Constitutional Law Summary Volume 1 Atty.

Gorospe

EQUAL PROTECTION

EQUAL PROTECTION ART. III Sec. 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, no shall any person be denied THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
People or things similarly situated shall be treated alike An element of due process against class legislation (legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending) [Executive Secretary v. CA, 429 SCRA 81] Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operations on merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees EQUALITY not IDENTITY of rights (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54) Guarantee includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow discrimination directly or indirectly. (Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 Classifying people and properties in order to give disparate rights must be substantial, reasonable and free from arbitrariness (Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298) In response to the argument of under inclusiveness, the legislature, in perfecting the constitutional guarantee, may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. It is not necessary that the prohibition should be couched in all embracing terms (Miller v. Willson 236 US 373) REQUISITES FOR VALID CLASSIFICATION The classification is based on substantial distinction which makes no real differences It is germane to the purpose of the law It applies not only to the present but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of present It applies to everyone or every member belonging to the same class. PEOPLE V. CAYAT, 68 PHIL 12 FACTS: Act 1639 was enacted which prohibited any native of the Philippines who was part of non Christian tribes to purchase and drink non native wines. Cayat, a native of Baguio and a member of non Christian tribe, was prosecuted in violation of said enactment. He challenged the constitutionality of the act on the ground that it was violative of the due process clause, the equal protection of the laws, and an invalid exercise of due process.

HELD: Since the Spanish regime, the government had been constantly vexed with determining measures in order to advance the civilization and material prosperity of the Non-Christian Tribes. Act 1639 was enacted to secure for these tribes the blessings of peace and harmony and to facilitate their

rapid and steady arch to civilization and culture. It is an established principle in constitutional law that the equal protection clause be observed when (1) the classification is based on a substantial distinction; (2) when the classification is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) when it applies to both present and future conditions, and; (4) it applies to people belonging to the same class. 1. Counsel for Cayat argued that the classification was not substantial because he who hailed from an accident of birth parentage should not be discriminated. The term non Christian tribe however refers not to religious beliefs, but to geographical and to native attributes of a low grade of civilization living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. 2. The act is germane to the purpose of the law. It is designed to inure peace and order among Non- Christian Tribes. Free use of intoxicating liquors has often resulted to lawlessness and crimes which hampered the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. All measures adopted in the promotion of public policy are geared towards recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges enjoyed by Christian Citizens. If incidentally, a non Christian denizen should suffer the stiffness of the law, it is in heeding to the principle The General Welfare is the supreme law. ORMOC SUGAR CO, INC V. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, 22 SCRA 603 FACTS: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed an ordinance which imposed tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the petitioner. The company challenged its constitutionality on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause because it was singled out when the ordinance was implemented and it violated the rule of uniformity of taxation HELD: The ordinance is unconstitutional. The requisites for valid classification are: (1) the classification is based on a substantial distinction; (2) when the classification is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) when it applies to both present and future conditions, and; (4) it applies to people belonging to the same class.It is true that at the time it was enacted, OSC was the only sugar company in Ormoc. Nevertheless, it shall look at future possibilities when another company will be established and will not be subjected to tax because the law only levies taxes to the petitioner, being singled out. JM TUASON & CO, INC V. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, 31 SCRA 413 FACTS: RA 2616 was enacted to expropriate Tatalon Estate in Quezon City which would be divided into small lots and would be sold to several individuals. Owners Gregorio Araneta and Company and Florencio Deudor assailed the unconstitutionality of said law on the ground that it contravened the equal protection clause since said statute only applied to Tatalon Estate and not to any other lands. HELD: To assure that general welfare be prompted, which is the end of a law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection ONLY if they can show that the governmental act assailed,

