Reconstructing the National State of Somalia: The Role of Traditional Institutions and Authorities

Dr. Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow)1

Without the role of traditional institutions and authorities reconstituting the Somali state would not have been possible during the initial state formation. However, such role is not sustainable in the modern democratic state where direct elections and party politics are indispensable.

Somalia is known as the classic symbol of the longest collapsed state in modern era. This dismal state of affairs is somewhat of a paradox given the fact that in previous decades Somalia represented what many thought to be one of the most unified states in Africa. It possesses a good measure of elements which have in the past been assumed to be the essential ingredients for the nation. 2 Somalias peoples share the same language, adhere to the Islamic faith, and despite its numerous clans, belong to one ethnic group. In the context of early modernization theory, these factors were thought to serve as vital ingredients in nation building in the developing world. In this respect, the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s was puzzling. However, in the absence of the state, various armed militia based on clan and their traditional elders filled the vacuum of making war and peace. Somali traditional institutions (TIs) are founded on Islamic faith and clan affiliation, the two basic pillars of Somaliness, and their traditional authorities (TAs) play complementary roles and responsibilities.3 Alas, at the onset of the nationalist struggle for the independence, TAs were regarded as perilous, emblematic of backwardness and antagonistic to modernization and the

Dr. Baadiyow holds PhD in Islamic studies from McGill University and is the Chairman of the Board of Trustee, Mogadishu University. Also, he was presidential candidate of Somalia in 2012. This paper was presented in the Nordic African Institute Conference held in Hargeysa, Somaliland on 17-18 June, 2013. 2 Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), v. 3 Abdurahman Abdullahi, Women, Islamists and the Military Regime in Somalia: The Reform of the Family Law and its Repercussions. A paper available from http://www.scribd.com/doc/15418893/Women-Islamists-and-Militry-Regime-in-Somalia; (accessed on June 5, 2013)

modern state.4 Hence, a number of legislative measures were enacted; malicious policies adopted and mass campaigns of public awareness were mobilized to curtail TAs.5 Nonetheless, TIs and related TAs resisted different modernization programs undertaken by both civilian (1960-1969) and military (1969-1991) regimes aimed to curb their role. In particular, during the authoritarian regime that adopted a socialist ideology and pursued vigorous anti-tradition programs, conflict between the state and society climbed to unprecedented levels.6 Thus, both elements of Somaliness, Islam and clan affiliation were radicalized, producing various Islamic movements and armed clan-based factions.7 In particular, clan-based armed opposition movements emerged in the 1980s, resisting the dictatorial regime until they finally collapsed the state in 1991. Since then, Somalia has reverted to quasi-statelessness and legitimate authority was restored to the TIs, and in particular, to the clan elders and their political leaders (known as warlords). Since then, clan elders representing traditional authority took the mantle in reconstructing local governance in their respected areas of influence. This was very much evident in the establishment of the first two administrations: Somaliland (1991) and Puntland (1998). On the other hand, Shari a law, which, besides customary law, constitutes the basic legal foundation of the Somali society, was introduced as the ultimate reference of the constitutions of these administrations.8 The same process of clan

Approach of Somali nationalists with respect to tradition is derived from modernization framework *based on+ the assumption that modernity and tradition are mutually exclusive polar opposites. See Abdul Rashid Moten, Modernity, tradition and modernity in tradition in Muslim societies. Intellectual Discourse, 19, 1-13, 2011, 3. 5 Three important laws were passed prior to 1969. The first was intended to reduce the authority of the tribal chiefs, the second to lessen tribal solidarity and the third resulted in banning political parties that utilized tribal names. The military regime enacted laws to liquidate dabar-goynta charged with eliminating clanism in Somalia; abolishing the Diya (blood money) system, renaming clan chiefs in the rural areas; and introducing compulsory auto insurance and local government responsibility for funeral expenses. Above all, massive propaganda against clanism was conducted in the name of the socialist transformation of Somali society. 6 The escalation of conflict between the military regime and Islamists in 1975, see Abdurahman M. A. Baadiyow.Women, Islamists and the Military Regime in Somalia: The New Family Law and its Implications. In Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics (Essays in Honour of I. M. Lewis), edited by M. V. Hoehne and V. Luling, 137 160. London: Hurst, 2010. 7 For example, the Majerten-dominated Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) (1978), the Isaq-led Somali National Movement (SNM) (1981), the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) (1986), and the Ogaden-dominated United Somali Patriotic (USP) (1989). On the other hand, various Islamic moments that included Islah (1978), Al-Itihad (1981), Aala-sheikh (1982) and others. 8 See Somaliland Constitution article (5:2): The laws of the nation shall be grounded on and shall not be contrary to I slamic Sharia. Available from http://www.so.undp.org/docs/Somaliland%20in%20English.pdf (accessed on June 5, 2013). Also, see Puntland Constitution article (6): Islam shall be the only religion of Puntland State of Somalia. No any other religion can be propagated in Puntland State, while the Islamic Religion and the traditions of the people of Puntland are the bases o f law. Available from http://www.so.undp.org/docs/Puntland%202001%20English.pdf ( accessed on June 5, 2013)

