Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 18

TUPAS v CA FACTS: Petitioners were party litigants in a case filed in the RTC petitioners received a copy of the decision

on of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on April 3, 1989 they filed a motion for reconsideration on April 17, 1989, or fourteen days later The order of May 3, 1989, denying the motion was received by the petitioners' counsel on May 9, 1989 Instead of filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals within the remainder of the 15-day reglementary period, that is, on May 10, 1989, the petitioner did so only on May 23, 1989, or 14 days later petitioners argue that they should not be prejudiced by the mistakes of their counsel because they are laymen and not familiar with the intricacies of the law ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were denied due process by the alleged mistake of their counsel HELD: NO The petitioners' counsel did not file the petition for review within the remaining period, which he should have known was only one day. Neither did he move for an extension that would have been granted as a matter of course. The petition for review being indisputably late, he could not thereafter ask that it be treated as a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which can be filed within a reasonable time. This remedy cannot be employed as a substitute for a lost appeal. 3 It follows that for having themselves forfeited the right to appeal, the petitioners cannot now plaintively claim that they have been denied due process Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy

resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court The petitioners have not shown that their counsel was exceptionally inept or motivated by bad faith or excusably misled by the facts. There is no reason why we should not apply the rule that clients should be bound by the acts of their counsel, including his mistakes Petitioners counsel is a prestigious member of the bar and his conduct at the trial demonstrated his experience and skill as a trial lawyer. The petitioners themselves describe him as "a graduate of one of the top law schools in the country, a bar examiner in Remedial Law, a law professor in Remedial Law and other law subjects, a former National Officer of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and a seasoned practitioner for more than 30 years." 6 The procedural mistake might have been understandable in an ordinary lawyer but not in the case of the petitioners' former counsel if the petitioners felt so strongly that the said decision was erroneous they would have demonstrated more spirit and promptitude in assailing it. Instead, they waited to move for reconsideration until the last hour and, ultimately, when the motion was denied, filed the petition for review only when it was already too late. Under these circumstances, equity cannot be extended to them to soften the rigor of the law they have not chosen to observe. equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. We said in an earlier case, and we repeat it now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient

days of the Roman jurists and is now still reverently observed is "aequetas nunquam contravenit legis BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO v PALANCA JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING: On Jurisdiction The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation. The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant. How Jurisdiction is Acquired

FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person. Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is

found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world. In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. xxx It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem. On Due Process xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe

that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary. The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale. Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendants last known address constitute denial of due process? The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the

proceedings. It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed. PERKIN ELMER v DAKILA Jurisdiction; Cause of Action; Venue; CounterClaim. Perkins Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd (PEIA) is a foreign (singapore) corporation not doing business in the Philippines which manufactures and sells lab instruments. Dakila Trading Corporation is a local corp that sells, distributes and leases lab equipments. Dakila and PEIA entered into a distributorship agreement where Dakila would order Instruments from PEIA or from local affiliate, Perkins Elmer Instruments Philippines (PEIP), 99% of its stocks are owned by PEIA. However, PEIA unilaterally terminated the agreement, prompting Dakila to file a case for Sum of Money against PEIA with a writ of attachment on properties here in the Philippines (the stocks of PEIP). Dakila asked the permission of the court to deputize its General Manager, Richard Tee, to serve EXTRATERRITORIAL SUMMONS to PEIA in Singapore. Alias summons were issued and were delivered to Perkinelmer Asia, a separate and distinct entity from PEIA or PEIP. PEIP filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, while Perkinelmer wrote a letter stating that they have been wrongfully served the summons. Dakila amended its

complaint saying that PEIA merely changed its name and that all outstanding debts and obligations are still answerable by Perkinelmer. Again the summons was served in Singapore and again, PEIP filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of Jurisdiction and cause of action, that the contract provided for termination of the agreement at any time and that the venue was improper. The RTC denied the motion and required PEIP to answer the amended complaint. CA affirmed. Issues: 1. Whether the RTC had acquired jurisdiction. 2. Whether there was a cause of action. 3. Whether there was proper venue. 4. (ancillary issue which the SC decided to discuss) Whether a compulsory counterclaim is deemed dismissed with the dismissal of the original claim. Held: 1.

2.

3.