far from being inspired by the attainment of common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no support in reason. Quezon City government intends to expropriate the property in order to address the increase in the population of the city which poses a serious housing problem, and that the same measure will implement the land for the landless program. Clearly, there is no sufficient refutation of the seriousness of the acts of Congress. It could indeed determine the subject of expropriation. Another incident which compelled the Congress to enact the said law was when petitioners owners induced the occupants to believe that Veterans Subdivision was the owner of the property, thus, the occupants bought the said property in good faith. When the area was already developed, owners came to light asserting their ownership o ver the subject property. In order to cure the said defect, Congress was prompted to enact the law GENDER The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men (Art II Sec 14) The view that women belong to the weaker sex has been disregarded (Villegas v. Subido, 109 SCRA 1) If gender is not material to any particular question, then it should not be dispositive of the issue. Special concern for the welfare and advancement of women should not be taken as a valid basis for stereotyped or prejudicial thinking about the role may play in traditionally areas associated with the distaff. BRADWELL V. ILLINOIS, 83 US 130 FACTS: Colyby Bradwell passed the Bar Exams, but the Illinois Supreme Court denied her application because she was a MARRIED WOMAN. The court was reluctant that she would not be available to her husband because of the contingencies that the law profession demands. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court denied her admission on the grounds that the law was silent about women entering to legal profession, allowing women to practice would warrant the civil offices to be populated by women, there are cases which are brutally not compatible with women and that the court was reluctant about the capacity of women to administer justice. Subsequently, a law was enacted stating that no person shall be precluded from any profession on account of sex. HELD: (Majority Opinion): There are privileges and immunities that belong to citizens of the US in that the relation and character, and that in there alone which a State is forbidden to abridge. But the right to be admitted to the practice of courts do not depend upon these immunities, including citizenship. (Separate Opinion, Justice Bradley) The real issue is WON a married woman can be admitted to practice as an attorney which is based upon the supposed right of every person, a man or a woman, to engage in any lawful employment. IT was left to the discretion of the court to establish rules by

which admission to the legal profession should be determined using the following a bases (1) the person should the proper administration of justice, and (2) the court may not admit persons not intended by the legislature to be admitted, even though not expressly excluded by the statute. Civil law has always recognized the wide difference between a man and a woman, viz: (1) the man i the protector of the woman; (2) The delicacy of a woman disqualifies her to several occupations by the society; (3) the constitution of a family is founded on the context that the domestic sphere belongs to woman; (4) the idea that a woman has an independent career is repugnant to the idea of a duly instituted family. The paramount destiny and mission of a woman are to fulfil her offices as a wife and as a mother according to the law of the Creator and the rules of civil society. It is not contrite to say that a woman has been endowed by the law as a fundamental right to enter any profession or calling. MICHAEL M V. SUPERIOR COURT, 450 U 464 FACTS: Michael, 17, was prosecuted for statutory rape which defines having sexual intercourse with a female, not the wife below 18. Michael challenged the constitutionality of the act on the ground that it was prejudicial to male genders alone. HELD: The equal protection clause does not demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons r to things which are different in fact be treated in law as the same. Substantially, there is a difference between a male and a female, and therefore they are not situated on equal footing. Only women can become pregnant and they suffer profound holistic consequences of sexual activity. Because virtually, all significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, the legislature acts within its authority when it elects to penalize the participant who suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. The risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young female. On the petitioners contention that gender neutral statute is effective and that both male and females can be criminalized will held the law in futility since female will then fear reporting any incident which in turn will incriminate them. On the petitioner argument that males are regarded as culpable aggressors, The statute seeks to prevent the occurrence of teenage pregnancies which normally lead to abortion. GOESAERT V. CLEARY, 335 US 464 FACTS: A Michigan law forbade any female to act as bartenders unless she is the wife or daughter of the male owner of a licensed liquor establishment. ISSUE: WON the classification as to wives and daughters violate the due process of non wives and daughters HELD: Michigan could forbid all women from working in a bar. This is so despite the vast changes in the social and legal position of women. The fact that women may now have the achieved virtues tht en have long claimed as theirs does not preclude the State from drawing a line between sexes, certainly in such matters and regulation of the liquor traffic. While Michigan may deny to all women opportunities for bartending, it cannot play favourites. Since bartending by women may, in allowable