power sharing and adopting a Shari'a-based constitution was evident at the national level since the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000.9 In the reconstruction of the national state institutions and local administrations, historic conflict between the state, clan and Islam, previously considered antithetical, was irrevocably reconciled. This was a total paradigm shift from the nature of state based on the concepts of modernization to tradition sensitive state-building approach and reemergence of tradition. Ironically, traditional and modern elites were engaged in new rapprochement of mutual recognition, acceptance and cooperation which reconstructing collapsed state necessitates. In that context, comprehensive reconciliation between tradition and modernity was realized and the modality of state-building in Somalia was guided with a spirit of collaboration and inclusiveness. Modern elites were not eschewing anymore the role of TIs and were not denying the role of Islam in politics. Methodologically, this paper approaches this topic from the historical perspective and studies the role of TIs within the historical evolution of the national state of Somalia. It will not touch statebuilding experiences of Somaliland and Puntland. Also, it will not include the role of traditional Islamic scholars having consideration of the existence of some sort of division of roles among TAs even though at times they are cross-current.

Defining Key Concepts

Traditional Institutions and Authorities The Oxford English Dictionary defines the noun tradition as the transmission of customs or beliefs from generation to generation, or the fact of being passed on in this way. Moreover, the Oxford dictionary defines authority as the power or right to give orders, make decisions, and enforce obedience. Thus, TA as such refers to a power that is received and handed down over from generation to generation. According to sociological definition introduced by Max Weber tradition denotes the authority of the eternal yesterday, i.e. of the mores sanctified through the

See Somali National Charter adopted in the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000, article 2.2: Islam shall be the religion of the state and no other religion or ideas contrary to Islam may be propagated in its territory. See also article 4:4 the Islamic Sharia shall be the basic source for national legislation and any law contradicting Islamic Sharia shall be void and null.

unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform .10 Conversely, Hobsbawm and Ranger put forth what they have termed invented traditions, defined as [a]set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.11 Moreover, traditions are likely to be invented when and if *a+ rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which old traditions have been designed, producing new ones to which they are not applicable, or when such old traditions and their institutional carriers and promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and flexible, or are otherwise eliminated.12 Individuals who have the right to rule TIs are said to have TAs, which derives their legitimacy, according to Max Weber, merely from tradition in contrast to other two forms of legitimacies such as legal and charismatic authorities.13 Adewumi and Egwurube define traditional authority as follows: The group referred to as traditional leaders/rulers are individuals occupying communal political leadership positions sanctified by cultural mores and values, and enjoying the legitimacy of particular communities to direct their affairs.... Their basis of legitimacy is therefore tradition, which includes the whole range of inherited culture and way of life; a peoples history; moral and social values and the traditional institutions which survive to serve those values.14 The Space of TIs in the State Framework What space do TIs occupy within the model of modern state intuitions? To answer of this question requires exploring it within the civil society context. Civil society emerged in the political discourse in the mid 1980s even though its meaning remains controversial and confusing. Competing definitions of civil society have their roots in various currents of Western schools of thought. However, alternative definitions are emerging, which offers space to
10

Cited in Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds.,. H.H.Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78. 11 Hobsbawm, E & T Ranger, The invention of tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1. 12 Hobsbawm and Ranger (ibid.:45). 13 Williams, Diana, Max Weber: Traditional, Legal-Rational, and Charismatic Authority (A paper presented at University of Arkon, Arkun, Ohio, 2003). 14 Adewumi, JB & J Egwurube. Role of traditional rulers in historical perspective. In Aborisade, Oladimeji (Ed.), Local Government and the traditional rulers in Nigeria (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1985), 20

different cultures and localities. One of the conventional definitions was offered by White and is that civil society is an intermediate associational realm between state and family, populated by organizations enjoying some autonomy in relation to the state and formed voluntarily by members of society to protect their interests or values.15 However, this definition excludes important type of civil society prevalent in Africa. Thus, Chazan posits the existence of two levels of civil society. The first level is primary groups that include indigenous institutions ..such as kinship ties, traditional political institutions and authority structures,.16 The secondary level is social and economic organizations related to modern formal institutions. The primary group is termed in the current literature as community based organizations (CBOs). Therefore, adopting a broad definition of civil society, traditional institutions are part of civil society. State-Building or State Reconstruction? In studying reconstruction of state institutions, a number of terminologies are used by various fields such as state-building, nation-building and peace-building. State-building alludes creating the state ex nihilo and is referred to interventionist strategies to restore and rebuild the institutions of the state. On the other hand, "nation-building" refers to the creation of a cultural identity that relates to the citizens of the state. Moreover, peace-building terminology used widely in the security studies literature is often used as a synonym for statebuilding.17 However, its more precise definition is "actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict and at least a modicum of political process".18 However, these terminologies at times converge and in other times have distinct meanings in the different fields of studies. This paper has a preference for use of more precise terminology of state reconstruction rather than other vague terminologies with confusing connotations.

