contentions are incorrect. Reasons:1. It was a Philippine custom then that upon the establishment of a new town, a large tract of land is always reserved in its center for the creation of a plaza. Before Victoria became a town it was a mere barrio. It must be assumedthat the principal residents of Victoria wanted to have a public plaza should their barrio be converted into a town.Therefore, even before Victoria became a town, the land now in dispute was always intended to be a public plaza.2. There was no sufficient proof that the late Casimiro Tanedo intended to donate the portion of the land intendedto be a public plaza to the church in general3. It has been fully proven that the plaza has always been used by the people of Victoria from the moment thetown was created4. Plazas destined for public use are not subject to prescription (Art. 1936,

the Old Civil Code)5. Planting of fruit trees by the curates, etc. do not constitute an act of private ownership but either evidence of public use or as embellishments for the benefit of the townspeople. c. 2 Rubi v. Provincial board of Mindoro 39 Phil. 660Facts : Rubi and his fellow Manguianes filed an application for habeas corpus on the ground that they were beingdeprived of their liberty by the provincial official s of Mindoro. Rubi claimed they were being held against their will at areservation in Tigbao, Mindoro while one Dabalos was imprisoned for having run away from the reservation. Theprovincial officials of Mindoro however, countered that they were authorized under section 2145 of the AdministrativeCode of 1917 to implement measures for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro by obliging them to livein one place in order to educate them. Held : The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the provincial officials of Mindoro on the grounds that:1. They were merely exercising the police power of the state for a lawful purpose and through lawful means,which can validly limit the exercise of Civil liberty. The Supreme Court cited past legislation implemented in the Philippineswhich justified the placing in a reservation of the Manguianes such as:a. Book 6, Title 3 A compilation of laws implemented during the Spanish forcing the Indios to leave poblaciones(communities) or reducciones in order to instruct them to the Catholic faith and enable them to live in a civilized manner.b. Decree of the Governor -General of January 14, 1881Decree ordering the Indios to be governed by the common law and not allowing them, unless with absolute necessity, to change their residence.c. Letter of Instructions by President McKinley Uncivilized tribes are allowed to keep their tribal governments,subject to regulation by the Americans.d. The Philippine Bill of 1902 The Philippine Commission (which composed of the Philippine Legislature, theother being the Philippine Assembly) was given exclusive jurisdiction over the territory inhabited by the Moros and other non-Christian tribes of the Philippinese . T h e J o n e s L a w 2. Although the Maguianes were labeled as non-Christian, the intent of the law was not to refer to any particular r e l i g i o n s o r g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b u t i s p r e d i c a t e d o n t h e l a c k o f c i v i l i z a t i o n b y t h e m , w h i c h t h e m e a s u r e implemented by the provincial officials of Mindoro intended to correct.3. The measure implemented was a valid delegation of legislative power by the Philippine legislature as it wasdone in accordance with Administrative Code of 1917 c.3 The Maura Law Queen Regent Maria Cristina of Spain, upon the recommendation of Colonial M i n i s t e r A n t o n i o M a u r a , promulgated the Royal Decree of May 19, 1893 which provided for an autonomous local government in the Philippines.Under the Maura Law there was constituted a Municipal Tribunal of five, the captain and 4 lieutenants. It was given chargeof the active work of governing the municipality, such as administration of public works, etc. and the details of taxation. Inaddition, each of its members was required to have special qualifications. These positions were honorary. The term of office was 4 years. The of ficers, together with 2 substitutes, were elected by 12 delegates of the principalia. Theprincipalia was composed of all persons who has held certain offices (such as cabeza de barangay or former captains) or who has paid a land tax of P50. The Governor General and the provincial governor retained disciplinary jurisdiction over the council and its individual members, the Provincial Board also had supervision of the municipal council (Malcolm, Govt.of the Philippines Islands, pp. 69-71, Document 362, The Maura Law of 1893) c. 4 The Treaty of Paris The Treaty of Paris officially ended the Spanish-American War of 1898. It was ratified by Spain and the UnitedStates on December 10, 1898. It contained 17 articles, important provisions including:Art. 1 Relinquishment by Spain of its claim of sovereignty and title to Cuba. Art. 2 Cession to the U.S. of theislands of Puerto Rico and Marianas. Art. 3 Cession to the U.S. of the Philippines for the sum of $20 million. Art. 9 Allowing Spanish subjects which are natives of the Philippines to remain in the Philippines if they so desire. The civil rightsand political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the U.S. shall be determined by Congress.Art. 11 Relinquishment of all civil and cr iminal jurisdictions over all territories ceded. Art. 12 Provides for rules ondeciding judicial proceedings pending at the time of the ratification of the treaty. D. The American Periodd.1 The Jones Law The Jones Law of 1893 was virtually an American -made constitution providing for a complete form of semi-autonomous government in the Philippines. It defined government functions into an executive to be appointed by the U.S.President with the consent of the Senate, who was

called the American Governor -General in the Philippines. The legislative power was vested in an elective bicameral/legislature a Senate and a House of Representatives. The judicialpower was exercised by the Supreme-Court and other lower courts, with Filipino and American justices. The Jones Lawalso extended the Bill of Rights, defined Filipino citizenship and provided for other safeguards and restrictions.The bulk of the Jones Law comprised mainly of defining the executive, legislative and judicial powers of the government. E. The Japanese Occupatione.1 Topacio Nueno Angeles, 76 Phil. 12Facts : Jose Topacio Nueno and 3 other petitioners ran for and eventually obtained seats in the Municipal Board of Manila in 1940. World War II and the subsequent Japanese occupation however took place. After the war, 6 new boardmembers were appointed by the President. Nueno, et. al. claimed that the appointment was null and void because 1) their term of office had not expired due to the world war and 2) even if 1) were not true, they still had the right to hold over their officers until their new successors were elected and qualified. Held : N u e n o a n d h i s g o o n s w e r e i n c o r r e c t . R e a s o n s : 1 ) T h e w o r d t e r m i s different from tenure. There is no law which allows the extension of terms of office by reason of war. 2) As for tenure, thesame may be shortened or extended for various reasons, such as the death of the incumbent or as otherwise provided bylaw. The principle of the right to hold over may validly extend the tenure of office. However, Nueno, et. al. cannot invokethis right because under 16 (a) of the Commonwealth Act, the President has the discretion of appointing temporary boardmembers until duly elected board members can be qualified. F.ThePostWarYearsf. 1 R.A. 2264, as amended The Local Autonomy Act Entitled, An Act Amending the Laws governing Local Governments by Increasing their A u t o n o m y a n d Reorganizing the Provincial Governments, the Act provides for, among other things: Procedure in establishing theprovincial, city, municipal and regularly organized municipal district budgets for each fiscal year, taxation sources;appropriation of funds for the general welfare of the public; grant of the power of eminent domain; composition of the provincial board; qualifications of members of the provincial board, governors, vice-governors, mayors and vicemayor;appointment power of provincial governor, city mayor and municipal mayor; and assignment of other powers to theprovincial board, municipal board or city councils. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the interpretation of the Local Autonomy Act shall be resolved in favor of the local government and shall be presumed to exist. f. 2 R.A. 2370 The Barrio Charter Act Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are located. They are quasi-municipalcorporations endowed with such powers as herein provided in said Act for the performance of particular government functions to be exercised by and through their respective barrio governments in conformity with law.Barrios may be created or its name changed by a petition of the majority of voters in the areas affected. They maysue and be sued and may be deal with any real or personal property in the manner provided by law.No barrio may be created if its population is less than 500 people or out of chartered cities, or poblaciones of municipalities

The Act also provides for the barrio council headed by the barrio lieutenant. The barrio council shall meet with thequalified voters of the barrio at least once a year in a barrio assembly to discuss, among others, election of new officers,raising of funds and adopt measures for the welfare of the barrio. The Act also provides for the qualifications of the barriocouncil members and their powers and responsibilities, such as the taxation power and its sources. f. 3 R.A. 3590 Revised Barrio Charter Act This Act is essentially the same as its predecessor, with the following pertinent amendments; 1)

A plebiscite may be called to decide on the recall of any member of the barrio council member or approve anybudgetary, supplement appropriations or special tax ordinances.2)Renaming the barrio lieutenant as barrio captain 3) Right of succession in case of vacancy in the barrio captain position (there is no vice-barrio captain in both Acts). 4) The municipal mayor shall have power of supervision over barrio officials\5)Procedure in barrio council, such as holding of meetings every month6)Effective ly of barrio ordinances (unless otherwise, after 60 days after its passage or 15 days after its confirmation in a plebiscite) f. 4 R.A. 5185 The Decentralization Act of 1967 This Act further strengthens the autonomous powers of local governments by providing for the following pertinentprovisions:1) Provincial and city governments are empowered to undertake field agricultural work and rural health work whenever deemed to be necessary to assist in national programs or services.2 ) A p p o i n t m e n t o f h e a d s , a s s i s t a n t h e a d s o f l o c a l o f f i c e r s a n d t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t e s 3 ) S u s p e n s i o n and removal of elective local officials (grounds: disloyalty to RP, dishonesty, oppression and misconduct in the office)4 ) R e s t r i c t i o n i n p r a c t i c e o f l a w b y m e m b e r s o f p r o v i n c i a l , c i t y o r m u n i c i p a l b o a r d 5 ) S u c c e s s i o n t o o f f i c e of vice-governor and vice-mayor.6) Filling of special vacancies in local legislative bodies.7) Filling of elective officers in newly created and newly classified provinces, cities, municipalities or municipaldistricts8) List of actions of provincial, city and municipal officials and provincial boards declared immediately effective.9) Certain duties and powers of local chief executives not to be subject to direction and review of any nationalofficial1 0 ) R e l e a s e a n d a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f c e r t a i n g o v e r n m e n t f u n d s 1 1 ) C r e a t i o n o f f o l l o w i n g positions: provincial engineer, city public works official, provincial attorney and city legal officer 12) Creation of Joint Local Government Reform Commission (for continuing studies on local autonomy of LocalGovernment and prepare local government code ) G. The Martial Law Epochg. 1 P.D.145 This decree amended Section 2 of R.A. 2264 or Local Autonomy Act because the said section was ineffective incarrying out the Secretary of Finances power to suspend the effectively of any local tax ordinance which in his opinion is unjust, excessive or oppressive or contrary to national polic y. Said decree improves this situation by giving the local legislative body either 30 days to modify the tax ordinance or appeal the suspension order of the Secretary of Finance in acourt of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or its part of parts in question is considered revoked g. 2 B.P. 337 The Local Government Code of 1983 This Code provides for the pertinent following provision:1) General powers and attributes of local government units.2) Powers and restrictions of Local Government Units to: Create sources of revenue; eminent domain; closure of roads;suability; enter into contracts; convey property; limited non-liability for damages.3) National supervision over local governments4) Relationship between Province-city, provincemunicipality; city-barangay, municipality-barangay; city-barangay; publicofficials-LGUs5) Fiscal matters; Expenditure of government funds; preparation of budget6) Requirement and prohibitions of local govt. officials; vacancy and succession7) Qualification and election of local govt. officials; vacancy and succession8) Recall, suspension and removal of elective officials9) Creation of local school boards10) Personnel Administration11) Settlement of municipal and barangay boundary disputes12) Details on

barangay and barangay officials; municipal and municipal officials; city and city officials; province andprovince officials H. The Present h. 1 R.A. 7160 The Local Government Code of 1991. From the LGC of 1983, the following pertinent provisionswere added:1)Operative principles of decentralization2)Authority by Congress or any political subdivision to create, divide, merge, abolish or alter boundaries3)Emphasis on general welfare and imposition of basic services and facilities on political subdivisions4 ) R e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f l a n d s 5)Authority of LGUs to secure and negotiate grants6)Creation of Local Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee 7 ) O t h e r procedural and technical changes II. PRIMARY LAW AND GENERAL PROVISIONSA. Read Article X, Section 9 and Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution a.1 Article X, Section 10 No province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged abolishedor its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code andsubject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. NOTE : Read the whole of Article X of the 1987 Constitution as well, as it refers to local, governments in general. Itcontains 21 sectors. Also Prof. Ulep must have meant Season 10 and not 5 in his outline.a. 2 Article XVIII, Sec. 8 - Unless otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan Authorityto be composed of the heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila Area.Article XVIII, Sec. 9 A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until it is converted into a regular province or itscomponent municipalities are reverted to the mother province.NOTE: Theres no point in reading all other sections of Article XVIII. See for yourself. B. Read R.A. 7924(Metropolitan Manila Development Authority) This Act states the policy of the State to treat Metro Manila as a special development and administrative regionand certain basic services affecting or involving Metro Manila as metro wide services more efficiently and effectivelyplanned, supervised and coordinated by a development authority as created herein, without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected LGU. Among its pertinent provisions are:1)Scope of MMDA (metro-wide) services: Development planning; transport and traffic management; solid waste disposal and management; Flood control; Urban renewal; zoning and land use planning; health sanitation;Urban protection and pollution control; pu8blic safety;2)Creation of Metro Manila Council (MMC) consisting of all mayors in Metro Manila3 ) P o w e r s a n d F u n c t i o n s o f M M D A , m a i n l y t o f o r m u l a t e , c o o r d i n a t e , a n d r e g u l a t e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a b o v e metro-wide services4)Functions of MMC, mainly to approve projects of MMDA 5) Function of MMDA chairman: Execute policies of MMC and manage operations of MMDA; appointmentpower; prepare budget of MMDA; disciplinary power on subordinates; ex officio board member (or his representative) of departments related to activities of MMDA such as DOTC, DOH, etc. 6) Institutional linkages of MMDA: NEDA, NGOs , accredited peoples organizations b. 1 Lopez, Jr. v. COMELEC, 136 SCRA 633Facts : Mel Lopez, et. Al. questioned the validity of P, D. 824 whic h provides for the creation of Metro ManilaCommission which shall hold sway over 4 cities (Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, and Pasay) and 13 municipalities. P.D. Hesays it runs counter to Art. 11, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution which states that: No province, city, municipality or barriomay be created, divided, abolished, merged or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteriaestablished in the Local Government Code and subject to the approval of the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in theunit or units affected. No plebiscite was conducted to vote for the creation of Metro Manila. He also claims the P.D. is adenial of the equal protection clause as other cities and municipalities were not similarly organized into such. Also thePresident cannot exercise direct supervision and control over the Metropolitan Manila Commission as it runs counter tothe autonomy of local governments. Held : Mel Lopez is incorrect. Reasons: 1.

Although a plebiscite was not conducted, a referendum was held Feb. 27, 1975 wherein the residents of theGreater Manila area authorized the President to reorganize the cities and municipalities under the Metro ManilaCommission. The requirements for a plebiscite were therefore deemed satisfied. Besides, at the ti me of thereferendum, there was no Local Government Code in existence then which provided the need for a plebiscite. Byvirtue of martial law and the absence of an interim Batasang Pambansa at that time, the President had authorityto enact said P.D.2.There is reasonable classification in organizing said 4 cities and 13 municipalities into a metropolitan area3.Article 8, Sec. 2 of the 1973 Constitution expressly recognizes the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila4 . T h e r e i s p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y i n t h e P r e s i d e n t s p o w e r o f d i r e c t s u p e r v i s i o n a n d c o n t r o l o v e r t h e Metropolitan Manila Commission. The presidential power of control can and should be constructed to mean thatsaid control is limited to those that may be considered national in character. b. 2 MMDA v. Bel-Air Assn, Inc., 328 SCRA 836Facts : Pursuant to R.A. 7924 which created the MMDA, MMDA issued a notice to the Bel -Air Village Assoc.(BAVA) that the former will open Neptune Street owned by the latter in Bel-Air Village, as well as tear down a perimeter wall owned by said village. Both actions, the MMDA said, is necessary for the decongestion of traffic along the said areas BAVA petitioned the trail court and later on the Court of Appeals to enjoin the implementation of MMDAs proposedactions. BAVAs petition was granted. The MMDA thus now seeks recourse with the Supreme Court, claiming amongothers that its proposed actions were in the exercise of the police power. Held : MMDA is wrong. The reason is that R.A. 7924 did not expressly or impliedly delegate any police power tothe MMDA, most notably the power to enact ordinances necessary for the implementation of its plans, programs and projects aimed at the delivery of metro-wide services in Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the LGUsconcerning purely local matters (See. 2, R.A. 7924) MMDAs proposed actions were not under the authority of any ordinance (Whats funny is that the MMC, the governing board of the MMDA, is composed of the different mayors of MetroManila, and these guys, as mayors per se, have the power or at least, the political will to enact ordinances) C. Read R.A. 6732 (Organic Act for ARMM [Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao]) Mindanao, encompassing 13 provinces and 9 cities, through a plebiscite for that purpose. This government shalloperate within the framework of the Regional Government. The executive power is conferred on the Regional Governor.The legislative power is conferred in the Regional Assembly. The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the lower courts shall continue to exercise their power as mandated in the Constitution; however, there shall be a Shariah AppellateCourt which shall also be learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence. The Shariah Courts decisions shall be final andexecutory subject to the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Tribal Appellate Courts for cases dealingwith tribal codes shall also be established.The Regional Government shall have fiscal autonomy or the power to create its own sources of revenue, subjectto the limitations of the Constitution and this Organic Act. The Organic Act also provides for: Protection of ancestral lands,ancestral domain and indigenous cultural communities; urban and rural planning and development; power to enact lawspertaining to the national economy and patrimony responsive to the needs of the Regional Government; public order andsecurity; education, science and technology and sports development; social justice and services; and power to amend or revise the Organic Act, either by Congress or by the Regional Assembly, the latter being subject to approval by Congress. c. 1 Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287Facts : Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 6734 on the following grounds:1)R. A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement (what conflicts the case doesnt say)2)R. A. 6734 provides for the unconditional creation of the ARMM and not through the mode of a plebiscite asprovided in the Constitution 3) The Constitution provides that ARMM shall be approved by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite by all votersresiding in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A. 6734 says by a majority or votes cast by the constituent units

in a plebiscite and only those provinces and cities where a majority of votes cast in favor of the OrganicAct shall be included in the Autonomous Region. R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the Constitution4)R. A. 6734 includes provinces and cities which do not have the same cultural and historical heritage and other relevant characteristics needed for admission to the ARMM5)R. A. 6734 violates constitutional guarantee on freedom of exercise of religion as some its provisions runcounter to the Koran6)The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of power to the ARMM is contrar y to theconstitutional mandate that the creation of the autonomous region hinges solely on the result of the plebiscite 7) R. A. 6734 says that only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included inthe ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the AutonomousRegion shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions . This provision, Abbas claims, is contrary to the Constitutional mandate that, No province city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged,abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established wit h thelocal government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the units directly affected. (Art. 10, Sec. 10, 1987 Constitution) Held : Abbas is wrong. Reasons:1)R. A. 6734 as an enactment of Congress, is superior to the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law to the Tripoli Agreement (though in my opinion it wouldnt matter if R. A. 6734 was prior to the Tripoli Agreement)2)The transitory provisions of R. A. 6734 does provide for a plebiscite (1 guess nobody reads t he transitoryprovisions) 3) The framers of the Constitution must have intended that the majority of votes must come from each of theconstituent units and not all the votes of the provinces and cities (I couldnt understand how the justicesarrived at this conclusion)4 ) I t i s n o t f o r t h e C o u r t t o d e c i d e o n t h e w i s d o m o f t h e l a w c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n c l u s i o n o f p r o v i n c e s a n d c i t i e s which Abbas claims should not be included in a plebiscite5)There is no actual controversy yet as to any violation of freedom of religion, only a potential one

6)The creation of an Oversight Committee is merely procedural and in fact will aid in the timely creation of the ARMM7)The power of the President to merge administrative regions is inherent in his power of general supervision over local governments. Besides, administrative regions are not territorial or political regions. Examples of administrative regions are Regions I to XII and the NCR c. 2 Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253Facts : In 1990, President Aquino issued E. O. No. 439 wherein she picked certain provinces and cities, some of which did not participate in the inclusion to the ARMM, to the reorganized to new regions (e.g. Misamis Occidental, whichdid not participate in the ARMM plebiscite, was transferred from Region X to Region XI). Aquino issued said E. O. pursuant ant R. A. 6734, which says: That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in suitable plebiscites shall beincluded in the ARMM. The provinces and cities which plebiscite no vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shallremain in the existing administrative regions. Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination,merge existing regions. James Chiongbian, a Sultan Kudarat congressman, filed a certiorari prohibition to protest the E.O., claiming that President Aquino had no power to reorganize administrative regions because said provision in R. A. 67341) also states that provinces, cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remainthe existing administrative regions 2) the Constitution does not expressly provide the President the power to mergeadministrative regions; in fact Art. 10, Sec. 10 of the Constitution (see II of your outline) prohibits this and 3) even grantingthat the President is allowed to merge administrative regions, there is law setting standard on how it is to be done. Held

: Chiongbian is wrong. Reasons:1)The sentence shall remain in the existing administrative regions, is further qualify by the phrase, Provided however that the President may, by administration determination merge the existing regions.2)Past legislation, particularly R. A. 5345 issued in 1968, authorized the President the help of a Commission onReorganization, to reorganize the different example departments including administrative regions. This showsthat traditional power to reorganize administrative regions has always been lodged in the President 3) The standard is found in R. A . 5 3 4 5 w h i c h s t a t e s t o p r o m o t e s i m p l i c i t y , e c o n o m i c e f f i c i e n c y i n t h e governme nt to enable it to pursue programs consistent with no goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve service transaction of the public business. D. Read R. A. 6766 (Organic Act for Cordillera Autonomous Region of 1989) This Act provides for creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) shall consist of the cities and provincesthat shall vote favorable in a plebiscite pursuant ant 10, Sec. 18 of the Constitution. Those cities and provinces are Benguet, Ifugao, Muslim Province, Abra, KalingaApayao and BaguioThe Act consists of the following pertinent articles:1)Guiding principles and policies similar to that of Art. 2 of the 1987 Constitution2)Vesting of legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly; executive power Cordillera g overnor with a deputygovernor as well; creation of indigenous special courts whose decisions are final and executory but subject tothe original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court3)Creation of a Regional Commission on Appointments4 ) M e a s u r e s t o p r o t e c t a n d d e v e l o p t h e a n c e s t r a l l a n d s a n d a n c e s t r a l d o m a i n s o f i n d i g e n o u s c u l t u r a l communities as well as the national economy and patrimonyT h e r e s t o f i t s p r o v i s i o n s a r e r o u g h l y s i m i l a r t o t h e O r g a n i c A c t f o r A R M M ( s e e 1 1 - c ) C A R n e v e r c a m e t o existence. Only Ifugao province voted in favor of CAR, so the Supreme Court in Ordillo v. COMELEC ruled thatIfugao could no constitute itself into the CAR> d. 1 Ordillo v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100Facts : CAR Regional Assembly member Alexander Ordillo raised the question i n his petition on whether theprovince of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the CAR, can alone legally and validlyconstitute such region. Held : Ordillos petition is meritorious. Reasons:1)Statutory construction of Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution shows that the word region is to be made up of more than one constituent unit2)Section 2 or R. A. 6766 says The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessar y for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, barangays and municipalities within the CAR. Therefore, Congress could not have intended that only a single province would constitute CAR3)It would be illogical for Ifugao to have 2 sets of officials, one for Ifugao and one for the CAR, when Ifugao is the only member of the CAR d. 2 Cordillera Board Coalitions v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 495 Facts : Pending the convening of Congress after President Aquino was swept into power in 1986, she issued E. O.220 which petitioner Cordillera Board Coalitions claimed created the CAR, thus preempting the constitutional mandatethat Congress shall be the one to pass an Organic Act providing for the creation of CAR. Petitioner also questions the constitutionality of the CAR as it runs contrary to Article 10, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution (See 11-1). Finally petitioner claims the CAR will interfere with the local autonomy of individual cities and provinces in general. Held : Cordillera Board Coalition is wrong. Reasons:1. The presumption of constitutionality of laws shall be applied in the case. E. O. 220 was actually envisioned toconsolidate and coordinate the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in theareas covered by the CAR as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordillera. It was not intended to preemptCongress2 . C A R i s n o t a p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n o r a t e r r i t o r i a l o r p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n . I t i s i n t h e s a m e g e n r e a s a n administrative region for the purpose of coordinating the planning and implementation of program and services in the covered areas. Thus no new territorial or political subdivision was created or merged with another.3. Local autonomy is

administrative autonomy. In the case of CAR and Muslim Mindanao, they are granted bothadministrative and political autonomy. Petitioner has failed to show specifically how the creation of administrative regionswill interfere with local autonomy. d. 3 E.O. 459 dated May 17, 1991 This E. O. is entitled Devolving to the Autonomous Region Government of the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao Certain Powers of the DECS, the Control and Supervision Over Its Offices in the Region and for other Offices.The E. O. aims to implement Sec. 1, Article XV of R. A. 6734 which states that, The Autonomous Region shallestablish, maintain and support a complete and integrated system of quality education and adopt an educationalframework that is meaningful, relevant and responsive to the needs, aspirations and ideals of the people in the region.To this end, the Regional Government is made responsible for the regional educational framework of the ARMM,such as formulating and implementing programs to improve education in general in the region. E. Read R. A. 7901, dated Feb. 23, 1995 (Creating the CARAGA Administrative Region)This Act is entitled An Act Creating Region 13 to be known as the CARAGA Administrative Region, and For Other Purposes. It consists of the provinces of Ag usan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur and thecities of Butuan and Surigao. The Act also transfers Sultan Kudarat to Region 11. F. Local Government Unit DefinedDefinition : A political subdivision of the state constituted by law and possessed a substantial control over its ownaffairs.Supporting Definition: The LGU is autonomous in the sense that it is given more power authority, responsibilitiesand resources remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of a sovereign nation, but no intended to be an imperium inimperia state within a statef. 1 Alvarez v. Guingona, Jr. 252 SCRA 695 Facts : Senator Heherson Alvarez, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with prayer TRO and preliminary prohibitoryinjunction assailing R. A. 7720, Said R. A. provides for a conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into a City.Alvarez said the municipality of Santiago failed to meet the requirement of Sec. 450 of the LGC that, for a municipality tobecome a component city, it must have an annual income of P20M. The reason is that in the computation of the averageannual income, the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) should have been deducted from the total income. Instead, theIRAs were added to the total income. Held : Alvarez is wrong. IRAs are the local government units rightful share to the national taxes. Section 450(c) of the LGC provides that the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and any recurring income. IRAs are a regular, recurring source of income; they are not specialfunding transfers since Sec. 17(g) of the LGC gives a technical description for the IRA for purposes of the LGC G. Local Autonomy explained 1. Autonomy either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power (Limbona v. Mangelin)2. Decentralization of Administration Occurs when the central government delegate administrative powers to politicals u b d i v i s i o n i n o r d e r t o b r o a d e n t h e basic government power and in the p r o c e s s t o m a k e l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t m o r e responsive accountable and Ensure their fullest development as self -reliant communities make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of thebureau managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate or national concerns ( Supra )3 . D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f p o w e r An abdication of political power in favor of local government units declared to b e autonomous. In that case the local government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central government authorities. According to a constitution author (Father Bernas) decentralization of power amounts to self - immolation since in that event, the autonomo us government becomes accountable not to thecentral authorities but to its own constituency (

Supra )4. Local Autonomy, Philippine Concept The national government does not completely relinquish all its power over localgovernments, including autonomous re gions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to politicalsubdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the locallevels. In turn, economic, political and social developments at the smaller political units are expected to propel social andeconomic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as whole the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinate towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country stilllies in the President and Congress. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government (Pimentel v. Aguirre)5. Fiscal autonom y Local government have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to the allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. g. 1 Malonzo, et, al v. Zamora, et, al 311 SCRA 224 NOTE: Dates and peso figures are crucial to this case. Facts : In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City issued Ordinance No. 0168, authorizing CaloocanCity mayor Macario Asistio Jr. to initiate expropriation proceedings for lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate owned by the CLT Realty Development Corp. An amount of P39, 352,047.75 was appropriated for this purpose. CLT however countered withan interpleaded and prayer for TRO on August 6, 1997, on the ground that Maysilo estate actually straddled both Caloocan City and the municipality of Malabon; therefore the Caloocan City and Malabon municipal governments shouldbe restrained and CLT must interplead and litigate among themselves their conflicting rights to claim such taxes.In the meantime, the voluntary sale of the CLT property failed to push through so the city government field a suitfor eminent domain against CLT on March 23, 1998.Some months afterwards, Rey Malonzo became mayor of Caloocan City. The expropriation of the CLT propertywas then declared discontinued, thus the appropriation of P50M for the budgetary item Expropriation of properties couldnow be reverted for use in supplement budget. Ordinance No. 0254 was then passed appropriating an amount of P39,343,028.00 for the immediate repair of offices and hiring of additional personnel.Because of this, the office of the President (OP), acting on an administrative complaint filed against Malonzo et.al., were adjudged guilty of misconduct and meted the penalty of suspension. Malonzos refuted the decision, claimingthat 1) the interpleader filed by CLT was an unavoidable discontinuance of the expropriation project; thus the amount of P39, 352,047.00 could be reverted into savings and 2) said amount was could be denomina ted as Expropriation of Properties and classified under Current Operating Expenditures. The OP countered that the amount of P39, 352,047.75was a capital outlay that must be spent for the project it is intended for, thus under Sec. 322 of the LGC it could not ber e v e r t e d i n t o s a v i n g s f o r a n o t h e r u s e 2 ) t h e f i l l i n g o f t h e i n t e r p l e a d e r c o u l d n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d a s a n u n a v o i d a b l e discontinuance since months after the interpleader, the Caloocan City government even filed an expropriation case for theCLT property 3) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, at the time of passing Ordinance No. 0254 did not adopt new or updatedrules of procedure for the current year; this was shown by the hurried passage in one day of the said ordinance and 4) theappropriation of P50M for Expropriation of Properties actually did not exist this was merely a subterfuge by Malonzo todip his hands into the P39, 352. 017.75 intended for the CLT property expropriation project. Held : Malonzo is correct. Reasons:1) During the oral arguments and pleadings, it was clear that the amount of P39, 352, 017.75 and whether it was a capital outlay or continuing appropriation was not the issue; rather the issue wasthe budgetary item Expropriation of Properties wherein the amount of P50M was appropriated for said use but was later discontinued, and later on, an amount of P39, 313, 028.00 from the P50M was appropriated for office repair and other miscellaneous expenses. Malonzos explanation that the P50M was not intended for the purchase of CLT property but for expenses incidental to expropriation, such as relocation of squatters, appraisal fee, etc. was believed by the Court. (Sowhat happened to the P39, 352, 047.75, if Malonzos explanation is to be believed? Justice Kapunan and 2 others dissented, believing the OPs argument that there was actually no P50M

existing to fund the Expropriation of Propertiesitem. In fact, Malonzo used the nonexistent P50M appropriation as a cover-up to illegally spend the P32, 352, 047.75 for repair of offices and hiring of personnel. Can you say kickback?)2) The failure to adopt new or updated rules of procedure of the Sangguniang Panlungsod as mandated by Sec.50 and 52 of the LGC is not intended to paralyze said Sanggunian from doing its job. An interpretation of Sec. 50 and 52of the LGC that will avoid inconvenience and absurdity must be adopted, thus the OPs contention is mistaken. g. 2 Sec. 1, Chapter 1, Title XII, E. O. 292 Declaration of policy. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. For this purpose, it shall providefor a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. Theallocation of powers and resources to loose government units shall be promoted and inter-local government grouping,consolidation a coordination of resources shall be encouraged. The state shall guarantee the local government units their just share in national taxes and their equitable shares in proceeds from the use natural resources, and afford them wider latitude for resource generation. g. 3 Pimentel v. Aguirre, G. R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000Facts : In 1997, President Ramos issued A. O. No. 372 which caught the ire of Senator Aquilino Pimentel becauseof certain 2 provisions which state 1) All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges,government-owned and controlled corporation and local government units will identify and implement measures in FY1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation for non-personalservice items, along the following suggested areas and 2) Pending of assessment and evaluation of the DevelopmentBudget Coordinating Committee of the emergency fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the Internal RevenueAllotment (IRA) to LGUs shall be withheld. Pimentel claims that both provisions do not comply with Section 284 of LGC,which provides for the 4 requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters 1) an unmanaged publicsector deficit of the national government 2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of various local leagues 3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the DOF, DILG and DBM and 4) any adjustmen t in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. Specially, Pimentel claims that there wasno showing that there was actually an unmanaged public sector deficit and that there was no consultations conducted withthe different leagues of local governments. Held : Pimentel is partly correct. Reasons:1. The Supreme Court is prepared to believe the Solicitor Generals assurance that the first provision abovestated is merely an advisory or guiding policy for local executives to follow, thus local autonomy is not interfered upon.2. The second provision is violative of local fiscal autonomy because its basic feature, the automatic release of theshares of LGUs in the national internal revenue, is missing. This is mandated in Article 10, Sec. 6 of the Constitution.Furthermore, Section 286 of the LGC provides that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within 5 daysafter every quarter of the ye ar and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. The withholding of 10% of the IRA is definitely a holdback. H. Public Corporation defined Definition 1: Those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the State (Act 1459, Sec.2)Definition 2: Those corporations created by the State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of itsown public works (Eliot, Mun. Corp. p. 1) I. Essential Elements of a Municipal Corporation 1) A legal creation or incorporation2. A corporate name by which the artificial personality or legal entity is known and in which all corporation acts aredone.3) Inhabitants constituting the population who are invested with the political and c orporate powers which areexecuted through duly constituted officers and agents;4) a place or territory within which the local civil government and corporate functions are exercised (Martin, Pub.Corp., 1971) J. Two fold character of a municipal corporation; its significance 1) Government the municipal corporation is an agent of the State for the government of the territory and theinhabitants within the municipal limits. The municipal corporation exercises by delegation a part of the sovereigntyof the State.2 ) P r i v a t e t h e M C a c t s i n a s i m i l a r

c a t e g o r y a s a b u s i n e s s c o r p o r a t i o n , p e r f o r m i n g f u n c t i o n s n o t s t r i c t l y government or political. The MC stands for the community in the administration of local affairs w/c is whollybeyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred K. What is Federalism? Definition: A s ystem in which political power is divided between a central (national) government and smaller government units.Supporting Definition: The central government is often called the federal government and the smaller units, states or provinces. In a true federal system, citizens owe their loyalty directly tothe central government, even though they live in states or provinces. The central government has direct authority over thepeople concerning powers granted to it in the constitution. III. CREATION AND ABOLITION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Sec. 6, LGC: Authority to create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be created divided,merged, abolished or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city,municipality or any other political subdivision of by ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or SangguniangPanlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations andrequirements prescribed in this Code. A. Requisites for creation of Local Government Units 1. Income. It must be sufficient based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilitiesand services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the LGU concerned.2. Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants of the within the territorial jurisdiction of theLGU concerned.3. Land Area. It must be contiguous unless it comprises 2 or more islands or is separated by an LGU independentof the other properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to provide for such basicservices and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be arrested by the Department of Finance, the NSO and the Land Management Bureau of the DENR. B. Decided cases: b. 1 Pelaez V. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569Facts : In 1964, President Macapagal issued several EOs creating 33 new municipalities, mainly in NorthernLuzon and Mindanao. The President based his power from Sec. 68 of the Revised Penal Code of 1917. Vice PresidentEmmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, restrainingh i m f r o m p a s s i n g i n a u d i t a n y expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive order and/or an y disbursement by said municipalities.Pelaez contends that: 1) Sec 68 of the Revised Administration Code has been impliedly repealed by R.A 2370,the Barrio Charter Act. 2) Sec. 68 is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and 3) Sec. 68 can allowthe president to interfere in local government affairs. Held : Pelaez is correct. Reasons:1. The Barrio Charter Act states that barrios may not be created nor their boundaries altered or their nameschanged except by act of Congress of the corresponding municipal board upon petition of the majority of voters in theareas affected and the recommendation of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated Thisimplies that if the President cannot create barrios, what more municipalities? (But I think this is not a very good argumentcoz its implying way too much).2. A law must be: a) Complete in itself so that there is nothing left for the delegate to do but to implement the statute and b) Fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinable The standard set by Sec. 68 is as the publicwelfare may require This standard, in relation to the law in question, is so broad that is virtually unfettered.3. The creation of Municipal Corporation is essentially legislative in character. If the president can createmunicipalities, situations may arise where he can submit local officials to his dictation by creating a new municipality andincluding therein the barrio wherein the officials preside, thus said officials positions would suddenly becomes vacant. Thepower of control by the president over local government is denied by the 1935 Constitutionb. 2 Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727Facts