legislative judgment, give rise to oral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures, the legislature need not to go to the full length of prohibition if it believes that as to a defined group of females, other factors are operating which either eliminate or reduce moral and social problems calling for prohibition. Evidently, Michigan believes that the oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaids husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront barmaid without such oversight. Collaterally, the petitioner argued that the reason behind the law was to bolster the desire of male to dominate the profession but the US SC decided not to delve with it. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTER, INC V. DRILON, 163 SCRA 386 FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of DOLE D.O. which suspends the temporary deployment of female Filipino domestic helpers and household workers on the ground that it was a discrimination against males or females and that it was only inimical against the mentioned workers and not to all Filipino workers, alike. HELD: It is well settled that equality before the law does not mean identity of rights, but: (1) the classification is based on a substantial distinction; (2) when the classification is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) when it applies to both present and future conditions, and; (4) it applies to people belonging to the same class. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers are the compelling motives for urgent government action. In the case of men, there is no evidence presented that men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. The court is not impressing with male chauvinistic notion but the ruling of the court is dependent on the evidence presented. Furthermore, the order is germane to the purpose of the law to enhance the protection for Filipino female workers. On the petitioners contention that it does not apply to all Filipina workers

alike the court ruled that doing so would be unreasonable and arbitrary for all of them are not similarly situated. TUAN ANH NGUYEN V. IMMIGRATON AND NATURALIZATION SCIENCE, 533 US 53 FACTS: Nguyen, born to a Vietnamese mother and an American father, was ordered to be deported after pleading guilty of two counts of sexual assault of a child. His father obtained a parentage order from the state court but the Immigration Board that deported him rejected the sae because the US law provides that the acknowledgment of a child to a citizen father and a non citizen mother should be done when he was still 18, not when he was 28. Consequently, a different rule applies if the citizen parent is the mother. HELD: For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. A citizen other expecting a child and living abroad has the right to enter the US so that the child can be born in the US and be a citizen there. This equivalence ensures expectant mothers who are citizens of the US to re-enter. This equivalence is not available for fathers because they do not have control where the child will be born. Although the immigration law requires certain conduct to be perfected by citizen

fathers, once that the citizenship has been completed, the protection given to children of citizen mothers and those of citizen fathers are the same. Sec 1409 requires either of these to be accomplished by a citizen father: legitimation; a declaration of paternity under oath; court order of paternity. The imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship, but not of a maternal one is justified, to wit: 1. The government is interested to assure biological parent child relationship. In case of other, the relation is verifiable from birth itself. In case of father the incontestable fact is that he needs not to be present at birth. Neutral face rule will have to lie on this case because the mother is always present since the day of the conception; furthermore, her name appears on the birth certificate, while such is not the case for fathers. 2. The government is also interested to the full potential of development between parent and child; a relationship which is not just a matter of law, but a matter of substance. Mothers are accorded these opportunities starting the moment the child has been conceived. The same will lie with fathers who, in one point, may not be aware of the conception of child within the span of 9 mos, nor, will the mother be certain that the father (whether putative or not) is truly the father of the child. STANLEY V. ILLINOIS, 405 US 645 FACTS: The State of Illinois passed a law stating that children born of unwed parents, upon the death of the mother, will be declared dependents and be placed on guardianship even without proof of neglect or hearing on paternal fitness, although such hearing are required before the State assumes custody of the children. HELD: All Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody. Denying them such is tantamount to denying them due process and equal protection of the laws. The interest of the state in promulgating the same act is to protect the moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community and to strengthen the family ties whenever possible, removing them from parents only when their welfare and safety cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal. Although the state guarantees this interest, if in the case at bar, the same is not apparent, the state has to spite its own articulated goals. The state insists that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents, but all unmarried fathers are not in this category. Some are wholly suited to maintain custody to their children.

Prostitution can be perverted by both men and women and it should not be ascribed to the latter gender alone. (City of Manila v. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308)

MARRIAGE AND LEGITIMACY There is a substantial difference wither to the status or the succession rights of legitimate and illegitimate children

In terms of marriage, distinctions are sometimes made between marriages on the time when they contracted specially in regard to benefit accruing to the surviving spouse GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS, 434 SCRA 441