15 16

See White, G., 1994, Civil society, democratization and development, Institute of Development Studies, 6. Chazan et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Lynne Riener Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1992). 17 Zoe Scott. Literature Review on State-Building. A report prepared for the Governance and Social Development Resource Center, 2007, 6. Available from http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HD528.pdf ( accessed on June 5, 2013) 18 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "Concepts and Dilemmas for State Building in the Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, Journal on Development 2008, Volume 9, No. 3, 13.

State reconstruction entails restoring a collapsed state to functionality, which includes "actions undertaken by international or national actors to support the economic and, to some extent, social dimensions of post-conflict recovery".19 This term is more appropriate in the Somali context from the point of view that only national state institutions collapsed in 1991, and the other two components of the state namely, its population and the physical landmass remain unchanged. The three components of any given state must have are, first, the idea of the state (the political, economic, religious and social ideologies that lay the foundation for the state in the minds of its people). Secondly, the physical land mass of the nation-state, including territorial borders, natural resources, and the man-made wealth within these boundaries. Thirdly, there are the institutional entities of the nation-state: the executive, legislative, administrative and judicial branches of the state. In the Somali context, through it has been weakened, the idea of the state and physical land mass remains intact while institutional entity have been collapsed. On the other hand, attempts to reconstruct the national state were ongoing since 2000 and the skeleton of the state was realized since then. Indeed, state reconstruction is a long process that entails ending conflict, holding elections, deploying international security forces, returning refugees, constructing national institutions, and reconstructing the infrastructure and economy. What kind of state is to be reconstructed? The role of TIs depends on the nature of the state to be reconstructed in Somalia. The collapsed Somali state was founded on four basic ideas: centralization, secularism, curbing clanism and the Greater Somalia project. Centralization was the nature of the governance system and secularism constitutes its ideology while curbing clanism and seeking Greater Somalia in order to unify Somali people internally and externally. The assumption was based on the idea that curbing clanism fosters nationalism, which encourages unification of all Somali territories divided during colonialism. 20 However, these basic principles had fallen one after another subsequent to the breakdown of the state in 1991. Decentralized system of governance was adopted since 2000 and the official name of

19 20

Ibid Somali-inhibited territory was divided among four powers in the 19th century, namely, Britain, Italy, France and Ethiopia. British Somali Protectorate and Italian Somaliland were united forming Somali Republic in 1960.

the state has a prefix of federal. Moreover, secularism as the ideology of the state had also completely fallen, and constitutions compliant with Islamic principles were adopted in Somaliland, Puntland and at the national federal level.21 Furthermore, the idea of curbing clanism to foster nationalism had been totally dropped after accepting power-sharing on clan affiliation and adopting what is termed the 4.5 formula. Finally, Greater Somalia project was derailed since the formation of the independent Republic of Djibouti in 1976, the adoption of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia where Somali region became one of the federated states and integration of Northern Frontier District (NFD) in the Kenyan society and nation-building.22 Therefore, the kind of stable state to be reconstructed in Somalia has three possible scenarios. The first is moving society towards the state, which was the model tried during post-colonial statebuilding. This approach intended to transform traditional communal society into modern individualistic society based on citizenship. It had demonstrated total failure being the model of the collapsed Somali state. The second approach is moving the state towards society which means to build modern state institutions on the primordial clan affiliation and traditional structures. This indigenization approach is not effective enough in building modern state functioning in the context of globalized world. Finally, the last scenario is moving both the state and the society towards each other. This model most likely offers the best approach that requires innovative process of integrating tradition and modernity through comprehensive reconciliation between the state and society.23 The last approach is the successful model employed by Somaliland, which had yielded impressive accomplishment in creating a legitimate democratic state. Conversely, at the national level, the state reconstructed from a top-down process was not gaining popular legitimacy even though traditional authorities have been given a leading role. Nevertheless, any state project in Somalia is expected to carry the characteristics of democratic, Islamic and federal in which local communities and their TAs always play an important role. Indeed, they played that role during the initial period of state reconstituting as legitimizing authority of the state institutions. Moreover, they always play the role of diffusing and resolving conflicts at the local and national levels.
21 22

See Constitutions of Somaliland, Puntland and Federal Constitution adopted in 2012. Djibouti, Somali Region in Ethiopia and NFD in Kenya were considered parts of the Greater Somalia project. 23 Abdurahman Abdullahi and Ibrahim Farah, "Reconciling the state and society: Reordering Islamic Work and Clan System". Available from http://www.scribd.com/doc/15327358/Reconciling-the-State-and-Society-in-Somalia (accessed on June 4, 2013)