Jurisdiction was never acquired on the Person of PEIA. Dakila anchored its extraterritorial service of summons on Sec. 15, Rule 14 of the RoC, but this rule pertains only to actions in rem, not in personam. In the case at bar, Dakila is suing PEIA for collection of sum of money and damages, the fact that PEIA had properties here in the Philippines in the form of stocks of PEIP which were attached, does not transform the case from in personam to in rem or quasi-in rem. Then again, in the Amended complaint, PEIP did answer, so was jurisdiction acquired by their participation? The SC said, It is settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court for the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of said court, based on the invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Take note, that their lack of participation would waive their right and the RTC would have ruled without them. But it is consistent in PEIPs pleadings that they have questioned the RTCs jurisdiction from the very beginning. (Dakila may have had cause of action, and the RTC may have been the proper venue, but the fact is, jurisdiction was not acquired) Despite the venue stipulation found in the Distribution Agreement stipulating that the exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from the same shall lie in the courts of Singapore or of the Territory (referring to the Philippines), whichever is elected by PEIA (or petitioner, as PEIA's alleged

successor), the RTC of the Philippines cannot be considered as an improper venue. Truly, the venue stipulation used the word "exclusive," however, a closer look on the Distribution Agreement would reveal that the venue stipulation was really in the alternative i.e., courts of Singapore or of the Territory, meaning, the Philippines; thus, the court a quo is not an improper venue for the present case. It bears to emphasize that petitioner's counterclaim against respondent is for damages and attorney's fees arising from the unfounded suit. While respondent's Complaint against petitioner is already dismissed, petitioner may have very well already incurred damages and litigation expenses such as attorney's fees since it was forced to engage legal representation in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of the improper service of summons upon it. Hence, the cause of action of petitioner's counterclaim is not eliminated by the mere dismissal of respondent's complaint. BOUDARD vs TAIT (1939 pa tong case na to) Topic: personal jurisdiction in personam over non residents FACTS: Emilie Boudard, in her capacity as the widow of Marie Theodore Boudard and as guardian of her coappellants (children born during marriage with deceased), obtained a judgment in her favor from the civil division of the CFI of Hanoi, French Indo-China for the sum equivalent to P56k. The judgment was rendered against Stewart Tait based on the fact that Marie Theodore Boudard, who was an employee of Stewart Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees although outside their duties. The CFI of Manila dismissed the complaint of petitioners based principally on the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI of Hanoi to render the judgment whose execution is being institutes in this jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was stated itself in the decision of the court in Hanoi stating that Tait was not a resident nor had a known domicile in Hanoi. The evidence adduced in trial conclusively proves that Tait nor his agents or employees were ever in Hanoi and that the deceased was never his employee. In fact, the first time Tait knew of the suit and the sum being ordered for him to pay was when he was served summons in the present case.

ISSUE: Did the CFI of Manila err in dismissing the complaint of petitioners for lack of jurisdiction? NO RATIO: Petitioners failed to show that the proceedings against Tait in the CFI of Hanoi were in accordance with the laws of France then in force. Moreover, the evidence of record shows that Tait was not in Hanoi during the time mentioned in the complaint. Judicial proceedings in a foreign country regarding payment of money are only effective against a party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings. The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment. The process of a court of one state cannot run into another and summon a party there domiciled to respond to proceedings against him. Notice sent outside the state to a non resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery; there must be actual service within the state of notice upon him. A personal judgment against a nonresident who has neither been served with process nor appeared in the suit is without validity. The process of a court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired by such. Effects of a judgment of a foreign tribunal: As to a specific thing, conclusive upon title to the thing As against a person, presumptive evidence of a right GOMEZ v CA Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. This an action for specific performance and/or rescission filed by herein petitioners, spouses Gomez, against the heirs of Jesus J. Trocino, Sr., herein respondents and their mother Caridad Trocino. Complaint alleges: Some time in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of land to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The mortgage foreclosed and the properties sold at public auction and before the expiry of the redemption period, the spouses Trocino sold the property to spouses Gomez on December 12, 1989, who in turn, redeemed the same from Dr. Yujuico. The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey ownership of the properties to Gomez.

