Biological Weapons: The White House published in 2009 a National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats with an underlying

theme that biological weapons eventually will be used in a terrorist attack. To prevent deadly viruses from being turned into mass-casualty weapons, officials say, one of the most difficult challenges is obtaining timely and accurate insight on potential attacks. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency has a team of researchers working these problems. But they worry that the pace of research is too slow to keep up with would-be terrorists.

Nukes: Large stockpiles of nuclear weapons are tempting targets for nation-states or groups set on attacking the United States and its allies, officials assert. Black-market trade in sensitive nuclear materials is a particular concern for U.S. security agencies. The prospect that al-Qaida or another terrorist organization might acquire a nuclear device represents an immediate and extreme threat to global security, says an administration report. No high-tech sensors exist to help break up black markets, detect and intercept nuclear materials in transit and there are no financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade. A much-hyped Department of Homeland Security effort to detect radioactive materials at U.S. ports has been plagued by technical hiccups. Analysts believe that although a full-up nuclear weapon would be nearly impossible for an al-Qaida like group to build, a more likely scenario would be a low-yield dirty bomb that could be made with just a few grams of radioactive material. North Koreas nuclear weapons program is hidden deep in its mountains, as are Irans alleged efforts. The two communities have placed a great deal of emphasis on tackling this problem during the last decade, he wrote. Most of it has been carried out with little attention. Despite the low profile, the military has been taking the problem seriously. Atacuri cu bombe nucleare. Cyber-Attacks: The drumbeats of cyberwarfare have been sounding for years. Network intrusions are widely viewed as one of the most serious potential national security, public safety and economic challenges. Technology, in this case, becomes a double-edge sword. The very technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower individual criminal hackers, organized criminal groups, terrorist networks and other advanced nations to disrupt the critical infrastructure that is vital to our economy, commerce, public safety, and military, the White House says. The cybersecurity marketplace is flooded with products that promise quick fixes but it is becoming clear that the increasing persistence and sophistication of attacks will require solutions beyond the traditional. Climate Change: The national security ramifications of climate change are severe, according to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. While the topic of climate change has been hugely politicized, Panetta casts the issue as a serious security crisis. In the 21st century, we recognize that climate change can impact national security ranging from rising sea levels, to severe droughts, to the melting of the polar caps, to more frequent and devastating natural disasters that raise demand for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, Panetta said. The administration projects that the change wrought by a warming planet will lead to new conflicts over refugees and resources and catastrophic natural disasters, all of which would require increased U.S. military support and resources. The scientific community, in this area, cannot agree on what it will take to reverse this trend. There is agreement, though, that there is no silver bullet. Transnational Crime: U.S. defense and law-enforcement agencies see transnational criminal networks as national security challenges. These groups cause instability and subvert government institutions through corruption, the administration says. Transnational criminal organizations have accumulated unprecedented wealth and power through the drug trade, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and other illicit activities. They extend their reach by forming alliances with terrorist organizations, government officials, and some state security services. Even the United States sophisticated surveillance technology is not nearly enough to counter this threat, officials say. IRREGULAR WARFARE CHALLENGES