Background: Somali Traditional Institutions

Somali People are scattered in four states in the Horn of Africa as a result of the colonial legacy: namely, the Somali state, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. They are sub-divided into four or five major clan families, and many other smaller clans such as Jareer, Reer-Xamar, Boon, Tumaal, Yahar, and others.24 Somali TAs carry different titles in the different regions. For instance, in Somaliland, Suldaan, Aaqil and Garaad are the most popular tiles while in Puntland, Boqor, Garaad, beeldajiye and Issim are the titles of TAs. On the other hand, in South-Central Somalia, Duub, Ugaas, Nabadoon and Malaaq are the most famous titles. Moreover, the role of TAs varies to certain degree from pastoral population, agro-pastoral dwellers and urban inhabitants. The effective basic social unit in the Somali clan system to which every Somali belongs is called the Diya-paying sub-clan.25 This social unit functions in rural areas and cities and is founded on either blood relations or alliances based on territorial attachments. Members of this unit act collectively through their clan elder in collaboration with the Islamic scholars of the clan. This units sustainability and resilience against pervasive Western modernity derive from its usefulness to its members and the services it offers. Diya-paying provides two important functions. First, it satisfies the basic human need for affection and the sense of belonging and identity to such a level that it is extremely difficult to live in Somalia without this belonging. In fact, individuals who do not belong to strong clans are despised and looked down upon.26 Second, it generates solidarity among its members in providing social welfare and common security in the absence of state institutions capable of providing these services. Inter-clan relations are regulated by the customary law called Xeer, which resembles Sharia law in most of its clauses. Clan attachments generate three major
24 25

These four clan families are Darood, Dir, Hawiye, and Digil and Mirifle. Other classification includes Isaaq and Dir separately. This unit is called Diya-paying since its members collectively participate in paying and receiving blood compensation for killed individuals. The full blood compensation is equal to 100 camels for men and 50 camels for women, payable also in monetary values. Nonetheless, often, neighbouring clans may agree on lesser values, such as 50 camels for men and 25 for women. The concept is derived from Islamic jurisprudence. 26 The cast groups in Somalia, called Nasab Dhiman, are nothing more than weaker or smaller clans and individuals cast out historically by other stronger pastoral clans for variety of their technical professions. These clans include Tumaalo, Yahar, Boon, Yibir, etc. See Asha A. Samad, Brief Review of Somali caste systems: Statement of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, August, 2002. Available from http://www.madhibaan.org/faq/somalia-brief-2002.pdf (accessed on June 5, 2013)

sentiments in the individuals that have some bearing on their behavior. First, the fame and the glory of an individual is derived from the fame and the glory of his ancestor.27 Accordingly, clan members glorify their forefathers, make annual sacrifices to them, build their tombs, and sometimes raise them to the level of saints. This culture is rooted in the indigenous Cushitic religion, a monotheistic system of belief in which God was called Waaq.28 Glorification of the forefathers was used as an effective means of propagating Islam by sheikhs of the Sufi orders who annually brought together pastoral populations at the location of their ancestral tombs. Every year at these locations, Islamic programs are organized, conflicts are settled, and religious functions are provided. Second is the inviolability of family duties and ties, which generates what Ibn-Khaldn called Asabiyah (esprit de corps), a social bond that can be used to measure the strength and capabilities of social groupings.29 This localized loyalty sometimes creates chauvinism and bigotry among clans and ignites inter-tribal wars. Third is the role of blood revenge as part of deterrent security measures and the maintenance of the collective honor and dignity of the clan members. This conduct weakens individual responsibility for crimes committed and results in sheltering members from penalty, which, in turn, serves to present the entire community as responsible and, therefore, makes it susceptible to revenge killing. Tribal sentiment is dynamic and ambivalent in its scope and level. It rises up to a greater clan confederacy and descends down sometimes to a small family level, depending on the context and conditions.30 In the pre-colonial era, clans were the only existing socio-political unit and often functioned in small geographical areas because of the camel-based transportation system and lack of modern communication technologies. However, on occasions, larger units emerged with a rudimentary system of governance, which were much more encompassing than the current politicized major clan-families such as Darood, Digil and Mirifle, Dir and, Hawiye. The Somali clan system could be classified into pastoral, agro-pastoral and urban dweller groups. The social system of the pastoral clans is depicted as a classical segmented system
27 28

Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1910), 22. Christopher Ehret, The Eastern Horn of Africa, 1000 BC to 1400 AD: The Historical Roots, in The Invention of Somalia, ed. Jumale, Ahmed (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1995), 249. 29 Fuad Baali, Society, State, And Urbanism: Ibn Khalduns Sociological Thought (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), 43. 30 David Laitin and Said Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 30.

where cultural unity exists, but politically diffused and broken down into a number of smaller political units whose basis of membership is kinship.31 The nature of this system involves a high propensity among its members to compete with one another for political domination, fissiparousness at times of crisis, and a weak territorial attachment.32 In agro-pastoral areas, the political structure emphasizes common socialization process, which requires official integration in the clan system. Clans in the agro-pastoral system cultivate mixed farming and therefore develop a stronger sense of territorial attachment.33 The main distinction between the pastoral and agro-pastoral clans is due to their different ecological settings, which have produced distinct economic cultures and linguistic dialects.34 The urban dwellers, Banaderi and Barvani people, have developed an identity linked to the Somali culture, on the one hand, and to the Arab and Persian merchants, on the other. This culture had also absorbed many urbanized nomadic populations through intermarriages and socialization.35 The major activities of the urbanized people were commerce, fishing, and small industries.