: B.P. No. 885 was passed allowing for the creation of the province of Negros del Norte on the Island of Negros. Petitioner Patricio Tan claimed that B.P. no 885 violated Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution which states: Noprovince, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundar y substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majorityof the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Specifically, the remaining areas in the province of NegrosOccidental were not allowed to participate in the plebiscite for the creation of Negros del Norte. Petitioner also claims theproposed province of Negros del Norte failed to meet the requirements of Sec. 197 of the LGC of 1983, specially that afuture province must have at least an area of 3,500 sq. km. Negros del Norte, Petitioner avers, is actually only 2,856.56 sqkm. Respondent claims the issue was already rendered moot and academic as the new province of Negros del Norte wasalready proclaimed. Moreover, the area of Negros del Norte is really 4,019.95 sq km, since the waters falling under the jurisdiction and control of Negros del Norte must be included in the total area of the province. Held : Tan is correct. The plebiscite is declared null and void Reasons:1)The phrase subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affectedmust be construed to mean that the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental should havebeen allowed to participate in the said plebiscite. The reason is that cities belonging to Negros Occidentalwill be added to Negros del Norte, thus Negros Occidentals land area will be dismembered. Certainly, the people of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to vote in the plebiscite as they are directly affectedby the diminution in land size of their province.2)A reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC of 1983 says. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands. The use of the word territory clearly reflects that thelaw refers only to the land mass and excludes the waters over which the political unit has control. In other words, Negros del Norte failed to meet the required land area of 3,500 sq. km for it to become a province.b. 3 Paredes v. Executive Secretary 128 SCRA 6Facts : By virtue of B.P. Blg 56, certain barangays in the municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao held a plebiscite to determinewhether they want to constitute themselves into the new municipality of Aguinaldo. Governor Zosimo Paredes et. al. however claimed that the rest of the barangays on Mayoyao should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite by virtue of Art. XI, Sec of the 1973 Constitution as the other barangays are also affected by the creation of the municipality of Aguinaldo. Held : Paredes is wrong. Presumption of constitutionality should be applied in this case. B.P. Blg. 56 is a reflection of local autonomy on the part of the barangay wanting to constituent themselves into a new municipality. Said barangaysshould be given leeway in becoming self-reliant communities. Moreover, the people in said barangays are the ones whowill constitute the new municipality of Aguinaldo, not the other barangays of Mayoyao excluded from B.P. Blg. 56 b. 4 Mun. of Candijay, Bohol v. Ca 251 SCRA 182Facts : The municipality of Candijay petitioned the RTC of Tagbilaran, Bohol, claiming that its boundary line actuallycovered barrio Pagahat, since the municipality of Alicia claims to have current territorial jurisdiction over said barrio. TheRTC awarded Pagahat to Candijay Alicia appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of Alicia on the groundsthat 1) applying the rule of equiponderance of evidence (a principle in Civil Procedure) with Candijay as plaintiff and Aliciaas defendant in the lower court, the court must rule in favor of the defendant. The equiponderance of evidence rule states:Where the scale shall stand upon equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or theother, the court will find for the defendant. Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence andnot on the weakness of defendants claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant,there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.In this case, both municipalities failed to satisfactorily back their claims that they owned barrio Pagahat: and 2) if Candijays boundary line claim was true, then not only would they claim Pagahat but also other certain barrios as well,which

would as a result, certainly expand Candijays territory far beyond than what the law allows her, Candijay petitionedis review on certiorari with the SC, claiming that 1) the CA misapplied the equiponderance of evidence rule and 2) themunicipality of Alicia had no juridical personality, having been created under avoid E.O. ( E.O. No.265) since Sec. 68 of the RAC of 1917 from which the said E.O. derived its authority, was declared unconstitutional in Pelaez v. Audition General (See III-b 1). Held : The Municipality of Candijay is incorrect Reasons:1. The SC sees no need in reviewing the equiponderance rule as it was not arrived whimsically or capriciously by theCA2. The Municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of E.O. 265 in 1949. 16 years late when Pelaez v. Auditor Generalwas promulgated. And yet even after, various government acts, most notably the recognition by the 1987 Constitution of Alicia as one of the 20 municipalities of the Third District of Bohol, indicate the States recognition and acknowledgementof the existence thereof. Alicia therefore, can claim the benefits of Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC of 1991 which states MunicipalDistrict organized pursuant to presidential issuances and E.O. and which have their respective set of municipal officialsh o l d i n g o f f i c i a l s h o l d i n g o f f i c e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e e f f e c t i v i t y o f t h e c o d e s h a l l h e n c e f o r t h b e c o n s i d e r e d a s r e g u l a r municipalities. Sec. 442 (d) is therefore a curative law in favor of Alicia. The objection against it bei ng a municipalcorporation should have been done before the LGC was enacted in 1991.b. 5 Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr. 265 SCRA 182 NOTE: Dates in this case are important because essentially Jimenez lost on account of the slow wheels of justice Facts : In 1949, President Quirino issued E.O. 258, creating the municipality of Sinacaban in the Province of Misamis Occidental. In 1988 by virtue of said E.O. Sinacaban filed a claim with the provincial Board of Misamis Occidentalagainst the municipality of Jimenez territorial possession of about 5 barrios. Jimenez in its reply with the provincial Boardthat same year and later on with the RTC in 1990, said that Sinacaban had no juridical personality to file a suit because itwas created under a void E.O. as promulgated in Pelaez Auditor General and 2) the disputed barrios belong to Jimenezsince in 1950 the municipalities entered into an agreement duly approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidentalback then which recognized Jimenezs jurisdiction over the disputed barrio in 1992, the RTC ruled in favor of Sinacabanusing as its basis the curative benefits of Sec. 2 of the LGC of 1991. Angrily, Jimenez added in its petition with the Supreme Court the RTCs decision was null and void because it failed to decide the case within one year mandated by theLGC of 1983 and the Constitution. Held : Jimenez is incorrect Reasons:1. Sinacaban can claim the benefits of Sec.442 (d) of the LGC of 1991, since various government acts throughthe years after the Pelaez case of 19 65 indicate the recognition by the years after the Pelaez case 1965 indicate the recognition by the state of the municipality of Sinacaban, most notably when the 1987 Constitution recognized Sinacabanas part of the 2 nd District of Misamis Occidental.2. Whatever agreement Sinacaban and Jimenez entered into 1950 must still conform with the territorial metes andbounds set forth in E.O. 258, otherwise the agreement in void (A relocation survey was ordered but the results of the survey was not stated in the case)3. Even granting that the RTC was deliberately slow, its decision is not rendered void. The only remedy left wouldbe to file administrative sanctions against it.b. 6 Mendenilla v. Onandia 5 SCRA 536 Facts : In 1954, the mayor of the municipality of Legaspi appointed Emilio Mendenilla as Chief of Police. Then, in1959, Congress passed R.A. 2234 converting the municipality of Legaspi into the City of Legaspi R.A. 2234 provides thatthe position of Chief of Police of the city of Legaspi is to be appointed by the President. Therefore, when Jose Manuel Onandia was appointed by the President City Chief of Police, Mendenilla assailed the legality of such a move, claimingthat his position as chief of police was not abolished when Legaspi was converted from a city to a municipality 2) Under R.A. 557 his

employment status as Chief of Police may not be abolished except in the manner specified in R.A. 557 and3) The Civil Service Law guarantees his security of tenure. Held : Mendenilla is incorrect Reasons:1. The position of Chief of Police of a municipality is totally different from the position of the Chief of Police of a city. Therefore, R.A. 2234 abolished the position of municipality Chief of Police and replaced it with a city Chief of police. Insupport of this contention, the Supreme Court cited Sec. 96, Article XVII of the charter which provides that the City Mayor the Vice Mayor, etc. are allowed to continue in office upon the effectivity of the charter until the expiration of their terms inoffice. Nowhere does it mention the Chief of Police in the said list of officials. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.2. Notwithstanding both R.A. 557 and the Civil Service Law, it is within the legal competence of Congress to enact R.A.2234. Congress has the plenary power to make laws, meaning its power to make any kind of law is, in theory, unlimited.Quiz: If the municipality of a municipal judge is converted into a city, can the judge continue to serve in the new city?Answer: Yes. A judge is not a municipal official. He does not derive his power or his appointment from a city charter; hederives them from the Constitution and other Laws.b. 7 Mathay v. CA 320 SCRA 703 NOTE: Dont confuse CSU with CSC Facts : During his term, Mayor Brigido Simon appointed 16 people to positions in the Civil Service Unit (CSU) of the local government of Quezon City. Simons authority to appoint was based upon P.D. 51. The Secretar y of Justice rendered an Opinion, stating that P.D. 51 was never published in the Gazette, therefore, conformably with the Tanada v.Tuvera ruling P.D. 51 never became law at all. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) thus ordered the revocation of allappointments in the CSU. However, the effects of such revocation were temporarily cushioned when the city councilissued an ordinance creating the Department of Public Order and Safety (DPOS). All present personnel of the CSU, thesaid ordinance stated are to be absorbed into the DPOS.However, the regular positions in the DPOS never got filled due to insufficient number of said positions and lackof funds.Simon and later on his successor, Mayor Ismael Mathay, remedied the situation by offering the CSU personnelcontractual appointment. When Mathay refused to renew their appointments, the CSU personnel complained to the CSC.The CSC replied by issuing resolutions ordering the CSU personnel reinstated. Mathay now asserts that the CSC cannotorder him to reinstate the said personnel as it is. In effect, giving the appointing power he possesses, as city Mayor to theCSC. Held : Mathay is correct. Reasons:1)First of all, the law applicable is B.P. 337 or the old LGC and not the LGC of 1991 since the material events of thecase took place during the time of the old LGC.2 ) U n d e r B.P. 337, the power to appoint rests in the local chief executive in the case t h e M a y o r . W h e n t h e c i t y council issued the ordinance allowing for the absorption of CSU personnel into the DPOS, it specifically made useof the wordings Present Personnel and not positions, thus the city council arrogated upon itself the appointingpower by dictating who shall occupy the DPOS positions. Even in the local government level, the separation of powers must be respected.3)The reasoning in no. 2 also applies to the CSC. The CSC claims that by virtue of the ordinance enacted by thecity council, the CSU personnel became regular employees and such they have gained the protection of the CivilService Law. Such reasoning is wrong because in the first place the CSU never existed at all, thus they were never part of the Civil Service to begin with. Thus when Simon and later on Mathay offered them contractualappointments, they were at the mercy of the appointing power of the said mayors, as they have the option not torenew their appointmentsb. 8 Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53Facts : R.A. 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays in Quezon City. QuezonCity councilor Moises Samson questioned the constitutionality of said R.A. claiming that 1) certifications as to income,land area and population of Novaliches were not presented during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. 85352) a certification attesting to the fact that the mother LGU, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of N o v a l i c h e s c i t y i n terms of income, land area and popul ation, was also not presented 3) a copy of t h e p e t i t i o n o f concerned barangays calling or the creation of City of Novaliches was not presented to the Quezon City Council, as mandated by the Implementing Rules of the LGC, 1991

and 4) R.A. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of theproposed City of Novaliches as mandated by Sec. 11 (a) of the LGC, 1991. Held : Samson is wrong. Reasons:1. The presumption of constitutionally of laws shall be applied in this case, meaning that Samson has burden of proof to show that R.A. 8535 was unconstitutional. Samson did not present any proof that no certifications were presentedduring the deliberations. And even granting that no certifications were indeed presented, the representatives of the DOF,NSO, DENR and even Quezon City mayor Ismael Mathay were present during the deliberations. The official statementsattesting to the income, land area and population of Novaliches could serve the certifications contemplated by law2. Mathay was present during the deliberation. If Quezon City would object to the creation of the City of Novaliches, he would be the first representative to do so. But he didnt.3. The failure to provide the QC council a petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches is not fatal as such petition is meant only to inform the QC council of such creation. W ith the mass media publicizing the creation of the city of Novaliches, Samson could not claim he was not informed of the proposed creation4. The failure of R.A.8535 to p rovide a seat of government for Novaliches is not fatal. Sec. 12 of the LGC provides that a government center shall be established by the LGU as far as practicable. Government centers can alsoserve as seats of government.5. The fact that the City of Novalic hes was not included among the 17 cities and municipalities listed in theordinance attached to the 1987 constitution does not mean that a constitutional amendment is necessary in order for Novaliches to become a city. The ordinance attached to the Constitu tion merely apportions the seat of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere, does it provide that Metro Manila shall beforever composed of 17 cities and municipalities.NOTE: the proposed City of Novaliches was later voted down in a plebiscite held for that purpose C. How are existing sub-provinces converted to provinces? * Sec. 10 LGC: Plebiscite Requirement . No creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the voted cast in a plebiscite called for the purposein the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120 days from thedate of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless the law or ordinance fixes another date.* Sec. 462 LGC: Existing Sub-provinces Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces uponapproval of the voters cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub provinces and the original provinces directly affected.The plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of this code.The new legislative district created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress bythe duly elected representatives of the original districts out of which said new province or districts were created unit their own representative shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections and qualifiedThe incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to holdoffice until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resultingfrom expiration of resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case of negative votes in the plebiscite results, shallbe filled by appointment by the President. The appointees shall hold office until their successors shall have been electedin the regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. After effectivity of such conversion,the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly created province through appointment if none has yet beenappointed to the same as hereinbefore provided, and shall also appoint a vice governor and other members of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold office unit their successors shall have been elected in the nextlocal election and qualified.All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said sub-provinces at the time of their conversion into regular provinces shall continue in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulation.C 1. Grino v. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 672 Facts : Pursuant to Sec. 462, LGC, a plebiscite to determine whether the sub -province of Guimaras (its mother province was Iloilo) wants to become a regular province was held simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections. Theparticipants in the said plebisc ite were the residents of Iloilo (except Iloilo city) and the 3 municipalities of Guimaras. Surprisingly, the

ballots issued in the said 3 municipalities did not provided any space for the election of governor, vicegovernor and the members of the Sanggunia ng Panlalawigan of the province of Iloilo. LDP Iloilo governor-candidateSimplicio Grino claims that the COMELEC erred in not allowing the said 3 municipalities to vote for the provincial officialsof Iloilo, since at the time of the plebiscite Guimaras was still a sub-province of Iloilo. Grino says if Guimaras voted for regular provincehood then there would have been no need for them at all to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo. Butwhat if Guimaras votes to remain as a sub-province? Should special election be held for the 3 municipalities so that theycan vote for the provincial official of Iloilo? Held : Obviously, Grinos petition was rendered moot and academic when Guimaras voted to become regular province. Besides its too late to undo what COM ELEC has done. If Guimaras did vote to remain as a sub province, Grinos petition would have been meritorious. D. Conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city and reclassification (implementing Rules andregulations, LGC). * Art 12 Conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city a) Requisites for conversion . A component city shall not be converted into a highly urbanized city unless the following requirements are present:1. Income latest annual income of not less t han P50M based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasure. The annual income shall included the income accruing to the general fund exclusive of special funds, transfersand non-recurring income and2. Population, which shall not be less than 200,000 inhabitants as certified by NSO.b) Procedure for conversion :1 . R e s o l u t i o n . T h e i n t e r e s t e d c o m p o n e n t c i t y s h a l l s u b m i t t o t h e o f f i c e o f t h e P r e s i d e n t a r e s o l u t i o n o f i t s Sanggunian adopted by a majority of all its members in a meeting duly called f or the purpose, and approved and endorsed by the city mayor. Said resolution shall be accompanied by certifications as to income and population2. Declaration of conversion. Within 30 days from receipt of such resolution, the President shall, after verifyingthat the income and population requirements have been met, declare the component city as highly urbanized3. Plebiscite. W ithin 120 days from the declaration of the President or as specified in the declaration, theCOMELEC shall conduct a plebiscite in the c ity proposed to the converted such plebiscite shall be preceded by acomprehensive information campaign to be conducted by the COMELEC with the assistance of national and local government officials, media, NGOs and other interested parties.c) Effect of conversion The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make it independent of the province where itis geographically locatedReclassification (See cases below and III-e)d. 1 Ceniza v. COMELEC 95 SCRA 763 Facts : on Dec. 22 1979, the interim Batasang Pambansa enacted B.P. Blg. 51 providing for local elections on Jan30, 1980. Its section 3, the subject of controversy, reads as follows:xxx Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component comes in accor dance with standardestablished in the LGC as province for in Art XI, Sec 4 (1) of the Constitution. Any city now existing with an annual regular income derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than P40M at the time of the approval of the act shall beclassified as a highly urbanized city. All other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located. xxx The registered voters may be entitled to voter in the election of the official of the province of which that city is a component. If its charter so provides. However, voters in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabovedefined shall no participate nor vote in the election of the official of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographical located.Robert Ceniza et.al. filed a case as tax payers and registered voters in the cities of Cebu ad Mandaue assailingSec. 3 Specially, they questioned the use of annual income of a given city as basis for classification of whether or not aparticular city is a highly urbanized city whose voters may no participate in the election of provincial officials of the province in which the city is geographically located. Ceniza and his fellow

goons claim Sec.3 regulates the exercise of freedom of suffrage and violates the equal protection of the law. Moreover, they attacked R.A. 5519 the law creating theCity of Mandaue, which went to effect without the benefit of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in the plebiscite or referendum. They particularly cited the charters provision denying Mandaue the right to participate in provincial elections. Held : Ceniza et. at. is mistaken. Reasons:1. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonom y of LGUs Corollar y to independencehowever, is the concomitan t loss of right to participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any government jurisdiction and authority over said city.2. Regular annual income of a given city is substantial distinction for classification. The revenue of a city wouldshow whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent economic, social and politicalunit. Thus, the equal protection of the laws in not violated.3. Freedom of suffrage is not imperiled since the Constitution does not give the city voter the right to participate inprovincial elections for territorial reasons4. The city of Mandaue came into existence. In 1969, the constitutional requirement that the creation, alteration,etc. of a city, province, etc. is subject to a plebiscite only came into being when the 1973 Constitution was enacted andtherefore cannot be applied retroactively.d. 2 Tobias v. Abalos 239 SCRA 106Facts : Robert Tobias, et. al. invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong City, assailed theconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7675, known as An act Converting the City of Mandaluyong into a Highly urbanized city known as the City of Mandaluyong. They cited, among others, Art. VIll, Sec. 49 of R.A. 7675, which provides that As ahighly urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of SanJuan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at thesame region Said provision Tobias claims is not germane to the title of R.A. 7675 thus being contrary to the one titleones u b j e c t r u l e s i n c e i t c r e a t e s a l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t w h e r e a s t h e t i t l e e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e s o n l y f o r t h e c o n v e r s i o n o f Mandaluyong into highly urbanized city. Also, Tobias, et. al. contend that the people of san Juan should have been madeto participate in the plebiscite as the same involves a change in their legislative district. Held : Tobias, et.al. are grossly erroneous Reasons:1. The creation of a new legislative district is a natural logical consequence of its conversion into a highlyurbanized city.2. The contention that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district is benefit of merit. The reason is that the principle subjectinvolved I the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate districtrepresentation was only ancillary thereto. Thus the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the saidplebiscite as they have nothing to do with the changed in status of neighboring Mandaluyong. (This argument is rather strange for me).d.3 Miranda v. Aguirre 314 SCRA 603Facts : On May 5, 1994 R.A. 7720 was passed converting the municipality of Santiago, Isabel into an independentcomponent city. On Feb 14, 1998 R.A. 8528 was passed amending R.A. 7720 on 2 points: 1 Sec. 2 of R.A. 7720 is herebyamended by deleting the words, an independent so that the municipality of Santiago will be converted into a componentcity only and 2) the voters of Santiago could now vote again for the provincial officials of the province of Isabela. JoseMiranda, the mayor of Santiago and other petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A. 8528. He says that said lawlacks the provision requiring that the plebiscite be held for its ratification. Alexander Aguirre, the Executive Secretary andother respondents on the other hand countered that (1) Miranda et. al. had no standing to file their petition 2) the issue isa political question and 3) R.A. 8528 did not created divide, etc or after any boundaries of Santiago it merely reclassifiedSantiago from an independent component city into a component city. Held : Aguirre and his cohorts are gravely mistaken. Reasons:1. Miranda had standing, he field the petition in his capacity as mayor of Santiago.2. The issue is justiciable, Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A.

8528, since it runs contrary to article X,Sec 10 of the 1987 Constitution. The court has the power to decide the constitutionality of any law.3. The reclassification will downgrade Santiagos status from an independent component city into a componentcity. Far reaching changes will then take place. Its political independence will diminish. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. Ordinance and resolution passed by the city council of Santiagowill have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabel. Taxes collected by the city would then be shared with theprovince. All these changes merit the need of a plebiscite so that the people at Santiago can air their side on the issue.Moreover, if a plebiscite can be held for the upgrading of an LGU, should not a plebiscite be held for its downgrading aswell?NOTE: Mendozas strong dissent was anchored on Art. X Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution. Said section refers toalteration of boundaries of Santiago were substantially altered nor any of its income, population or land area been radically changes Santiago was neither recreated into another LGU nor abolished, much less its boundaries alter. (Thisgood justice is implying the reclassification was administrative in nature. E. Classification of provinces, cities and municipalities (Read E.O. 349) This act is entitled providing for a new income classification of provinces, cities and other municipalities Pertinentprovisions include:Sec. 1. Classification of provinces and cities. Provinces and cities except Manila and Quezon City, which shall be considered as special class cities, are hereby divided into 6 main classes according to the annual average income theyactually realized during the last 4 calendar years immediately preceding as follows: a) First class P30M or more b)Second class P20M-P30M; c) Third class P15M-P20M; d) Fourth class P10M-15M, e) Fifth class P5M10-M; f) Sixth classless than P5MSec. 2. Classification of Municipalities x x x according to the annual average income they actually realized during thelast 4 calendar years immediately preceding as follows; a) First class, P15M or more b) second class, P10M-15M c) Thirdclass, P5M-10M d) fourth class P3MP5M e) Fifth class, P1M-3M f) Sixth Class, less than P1M.Sec. 3. Period of General Reclassification of Province, Cities and Municipalities. Upon the effectivity of this E.O. andfor each period of 4 consecutive calendar years thereafter, the Secretary of Finance shall reclassif y the all provinces,cities, except Manila and Quezon City, Which shall remain as special class cities, and municipalities, on the basis of theforegoing schedules of the average annual income of each province, city or municipality derived during the last 4 consecutive calendar years immediately such reclassification according to the provisions hereof.Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. As used this E.O.a. Annual Income revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of thelocal general and infrastructure funds including the internal revenue and specific tax allotments provided for in PDs 144and 436, both as amended but exclusive of non-recurring receipt, such as other national ads, grants, financial assistance,loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets and similar othersb. Average annual income- sum of the annual income - sum of the Annual Income as herein defined actuallyobtained by a province, cities and municipalities.Sec. 5 Use of income classification of provinces, cities, and municipalities. xxx as basis for: a) Fixing of maximum taxceiling imposable by the local government b) Determination of statuto ry and administrative aids, Financial grants andother forms of assistance to local government c) Establishment of salary scales and rates of allowances per diems, andother emoluments that local government officials and personnel may be entitled to d) Implementation of personnel policieson promotions, transfers, details or secondment, and related matters at the local government levels e) formulation andexecution of local government budget policies and f) Determination of the financial capability of local government units toundertake development programs and priority projectsNOTE: There are 7 more sections, mainly on salaries and taxes- you know, ways to put more money into the pocket of our bureaucrats F. Settlement of boundary disputes( Sec. 118, LGC, Sec 15-19, IRR) * Section 118. Judicial Responsibility for settlement of Boundary Dispute. Boundary dispute between and amongLGUs shall, as much as possible. Be settled amicably. To this end:a . B o u n d a r y d i s p u t e s i n v o l v i n g 2 or m ore barangays in the sam e cit y or m unicipality shall be referred f o r settlement to the Sangguniang Panlungsod Sangguniang Bayan concerned.b. Boundary disputes involving 2 or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlementto the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned.c. Boundary dispute involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the Sangguniang of the province concerned.d. Boundary dispute involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on theother or 2 or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective Sangguniang of thepartiese. In the event the Sangguniang fails to present an

amicable settlement within 60 days from the date the disputewas referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter the dispute shall be formally tried by the Sangguniang concerned which shall decide the issue within 60 days from the date of the certification referred to above.*Sec. 15 definition and policy. There is a boundary dispute when a portion or a whole of the territorial area of anLGU is claimed by 2 or more LGUs. Boundary disputes between or among LGUs shall, as much as possible, be settledamicably * Sec.16 Jurisdictional Responsibility. Boundary disputes shall be referred for settlement to the following:a . S a n g g u n i a n g P a n l u n g s o d o r S a n g g u n i a n g f o r t h o s e i n v o l v i n g 2 o r m o r e b a r a n g a y s i n t h e s a m e c i t y o r municipality as the case may be.b. Sangguniang Panlalawigan for those involving 2 or more municipalities with in the same province.c. Jointly, to the Sanggunian of provinces concerned, for those involving component cities or municipalities of different provinces.d. Jointly, to the respective Sangguniang for those involving a component city or municipality and highly urbanizedcity of 2 or more highly urbanized cities.* Sec. 17 Procedures for settling Boundar y Disputes they are 1) filing of petition 2) contents of petition 3)documents attached to petition (e.g. provincial, city or barangay map as the case may be technical description of theboundaries of the LGUs concerned 4) Joint hearing 5) failure to settle amicably (a certification shall be submitted to theeffect 6) Decision 7) Appeal (To the proper RTC)*Sec 18. Maintenance of Status Quo. Pending final resolution of the dispute, the status of the affected area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all purposes.* Sec 19. Official Custodian. The DILG shall be the official custodian of all documents on boundary disputes of LGUs.f 1. City of Pasig v. COMELEC et.al. 314 SCRA 179 Facts : 2 petitions were raised by the City of Pasig and the municipality of Cainta respectively. Both Questionedthe priority of the suspension of the scheduled plebiscites for the proposed creation of Barangay Karangalan andbarangay Napico (pursuant to 2 ordinances passed by both cities) Cainta had contended that the proposed barangaysinvolve areas included in the boundary dispute between her and Pasig; hence the suspension of the scheduled plebiscitesis justified. Pasig however contends otherwise. Despite this, the COMELEC ruled against Cainta and the plebiscite for thecreation of barangay Napico pushed through. The core issues now are 1) whether or not the said barangay dispute is aprejudicial question which must be resolved before any plebiscite can be held and 2) W hether the plebiscite alreadyconducted ratifying the creation of Barangay Napico has rendered the issue as to it moot and academic. Held : Cainta is correct. Reasons1. Pasig cannot deny that there is a pending boundary dispute between her and Cainta Surely, whether the areain controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of the Pasig hasmaterial bearing to the proposed barangay Karangalan and Napico. The importance of drawing with precise strokes theterritorial boundaries of an LGU cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of theterritorial jurisdiction of an LGU. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of LGUs willsow costly conflicts in the exercise of government powers which will ultimately the peoples welfare.2. As was done before in Tan v. COMELEC, the plebiscite already conducted for the creation of Barangay Napicocan be annulled and set aside.Held: SC held that the plebiscite should be held in abeyance.f. 2 DILG Opinion No. 161-1994 (still to search) G. Naming of LGU naming of LGUs and public places, streets and structures * Sec 13, LGC, Art 20-23, IRRa. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission (PHC), changethe name of the following within territorial jurisdiction:1.Component cities and municipalities upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned.2.Provincial roads, boulevards, avenue, thoroughfares and bridges3.Public vocationa l or technical school and other post -secondary and tertiary schools4.Provincial hospitals, health centers and other health facilities5.Any other place or building owned by the provincial government.b. The Sangguniang of highly urbanized cities and of component cities whose charters prohibit their voters fromvoting for provincial electrical officials, hereinafter referred to in this code as independent component cities may

inconsultation with the PHC change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction:1. City barangays, upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang barangay concerned.25 essentially the same as (a) nos. 2-5 above except only to those within its territorial jurisdiction. c. The sanggunians of component cities and municipalities may, in consultation with its territorial.d. None of the foregoing LGUs institutions, places, or buildings shall be named after a living person nor a changeof name be made unless for a justifiable reason and in any case not oftener than once every 10 years. The name of anLGU or a public place, street or structure with historical, culture or ethic significance shall not be changed, unless by aunanimous vote of the sanggunian concerned and in consultation with the PHC.e. A change in name of a public school shall be made only upon the recommendation of the local school boardconcerned.f. A change in name of public hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities shall be made only upon the local board concerned.g. In any change of name, the office of the president, the representative of the legislative district concerned andthe bureau of posts shall be notified. Note: Letters (d) to (b) are the limitations in the change of name of a local government unit institution or places or buildings.* Art. 20-22 IRR These articles are essentially copied from sec 13 (a) (b) and (c),LGC See for yourself * Art.23, IRR Guidelines and limitation a. No name of LGUs, public places, street and structures with historical, culture or ethnic significances shall bechanged, unless with unanimous vote of the sanggunian and in consultation with the National Historical Institution (NHI).b. No change in the name of an LGU shall be effective unless ratified in a plebiscite called for that purpose.c. Naming shall be subject to the following conditions:1. Naming after leaving person shall be not followed.2. A chance in the name shall only be for a just able reason.3. Any change shall not be made more than once every ten years.4. A chance in name of a local public school shall be made upon the recommendation of the school board.5 . A c h a n c e i n n a m e o f l o c a l p u b l i c h o s p i t a l , h e a l t h c e n t e r a n d o t h e r h e a l t h f a c i l i t i e s o n l y u p o n t h e recommendation of the local school board.6. The whole line of the street shall have only.7. The name of the family in a particular community whose members contributed significantly to the welfare of theFilipino people maybe used.d. The office of the president, the representative of the legislative district concerned, and the postal service shallbe notified of any change in name of LGUs, public places, streets and structures H. Rules of interpretation, (Sec 5, LGC) *Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:a. Any provision on a power of local government shall be liberally interpreted its favor, and in case of doubt, anyquestion thereof shall be reserved in favor of devolution of powers and the lower LGU. Any and reasonable doubt as tothe existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of LGU concerned.b. In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the LGU enacting it,and liberally in favor of the tax buyer. Any tax exemption, relief of incentive granted by any LGU pursuant to the provisionsof this code shall be construed strict against the person claiming it.c . T h e g e n e r a l w e l f a r e p r o v i s i o n o f t h i s c o d e s h a l l b e l i b e r a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d t o g i v e m o r e p o w e r s L G U s i n accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.d. Rights and obligations existing on the effective of this code and a rising out contact or any other source of presentation involving an LGU shall be governed by the original terms conditions of contracts or the law in force at thetime such rights were vested.e. In the resolution of controversies arising under this code where no legal provision of jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the customers and traditions of the place where the controversies took place.h.1 Principle of devolution (See Sec 17 [4] (c) and (i) LGC} * Sec 17, LGC. Basic Services and Facilities.a. LGUs shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties andfunctions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agenciesand offices devolved to them pursuant to this code. Local government shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary appropriate or incidental to efficient and effectiveprovision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein;[4] For a cityAll the services and facilities of the municipally and province, and in addition thereto, the following:a. Adequate communication and transportation facilities.b. Support for education, police and fire services and facilitiesb. National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to LGUs the responsibility

