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EAGLE REALTY VS REPUBLIC JULY 4, 2008 Facts: Petitioner Eagle Realty Corporation, a company engaged in the real estate

business, bought a parcel of land from a certain Reyes in 1984 via a Deed of Sale. Petitioner seeks the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 2008, which affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision dated January 22, 2001 and Resolution dated January 8, 2002, and upheld the cancellation of petitioners certificate of title based on a finding that it is not a purchaser in good faith and for value. In the assailed decision, the Court held that "a corporation engaged in the buying and selling of real estate is expected to exercise a higher standard of care and diligence in ascertaining the status and condition of the property subject of its business transaction." The Motion for Reconsideration centers on the application of Sunshine Finance to the present case. Petitioner argues therein that the ruling in Sunshine Finance is a recent innovation, established long after the subject property was transferred in petitioners name in 1984, hence, should not be applied to the case. Prior jurisprudence that protected banks, investment corporations and realty companies, without imposing any additional burden of going beyond the face of the title, should be applied instead. Petitioner points out that it purchased the subject property in 1984, when prevailing jurisprudence did not, as yet, impose upon realty companies the obligation to look beyond the certificate of title for it to qualify as an innocent purchaser for value. To charge petitioner with such additional obligation is to burden it with a then non-existent obligation which thus violates its right to due process. In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that the ruling in Sunshine Finance is not in the nature of a statute that cannot be retroactively applied; it is jurisprudence that merely restates the definition of an innocent purchaser for value. Issue: Whether or not Eagle Realty is an innocent purchaser and whether the Sunshine Finance case is applicable in the present case. Held: Judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.

Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, as is the situation in this case. The assailed decision merely defines an "innocent purchaser for value" with respect to entities engaged in the real estate business. In Sunshine Finance, the Court required, for the first time, investment and financing corporations to take the necessary precautions to ascertain if there were any flaws in the certificate of title and examine the condition of the property they were dealing with. Although the property involved was mortgaged to and, subsequently, purchased by therein petitioner several years before the said decision was promulgated, we note that the rule was immediately applied to that case. In the present case, assailed ruling expands the ruling in Sunshine Finance to cover realty corporations, which, because of the nature of their business, are, likewise, expected to exercise a higher standard of diligence in ascertaining the status of the property, not merely rely on what appears on the face of a certificate of title. In like manner, our ruling should be applied to the present case; otherwise, it would be reduced to "a mere academic exercise with the result that the doctrine laid down would be no more than a dictum, and would deprive the holding in the case of any force." ALEJANDRO TY VS QUEEN ROW DECEMBER 4, 2009 8. GREGORIO TENGCO VS. HEIRS OF JOSE ALIVALAS, 168 SCRA 198

9. REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF CARLE, 105 PHIL. 1227 (1959); 10. INGARAN VS RAMELO, 107 PHIL. 498 (1960); 11. LOPEZ VS. PADILLA, G.R. 27559, MAY 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44 12. APUYAN VS HALDEMAN 438 SCRA 402 APUYAN vs. HALDEMAN

GRN 129980 September 20, 2004

Azcuna, J.:

FACTS:

Apuyan filed for a petition for quieting of title against respondents. Respondents filed on answer alleging among other that they have been in possession of their respective properties since 1962 and that petitioner produced his title to the property through fraud. The trial court ordered the hearing suspended until the termination of the proceedings before the DENR. After DENR ruled in favor of petitioner herein, RTC held parties into a pre-trial agreement and subsequently ruled that petitioner was guilty of fraud and misrepresentation while respondents are the owners of the land in question by virtue of the documentary and oral evidence, including the dismissal of the ejectment case filed by petitioner against respondents. Plaintiff received a copy of the decision on October 17, 1996 and filed a motion for reconsideration on time. Reconsideration was denied and an appeal notice therefrom was filed but RTC ruled that plaintiff failed to perfect his appeal thus the order become final and executor. CA observed that the notice of appeal filed with trial court on January 14, 1997 was not form the decision, but from the order denying the motion for reconsideration which cannot be done. It stated that although the notice of appeal prayed for the elevation of the entire records to the CA, it did not cure the defect in the notice of appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in holding that the inadvertent omission in the petitioners notice of appeal to include the RTCs decision as being appealed from is fatal to petitioners appeal.

RULING:

We rule in the affirmnative.

Section 9 of Rule 37 and Section 1 of Rule 41 of the present Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

Sec 37. Remedy against denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration. An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order.