On January 10, 1992, the trial courts Process Server served summons on respondents, but it was returned. Original summons issued were served to the defendants Jacob, Jesus Jr., Adolfo, Mariano, Consolacion, Alice, Racheal thru defendant Caridad Trocino (mother) at their given address evidenced by her signature found at the lower portion of the original summons. On January 27, 1992, the defendants, through their counsel Atty. Expedito P. Bugarin, filed their Answer. Defendant Caridad A. Trocino, respondents mother, verified said pleading. RTC ruled in favor of Gomez. RTC issued an order ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu City to issue new titles in the name of herein petitioners. On March 13, 1996, respondents Adolfo and Mariano Trocino filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for the annulment of the judgment rendered by the RTCCebu. Private respondents alleged that the trial courts decision is null and void on the ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons as they were not validly served with a copy of the summons and the complaint. At the time summons was served on them, Adolfo Trocino was already in Ohio, U.S.A., and has been residing there for 25 years, while Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol, and has been residing there since 1986. They also refuted the receipt of the summons by Caridad A. Trocino, and the representation made by Atty. Bugarin in their behalf. On September 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision granting the petition and annulling the decision of the RTC-Cebu. W/N summons was effectively served on respondents? SC = NO. This case is an action in personam because it is an action against persons, namely, herein respondents, on the basis of their personal liability. As such, personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire of jurisdiction over their persons. A distinction, however, must be made with regard to service of summons on respondents Adolfo Trocino and Mariano Trocino. Adolfo Trocino, as records show, is already a resident of Ohio, U.S.A. for 25 years. Being a non-resident, the court cannot acquire

jurisdiction over his person and validly try and decide the case against him. On the other hand, Mariano Trocino has been in Talibon, Bohol since 1986. To validly acquire jurisdiction over his person, summons must be served on him personally, or through substituted service, upon showing of impossibility of personal service. Such impossibility, and why efforts exerted towards personal service failed, should be explained in the proof of service. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds. In the present case, the process server served the summons and copies of the complaint on respondents Jacob, Jesus, Jr., Adolfo, Mariano, Consolacion, Alice and Racheal, through their mother, Caridad Trocino. The return did not contain any particulars as to the impossibility of personal service on Mariano Trocino within a reasonable time. Such improper service renders the same ineffective. Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. Moreover, inasmuch as the sheriffs return failed to state the facts and circumstances showing the impossibility of personal service of summons upon respondents within a reasonable time, petitioners should have sought the issuance of an alias summons. Under Section 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, alias summons may be issued when the original summons is returned without being served on any or all of the defendants.28 Petitioners, however, did not do so, and they should now bear the consequences of their lack of diligence. The fact that Atty. Expedito Bugarin represented all the respondents without any exception does not transform the ineffective service of summons into a valid one. It does not constitute a valid waiver or even a voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction. There was not even the slightest proof showing that respondents authorized Atty. Bugarins appearance for and in their behalf.

While Caridad Trocino may have engaged the services of Atty. Bugarin, it did not necessarily mean that Atty. Bugarin also had the authority to represent the defendant heirs. The records show that in all the pleadings which required verification, only Caridad Trocino signed the same. There was never a single instance where defendant heirs signed the pleading. The fact that a pleading is signed by one defendant does not necessarily mean that it is binding on a codefendant. Furthermore, Caridad Trocino represented herself as the principal defendant in her Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Consequently, the judgment sought to be executed against respondents were rendered without jurisdiction as there was neither a proper service of summons nor was there any waiver or voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction. Hence, the same is void, with regard to private respondents except Caridad Trocino. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.11 Any judgment without such service in the absence of a valid waiver is null and void. DIAL CORP v SORIANO FACTS: The petitioners are foreign corporations organized and existing under the laws of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Malaysia, are not domiciled in the Philippines, nor do they have officers or agents, place of business, or property in the Philippines; they are not licensed to engage, and are not engaged, in business here. The respondent IVO is a Philippine corporation which through its president, Dominador Monteverde, had entered into several contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the petitioners. Those contracts stipulate that any dispute between the parties will be settled through arbitration under the rules of either the Federation of Oils Seeds and Fats Association (FOSFA) or the National Institute of Oil Seed Products (NIOP). Because IVO defaulted under the contracts, the petitioners and 15 others, initiated arbitration proceedings abroad, and some have already obtained arbitration awards against IVO. IVO filed a complaint for injunction and damages against nineteen (19) foreign coconut oil buyers including the petitioners, with whom its president, Dominador Monteverde, had entered into contracts for the delivery of coconut oil. IVO repudiated Monteverde's contracts on the grounds that they were

