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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(mini intro depending on transition from earlier part) As previously stated, Thomas Aquinas defined law as an ordinance of reason

for the common good made by him who has care of the community and promulgated. In the course of class discussions, it was mentioned that reason formulated norm and that common good should not cause evil. It was also stated that reason is about correct thinking (Villareal, Philosophy of Law lecture, 2012). The term correct thinking connotes a determination of what is right or wrong, good or evil. Hence, correct thinking would, undoubtedly involve morality. This illustrates the concept of incorporationism, wherein law and morality are perpetually intertwined (Coleman & Leiter, 1999). However, H.L.A. Hart and the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars provide a different definition of what constitutes a valid law. Their respective tenets question the intrinsic validity of the law and the process, or rather the thoughts, to which laws are arrived at. For Hart, there are two types of rules which make up law, namely primary rules, which limit or expand liberty and secondary rules (Coleman & Leiter, 1999). Secondary rules, on the other hand, includes the creation of the power to legislate and adjudicate, and as well as a rule of recognition (Coleman & Leiter, 1999). The rule of recognition mentioned pertains to a social rule which is accepted as authoritative from the internal point of view (Coleman & Leiter, 1999). According to Hart, laws draw their validity from the rule of recognition, which involves the determination of what norms have the binding force of law (Coleman & Leiter, 1999). As a positivist, Hart moves away from morality by stating that morality should not be a criterion of legality since it will result to a failure to reduce certainty (Coleman & Leiter, 1999). At the same, Hart recognizes that a margin for uncertainty should be allowed, such that judicial decision may include other standards, such as morality, in meting out judgments (Coleman & Leiter, 1999). Relating it to Aquinas definition of law, it would seem that, although Hart is a positivist, who tries to move away from morality as part of law, he cannot successfully do so. His analysis of judicial discretion, as well as the rule of recognition, recognizes the role of morality in law-making and adjudication since the recognition afforded to these laws in order for them to be valid is based on the internal point of view of the person making the law or adjudicating. That internal point of view as part of , or rather resultant of the reasoning process of the said individuals connotes deference to the injection of morality into laws given that morality is part and parcel of being a human person (Villareal, Philosophy of Law lecture, 2012). Going back to the definition of law by Aquinas, it seems that his definition subsumes Harts because Aquinas definition also states that laws are promulgated by a person based on correct thinking which allows for discretion or, in the words of Hart, a margin of uncertainty as to what is deemed part of correct thinking and what should be made law. Following this line of thought, the definition of law provided by critical legal scholars is subsumed by Aquinas definition as well. It was stated, [c]ritical scholars dont see legal language as indeterminate relative to the social context to which it refers. Rather, they see legal language as indeterminate because of the social context to which it refers?

(Binder, 1999). This means that law is indeterminate (Villareal, Philosophy of Law lecture, 2012). It was also pointed out during class discussions that the CLS tenets are conflicting since the rules of indeterminacy must be determinate (Villareal, Philosophy of Law lecture, 2012). Based on Aquinas definition of law, it is determinate that law should be based on reason or correct thinking, and, by extension, morality. Notwithstanding certain norms which should not be contravened, such as the right of life, morality is indeterminate since what constitutes right or wrong may differ depending on the person and the his/her upbringing, specifically his/her culture or the social context he/she was brought up in. An individuals reasoning or correct thinking may not necessarily be the same as the next person. (conclusion-ish part for hart and cls) In light of these, it is evident that although these scholars have tried to veer off the concept of morality as intrinsic to law. They cannot successfully do away with the notion of morality as intertwined with law. Based on these discussions, the group retains and sustains the Aquinass definition of law as an ordinance of reason for the common good made by him who has care of the community and promulgated. His definition provides for a definition of law which allows for adjustments with respect to different notions of what constitutes morality, but, at the same time, is limiting enough by stating that laws should be based on correct thinking, for the comm on good, and should be promulgated as well. (Starting point which may be integrated with Aileens) In relation to the discussion on Harts and CLS respective ideas of law, in the Filipino context, morality is inextricable from law, as can be seen by the non-passage of the Reproductive Health Bill (RH Bill). The RH Bill brought about a lot of debates, where the opposition to the said bill primarily relied on morality concerns, especially with regard to the right to life.. (relate onwards)

Bibliography Binder, G. (1999). Critical Legal Studies. In D. Patterson (Ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (pp. 280-290). Oxford: Blackwell. Coleman, J., & Leiter, B. (1999). Legal Positivism. In D. Patterson (Ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (pp. 241-259). Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell. Villareal, E., Philosophy of Law lecture, 2012.