for the provision of basic service and facilities enumerated in this section within six months from the effect of this codeAs used in this code the term devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power andauthority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities.c. The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to LGUs of the records ,equipment, andother assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the develop powers, function and responsibilities personnel of said national agencies or office shall be absorb by the local government units to which theybelong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extend that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight community Provided, That the right accorded to such personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules of similar regulation shall not be impaired Provided for their, That regional directors who are career service executed officers andother officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the LGU shall b e retained by theNational Government, without any revolution of rank, salary or tenure.h. 2 Badua v. Cordillera Bodong Administration, 94 SCRA 10 Facts: In 1996.David Quema as the owner of 2 parcels of land in Lacaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra mortgagedsaid parcels of land of 6,000 to Dra. Erotida Valera. He was able to redeem the land of 22 years later, long after Dra. Valera had already died. He allegedly was able to pay the redemption price of Dra. Valeras heir. Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua alleged howe ver that Dra. Valera sold the land to her while she was still alive. However, Rosa could not produce the deed of sale because it was allegedly in the possession of Vice-governor Benesa.As Quema was prevented by Rosa from cultivating the land, Quema, instead of filling a case with the provincialcourts, filed it instead with the Maeng Tribal Court of the Cordillera Bondong Administration (CBA) In 1989, The tribal courtrule in favor of Quema when the Baduas refused to vacate the subject land, they (the Baduas) received a warning order from the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army. The Baduas the felid a special and extraordinary relief with the SC, whichwas duly treated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, questioning the jurisdiction and legal personality of the MaengTribal Court, the CBA and the CPLA. Held : The petition is that the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) never came into l e g a l e x i s t e n c e a s a consequence of the Ordillo v. COMELIC ruling. As a result, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an advisory or special court under R. A.6766. Instead, it is just an ordinary tribal court with mere advisory and conciliatory power to makepeace, settle and compromise. Such courts are not considered part of Philippine judicial s ystem. By analogy to thepangkat or conciliatory panels created under P.D.1508, if the Badua had failed to seasonably repudiate the Maeng TribalCourts decision, said decision would have had the force and effect of a final judgment in court. As was shown, the Baduas did file a timely petition with the SC. IV. POWERS OF MUNICAL CORPORATION (MC)A. Sources of Power 1. Constitution of a state2. Statutes of a state including a) those applicable to all municipal corporation or to the class to which theparticular municipal corporation belongs and b) special act of the legislature, as far as authorized, applicable to the particular municipal corporation.3. The charter 4. Doctrine of inherent right of self -government with respect to certain municipal matters (applicable to states which adhere to it). B. Classification of Power 1.) Express, implied and inherent power a. Express - those granted in express word by the special charter or the g e n e r a l l a w u n d e r w h i c h corporation is organized.b. Implied- those granted which arise by natural implication from the granted of express power or bynecessary inference from the purposes or function of the corporation (e.g. an ordinance to prevent fires necessarilycarries with it the authority to chase fire trunks).c. Inherent-those which are necessary and inseparable from every corporation, and which come into existence as a matter of course as soon as an MC is created they are: 1. To have perpetual succession2. To sue and be sued, implead, grant and receive by its corporation name and other acts as a judicialperson3. To make by laws and ordinances for the government of the corporation.4. To make and ordinance for the government of the corporation.Note: Usually these so-called inherent powers are expressly provided in MCs charter.2.) Legislative and executive powers a. Legislative authority to make lawsb. Executive authority to enforce lawsNOTE: The test to determine what is legislative and what is administrative is whether the ordinance is

onemaking a new or one executing law already in existence. The former is legislative; the latters executive.3.) Intramural and extramural powers 1.) Intramural those exercised within the corporate limits of a municipal corporation.2.) Extramural those exercised without like those given for the protection of water supply, prevention of Nuisance, and also for police purposes.4.) Governmental and municipal powers 1.) Governmental those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting thepublic welfare within. They include those which are legislative, judicial, public and political. Specific examples are: Administration of justice, police power; eminent domain; promotes public education; fire prevention and safety; and allother powers to be exercised by the MC as an agent the State, for the benefit of the public or of the exercise of which thecorporation receives consideration.2.) Municipal those exercised for the specified benefits and advantage of the urban community and they includethose which are ministerial, preemptory, private and corporate plans of which the corporation receives no compensation.5.) mandatory and discretionary powers a.) Mandatory those the exercise of which are required of municipal corporations.b.) Discretionary those which the corporations may perform or not depending upon own judgment anddiscretion. III. Kinds of PowersA. Police Power (General Welfare Clause) and the limitations on the exercise (Sec. 16, LGC) 1. Police Power the power to prescribe regulations to promote health, moral, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential insistent and illimitable of power. It is elastic and must beresponsive to various social conditions. Police power is inherent in the State but not in municipal corporations. In order that a municipality corporation may exercise police power, there must be a legislative grant which necessarily also setslimits for the exercise of the power.2 . G e n e r a l W e l f a r e C l a u s e ( S e c . 1 6 , L G C ) E v e r y L G U s h a l l e x e r c i s e t h e p o w e r e x p r e s s l y g r a n t e d , t h o s e necessarily implied there from, as well as the powers necessar y, appropriated incidental for its efficient and effectivegovernance, and those which are essential to the promotion of general welfare. W ithin their respective territorial jurisdictions, LGUs shall ensure and support among other things, he preservation and enrichment of culture, promotehealth and safety, enhance the right people to balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriatethe self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social j u s t i c e , p r o m o t e f u l l e m p l o y m e n t a m o n g t h e i r r e s i d e n t s , m a i n t a i n p e a c e a n d o r d e r a n d p r e s e r v e t h e c o m f o r t a n d convenience of their inhabitant.3. Limitations on the exercise - a police power measure may be struck down as invalid if it does not meet tests a.)The interest of the public generally, as distinguish from those of a particular class, requires the exercise of the policepower and b.) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 1. Binay y Domingo 201 SCRA 508Facts : On Sept 27, 1988, the Municipality of Makati, through its Counc il, approved Resolution No. 60, whichprovided for a burial assistance program by the office of the mayor. Said program aims to extend financial assistance of P500 to bereaved families whose income does not exceed P2, 000. The Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved Res.No. 60 on the grounds that the said resolution 1.) did not have an obvious or real connection to the public safety, health,morals or general welfare in order to be sustained as a legitimate exercise of police power; and 2.) said resolution onlybenefits few individuals when it should benefit the inhabitants of the municipality as a whole. Mayor Jejomar Binay nowpetitions the SC that the Resolution be declared a valid exercise of the police power. Held : The COA is wrong Reasons: 1. COA tried to redefine for itself the meaning of police power. Police power is not capable of an exact definition. Itis not limited to peace, order, morals and all the crap but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bringout of them the greatest welf are of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. (wow)2. COA is not attuned to the changing times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentallybenefits a limited

number of persons. The drift is toward social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provideadequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice, as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. 2. American Mail Line v. City of Basilan 2 SCRA 309Facts : On Sept. 12, 1955, the City Council of Basilan City enacted Ordinance No. 180, amending Title Iv,Ordinance No. 7, which read as follows: Article IV Regulation o f berthing, mooring, docking and anchoring at piers or wharves at any point within the City of Basilan and for anchoring at any open bay, channel or any point within theterritorial waters of the City of Basilan. Ordinance No. 180 also added a new paragraph as an amendment with read: Any foreign vessel engaged in otherwise trade which may anchor at any open bay, channel or any loading point withinthe territorial limits of the City of the City of Basilan for the purpose of unloading logs or passengers and other cargoesshall pay an anchorage fee of centavo (P0.50) per registered gross ton of the vessel for the first 24 hours or part of thereof and for succeeding hours part thereof, provided that maximum charge shall not exceed P75 per day, irrespectiveof the greater tonnage of shippage.Several foreign shipping companies, including American Mail Lines questioned the validity of such an ordinancewith regards to the right of City of Basilan to impose such a fee. The City of Basilan answered that heir power to enactsuch an ordinance is based on a citys exercise of its revenue raising or of its police power. To support their contention,Basilan presented their Charter (R.A. 288) which states: Sec. 14 General Powers and Duties of the Council. Except asotherwise provided by law, and subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the Council, the Council shall have thefollowing legislative powers: a.) To levy and collects taxes for general and special purposes in accordance with law x x x c)To enact ordinances for the maintenance and preservation of peace and good morals x x x v) fix the charges to be paid byall watercraft at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places. Moreover, Basilan said the fees in question arefor a regulatory purpose, the reason being the island is a potential haven for smugglers and other illegal activities (theunderstatement of the century). Who is correct? Held : American Mail Line is correct Reasons:1. First of all, the phrase, in accordance with the law in Sec. 14 a.) of the Charter means that the City of Basilan isnot given a blanket taxation power.2. It is automatic that the power to regulates as an exercise of police power does not include the power to imposefees for revenue purposes. Thereof, Basilans claim that Ordinance No. 180 is for a regulatory purpose and not just for revenue purpose wont save said Ordinance from invalidity. Moreover, the maximum charge of P75 is more than what theNational Government imposes for harbor fees.3. Basilans Charter also grants Basilan the power to fix charges to be paid by all watercraft landing at or usingpublic wharves, docks, and levies or landing places. Said provision does not authorize Basilan to collect anchorage feesas can be shown by the need of Basilan to enact the amendatory ordinance. (Huh? Excuse me?) 3. Villanueva y Castaneda Jr. 154SCRA 142Facts : On Nov. 7, 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando passed Resolution no. 218 allowing some 24market vendors to construct their stalls along the vicinity of public market in San Fernando, Pampanga. The action wasprotested in Civil Case No. 2040 in the CFE of Pampanga and a preliminary injunction was issued to prevent constructionof said stalls. W hile the case was pending, the municipal council then passed Resolution no. 29 wh ich declared thesubject area as a parking place and a public plaza, thereby impliedly repealing Resolution no. 218. In 1968, Civil Case no.20 was decided and held that the land occupied by the market vendors was beyond the commerce of man and could notbe the subject of private occupancy.T h e d e c i s i o n w a s a p p a r e n t l y n o t e n f o r c e d . T h e m a r k e t v e n d o r s e v e n c l a i m t h a t i n 1 9 7 1 , t h e m u n i c i p a l government allotted them specific areas for which hey paid daily fees to municipal government. By 1982, the number of vendors has ballooned to 200. The clamor to enforce Resolution no. 29 grew. After an investigation by he municipalattorney, the OIC of the Office of the Mayor Vicente Macalino, ordered the demolition of the stall. The vendors protested(they apparently had little legal basis coz all they did was protest) Held : Resolution no. 29 must be enforced. The reason is that, under the Civil Code, public plazas are propertiesof public dominion to be devoted for public use. And even assuming that here was a lease agreement actually existingbetween the vendors and municipal government as the

vendors claimed the resolution could have effectively terminatedthe agreement. It is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of acon tract. In fact, ever y contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenial infirmity that it contains an impliedreservation of the police power as a postulate of existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to changethe provision of contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for promotion and protection the general welfare. Such act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the police power. 4. De la Cruz v. Paras 123 SCRA 569Facts : The Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan passed Ordinance No. 84 which among others, state: Beingt h e p r i n c i p a l c a u s e i n t h e d e c a d e n c e o f m o r a l i t y a n d b e c a u s e o f t h e i r o t h e r a d v e r s e e f f e c t s o n t h e c o m m u n i t y a s explained above no operator night club, cabarets and dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operatewithin the jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girlsand professional dance for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition x x x shall includethe prohibition in the renewal thereof.Vicente de la Cruz and other club owners assailed this Ordinance (among the respondents was Edgardo L. Paras, the judge who ruled against them at the lower court and who was a former Associate Justice of the SC), claimingthat1.) Municipality had no authority to prohibit a lawful business or calling and 2.) the Ordinance violated their right to dueprocess and equal protection of the laws as they and the professi onal hostess, et. Al who works for them are being deprived of their property rights without due process of law. Held : The Court ruled in favor of de la Cruz Reasons.1. In the guise of a police regulation, the Ordinance invaded personal or property rights personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing their night clubs, and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to eearned by those therein employed.2. Under the LGC of 1983, the Sanggunian Bayan is allowed to regulate, among others, the establishment andoperation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainmentThat the MunicipalCouncil of Bocaue is allowed to regulate but not to altogether prohibit such establishment is all too clear. 5. Velasco y Villegas 120 SCRA 568Facts : The City of Manila passed Ordinance no. 4964 which said, It shall be prohibited for any operator of anybarber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of saidbarber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person. Tomas Velasco and other members of he Sta. Cruz Barber Shop Association deplored said ordinance as tantamount to deprivation of property, specifically of their means of livelihood without due process of law (Astor Villegas, the respondent, is the mayor of Manila at that time.) Held : Villegas contention doesnt deserve even an inkling of sympathy. The reason is that, as indicated in theordinance, the objective said Ordinance are: 1.) to be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in thebusiness of the massage clinic under Ordinance no. 3659 as amended by Ordinance no. 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and 2.) in order to forestall possible immorality whichmight grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers. T he SC has been most liberal insustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. 6. US v. Pompeya 31 Phil 245Facts : On June 1, 1914, Silvestre Pompeya was charged with violation of municipality ordinance of Iloilo, E. O.No. 1 series of 1914 based on section 40 (m) of Municipal Cod. Said ordinance, as based from Act 1309, states. With theapproval of provincial governor, when a province of municipality is infested with ladrones or outlaws the municipality council is empowered to authorize the ablebodied male residents of the municipality between the ages of 18 to 50 years,to assist, for a period not exceeding 5 days in any one month, in apprehending ladrones, robbers and other lawbreakersand

suspicious characters and to act as patrols for the protect ion of the municipality, not exceeding one day in each week. Violation of said ordinance is penalized by a fine not less than P100 or 3 months imprisonment or both. Pompeyaargues that the said ordinance violates the citizen provisional right to liberty. Held : Pompeya is just plain lazy (in other words, Pompeya is wrong). W ay back during the feudal age, lords of manors have called upon their vassals to defend the very land they till upon. Even up to the time remote towns and countries have made it obligatory upon their citizens to defend their territory from felons. The ancient obligation to assist inthe protection of peace and good order of the community is still recognized in all well -organized governments in theposse comitatus (power of the country). Pos se comitatus is in other words common law and Act 1309 is statutor yrecognition of such common-law right. Overall, the State is simply exercising its police power. 7. Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council 24 Phil 471Facts : The Municipal Council of Iloilo granted the Iloilo Ice Cold Storage Company (ICS) authority to construct anice cold storage plant in the city of Iloilo. Some time later, residents within the vicinity of said plant complained of thesmoke and fumes emitted by the smokestacks of the said plant. The Municipal Council thus ordered the ICS to elevate thesubject smokestacks; otherwise the plant would be enforced to close down. ICS replied that the Municipal Council has nopower under the Municipal Code to declare their plant as a nuisance. Only the counts may do so. Held : ICS is correct Reasons:1 . ) i t i s c o n c e d e d t h a t 3 9 ( j ) o f t h e M u n i c i p a l c o d e e m p o w e r s t h e M u n i c i p a l C o u n c i l t o d e c l a r e a n d a b a t e nuisances, However, there is a distinction between a nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. The first refers to thosewhich are unquestionably and under all circumstances, nuisances. The second is well obviously, the opposite of the first.2 . ) T h e q u e s t i o n n o w i s w h e t h e r t h e M u n i c i p a l C o u n c i l h a s t h e b l a n k e t a u t h o r i t y t o d e c l a r e a n y t h i n g a s a nuisance. The court ruled in the negative, the reason being that everything would be at the uncontrolled will of the localauthorities, In order words, while the Municipal Council has the power to declare and abate nuisance it does not have thepower to declares such nuisance as a fact and that it exists. Only the ordinary courts can determine the fact of nuisance.The ice plant in question can be definitely said to be not nuisance per se. 8. Technological developers, Inc. y CA 193 SCRA 147Facts : Technology Developers Inc. (TDI) is a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and exportof charcoal briquette. It received an order from Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz ordering he full cessation of TDIs plant in Guyong Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Also TDI Plant manager Armando Meneses was ordered to appear before the said mayor and produce the following a.) Building permit b.) Mayors Permit c.) Region III Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources AntiPollution Permit, and other documents.TDI was found to lack a Mayors Permit and the Region IIIPollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Without previous and reasonable notice to TDI, Acting Mayor Cruz ordered the padlock of TDIs plant.TDI was granted a writ of preliminary injunction against the Acting Mayors order. Upon motion for reconsideration,Acting Mayor Cruz presented evidence that TDIs plant produce hazardous fumes which endangered the lives of thepeople living nearby. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court dissolved the writ. An appeal by TDI with the CAproves fruitless. Thus, TDI sought relief with the SC. Held : TDI's petition has no merit. The simple reason is that TDI failed to secure a Mayors Permit and Region III-Pollution of Environment and natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. The Temporary Permit it received from the nationalPollution Control Commission has already expired. 9. US v. Toribio 15 Phil. 86Facts : Act No. 1147 regulates the registration, branding and slaughter of cattle. Its provisions state among othersthat 1.) no large cattle shall be slaughter or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasure

and 2.) any person violating this Act shall be punished by line of up to P500 or imprisonmentof up to 6 months or both. Convicted under said Act, Luis Toribio insists that he had not violated any law since. If you readthe provision quite carefully, there was no showi ng that the animal he slaughtered was committed inside a municipalslaughterhouse and that thereof, any animal he slaughters elsewhere does not require a permit from the municipal treasure. Held Toribio is wrong. The act primarily seeks to protect large cattle of the Philippines against them and to makeeasy the return and recovery of such cattle to their proper owners when lost. Strayed or stolen therefore the act can alsobe constructed as to require a permit for all slaughter of cattle whether in or out of a municipal slaughterhouse. And if as aresult, the language of the statue is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction can be adopted whichwill tell most to give effect to the manifest intent of the law maker and promote the object for which the statue was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which will tend most to tender abortive other provision of the statue. Thus,Toribios construction of the law should not be adopted and be replaced instead with the omniscient SC.Another reason for the adoption of the second construction is that it is more attuned to the exercise of the policepower of the state, in order to protect the community from the lost of service of such animals by their slaughter byimprovised owners. 10. Solicitors Generally MMA No. 204 SCRA No. 837Facts: On May 24, 1990 the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) issued ordinance No. 11 series of 1991 authorizing itself to detach the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violation was not among the sanction imposed bythe Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by Letter of Instruction 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public street. It was there also observed that even confiscationof drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribe by the degree nor was it allowed by the decree to beimpose by the commissionMonths later, several complaints again proliferated all over metro Manila concerning the confiscation of driverslicenses and license plates. Several officers offered different defenses justifying the confiscation, the more popular oncebeing that, the confiscations were valid pursuant to ordinance no.7 series of 1988 and that the Gonong decision should beinterpreted to mean that only the confiscation of license plates are prohibited. Director General Cesar Nazareno of thePNP even insisted that his office has never authorized the removal of license plates of illegally parked vehicles and has infact, event the directed full compliance of the Gonong decision in memorandum dated February 28, 1991.On July 2, 1991, the SC issued a resolution asking the solicitor general and the MMA to file their commentsregarding the issue. The solicitor general involves the view that ordinance no.11 is null and void for begin unrivalled exercise of the delegated legislative power since PD 1605 does not permit and thus impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of drivers license (Expresio unuis est exclusion alterius). Th e MMA however, invokesE O 3 9 2 t h e l a w p r o v i d i n g f o r M M A s c r e a t i o n , w h i c h v e s t e d i n i t a m o n g o t h e r s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f p r o m u l g a t i n g resolutions and other is issuances of Metropolitan W ide Application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination and the exercise of its role making powers. Also MMA said that the ordinance cannot be attacked collaterallybut only in a direct action challenging its validity. Held: The MMA is wrong. Reasons: 1) Considering the confusion over what law to follow regarding the confiscation, with some officers even declaringthat Gonong decision was wrong the SC decided to rule on the issue squarely despite the fact that ordinance No.11 wasnot challenged in a direct action. Besides, the SC squarely said, said rule concerning direct actions is not an inflexibleone. 2) As to the merits, the SC admits that the power t o p r o m u l g a t e m e a s u r e s t o p r o m o t e t h e c o m f o r t a n d convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems due in a large part to stimulation of traffic rules(E.O. 392 and the general welfare clause LGC) is valid delegation of legislative power. But the real issue is not thevalidity of the delegation of legislative power. It is the validity of such exercise of delegated power. A municipal ordinanceto be valid

a) Must not contravene the Constitution b) Must not be unfair or oppressive c) Must not be partial or discriminatory d) Must not prohibit but may regulate trade and e) Must be general and consistent with public policy. 11 . Acebedo Optical Co. Inc. v CA 329 SCRA 314Facts: Acebedo Optical Co. applied with the office of the City Mayor Iligan for a business permit. City Mayor Camilo Cabili issued the said permit but subject to the following conditions. 1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only an optical store. 2) Acebedo cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these arefunction of optical clinics. 3) Acebedo cannot sell reading and similar eye glasses without a prescription having been first made by anindependent optometrist (not its employee) or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public without need of prescriptions, Ray ban and similar eye glasses. 4) Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses but can advertise Ray ban and similar glasses andframes. 5) Acebedo is allowed to grind glasses but only upon the prescriptions of an independent optometrist.The Samahan ng Optometrist ng Pilipinas (SOPI) however, ledged a complaint against Acebedo, alleging that Acebedoviolated all the conditions impose on its business permit. Acebedo in response, protested the conditions impose by the citymayor stating that 1) The conditions impose are beyond what the city mayor can impose within his authority as they have no basisin any law or ordinance and 2) Acebedos acceptance of the business permit does not stop it from challenging the said conditions as ultravires since a permit is not a binding contract. Held: Acebedo is correct. Reason: 1) The court has already ruled in SOPI v. Acebedo International that in the absence of a law prohibiting the hiringby corporation of optometrist, there is then no prohibition against the hiring by corporations of optometrist( this is in reference to the No.3 conditions of the business permit ). The current optometry law (R.A. 8050) containsno such prohibitions, 2) a license of contract is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permitted and is not aproperty in the constitutional sense. A license is rather in the nature of a special privilege of permission or authority to do what is within its term. It is not anyway vested permanent or absolute. Therefore the businesspermit in the case at bar not being a contract Acebedo is not stopped from challenging the conditions thereinas ultra vires. 3) Overall, the primary purpose of the optometry law in regulating the practice of optometry to insure that optmetrical services are too be rendered by competent and licensed person in order protect the health andphysical welfare of the people from the dangers endangered by unlicensed

practice. Such purpose may befully accomplished although the person rendering the service is employed by a corporation. NOTE: In effect, the only condition challenged by Acebedo was condition No. 3 NOTE: Is optometr y a profession or a mechanical art? Both the majority (as penned by just Purisima) and dissentingopinions (as penned by justice Vitug) could not agree on this question.Distinction is important because if optometry is a profession, then the optometry, Law should be reexamined asthere is the danger that corporation , in hiring optometrist, may be perceived as engaged in the practice of optometry is aprofession, them corporation might compromise the professional accountability of optometr y as the motivation to sell eyeglasses may prevail over professional ethics. For instance, the control exercised by corporations over optometristhired as employees might force said optometrist in sacrificing their professional opinion for the for the sake of selling thecorporations products (All these arguments about optometry being a profession i s BS. The SOPI is just afraid of the competition offered by corporation, but the Court, in its infinite wisdom not touch on that) B) Eminent Domain 1. Requisites for the Exercise* S e c . 1 9 , L G C E m i n e n t D o m a i n , A n L G U m a y , t h r o u g h i t s c h i e f e x e c u t i v e , a n d a c t i n g p u r s u a n t t o a n ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use or purpose or welfare for the benefits of the poor andlandless upon payment of just compensation pursuant to the provision of the Constitution and pertinent laws: providedhowever that the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offering has been previouslymade to the owner and such offer was not accepted. Provided further , that the LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceeding and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated. Providedfinally that the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. *Art 32.IRR Eminent Domain when exercise a) an LGU may through its chief executive and acting pursuant toan ordinance exercise the power of eminent domain for public use purpose welfare of the poor and landless uponpayment of just compensation, pursuant to the provision the Constitution and pertinent laws b) The power of eminentdomain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer wasnot accepted. *Art, 36 IRR a) if the LGU fails to acquire private property for public use purpose or welfare through purchase,LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sangguniang authorizing its chief executive to initiateexpropriation proceeding b) The local chief executive shall cause the provincial, city or municipal attorney concern or: inhis absence , the provincial or city prosecutor to file expropriation proceeding in the proper court in accordance with rule of Court and other pertinent laws c) The LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing expropriationproceeding and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% of the fair market value of the property basedon the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated *Art 37, IRR Payment. The amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall determined by the proper court based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. *Rule 67, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure This rule consists of 14 sections enumerating the procedure to be followed in eminent domain. Briefly the ruleenumerates the following section: 1) The Complaint 2) entry of plaintiff depositing value with National or provincial Treasure (but this section No. 2 has been repealed by P.D. No. 42) 3) defenses and objection 4) order of condemnation 5)ascertainment of compensation 6) proceeding by commission 7) report by commission and judgment thereupon 8) actionupon commissioner report 9) uncertain ownership/conflicting claim 10) right of plaintiff after judgment and payment entrynot delayed by appeal, effect of reversal 12) cost, by whom paid 13) recording, paym ent and its effect 14) power of guardian in such proceedings.P.D. No.42 in a relation to Section 2 of Rule 67, effectively removes the discretion of the counting determining

theprovisional volume. W hat is to be deposited is an amount equivalent to the assessed value for taxation purposes. No hearing is required for the purpose. All that is needed is noticed to the owner of the property sought to be condemned. NOTE: So that you dont have to bother reading the crappy 14 sections enumerated in Rule 76, lets use insteadthe summary given by the Court regarding the 3 stages of every action of expropriation in NAPOCOR v. Jocson: 1) The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiffs to exercise the power of eminentdomain ant the property of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation de claring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take thep r o p e r t y s o u g h t t o b e c o n d e m n e d , f o r t h e p u b l i c u s e o r purpose described in the com plaint, upon thepaym ent of just com pensation to b e d e t e r m i n e d a s o f d a t e o f t h e f i l l i n g o f t h e c o m p l a i n t . A n o r d e r o f dismissal, if this is to be ordained, would be a final one since it finally disposes of the action and leaves theCourt with nothing more to be done on the merits. So too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, the Rules expressly state in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to exercise of theright of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filled or heard. 2) The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the justcompensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not morethan 3 commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, andfindings of, the commissioners will be final too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, andleave nothing more for the Court to be done by the Court regarding the issue. 3) However, upon the filling of the complaint or at anytime thereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter upon the possession of the property involved upon compliance with P.D. 42 which requires the petitioner, after due notice to the defendant, to deposit with the PNB in its main office or any of its branches or agencies anamount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. The assessed value is thatindicated in the tax declaration. *DILG Opinion No. 10-1996 The researcher isnt too keen in going to the DILG to get their opinions. R2) Purposes of expropriation a. In the Philippines, regular provinces are authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain for the followingpurposes: the construction and extension of roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges, ferries, levees, wharves or piers; the construction of the public buildings including schoolhouses; and the making of necessary improvements in connectiontherewith; the establishment of parks, playground, plazas, market places, artesian wells or s ystems for the supply of water, and the establishment of cemeteries, crematories, drainage system, cesspools, or sewage systems.b. Municipalities in regular provinces are authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain for any of thefollowing purposes: the construction or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges, ferries, levees, wharves or piers;the construction buildings, including schoolhouses, and the making of improvements on parks, playground, plazas,marketplaces, artesian wells, or s ystem for the supply of W ater, and the establishment of cemeteries, crematories,drainage system, cesspools, or sewage systems. 3) Illustrative cases:

1. National Power Corporation v. Jocson 206 SCRA 520Facts: The NAPOCOR is a GOCC created and existing by virtue of RA No. 6395, as amended, for the purpose of undertaking the development of hydraulic power, the production of power from any source, particularly by constructing,operating and maintaining power plants, auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines, power stationand other works for the purpose of developing hydraulic power from any river, creek, lake, spring and waterfall in the Philippines and supplying such power to the inhabitants thereof. In order to carry out these purposes, it is authorized tocarry out the power of eminent domain.On March 30, 1990, NAPOCOR filled 7 cases of eminent domain against 7 private citizens before the RTC of Bacolod city for the acquisition of a right of way easement over portion of the parcels of land described in the complaint for its Negros Panay Interconnection Project, particularly the Bacolod Tamonton Transmission Line. The complaints uniformlya allege that petitioner urgently needs position of the affected land to enable it to construct its tower and transmission linein a manner thats is compatible with the greatest good while at the same time causing the least private injury, the purposefor which the lands are principally developed will not be injured by the transmission lines as it will only acquire a right of easement thereon , and it had negotiated with the offered to pay defendants for the portion affected by the BacolodTamonton Transmission Line, but the parties failed to reach an agreement despite long and repeated negotiations, and bep r a y t h a t , among others, that the RTC fix the provisional value of the portion of t h e p a r c e l s o f l a n d s o u g h t t o b e expropriated pursuant to Sec.2, Rule 67 of the Rules of the Court.On June 25, 1990, the RTC, after finding the existence of public interest which may be serve by the expropriation,fixed the provisional values of the 7 subject areas and directed the NAPOCOR to deposit the amounts with the PNB inescrow of the benefits of the defendants pending decision on the merits. The market values mentioned in the Order aret h e s a m e v a l u e s a p p e a r i n g i n t h e f a x declarations of the properties and the notices of Assessment issued by t h e Assessor. In compliance with said Order. NAPOCOR deposited the sum of P23, 180,828.00 with the PNB.Two of the defendants however, filled motions for reconsideration. The first one filled b y Jesus, Fernando,Michael and Ma. Cristina Gonzaga (the Gonzaga Four) alleged that the provisional value of the property involvedtherein has been set much to low, the reason being that the expropriation of their areas would render the remaining portion practically at a loss considering that the presence of the transmission lines will pose a danger to the inhabitants inthe area as well as destroy the marketability of the remaining potion after expropriation. Moreover, the subject areas arelocated near several posh subdivisions. The second one filled by Louis Gonzaga, et, al. sought for a re-evaluation of the areas owned by them as said areas were contiguous to the Gonzaga Four and were thus affected by the samecondition.T h e R T C g r a n t e d t h e i r m o t i o n a n d t h e N A P O C O R , i n c o m p l i a n c e , d e p o s i t e d t h e a d d i t i o n a l a m o u n t o f P22,866,860,00 with the PNB.On July 18, 1990 the RTC Judge Enrique Jocson issued another Order increasing the amounts to be received ascompensation on the part of the Gonzaga Four, Louis Gonza ga and 3 other defendants amounts. NAPOCOR in aresponse filled a complaint of grave abuse of discretion against the said judge, saying the increases he ordered are excessive and unconscionable. Nevertheless, due to the urgent need to complete the interconnection project as soon aspossible, NAPOCOR deposited the order additional amounts. Still despite doing so, NAPOCOR claimed the Judgestubbornly refused to issue the writ of possession.Did the Judge act with grave abuse of discretion? Held : Yes. Reasons 1. The Judge ignore P.D.No.42 ( see the info titled Rule 67,Rules of Court, page 27 of this reviewer).He fixedthe provisional values of the subject properties at their market values and daily opportunity profits, something which should not be done. The values should be fixed at an amount equivalent to the assessed value for taxation purpose.2. More importantly, when the Judge, although erroneously, fixed the provisional values of the subject propertyand NAPOCOR in turn deposited the said amounts, the said Judge last plenary control over the order fixing the amounto f t h e d e p o s i t a n d has no power to annul, amend or modify it matters of substance pending the c o u r s e o f t h e condemnation proceedings. The reason for this is that a contrary ruling would defeat the

very purpose of the law which isto provide for a speedy and summary procedure whereby the peaceable possession of the property subject of the expropriation proceedings may be secured without the delays incident to prolonged and vexatious litigation touching theownership and value of such lands, which should not be permitted to delay the progress of the work.3. The Judge also, in effect, gave the defendants the final authority to determine just compensation when in fact;the determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings is a judicial function. Moreover, he did not evenappoint the 3 commissioners as mandated by Sec. 5 of Rule 67 of Court in order to ascertain and report to him the justcompensation sought to be taken. He even ruled that the writ of possession shall be issued only after the defendants havereceived the amounts, which should not be the ease. All these show the gross ignore of the Judge and his orders and rulings must be reversed. 2. City Government of QC v. Ericta 129 SCRA 759Facts : The Quezon City Council passed Ordinance No.6118 S9 4 e n t i t l e d O r d i n a n c e r e g u l a t i n g t h e establishment, maintenance and operation of private memorial type cemetery or burial ground within the jurisdiction of Q.C and providing penalties for he violation thereof. Said ordinance provides, among others: Sec.9 .At least 6% o f thetotal area of the memorial park cemetery shall be seta side for a charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers andhave been residents of Q.C for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. Thearea so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months from thedate of approval of the application.For 7 years, the ordinance was not enforced by city authorities, but when the Q.C Council decided to enforce it bypassing a resolution to that effect, Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. responded by filling a petition for declaratory relief, prohibitionand mandamus with preliminary injunction with the CFI in Q.C praying that the ordinance be declared null and void. Saidpetition was granted. The question now raised is: Is the said ordinance a valid exercise of the police power? Held : No. Reasons:1. The Charter of Q.C grants Q.C. the power to tax, fix the license fee and regulate such other Business, tradeand occupation as may be established or practiced in the City. The power to regulate however, does not include the power to prohibit. A portion, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance not only confiscatesbut also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemeter y because under Sec. 13 of said ordinance, violation of itsprovisions is punishable by fine, imprisonment and/or that the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall berevoked or cancelled. Sec.9 is not mere police regulation but an outright confiscation of private property without due process of law may, even without compensation.2. W hen the Local Government Code of 1983 provided that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may provide, for theburial of the dead in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorized the city to provide its owned cityowned land or to buy of expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. Expropriation however, requirespayment of just compensation. Thus, Himlayang Pilipino Inc. cannot be said to have impliedly acknowledge sequestrationof 6 % of its property without just compensation when it accepted the permits to operate from the city government. 3. Heirs of Juancho Ardona v.Reyes 125 SCRA 221Facts : The Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for the expropriationof some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in Barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTAs expressauthority, as mandated in its Charter, to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any privateland within and without the tourist zones for the development into integrated resort and sport complexes of selected andwell- defined geographic areas with potential tourism value.The defendants, numbering 40, filed motions to dismiss on the ground that the taking was not for Public use,specifically that the there is no constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes.Moreover, the defendants claimed that the land they own subject of the expropriation is actually covered by certificate of land transfer (CLT) and emancipation patentsT h e r e b y m a k i n g t h e l a n d s e x p r o p r i a t e d w i t h i n t h e c o v e r a g e o f t h e l a n d r e f o r m a r e a u n d e r P . D N o . 2 T h e defendants argue that the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other state policies like those relating to the health and physical well-being of the people. Held