mere "paper trading in futures" as no actual delivery of the coconut oil was allegedly intended by the parties. On motion of IVO, respondent Judge authorized it to effect extraterritorial service of summons to all the defendants through DHL. Pursuant to that order, the petitioners were served with summons and copy of the complaint by DHL courier service. Petitioners filed motions to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground that the extraterritorial service of summons to them was improper and that hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. RTC denied.and upheld the validity of the extraterritorial service of summons to them. The petitioners' motions for reconsideration of that order were also denied by the court (Annex M), hence this petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary retraining order which We granted. ISSUE: Whether extraterritorial service was proper? HELD: NO. Only in four (4) instances is extraterritorial service of summons proper, namely: "(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines" (De Midgely vs. Fernandos, 64 SCRA 23). The complaint in this case does not involve the personal status of the plaintiff, nor any property in the Philippines in which the defendants have or claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached. The action is purely an action for injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing against IVO ("abusing and harassing") its contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the defendants, and to recover from the defendants P21 million in damages for such "harassment." It is clearly a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. "An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in remedies is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person." (Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., 76 SCRA 85). A personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property (Hernandez vs.

Development Bank of the Philippines, 71 SCRA 292).<re||an1w> As Civil Case No. 87-40166 is a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. In an action for injunction, extraterritorial service of summons and complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject them to the processes of the regional trial courts which are powerless to reach them outside the region over which they exercise their authority (Sec. 3-a, Interim Rules of Court; Sec. 21, subpar. 1, B.P. Blg. 129). Extraterritorial service of summons will not confer on the court jurisdiction or power to compel them to obey its orders. Neither may the court by extraterritorial service of summons acquire jurisdiction to render and enforce a money judgment against a non-resident defendant who has no property in the Philippines for "the fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over non-residents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment "(Boudard vs. Tait, 67 Phil. 170, 174). WHEREFORE, We hold that the extraterritorial service of summons on the petitioners was improper, hence null and void. The petition for certiorari is granted. The orders dated April 24, 1987 (Annex B) and December 15, 1987 (Annex H) of the respondent Judge are hereby set aside. The complaint in Civil Case No. 87-40166 is hereby dismissed as against the petitioners for failure of the court to acquire jurisdiction over them. CRUZ v CRUZ FACTS: petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of the Court of Appeals On December 15, 1999, petitioner spouses Lydia Flores-Cruz and Reynaldo I. Cruz purchased a lot from Lydias siblings (all surnamed Flores) Their father, Estanislao Flores, used to own the land as an inheritance from his parents. When he died, petitioners paid the realty taxes on the land although neither of them occupied it. Petitioners sold portions thereof to third parties later on

After the death of Estanislao, petitioners found out that respondent spouses Leonardo and Iluminada Goli-Cruz et al. were occupying a section of the land petitioner Lydia offered to sell them said portions but the talks failed. They asked respondents to leave but the demands were ignored Respondents countered that their possession of the land ranged from 10 to 20 years and that the property was alienable public land. They likewise argue that they had no knowledge of petitioners and their predecessors ownership of the land. They took steps to legitimize their claim and paid the realty tax on their respective areas for the taxable year 2002. Subsequently, however, the tax declarations issued to them were cancelled by the Provincial Assessors Office and re-issued to petitioners On August 6, 2001, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the land in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 82 Respondents filed a motion to dismiss claiming, among others, that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case as it should have been filed in the MTC since it was a summary action for ejectment under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court RTC denied the motion and rendered a decision in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to vacate the land CA ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action for recovery of possession because petitioners had been dispossessed of the property for less than a year It held that the complaint was one for unlawful detainer which should have been filed in the MTC. Thus, it ruled that the RTC decision was null and void According to the CA, considering that petitioners claimed that respondents were possessors of the property by mere tolerance only and the complaint had been initiated less than a year from the

demand to vacate, the proper remedy was an action for unlawful detainer which should have been filed in the MTC ISSUE: whether the RTC had jurisdiction over this case HELD: NO the nature of the action on which depends the question of whether a suit is within the jurisdiction of the court is determined solely by the allegations in the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced Only facts alleged in the complaint can be the basis for determining the nature of the action and the courts competence to take cognizance of it. One cannot advert to anything not set forth in the complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the action thereby initiated The necessary allegations in a complaint for ejectment are set forth in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court Petitioners alleged that the former owner (Estanislao, their predecessor) allowed respondents to live on the land. They also stated that they purchased the property on December 15, 1999 and then found respondents occupying the property. Yet they demanded that respondents vacate only on March 2, 2001 It can be gleaned from their allegations that they had in fact permitted or tolerated respondents occupancy Based on the allegations in petitioners complaint, it is apparent that such is a complaint for unlawful detainer based on possession by tolerance of the owner. It is a settled rule that in order to justify such an action, the owners permission or tolerance must be present at the beginning of the possession. Such jurisdictional facts are present here It is no longer true that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lie with the RTC regardless of the value of the property. When the case was filed in 2001, Congress had already approved