FACTS: Nicolas and Milagros got married. Almost two years passed and Nicolas was about to retire, he indicated Milagros to be his sole beneficiary under PD 1146. When Nicolas died and Milagros filed for a survivorship pension, GSIS denied her request because pursuant to Sec 18 of PD 1146, those who would contract marriage three years before a pensioner would qualify for his pension would be disqualified for the same. RTC granted Milagros claim citing the property as part of labor and therefore part of the conjugal property. CA affirmed. HELD: The proviso is unduly oppressive as it out rightly denies a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage within three year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of property without due process of law (opportunity to be heard). The requisites for the application of equal protection clause are: (1) the classification is based on a substantial distinction; (2) when the classification is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) when it applies to both present and future conditions, and; (4) it applies to people belonging to the same class. The proviso in question discriminates against dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualifies for the pension. The provision is vague because even if the dependent contracts marriage more than three years before the pensioners death, if the same has been contracted within the banned period, the same will be void a well. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose it seeks to avail. If the reason of the prohibition is to prevent deathbed marriages, the reckoning point should be the time when he died. The law must not presume that contracted marriages within three years before the retirement or death of a member are sham marriages. LABINE V. VINCENT, 401 US 532 FACTS: When Ezra died, Labine, the guardian of the illegitimate daughter of Ezra, contested the constitutionality of a certain Louisiana law which bars an illegitimate child from equally sharing with the legitimate children in the fathers estate on the ground that the law was an invidious discrimination and therefore violative of Due Process and Equal Protection Laws. HELD: Under the Louisiana law, children born out of wedlock and who were never acknowledged by their parents have no rights to take property by intestate succession from their fathers estate. Illegitimate children acknowledged by their fathers are natural children and can take by intestate succession to the exclusion of only the state. The parents may bequeath 1/3 or of their properties, provided that their father is not survived by legitimate children. Finally, children born out of wedlock may be legitimated or adopted to protect their rights to intestate succession or by operations of wills.

The law may be unconstitutional on the part of the illegitimates, but declaring it unconstitutional will also prejudice the legitimates. Ezra could have availed any of the remedies mentioned in order to further the succession rights of his illegitimate daughter. AGE One could be disqualified on a certain subject by reason of age Age is required for the exercise of suffrage, for the contract of marriage, for compulsory retirement and effective bar for further employment beyond a certain age. DUMLAO V. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 FACTS: Dumlao assailed the constitutionality of BP 52 Sec 4 which prohibits retired elective official from municipal to provincial or city, who has received payment of their retirement benefits and has been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to run for the same elective local office for which he has retired. Petitioner claimed that the law was designed to frustrate him any bid to make a political comeback that it was a form of class legislation and the same was calculated in furtherance of arbitrariness. HELD: For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective officials because there may be retirees below 65 or there may be good officials who are beyond 65. But such is not the case when an elective official who has retired from his local position. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work. METHOD OR MODE OF DYING The law frowns upon suicide, but not necessarily on the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment which may similarly lead death. VACCO V. QUILL, 521 US 793 FACTS: Petitioners are physicians who assail the constitutionality of a New York law which proscribes suicide. Although in their profession as doctors, they are allowed to prescribe lethal medications to terminally ill patients, they are deterred to do so because of the said prohibition. HELD: The distinction between assisting suicide; and withdrawing life sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and in our legal traditions; is both important and logical. The distinction comports with fundamental legal principles of causation and intent. When a patient refuses life sustaining medical treatment, he dies as a result of it; contrary to a patient who ingests lethal medication prescribed by the physician. A physician, who honors a

patients refusal to have life sustaining treatments, purposely intends only to respect the patients wishes. A doctor who assists a suicide must necessarily and indubitably intend that the patient be made dead. Similarly, the state legislatures have drawn a clear line between assisting suicide and withdrawing or permitting the refusal of unwanted life saving medical treatment by prohibiting the former and allowing the latter. The principle behind this holding is not predicated on the persons right to hasten death but on well established rights to integrity and freedom from unwanted touching. New Yorks reason for the distinctions are: prohibiting intentional killing and preser ving life; preventing suicide and maintaining the physicians role as healers; protecting the vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide towards euthanasia. ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE Sometimes, changes are made in passing rates such that there is a difference between and among examinations given on different occasions. TABLARIN V. GUTIERREZ, 152 SCRA 730 FACTS: Tablarin, et al were seeking admission to several medical schools, however, they were not able to take the NMAT successfully. They sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, the BME and CEM from proceeding with the said examination and they assailed the constitutionality of RA 2382 on the ground that it would violate the equal protection clause because of the yearly changes in the cut off scores for successful applicants. HELD: Different cut off scores may be dictated by differing conditions obtained during those years. To establish a permanent and immutable cut off score regardless of changes in circumstances annually may result in an unreasonable rigidity. The language of the questioned provision of law leaves the BME with measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change. NATIONALITY AND ALIENAGE ICHONG V. HERNANDEZ, 101 PHIL 1155 FACTS: RA 1180 was enacted to prohibit persons, associations, partnerships or corporations, the capital of which are not wholly Filipino owned, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade unless such aliens have actually been engaged in the said business on May 15, 1954. The aliens exempted from the prohibition will continue to engage in the retail business unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement.