Traditional Authority: from Marginalization to Empowerment

This section will explore historical evolution of the relations between TAs and the national state over more than half a century between 1960 and 2012. It looks at dynamics and interactions of modernity and tradition in three historical periods. The first period is between 1960 and 1991 when the post-colonial national state was intact and the idea of Western modernization was dominant. The second period is the first ten years after the collapse of the state in 1991 in the circumstance of statelessness and civil war until 2000, when the first national state was reinstituted in the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti. Finally, the third period is

31

This classical segmented system is not peculiar to Somalia, but is found in other African countries. For instance, the Kuru in Liberia, the Nuir in Sudan, just to name a few. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard pioneered the study of the acephalous societies in Africa. See Christian P. Pathlom, The Theory and Practices of African Politics (New Jersey, Printice Hall Inc., 1976), 14. 32 The difficulty of uniting various segments in the face of an outside threat is well illustrated in works such as Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart (London: Heinemann, 1958) and Elechi Amadi, The Great Bonds (London: Heinemann, 1969). 33 I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (London: Longmans, 1980), 13. 34 Mainly pastoral Somalis speak the Maxaay dialect, while many agro-pastoral clans speak the may dialect of the Somali language. See Lee Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900 (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1982), 23. 35 For details of the history of the Urban Dwellers of Banaderi, refer to Scott Reese S., Patricians of the Banadir: Islamic Learning, Commerce and Somali Urban Identity in the Nineteenth Century, (PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1996).

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between 2000 and to 2012 after the establishment of the national state in Djibouti in 2000 and subsequent formation of various regimes.

Marginalization of the Traditional Authorities (1960-1991) Clan divisions are neither evil nor good, but rather are a neutral and natural social setting, prevalent in many societies and particularly among Muslims, where family values are very strong. This neutral entity could be utilized either positively or destructively. Utilization of the clan system was proposed by I. M Lewis who wrote that, "If further progress is to be achieved in state formation, Somali politicians will surely have to come out of denial and start seriously exploring how clan and lineage ties can be utilized positively. Perhaps they could learn from their nomadic kinsmen who unashamedly celebrate these traditional institutions. Here a less Eurocentric and less evolutionary view of lineage institutions by Western commentators, social scientists, and bureaucrats might help to create a more productive environment for rethinking clanship (i.e. agnation) positively".36 Moreover, Abdul Rashid Moten states that tradition and modernity need not be polar opposites. A society will contain both traditional and modern elements, and individuals may operate with remarkable effectiveness in two discrete worlds of experience through a process of compartmentalization.37

Historically, the visible polarization of the Somali society took place after the independence with the emergence of secular and Islamist elites created by implemented different educational curriculum. With the development of the nation-building process, bifurcation of the elites (traditional and modern) occurred gradually, as illustrated in the figure (3). The existence of four basic types of elite formation in Somalia was observed. The traditional elites consisting of clan elders and traditional Islamic scholars constitute traditional authorities and constitute the foundation of Somali traditional institution. On the other hand, modern elites consisting of secular elites and Islamist elites constitute the two super-structural elites, created mainly through modern education. As the diagram indicates, historical power praxis and the dynamics
36

I. M. Lewis, Visible and Invisible Differences: the Somali Paradox (Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 74, November 2004), 508. 37 Abdul Rashid Moten, "Modernity, tradition and modernity in tradition in Muslim societies" (Intellectual Discourse, 19, 1-13, 2011), 3.

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of Islam (traditional and modern), clan (represented by elders) and the state (represented by secular elites) is the most challenging equation in Somalia in terms of integrating these elements into the state reconstruction framework.

Islamist elites

Secular elites

Traditional Islamic scholars

Traditional clan elders

Figure 1. The diagram of TAs versus modern elites in Somalia

In fact, relations between the traditional elites, clan elders and traditional Islamic scholars, are generally cordial and collaborative in order to maintain community cohesion. On the other hand, secular elites and the Islamic elites are antagonistic because of their different vision on the nature of the state. Secular elites, the inheritors of the post-colonial state, eagerly pursue preserving the secularity of the state whereas Islamists advocate zealously for its Islamization.38 As the rule in all dictatorial regimes, Islamists were oppressed and denied basic freedom of expression. However, traditional institutions remain the insurmountable power base indispensible for both competing elites and contest to gain their trust and support. Ironically, TAs were portrayed by Somali nationalists during the struggle for independence as an incurable cancer and a pervasive and inescapable threat to the national cohesion. This notion presupposed and emphasized the incompatibility of and conflict between the tradition and modernity. The political culture created during the formative period of the Somali state still contaminates political performance. Gradually, they became an inescapable nest praying every Somali politician because of clan-focused political culture it inculcated through years. In
38

Detailed description of the elite development and their relations refer to Abdurahman Abdullahi, Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam: The crisis of the political loyalties in Somalia (MA thesis, Islamic Institute, McGill University, 1992), 92-101.