: The Ardonas fortys petition should be dismissed. Reasons:1. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes like the construction of roads, bridges, parks andthe like. Public use is not use by the public. It also mean, public well-fare and such a concept are broad, and inclusive.The values it represents are spiritual, as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious, as well as clean, wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled.Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of Eminent Domain is clear.As a general rule then, as long as the taking is public, the power of eminent domain comes into pay.2. The fact that private concessionaires such as private firms, food outlets, etc. will lease the subject areas will notdiminish the public character of the expropriation ( In other words, the place is open to anybody for as long as she or hecan pay).3. The records show that the only 2 of the 40 defendants have CLTs or emancipation patents. And those CLTs intheir possession covers only less than 1 hectare of the 282 hectares intended fore expropriation. Moreover, the less-than1 0 - h e c t a r e p o r t i o n o f l a n d i s n o t even part of the resort and sports complex proper but is part of the 32 h e c t a r e resettlement are for all persons affected by the expropriation. Certainly, the human settlement needs of the manybeneficiaries of the 32 hectareResettlement area should prevail over the property rights of two of their compatriots. (This last sentence did not sit wellwhich Justice Makasiar and 2 others dissenters because the two persons who had CLTs were conveniently ignored). 4. City of Manila v. Chinese Community 40 Phil. 349Facts : On Dec. 11.1916, the City of Manila presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that for the purposeof constructing a public improvement, namely the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the City of Manilato acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo of said city within Block 83of said district. The proposed extension of Rizal Avenue however will take a part of the Chinese cemetery, a publiccemetery at that the Chinese Community of Manila thus contended that 1) the City of Manila cannot appropriate thecemetery or a portion thereof as said cemetery is public property, only private property may be expropriated and 2) thereis no necessity for the improvement as a whole in the first place. Is the Chinese Community correct? Held : The Chinese community is correct as to its contention Reasons:1. First of all, the matter regarding the extent of the courts authority in expropriation cases must set tled. Anexamination of Sec.243 in Act No.190 (the predecessor of todays Rule 67 of the Rules of Court) reveals, if the Court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land exists, it shall then appoint commissioners. The City of Manilacontends that since expropriation is exclusively a Legislative function, the authority of the courts then is limited to determining the following a whether a law granting the expropriation exists and b) the value of the land in question. Thiscontention is partly meritorious. There is no question that the court has authority to fix the values of the land question. Asto the authority of determining whether a law granting the expropriation exists, a distinction must be made between a)laws granting special purpose an d b) laws grating a general authority. If the law in question grants expropriation of a particular parcel of land and for a specific public purpose, then the Courts would he without jurisdiction to inquire into thepurpose of that legislation, regardless on whether or not the land in question is private or public. But if the Legislatureshould grant general authority to a municipal corporation then to expropriate private lands, for public purpose, the courtsthen would have Authority then to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented concerning whether Or not the land in question was private and whether the purpose was in fact, public. In the instant case, since the City of Manila was given a general grant of authority to expropriate priva te lands under its Charter, the Court has authority toinquire on whether the exercise of such expropriation by the City of Manila is indeed publicin other words, the Courtmay inquire into the necessity of the expropriation.2. As mentioned above public property may be expropriated provided a special grant of Authority for a particular parcel of land was passed by the Legislature. The City of Manila was not granted such a special authority. Therefore, theChinese Cemetery or a portion thereof may not be expropriated.3. It is axiomatic that the taking of private property for public use is not justified unless there is a genuine publicnecessity for the taking. In the present case, even if granting that a necessity exists for The opening of the street inquestion, the record contain no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The

records show thatadjoining and adjacent lands and have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the city. 5. National Power Corporation v. CA 254 SCRA 577Facts : In 1978, NAPOCOR took possession of a 21,995 sq. m. land which is a portion of Lot 1 Of the subdivisionplan (LRC) Psd_116169 situated in Marawi City, owned by Macapanton Mangondato, Under the mistaken belief that itforms part of the public land reserved for use by NAPOCOR of Hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No.1354 of the President of the Philippines dated Dec.3, 1974. NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until thenpossessed and administered by Marawi City so that in exchange for the citys waiver and quitclaim of any right over theproperty, NAPACOR had paid the city a :financial assistance : of P40 sq. m.In 1979, when NAPOCOR started building its Agus 1 (Hydroelectric plant) project, Mangondato demandedcompensation from NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to compensate insisting that the property is public land and that it hasalready paid financial assistance to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property.Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered property covered by a TCT in his name that hewas not privy to agreement between Marawi City and NAPOCOR and that any Payment made to said city cannot be considered as payment to him More than a decade later, NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the property belongs to Mangondato. On August14, 1990, NAPOCORs National power Board (hereafter Power Board) passed a resolution resolving to pay Mangondatothe base price of P40 per sq.m for only a 12,132 sq.m portion Of the subject property (P 485,280,001) plus 12% interestper annum from 1978 (P698, 808.00) pending A determination by NAPOCORs regional legal council on whether P100.00is the fair market value of Property.Pursuant to the aforementioned resolution, Mangondato paid P1, 184.088.00. On May 17, 1991, the power Boardpassed a resolution resolving to pay Mangondato P100 per sq.m excluding the 12 % interest per annum.In a letter, Mangondato disagrees with the power boards new resolution. He said that this property was worth evenmore than p300 per sq.m but he was willing to settle for P300 per sq.m greedy bastard).On May 25,192, NAPOCOR authorized its president to negotiate with Mangondato for the payment of P100 for theland plus 12 % per annum from 1978 less the payments already made 10 Mangodato and to Marawi City on the portion of his land.On July 7, 1992, the greedy bastard replied by filling a civil case seeking to recover possession of he property described in the complaint as Lot of the subdivision plan against NAPOCOR, the payment of a P15, 000 monthly rent untilthe surrender of the property, and the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain NAPOCOR from proceeding with any construction and/or improvements on Mangondatos land or from committing any actof dispossession.On July 27, 1992, NAPOCOR countered by filling a complaint for eminent domain against Mangondato. The lower court then ordered, after duly appointing 2 commissioners, that NAPOCOR deposit the amount of P10, 997,500.00 withthe PNB, provisionall y fixing the value of the land at P500 per sq. m., P100 lower than the assessed value of the land appearing in its tax declaration for 1992 which was P100.In its decision, the lower court denied the recovery of possession by Mangondato but ordered NAPOCOR to paythe former a monthly rent of P 15,000 from 1978 to 1992 with 12 % interest per annum and condemning the property infavor of NAPOCOR effective July 1992 upon payment of P1000 per sq.m. or P21,995,000.00 as just compensation.NAPACOR contested the decision. In its assignment of errors, NAPOCOR said that the lower court erred in affirming that the just compensation for the property is its value in 1992, when the complaint was filed, and not its value in1978, when he property was taken by petition, ergo, the court erred in fixing the value of just compensation at P1, 000 per sq.m instead of P40 per sq.m Held : NAPOCOR is wrong. Reasons:1. The general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the dateof the filling of the complaint Sec.4 rule 67, Rules of Court. Normally, the time of taking coincides with the filling of thecomplaint for just compensation. However, if the time of taking does not coincides with the time of the filling, the rule isthat the value of the property should be computed from the time the property as taken into possession from the time hewas deprived thereof while the value itself its determined at the time of the filling of the complaint.2. The taking for the purpose of determining the value of the property, is determined when the following elementsconcur.a)The expropriator must enter a private property.b)The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentar y period.c)The entry into the property should be under warrant or

color of legal authority. d)The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected.e)The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.In NAPOCORs case, element no.3 was not present when NAPOCOR took possession of the subject property in1 9 7 8 s i n c e N A P O C O R f a l s e l y b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y w a s p u b l i c l a n d r e s e r v e d f o r i t s o w n u s e u n d e r Proclamation No. 1354. Only in 1992, when it initiated expropriation proceedings, did it obtain color of legal authority. Theprovisional value of the same would then be assessed as of 1992. 6. Province of Camarines Sur v. CA 222 SCRA 173Facts : On Dec. 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed ResolutionNo.129,S-88, authorizing, the Provincial governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitolsite, in order to establish a pilot farm for non -food and nontraditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.Pursuant to the resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through Governor Luis Villafuerte filed two separatecases of expropriation against Ernesto and Efren San Joaquin, with the RTC of Pill, Camarines Sur. Forthwith, and thesaid province filed a motion for the issuance of the write of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearingof the motion.The San Joaquins filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. Thecourt denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province to take possession of the said property upon the depositwith the Clerk of Court of the amount P5, 714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damagesthat the San Joaquins may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper The trial court ruled in favor of the Province. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the San Joaquins, stating amongothers that the trial court suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the province shall have submitted toe requisiteapproval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondentsfrom agricultural to non- agricultural land (this is in deference to the Solicitor Generals view that the Province must firstsecure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform ( DAR) regarding the plan to expropriate the lands of the SanJoaquins for use as a housing project.The province now defends its expropriation of the subject lands, claiming its authority from Sections 4 and 7 of theLocal Government Code of 1983, and that the expropriation was for a public purpose. Held : The Province of Camarines Sur is correct. Reasons:1. Public use now means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the generalwelfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like are sort community or a housing complex. In the cage, thee x p r o p r i a t i o n h e r e i s f o r p u b l i c p u r p o s e . T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a p i l o t c e n t e r w o u l d i n u r e t o t h e d i r e c t b e n e f i t a n d advantage of the people of the Province. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluableinformation and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of fisherman, farmers,and craftsmens would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.2. As to the issue whether the approval of the DAR (for the purpose of realizing the housing project intent of theexpropriation) is needed before expropriation proceedings can continue, the Court simply ruled that the same is not needed, simply because the L:GC of 1983 nor any other laws does not require the same. 7. Moday v. CA 268 SCRA 586Facts : On July 23,, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bumawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 4389authorizing the Municipal Mayor to initiate the expropriation of a one (1) hectare portion of Lot No. 6138 Pls-4 along theNational Highway owned by Percival Moday for the site of the Bunawan Farmers Center and other Government SportsFacilities.Said Resolution was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan however disapproved the resolution on the ground that the expropriationwas unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of government center.Undaunted, the Municipality of Bunawan nevertheless filed a pe tition for Eminent Domain against Moday. After depositing the necessar y amount in accordance with Rule 67 of the Rules of Court with the municipal treasurer, the Municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of the Subject Matter.Despite Modays opposition and after the hearing of the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of the Municipality, sayingthat among others, that since the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan failed to declare the Municipalitys resolution as invalid, thesame should be deemed effective. (Wow, the RTC has 2 different meanings for invalid and disapproval). An appeal tothe CA also proved fruitless. In the meantime, the Municipality created 3 buildings on the subject property.Upon petition by Moday, the SC issued a TRO to prevent the Municipality from using the buildings it alreadyc o n s t r u c t e d a s w e l l a s c o n s t r u c t i n g f u t u r e b u i l d i n g s . M o d a y , i n h i s p e t i t i o n t o t h e S C , a l s o a d d s t h a t s i n c e t h e Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved the resolution, the same is void and thus the Municipality could not insist inpushing through with the expropriation. Held : Moday is wrong. Reasons:1) The Municipalitys power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed. Sec. 9 of the LGHC of 1983states, LGUs may, through its head, and acting pursuant to a resolution of its Sanggunian, exercise the right of eminentdomain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.2) A reading of Sec. 153, LGC of 1983 states, If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) shall find that any municipalordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang bayan (SB) or the Mayor, itshall declare such ordinance, resolution or Executive Order invalid in whole or in part xxx. The effect of such action shallbe to annul the ordinance, resolution or Executive Order in question in whole or in part. The action of the SP shall be final. Said section gives the condition if such resolution is beyond the power conferred upon by the Sangguniang Bayanor Mayor xxx. Obviously, it is well within the power of the Municipality to exercise the right of eminent domain and thus,the SB has the capacity to promulgate a resolution pursuant to the exercise of such a right. The SP therefore, was withoutauthority to disapprove said resolution.3. Finally, Moday claimed the expropriation against his property was motivated by political revenge since he didnot support Mayor Bustillos candidacy in the previous elections. If that were true, then Modays petition would have beenmeritorious since the taking of private property for public use must be genuine. The SC simply ruled that there was noevidence to support such claim. Besides, the records do not show that there was indeed another available property for thesame purpose. C) Power of Taxation (Five requisites for the exercise, publication requirements and public hearing) Five requisites for the exercise: 1.Municipal revenue obtainable by taxation shall be derived from such sources only as are expressly authorizedby law.2.Taxation shall be just and uniform in each municipality. 3 . I t shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose tax in any form, w h a t e v e r u p o n g o o d s a n d merchandize carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or exporttax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shallbe void. Note : Compare this with Sec 133 (e) of LGC 1991, Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powersof provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following xxx (e) taxes, fees and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of, or passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of LGUs inthe guise of charges of wharfage, tolls for bridges or otherwise, or other taxes, fees or charges in any form whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise.4.In no case shall the collection of municipal taxes be left to any person.5.Except as allowed by law, municipal funds shall be devoted exclusively to local public purpose. Publication Requirements: 1.Two modes of apprising the public of a new ordinance a c c o r d i n g t o S e c . 4 3 L o c a l T a x C o d e ( b a s e d o n the Allied Thread v. City of Manila case)a.By means of publication in a newspaper of general circulation, or b.By means of posting of copies thereof in the local legislative hall or premises and 2 other conspicuousplaces within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government.2 . P u b l i c a t i o n o f T a x O r d i n a n c e s a n d R e v e n u e M e a s u r e s ( S e c . 1 8 8 , L G C o f 1 9 9 1 ) 3.W ithin 10 days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city and m u n i c i p a l o r d i n a n c e s of revenue measures shall be published in full for 3 consecutive days in a newspaper of localcirculation. Provided, however, that in provinces, cities and municipalities

w h e r e t h e r e a r e n o newspapers of local circulation, the same may be post ed in at least 2 conspicuous and accessible places. Public Hearing:1.Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and revenue Measures; Mandatory PublicHearings (sec 187, LGC of 1991) - The procedure for the approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance withthe provisions of this Code: Provided that any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenuemeasures may be raised on appeal within 30 days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within 60 days from the date of the receipt of the appeal. Provided, however, that such appeal do not have theeffect of suspending the effectivity of ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee or charge therein. Provided,finally, that within 30 days after the receipt of the decision or the lapse of the 60 -day period without the Secretar y of J u s t i c e a c t i n g u p o n t h e a p p e a l , t h e a g g r i e v e d p a r t y m a y f i l e a p p r o p r i a t e p r o c e e d i n g s w i t h a c o u r t o f c o m p e t e n t jurisdiction.2.Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees and Charges ( Sec. 186, LGC of 1991) Local governments may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwiseenumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NLRC), as amended, or other applicable laws. Provided, that the taxes, fees or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy; Provided further, that the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enactedwithout any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. 1.a Allied Thread Co. v. City Mayor of Manila 133 SCRA 338Facts : Allied Thread Co is engaged in the business of manufacturing of sewing thread and yarn under dulyregistered trademark and labels. It operates its factories and maintains an office in Pasig, Rizal. In order to sell its products in Manila and other parts of the Philippines, Allied Thread Co engaged the services of a sales broker, Ker andCompany Ltd, the latter deriving commission for every sale made for its principal.O n J u n e 1 2 , 1 9 7 4 , t h e M u n i c i p a l B o a r d o f t h e C i t y o f M a n i l a e n a c t e d O r d i n a n c e N o . 7 5 1 6 i m p o s i n g o n manufacturers, importer, porters or producers, doing business in the city of Manila, business taxes based on gross salesrecorded on a graduated basis. A s used by the Ordinance, graduated basis meant that 60% of all sales recorded in theprincipal offices of all businesses are located in the City of Manila, the same shall be taxable as well by said City. As for the branches of businesses, all sales recorded by it shall be taxable by the City of Manila provided they are also located inthe said City.T h e M a y o r o f M a n i l a a p p r o v e d s a i d O r d i n a n c e o n J u n e 1 5 , 1 9 7 4 . I n l e s s t h a n t w o m o n t h s , h o w e v e r , t h e ordinance underwent a series of amendments. The last amendment was approved by the Mayor on July 29, 2974.Having affected by the aforementioned Ordinance, being manufacturers and sales brokers, Allied Thread Co fileda petition for declaratory relief contending that Ordinance 7516 is not valid or enforceable as the same is contrary to Sec 52 of PD 426, as clarified by Local Tax Regulation No 1-71. To quote said Regulation: A local tax ordinance shall go intoeffect on the 15 th day after approved by the local chief executive in accordance with Sec 41 of the Code. In view hereof and considering the provisions of Art 54 of the Code regarding the accrual of taxes a local tax ordinance intended to takeeffect on July 1, 1974 should be enacted by the local chief ex ecutive not later than June 15, 1974. Otherwise stated, Allied Thread Co asserts that due to the series of amendments in the Ordinance 7516, the same Ordinance fell short of the deadline set forth by Sec 54 of PD 426 that for an ordinance intended to take effect on July 1, 1974, it must be enacted on or before June 15, 1954. As mentioned earlier, the last amendment of the ordinance was approved on July29, 1974.Allied Thread also contended that the questioned Ordinance did not comply with the necessar y publ icationrequirement in a newspaper of general circulation as mandated by Sec43 of the Local Tax Code. Moreover, Allied Threadclaimed that it should not be covered by the said Ordinance as amended; because it does not operate or maintain abranch office in Manila and that its principal office and factory are located in Pasig, Rizal. Held : Allied Thread is wrong. Reasons:1. Ordinance No 7516 was approved by the City Mayor in June 15, 1974. Therefore, he made the deadline (barely). The subsequent amendments did not in any way invalidate nor move the date of its effectivity. To hold otherwisewould limit the power of the

defunct Municipal Board of Manila to amend an existing ordinance as exigencies require.2. The Court is persuaded that there was substantial compli ance of the law on publication. The City of Manilacomplied with the second mode of notice.3. Allied Thread does its business through its agent, Ker and Company. The power to levy an excise tax upon theperformance of an act or the engaging of an occupation does not depend on the domicile of the person subject to the excise nor upon the physical location of the property and in connection with the act or occupation taxed but depend uponthe place in which the act is performed or occupation engaged in in this case, upon the place where the respected salestransactions is perfected and consummated. 1.b Reyes v. CA 320 SCRA 486Facts : The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan, Metro Manila implemented 5 tax ordinances. Antonio Reyes and 2others (the Reyes Three) filed an appeal with the Department of Justice alleging the constitutionality of these tax ordinances allegedly because they were promulgated without previous public hearings thereby constituting deprivation of property without due process of law. Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon however, dismissed the appeal for being filed outof time since the last of the 5 ordinances took effect on Oct 29, 2992 while the Reyes Three filed their appeal only on May21, 1993, way past the 30-day period from the effectivity thereof for appeal as allowed by Sec 187 of the LGC of 1993.The CA also ruled in favor of Franklin Drilon.Undaunted, the Reyes Three, in a petition for review with the SC, claim that notwithstanding the 30-day periodimposed by the law for appeal, an ordinance enacted without the requisite of public hearing is unconstitutional and thusvoid from the beginning ( in other words, an action to declare anything unconstitutional does not prescribe since it isreduction as absurdum). Also the Reyes Three ask if constitution ality of Sec. 187 can be raised for the first time on appeal. (see Public Hearing of this reviewer). Held : The Reyes Three are wrong: Reasons:1. There is a reason why protests over tax ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames. A municipal tax ordinance empowers an LGU to impose taxes. The power to tax is one of the most effective instruments toraise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of LGUs for the delivery of basic services essential tothe promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of peace, progress and prosperity of the people. Consequently,any delay in tax measures would be to the detriment of the public.2. While it is true that the public hearings are required to be conducted prior to the enactment of a tax ordinance,the Reyes Three did not show any proof that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan failed to conduct the required publichearings. The reason is that the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to a petitioner cause of action.Hence, as the Reyes Three are the ones asserting the lack of a public hearing, they have the burden of proof. Since theReyes Three failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enacted thereof, the Court is constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality. This is true despite the fact that the Sanggunian has the control of records or the better meansof proof regarding the alleged, and the Reyes Three are not relieved from the burden of proving their averments.3. On the validity of Sec. 187 of LGC of 1991, the Court stresses that the constitutionality of an act of Congresswill not be passed upon by the Court unless at the first opportunity that question is properly raised and presented in anappropriate case, and is necessary for the determination of the case, particularly where the issue of constitutionality is thevery lis mota presented. The constitutionality of a statutory provision should not be entertained by the Court where it wasnot specifically raised below, insisted upon and adequately argued. The Court finds no real necessity in tackling the constitutionality of Sec. 187 of LGC of 1991. 2. Limitations on municipal taxing power * Sec. 133, LGC of 1991. Common Limitations on the Taxing Power of LGUs. Unless otherwise provided herein,the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of thefollowing:a. Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutionsb. Documentary stamp taxc. Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa, except as otherwise providedthereind. Customs duties, registration of fees of vehicles and wharfages on wharves, tonnage dues and all other kinds of custom fees, charges and dues except wharfage of wharves constructed and maintained by the LGU concerned.e. Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into, or out of, or passing through theterritorial jurisdictions of LGUs in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges ort otherwise, or other taxes, fees inany form whatsoever upon such goods and merchandisef. Taxes, fees or charges on

agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal farmers or fishermeng. Taxes on business enterprises certified by the BOI as pioneer or non -pioneer for a period of 6 or 4 years,respectively from the date of the registration.h. Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the NIRC, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleumproducts.i. Percentage on VAT sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods and services except as otherwise provided herein j. Tax on gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Codek. Taxes paid on premiums by way of reinsurance or retrocessionl. Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except tricycles.m. Taxes, fees or other charges actually exported, except as otherwise provided hereinn. Taxes, fees or charges on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprise and Cooperatives duly registeredunder R.A. 6180 and R.A. 6938 otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of the Philippines respectivelyo. Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs *The Basic Rule of Municipal Taxing Power Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for thecurrent rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general andbroad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; theconstitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and mademore autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that a) the taxpayer will not be overburdened or saddled with multipleand unreasonable impositions; b) each local government unit will have its fair share of available resources; c) theresources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just (MERALCO v. Province of Laguna) 2.a Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. City of Butuan 24 SCRA 789Facts :Pepsi Cola seeks to recover the taxes paid by it to the City of Butuan and collected by the letter. Pursuantto its Municipal Ordinance No. 110, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 122, both series of 1960, which Pepsi assailas null and void and to prevent the enforcement thereof.Pepsi maintains that the disputed ordinance is null and void because (1) it partakes of the nature of an importantt a x ; ( 2 ) i t a m o u n t s t o d o u b l e t a x a t i o n ; ( 3 ) it is excessive, oppressive and conf iscatory; (4) it is highly unjust anddiscrim inatory; and (5) section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, upon the a u t h o r i t y o f w h i c h i t w a s e n a c t e d , i s a n unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. Said Ordinance, as amended, imposes as a tax on any person,association, etc., of P0.10 per case of 2 4 bottles of Pepsi-Cola and Pepsi paid under protest the amount of P4,926.63 from August 16 to December 31, 1960 and the amount of P9,250.40 from January 1 to July 30, 1961. Held :Pepsis contentions are partly tenable. Reasons: (1) The Second and last objections are manifestly devoid of merit. Indeed, independently of whether or not thetax in question, when considered in relation to the sales tax prescribed by Acts of Congress, amounts todouble taxation, on which the Court need not and does not express any opiniondouble taxation, in general, isnot forbidden by the Constitution. The Philippines has not adopted, as part thereof, the injunction againstdouble taxation found in the Constitution of the United States. Then, again, the general principle against ,delegation of legislative powers, in consequence of the theory of separation of powers is subject to one well-established exception, namely; legislative powers may be delegated to local government to which said theorydoes not apply in respect of matters of local concern.

(2) The third objection is, likewise, untenable. The tax of P0.10 per case of 24 b o t t l e s , o f s o f t d r i n k s o f carbonated drinks in the production and sale of which plaintiff is engaged or less than P0.0042 per bottle ismanifestly too small to be excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory. (3) The first and the fourth objection merit, however, serious consideration. As amended by Ordinance no. 122,the tax is imposed only upon any agent and/or consignee of any person, association, partn ership, companyor corporation engaged in selling soft drinks or carbonated drinks. As defined in section 3 -A of Ordinanceno. 122, a consignee of agent shall mean any person, association, partnership, company or corporation whoacts in the place of another by authority from him or one entrusted with the business of another or to whom isconsigned or shipped no less than 1,000 cases of hard liquors or soft drinks ever y month for resale, either retail or wholesale.As a consequence, merchants engaged in the sale of soft drinks of carbonated drinks, are not subjected to thetax, unless they are agents and/or consignee of another dealer, who, in the very nature of things, must be one engaged inthe business outside the City. The intention to limit the application of the ordinance to soft drinks and carbonated drinksbrought into city from outside thereof becomes apparent. Viewed from this angle, the tax partakes of the nature of an import duty, which is beyond defendants authority to impose by express provision of law.The tax in question would still be invalid, as discriminatory, and hence, violative of the uniformity required by theConstitution and the law thereof, since only sales by agents of consignee of outside dealers would be subject to tax.Sales by local dealers, not acting for or on behalf of other merchants, regardless of the volume of their sales, and even if the same exceeded those made by said agents or consignee of producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan, would be exempt from the disputed tax. 2. b Province of Bulacan v. CA 299 SCRA 442Facts :on June 26, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan passed Provincial Ordinance No. 3, known as an Ordinance Enacting the Revenue Code of the Bulacan Province. Which was to take effect on July 1, 1992. Section21 of the ordinance provides as follows: Sec. 21. Imposition of Tax. There is hereby levied and collected a tax of 10% of the fair market value in the locality per cubic meter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources,such. But not limited to marble, granite, volcanic cinders, basalt, tuff and rock phosphate. Extracted from public lands or from bed of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction.Pursuant thereto, the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, in a letter dated November 11, 1993, assessed private respondent Republic Cement corporation (hereafter Republic Cement) O2,524,692.13 for extracting limestone, shale andsilica from several parcels of private land in the province during the third quarter of 1992 until the second quarter of 1993.Believing that the province, on the basis of above-said ordinance, had no authority to impose taxes o quarry resourcesextracted from private lands, Republic Cement formally c ontested the same on December 23, 1993. The same washowever, denied by the Provincial Treasurer on January 17, 1994. Republic Cement consequently filed a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan on February 14, 1994. The province filed a motion to dismissRepublic Cements petition, which was granted by the trial court on May 13, 1993, which ruled that declaratory relief wasimproper, allegedly because a breach of the ordinance had been committed by Republic Cement.On July 11, 1994, Republic Cement filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking to reverse thetrial courts dismissal of their petition. The Court, in a resolution dated July 27, 1994, referred the same to the Court of Appeals.In the interim, the Province of Bulacan issued a warrant of levy against Republic Cement, allegedly because of itsunpaid tax liabilities. Negotiations between Republic Cement and the province resulted in an agreement and modus vivendi on December 12, 1994, whereby Republic Cement Agreed to pay under protest P1,262,364.00, 50% of the taxassessed by petitioner, in exchange for the lifting of the warrant of levy. Furthermore, Republic Cement and the ProvinceA g r e e d t o l i m i t t h e i s s u e f o r r e s o l u t i o n b y t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s t o t h e q u e s t i o n a s t o w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e p r o v i n c i a l government could pursuant

to Section 21of Provincial Ordinance No. 3.The CA ruled that the Province had no authority to issue Ordinance No. 3, hence this appeals to the SC. Held : The decision of the CA must be sustained. Reasons: (1) Ordinance No. 3 is based on Sec. 158 of the LGC of 1991 which states: The province may levy andcollect not more than ten percent (10%) of fair market value in the locality per cubic meter of ordinarys t o n e s , s a n d , g r a v e l , e a r t h a n d o t h e r q u a r r y r e s o u r c e s , a s d e f i n e d u n d e r t h e N a t i o n a l I n t e r n a l Revenue Code, as amended, extracted from private lands. Need we say more? (2) It is true that under Sec. 133 (h), the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalitiesa n d baranga ys shall not extend to the levy of exercise taxes on articles e n u m e r a t e d u n d e r t h e National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 151 of the NIRC, by the way levies excise taxes onall quarry resources, regardless of origin, whether extracted from public or private land. Thus an LGUmay not ordinarily impose taxes on stones, sand, earth and other quarry resources, as the same arealready taxed under the National Internal Revenue Code, However an LGU can still impose a tax onstones, sand, gravel, earth and othe r quarry resources extracted from public land because it is expressly em powered to do so under the LGU. But again it only sa ys Public T h e P r o v i n c e o f Bulacan cannot tax Republic Cement because its extracting minerals from private lands. Dont forget, public versus private. 3. Other Illustrative Cases:3. a Basco v. PAGCOR 197 SCRA 52Facts : Atty. Humberto Basco, the Chairman on the committee of Laws of the City Council of Manila, and 3 other lawyers, (the Basco Four) filed a petition seeking to annul t he Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)because among others. 1) It waived the Manila City governments right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law and 2) for the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded intothe local governments right to impose local taxes and license fees in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of the local autonomy. Held : The Basco four contentions are all unmeritorious Reasons:1)Any petitioner assailing the constitionality of the law must realize that said law is armed with the presumption of constitionality. With this in mind, the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the law he wishes toassail is unconstitutional. 2) The Basco Four assailed Sec. 13 par. 2 of P.D 1869 which states that LGUs cannot impose on PAGCORtaxes on any kind (except for the 5% franchise tax) Said provision, they claim is a violation of local autonomyit waives the City of Manilas right to impose taxes and license fees. The court answered that.a ) T h e C i t y o f M a n i l a b e i n g a M e r e m u n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n h a s n o i n h e r e n t r i g h t t o i m p o s e t a x e s . T h u s , t h e Charter or statute must plainly show am intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. Itspower to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon bythe state itself which has the inherent power to tax.b ) T h e c h a r t e r o f t h e C i t y o f M a n i l a i s s u b j e c t t o c o n t r o l b y c o n g r e s s . I t s h o u l d b e s t r e s s e d t h a t m u n i c i p a l c orporation are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporation due to its legislative powers Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemption or even take back the power.c ) T h e C i t y of Manilas power to impose licenses fees on gambling has long been r e v o k e d . A s e a r l y a s 1 9 7 5 , the power of local government to regulate gambling thru the grant of franchise, licenses or permits waswithdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government.PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All its stocks areowned by the National Government : it has dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the