Republic Act No. 7691 which expanded the MTCs jurisdiction to include other actions involving title to or possession of real property (accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria) where the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000 (orP50,000, for actions filed in Metro Manila) Because of this amendment, the test of whether an action involving possession of real property has been filed in the proper court no longer depends solely on the type of action filed but also on the assessed value of the property involved. More specifically, since MTCs now have jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria (depending, of course, on the assessed value of the property), jurisdiction over such actions has to be determined on the basis of the assessed value of the property This issue of assessed value as a jurisdictional element in accion publiciana was not raised by the parties nor threshed out in their pleadings. Be that as it may, the Court can motu proprio consider and resolve this question because jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties To determine which court (RTC or MTC) has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon. The complaint did not contain any such allegation on the assessed value of the property. There is no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of petitioners. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether it is the RTC or the MTC which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action Moreover, the complaint was filed (August 6, 2001) within one year from the demand to vacate was made (March 2, 2001).

Petitioners dispossession had thus not lasted for more than one year to justify resort to the remedy of accion publiciana Since petitioners complaint made out a case for unlawful detainer which should have been filed in the MTC and it contained no allegation on the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in proceeding with the case. The proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. It follows that the CA was correct in dismissing the case HASEGAWA v KITAMURA Facts: 1. The petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co. is a Japanese consultancy firm which provides technical and management support in the infrastructure project of foreign governments. It entered into a Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. Under the ICA, the respondent will extend professional services to the petitioner for a year. 2. Subsequently Kitamura was assigned as project manager of STAR project in 1999. In 2000, he was informed by the petitioner that it will no longer renew the ICA and that he will be retained until its expiration. Kitamura filed a civil casefor specific performance before the RTC of Lipa and damages. 3. The lower court ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute and denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss since accordingly, it is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by Kitamura. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case HELD: YES 1. The only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice-oflaw rules as raised by the petitioner is inapplicable and not yet called for (reference to lex loci, lex contractus, or state of most significant rule). The petitioner prematurelyinvoked the said rules before pointing out any conflict between the laws of Japan and the Philippines. 2. The doctrine on forum non conveniens cannot be invoked to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. Dismissing the case on this ground requires a factual

determination hence the principle is considered to be more a matter of defense.

FIGUEROA v PEOPLE Estoppel by laches NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. TheRTC found him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questionedRTCs jurisdiction on the case.The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches hasalready precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participatin g therein and without him ever raising the jurisdiction al infirmity.The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absentherein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON petitioners failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case,constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding thefact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the CA HELD: No. RATIO: Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the issueof jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost bywaiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases inwhich the factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, that is,lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that theparty entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stagewhen the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional casebecause of the presence of laches.In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner Atty.Regalado, after the

receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt,promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction based onprocedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive toshow cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to thateffect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to takethe case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply. The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, consideringthat he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, noconsiderable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. DISPOSITIVE: Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is dismissed METROMEDIA v PASTORIN Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction by Estoppel. Johny Pastorin was a field collector for the Metromedia Times Corporation (MT). Prior to the incident which gave rise to this case, he was already served a letter of termination for tardiness. But he was not dismissed, due to the intervention of the collective bargaining agent of his union. Thereafter, Pastorin obtained a loan from one of the dealers of Metromedias publications, Gloria de Manuel for 9k. Pastorin paid only 1,125 and then reneged on his obligations, he also stopped collecting de Manuels payables to Metromedia. De Manuel wrote a letter to Metromedia, reporting the incident and asking for help to collect on the loan (didnt say if she was ever paid). Pastorin was asked by MT to explain the incident, to which he admitted everything but did not explain why he made the loan or how he was going to repay it. A suspension of 4 days was given and transfer to the Administration Department. Pastorin instead did not report for work and sued MT for constructive dismissal, back-wages and other money claims with the Labor arbiter, whom decided in Pastorins favor. MT appealed to the NLRC, claiming lack of Jurisdiction of the LA as it was a grievance issue cognizable by a voluntary arbitrator. NLRC reversed, hence the appeal. Issue: Whether MT in questioning jurisdiction belatedly only on appeal to the NLRC was already estopped. (There was no estoppel, the GR must apply, that

Jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage. The exceptions provided by jurisprudence for estoppel are extraordinary circumstances as in Tijam where it was questioned only 15yrs after appeal was madePastorin didnt even try arguing against MT, he merely fought for the decision of the LA to be affirmed, which actually had no jurisdiction.) Held: (sorry, here, the SC laid bare all the Jurisprudence on jurisdiction by estoppel, so I think the syllabus would actually be helpful, basically the NLRC decision was affirmed, MT was not estopped) 1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION; CASES WHERE THE COURT UPHELD THAT A PARTY'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE A COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION ESTOPPED SUCH PARTY FROM ASSAILING LACK OF JURISDICTION. Tijam represented an exceptional case wherein the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen (15) years, and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the Court of Appeals. Even Marquez recognizes that Tijam stands as an exception, rather than a general rule. . . . In the case of Martinez, the issue is not jurisdiction by estoppel but waiver of preliminary conference. In that case, we said: As pointed out by petitioners, private respondents had at least three opportunities to raise the question of lack of preliminary conference first, when private respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file their position paper; second, at the time when they actually filed their position paper in which they sought affirmative relief from the Metropolitan Trial Court; and third; when they filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court expunging from the records the position paper of private respondents, in which motion private respondents even urged the court to sustain their position paper. And yet, in none of these instances was the issue of lack of preliminary conference raised or even hinted at by private respondents. In fine, these are acts amounting to a waiver of the irregularity of the proceedings. For it has been consistently held by this Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction. The case of Ducat was categorical in saying that if the parties acquiesced in submitting an issue for determination by the trial court, they are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the same court to pass upon the issue. But this should be taken in the context of the "agreement" of the parties. Centeno involved the question of jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Arbitration Board (DARAB). The

Court did rule therein that "participation by certain parties in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto, bars them from any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them." Still, the Court did recognize therein that the movants questioning jurisdiction had actually sought and litigated for affirmative reliefs before the DARAB in support of a submitted counterclaim. No similar circumstance obtains in this case concerning the petitioner. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASES WHERE ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY TO CONFER JURISDICTION TO A TRIBUNAL THAT HAS NONE. The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter was assailed in the cases of De Rossi v. NLRC and Union Motors Corporation v. NLRC during appeal to the NLRC. Since the same circumstance obtains in this case, the rulings therein, favorable as they are to the petitioner, are germane. In De Rossi, this Court elucidated: Petitioner maintains that MICC can not question now the issue of jurisdiction of the NLRC, considering that MICC did not raise this matter until after the case had been brought on appeal to the NLRC. However, it has long been established as a rule, that jurisdiction of a tribunal, agency, or office, is conferred by law, and its lack of jurisdiction may be questioned at any time even on appeal. In La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78, 90, this Court said: "Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside." We held in the Union Motors Case: The long-established rule is that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law. [Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggaggawa v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 536 (1993); Atlas Developer & Steel Industries, Inc. v. Sarmiento Enterprises, Inc., 184 SCRA 153 (1990); Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 30 (1968)]. Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Where it appears that the court or tribunal has no jurisdiction, then the defense may be interposed at any time, even on appeal or even after final judgment. Moreover, the principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent this court from taking up the question of jurisdiction. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHEN JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL APPLIES AND WHEN IT IS CLARIFIED BY THE COURT. The rulings in Lozon v. NLRC addresses the issue at

hand. This Court came up with a clear rule as to when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not: Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. In People vs. Casiano (111 Phil. 73, 93-94), this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held: "The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE USED TO ASSAIL ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. Applying the guidelines in Lozon, the labor arbiter assumed jurisdiction when he should not. In fact, the NLRC correctly reversed the labor arbiter's decision and ratiocinated: What appears at first blush to be an issue which pertains to the propriety of complainant's reassignment to another job on account of his having contracted a private loan, is one which may be considered as falling within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless, since the complainant is a union member, he should be bound by the covenants provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. . . . Based on the foregoing considerations, it appears that the issue of validity of complainant's reassignment stemmed from the exercise of a management prerogative which is a matter apt for resolution by a Grievance Committee, the parties having opted to consider such as a grievable issue. Further, a review of the records would show that the matter of reassignment is one not directly related to the charge of complainant's