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academia, scholars such as I. M. Lewis and Said Samatar blamed primordialism for most Somali ailments. This viewpoint is lucidly expressed by Prof. Said Samatar, who wrote, Somali polity is shaped by a single, central principle that overrides all others, namely the phenomenon that social anthropologists call the segmentary lineage system.39 The implication of such perception was very severe: it led to the development of the failed policy of Dabar-goynta Qabyaaladda (eliminating tribalism) initiated by the founding father of the nation in the manifesto of the Somali Youth League (SYL).40 However, implementing the policy of eliminating tribalism was adopted strongly by the military regime (1969-1991). The military regime tried to stamp out clan identity in favor of the ideology of nationalism. Paradoxically, the regime was implanting and practicing clanism at the highest echelon of the state institutions by creating an inner circle crony accordingly while officially advocating its elimination. This double standard policy ushered in the polarization of the society into clan-lines and radicalization of many clans who opted for armed resistance against the state, which resulted in its collapse in 1991.

Re-emergence of Traditional Authorities (1991-2000) After the collapse of the state and outbreak of the civil war, tradition was re-invented and new roles have emerged in the power configuration of the clan structure. It was observed by the author of this paper that many TIs had integrated with the political elites. For instance, power configuration of some clans during the civil war is structured as follows: 1. The political leader of the clan is often called warlord" if he commands armed militia, advocates for clan political interest and participates in political conferences. 2. The social leader is the traditional elder who manages clan affairs socially and cooperates with the political leader in mobilizing members of the clan for war.

39

Said S. Samatar, Unhappy Masses and the Challenges of Political Islam in the Horn of Africa. Available from www.wardheernews.com/March_05/05 (accessed on June 8, 2013).
40

See Somali Youth League Constitution. Available from http://somaliyouthleague.wordpress.com/2011/07/14/constitution/ ( accessed on June 10, 2013)

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3. The spiritual leader is a traditional Islamic scholar who performs certain functions in the community and plays a partnership role during the war. 4. Economic leaders of the clan constitute business individuals who finance the war and political agenda of the political leader. 5. Military leaders rule the militia of the clan who are responsible for waging wars and defending socalled clan interest. During the civil war, the highest authority is vested in the political leader while in peace time; the clan elder has such authority.

Social Leader

Militry Leader

Political leader

Economic leader

Spiritual Leader

Figure2: The power configuration of the clans during the civil war

This discourse may have taken the upper hand during the civil war, when the clan system became the only model for power sharing among Somali clans in Somaliland, Puntland, and national reconciliation conferences since 2000. The clan power-sharing formula was based on the famous 4.5 system, recognized and affirmed in the Transitional National Charter (TNC) in 2000, was a temporary victory of the traditionalist approach over transformationist discourse. Nevertheless, continuous change is occurring in the Somali political thought, and other identities such as Islamism and nationalism are re-emerging rapidly. The future may usher in a hybrid system that would amalgamate the three components of the Somali equation and avoid criminalizing or marginalizing one of its three identity elements: Islam, clan, and nationalism.

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Contested Role of Traditional Authorities (2000-2012) The role of TAs was vacillating between complete empowerment (2000-2004), a marginal complementary role (2004-2009), total marginalization (2009-2012) and complete empowerment (2012). Historical Somali state was divided by the International community after the civil war into three major regions: Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia. In the south-central Somali regions, a geography which begins from south of Galkayo city up until the Kenyan border, Somalia remained in turmoil as fiefdoms in the hands of continuously fighting warlords answerable to no central authority until 2000. On the other hand, Somaliland and Puntland succeeded overcoming the challenges of the armed factions such as Somali National Movement (SNM) and Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), respectively, and established peaceful and thriving but fragile administrations on clan-based power-sharing models. It can be argued that early recognition of the elites of these two regions to the roles of clan elders and Islamic scholars in the rebuilding institutions have contributed to the successful reconstruction of the state institutions while at the same time prevented the empowerment of extremist tendencies.41 On the other hand, after more than twelve failed conferences, a new approach for reconciliation was set into motion in the Djiboutisponsored peace initiative in 1999. This conference had adopted officially a clan power-sharing formula based on the famous 4.5 system.42 This means that the clan factor was recognized and affirmed in the Transitional National Charter (TNC). The change of the elites views on state -society relations has not only practical relevance in the absence of modern political institutions, but also affirmed the victory of the traditionalist approach over sophomoric modernists mythology. The 2000 Somali Peace Conference in Djibouti was sponsored by the Djibouti government. It came after ten years of catastrophic civil war that began in 1991 and espoused an innovative

41

Islamists participated in the formation of Somaliland and their influence is evident in the adopted flag and constitution. With respect to Puntland, they disbanded the SSDF armed faction and weakened Al-Itixaad Islamic organization the bloody war of 1992. 42 4.5 formula of power sharing adopting during Djibouti Reconciliation Conference in 2000 were strongly criticized by many scholars like Omar Enow, Mohamed Enow, Abdi Samatar and Ahmed Samatar. However, these scholars failed to come up with an acceptable practical approach of power sharing in the absence of political institutions. Also, it is important to note that 4.5 formula offered women and minority clans more seats in the parliament while so called dominant clans received fewer seats comparatively. In the final analysis, 4.5 was a temporary measure of democratization of traditional society and never intended to be used as permanent th approach for future political model. See Mohamed A. Enow. Inclusive but unequal: the enigma of the 14 SNRC and the Four point five (4.5) factor in Abdullahi A. Osman and Issaka K. Souare (edited), Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives on Reconstituting a Failed State (London: Adonis and Abby publishers Ltd, 2007).