IW focuses on the control or influence of populations, not on the control of an adversarys forces or territory (right diagra m, Figure 1). Ultimately, IW is a political struggle with violent and non-violent components. The struggle is for control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population. The foundation for IW is the centrality of the relevant populations to the nature of the conflict. The parties to the conflict, whether states or armed groups, seek to undermine their adversaries legitimacy and credibility and to isolate their adversaries from the relevant populations and their extern al supporters, physically as well as psychologically. At the same time, they also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population. Irregular warfare challenges include threats from non-state actors like terrorist groups (such as al Qaida and Hezbollah), drugtrafficking organizations (such as Mexican cartels), and violent global activists (such as anarchist groups). There will also be threats from states that generate irregular warfare challenges purposefully (such as Iran) and from those who do so inadvertently because of weak governance (such as instability in Mexico). These threats are increasingly networked, adaptable, and empowered by cyberspace to find new ways to recruit, collect intelligence, train, distribute propaganda, finance, and operate. To illustrate future threats, it is useful to highlight al Qaida and its affiliates, who some skeptics dismiss as being significantly weakened. The future threat from al Qaida and its affiliates will likely depend on several factors: the survival of a leadership structure; weak governments in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia; and some support from local cells. Based on current trends, it appears likely that al Qaida will retain key leaders (though not necessarily in Pakistan), some governments will remain weak, and al Qaida will enjoy local support in some countries. Its objectives will likely remain fairly consistent: overthrowing multiple regimes to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate (the near enemy, or al-Adou al-Qareeb), and fighting the United States and its allies who support them (the far enemy, or al-Adou alBaeed). Irregular warfare presupune controlarea i influenarea populaiei de pe un teritoriu int. Acesta este o lupt de ordin politic cu componente violente i nonviolente. Lupta are ca scop controlarea sau influenarea , precum i ctigarea suportului populaiei. Prile conflictului, state sau grupuri armate, urmresc s minimalizeze c redibilitatea adversarului n faa populaiei i s l izoleze de suporterii si externi, att fizic, ct i psihologic. Provocrile din cadrul Irregular Warfare include ameninri venite din partea unor grupuri teroriste, organizaii traficante de droguri, activiti violeni precum grupurile anarhiste. De asemenea, ameninrile pot proveni i din partea unor actori statali precum Iran sau Mexic. Ameninrile devin adaptabile i flexivbile, fiind alimentate de cyberspaiu cu ajutorul cruia se gsesc noi recrui, se adun informaii, se promoveaz, se finaneaz i se opereaz. Pentru a ilustra ameninrile acestui tip de rzboi, este necesar s se sublinieze atacurile organizaiei teroriste al Qaida a crui aciuni au depins de factori precum supravieuirea unei structuri de leadeship, guvernarea slab n Africa de Nord, Orientul Mijlociu i Asia de Sud i ctigarea sprijinului unor celule locale. II. STRATEGIES Counterinsurgency There are two main counterinsurgency strategies for irregular warfare. A.Population-centric: The first is the population-centric strategy outlined in Field Manual 3-24 and other sources. 19 FM 3-24 drew many of its best practices from such cases as the British in Malaya and the French in Algeria. As the U.S. experienced in Vietnam and Afghanistan, an outside power cannot force a local government to be legitimate. In addition, deploying large numbers of outside forces as some advocates of this strategy insist has not always been successful. Indirect: In some cases a better approach may be an indirect strategy that focuses on advising, equipping, and supporting local regular and irregular forces and actors. This type of assistance which includes foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare has historically been performed by U.S. Special Operations Forces and intelligence agencies. U.S.

efforts to assist the Philippines in 1950s and again since 2001, Thailand in the 1960s, and Colombia against its insurgents in the 1990s and 2000s were relatively successful in weakening or defeating insurgent groups B. Insurgency . At other times, the United States may be involved in supporting insurgent groups and will likely have to choose between one of two strategies. 1.Maoist insurgent strategy: First is the traditional Maoist-style strategy of guerrilla warfare, which the United States supported against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It involves organizing a portion of a states population to impose exorbitant costs on the government. Although a Maoist strategy targets opposing armed forces and their support networks, its goal is to destroy the will of the attacker, not necessarily its capacity to fight. It is not a strategy aimed at securing a quick government defeat. A Maoist strategy consists of three sequential but overlapping phases. The first involves organizing insurgent political and military structures from among the population. One of the primary objectives during the first phase is to persuade as many people as possible by co-opting or coercing them to commit to the movement. While a Maoist strategy has generally been implemented in rural insurgencies, and was conceived by Mao for that purpose, it has also been adapted to urban insurgencies. If the insurgents can gradually gain support and achieve initial military successes, they enter the second and longest phase, which is characterized by guerrilla warfare and progressive expansion. Further victories, if they occur, may lead to demoralization, lethargy, and defections from the government. This leads to a third phase, which involves destruction of the enemy.Insurgents shift to mobile conventional attacks on a large scale with the hope of government collapse. 2. Conventional insurgent strategy: The second is a conventional strategy, which the United States supported against the Taliban in 2001. It involves skipping Maos first two stages and focusing on conventional military action against the government. This strategy includes the use of armed forces to capture or destroy the adversarys armed forces, thereby gaining control of its values population, territory, cities, or vital industrial and communications centers. The goal is to win the war in a decisive engagement or a series of engagements by destroying the adversarys physical capacity to resist. Insurgent forces may, for example, advance to capture a defenders values or strategic assets like a capital city, communications center, or base and the defender moves to thwart that effort. A battle or series of battles then follows until one side admits defeat or there is a political settlement.