having committed an act which is inimical to respondents' interest, since the latter had already been addressed to by complainant's service of a suspension order. The transfer, in effect, is one which properly falls under Section 1, Article IV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and, as such, questions as to the enforcement thereof is one which falls under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter." In line with the cases cited above and applying the general rule that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal. Respondent relied solely on estoppel to oppose petitioner's claim of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the labor arbiter. He adduced no other legal ground in support of his contention that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, his claim falls flat in light of our pronouncement, and more so considering the NLRC's correct observation that jurisdiction over grievance issues, such as the propriety of the reassignment of a union member falls under the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. SHELTER v HON. FORMARAN CHAVEZ v CA FACTS: An Information for Libel dated 26 June 1995 was filed before the RTC of Manila against private respondents Rafael Baskinas and Ricardo Manapat, with petitioner Francisco Chavez as the complainant. The Information reads in part: "That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be published in "Smart File," a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, the following, to wit: xxxx with which published articles, the said accused meant and intended to convey, as in fact they did mean and convey false and malicious imputations of a defect, vice and crime, which insinuations and imputations as the accused well knew are entirely false and untrue and without the foundation in fact whatsoever, and tend to impeach, besmirch and destroy the good

name, character and reputation of said FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, as in fact, he was exposed to dishonor, discredit, public hatred, contempt and ridicule. CONTRARY TO LAW.1 Private respondents moved to quash the Information, as well as the corresponding warrants of arrest subsequently issued. However, these motions were denied by the RTC of Manila. Private respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The petition was granted; hence the present petition. ISSUE: whether the above-quoted Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for libel, considering the following requirement imposed by Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 4363? HELD: Jurisprudence applying the provision has established that it does not The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. Referring to the fact that the Information against private respondents states that the libelous matter was "caused to be published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation in Manila," the Court of Appeals deemed the cases of Agbayani v. Sayo3 and Soriano v. IAC4 as controlling. Based on the doctrines pronounced in said cases, the appellate court held that the Information failed to allege where the written defamation was "printed and first published," an allegation sine qua non "if the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the publication." 5 It was observed that "venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private person is either in any of

only two places, namely: (1) where the subject article was printed and first published; and (2) where complainant of the commission actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense." The Information, it was noted, did not indicate that the libelous articles were printed or first published in Manila, or that petitioner resided in Manila at the time of the publication of the articles. The rules on venue in article 360 may be restated thus: 1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.7 The Information by itself is defective on its face, for the reasons we have stated, that there is no need to evaluate whether Smart File was actually printed and first published in Manila or Makati City. The plain fact is that the Information failed to make the sufficient allegation in that regard, and even any ascertainment that the articles were printed and first published in Manila does not cure the jurisdictional defect of the Information. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SPRINGFIELD v RTC JUDGE STA. ANA v CARPO VDA. DE BALLESTEROS v RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN GARCILLANO v HOUSE OF REPRESENATTIVES Topic: Supreme Court Power of Judicial Review FACTS: This case is about the tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between GMA and a high ranking official of COMELEC which

resulted to a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the GMAs admin on the line. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the Hello Garci tapes, allegedly contained GMAs instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate the results of the 2004 presidential elections in her favor. A privilege speech of Sen. Chiz Escudero set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the respondents. NBI submitted to respondent House Committees 7 original tape recordings of the 3 hour conversation. Garcillano filed with this court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with orayer for TRO for the committees to be restrained from using the tape recordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped conversations and have them stricken off the records. 2 years after the debastes and discussions on the matters stopped, Sen. Lacson delivered a privilege speech which was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security. Sen. Santiago aired concern of the possible transgression of RA 4200 prohibiting and penalizing wire tapping. Petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili as retired justices filed the same petition as Garcis for violation of RA 4200. They also argued that the intended legislative inquiry violates sec. 3 art. III of the constitution. The senate did not issue the injunctive writ so it proceeded with its public hearings on the Hello Garci tapes. Major Sagge as member of the ISAFP moved to intervene as he was being summoned by the senate to appear and testify. While both petitions involve the Hello Garci recordings, they have different objectives- the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House while the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation. The Court dismisses the 1st petition and grants the 2nd. ISSUE: Whether the Senate is allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure? NO. RATIO: The standing of petitioners are established. As to the dismissal of the 1st petition, it has already been moot and academic since the tapes were already played so the relief prayed for by Garci cannot be granted anymore. As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned

legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. With respect to the Senate at the time of the case, no effort was undertaken for the publication of rules when they first opened their session. Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page. The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes. LAZATIN v HON. DISIERTO Petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds. The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash.