category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentalityof the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might beburdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local Government.( 3 ) T h e states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in a n y m a n n e r c o n t r o l the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federalg o v e r n m e n t . T h i s d o c t r i n e e m a n a t e s f r o m t h e s u p r e m a c y o f t h e N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t o v e r l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s . Otherwise, mere creatures of the state can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as a tool for regulation. ( 4 ) T h e B a s c o Four cannot also invoke Article X, sec 5 of the 1987 Constitution w h i c h s a y s , E a c h l o c a l government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy.Such taxes, fees and charges shall exclusively to the local government. The power of local government to impose taxesand fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. 3. b Mactan Cebu Intl Airport v. MarcosFacts : Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958mandated to principally undertake to economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City, and such other Airports as maybe established in the province of Cebu. It is also mandated to a) encourage, promote and develop international anddomestic air traffic in the Central Visayas and Mindanao regions as a means of making the regions centers of internationaltrade and tourism, and accelerating the development of the means of transportation and communication in the country;a n d b ) u p g r a d e t h e s e r v i c e a n d f a c i l i t i e s o f t h e a i r p o r t s a n d t o f o r m u l a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t a b l e s t a n d a r d s o f accommodation and service.Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxesimposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities in accordance withSection 14 of its charter. However, on Oct. 11, 1994, the city of Cebu claimed started demanding payment on parcels of land belonging toMCIAA. The city of Cebu claimed that MCIAA cannot rely on Sec. 14 of its charter becauseas MCIAA is a GOCC- its taxexemption privilege has been withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC as follows; Sec. 193. Withdrawal of TaxExemption Privilege. Unless otherwise provided in this code, tax exemptions or incentive granted to, or presently enjoyedby all persons whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA No. 6938, non-stock, and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions,are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code x x x Sec. 234.Exemptions from Real Property taxes. x x x except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of realproperty tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government owned or controlled corporation, are herby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code.For its defense, MCIAA relies on Sec. 133 (o) of the LGC which says unless otherwise provided herein (in this Code), theexercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following x x x (o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, andLGUs. MCIAA relies on the ruling of Basco v. P AGCOR, which stated that local governments have no power to taxinstrumentalities of the National Government and that PAGCOR, it is performing both proprietary and governmentfunctions. MCIAA claims that like PAGCOR, it is performing a governmental function as well (read the first paragraphabove again), thus, it should be exempt from taxation by the City of Cebu. Held : M C I A A i s w r o n g . R e a s o n s : 1)Basco v. PAGCOR was decided before the enactment of the LGC of 1991. It thus finds no application in this case because the arguments here rely heavily on said LGC.2 ) T h e n t h e r e i s t h e c u r i o u s S e c 2 3 4 w h i c h s t a t e s , E x e m p t i o n s f r o m R e a l P r o p e r t y T a x . T h e f o l l o w i n g a r e exempted from payment of the real property tax:

a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof had been granted, for reconsiderationor otherwise, to a taxable person x x x except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code. CanMCIAA claim that is parcels of land are basically owned by the Republic of the Philippines in Cebu thus landsare exempt from real property tax? The court answered no, because under MCIAAs charter, all lands owned by existing airports belonging to the Republic of the Philippines in Cebu are transferred to the MCIAA,meaning, there was an absolute conveyance of ownership to MCIAA. The Republic of the Philippines is nolonger the owner of the lands in question, thus MCIAA is not spared from real property taxes. 3) While MCIAA is correct in invoking Sec 133 (o) above which disallows LGUs to tax the National Government,its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs, Sec 133 (o) is also qualified by the phrase, unless otherwiseprovided herein. (in this code). The tax imposed upon MCIAA concerns real property taxes. Thus MCIAA isalso subject to Sec 234 and for reasons mentioned in no.2). MCIAA is not spared from property taxes.4)The ultimate fact remains that Sec 193 of the LGC of 1991 has repealed the tax exemption privilege enjoyed by MCIAA as stated in Sec. 14 of its charter. This policy is consistent with the States policy to ensure genuineand meaningful autonomy to LGUs. NOTE : the Republic of the Philippines is not the same as National Government (W ow!). To better understand this situation, lets have a rundown of some boring definitions:a)Republic of the Philippines s ynonymous with Government of the Republic of the Philippines; thecorporate government entity through which the function of government are exercised throughout thePhilippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through whichpolitical authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions,the provincial city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.b)National Gover nment the entire machinery of the central government (executive, legislative and juridical) as opposed to the forms of local governments.c ) A g e n c y any of the various units of the Government, including a department, b u r e a u , o f f i c e instrumentality, or GOCC or a local government or a distinct unit thereind ) I n s t r u m e n t a l i t y a n y a g e n c y o f t h e N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t , n o t i n t e g r a t e d w i t h i n t h e d e p a r t m e n t framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporatepowers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonom y; usually though a charter e.g. regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and GOCCs 3. c MERALCO v Province of Laguna 306 SCRA 750Facts :On various dates. Certain municipalities of the Province of Laguna, including, Bian, Sta. Rosa, SanPedro, Luisiana, Canluan and Cabuyao, by virtue of existing laws then effect, issued resolution through their respectivemunicipal councils granting franchise in favor of petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) for the supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas. On 19 January 1983, MERALCO was likewise granted a franchise by the National Electrification Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna.On 12 September 1991, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government, Code of 1991, wasenacted to take effect on 01 January 1992, enjoying local government units expressed therein own sources of revenueand to levy taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of localautonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code, respondent province enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92,effective 01 January 1993, imposing a tax on business enjoying a franchise.On the basis of the above ordinance, respondent Provincial Treasurer sent a demand letter to MERALCO for thecorresponding tax payment. MERALCO, however, contented that the imposition of a franchise tax under Section 2.09 of Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, insofar as it concerned MERALCO, contravened the provisions of Section 1 of P.D. 551 which read: Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable byall grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two per cent(2%) of their gross receipt received from the sale of

electric current and f rom transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current. Such franchise tax x x x shall any provision of the Local Tax Code or any other lawto the contrary notwithstanding, be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on earnings, receipt, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current. (Note theitalicized sentence) MERALCO now contents that 1) the phrase shall be in lieu of all taxes x x x in sec 1 of P.D. 551 prevents the province of Laguna from imposing franchise taxes on it 2) whether the ordinance is violative of the non-impairment clauseand 3) whether the LGC of 1991 has repealed, modified or amended P.D. 551. Held : All contentions by MERALCO are incorrect. Reasons: 1) Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional mandate of vesting broad tax powers to localgovernment units, the Local Government Code has effectively withdrawn under Section 193 thereof, tax exemptions or incentives therefore enjoyed by certain entities. This is also supported by Section 137 whichstates, Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the province may impose atax on business enjoying a franchise x x x and also by Sec. 534, the repealing clause, which declares. Allgeneral and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamation and administrative regulation, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are herebyrepealed or modified accordingly.2)In the recent case of the City Government of San Pablo, etc., et al. vs. Hon. Beinvenido V. Reyes, et. Al., theCourt has held the phrase in lieu of all taxes has to give way to the peremptor y language of t he LocalGovernment Code specifically providing for the withdrawal of such exemptions, privileged, and that upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code all exemptions except only as provided therein can no longer beinvoked by MERALCO to disclaim liability for the local tax.3)W hile the court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax exemptions contained in special franchises as beingin the nature of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these exemptions,nevertheless, are far from being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly, be invoked, are those agreed toby the taxing authority in contracts, such as tho se contained in special government bonds or debentures,lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may notbe revoked without impairing the obligations of contracts. These contractual tax exemptions, however, are notto be confused with tax exemptions granted under franchise. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant whichis beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Indeed, Article XII, section 11, of the1987 Constitution, like its precursor provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that nofranchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that such privilegeshall be subject to amended, alternation or repeal by Congress as and when the common good so requires. 3. d Municipality of San Fernando v. Sta. Romana 149 SCRA 27Facts :The Municipality of San Fernando, La Union which was undertaking a cement road construction aroundits Supermarket and other municipal projects, needed sufficient gravel and sand from their source, the Municipality of Luna, La Union but its trucks sent to the latter municipality to haul said road construction materials were allegedly chargedunreasonable fees per truck load.Said fees charged by Luna were based on Section 1 of Ordinance No. 1 enacted by it which reads, There shallbe collected from any person, partnership or corporation engaged in any business, occupation or calling or enjoying anyprivilege hereunder enumerated the following municipal license and/or fees x x x On March 18, 1968, the Municipality of San Fernando represent by its incumbent Municipal Mayor Lorenzo L.Dacanay filed a complaint for injunction with W rit of preliminary Injunction at the Court of First Instance of La Uniona g a i n s t t h e M u n i c i p a l i t y o f L u n a a n d i t s o f f i c i a l s a n d a u t h o r i z e d a g e n t s , p r a y i n g t h a t t h e M u n i c i p a l i t y o f L u n a b e immediately enjoined from preventing San Fernandos its from obtaining road construction from Luna, La Union and fromlevying unreasonable and after trial to make the injunction permanent. The lower court granted said petition.

The main issue in this case is whether the Municipality of Luna h as the authority to pass Ordinance No.1 andimpose the license fees in question. Held :The answer is No, but for a surprising reason. The reason is that this issue in the case at is governed byPresident Decree No. 231, enacting a Local Tax Code (for Provinces, Cities, municipalities and Barrios) which took effecton July 1, 1973. The Code provides:SEC 10. Sand and gravel fee. The province may levy and collect a fee of not exceeding twenty-five centavos per cubicmeter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel earth and other materials selected from lakes, rivers, streams, creeks and other public waters within the jurisdiction of the province.SEC 22. Specific limitations on power. Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the municipality shall not levy thefollowing:(a)Taxes, fees and charges that the province or city is authorized to levy in this Code x x xSection 10 of aforesaid decree was later amended by Presidential Decree No. 426 dated March 1974, and nowreads: Sand and gravel tax. The province may levy and collect a tax of not exceeding seventy-five centavos per cubicmeter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel earth and other materials extracted from public and private lands of the governmentor from the beds of seas, lakes, streams, creeks, and other public wa ters within the jurisdiction of the province. Themunicipality where the materials extracted shall share in the proceeds of the tax herein authorized at a rate of not morethan thirty per cent thereof as may be determined by the Provincial Board. The permit to extract the materials shall beissued by the Direction of Mines or his duly authorized representative and the extraction thereof shall be governed byregulations issued by the Director of Mines.Under the above-quoted provisions of the Local Tax Code, ther e is no question that the authority impose thel i c e n s e f e e s i n d i s p u t e , p r o p e r l y b e l o n g s t o t h e p r o v i n c e c o n c e r n e d a n d n o t to the Municipality of Luna which isspecifically prohibited under Section 22 of s a m e C o d e f r o m l e v y i n g f e e s a n d c h a r g e s t h a t t h e p r o v i n c e o r c i t y i s authorized to levy in this Code. On the other hand, Municipality of San Fernando cannot extract sand and gravel from theMunicipality of Luna without the corresponding taxes or fees that may be imposed by the province of La Union. NOTE : This is a lousy case. The LGC wasnt even used as legal basis in the decision, but then was an old case.What if we decide this case using the LGC of 1991? Was San Fernando forming a governmental or proprietary function inconstructing roads? In either case, based on these of facts alone, can the municipality of Luna tax the municipality of SanFernando? 3. e Compania General de Tabacos v. City of Manila 8 SCRA 367Facts :Compania General Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera for short) filed this action i n t h e c o u r t o f F i r s t Instance of Manila to recover from appellants, City of Manila and its Treasurer, Marcelino Sarmiento also hereinafter referred to as the city the sum of P15, 280.00 allegedly overpaid by it as on its wholesale and retail sales of liquor for theperiod from the third quarter of 1954 to the second quarter of 1957, inclusive, under Ordinances Nos. 3634, 3301, and3816.Tabacaleras action for refund is based on the theory tat, in connection with its liquor sales, it could pay the licensefees prescribe by Ordinance No. 2258 but not the municipal sales taxes imposed Ordinances Nos. 3634, 3301, and 3816;and since it already paid the license fees aforesaid, the sales paid by the amounting ton sum of P 15,208.00 under thethree ordinance mentioned heretofore is overpayment made by mistake and therefore refundable.The city, on the other hand, contends that for permit issued to it granting proper authority to conduct or engage inthe sale of alcoholic beverages or liquors Tabacalera is subject to pay the license prescribed by Ordinance No. 3358,aside from the sales taxes imposed by Ordinances Nos. 3634, and 3816 that even assuming that Tabacalera is notsubject to the payment of the sales taxes prescribed by the said three ordinances as regards its liquor sales, it is notentitled to the refund for the following reasons: 1) the said amount was paid by the plaintiff voluntarily and without protest:2) If at all the alleged overpayment was made by mistake, such mistake was one of law and impose from the plaintiff neglect of duty; 3) The said amount had been added by the plaintiff to the selling price of the liquor sold by it and passedto the consumers; 4) The said amount had been already expended by the defendant City for public improvement and essential services of the City government, the benefits of which are enjoyed and being enjoyed by the plaintiff. Held

: Tabacaleras contentions are untenable. What is collected under Ordinance No. 3358 is a license fee for theprivilege of engaging in the sale of liquor a calling in which it is obviously not anyone or anybody may freely engage,considering that the sale of liquor indiscriminately may endanger public health and morals. On the other hand, what thethree ordinances mentioned herefore impose is a tax for revenue purposes based on the sales made of the same articleor merchandise. It is already settled on this connection that both a license fee and a tax may be imposed on the samebusiness or occupation for selling the same article, this not being in violation of the rule against double taxation. This isprecisely the case with the ordinances involved in the case at bar. 3. f Ty v. Trampe 250 SCRA 500Facts : On 06 January 1994, the Municipal Assessor of Pasig sent a notice of assessment concerning certain realproperties owned by Alejandro B Ty located in Pasig, Metro Manila. A similar notice for the same reason was also sent toMVR Picture Tube. Inc. located in Pasig, Metro Manila. In a dated 18 March 1994, petitioners Ty and MVR Picture Tube Inc. (Ty and Company) through counsel requested the Municipal Assessor to consider the subject assessments. Notsatisfied, Ty and Company on 29 March 1994 filed with the RTC of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by Judge Aurelio Trampe, a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminaryinjunction to declare null and void the new tax assessment and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on saidassessments. The judge denied said petition.Ty and Company now contends that 1)the Court gravely erred in holding that Presidential decree No. 921, including its implementing rules and regulations, were expressly repealed by R.A 7160 the Court erred in not declaring theconfiscatory and oppressive nature of the assessments as illegal ab initio and unconstitutional constituting a deprivationo f p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t d u e p r o c e s s o f l a w a n d t h e C o u r t e r r e d i n d e c l a r i n g t h a t T y a n d c o m p a n y f a i l e d t o e x h a u s t administrative remedies provided the law by not paying tax although under protest instead (Sec. 252, LGC). To put it inwords justice Panganiban, who loves to ask a question before writing his decisions, are the increased real state taxesimposed by and collected by the Municipality of Pasig, effective from the year 1994, legal? (With all due respect to thegood Justice, the real question is: Does the municipal, provincial city assessor [as the case may be]. Acting alone, havethe authority to prepare the Schedule of Values real property as mandated by R.A. 7160, or is the schedule of Valuesprepared by a group of assessors as mandated by P.D. 921? Obviously, we have 2 conflicting laws here). Held : Ty and Companys petition is meritorious. Reasons:1)To resolve Ty and Companys first contention, we have to examine certain 3 laws. The first is R.A. 15 of P.D.464, the Real Property Tax Code which states, Preparation of Schedules of Value before any general revisionof property assessments is made as provided in this Code, there shall be prepared for the province or a schedule of Market Value for the different classes of real property therein situated in such form and detail asshall be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance.The second is Section 9 of P.D. 921 which states, Preparation of Schedule of Value for Real Property within theMetropolitan Area. The Schedule of Value that will serve as the basis for the appraisal and assessment for taxation purposes of real properties located within the Metropolitan Area.Shall be prepared jointly by the City Assessors of the Districts created under Section one hereof, with the CityAssessors of Manila acting as Chairman, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 464, asamended, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code, and the implementing rules and regulations thereof issued bythe Secretary of Finance.The second is Section 9 of P.D. 921 which states. Preparation of Schedule of Values that will serve as the basisfor the appraisal and assessment for taxation purposes of real properties located within the Metropolitan Area shall beprepared jointly by the City Assessors of the Districts created under Section one hereof, with the City Assessor of Manilaacting as Chairman, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 464, as amended, otherwiseknown as the Real Property Tax Code, and the implementing rules and regulations thereof issued by the Secretary of Finance. Also, we have Section 1, same P.D., which states, Division of Metropolitan Manila into Local Treasury andAssessment Districts. For purposes of effective fiscal management, Metropolitan Manila is hereby divided into thefollowing Local Treasury and Assessment Districts:F i r s t D i s t r i c t M a n i l a S

econd DistrictQuezon City, Pasig, Marikina, Mandaluyong and San JuanT h i r d D i s t r i c t C a l o o c a n C i t y , M a l a b o n , N a v o t a s a n d V a l e n z u e l a Fourth DistrictPasay City, Makati, Paraaque, Muntinlupa, Las Pias, Pateros a n d T a g u i g Manila, Quezon City, Caloocan City and Pasay City shall be the respective Centers of the aforesaid Treasur y and Assessment Districts.The third is Sec. 212 of the LGC, 1991 which states, Preparation of Schedule of Fair Market Values. Before anygeneral revision of property assessment is made pursuant to the provisions of this Title, there shall be prepared aschedule of fair market values by the provincial, ci ty and the municipal assessors of the municipalities within theMetropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real property situated in their respective local government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned x x x.The question now is, who will prepared the schedule of Fair Market Values: the guys under P.D. 921 of the guysunder LGC of 1991? It should be noted that the LGC did not expressly repeal P.D. 921. Did the former impliedly repeal thelatter then? The court answered no. I t is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored.An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are soclearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of thelegislature cannot be overturned by judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the lawsand resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.It is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistentwith the legislative intent and policy. By reading together and harmonizing these two provisions, we arrive at the followingsteps in the preparation of the said schedule, as follows: a)The assessors in each municipality or city in the Metropolitan Manila area shall prepare his/her proposedschedule of values, in accordance with Sec. 212 R.A. 7160.b)Then, the Local Treasury and Assessment District shall meet per Sec. 9 P.D. 921. In the instant case, thatdistrict shall be composed of the assessors in Quezon City, Pasig , Marikina, Mandaluyong and San Juan,p u r s u a n t t o S e c . 1 o f s a i d P . D . I n t h i s m e e t i n g , t h e d i f f e r e n t a s s e s s o r s s h a l l c o m p a r e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l assessments, discuss and thereafter jointly agree and produce a schedule of values for their districts, takinginto account the preamble of said P.D. that they should evolve a progressive revenue raising program thatwill not unduly burden the taxpayers. c ) T h e s c h e d u l e jointly agreed upon by the assessors shall they be published in a newspaper of g e n e r a l circulation and submitted to the sanggunian concerned for enactment by ordinance, per Sec. 212, R.A. 7160. 2) Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper,there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve question of fact but of la. Ty andcompany are not merely questioning the amounts of increase in the tax, they are questioning the very authorityand power of the assessor, acting solely and increase in the tax, they are questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to collectthe tax. Therefore, there is no reason for Ty and company to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for inthe LGC, namely Sec 226 (appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals) and Sec. 252 (Payment under protest). 3) Finally the court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the law if the controvers y can be settled on other grounds, like in this case, by harmonizing the conflicting provisions of P.D. 921 and the LGC. D) Power to Open and Close Roads (Sec. 21, LGC, Art. 43-45, IRR) * Sec. 21. Closure and Opening of Roads(a) An LGU may, pursuant to an ordinance permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park or square falling within its jurisdiction: provided however, that in the case of permanent closure, such ordinance must beapproved by at least 2/3 of all members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the publicfacility that is subject to closure provided.(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making provisions for themaintenance of public safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed

for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the LGU concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed . Provided however, That no freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.(c) Any national or local road, alley, park or square may be temporarily closed during an actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public works and highways,telecommunications and w aterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified by the local chief executive c o n c e r n e d i n a w r i t t e n o r d e r . P r o v i d e d h o w e v e r , t h a t n o n a t i o n a l o r l o c a l r o a d , a l l e y , p a r k o r s q u a r e s h a l l b e temporarily closed for athletic, cultural or civic activities not officially sponsored, recognized or approved by the LGUconcerned.(d) Any city, municipality or barangay may by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily close and regulate theuse of an any local street road thoroughfare or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets or shopping areas may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.* Art 43. Authority to Close or Open. An LGU may, through an ordinance permanently or temporarily close or openany road, alley, park or square within its jurisdictions.* Art 44. Permanent Closure.( a ) N o p e r m a n e n t c l o s u r e o f a n y l o c a l r o a d , s t r e e t , a l l e y , p a r k o r s q u a r e s h a l l b e e f f e c t e d unless there exists a compelling reason or sufficient justification therefore such as, but notlimited to change in land use, establishment of infrastructure facilities, projects or suchother justifiable reasons as public welfare may require.(b)When necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure shallbe provided. No freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site( c ) N o s u c h w a y o r p l a c e o r a n y p a r t t h e r e o f s h a l l b e p e r m a n e n t l y c l o s e d w i t h o u t m a k i n g provisions for the maintenance of a public system therein( d ) A p r o p e r t y p e r m a n e n t l y withdrawn from public use m ay be used or conveyed f or anypurpose for which other real property belonging to property m a y b e l a w f u l l y u s e d o r conveyed. (e) (The ordinance authorizing permanent closure must be approved by at least 2/3 of allmembers of the Sanggunian. Public hearings shall first be conducted before any ordinance authorizing permanent closure of any local roads, alley, park or square is enacted. Noticesof such hearings and copies of the proposed ordinance shall be posted for a minimum of 3consecutive weeks in conspicuous places in the provincial capitol, or in the city, municipal,or barangay hall of LGU and within the vicinity of the street or park proposed to be closed.* Art. 45. Temporary Closure. Any national of local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed duringactual emergency or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or undertakings of pubic works andhigh ways, telecommunications and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned in a written order as follows:(1) During fiestas for a period not exceeding 9 days(2) During agricultural or industrial fairs or expositions, for a period as may be determined to be necessary andreasonable(3) When public works projects or activities are being undertaken, for a period as may be determined necessaryfor the safety, security, health or welfare of the public or when such closure is necessary to facilitate completion of theprojects or activities(4) An LGU may temporarily close and regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or public placewhere shopping malls, Sunday market, flea or night mar ket, or shopping areas may be established and where goods,merchandise, foodstuff, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public(5) No national or local road, alley, park, or square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civicactivities not officially sponsored, recognized or approved by the LGU. Factors to consider in vacating a street a) Topography of the property surrounding the street in the light of ingress and egress to other streetsb) Relationship of the street in the road system throughout the subdivisionc) Problem posed by the dead end of the streetd) Width of the streete) Cost of rebuilding and maintaining the street as contrasted to its ultimate value to all of the property inthe vicinityf) Inconvenience of those visiting the subdivisiong) Whether the closing of the street would cut off any property owners from access to a street. d.1 Favis v. City of Baguio 27 SCRA 1060Facts

: This case took place in Baguio City.O n A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 5 7 , A n t o n i o F a v i s b o u g h t a p a r c e l o f l a n d f r o m t h e A s s u m p t i o n C o n v e n t , I n c . T h i s l a n d i s surrounded by the following areas (go get a pen and paper and draw a map of this land to better understand this case):1. Lot 2-E-3-B-3B-1 this lot is owned by Assumption and is loc ated southwest of Favis land; this lot was donated to the City because it was the site for a proposed road. This donated road is Favis only means of ingress andegress to Lapu-lapu Street, a public street.2. Lapu-lapu Street this street is a portion of the Baguio Market Subdivision, a big tract of land registered in thename of the City. Lapulapu street is connected at one end to two lots: a) Lot 2 -E-3-B-3-B-1; and b) a lot owned byOlmina Fernandez. Generally, Lapu-lapu Street is 8 m. in width, but at its connecting point with Lot 2E-3-B-3-B-1, its only2.5 m. in width.3. Lot 25 this lot is located in the northern portion of Baguio Market Subdivision and is right beside Fernandezslot. The shell Oil Company leased this lot in 1947 for its use as a service station. 10 years later, Shell leased Lot 25 againand a portion of Lapu-lapu Street as well, reducing the latters width to only 5 meters. The City approved the renewal of the lease thru Resolution No. 132-61.Favis protested the lease because it reduced the width of Lapu-lapu Street, thus (1) his entrance and exit to andfrom his property has become very difficult; (2) it became impossible for his big trucks and trailers to turn around; (3) itmade the area around it very dangerous in case of fire; and (4) it has caused perpetual danger, annoyance, irreparablel o s s a n d d a m a g e n o t o n l y t o t h e p u b l i c in general but especially to Favis himself. In response, the City a p p r o v e d Resolution 215-61, converting the remaining 5 m. -width portion of Lapu-lapu street into an alley (lousy resolution). Unsatisfied with the Citys response, Favis Commenced suit to annul the lease contract for the reasons mentioned aboveand also because of the following: 1) the power to close streets should be effected thru an ordinance and not thru aresolution; 2) the City failed to give notice to owners of contiguous properties whose rights might be affected; and 3) thecity council of Baguio and municipal bodies in general, have no inherent right to vacate or withdraw a street from publicuse, either in whole or in part, thus there must be a specific grant by the legislative body to the city or municipality concerned. Held : Favis contentions are unmeritorious. Reasons:1) The embattled resolutions are just as good as ordinances. The objection is only of forms, not of substance 2) Notice is not needed because the City Charter requires notice only when the ordinance in question also callsfor an assessment regarding a project to be implemented. In this case, no assessment was called for and was in fact, notnecessary.3) While Favis is correct that municipal bodies have no inherent right to close a public street, still the City Charter does authorize Baguio City to close public roads in its discretion absent a plain case of abuse, or fraud or collision. Faithfulness in public trust is presumed. Public interest is served thru 1) savings from cost of road maintenance; and 2)gaining by the City of some income thru leasing.4) Favis private rights were not invaded. Lapu-lapu street does not abut his parcel of land. The general rule isthat one whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street has no right to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still has reasonable access to the general system of streets. The circumstances in some casesmay be such as to give a right to damages to a property owner, even though his property does not abut on the closedsection. But to warrant recovery in any such case the property owner must show that the situation is such that he hassustained special damages differing in from those sustained by kind, and not merely in degree, the public generally.2. Other illustrative cases: d.1. Cabrera v. CA 195 SCRA 314Facts : On Sept. 19, 1969, the Provincial Board of Catanduanes passed Resolution 158 authorizing the closure of the old road leading to the Capitol City of Catanduanes. A new road was built which traversed the land of RemediosB a g a d i o n g a n d s e v e r a l o t h e r s s i m i l a r l y a f f e c t e d . B a g a d i o n g a n d f r i e n d s w e r e g i v e n p o r t i o n s o f t h e o l d r o a d a s compensation for the properties they lost as a result of the construction of the new road.One man, Bruno Cabrera, did not like the idea of the old road being gone. He filed a complaint for Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages alleging that theold road in question was a public road owned by the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and was thusbeyond the commerce of man. It stands to reason then, that said road cannot be the subject of private contracts, such asbarter or exchange. Moreover, Cabrera insists, control over public roads lies with Congress, not with the Provincial Board.

Held : Cabrera is wrong. Reasons:1) Resolution 158 states, in black and white ink, that it is for the closure of a public road and not for a contract of barter or exchange. RA 5185 Sec 11 (a) (An Ant Granting Further Local Autonomy to Local Governments), in relation toSec. 2246 of the revised Administration Code, is the pertinent law from which Resolution 158 derives its authority.2) The barter or exchange is legal coz its in accordance with Sec. 412 of the Civil Code, which states: Propertyof public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial propertyof the State.Note: The power to open or close roads is expressly provided for in Art. 43, IRR of the LGC, 1991. d.2.Dacanay v. Asistio 208 SCRA 404Facts : Way back in January 5, 1979, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) enacted MMC Ordinance 7902, which allowed certain city and municipal public streets and roads to be sites for many vendors applied for licenses toconduct such activities in said streets.On Dec. 20, 1987, the RTC of Caloocan City ruled that the streets were of public dominion and ordered thedemolition of said stalls. But Mayor Martinez, who had advocated the demolition of the said stalls, has been replaced byMayor Asistio. Mayor Asistio did not carr y out the order of the RTC, for humanitarian reasons. Francisco Dacanay, aconcerned citizen and a resident along Heroes del 96 street, filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Mayor, thru theCity Engineer, to remove the said stalls. Will the petition prosper? Held : Yes, for the plain and simple reason that public roads cannot be the object of leases and thus cannot bebargain away thru contracts. Public roads should serve the purpose for which they were built: for public use as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. d.3. Macasiano v. Diokno 212 SCRA 464Facts : On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Paranaque passed Ordinance no. 90, s e r i e s o f 1 9 9 0 , w h i c h authorized the closure of 5 streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque for the establishment there of a flea market. On July20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved the said ordinance but subject to the following conditions:1. That the afore-named streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of the residents do notoppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas thereon;2. That the 2 meter middle road to be used for flea market/vending area shall be marked distinctly, and that the 2meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians;3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly designated;4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas aredeveloped and donated by the Public Estate Authority. Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service, a service cooperative, then entered into a contract with Paranaque for theconstruction and operation of market stalls in the said streets.Some months later, Brg. Gen. Levy Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, entered the picture. He wrote Palanyag a letter demanding the latter to discontinue the flea market, otherwise the marketstalls would be dismantled. Macasianos beef was that Ordinance No. 90which authorized the lease and use of publicthoroughfares as site for flea markets is not valid because it is on legal basis. Was he correct? Held : Yes. Reasons:1) The Municipality of Paranaque did not follow Sec. 10, Chapter 11, LGC 1983, to the letter. Its states that: Closure of roads. A local Government unit may likewise, through its head acting pursuant to resolution of its sanggunianand in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code, states any barangay, municipal, city or provincialroad, street, alley, park or square. No such way or any part of thereof shall be close without indemnifying any personprejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn form public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed.Note the italicized phrase and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code. The power to close roads by LGUs is still subject to existing law. In this light, Art. 424 of the Civil Code is relevant. It essentially saysthat if public property is withdrawn from public use, the property becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned andmay thus be subject to ordinary contracts. This is all assuming if the public are still open to vehicular traffic and are thusstill devoted to public use.2) Following the argument of the # 1 above, it goes to show that Paranaque did not

follow condition as imposedby the MMA for Ordinance 90 tie be valid. The legality of Ordinance 90, under the circumstances, cannot be sustained. d.4. Sangalang v. IAC 176 SCRA 719Facts : As far back in 1977, Makati, Metro Manila has always been plagued by traffic. For this reason, during thattime, Mayor Nemesio Yabut of Makati ordered that studies be made on ways on how to alleviate the traffic problem, particularly in the areas along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed that the subdivision plano f B e l - A i r w a s a p p r o v e d b y t h e C o u r t of First. Distance of Rizal on the condition, among others, that its m a j o r thoroughfares connecting to public streets and highways shall be opened to public traffic. Accordingly, it was deemednecessary by the Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public to open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac,Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit and Pasco de Roxas streets. As a result, the gates owned by BAVA at Jupiter and Orbit were ordered demolished.Mayor Yabut justified the opening of the streets on the following grounds:1) Some time ago, Ayala Corporation donated Jupiter and Orbit Streets to Bel-Air on the condition that, under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, the general public shall always be open to the general public. Theseconditions were evidenced by a deed of donation executed between Ayala and Bel-Air.2) The opening of the streets was justified by public necessity and the exercise of the police power.3) Bel-Air Village Associations (BAVA) articles of incorporation recognized Jupiter Street as a mere boundary tothe southwest thus it cannot be said to be for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents.4) BAVA cannot hide behind the non-impairment clause on the ground that is constitutionally guaranteed. Thereason is that it is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.BAVA, on the other hand, contended:1) Rufino Santos, president of BAVA, never agreed to the opening of the said streets2) BAVA has always kept the streets voluntarily open anywayMoreover, BAVA claims the demolition of the gates abovementioned was a deprivation of property without processof law or expropriation without just compensation.Who is correct: the Mayor or BAVA?Held: The Mayor is correct, for the reasons mentioned above. Also, the demolition of the gates is justified under Art. 436 of the Civil Code.When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of health, safety or security, theowner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified.In this case, BAVA has the burden of showing that the seizure of the gates is unjustified because police power canbe exercised without provision for just compensation. The Court is of the opinion that the Mayor did not act unreasonablynor was the opening of the gates unjustified. In fact, the gates could even be considered public nuisances, of which summary abatement, as decreed under Art. 701 of the Civil Code, may be carried out by the Mayor. d.5.Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles 66 SCRA 481Facts : The subject of the dispute is a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City (10 years from now, wouldthis name really matter?).One day, on Sept. 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed a resolution declaring the abovementioned street tobe abandoned. Subsequently, the council passed another resolution authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the street (which was actually a parcel of land) thru a public bidding. Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Inc. then bought the said parcel of land.However, when Cebu Ox ygen tried to have its land registered, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that it is a public road intended for public use and thus was outside thecommerce of man. The question now is whether the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. Held : Yes, for the simple reason that the City Charter of Cebu authorizes the same (Note that today, LGUs mayclose roads or streets under the authority of the LGU of 1991, charter of no charter). d.6.Pilapil v. CA 216 SCRA 33Facts : This case spanned for a period of 6 years only to reach an unexpected, tragic conclusion for the spousesColomida.Spouses Pilapil own a parcel of land in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu. Spouses Colomida, on the other hand,bought a parcel of land located also in Bahak. Now this land owned by the Colomidas has for its ingress and egress to theNational Road a camino vecinal (barrio road). However, this camino vecinal transverses the property of the Pilapil, whichwas the root of all their problems.The Pilapil denied the existence of the camino vecinal. Socrates Pilapil, the husband, presented himself aswitness (which was lousy) as well as Engineer Epifanio Jordan,

Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Liloan. The engineer said that while that zoning map of Poblacion, Liloan made reference to a camino vecinal, said reference was but a mere proposal of its existence to the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan.The Colomidas, on the other hand, relied on old-timers as witnesses witnesses such as Florentino Pepito, whoattested to the existence of the Camino vecinal and its availability to the general public since practically time immemorial.The trial court ruled in favor of the Colomidas because the zoning map used as evidence by the Pilapil did not specifically indicate that the amino vecinal was indeed merely proposed since other roads and streets were classified assuch. The CA upheld that trial court, basically because it said that findings of facts by the trial court, as a general rule,should be undisturbed.Would the SC uphold the CA ruling? Held : No. In its infinite wisdom, the SC said that it didnt matter what opinion the Colomidas or the engineer gaveregarding the existence of the camino vecinal. W hat really mattered is the zoning plan (the Urban Land Use Plan) as finally approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Liloan. The zoning plan showed that the camino vecinalwas declared closed. CLOSED! Its so crystal clear, cant you see? And its beyond dispute that the abandonment, closureor establishment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan under the LGU of 1983. The SCrebuked the parties for not having resorted to a pre-trial conference which would have prevented the dragging of a trivialcase for six years. E) Corporate Powers (Sec. 22, LGC, Art. 46, IRR) * Sec. 22, LGC, Corporate Powers. A) Every LGU, as a corporate, shall have the following powers:1. To have continuous succession in its corporate name;2. To sue and be sued;3. To have and use a corporate seal;4. To acquire and convey real or personal property5. To enter into contracts; and6. To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided in this Codeand other laws.b) LGUs may continue using, modify, or change their existing corporate seals. Provided, that newlyestablished LGUs or those without corporate seals may create their own corporate seals which shall be registered withthe DILG. Provided further, that may change of corporate seal shall also be registered as provided herein.c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive inbehalf of the LGU without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contrast shall be postedat a conspicuous place in the province capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.d ) L G U s s h a l l e n j o y f u l l l o c a l a u t o n o m y t o t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r p r o p r i e t a r y f u n c t i o n s a n d i n t h e management of their economic enterprises, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other applicable laws.*Article 46, IRR. Note: Its exactly the same as Sec. 22, LGC. *Municipality Liability A. General Rule Municipal liabilities arise from various sources in the conduct of municipal affairs, both governmental andproprietar y. Broadly, claims against municipalities include all obligations upon all municipal contracts and upon alloutstanding bonds, notes, and warrants issued by them. Strictly, however, these claims are demands for payments for articles, furnished or services rendered to a municipality in the conduct of its affairs, or demands asserting the tort liabilityof the municipality.B. Exceptions 1. As provided by lawa) Article 2189, New Civil Code Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damagesfor the death of or injuries suffered by any person by reason of the defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, publicbuildings, and other public works their control and supervision. Cases:e.1. City of Manila v. Teotico 22, SCRA 267Facts : On Jan. 27, 1958, at about 8 p.m., Genaro Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. BurgosAvenue, Manila, waiting for a jeepney to take him downtown. After 5 minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that camealong to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps he fell inside an uncoveredand unlighted manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Teotico sustained a lacerated wound in his left eyelid, conclusion on his leftthigh, the upper left thigh oh m y goodness, ever y injury imaginable! (Use Atty. Uleps tone of voice).