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approach to Somali reconciliation. This turned out to be a remarkable milestone for political realism as the conference departed from the warlord-driven process, the concept of a building block, and the radical nationalist perspective. Consequently, hitherto underestimated factors of political division and taboo issues such as clans, minorities, religion, and the status of women were accounted for, recognized, and addressed within the power sharing arrangements. Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh, in his capacity as the chairperson of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), maintained in his speech at UN headquarters on 22 September 1999 that any Somali reconciliation conference would be driven by Somali civil society. The subsequent Somali Peace Conference was held in Djibouti in two phases. Phase one was inaugurated in March 2000 with the intention of mobilizing ideas and garnering support for the conference from variety of Somali groups. The second phase was launched on 2 May 2000 and more than 2,500 Somalis participated.43 The most difficult part was resolving criteria of participation in the conference. However, after long discussions and consultations exploring all the options available, the option of clan-based representation ultimately prevailed.44 It was accepted that Somalia has four major clan families, namely the Darood, the Hawiye, the Dir and Digil, and the Mirifle. Moreover, there is also accepted the existence of numerous smaller clans outside of these four major ones. What was accepted and agreed upon were a power sharing criterion of 4.5 quotas that comprise four equal quotas for the major clans and one-half of a quota for the alliance of all other small clans. Women lobbied to be considered as having separate clan status because the clans did not include them among their official delegates, and they gained that privilege with the strong support of the Djibouti President Guelleh. For instance, women were well represented in the Charter Drafting Committee and the Steering Committee of the conference. The quota system adopted by the conference and recorded in the National Charter adopted in the conference allocated 44 seats to each of the four major clans, 24 seats to the minority clan alliance, and 25 seats to women.
43

Official delegates numbered 810, consisting of four clan delegations of 180, each including 20 women, and 90 minority clan alliance representatives, including ten women. Among the 810 delegates, women gained 90 delegate places, or about 9 per cent of the delegates. In addition, more than 1,500 observers were allowed to attend the conference. 44 The alternative option which did not receive enough support was proposed by Abdulqadir Adan Abdulle, the son of the former Somali President Adan Abdulle Osman who presented a paper in the first intellectual conference in preparation to the Reconciliation Conference in 2000. His concept was based on sharing parliamentary seat according to the regions and their historical seats in 1960, adjusted as agreed.

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In addition, 20 seats were designated for selected individuals as an adjustment and reconciliation gesture.

The TAs in this conference played a role of reconciliation between conflictual clans, discussed and agreed on the power sharing formula between major clan families and descended into the local level until they assigned every Member of Parliament to a specific sub-clan. The organizing authorities of the conference were led by the Somalis while Djiboutis role was facilitation in resolving difficult conflicts. The following structures were established to administer the conference. At the national Level was: (1) the National Steering Committee which was responsible to chair conference proceedings consisting of six individuals from the four major clans, representative of the alliance of smaller clans and representative of the women, (2) the National Technical Committee contesting of 14 intellectuals responsible to oversee and facilitate various conference activities such as charter making, taking notes on the conference and so on, and (3) the National Charter Committee consisting of 30 educated individuals equally shared by all clans in addition to the equal quota assigned to women each having five members. Finally, there was the National Commission of Arbitration and Conflict Resolution consisting of 40 TAs from all clans who were responsible to verify and arbitrate deputed power sharing between various clans, sub-clans and sub-sub-clans. The role of this national arbitration commission cannot be effective without lower level of conflict and arbitration mechanism among various clans. These lower strata of conflict resolution descend from the top-down process of clan family elders, sub-clan family elders and sub-sub clan elders. It could be concluded that without the role of TIs and TAs, reconstituting the Somali state would not have been possible. The failure of more than 12 warlord-dominated since 1991 testifies the essential role of traditional authorities in reconstituting the state.