HELD: 1. The mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national trader. The aliens aim or purpose is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturall y lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country or that spirit of regard and consideration

to Filipino customers. An alien never makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. The practices resorted by aliens in the control of distribution, their secret manipulation of stocks, commodities and prices, their utter disregard for the welfare of their customers are justifying reasons for classifying aliens and national retail traders. The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens are sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the efficacy of the law but it is the prerogative of the Congress to promulgate such as part of its law making power. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes as a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. OFFICE AND EMPLOYMENT There are substantial differences between employees of public and private sectors, i.e. the restrictions on the right to strike by government employees Elective and appointive officials may be treated differently with respect to the effect of the filing of their candidacies; while the latter may be deemed resigned, the former may still hold on to their positions (Farinas v. Executive Secretary, 417 CRA 503) NUNEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433 FACTS: Nunez was charged with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. He assailed the law establishing the Sandiganbayan as it would violate the equal protection of the laws. Pursuant to PF 1486, no intermediate review by the CA which is otherwise available to those who prosecuted before the ordinary courts. HELD: As a response to the urgency in suppressing dishonesty in public service, the Sandiganbayan was created pursuant to PD 1486. It follows that those, who would be tried pursuant to the enactment of the new constitution and that of the stated law, would follow a different procedure, whether private citizens or public officials. The court ruled that the guarantee of Bill of Rights which includes due process and equal protection must give way to specific provisions to meet current contingencies. The scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation. INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS V. QUISUMBING, 333 SCRA 13 FACTS: Respondent school was established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. It was empowered by PD 732 to hire teachers both from the national and international spheres. Its faculty members were classified either as local hires or foreign hires. The latter types of employees receive additional 25% remuneration ON TOP OF THEIR ALLOWANCES because of dislocation factors and limited tenures and to bolster the schools adaptive measures to maintain a competitive line up of faculty members on an international level by

enticing them to maintain their employment. Petitioner labor union assailed its constitutionality on the ground that it was violative of the equal protection clause. HELD : Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned by the Labor Code. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights shores up the maxim equal work for equal pay. Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skills effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. In discharging additional pay for its foreign hired teachers, the school failed to prove that such teachers function 25% more efficiently than local hires. The local hires perform the sae services as foreign hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. In view of the dislocation factors the SC rules that foreign hires are already accorded with housing, transpo, shipping costs, taxes and home travel allowances which are enough. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS Commission of the same offense does not necessarily have to be sanctioned with the same punishment without regard to any attendant circumstances and considerations. It would not be justifiable to impose a more severe penalty upon mere followers than that inflicted upon their leaders (Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) Adjustments have to be made for the penalty to fit the crime and its peculiar circumstances without prejudice to the equal protection clause, provided there is enough justification for different treatment SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA, 316 US 535 FACTS: Petitioner was convicted of stealing chickens, and two separate counts of robbery with firearms. Consequently, he was subjected to sterilization pursuant to Oklahomas Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act. A habitual criminal in Oklahoma is a person who has been convicted twice or oftener for crimes involving moral turpitude. Exception to the rule is the commission of certain offenses like embezzlement. Skinner assailed its constitutionality. *Embezzlement appropriation of the property of an employer by an agent *Larceny Unlawful taking and carrying away of personal property without right, with intent to deprive the rightful owner of the same *If A, an employer of B, entrusts $100 to the latter, and B misappropriates the same, B is guilty of Embezzlement. If B does it thrice, he will not be subjected to sterilization *If C steals $20 from D, he is guilty of Larceny. If he does it thrice, he will be subjected to sterilization HELD: The nature of Larceny and Embezzlement are the same. But only those guilty of larceny; and thrice have been convicted of such would be subjected to sterilization no matter how habitual his proclivities for embezzlement are. When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense, and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination if it had selected a particular group for the oppressive treatment.