Teotico washospitalized and the anti-tetanus injections administered to him caused allergic eruptions which required further medicaltreatment. Teotico filed an action for damages (actual and moral damages) against the City of Manila. The City deniedliability contending that Sec. 4 of the City Charter (RA 409) should prevail over Art. 2189 of the Civil Code because theformer is a special law intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law applicable tothe entire Philippines. Held : Sec. 4 of RA 409 ref ers to liability arising from negligence in general regardless of the object thereof whereas Art. 2189 governs liability due to defective streets in particular. Since the presentation action is based upon thedetective condition of a road, said Art. 2189 is decisive. Under Art. 2189, it is not necessary for the liability thereine s t a b l i s h e d t o a t t a c h t h a t t h e d e f e c t i v e r o a d s o r s t r e e t s b e l o n g t o t h e p r ovince, city or municipality from whichresponsibility is exacted. W hat said Artic l e r e q u i r e s i s t h a t t h e p r o v i n c e , c i t y o r m u n i c i p a l i t y h a s e i t h e r c o n t r o l o r supervis ion over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would notnecessarily detract from its control of supervision by the City of Manila, under RA 4 09. The City of Manila is thereforeliable to Teotico for damages. e.2. Jimenez v. City of Manila 150 SCRA 510Facts : Bernardino Jimenez was the unlucky said who fell in an uncovered opening o the ground located within thepremises of the Sta. Ana public market. At that time, the market was flooded with ankle-deep rainwater which preventedthe opening form being seen. Jimenez, for his part, went to that market to buy bagoong despite the rains. He sustained aninjury due to a rusty 4-inch nail which pierced his left leg.Jimenez sued the Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC) and the City of Manila for his misfortune. The Sta. AnaMarket at that time was under the administration of the AIC by virtue of a management and Operating Contract it had withthe City of Manila. The trial court held the AIC responsible but absolved the City of Manila. Is the City of Manila indeed notliable? Held : The City of Manila is liable. Reasons:1) Again, Art. 2189 comes into play, since the injury took place in a public building.2) Also, Art. 2189 requires that the LGU must retain supervision and control over the public work in question for itto be held liable. The evidence showed that the Management and Operating Contract explicitly stated that the City of Manila retained supervision and control over the Sta. Ana Market. Also, in a letter to Finance Secretary Cesar Virata, Mayor Raymond Bagatsing admitted this fact of supervision and control. Moreover, Sec. 30(g) of the Local Tax Code saysthat public markets shall be under the immediate supervision, administration and control of the City Treasurer.3) Jimenez could not be held for negligence. A customer in a store has every right to presume that the owner willcomply with his duty to keep his premises safe for customers. The owner of the market, on the other hand, was proven tohave been negligent in not providing a cover for the said opening. The negligence of the City of Manila is the proximatecause of the injury suffered.NOTE: It is not necessar y for the LGU to have ownership over the publ ic work in question; mere control andsupervision is sufficient. e.3. Guilatco v. City of Dagupan 171 SCRA 382Facts : Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, was about to board a tric ycle at a sidewalk located at PerezBoulevard when she accidentally fell into a manhole located in said side walk, causing her right leg to be fractured. Shewas hospitalized and also as a result, suffered loss of income and moral damages.Guilatco sued the City of Dagupan. The City replied that Perez Boulevard, where the deadly manhole waslocated, is a national road not under the control and supervision of Dagupan. It is submitted that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control and supervision thru the Highway Engineer, who by mere coincidence, is also the CityEngineer of Dagupan (malas naman namin, City Engineer).Is the City of Dagupan liable? Held : Yes, Reasons:1) We again apply Art. 2189. But the bigger question is , does the City of Dagupan have control and supervisionover Perez Boulevard in order for it to be held liable? The answer is yes. Why? Read on.2) The City of Dagupan argued that the supervision and control over Perez Boulevard belongs more to hisfunction as ex-officio Highway Engineer, thus the Ministry of Public Highways should be held liable. However, the courtgave this arguments: Alfredo G. Tangco, in his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex -Officio HighwayEngineer, as Ex-

Officio City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as Building Official for Dagupan City, receives the following monthly compensation: P1,810.66 from Dagupan City, P200.00 from the Ministry of Public Highways, P100.00 from the Bureau of Public W orks and P500.00 by virtue of P>D 1096, respectively. This function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursedthrough Maintenance Foeman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these last two officials are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from thecity through the City Engineer. There is , therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the City Code is clear.(Duh? What kind of explanation is that? Personally, I cant understand it, but if the SC says the City of Dagupan is liable,then we must trust the wisdom of the omniscience SC). e.4. Dumlao v. CA 114 SCRA 247Facts : These events took place in Dagupan City.O n F e b . 2 8 , 1 9 6 4 , a b o u t 1 1 : 3 0 p . m . , t h e s p o u s e s E l i z a l d e w e r e d r i v i n g a j e e p t h r u T e l o m e s B r i d g e w h e n suddenly; they came upon a huge hole about 1 meter in diameter and 8 feet deep at the south end of the bridge. TheElizaldes managed to avoid the boulders but instead slammed into a truck owned by Hermanos de Yap and driven byDulcesimo Ducoy. The truck came from the opposite direction on the wrong lane. The Elizaldes died as a result of the incident. The heirs of the Elizaldes included in defendants in its complaint the City of Davao and Samuel Dumlao, the CityEngineer. Specifically, Dumlao was sued in his personal capacity.Dumlao argued that he cannot be held liable is his personal capacity. Is he correct? Held :Yes.1) The allegations in the complaint clearly state that he was being sued in his official capacity as City Engineer.2) There was no showing that there was bad faith or malice which would warrant Dumlao personally liable inconnection with the discharge of his duties.3) The best that could be imputed to him is an act of culpable neglect, inefficiency and gross negligence in theperformance of his official duties.b ) A r t i c l e 2 1 8 0 , C i v i l C o d e T h e o b l i g a t i o n i m p o s e d b y A r t i c l e 2 1 7 6 i s d e m a n d a b l e w a s o n l y f o r ones own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages causedby the minor children who live in their company.The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damagescaused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of thei r functions.Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.The State is responsible in like manner when it acts thru a special agent but not when the damage hasbeen caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which caused what is provided in Article 2176 shallbe applicable.Lastly, teachers or head of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.The responsibility treated of in this article cease when the persons herein mentioned proved that theyobserved all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. e.5. Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte 102 Phil. 1186Facts : Palafox filed a suit to recover damages from the provincial government for the death of his son caused bythe negligence of a regular chauffer of the provincial government. The accident occurred while the chauffer was working atthe highway construction. The questions now are: 1) May the province be held liable? 2) Does the doctrine of respondentsuperior apply? Held : The answers to both questions are given below (obviously): 1) To attach liability to the State for the negligence of its officer or employee, the latter must be not upon whomproperly devolved the duty of driving the truck on that occasion. This principle applies both to the national and municipalgovernments. The province is liable.2) The doctrine of respondeat superior or corporate liability for the negligence or tort of its officers, applies onlywhere the government is engaged in proprietary or business functions. When engaged in government functions, as theconstruction and maintenance of roads, the doctrine does not apply. The reason for the exemption is the government doesnot undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since

that would involve inall its operations endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses subversive of the public interest. 2. Liability for torts if engaged in proprietary functionCases : 1. Torio v. Fontanilla 85S CRA 599Facts : The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed a resolution celebrating a town fiesta for 3 dayson January, 1959. The resolution created on Executive Committee which would oversee the operations of the town fiesta.The Executive Committee in turn had a sub-committee in charge of building 2 stages, one of which was for a zarzuelaprogram.Vicente Fontanilla was one of the actors of the zarzuela. While the zarzuela was going on the stage where theplay was set collapsed. Fontanilla, who has at the rear of the stage, was pinned underneath and died the following day.The family and heirs of Fontanilla filed a complaint against the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Counciland the individual members of the Municipal Council. Can they be held liable? Held : The Municipality of Malasiqui is liable and the individual members of the Municipal Council are not liable.Reasons:1) The basic rule to be first followed is that a municipal corporation cannot be held liable for an injury caused inthe course of performance of a governmental function. W ith respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable upon contracts and in torts.2) The next question to be answered is that whether the fiesta above-quota was performed by the municipality int h e e x e r c i s e o f i t s g o v e r n m e n t a l o r p r o p r i e t a r y f u n c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o 2 2 8 2 o f t h e r e v i s e d A d m i n i s t r a t i v e C o d e , municipalities are authorized to hold fiesta, but it is not their duty to conduct such. Thus, the fiesta is proprietary in nature.The same analogy can be applied to the maintenance of parks, which is a private undertaking, as opposed to the maintenance of public schools and jails, which are for the public service. (The key word then is duty.)3) Under the doctrine of respondent superior (see first paragraph of Art. 2180), the municipality can be held liablefor the death of Fontanilla if a) the municipality was performing a proprietary function at that time and b) negligence can beattributed to the municipalitys officers, employees or agents performing the proprietary function. The evidence proved thatthe committee overseeing the construction of the stage failed to build a strong enough to insure the safety of zarzuela participants. Fontanilla was entitled to ensure that he would be exposed to danger on that occasion.4) Finally, the municipal council is not responsible. The Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinaryp r i v a t e c o r p o r a t i o n with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary p r i n c i p l e t h a t a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter arenot as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquillana committed by the corporationsemployees of agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. To make an officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the corporation there must have been upon his part such a breach of duty ascontributed to or helped to bring about, the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the wrongful act. 2. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firing 195 SCRA 692Facts : Laurence Banino, Sr., along with several other passengers in a jeepney they were riding in, died after collision involving said jeepney, a privately owned graved and sand trucks and a dump truck owned by the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, driven by Alfredo Bislig, a regular employee of said municipality. The heirs included in its complaint the municipality and the dump trucks driver. The municipality invokes non-suability of the State. Is it correct?Held: Yes.1) The general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes theform of express of implied consent.Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to besued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may bepassed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi delict.Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of theother contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint thus opening itself to a counterclaim. Municipal corporations for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged ingovernmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit.

Nevertheless, they are subject tosuit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. 2. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. Suability depends on the consent of the stateto be sued, liability on the applicable law and the establi shed facts. The circumstance that a State is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held allowing itself to be sued. When the state doeswaive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.3. About the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality is performinggovernmental of propriety functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, the distinction of powers becomesimportant for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury tothird persons.It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the dischargeof governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietycapacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant isn o t a c t i n g i n i t s governmental capacity when the injury was c o m m i t t e d o r t h a t t h e c a s e c o m e s u n d e r e x c e p t i o n s recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.4. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that he was on his way to NaguilianRiver to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernandos municipal streets.In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3 (m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck wasperforming duties or tasks pertaining to his office. 3. Read RA 7678 DIGITEL Franchise The title states: Republic Act no. 7678, February 17, 1994: An Act granting the Digit al TelecommunicationsPhilippines, Incorporated, a franchise to install, operates and maintain s telecommunications systems throughout thePhilippines and for other purposes.Section 13 states: Warranty in Favor of the National and Local Government. The grantee shall hold the national,provincial, city and municipal governments harmless from all claims, accounts, demands or actions arising out of a c c i d e n t s o r i n j u r i e s , w h e t h e r t o p r o p e r t y o r t o p e r s o n s , c a u s e d b y t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n a n d o p e r a t i o n o f t h e telecommunications systems of the grantee. * Liability for Contract Municipal corporations are liable on contracts entered into in their behalf by their authorized agents acting withinthe scope of their authority, provided that the municipal corporations are authorized to enter into said contracts by their charter. * Section 24, LGC. Liability for damages LGUs and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury or damage to property. 4. City of Manila v. JAC 179 SCRA 423Facts : The City of Manila leased a lot of the North Cemetery to Irene Sto. Domingo. The period of the lease isfrom June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2001.Irenes husband died and was buried in said lot on June 6, 1971. The authorities of the North cemetery however,ordered the lot exhumed on January 25, 1978, according to their interpretation in good faith of AO No. 5, 1975, whichprovided for a uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use anddisposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, etc.Naturally, Irene and her family were shocked, Adding to their dismay was that the remains of her husband wascallously dumped in a warehouse of a cemetery were thousands of other sacks of bones were kept. The risk, according toher, of claiming the wrong set of bones was high. Irene filed a claim for damages against the city. Will the suit prosper? Held : Yes, reasons:1.In connection with its powers as a municipal corporation, the City of Manila may acquire property in its publicor governmental capacity, and private or propriety capacity. The NCC divides such properties into property

for p u b l i c u s e a s p r o v i n c i a l r o a d s , c i t y s t r e e t s , m u n i c i p a l s t r e e t s , t h e s q u a r e s , f o u n t a i n s , p u b l i c w a t e r s , promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. 2. In the absence of special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila, which wasc r e a t e d b y r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e M u n i c i p a l B o a r d o f A u g u s t 2 7 , 1 9 0 3 a n d J a n u a r y 7 , 1 9 0 4 . W i t h i t s a c t s o f dominion, there is therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its propriety of private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial was leased infavor of the Sto. Domingo. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even of no penalty for suchbreach is prescribed in the contract.3.It should also be noted that the Charter of Manila states that it may sue and be sued. By virtue if this and thedoctrine of respondent superior, the City is liable for the negligent acts of its agents in failing to verif y the duration of the lease above- quoted. The agents reliance in AO No.5 is unavailing because said AO coversonly new leases. * Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability (Contra personal liability) To hold a municipal corporation for benefits received under an implied contract:a . I t i s necessar y to show that the implied contract be within the c o n t r a c t u a l p o w e r s o f t h e corporation and that the officers who entered into contract were fully authorized.b . I t m u s t b e f u r t h e r s h o w n t h a t t h e b e n e f i t s w e r e v o l u n t a r i l y a c c e p t e d u n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s as will indicate that payment was intended by the parties or that justice and equity would require the payment of compensation. 1. Inciong v. Domingo 211 SCRA 139Facts : This case basically concerns the implied liability of a municipal corporation in paying the fees of anattorney it hired. But first, the useless facts.The Philippines Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) owned a sugar refinery at Barangay Caloocan, Balayan, Batangas. However, PHILSUCOM failed to pay the real state taxes due on said sugar refinery. So the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas scheduled for the sale of the sugar refinery thru a public auction.PHILSUCOM, however, was granted a restraining order maintaining the status quo. In the meantime, BarangayCaloocan, thru Atty. Ceferino Inciong, intervened in the case as it had 10% property tax share to be collected formPHILSUCOM. To make the long story short, Atty. Inciong eked out a compromise agreement for both warring parties soeverybody went home happy except for Atty. Inciong.It seemed that the request of the Barangay Captain of Caloocan for petitioners legal assistance was not taken upnor approved by the Sangguniang Barangay nor was there any showing that it was approved by the Solicitor General andconcurred in by COA as required under COA Circular No. 86 255, dated April 2, 1986.Also it seemed that the hiring of petitioner by the Punong Barangay did not carry with it the approval of theSangguniang Barangay as required under Section 91 (1-1) of the B.P. 377, nor was there any appropriation therefore; thehiring was not approved by the Solicitor General and concurred in by COA.In other words, Barangay Caloocan doesnt want to pay Atty. Inciong. Is that correct? Held : Our companero must be paid. Reasons:1 . W e d o n t w a n t t o s e e a kindred spirit get unpaid or else we lawyers will have to go on strike 2.As correctly stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, t h e p o s i t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t C h a i r m a n o f t h e COA disallowing payment of attorneys fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong is not proper in the lightof the following considerations:a.The employm ent by Barangay Caloocan of petitioner as its counsel, even if allegedly unauthorized bythe Sangguniang Barangay, is binding on Barangay Ca loocan as it took no prompt measure to repudiate petitioners employment.b.The decision of the RTC directing Barangay Caloocan to pay attorneys fees to petitioner has become final and executory and is binding upon Barangay Caloocan.c.COA Circular No. 86 255 cannot diminish the substantive right of petitioner to recover attorneys fees under the final and executory decision dated August 9, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court.3 . T h e r e s p o n d e n t COA Chairman states that PHILSUCOM paid

t h e a m o u n t o f 7 , 1 9 9 , 8 8 7 . 5 1 p e s o s t o the Municipal Treasurer under the Amnesty Compromise Agreement. Out of this amount, the MunicipalT r e a s u r e r a l l o c a t e d t o B a r a n g a y C a l o o c a n a s i t s s h a r e t h e a m o u n t o f 7 1 9 , 9 8 8 . 7 5 p e s o s . T h i s allocation is erroneous because pursuant to Republic Act No. 5447, Barangay Caloocan should onlyshare from the basic tax which is 50% of what PHILSUCOM paid because the other half should go tothe Special Education Fund. Under the said Republic Act No. 5447, the rightful share of BarangayCaloocan should be 359,944.38 pesos only.The Chairman prayed that in the event the Court orders the payment of attorneys fees to petitioner this amount of 359,944.38 pesos should be made the basis therefore. The Court replied in a booming voice, WHEREFORE, the petitionis GRANTED and respondent is ordered to direct the payment of attorney fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong in anamount equivalent to 10% of 359,994.38 pesos. 2. Province of Cebu v. JAC 147 SCRA 447Facts : Again, this case concerns the implied liability of a municipal corporation in paying the fees of an attorneyhired but the attorney ended up with only a pittance.There was a time when Cebu City almost became the owner of practically the whole of the Province of Cebu. Thishappened in Feb. 4. 1964 when the Vice Governor and the Provincial Board of Cebu, taking advantage of Governor Rene Espinas absence (he was away on an official business trip [ows?]} donated 210 lots or 380 hectares of provincialpatrimonial land to Cebu City. When Governor Espina finally heard of the donation, he filed a case to declare the donationvoid for being illegal and immoral. The defendants in the case were Cebu City, City mayor Sergio Osmena and the dumbprovincial officials responsible for the donation.Governor Espina hired Atty. Pablo Garcia, a private lawyer, as his counsel. Atty. Garcia toiled for 8 years on thec a s e , b u t f o r s o m e r e a s o n , h e w a s n o l o n g e r c o u n s e l w h e n t h e p a r t i e s s e t t l e d f o r a c o m p r o m i s e a g r e e m e n t . Nevertheless, Atty. Garcia claims he is entitled to fees worth 30% of the worth of the properties or 36 million pesos (astaggering amount, considering that the amount was based on the peso - dollar rates of 1979).The province of Cebu City however refused to give him even one centavo. They said Sec. 1683 of the RAC andSec. 3 of the Local Autonomy Law is clear that only the provincial fiscal and municipal attorney can represent a provinceor municipality in its lawsuits. More importantly, if the province of Cebu were to hire a private lawyers (such as when theprovincial fiscal is disqualified) the Provincial Board must pass a resolution to allow such a move.The Trial court awarded attorneys fees based on quantum merit. On appeal, the IAC awarded 5% worth of properties. The questions now are 1. Should the province pay Atty. Garcia and 2? If so how much is Atty. Garcia entitledto? Held : The province must pay Atty. Garcia but he is entitled only to quantum merit. Reasons:1 . I b i q u i d generaliter conceditur; inest haee exception, si non a l i q u i d s i t c o n t r a j u s f a s q u e . ( W h e r e anything is granted generally, this exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right).This simply means that every rule, no matter how strict or harsh, must have an exception. Here, equitycomes into play. To deny Atty. Garcia compensation for his professional services would amount to adeprivation of property without due process of law. 2. The argument that the hiring of private lawyers by a province must first gain the approval of theProvincial Board is absurd. First of all, the service of the Provincial Fiscal has already been engaged by the Provincial Board. More importantly, its so stupid for the Provincial Board to pass a resolutiongrant the hiring of a private lawyer who would litigate against them. The Provincial Board may just notpass such a resolution. The legal maxim which we can use as a basis for this situation is Nemo tenetur ad impossibile (The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility)3 . U n t i l t h e c o n t r a r y i s c l e a r l y s h o w n , a n attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the l i t i g a n t whom he purports to represent. His authority to appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, nothaving been questioned in the lower court, it will be presumed on appeal that counsel was properlyauthorized to file the complaint and appear for his client. Even

where an attorney is employed by anunauthorized person to represent a client, the latter will be bound where it has knowledge of the factthat it is being represented by an attorney in a particular litigation and takes no prompt m easure torepudiate the assumed authority. Such acquiescence in the employment of an attorney as occurred inthis case is tantamount to ratification. The act of the successor provincial board and provincial officialsin allowing Atty. Pablo P. Garcia to continue as counsel and in joining him in the suit led the counsel tobelieve his services were still necessary.4 . A t t y . G a r c i a i s e n t i t l e d o n l y t o q u a n t u m m e r i t . H e s i m p l y w a s n o t c o u n s e l w h e n t h e c o m p r o m i s e agreement was made. He gets only 30,000 pesos, * Instances where the municipal mayor was held liable for back salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality Salcedo vs. Court of Appeals the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police hehad dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor refuse to reinstate him indefiance of an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate. Nemenzo vs. Sabillano the municipal mayor was held pers onally liable for dismissing a police corporal whopossessed the necessary civil service eligibility , the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without any administrative investigation. Rama vs. Court of Appeals - the governor, vice governor, member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincialauditor, provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their individual andpersonal capacity damages to some 200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions because of their party affiliations. * Instance where the municipality was also held liable along with municipal mayor 3. Laganapan v. Asedillo 154 SCRA 377Facts : Solano Laganapan was appointed Chief of Police. However, he was summarily dismissed from his positionby respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo of Kalayaan, Laguna on the ground that his appointment was provisional and that hehas no civil service eligibility. Respondent Epifanio Ragotero was appointed acting chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna onthe same day in place of the petitioner.Subsequently, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna abolished the appropriation for the salary of the chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna. Laganapan thus filed a complaint against Mayor Asedillo and the Municipality of Kalayaan for reinstatement and payment of back wages. May Laganapan be reinstated? Is the Municipality also liable? Held : The municipality is liable but Laganapan cannot be reinstated. Reasons:1 . L a g a n a p a n w a s summarily dismissed without any semblance of c o m p l i a n c e w i t h d u e p r o c e s s . N o charges were filed, no notice or hearing was made, no nothing. The Court finds no merit in the m a y o r s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t , s i n c e t h e a p p o i n t m e n t s e x t e n d e d t o L a g a n a p a n a s c h i e f o f p o l i c e o f Kalayaan, Laguna, were all provisional in nature, and not permanent, his services could be terminatedwith or without cause at the pleasure of the appointing officer. While it may be true that Laganapanwas holding a provisional appointment at the time of his dismissal , he was not a temporary official who could be dismissed at any time. His provisional appointment could only be terminated thirty (30)days after receipt by the appointing officer of a list of eligible form the Civil Services Commission.Here no such certific ation was received by Mayor Asedillo thirty (30) days prior to his dismissal of Laganapan.Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary dismissal of Laganapan by Asedillo, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan instead of opposing or at least protesting Laganapans summary dismissal of his position, even abolished the appropriation for the salar y of the Chief of Police of Kalayaan Laguna. The Court considers this act of the Municipal Council as an approval or confirmation of the act of respondent Mayor in summarily dismissing Laganapan, as to makesaid municipality equally liable as the mayor for the reinstatement of Laganapan and for the payment of his back salaries.Finally it should be noted that Asedillo was sued not personally, but in his capacity as mayor.2 . L a g a n a p a n c a n n o t b e reinstated. PD 482, recently enacted at that time, calls for the

a p p o i n t m e n t o f a permanent Chief of Police (known as Station Commander), in certain provinces including Laguna. Hisreinstatement is not feasible. The Mayor and the municipality are instead liable for payment of backsalaries. 4. Salcedo v. CA 81 SCRA 408Facts : Arsenio Salcedo was appointed Chief of Police of Candelaria, Quezon. Records show that Salcedo thenheld civil service eligibility, having passed the U.S. Civil Service Examination for Messenger and Skilled laborer in 1928.Considering his eligibility appropriate to the position of Chief of Police, the Commissioner of Civil Service validated thesame and attested the appointment of Salcedo as permanent. Since then Salcedo has discharged the functions of hisofficeAn administrative complaint for misconduct and serious irregularities was later filed against Salcedo. It seemedhowever that the mayor of Candelaria, Venancio Dia wanted him kicked out right away so he terminated the services of the poor guy. The basis of the termination was erroneous and illegal, sin ce Salcedo didnt possess the appropriate eligibility for the position of Chief of Police (his civil service eligibility arose form a U.S based test, remember?)Salcedo appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service. Although the Commissioner found him guilty of conductunbecoming of a police officer, he was nevertheless reinstated and was given a fine and a warning instead.The Mayor however really hated the guy. He refused to have Salcedo reinstated. The CA agrees with the mayor.The lone issue in this instant action is whether the respondent mayor can legally terminate Salcedos servicesnotwithstanding the attestation of the latters appointment as permanent by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Held : The mayor cannot terminate Salcedos services. The reason i s that even though he did not take therequired examination either under the Old or New Civil Service Law, that wasn't his fault. His claim to eligibility came fromthe U. S. Civil Service Examination he took in 1928 when the Philippines was still a U.S Colo ny. Salcedo cannot berequired to take the examination again after his eligibility had already been declared permanent by the Commission.The respondent mayor persistently ignored the order of reinstatement given by the Commissioner of Civil Service.He defied the directive of a superior body with final authority on the matter which is the mayor's duty to comply. For actingarbitrarily and without legal justification in terminating the services of petitioner and refusing to reinstate him as Chief of Police, the mayor must be held personally liable for the back salaries of Salcedo, except for the time Salcedo was suspended. Legislative Powers * Requisites of a valid ordinance1.Must not contravene the constitution or statute2 . M u s t n o t b e o p p r e s s i v e 3.Must not impartial, fair and general4.Must not prohibit, but may regulate trade5.Must not contravene common right6.Must be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p u b l i c 7 . M u s t n o t b e u n r e a s o n a b l e NOTE: See also Solicitor General V. MMA, p. 25 of this reviewer Distinction between an Ordinance and a ResolutionAn ordinance prescribes a permanent rule of conduct government; whereas a resolution is of temporary character only*Article 107, IRR. Ordinances and Resolutions. The following rules shall govern the enactment of ordinances andresolutions 1.Legislative actions in a general and permanent character shall be enacted in the form of ordinances, while thosetemporar y characters shall be passed in the form of resolutions. Matters relating to propriety functions and to private concerns shall be enacted in a resolution.2.Proposed ordinances and resolutions shall begin writing and shall contain an assigned number, a title or caption,an enacting or ordaining clause and the date of its proposed effectivity. In addition, every proposed ordinanceshall be accompanied by a brief explanatory note contain the justification for its approval. It shall be signed by theauthor or authors and submitted to the secretary to the sanggunian who shall report the same to the sanggunianat the next meeting.3.A resolution shall be enacted in the same manner prescribed for an ordinance, except that it need not go through a third reading for its final consideration unless decided otherwise by a majority of the sanggunian members.4 . N o o r d i n a n c e o r r e s o l u t i o n s h a l l be considered on second reading in any regular meeting unless it has b e e n reported out by the proper committee to which it was referred or certified as urgent by the local chief executive.5 . A n y l e g i s l a t i v e m a t t e r d u l y c e r t i f i e d b y t h e l o c a l c h i e f e x e c u t i v e a s u r g e n t w h e t h e r o r n o t i t i s i n c l u d e d i n t h e calendar of business, may be

presented and considered by the body at the same meeting without need of suspending the rules.6 . T h e s e c r e t a r y t o t h e s a n g g u n i a n o f t h e p r o v i n c e , c i t y o r m u n i c i p a l i t y s h a l l p r e p a r e c o p i e s o f t h e p r o p o s e d ordinance or resolution in the form it was passed on second reading and shall distribute to each sanggunian member a copy thereof, except that a measure certified by the local chief execute as urgent may be submitted for final voting immediately after debate or amendment during the second reading.7.No ordinance or resolution passed by the sanggunian in a regular or special session duly called for the purposeshall be valid unless approved by majority of the members present, there being a quorum. Any o rdinance or resolution authorizing or directing the payment of money or creating liability, shall require the affirmative vote of allthe sanggunian members for its passage.8.Upon passage of all ordinances and resolution directing the payment of money or cr eating liability, and at therequest of any members, of any resolution or motion, the sanggunian shall record the ayes and nays. Eachapproved ordinance or resolution shall be stamped with the seal of the sanggunian and recorded in a book keptfor the purpose. *Article 108 144, IRR, LGC As we go along this reviewer, we'll ferret out the cream from the crap which articles deserve to be read againand again and which should be considered stinker, articles of such jaw - dropping ineptitude that the hapless law studenthas no recourse but to shake her head and mutter, What the hell they were thinking?. But then, this is just probably theauthor talking lazy, so go read the codal instead. 1. Mascunana v. Provincial Board of Negros Occidental 79 SCRA 339Facts : The case doesnt really teach mush -if anything at all about the coordinates and resolution but anyway...Angel Mascunana and Angeles Veldeflor lived near a piece of land which was the subject of controversy of thiscase. The two claimed that this piece of land was actually part of the extension of Burgos Street. On this piece of landwere squatters and their houses. One of the squatters was an influential councilor named Leon Treyes.The two requested the municipal mayor of Talisay, Negros Occidental that the land in question be cleared of squatters so that the public can make use of that portion of Burgos Street.A debate resulted on whether the land had been used as street or has it been withdrawn form public. The municipal council of Talisay made an ocular inspection of the place and declared that there was no reason for opening it tovehicular traffic (note that Treyes is a member of the municipal council). The municipal council thus passed Resolution no.59 ordering the said land closed. The provincial board of Negros Occidental approved Res. No. 59 thru its res. NO. 1035Mascunana and Veldeflor filed a complaint with the VCFI of Negros Occidental questioning the validity of the tworesolutions. They wanted the street opened because it was a property of public dominion and if the same was not possible, then they should have been indemnified for damages under Sec. 2246 of the RAC since their properties wereadjacent near the questioned land. The CFI however dismissed their complaint summarily in a minute resolution . Thereason, the CFI explained, is that the issue concerns a resolution passed by a municipal corporation and therefore does not need to be resolved thru an action for declaratory relief. Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent rule tobe followed in this case, refers only to an ordinance and not a resolution.Should the CFI pass on the merits of the case of Mascunana and Veldeflor?Held: Yes. A trial court's order dismissing a complaint or petitions is appealable like a final judgment. Also, Mascunana, et. al.'s action is not an action for declaratory relief but an ordinary action for the enforcement of Sec. 2246 of the RAC. The issue on whether the complaint involved an ordinance or a resolution is irrelevant. 2. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties July 20, 1994Facts : This case is interesting because local autonom y was defeated unwittingly perhaps by the same statutegranting it. The LGC of 1991.PAGCOR, drunk with the success because it was able to open casinos in several cites, announce plans of opening one in Cagayan de Oro City. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of said city was swift: it passed 2ordinances preventing the operation of casinos in its territory. Mayor Pablo Magtajas, one of the petitioners, said the ordinances were valid because 1. the Sangguniang Panlungsod have the power to enact ordinances to prevent, suppressand impose appropriate penalties for gambling and other prohibited