In the reconstruction of the Somali National State and Puntland Regional State, TAs was not incorporated in the state institutions and was kept out to play the role of civil society intervening in the affairs of the state whenever conflict arises and their services are needed. On the other hand, Somaliland incorporated TAs into the framework of the state institutions as the

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upper house of the state and was given ultimate authority on certain important issues. At the national state reconstruction, the role of the TAs was diminished again after Djibouti Reconciliation Conference in 2000. For instance, in the Somali Conference in Kenya in 2004, warlords were empowered over TAs and an exclusive warlord-dominated conference was concluded with the formation of the Transitional Federal Institutions. The roles of the TAs were nominal and complementary to the dominant role given to the warlords. Moreover, with US financial and political support, some warlords formed an anti-terror alliance against Mogadishubased Islamists, notably the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and its allegedly Mogadishu-based backers in February 2006. However, this undertaking did provoke an unprecedented surge of Islamic rage in Mogadishu under the UIC leadership and the US-backed warlord program was aborted. Thus, the political environment of Somalia had changed dramatically with the outright victory of UIC over the warlords and their uncontested power in Mogadishu and the surrounding regions.

Nevertheless, the jubilation of UIC lasted short time as the impasse of the peaceful dialogue and escalation into a total war involving the Ethiopian military, with tacit US support. The conflict between Transitional Federal Institutions supported by Ethiopia and armed insurgence opposing them continued until new peace and Reconciliation Conference was held in Djibouti in 2009.

The second Somali Conference in Djibouti in 2009 between the federal government and Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) was in general the replica of Somali Conference in Kenya in 2004 in terms of empowering armed groups. Nonetheless, there were two differences: doubling the number of seats of the parliament from 275 to 550 and complete empowerment of the armed groups to select additional members of the parliament without giving any role to TAs. This conference totally ignored TAs and their legitimacy on the clans even though the process of clan-based division of power continued. However, the role of TAs re-emerged in the national conference held in Mogadishu in 2012. They participated in the constitution making process and also were given the ultimate role of selecting members of the

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parliament, regaining their previous role in the Djibouti-held Somali conference of 2000 and taken away since the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Kenya in 2004.

However, limitations of TAs had been growing in the process of selecting members of the parliament. Many TAs created political conflict between their communities by favoring some member over others without the consent of the majority of the clan members. Also, allegations of corruption and favoritism were rampant in particular in the last conference of 2012 which had tarnished cohesion of many communities and tainted the respectable image of TAs.

Conclusion
TIs and TAs are located in the space of civil society and play a vital role in the social and political spheres. It took more than 50 years after the independence of Somalia in 1960 to recognize that without comprehensive integration of modernity and traditions, a stable state will not materialize in Somalia. The following diagram indicates historical evolution of the roles of the TIs and TAs in three periods of Somali history.
Marginalization of Traditional Authorities
TAs were portrayed by Somali nationalists during the struggle for the independence as an incurable cancer for the national cohesion. This notion presupposed and emphasized the incompatibility and conflictuality of the tradition and modernity and led to the policy of Dabargoynta Qabyaaladda (eliminating tribalism).

1960-1991

Re-emergence of Traditional Authorities (1991-2000)

1991-2000

After the collapse of the state and breakout of the civil war, TIs became the only legitimate authorities to make peace and mobilize for war. Tradition was re-invented and many TAs had integrated with the political elites ( warlords).

Contested Role of Traditional Authorities (2000-2012)

2000-2012

In the civil-socity led conferences in 2000 and 2012, TAs were compeletely empowered to select members of the parliamnet. In the armed groups' led conefrences in 2004 and 2009, TAs were marginalized and their role was curtailed.

Figure 3: Historical Evolution of the Role of TAs

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In the first period between 1960 and 1991, TAs were marginalized, however, reemerged vehemently after the collapse of the state in 1991 being the only legitimate authorities in Somalia. Besides their traditional role of resolving conflicts and managing the affairs of their respected clans, they have engaged in reconstructing local and national institutions. In fact, wherever, their authority was accepted by the political elites and the clout of the armed factions was abolished, functioning administrations were established. This was the model of reconstituting state institutions in Somaliland and Puntland, which succeeded restoring peace and community cohesion earlier, in 1991 and 1998, respectively. On the contrary, the SouthCentral regions where armed functions remained intact and TAs are diminished, lawlessness and hostilities lingered. The difference between the South-Central regions, Somaliland and Puntland in terms of institution building and peacefulness was therefore contingent on the different roles of TAs in these localities. Even though the legitimizing role of the TAs was indispensable during the initial state formation, such a role is not sustainable in the modern democratic state. Hence, both Somaliland and Puntland have progressed toward direct elections and party politics where "one person-one vote" is exercised. The continuation of selection process of the members of the parliament by the TAs negates the concept of the modern state based on citizenship instead of traditional representation of the members of kinship groups. Moreover, it was noted that the power conferred on TAs corrupts the creation of viable and responsible parliament and at the same time tarnishes the image of the traditional institutions.45 Thus, the role of TAs should be confined in the TIs and the state should keep balance between their politicizations and marginalization. However, Somali state reconstruction should be based on a new model that accommodates its social norms, its Islamic value and promotion of citizenship, human rights and democracy.

45

"The more intensively TAs get involved in politics beyond their control, the higher is the probability that they have to make unpopular decisions and therefore loose the support of the community they claim to represent." See Markus V. Hohne, "Traditional Authorities in Northern Somalia: Transformation of positions and Powers" (Working Paper No.82, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers, 2006), 22.

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