Sec 41. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

In the case at bar, we consider that an appeal from the order denying the motion for reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court as an appeal from a final order. Then trial courts decision dated January 7, 1997 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision dated October 9, 1996 is not an interlocutory order but a final order, as the trial court finally resolved therein the issues raised in the MR, which were already passed upon in the RTCs decision. In effect, petitioner appealed from the final order of the trial court dated January 7, 1997 which appeal was filed on time. 13. VDA. DE CABRERA VS CA (267 SCRA 339) 14. ALINAS VS ALINAS ( APRIL 14, 2008) 15. HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC, APRIL 29, 2009 FACTS: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before theRTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property fromEduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-ininterest had been in open, notorious,and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare propertyowned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio,Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his foursons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sonsfrom their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgiliosucceeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originallybelonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by EduardoVelazco to Malabanan.Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject

propertywas verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan hadfailed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the publicdomain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of theproperty in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling anddismissed the appliocation of Malabanan. ISSUES: 1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registeredunder Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the PropertyRegistration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12,1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of theapplicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?2. For purposes of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of landclassified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible toacquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code? 3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use orbecause its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of theProperty Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitiveprescription? 4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? HELD: The Pertition is denied.(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of thePublic Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through theirpredecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possessionand occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, andregistrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not requirethat the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of

possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto assoon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section47 of the Public Land Act.(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is furtherconfirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that underthe Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with adeclaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an expressgovernment manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained forpublic service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for theacquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquiresownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secureregistration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, oneordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquiresownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in goodfaith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a personsuninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan hasacquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as hispredecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 orearlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their ownevidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, theycannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property RegistrationDecree.Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While thesubject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competentevidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of thenational evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of thesubject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change itsstatus as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it isinsusceptible to acquisition by prescription 16. GUNDOLA V. CA 284 SCRA 617 17. REPUBLIC V. CA 235 SCRA 567 18. DFA V. CA NOV 20 2000

19. PAGKATIPUNAN V. CA MARCH 21 2002 20. REPUBLIC V. DE GUZMAN 326 SCRA574 21. REPUBLIC VS CA AND NAGUIT 22. TENGCO VS HEIRS OF ALIWALAS 23. TOMAS AVERIA, JR., V THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA 24. ASSOCIATION OF BAPTISTS FOR WORLD EVANGELISM, INC VS FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH AND COURT OF APPEALS 25. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SEGUNDINA ROSARIO

1. ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE VS CA 272 SCRA 254 2. FRANK N. LIU VS LOY 438 SCRA 244 3. SPS ANTONIO VERA CRUZ VS CALDERON JULY 14, 2004 4. SPS DIMACULANGAN VS ROMASANTA FEB 27, 2004 5. ALINAS VS ALINAS APRIL 14, 2008 6. EAGLE REALTY VS REPUBLIC JULY 4, 2008 7. ALEJANDRO TY VS QUEEN ROW DECEMBER 4, 2009 8. GREGORIO TENGCO VS. HEIRS OF JOSE ALIVALAS, 168 SCRA 198 9. REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF CARLE, 105 PHIL. 1227 (1959); 10. INGARAN VS RAMELO, 107 PHIL. 498 (1960); 11. LOPEZ VS. PADILLA, G.R. 27559, MAY 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44 12. APUYAN VS HALDEMAN 438 SCRA 402 13. VDA. DE CABRERA VS CA (267 SCRA 339) 14. ALINAS VS ALINAS ( APRIL 14, 2008) 15. HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC, APRIL 29, 2009 16. GUNDOLA V. CA 284 SCRA 617 17. REPUBLIC V. CA 235 SCRA 567 18. DFA V. CA NOV 20 2000 19. PAGKATIPUNAN V. CA MARCH 21 2002 20. REPUBLIC V. DE GUZMAN 326 SCRA574 21. REPUBLIC VS CA AND NAGUIT 22. TENGCO VS HEIRS OF ALIWALAS

23. TOMAS AVERIA, JR., V THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA 24. ASSOCIATION OF BAPTISTS FOR WORLD EVANGELISM, INC VS FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH AND COURT OF APPEALS 25. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SEGUNDINA ROSARIO 26. Director vs CA (April 30, 1991) 27. Republic vs de Guzman (326 SCRa 574) 28. Republic vs Herbieto (May 26, 2005) 29. . Buenaventura vs Republic (March 2, 2007) 30. Fieldman vs Republic (March 28, 2008) 31. Republic vs Imperial (June 25, 2008) 32. Republic vs Diloy (August 26, 2008) 33. Republic vs Bibonia (June 21, 2007) 34. Llanes vs Republic (November 27, 2008) 35. Republic vs Cayetano Serrano (Feb 24, 2010) 36 Director of Lands v. CA (106 SCRA 426) 37. REPUBLIC VS VDA DE NERI MARCH 4, 2004