games of chance (Art. 468, LGC, 1991); 2. the ordinance were an expression of the police power under the General Welfare Clause; and 3. the LGC of 1991 modifiedthe charter of the PAGCOR as the LGC of 1991 was a later enactment of Congress. Is Magtajas correct? Held : No. Reasons:1.Art. 48 of the LGC clearly refers only to prohibit gambling and other games of chance. Casinos are not prohibited because they are expressly allowed by P.D. 1869. the law creating PAGCOR. 2. The ordinances in question cannot contravene PD 1839. It must be remembered that a municipal ordinance to bev a l i d , m u s t a m o n g o t h e r s n o t c o n t r a v e n e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o r any statute. T h e r e a s o n i s t h a t m u n i c i p a l governments are mere agents of the state.3.The repealing clause of LGC of 1991 did not expressly repeal PD 1869. Implied repeal, on the other hand are notlightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. There was no sufficientindication of an implied repeal of PD 1869. In fact, later enactments after the LGC of 1991 recognize the existenceof PD 1869. The rule in legal hermeneutics is that statues should not be pit against each other but instead, everyeffort by the courts must be made to harmonize them. As a becoming respect to a co - equal (idiotic?) branch of government. V. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS (ART. 59, 64, IRR) Article 59, IRR... General supervision of the province over component cites and municipalities. a. The province, thru its governor, shall exercise supervisory authority over component cities and municipalities within itsterritorial jurisdiction to ensure that they act within the scope of their prescribed powers and function. Highly urbanize citesand independent component cities shall be independent of the province.b. The scope of the supervision by the province over component cites and municipalities shall include but not limited to thefollowing:1.The governor shall review executive order issued by the mayor of the component city or municipality, subject tothe concurrence of the sangguniang panlalawigan, except as other wise provided under the Constitution and special statutes. If the governor and the sangguniang panlalawigan failed to act on said executive order within 30days form receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed consistent with law and therefore valid.2.The sangguniang panlalawigan shall review all approved city or municipal ordinance and resolution approving thedevelopment plans and public investment programs formulated by the city or municipal development councils.3.The SP shall review the ordinances authorizin g annual or supplemental appropriations of component cities and municipalities in the same manner and within the same period prescribe for the review of other ordinances of theLGU.4.The governor shall visit component cities and municipalities of the provinc e at least once every 6 months to fullyunderstand their problems and conditions, listen and give appropriate counsel to local officials and inhabitants,inform the officials and inhabitants of component cites and municipalities of general laws and ordinances which especially concern them and conduct visits and inspections to the end that the governance of the province shallimprove the quality of life of the inhabitants.5.The governor shall coordinate plans of the province in coordination with mayors of cites and municipalities as well as NGO's concerned to:a . F o r m u l a t e p e a c e a n d o r d e r p l a n o f t h e p r o v i n c e i n c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h m a y o r s o f c o m p o n e n t c i t i e s a n d municipalities and the National Police Commission.b. Adopt adequate measure to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest a nd other resources of the province, in coordination with mayors of component cities and municipalities.c . Coordinate efforts of component cites and municipalities in the nation a l o r r e g i o n a l p a l a r o o r s p o r t s development activities; andd Call conventions, seminars, conferences or meetings of any elective and appointed officials of the provinceand component cities and municipalities.6 . T h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e b a s i c r e a l property tax, including interest thereon and proceeds form the use, leas or disposition, sale or redemption of property acquired at a public auction shall b e s h a r e d b y t h e p r o v i n c e , municipality and barangay in the manner prescribed in Rule XXXI of these Rules.7 . T h e p r o v i n c e s h a l l s h a r e i t s c o l l e c t i o n s f o r m t h e t a x o n s a n d ,

g r a v e l a n d o t h e r q u a n t i t y r e s o u r c e s w i t h i n i t s component city and municipality and the barangay where said resources are extracted. * Article 62, IRR. Role of people's organizations, non governmental organizations and the private sector LGU's shall promote the establishment and operation of people's organizations, NGOs and the private sector tomake them active partners in the pursuit of local autonom y. For this purposes, people's organization, NGO's and theprivate sector shall be directly involved in the following plans, programs, projects and activities of LGUs:a. Local special bodies;b. Delivery of basic services and facilitiesc. Joint ventures and cooperative programs and undertakingsd. Financial and other forms of assistancee. Preferential treatment for organizations and cooperatives of marginalized fishermenf. Preferential treatment for cooperatives development andg. Financing, cooperative, maintenance, operation, and management of infrastructure projects * 1. Between the national government and the local governments: 2 . W i t h P N P : 3 . W i t h c o m p o n e n t c i t e s a n d municipalities: 4. With People's and Non Governmental Organizations (Sec. 25-36, LGC)Sec. 25. National supervision over local governments a. Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over LGU'sto ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities and independentcomponent cities, thru the province with respect to component cities and municipalities and the city and municipalities withrespect to barangays.b. National Agencies and offices with the project implementation functions shall coordinate with one another andwith the LGU's concerned in the discharge of these functions. They shall ensure the participation of LGU's both in theplanning and implementation of the said projects.c.The President may, upon request of the LGU concerned, direct the appropriate national agency provide financial,technical or other forms of assistance to the LGU. Such assistance shall be extended at extra cost to the LGUconcernedd . N a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s a n d o f f i c e s i n c l u d i n g g o v e r n m e n t o w n e d o r c o n t r o l l e d c o r p o r a t i o n s w i t h f i e l d u n d e r o r branches in a province, city or municipality shall furnish the local chief executive concerned, for information andguidance, monthly reports including duly certified budgetary allocations and expenditures Sec. 26. Duty of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance (just go and read the code or JGRC)Sec. 27. Prior consultations required (JGRC)Sec. 28. Powers of local chief executives over the units of the Philippine National Police The extent of operational management and control of local chief executives over the police force, fire protectionunit, and jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of RA6975, otherwise known as the DILG Act of 1990, the rules and regulations issued are pursuant thereto. Sec. 29. Provincial relations with component cites and municipalities The province, thru the governor, shall ensure that every component cities and municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities and independentcomponent cities shall be independent of the province. Sec. 30. Review of executive orders a. Except as otherwise provided under the Constitutions and special statues, the governor shall review executiveorders promulgated by the component city or municipal mayor within his jurisdiction. The city municipal mayor shall reviewall EO's promulgated by the punong ba rangay within his jurisdiction. Copies of such orders shall be forward to the governor or the city or municipal mayor, as the case may be, within 3 days from their issuance. In all instances of review,the local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such EO's are within the powers granted by law and in conformitywith provincial, city or municipal ordinances.b. If the governor or city or municipal mayor fails to act on said EO's within 30 days of submission, the same shallbe deemed consistent with law and therefore valid. Sec 31. Submission of municipal question to the provincial legal officer or prosecutor In the absence of municipal legal officer, the municipal government may secure the opinion of the provincial legalofficer and in the absence of the latter, that of the provincial prosecutor on any legal question affecting the municipality Sec 32. City and municipal supervision over their respective barangays

The city or municipality, thru the city or municipal mayor concerned shall exercise general supervision after component barangay to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. Sec 33. Cooperative undertakings among LGU's LGUs' may, thru appropriate ordinances, group themselves, consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services andresources for purposes commonly beneficial to them. In support of such undertakings, the LGU's involved may, upon approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public hearing for the purpose, contribute lands, real estate, equipment,and other king of property and appoint or assign personnel under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon bythe participating local units thru Memoranda of Agreement. Sec. 34. Role of people's and non governmental organizations LGU's shall promote the establishment and operation of people's and non governmental organization to becomeactive partners in the pursuit of local autonomy. Sec. 35. Linkages with people's and non governmental organizations LGU's may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative agree m e n t s w i t h p e o p l e ' s a n d n o n governmental organizations to engage in the delivery of basic services, capability building and livelihood projects, andtop develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversity, agriculture, spur industrialization,promote ecological balance and enhance the economic and social well being of the people. Sec 36. Assistance to people's and non governmental organizations An LGU may thru its local chief executive and with the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned, provideassistance, financial or otherwise to such people's and non governmental organizations for economic , socially oriented, environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented within its jurisdiction. REQUIREMENTS AND PROHIBITIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL LOCAL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES (Sec 90, 94, 94,Art 177, 179, IRR) Section 90. Practice of Profession a. All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in anyoccupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.b. Sanggunian officials may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools exceptduring session hours. Provided, that sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:1.Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein and LGU or any office, agenc y or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party2.Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an official or employee of the national or local government isaccused of an offense committed in relation to his office3.Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the LGU of which he is an official4.Use property and personnel of the Government exce pt when the sanggunian member concerned is defending theinterest of the Government.c . D o c t o r s o f m e d i c i n e m a y p r a c t i c e t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n e v e n d u r i n g o f f i c i a l h o u r s o f w o r k o n l y o n o c c a s i o n o f emergency. Provided, that the official do not derive any monetary income profession. Section 94. Appointment of elective and appointive local officials: candidates who lost in an election a. No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officeor position during his tenureUnless otherwise allowed by law or primary functions of his position, no elective or appointive local official shallhold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision or agency, or instrumentality thereof, includinggovernment owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) or their subsidiaries;b. Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any elections shall within 1 year after suchelection be appointed to any office in the Government or any GOCC or in any of the subsidiaries Section 95. Additional or double compensation No elective or appointive local official or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensationunless specifically authorized by law, nor accept, without the consent of Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind form any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered additional or double or indirect compensation. Article 177. IRR. Practice of profession. Same as Section 90, LGC Article 179. IRR Prohibited business and pecuniary interest.

a. It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee whether directly or indirectly, to:1.Engage in any business transaction with the LGU in which he is an offi cial or employee or over which he has the power of supervision or with any of its authorized boards, officials, agents or attorneys where money is to be paid,or property or any other thing of value is to be transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the resources of the LGU tosuch person or firm;2.Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by LGU 3 . P u r c h a s e a n y r e a l e s t a t e o r other property forfeited in favor of an LGU for unpaid taxes or assessment or b y virtues of a legal process at the instance of the said LGU4.Be a surety for any person contracting or doing business with an LGU for which a surety is acquired; and 5.Possess or use any public property of an LGU for private purposes b., All other prohibitions governing the conduct of national public officers relating to prohibited business and pecuniaryinterest so provided in RA 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public officials andEmployees, and other rules and regulations shall also be applicable to local government officials and employees.Read SC Circular No. 12 dated June 30, 1988Circulars passed by the SC and administrative agencies are a bit more difficult to research. They're probably notthat important anyway probably. 1. Javellana v. DILG 212 SCRA 475 Facts : Attorney Edwin Javellana was a city councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. He was accused of e n g a g i n g i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f l a w w i t h o u t s e c u r i n g a u t h o r i t y f o r m t h e R e g i o n a l D i r e c t o r o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f L o c a l Government. He also filed a case against the City Engineer, obviously a fellow city official. Javellana contends that the 2ordinances and Sec. 90 of the LGC of 1991 which served as the basis of the charges against him were unconstitutionalbecause, according to Article VIII Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court may promulgate rules andregulations for the practice of law. He also attacked the said laws for being discriminatory for they ganged upon lawyersand doctors when other similar professions like teachers and morticians were not affected. Held : Javellana is wrong. Reasons:1.His contention that Section 90 of the LGC of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VII,Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the ci rcular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The LGC and DLG MemorandumCircular No. 90- 81 simply prescribes rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflict of interest between thedischarge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.2 . S e c t i o n 9 0 o f t h e L G C d o e s n o t discrim inate against the lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial a n d municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunianmembers may practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in school except during session hours. If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, thepractice of law is more likely than other to relate to or affect the area of public service 2. Villegas v. Legazpi 113 SCRA 39Facts : Raul Villegas was an Assemblym an of the Batasang Pambansa form the province of Cebu. EstanislaoFernandez was also an Assemblyman (from where, the case doesn't say, but that's not important). Both were accused of violating Sec. 11 Article VIII of the 1973 Charter which states that: No member of the National Assembly shall appear ascounsel before any court inferior to a court without appellate jurisdiction. The records show they appeared as counsel for cases which were exercised by the CFIs in their original jurisdiction . Did they violate the constitutional prohibition? Held : Yes. Stated positively, the constitutional provision allows Assemblym an to appear only when the courthandling their case exercise appellate jurisdiction. Only Appellate jurisdiction is permitted because the office of the Assemblyman carry so much influence and prestige that they might unduly influence upon the administration of justice.

3. Noriega v. Sison 125 SCRA 293 Facts : The name of the guy here is Emmanuel Sison. We place emphasize o n t h e n a m e h e r e c o z t h e complainant Hermino Noriega made such a big deal out of it Noriega claimed that Sison, an attorney who works as aH e a r i n g O f f i c e r f o r t h e S E C , h e l d h i m s e l f o u t t o t h e p u b l i c a s A t t y . M a n u e l S i s o n a n d u n d e r s u c h a g r o s s misrepresentation of his name handled a case for a close family friend. Noriega said that Sison violated the prohibition ongovernment employees form practicing their professions. Sison replied that the SEC, thru associate commissioner,authorized him to allow as counsel for such and that he did it for free. Held : Sison's appearance as counsel as cited was an isolated case, the same therefore did not constitute practiceof law since he did not receive pecuniary benefit (Note that this case took place before the advent of the Cayetano v Monsod ruling). The case against him seemed more like an instrument of harassment Noriega since the latter once lost toSison in a SEC case. There is simply no evidence that the interchanges his name for a fraudulent purpose (the guy's entitled to use a nickname like everybody else, right?) nor this pleading which revealed his name to be Manuel Sison betainted with deception since it was a mistake of Sison's part and he consistently tried to correct the same by pointing it outin court. ELECTIVE OFFICIALSA . Q u a l i f i c a t i o n a n d E l e c t i o n 1 . F r i v a l d o v . C O M E L E C 2 5 7 SCRA 727 Facts : The dissenting opinion by Justice Davide here is both prophetic and ironic b e c a u s e h e s p o k e t h a t sovereignty cannot be fragmentized because such fragment cannot be treated as a whole. Davide was talking about therule that the popular will of the people (of Sorsogon) in electing Juan Frivaldo as governor should not be frustrated sincehe garnered the most votes. Yet Frivaldo won under a cloud of doubt because he may not have legally reacquired hiscitizenship in time for the elections. To allow Frivaldo as governor just because the popular will of the electorate shouldnot be frustrated but setting aside the rule of law in the process would be anarchy. Davide said (How ironic that it wasDavide himself who swore in GMA as President during EDSA II)The majority opinion however, fortunately or otherwise, is the prevailing rule, Frivaldo filed his certificateof candidacy for governor on March 20, 1995. Raul Lee, the eventual second placer, filed a petition with the COMELEC todisqualify Frivaldo because he was not yet a Filipino citizen at the time. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Lee but sinceFrivaldo moved for reconsideration, his candidac y continued. Frivaldo eventually topped the elections but on June 30,1995, the COMELEC acting on Lee's petition, proclaimed Lee as governor.A week later, Frivaldo filed a petition claiming that on June 30, 1995 (day of Lee's proclamation), he took his oathof allegiance as a Filipino citizen after his August 17, 1994 petition for repatriation has been granted. The COMELEC thusproclaimed Frivaldo as winner.Lee contends: 1. that Frivaldo's disqualification due to his lack of citizenship is a continuing condition andrendered him ineligible to run for governor; and 2. the alleged repatriation of Frivaldo cannot be retroactive. Held : Lee is wrong (or maybe, wronged). Reasons: 1. Under Sec. 39 of the LGC of 1991, there is no showing that a candidate for an electoral position must be a Filipinocitizen at any particular date and time. Admittedly, there was the objection that since a candidate must have beena registered voter beforehand, he must have therefore possessed Filipino citizenship in order to become a registered voter. The Court gave an explanation that the qualification of citizenship for a registered voter andthat for a candidate are separate. The registration requirement of a candidate moreover, is for the purpose of r e g i s t e r i n g him as a voter in the area or requirement of a candidate moreover, is only for t h e p u r p o s e o f registering him as a voter in the area or territory he seeks to govern. He does not actually have to vote (Ang layo!The issue is citizenship, not voting. The issue of being a registered voter

was merely raised to bolster the claimthat the qualification of citizenship is a continuing one and thus cannot be acquired at a later time. The Court issaying, Run now, acquire citizenship later, which is lousy. Is this the way we treat our precious citizenship?)2.The alleged repatriation of Frivaldo can be retroactive. PD 725 declares that repatriation creates a new right in order to cure a defect in the existing naturalization law. In Frivaldo's cause he was stateless at the time he tookhis Filipino oath of allegiance since in his comment, he has long renounced his American citizenship (a self serving statement). Moreover since he ran for governor several times prior to 1995, he necessarily must havetaken the Filipino oath of allegiance several times as well, which is another indication of renunciation of hisAmerican citizenship (Davide countered that i t is the US, not Frivaldo, who decides who is and who is not her nationals, a principle in international law). Therefore, to prevent prejudice to Frivaldo by letting him remain stateless for a substantial period of time while in the meantime being deprived of his rights, it is clear then that PD725 was intended to be retroactive. In short, Frivaldo's repatriation retracted to Aug 17, 1994, the day he filed hisapplication for such and not just on June 30, 1995. 2 . S a l o m o n v . N E A 1 6 9 S C R A 5 0 7 Facts : Natividad Salomon was a Director for the La Union Electric Corporation (LULECO). Because she was alsoa Barangay Captain of Natividad, Naguilan, La Union, the Minister of Local Government of La Union appointed her as amember of the sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union. The National Electrification Administration, however, disqualifiedher from further acting as LULECO director by authority of Sec. 21 of PD 269 which says, Elective officers of the government, except barrio captain and councilors, shall be ineligible to become officers and/or directors of any (electriccooperative). (Section 21 PD No. 269). The legal provision is also incorporated in section 3, Article IV of the LULECO'sby laws which runs: No persons shall be eligible to become or to remain a board member of the cooperative who holdsan elective office in the government above the level of a barangay captain.Salomon simply argued that she is not an elective officer but an appointive officer as the facts above show. Is shetherefore exempt form the prohibition?Held: No, the spirit of the law would be undermined that incumbents of elective offices be prevented form exerting political influence and pressure on the management of the cooperative. The spirit of the law is as much a part of what iswas written (wow). B. Vacancies and succession1 . P e r m a n e n t V a c a n c i e s * Sec 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the governor, vice governor, mayor and vice mayor. a. If a perm anent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or m ayor, the vice g o v e r n o r o r v i c e m a y o r concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs on the office of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automaticallyby other sangguniang members according to their ranking as defined therein.b. If a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member or, in the case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member shall becomethe punong barangay.c. A tie between or among the highest ranking sangguniang members shall be resolved by the drawing of lotsd. The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired portions of their predecessors.For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,refuses to assume office, fails to qualif y, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.For purposes of succession as provided in this chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on thebasis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each districtin the immediately preceding local election. * Sec 45. Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian a. Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic successions provided above do not apply shall befilled by appointment in the manner provided:1.The President, thru the Executive Secretary, in the case of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Sanggunian Panlungsod of highly urbanized cites and independent component cities; 2. The governor, in case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cites and the sangguniang bayan3.The city or municipal mayor, in case of the sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of the sangguniangbayan concernedb. Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which the sangguniang member concerned had been elected

and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacanc y in thesanggunian shall be appointed in the same manner herein provided. The appointee shall come form the same politicalparty as that of the sangguniang member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.In the appointment herein mentioned a nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highestofficial of the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non and any appointment without such nomination shall benull and void and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official thereof.c. In case the permanent vacancy in the representation of the youth and barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shallbe filled automatically by the official next in rank by the organization concerned 2.Temporary Vacancies * Section 46 Temporary vacancies in the office of the local chief executive a. W hen the governor city or municipal mayor or puno ng barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, suspension from office, thevice-governor, city or municipal vice -mayor or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall automaticallyexercise the powers and perform the duties of the local chief executive concerned except the power to appoint, suspend,or dismiss employees which can only be exercised if the period of the temporary incapacity exceeds for 30 working daysb . S a i d t e m p o r a r y i n c a p a c i t y s h a l l t e r m i n a t e u p o n s u b m i s s i o n t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s a n g g u n i a n o f a w r i t t e n declaration by the local chief executive concerned that he has to return back to office. In cases where the temporaryincapaci ty is due to legal causes the local chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary documents that saidlegal causes no longer exist.c. When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside his territorial jurisdiction for period not exceeding 3 consecutive days, he may designate in writing an officer -in-charge of the said office. Such authorization shall specifies the powers and functions that the local official concerned shall exercise in the absence of thelocal chief executive except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employeesd. In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or refuses to issue such authorization, thevice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the case maybe, shall have the right to assume powers, duties and function of the said office on the 4 th day of absence of the said localchief executive, subject to the limitation provided in subsection (C) hereof e. Except as provided above the local chief executive in no case authorized any local official to assume thepowers, duties and functions, other than the vice -governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, the highest sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be. 3.Resignation * Article 82 IRR. Resignation a. Resignation of elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e f o l l o w i n g authorities:1.By the President, in the case of governor and vice-governor, mayors and vice-mayors of highly urbanizedcities, independent component cities and municipalities within the Metro Manila and other metropolitanpolitical subdivisions as may be created by law.2 . B y t h e g o v e r n o r , i n c a s e o f m u n i c i p a l m a y o r , m u n i c i p a l v i c e m a y o r s , m a y o r s a n d v i c e - m a y o r s o f component cities3.By the sanggunian concerned, in the case of sanggunian members: and4.By the city or the municipal mayor, in the case of barangay officials b. The DILG shall be furnished copies of the letters of the resignation letters of elective local officials together withthe action taken by the authorities concernedc. The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned within 15 days from receipt thereof d. Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon presentation before an opensession of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its records. This provision shall not apply to sanggunian members who are subject to recall elections or to cases where existing laws prescribed of acting upon such resignations. 1. Panis v. Civil Service Commission 229 SCRA 589Facts

: The Cebu City Medical Center (CCMC) is a government hospital of Cebu City. One day, a new office insaid hospital was created by virtue by a valid reorganization the Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration. Two candidates for the appointive position cropped up. Jaime Panis and Bella Veloso, Panis loved to crow about his senioritystatus and thought he would be chosen for the position. However, the city mayor appointed Veloso, Panis now claimsthat the appointment of Veloso was made in violation of law, existing civil service rules and established jurisprudencebecause the seniority and next in rank rules were disregarded. Held : Panis is wrong. First, even if granting that Veloso was originally an outsider as she came from the privatesector, it will not prohibit her employment as long as she has her civil service eligibility. Second, the next rank rule appliesonly in cases of promotion. The position being fought was newly created. Assuming however, that said position couldonly be filled up through promotion, still the next in rank rule is not mandator y it nearly gives preferential treatment. Ultimately, the power to appoint lies within the discretion of the local chief executive vested with the power, provided thatappointee possesses the minimum requirements provided by law. 2. Menson v. Petilla 197 SCRA 251Facts : For a time, the province of Leyte had not proclaimed any governor. So on February 16, 1988, the secretaryof local government appointed vice-governor Leopoldo Petilla as acting governor of the province of Leyte.Now the position of vice-guy was vacant. The secretary of local government thus appointed Aurelio Menson, asenior member of sangguniang panlalawigan as vice-governor.Everything would have been fine except for one thing: the LGC of 1983 does not provide for succession of theoffice of the vicegovernor (even the LGC of 1991 as well). Still, Menzon did serve for more than a year as vicegovernor.O n J u l y 7 , 1 9 8 9 , a f t e r s o m e s e r i o u s d e b a t e o n t h e l e g a l i t y o f M e n s o n ' s a p p o i n t m e n t , t h e s a n g g u n i a n g panlalawigan issued a resolution holding invalid the appointment of Menson as vice-governor. Their reasoning: legallyspeaking, there is no vacancy in the office of the vice-governor cause no law recognizes its existence. And granting thatsuch vacancy legally exists, the law does not authorize secretary of local government to have an appointment thereto. Asa result, poor Menson was not paid emoluments attached to his office as vice-governor.Was there really a vacancy? Is Menson entitled to the emoluments? Held : 1. Menson was appointed precisely to avoid such scenario. Besides, the law on public officers is clear onthe matter. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. In a scenario there is avacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.Applying the definition of vacancy in this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the vice-governor was leftvacant when the duly elected vice-governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed acting governor. In the eyes of the law, theoffice to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the vice-governor 2. It may be noted under commonwealth act no. 588 and the revised administrative code of 1987, the President isempowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Admittedly,both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provisionin the local government code and in the best interest of public service, the SC saw no-cogent reason why the procedurethus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. Petilla et. al. contend that the provincialboard is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local government as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, the SC has noproblem ruling in favor of the president, until the law provides otherwise.3. In view of the foregoing, Menson's right to be paid the salary attached to the office of the vice -governor isindubitable. And, even granting that the President, acting through the secretary of local government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is de facto officer entitled to compensation.4. The SC explain ed that the vacancy must always be filled, in this wise: A vacancy creates an anomaloussituation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of the right of the representation and governance in their own local government. In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosenfew, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc, the management of governmental affairs, may be

hampered.Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the governor or thevice-governor is missing 3. Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. CA 284 SCRA 276Facts : Augusto Antonio was a barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres, Catanduanes in March 1989. Thisguy later became president of the Association of Barangay Councils or ABC. Thanks to the LGC of 1983, his positionalso entitles him to be a member of the sangguniang bayan of the Municipality of San Andres.Meanwhile, the election for president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) was for themunicipality. FABC was for the province was declared void for lack of quorum so the provincial council was forced toreorganize. As a result, the DILG secretary, in recognition of Antonio as a power hungry politician, designated him as atemporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Nenito Aquino, the ABC vice-president took his place. Antoniohowever, never questioned Aquino as his replacement. Antonio tendered his resignation from the sangguniang bayan(but not as ABC president) and would later on serve the sangguniang panlalawigan for 2 years.Some time afterwards, the election for president of FABC above quoted, which was once declared void, was reversed by the SC. Also, was found to unqualified for membership in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan so he got promptlykicked-out.A year passed. Then Antonio heard that Aquino resigned from the presidency of the ABC. Antonio now wants hiso l d j o b b a c k a s A B C p r e s i d e n t . T h e S a n g g u n i a n g B a y a n r e f u s e d t o t a k e h i m b a c k , s a y i n g h e r e s i g n e d f r o m t h e Sangguniang Bayan a long time ago. Antonio replied that the third requirement for his valid resignation acceptance bythe president or his alter ego was missing. Moreover, if his resignation was valid he did not resign as ABC president and said position still carries with it the benefit of being an ex-officio member o f t h e S a n g g u n i a n g B a y a n . T h e Sangguniang Bayan countered that he either did one of two things resignation or abandonment of his old post. Held : Antonio did not effectively resign but he did abandon his post. Reasons:1.Resignation as the Act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in some form expressed or implied or theintention to surrender renounce and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawfulauthority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: a. an intention to relinquish a part of the term; b. an act of relinquishment; and c. an acceptance by the proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.Antonio did not effectively resign because the third element is missing. While it is true that the LGC is silent as towho shall accept the resignation of a Sanggunian Bayan member, jurisprudence has held that in the absence of statutoryprovisions as to whom resignations shall be submitted, the appointing person or body shall receive the resignation. Thepresident or his alter ego is the appointing person in this case and there was no evidence that either of them have received Antonio's resignation.2 . A n t o n i o h o w e v e r , a b a n d o n e d h i s p o s t . A b a n d o n m e n t o f a n o f f i c e h a s b e e n d e f i n e d a s t h e v o l u n t a r y relinquishment of an office by the holder with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. Thefollowing clearly manifest the intention of private respondent to abandon his position: 1. his failure to perform his functionas member of the Sangguniang Bayan. 2. his failure to collect the corresponding remuneration for the position, 3. hisfailure to object to the appointment of Aquino as his replacement in the Sangguniang Bayan, 4. his prolonged failure toinitiate any act to re assume his post in the Sangguniang Bayan after the Supreme Court had nullified his designation tothe Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On the other hand, the following, the following overt acts demonstrate that he had affected his intention 1. hisl e t t e r o f r e s i g n a t i o n f r o m t h e S a n g g u n i a n g B a y a n , 2 . h i s a s s u m p t i o n o f o f f i c e a s m e m b e r o f s a i d S a n g g u n i a n Panlalawigan 3. his faithful discharge of his duties and functions as member of said Sanggunian and 4. his receipt of theremuneration for such post.W hile it was true that Antonio was designated as member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan meaning hisappointment there was merely to discharge duties in addition to his regular responsibilities as a Sanggunian Bayan Members still his express and implied acts clearly indicate hi abandonment of the latter.3. Lastly, Antonio, who remained ABC president, claims the legal right to be a member of the Sangguniang Bayanby virtue of Section 146 of BP Blg 337. However, his right thereto is not self executor y, for the law itself requires another positive act an

appointment by the President or the secretary of local government per EO 342. What Antoniocould have done in order to be able to re assume his post after Aquino's resignation was to seek a reappointment formthe President of the secretary of local government. By large, Antonio cannot claim an absolute right to the office which.By his own actuations, he is deemed to have relinquished. 4.Gamboa Jr. v. Aguirre Jr. 310 SCRA 867Facts : In the 1995 elections, we have the following winners from Negros Occident al: Rafael Coscolluela asgovernor; Romeo Gamboa as vice governor; and Marcelo Aguirre and Juan Araneta as Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP).Now, under the LGC of 1991, the vice governor shall also be the officer of the SP. Keep this in mind later on.The governor went away on an official trip abroad. Before he left, he designated vice governor as acting governor.So the vice governor became acting governor. But when vice governor Gamboa, who was now acting governor as well,tried to preside over SP sessions, some SP members resented and even filed a case in court to prohibit him from doingso. The court even declared Gamboa as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP duringthe period that he is the acting governor. Was the trial court correct? Held : Yes, if you'll look at the composition of the SP, no presence of the governor. can be found. Since Gamboabecame acting governor., he technically had given up his SP membership notwithstanding him being still vice governor.since the LGC of 1991 is clear that the composition of the SP should not have even the slightest hint of governor'spresence not even his smell. W hat the law enumerates, the law necessarily excludes. An acting give smells like a governor. For all other purposes however, Gamboa still remains as vice governor.In such case, since the vice governor. cannot preside, the SP members present and constituting a quorum shallelect a temporary presiding officer form among themselves (Sec 49b, LGC) C.Recall(See 69-75, LGC and Art 154 162, IRR) * Sec 69, LGC. By whom exercised . The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by regular votersof an LGU to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs. * Sec 70 Initiation of the recall process a. Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the LGU to which thelocal elective official to such recall belongs.b. There shall be a preparator y recall assembly in every province, city, district and municipality which shall becomposed of the following:1 . P r o v i n c i a l l e v e l . A l l t h e m a y o r s , v i c e m a y o r s a n d s a n g g u n i a n m e m b e r s o f t h e m u n i c i p a l i t i e s a n d component cities2. City level: all punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city3. Legislative district level. In case where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective municipal officers in the district and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod members are electedby district, all elective barangay officials in the district and4. Municipal level. All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.c. A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a public place initiate arecall proceeding against any elective official in the LGU concerned. Recall of city, provincial and municipal officials shallbe validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the preparatory recall assembly concerned during itssession called for the purpose.d. recall of any elective provincial, city, or municipal or barangay official may also be validly initiated on petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the LGU concerned during the election which the local official sought to be recalled was elected.1. A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his rep and in the absence of rep of thepetitioner and a rep of the official sought to be recalled and in a public lace in the province, city or municipality or barangayas the case maybe, shall be filed with the COMELEC thru its office of the LGU concerned. The COMELEC or its duly authorized rep shall cause the publication of the petition in a public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than 10days nor more than 20 days for the purpose of ratifying the authenticity and genuineness of the petition and the requiredpercentage of voters.2. Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorize rep shall announce the acceptanceof candidates to the position and thereafter prepare a list of candidates which shall include the name of the official soughtto be recalled. *Sec 71 Election on recall

. Upon filing of a valid resolution or petition for recall with the appropriate local office of theCOMELEC, the Commission or its duly recognized rep shall set the date of the election on recall, which shall be not later than 30 days after the filing of the resolution or petition for recall in the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials and45 days in the case of provincial officials. The official officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as aduly registered candidate or candidates to pertinent positions and like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.* Sec 72 effectivity of recall. The recall o f a n e l e c t i v e l o c a l o f f i c i a l s h a l l b e e f f e c t i v e o n l y u p o n t h e s e c r e t i o n a n d proclam ation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the electionon recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is therebyaffirmed and he shall continue in office. *Sec 73 Prohibition form resignation. The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign whilethe recall process is in progress. *Sec 74 Limitations on recall a. An elective local official may be the subject of a recal l election only once during the term of his office or loss of confidence.b. No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official's assumption to office of 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election. * Sec 75. Expenses incidental to recall elections . A l l e x p e n s e s i n c i d e n t a l t o r e c a l l e l e c t i o n s s h a l l b e b o r n e b y t h e COMELEC. For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual General Appropriation Act a Contingency fund at thedisposal of the COMELEC for the conduct of recall elections. * Art 154 162, IRR. Exactly the same as above, but with addition of Who may be recalled (see below) 1 . R e q u i s i t e s If there's such a thing as requisites of a recall, it's probably found buried in Section 69 and 70 of the LGC of 1991.The requisites probably are:a. Initiation, either thru direct action by the people or thru a preparatory recall assembly; andb. Election 2.Who may be recalled Art 155. IRR Who may be recalled. Any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official may be recalled for lossof confidence in the manner prescribed in this rule provided that no recall may be instituted against said elective localofficial who have been the subject of a previous recall election held during the same term of office. 3 . G r o u n d s f o r r e c a l l s Loss of confidence, which is a political question4 . W h e n r e c a l l m a y n o t b e h e l d See Section 74, LGC of 19915 . P r o c e d u r e f o r r e c a l l See Section 70, supra6 . E f f e c t i v i t y o f r e c a l l See Section 72, supra 1 . G a r c i a v . C O M E L E C 2 2 7 S C R A 1 0 0 Facts : Enrique Garcia was elected Governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice mayors andSangguniang Bayan members of the 12 municipalities of Bataan however convened and constitute themselv es into aPreparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of Garcia. The PRA's first resolution calling for the recall of Garcia washowever shot down by the SC because it was found that the backers of the PRA sent only selective notices to local officials most likely sympathetic to their cause. The PRA thus cured this defect in their second resolution. Scared, Garcianow assails the constitutionality of Section 70 of the LGC of 1991, which allows a preparatory recall assembly to initiate arecall of an elective official. Garcia says that its highly possible that the dominant political party in government can use arecall as a tool in ousting their incumbent opponents; 2) the RPA is not reflective of the peoples will; 3) the right to initiaterecall rests with the people itself. Held