PEOPLE V. CHING KUAN, 74 PHIL 23 FACTS: Ching Kuan was penalized to pay a fine of P150.00 after pleading guilty of constructing a 297 square meter building of strong materials in the district of Tondo without securing a permit from the city engineer. He appealed before the CFI and he was penalized a fine of P175.00. He went to the SC and challenged the constitutionality of Art 66 of the RPC which permits the courts to take into consideration the wealth and the means of the culprit in the imposition of the fines WHICH ACCORDING TO HIM IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE RICH AND FAVORABLE TO THE POOR. HELD: The codal provision in question aims precisely at equality before the law. Since the lightness or severity of the fine depends upon the culprits wealth or means, it is only just and proper that the latter be taken into account in fixing the amount. To impose the same amount of a fine to the same person who are differently circumstanced would mete out a penalty of unequal severity and therefore discriminatory. Equality before the law is not literal nor mathematical, but relative and practical. The perpetuation of rape against a 5 year old girl does not absolve or exempt any person from the imposition of death penalty by fact that he is poor, uneducated, jobless, and lacks catechetical instruction (People v. Mijano, 311 SCRA 81) PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS, 324 SCRA 689 FACTS: Cong. Jalosjos, convicted of statutory rape and two counts of acts of lasciviousness filed a motion before the SC to allow him to discharge the functions of his office as a congressman, including attendance to legislative sessions and committee meetings. His argument centered on the mandate of the sovereign will. ISSUE: Is being a congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused as a prisoner from the same class of persons validly confined under the law? HELD: The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excused to free a person validly in prison. The accused is only one of the 250 members of the House and 24 of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the absence of one or a few of its members. The importance of a function depends on the need of its exercise. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. The election to the position of a congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift hi from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public defense. The accused states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by

unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement. PEOPLE V. VERA, 65 PHIL 56 FACTS: Mariano Co Unjieng was convicted of a certain case in the CFI of Manila. On appeal, he filed motion for reconsideration, and motion for new trial but the same was denied. He elevated it to US SC via certiorari but it was denied. The Philippine SC came to said findings and the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment. Unjieng filed a petition for probation. It was denied twice by two CFI judges. The fiscal of Manila came to the court to make the judgment of Unjieng material. Furthermore, the assailed the constitutionality of the probation law on the ground that it was constitutive of undue delegation of powers and violative of the equal protection laws because its application in the entire country was not uniform. HELD: The counsel for the petitioner claimed that there some provinces appropriate funds for probation officers, some do not. Some apply the probation law and some do not. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from unwarranted delegation of legislative power. A law may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. Statues may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effects in operation. CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. BSP, 446 SCRA 299 FACTS: RA 7653 established BSP. Sec 15(c) Art II of the said law provides for exemption to the application of the salary standardization law, except those employees with a salary grade of 19 and below. The seven charters of the Government Financial Institutions subsequently exempted their employees to Salary Standardization Law, a well. Several years after its enactment, petitioners assailed the Constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the questioned law created classes of employees in BSP, the same being a case of class legislation; and it was not germane to the purpose of the law which is professionalism and excellence at all levels. HELD: 1. Under the present standards of equal protection, Sec 15 of Article II of RA 7653 is valid. It is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of Officers SG 20 and above was intended to address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It is not based on palpable and entirely arbitrary legislative sense. 2. The enactment, however of subsequent laws which exempt all other rank and file employees of GFIs renders the continued application of the challenged provision a violation of the equal protection clause. The Rank and File employees of seven GFIs were granted exemption from the application of Salary Standardization Law that was specifically denied to the rank and file employees of BSP. The charters creating seven GFIs significantly changed and altered the reasonability of continued operation of the proviso of Art. 7653. In fine, the policy