(28) Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114 were filed against herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners. Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution. It recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for insufficiency of evidence. The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution and ordering the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings. Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition. Petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They point out that under the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan). Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability because the checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin allegedly as reimbursement for the advances he made from his personal funds for expenses incurred to ensure the immediate implementation of projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo victims. SC = petition unmeritorious. Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, aka Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those

powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman. Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770. Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and the principle of stare decisis set aside. Again, this contention deserves scant consideration. The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus: ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.141avvphi1 Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.16 The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that " [a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's

confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished."17 Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same. In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the power of control and supervision over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter. CRUZ v MIJARES FACTS petitioner sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served. Motion denied. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order and was denied as well. ISSUE: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case. HELD: 1. This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an

absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will be directed. A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals. The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns before us. 2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case. In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant. FIRST UNITED v PORO POINT

Topic: Court of Appeals FACTS: The case stemmed from extrajudicial proceedings instituted by respondent PCI against the real estate mortgage and amendment of real estate mortgage executed by petitioner CGP. CGP obtained 2 loans from PCI worth P16M which were secured by real estate mortgages over 2 parcels of land. CGP failed to pay its indebtedness to PCI pursuant to the terms and conditions of the promissory notes so PCI filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties. During the public auction, the highest bidder was PCI and a Certificate of Sale was issued in their name. CGP however failed to redeem during the redemption period so PCI insisted that actual possession be turned over but CGP refused the demand. PCI filed before RTC Munitinlupa a petition for ex parte issuance of a Writ of Possession which CGP opposed. RTC issued an order against CGP. An MR of CGP averred that the hearing for ex parte reception of evidence was violative of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in its favor by the same court although in a different case involving the same parties for the annulment of the foreclosure proceedings. It argued that although the complaint for annulment of the foreclosure proceedings had been dismissed by the trial court, the order was not yet final and executory because it was appealed to the CA, the writ should still be considered in effect and subsisting. The RTC reconsidered. PCI filed an MR but the RTC ruled that the opposition of CGP raised issues that needed to be heard in the presence of both parties, the general rule frowned on ex parte proceedings. PCI filed Certiorari under rule 65 but it was referred to the CA by this court for appropriate action. CA granted PCIs petition and set aside the order of the RTC in favor of CGP finding that the judge gravely abused his discretion in suspending the proceedings relating to the writ of possession asked for by PCI. SEC. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying,

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v CA

AMPONG v CSC

CGP TRANSPORT v PU LEASING

restoring or granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support. The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of the adverse party. It likewise noted that the fact that there was no dispute vis--vis herein petitioner CGPs failure to redeem the foreclosed real properties within the period, herein respondent PCIs right to possession thereof is quite patent and absolute; and that any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. CA denied MR of CGP. ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari of respondent, there being already a final finding by this Honorable Court in its Resolution dated December 3, 2001, in G.R. No. 150483, that the said petition raised questions of facts and therefore not proper for petition for certiorari? NO RATIO: Respondent PCI, in contrast, maintains that in rendering its assailed Decision, the Honorable Court of Appeals simply discharged the duty assigned to it by this Honorable Court, apropos the latters 3 December 2001 Resolution. We sustain respondent PCIs importunings and dismiss petitioner CGPs petition. Although the form or mode of the original petition filed by herein respondent PCI from the Order of the RTC was a special civil action for certiorari, an incorrect mode of appeal there being questions of fact as assigned errors, i.e., the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstance, their relation to each other and to the whole situation,[20] this Court, in order to serve the demands of substantial justice, considers and disposes of the case as an appeal by certiorari instead. In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. In petitions such as the one filed in G.R. No. 150483, questions of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal under Rule 45 as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law. Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in

fact binding on us subject to certain exception. Cases where an appeal involved questions of fact, of law, or both fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. x x x he MAY include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties. It was on this score that we referred the subject petition to the appellate court. Under Section 5(f) of Rule 56 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal may be dismissed on the ground of erroneous choice or mode of appeal. Said section reads: SEC. 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. The appeal MAY be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds: (f) Error in the choice or mode of appeal. This notwithstanding, the Court may refer the case to the Court of Appeals under par. 2, Section 6 of the same rule. Said section states: SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. x x x An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact MAY be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.[Emphasis supplied.] This Courts discretion to refer the case to the Court of Appeals is by reason of the term may in both sections. Such term denotes discretion on our part in dismissing an appeal or referring one to the Court of Appeals. Petition denied.