: Garcia is wrong reasons:1) All powers are subject to abuse anyway. To deny power because it can be abused by the grantee is to render government powerless and no people need a toothless government. This is the reason behind the presumption that publicofficials are actually performing their duties in good faith.2) The PRA is merely a step in the recall process. The recall it self still has to be submitted to the people for affirmation thru an election. The PRA is not the recall itself, thus it cannot be said to be reflective of the peoples will.3 ) T h e P R A i s a l s o i n i t i a t i o n o f r e c a l l b y t h e p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s , a l t h o u g h d o n e i n d i r e c t l y t h r o u g h t h e i r representatives. The reason for using PRA as a mode for initiating recall is because admittedly, initiating recall thru directaction by the people is difficult and expensive.4) Davides dissent: the power to initiate recall includes the power not to initiate. The power to initiate becomesmeaningless if another body is authorized to do it for the electorate. Its not hard to see that in reality, its far eas y getmajority of the PRA to initiate a recall proceeding. In effect a small group can easily negate the power of the vastelectorate to initiate recall (therefore, the good justice is dou btful of the republican s ystem of the government). W hatcongress should have done is to reduce the minimum 25% requirement down to 15 or 20% (which is good idea). 2. Evardone v. COMELEC 204 SCRA 464Facts : The guys here calling for a recall of an elective official failed because they initiated the recall a bit too late.Felipe Evardone won as mayor of municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar in the 1988 election. 2 years later, Alexander Apelado and friends filed a petition for the recall of Evardone. The COMELEC approved the signing of the saidpetition for recall.There was some ballyhoo regarding a TRO issued by the SC retraining Apelado and friends from proceeding of the signing of the petition, but thats not important. W hat Everdone complaining about is that th e COMELEC cannotformulate rules and regulations governing the procedure of recall elections because according to the 1987 Constitution,Congress is supposed to pass a new local government code which would provide for the procedure in recall elections.Since such a code wasnt passed at the time, the initiation for recall must fail because theres no procedure in existence tofollow anyway. Held : The initiation of recall must fail, but for a different reason.1) Its true tat the LGC of 1991 has yet to be passed. However, the LGC of 1983 (BP 337) was still in force in hattime as can be shown in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission where the effectiveness of BP 337 wasexpressly recognized. BP 337 authorizes the COMELEC to supervise and control rec all elections and promulgate thenecessary rules and regulations.2) However, the SC promulgated this decision in 1991. The 1992 elections was only 7 months away, BP 337 disallows the holding of recall elections one year immediately preceding a regular local election. 3. Paras v. COMELEC 264 SCRA 49Facts : Pati SK elections ba naman pinatulan ng recall.Danilo Paras won as Punong Barangay in the 1994 barangay elections of Pula, Cabanatuan City. A petition for hisrecall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Paras managed to delay the holding of therecall elections 3 times (note that the term of a Punong Barangay is for 3 years only). The third attempt at a recall electionwas slated for Januar y 13, 1996. Paras gleefully noted that the recall action was barred by representation as no recall shall take place. 1 year immediately preceding a regular election as managed by SEC.74(b), LGC of 1991. Held : A Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election is not a regular local election, at least within the contest of Section74 because said Section 74, when taken together as a whole, is intended for elective positions with minimum terms of 4years. Paras interpretation of the statute is too literal and absurd. The spirit, rather than the letter of the law, determinesits contents.However Paras delaying tactics worked. The next regular elections concerning the barangay office concerned ismerely 7 moths away. Recall is no longer possible by virtue of same election 74(b). Paras still merges as the winner (Moral lesson: Wag mo ng patulan ang SK elections 3 taon lang naman natiis yan eh). 4. Mercado v. Board of Elections Supervisors of Ibaan, Batangas 243 SCRA 422Facts : Jose Mercado was proclaimed SK chairman of Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan Batangas during the 1992elections. His rival, Crisanto Pangilinan, filed a protest with the Board of Elections Supervisors (BES) on the ground thatsome votes, were invalidated by the Board of Election Tellers (BET)

Chairman without insulting his fellow members. Pangilinan won in the recount Mercado assailed in the authority of the BES act on the protest filed by his rival. He said the ground created byPangilinan was in the nature of an election protest properly cognizable by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court (asmandated by Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code) and not by some never heard BES, a body created by the COMELEC thru its Resolution No. 2499.The RTC dismissed Mercados complaint saying that Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC did not vest in theRTC jurisdiction to try SK elections. Mercado then argued at the SC that Res. No. 2499 was null and void in the first placebecause SK elections are governed by the Omnibus Election Code and not by some numb resolution passed without legalbasis by the COMELEC. Held : Mercado is mistaken. Reasons:1) The SK election is not an election involving elective barangay officials within the context of the OmnibusElection Code and the Constitution. The position of SK chairman is not include as one of the elective members of theSangguniang Barangay (which consist of the punong barangay and 7 regular sangguniang barangay members). An SKchairman is at best merely an ex-officer member of Sangguniang Barangay. Therefore, SK elections are not governed bythe Omnibus Election Code.2) Article 203 of the IRR of the LGC 1991 states that SK elections shall be governed by the rules promulgated bythe COMELEC. Therefore, the BES, as a creation of COMELEC Res. No. 2499, has legal authority to take cognizance of the SK election protest. 5. Claudio v. COMELEC 311 SCRA 388Facts : Jovito Claudio won as mayor of Pasay City in the 1998 elections. In May, 1999, less than a year later,several barangay chairs gathered to discuss the filing of a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio and the Convening of the PRA. It took only less than 2 weeks for the members of the PRA to obtain a majority vote for the passing of a resolution calling for said recall.Claudio however complained that what his opponents did was contrary to section 74 of the LGC 1991, because of the word recall in said section should be interpreted not only to mean a recall election alone, but is also intended to include the convening of the PRA and the filling by it of a recall resolution. If Claudios interpretation is correct, then hisenemies may have indeed violated the statutory prohibition that no recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the officials assumption to office since the PRA did indeed convene less than a year from Claudios assumption intooffice.Claudio also argued that the phrase regular local election in said Section 74(b) includes the election period for that regular election and not only the date of such election. Held : Claudio is wrong. Reasons:1) The word recall in Section 74(b) refers to the recall election and not the preliminar y proceedings to recall. Section 74 speaks of limitations on recall which, according to section 69, is a power which exercised by the registeredvoters of an LGU. Since the voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recallproceedings is not prohibited within the 1 year period provided.2) Another reason why the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the 1 year period provided in74(b) is that to hold the otherwise would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of itsmembers. Indeed, it would be wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To thecontrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in incumbent.3) The election period is not included in the phrase regular local election. Claudios interpretation would severelylimit the period during which a recall election may be held. Such an interpretation must be rejected because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make LGUs more responsive and accountable D. Local Initiative and Referendum (Sec. 120-127, Art. 133-153, IRR) *Sec. 120, LGC. Local initiatives defined. Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of anLGU may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.*Sec. 121. Who may exercise. The power of local initiative and the referendum may be exercised by all registeredvoters of the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. *Sec. 122. Procedure in local initiative. a) Not less than 1,000 registered voters in case of provinces and cities, 100 in case of municipalities, and 50 incase of barangays, may file a petition with the sanggunian concerned proposing the

adoption, enactment, repeal or amendment of an ordinance.b) If no favorable action is taken thereon by the sanggunian concerned within 30 days from its presentation, theproponents, thru their duly authorized representatives, may invoke their power of initiative giving notice thereof to thesanggunian concerned.c ) T h e p r o p o s i t i o n s h a l l b e n u m b e r e d s e r i a l l y f r o m R o m a n n u m e r a l I . T h e C O M E L E C o r i t s d e s i g n a t e d representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition d) 2 or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.e) Proponents shall have 90 days in the case of provinces and cities, 60 days in the case of municipalities, and 30d a y s i n t h e c a s e o f baranga ys, from notice m entioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the r e q u i r e d n u m b e r o f signatures.f ) T h e p e t i t i o n s h a l l b e s i n g e d b e f o r e t h e e l e c t i o n r e g i s t r a r , o r h i s d e s i g n a t e d r e p . i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e representative of the proponent and a rep. of sanggunian concerned, in a public place in the LGU, as the case may be.Stations for collecting signatures must be established in as many places as may be warranted.g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the COMELEC, thru its office in the LGU concern ed for their approve within 60 days from the date of certification by the COMELEC, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, 45 days inthe case of municipalities, and 30 days in the case of barangays. The initiative shall then be heard on the date set, after which the result thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the COMELEC.*Sec. 123. Effectively of local propositions. If the proposition is approved by a majority of a vote cast, it shall takeeffect 15 days after certification by the COMELEC as if affirma tive action thereon had been position is considered defeated.*Sec. 124. Limitations of local initiative.a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the sanggunian to enact.c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the sanggunian concerned adopts in to the proposition presented andthe local chief executive approves the same, the initiative shall be canceled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.*Sec. 125. Limitations upon sanggunian. Any proposition or ordinance adopted thru the system of initiative andreferendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, mod ified, or amended by the sanggunian concerned within 6months from the date approval thereof and may be amended, modified, or repealed within 3 years thereafter by a vote of of its members: Provided, that in case of barangays, the period shall be 18 moths after the approval thereof.*Sec. 126. Local referendum defined. Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of theLGUs may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.The local referendum shall be held under the direction and control of the COMELEC within the 60 days in case of provinces and cities, 45 days in case of municipalities and 30 days in the case of barangays.The COMELEC shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.*Sec. 127. Authority of courts. Nothing in this chapter shall prevent or preclude the power courts from declaringnull and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Chapter for the violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the sanggunian concerned to enact the said measure. NOTE : Articles 133-153, IRR are roughly the same Section 120-127 above. However, we should take note of Art.145, IRR, which basically states the number of signature required.1) In a province or city at least 10% of the registered voters therein, with each legislative district represented byat least 3 % of the registered voters therein.2) In a municipality at least 10% of registered voters therein, with each barangay represented by at least 3% of registered voters therein.3) In a barangay 10% of registered voters therein. 1. Garcia v. COMELEC 237 SCRA 279Facts : The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) ng Morong, Bataan passed Resolution No. 10 wherein agreed to theinclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accordance with RA 7227Enrique Garcia (whos this guy? His name keeps popping out of nowhere) and friends filed a petition with the SBto annul the said resolution. When their petition went unheeded, Garcia resorted to the power of initiative under the LGCof 1991. The COMELEC however denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that under the LGC of 1991m thesubject of local initiative refers only to an ordinance and not a solution. Is the COMELEC correct? Held : No. and the SC made COMELEC pay by dumping tons of legal basis providing that resolutions can also bethe subject of local initiatives thus making the case as written unnecessarily long. Some reasons are:1)

Sec. 32 of Article VI of the Constitution says that initiative and referendum is a system wherein the people candirectly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law. The word act makes it clear that resolutions are alsoincluded initiatives.2) RA 6735 defines 3 system of initiative, one of them being initiative on local legislation which included, amongothers, resolution. 3) In the LGC itself, Section 124 says, Initiatives shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunian to enact. Definitely, the scopes of Sanggunians powers include resolutions which makethem covered under initiatives. E. Disciplinary Action (Art. 124, IRR) *Article 124. Grounds for Disciplinary Action.a) An elective local official may be censured, reprimanded, suspended or removed from office after due notice andhearing on the following grounds:1) Disloyalty to the republic of the Philippines.2) Culpable violation of the Constitution.3) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence or dereliction of duty.4) Commission of any offense including moral amplitude or an offense punishable by at least prison mayor which is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment.5) Abuse Authority6) Unauthorized absence of 15 consecutive working days, in the case of the local chief executive and 4consecutive sessions in the case of members of the sanggunian panlalawigan, sanggunian panlungsod, sangguniang bayan and sangguniang barangay.7) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and8) such other grounds as may be provided by the Code, RA 6713, RAC of 1987, RPC and all other applicable general and special laws.b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph a, of this articleby order of the proper court, or the disciplinary authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion if the other. 1.Grounds for Suspension and Removal (Sec. 60, LGC) *Sec. 60 Grounds for disciplinary action. (Same as Article 124, IRR above). 1. Espiritu v. Melgar 206 SCRA 256Facts : A certain Ramir Garing filed a complaint against Mayor Nelson Melgar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro,charging him with grave misconduct, abuse of authority, oppression, culpable violation if the Constitution (no kidding,Garing practi cally threw the revised penal code at him). Garing claimed the mayor punched and kick him willfully unlawfully and feloniously (you know, the usual Im innocent, believe me way of introducing a complaint) while the latter was delivering a public speech. After evaluating the complaint, Governor Benjamin Espiritu had the mayor preventivelysuspended for 60 days. Upon petition by the mayor, the RTC of Oriental Mindoro issued a writ of preliminary injunctionpreventing the governors order of suspension. Was the injunction proper? Held : No, Reasons:1) The provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by the law to preventively suspend the municipalmayor of Naujan at anytime after the issues had been joined and any of the following grounds were shown to exist:a . W h e n t h e r e i s r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t h a s c o m m i t t e d t h e a c t o r a c t s complained of.b . W h e n t he evidenc e of t he c ulpabilit y is s tr ong.c .W hen t he gr avit y o f t he of f ens e s o w a r r a n t s ; o r d.W hen the continuance in office of the respondent could influences the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity if the records and other evidence. (LGC of 1893).2) As a general rule, the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and the sufficiency of the cause. So, unless a flagrant abuse of the exercise of that power is shown,public policy and a becoming regard for the principle of separations of powers demand that the action of said officer or body should be left undisturbed. 2. Llamas v. Orbos 202 SCRA 844Facts : Mariano Un Ocampo III was the incumbent governor of the province of Tarlac in 1989. he was charged bythe vise governor Rodolfo Llamas of violating RA 3019, the Anti -Graft and Corrupt Practices Act Specifically, he wascharged with executing a loan agreement with a non-stock and a non-profit organization headed by the governor himself as chairman wherein said agreement was grossly inimical to the interest of the Provincial Government (because the loan,among others, did not provide for interest and security). The Department of Local Government Secretary Oscar Orbos,after reviewing the governors case, slapped a 90 days suspension (not preventive suspension) on the hapless governor.Thereafter, the vise governor took over as acting governor.The governor filed a motion for reconsideration. However the DLG secretary, in the spirit of Christmas perhaps,filed a resolution granting

executive clemency to the governor by reducing his sentence to that portion had already served.The vise governors now question the legality of issuing executive clemency or pardon to the administrative casewhen the same should apply only to criminal cases Held : Llamas is incorrect. The 1987 Constitution makes no distinction as to criminal or administrative cases. Thephrase after conviction of final judgment does not make explicit reference to criminal cases fact, the Constitution doesnot allow pardon in impeachment cases. That the Constitution does not make a same exemption to the administrativecases shows that executive clemency can be granted in administrative cases.Section 43 of PD 807 also recognizes executive clemenc y in administrative cases in meritorious case bycommutation or removalPadillas Dissent: the spirit and intent of pardons is to afford relief from the enforcement of the criminal whichimposes penalty and which appears unduly harsh. To grant pardons to release private obligations prevent or destroy civilrights is plain abuse. 3. Aguinaldo v. Santos 212 SCRA 768Facts : Rodolfo Aguinaldo was elected governor of Cagayan in 1988. Two years later, after due no hearing, theDepartment of Local Government Secretary Luis Santos found Aguinaldos guilty of disloyalty to the Republic and of culpable violation of the Constitution. Santos ordered Aguinaldos removal from of Pending criminal charges of disloyaltyto the republic, under Art. 137, RPC were also lodged against him:Aguinaldo questioned the legality of his removal with the SC. In the meantime, Aguinaldo filed certificate of candidacy for governor again. 3 disqualification cases were filed against him on the ground he was removed from office.Still, he was allowed to run and won a landslide victory. Held : Since Aguinaldo was re-elected as governor, the pending administration case against regarding his removalfrom office was rendered moot and academic. The reason is that the electorate clearly forgiven him for the administrativemisconduct he committed during the last term. This is the rule along with the theory that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers misconduct to the extent of cutting of theright to remove him therefore. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending ag ainst petitioner for acts he mayhave committed during the failed coup.NOTE: Under the qualified agency doctrine, alter egos of the President have the power to discipline, suspend or remove elective officials under the grounds provided by law. 4. Yulo v. CSC 219 SCRA 470Facts : Back in November 24, 1986, Officer-In-Charged Apolonio Elasigue of the municipality of Calamba, Lagunaterminated the services of Teofilio Mamplata and 43 other employees of said municipality. The basis municipality for thetermination was reorganization and the approval of a new starting pattern.At first, the later-Agency Review Committee created under the Freedom Constitution reviewed the case of thesaid employees.The Merits System Protection Board (MSFB) of the CSC handled the case of the 43 employees. Pending the disposition of the case however, Elasigue last in the mayoralty race to Jesus Miguel Yulo.Yulo was just as unsympathetic as Elasigue regarding the plight of the dismissed employees. However, the MSFBfound no sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the dismissed employees (the charges against them were questionableintegrity as insinuated by Yulo) and ordered the reinstatement of some 28 of them (which was reduced further to 21 dueto the death and/or reemployment of some of them) and payment of their back wages. The CSC affirmed the MSFBs decision.Yulo now tried a different tack: that the termination of employment of the said employees was justified under atransitory provision of the Freedom Constitution which states, All elective and appointive officials under the 1973C o n s t i t u t i o n s h a l l c o n t i n u e t o o f f i c e u n t i l o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d b y t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n o r e x e c u t i v e o r d e r o r u p o n t h e designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within the period of 1 year from February 25, 1986. Held : The argument is devoid of merit. On his narration of facts, Yulo himself admitted that private respondentss e r v i c e s w e r e t e r m i n a t e d p u r s u a n t t o t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d a p p r o v a l o f t h e n e w s t a f f i n g p a t t e r n o f C a l a m b a o n November 3, 1986. Yulos argument to the effect that respondents were separated from the service by virtue of theFreedom Constitution or Executive Order No. 17 is palpably an afterthought. It may be reiterated

here that the mainreason wh y the then inter-Agenc y Review Committee refused to take cognizance of the instant case was because Mamplata et al were not removed pursuant to Executive Order No. 17, such declaration by the said Committee destroyswhatever argument Yulo tried to build using the Freedom Constitution as a basis.More importantly, it is undeniable that private respondents employment with the municipality was a lawfully terminated. On this score alone, the dismissed employees ought to and must be reinstated. Illegal removal of career civilservice employees in violation of their Constitutional right to security of tenure will not be condoned under the guise of reorganization 5. Grego v. COMELEC 274 SCRA 461Facts : Back in October 31, 1981, Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the SCitself after a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative case filed against him. The dispositive portion of thedecision is important in this case so its given special mention: W herefore, finding the respondent Deput y Sheriff Humberto Basco of the City Court of Manila guilty of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement to anyposition in the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations.But this guy doesnt give up in the face of adversity. He ran for councilor 3 times in 1988, 1992 and 1995 in theCity of Manila and won each time. His second and third campaigns as councilor was however mired by disqualificationlawsuits from left and right as his sins from 1981 came back to haunt him.Particularly, his third campaign for councilor ran into some serious legal obstacle. One of them come from Sec.40(b) of the LGC of 1991 which states that persons running for any elective office are disqualified if they were previouslyremoved from office as a result if an administrative case. Another was that his proclamation as councilor for the third timewas allegedly void because his disqualification case was still pending. Lastly, it seemed that the SC decision from 1981forever barred him from seeking public office. Will Humberto Lucky Basco overcome the odds and win? Held : Yes, Reasons:1) The LGC of 1991 cannot be applied retroactively, since no provision allows for it. Basco misgivings happenedway back in 1981 long before the inception of the LGC.2) The suspension of the proclamation of a winning candidate on the ground of a pending disqualification caselies within the discretion of the COMELEC according to its evaluation of the evidence (Section 6, RA 6646). The findingsof facts and conclusions of the COMELEC, absence of a showing of grave, abuse of discretion, must be generallyrespected and even given finality. Besides, absent and any determination of irregularity in the election returns, it is a mandatory ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers to count the votes and declare the result.3) The 1981 SC decision uses the word reinstatement (see above). Rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission defined reinstatement as the reappointment of a person who was previously separated from theservice x x x. Obviously, Basco is not seeking to get reappointed but to get elected and re-elected. He is not thereforebarred from seeking public office. 2.Procedure (Sec. 84, LGC) *Sec. 84. Administrative discipline. Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointivelocal officials and employees as well as their suspension and removal shall be in accordance in the civil service law andrules and order pertinent laws. Te result of such administrative investigations shall be reported to the CSC. 3. Preventive Suspension (Section 63-64, 85-87, LGC, Art. 127, IRR) Read also section 42, PD 807(now Sec. 52, RAC of 1987) *Section 63. Preventive Suspension.a) Preventive Suspension may be imposed:1) By the president, if the respondent Is an elective official of a province, highly urbanized or independentcomponent city.2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality.3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of a barangay.b) preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt isstrong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in the office of the respondentcould influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence: provided, thatany single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond 60 days: provided further, that in theevent that several administrative cases are filed against and elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than 90 days within the single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.c) Upon

expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elected official shall be deemed reinstated inoffice without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within 120 days fromthe time he as formally notified of the case against him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to hisfault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing thetime of termination of the case.d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be penalized as abuse of authority.*Sec. 64. Salary of respondent pending suspension. The respondent official preventively suspended from officeshall receive salary or compensation including such emoluments accruing during such suspension.*Sec. 85. Preventive suspension of appointive local officials and employees a) the local chief executives may preventively suspend for a period not exceeding 60 days any subordinate officialo r e m p l o y e e u n d e r h i s a u t h o r i t y p e n d i n g i n v e s t i g a t i o n i f t h e c h a r g e d a g a i n s t s u c h o f f i c i a l s o r e m p l o y e e i n v o l v e s dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that therespondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant his removal from the service.b) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended official or employee shall be automaticallyreinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative proceedings against him until its termination.If the delay in the proceeding of the case is due to the fault, negligence or request of the respondent, the time of the delayshall not be counted in the computing of the period of the suspension herein provided.*Sec.86. Administrative investigation. In any LGU, administrative investigation may be conducted by a person or committee duly authorized by the local chief executive. Said person or employee shall conduct hearings on the cases brought against appointive local officials and employees and submit their findings and recommendations in the local chief executive concerned within 15 days from the conclusion of the hearings. The administrative cases herein mentioned shallbe decided within 90 days from the time the respondent is formally notified by the charges.*Sec. 87. Disciplinary charges. Except other wise provided by the law, the local chide executive may impose thepenalty of removal from service, demotion in tank, suspension for not more than 1 year without any fine in an amount notexceeding 6 months salar y, of reprimand and other wise disciplined subordinate officials and employees under his jurisdiction. If the penalty imposed is suspension without pay for not more than 30 days, the decision shall be appealableto the CSC, which shall decide the case within 30 days from receipt thereof.*Article 127, IRR. Exactly the same as Sec. 63, LGC*Sec 52, RAC of 1987. Lifting of preventive suspension pending administrative investigation (Book V, Subtitle A onCSC, chapter 6). When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finallydecided by the disciplining authority within the period of 90 days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is nota presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: provided, that when the delay indisposition of the case is due to the fau lt, negligent or the petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.Kinds of preventive suspension (with regards to civil service employees who are charged with offense punishablewith suspension or removal) (revised administrative code of 1987)1) Preventive suspension, pending investigation.2) Preventive suspension pending appeal, if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority suspensionor dismissal. I. Garcia v. Mojica 314 SCRA 207Facts : On May 7, 1988, Cebu city mayor Alvin Garcia signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphaltto the city, 4 days later national elections were held and Mayor Garcia won reelection contract, in the other hand, tookeffect on September 1998.On march, 1999, news reports came out that the said purchase of asphalt was anomalous investigation but thespecial prosecution officer of the office of the Ombudsman revealed that (1) the contract for supply of asphalt to Cebu citywas designed to favor F.E. Zuellig, (2) the amount quoted on the contract was too expensive compared for the amount for which asphalt may be bought from local suppliers such as Shell and Petron, particularly considering that the amount wasfixed in dollars and was payable i n pesos, thus exposing the city government to the risk attendance to a fluctuating exchange rate, and (3) the interest of the city under the administrative cases be filed against Mayo Garcia.The deputy Ombudsman handled Garcias case and recommended 6 moths preventive suspension against thelatter the maximum imposable under RA 6770, the Ombudsman Law. Garcia now raises the following issues:1. What is the effect of the reelection of the petitioner on the investigation of acts done before his reelection? Didthe Ombudsman for Visayas gravely abuse his discretion in conducting the investigation of petitioner and ordering hispreventive suspension?2. Assuming that the ombudsman properly took cognizance of the case, what law should

apply to the investigationbeing conducted by him, the LGC R.A 7160 of the ombudsman law (R.A 6770)? Was the procedure in the law properlyobserved?3. Assuming further that the ombudsman has jurisdiction, is the preventive suspension of the petitioner based onstrong evidence as required by law? Held : The answers are:1. Garcia cannot anymore be held administratively liable for an act committed during a previous term. Themeeting of minds to the contract, especially with regards to the stipulation deemed prejudicial to the city has already occurred during the mayors previous term. It hardly matters that the benefits of the contract are to be delivered duringGarcias current term

expressly empowered to do so under the LGU. But again it only says P u b l i c T h e P r o v i n c e o f Bulacan cannot tax Republic Cement because its extracting minerals from private lands. Dont forget, public versus private. 3. Other Illustrative Cases:3. a Basco v. PAGCOR 197 SCRA 52Facts : Atty. Humberto Basco, the Chairman on the committee of Laws of the City Council of Manila, and 3 other lawyers, (the Basco Four) filed a petition seeking to annul the Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)because among others. 1) It waived the Manila City governments right to impose taxes and license fees, which isrecognized by law and 2) for the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded intothe local governments right to impose local taxes and license fees in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of the local autonomy. Held : The Basco four contentions are all unmeritorious Reasons:1)Any petitioner assailing the constitionality of the law must realize that said law is armed with the presumption of constitionality. With this in mind, the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the law he wishes toassail is unconstitutional. 2) The Basco Four assailed Sec. 13 par. 2 of P.D 1869 which states that LGUs cannot impose on PAGCORtaxes on any kind (except for the 5% franchise tax) Said provision, they claim is a violation of local autonomyit waives the City of Manilas right to impose taxes and license fees. The court answered that.a ) T h e C i t y o f M a n i l a b e i n g a M e r e m u n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n h a s n o i n h e r e n t r i g h t t o i m p o s e t a x e s . T h u s , t h e Charter or statute must plainly show am intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. Itspower to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon bythe state itself which has the inherent power to tax.b ) T h e c h a r t e r o f t h e C i t y o f Manila is subject to control by congress. It should be stressed that m u n i c i p a l corporation are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and abolish municipalcorporation due to its legislative powers Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemption or even take back the power.c ) T h e C i t y o f M a n i l a s p o w e r t o i m p o s e l i c e n s e s f e e s o n g a m b l i n g h a s l o n g b e e n r e v o k e d . A s e a r l y a s 1 9 7 5 , the power of local government to regulate gambling thru the grant of franchise, licenses or permits waswithdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government.PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All its stocks areowned by the

National Government: it has dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role isgovernmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentalityof the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local Government.( 3 ) T h e s t a t e s h a v e n o power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in a n y m a n n e r c o n t r o l the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federalg o v e r n m e n t . T h i s d o c t r i n e e m a n a t e s f r o m t h e s u p r e m a c y o f t h e N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t o v e r l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s . Otherwise, mere creatures of the state can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as a tool for regulation.( 4 ) T h e B a s c o F o u r c a n n o t a l s o i n v o k e A r t i c l e X , s e c 5 o f t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h s a y s , E a c h l o c a l government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other chargessubject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy.Such taxes, fees and charges shall exclusively to the local government. The power of local government to impose taxesand fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. 3. b Mactan Cebu Intl Airport v. MarcosFacts : Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958mandated to principally undertake to economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of theMactan International Airport in the province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City, and such other Airports as maybe established in the province of Cebu. It is also mandated to a) encourage, promote and develop international anddomestic air traffic in the Central Visayas and Mindanao regions as a means of making the regions centers of internationaltrade and tourism, and accelerating the development of the means of transportation and communication in the country;a n d b ) u p g r a d e t h e s e r v i c e a n d f a c i l i t i e s o f t h e a i r p o r t s a n d t o f o r m u l a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t a b l e s t a n d a r d s o f accommodation and service.Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxesimposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities in accordance withSection 14 of its charter.

However, on Oct. 11, 1994, the city of Cebu claimed started demanding payment on parcels of land belonging toMCIAA. The city of Cebu claimed that MCIAA cannot rely on Sec. 14 of its charter because- as MCIAA is a GOCC- its taxexemption privilege has been withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC as follows; Sec. 193. Withdrawal of TaxExemption Privilege. Unless otherwise provided in this code, tax exemptions or incentive granted to, or presently enjoyedby all persons whether natural or juridical, includ ing government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA No. 6938, non-stock, and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions,are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code x x x Sec. 234.Exemptions from Real Property taxes. x x x except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government owned or controlled corporation, are herby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code.For its defense, MCIAA relies on Sec. 133 (o) of the LGC which says unless otherwise provided herein (in this Code), theexercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of

thefollowing x x x (o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, andLGUs. MCIAA relies on the ruling of Basco v. PAGCOR, which stated that local governments have no power to taxinstrumentalities of the National Government and that PAGCOR, it is performing both proprietary and governmentfunctions. MCIAA claims that like PAGCOR, it is performing a governmental function as well (read the first paragraphabove again), thus, it should be exempt from taxation by the City of Cebu. Held : M C I A A i s w r o n g . R e a s o n s : 1)Basco v. PAGCOR was decided before the enactment of the LGC of 1991. It thus finds no application in this case because the arguments here rely heavily on said LGC.2 ) T h e n t h e r e i s t h e c u r i o u s S e c 234 which states, Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following a r e exempted from payment of the real property tax: a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof had been granted, for reconsiderationor otherwise, to a taxable person x x x except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code. CanMCIAA claim that is parcels of land are basically owned by the Republic of the Philippines in Cebu thus landsare exempt from real property tax? The court answered no, because under MCIAAs charter, all lands ownedby existing airports belonging to the Republic of the Philippines in Cebu are transferred to the MCIAA, meaning, there was an absolute conveyance of ownership to MCIAA. The Republic of the Philippines is nolonger the owner of the lands in question, thus MCIAA is not spared from real property taxes. 3) While MCIAA is correct in invoking Sec 133 (o) above which disallows LGUs to tax the National Government,its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs, Sec 133 (o) is also qualified by the phrase, unless otherwiseprovided herein. (in this code). The tax imposed upon MCIAA concerns real property taxes. Thus MCIAA isalso subject to Sec 234 and for reasons mentioned in no.2). MCIAA is not spared from property taxes.4)The ultimate fact remains that Sec 193 of the LGC of 1991 has repealed the tax exemption privilege enjoyed by MCIAA as stated in Sec. 14 of its charter. This policy is consistent with the States policy to ensure genuineand meaningful autonomy to LGUs. NOTE : the Republic of the Philippines is not the same as National Government (Wow!). To better understand this situation, lets have a rundown of some boring definitions:a)Republic of the Philippines synony mous with Government of the Republic of the Philippines; the corporate government entity through which the function of government are exercised throughout thePhilippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through whichpolitical authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions,the provincial city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.b)National Government the entire machinery of the central government (executive, legislative and juridical) as opposed to the forms of local governments.c ) A g e n c y any of the various units of the Government, including a departme n t , b u r e a u , o f f i c e instrumentality, or GOCC or a local government or a distinct unit thereind ) I n s t r u m e n t a l i t y a n y a g e n c y o f t h e N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t , n o t i n t e g r a t e d w i t h i n t h e d e p a r t m e n t framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporatepowers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy; usually though a charter e.g. regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and GOCCs

3. c MERALCO v Province of Laguna 306 SCRA 750Facts :On various dates. Certain municipalities of the Province of Laguna, including, Bian, Sta. Rosa, SanPedro, Luisiana, Canluan and Cabuyao, by virtue of existing laws then effect, issued resolution through their respectivemunicipal councils granting franchise in favor of petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) for the supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas. On 19 January 1983, MERALCO was likewise granted a