determination argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank and file and officer of BSP, but not the rank and file employees of BSP and GFIs who are similarly situated. If a law has the effect of becoming unconstitutional either directly or indirectly, the law must not be countenanced. 3. The BSP is the central monetary authority and the banker of the government and all its political subdivisions. It supervises banks, quasi banks, including GFIs. Before the SSL was enacted, PD 995 was at force. Its policy is to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties. In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no peculiar characteristics pertain to the GFIs and their rank and file employees and those of the BSP. Thus, the argument that GFIs employees were exempted because of the importance of their institutions mandate cannot stand. 4. (Discussions revolve on international implications of equal protection). The same not included because of the proclamation of the ponente himself not to rely with these international rulings. 5. The Court uses deferential test for the executives and officers of BSP and strict scrutiny test to those employees of GFIs and BSPs. *Dissenting Opinion Justice Carpio Morales Judicial restraint must be applied; the majority decision is akin to a law which the 13 Congress intends to enact. Furthermore, double standards must not be used in declaring the law unconstitutional *Dissenting Opinion Justice Panganiban since the executives are not suspect classes in the case at bar, deferential test must then be used and abandon the strict scrutiny test INVERSE EQUAL PROTECTION The law cannot provide for artificial or fictional parity by having those that are not really equal or similar become equal Requiring an equal amount of fee for employment permit without taking into account differences in the situation of those covered would be violative of the clause (Villegas v. Hiu Chong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270) Putting on equal footing secured and unsecured creditors i regard to their claims against an insolvent debtor is inverse (National Development Co v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 192 SCRA 257) PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION V. PRADO, 227 SCRA 703 FACTS: RA 7354 Sec 35 withdraws the franking privilege of the members of SC, CA, RTC, MTC, McTC, LRC, RODs along with certain government offices, without withdrawing the same to the President, VP, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, widows of former Presidents, NSO and the general public in filing complaints against public officers or employees.
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HELD: Similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favour to some and unjustly discriminate against others. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care was given to its repealing clause, resulting in unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary. There is no question that if there is any major branch of government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department as the respondents themselves point out. In the comments of the respondents, it states that the Judiciary uses P73M for frank mail. The respondents aver that due to the volume of mail from the Judicary that franking privilege must be withdrawn. This in itself is self defeating. Heeding to the arguments of the respondents is similar to saying that those who need the service badly must be deprived of the same, while those who need it must use it. If the problems of the respondent are loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it to all offices who take advantage of the same. EQUALIZING ILLEGALITY What is illegal is plainly against the law and the fact that others were able to get away with it is no justification to provide equal chances for others under the Equal Protection Clause. The guarantee must be understood to refer only to matters which are within the bounds of law. ALUNAN III V. MIRASOL, 276 SCRA 501 FACTS: RA 7160 provides that the first SK election after the bill took effect on Jan 1, 1992 would be 30 days after the next local election. The first local election was held on May 11, 1992. COMELEC issued a resolution stating that the SK election would be on September 30, 1992 under the direct control and supervision of DILG. Then DILG Secretary issued a resolution exempting the City of Manila from the said elections because the said city just had their first local elections on May 26, 1990. It averred that the Local Government Code intended to exempt from the first SK elections those elected under the Kabataang Barangay chapters which may have conducted their elections from 1988 to 1992. Respondents claimed violation of the equal protection of the laws because several barangays who held previous elections from 1988 to 1992 were also allowed to conduct their elections. HELD: What other barangays did was against the law. Therefore no discrimination took place. DELEGATED DISCRIMINATION In some instances, violation of the equal protection clause does not appear on the face of the law itself but on the manner in which it is implemented. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered with an evil eye or an unequal hand, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356) A violation of the guarantee of equal protection may be seen on the face of the law itself or perceived and felt in the manner in which what pretends to be a just and fair regulation is actually utilized as tool to camouflage a discriminatory act

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION A CASE OF COMPENATORY DISCRIMINATION In the United States, where racial discrimination had been prevalent in the past, affirmative actions were taken in order to compensate for the injuries brought by the past. Some of these actions include preference in employment and lay off, as well as admission to certain educational institutions. US Supreme Court affirmed one of these actions (Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 US 244) but invalidated the other (Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 US 306) In a world of great diversity, it is always a challenge to find the appropriate balance between acceptable classification and invidious discrimination. Classifications necessarily mean making distinctions, and grouping people or things always raises the issue as to whether Equal Protection has been applied to it. There should be no hesitation in using equal protection as a major cutting edge to eliminate irrational discrimination in the society. (Central Bank Emplyees Association v. BSP, supra)