Team 3 Draft CT Policy Hearing Schedule

(as of 12/29/2003 9:16 PM)

Staff statements:
• How did bin Laden and AQ rise to threaten the US? (perhaps by Team 1)
• Clinton CT policy
• Bush CT policy, pre-9/11
• Bush CT policy, 9/11-9/20

Day One: The Gathering Storm

• AM (Tend}: How well did the U.S. intelligence community track the adapting AQ
threat? What did the intelligence community do to counter the AQ threat?
• PM (Clarke— and perhaps Cresseyf): How did the National Coordinator see the AQ
threat? What efforts did the National Coordinator undertake to counter the AQ threat
(diplomacy, capturing AQ leaders, kw enforcement, financial controls, 1C actions,
public diplomacy, etc?) How well did the USG perform?

Day Two: Diplomacy. Force, and Strategy

• AM (A thrift— and perhaps Pickering?): How did the State Department see the AQ threat
before Jan. 2001? What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of
UBL/AQ? How did other states and organizations respond?
• PM (1) (Cohen, Sheltan): How did the U.S. military see the threat posed by terrorism
before Jan 2001? What did the military do to counter the UBL/AQ threat?
• PM (2) (Bergr— andperhaps Steinberg?): What was the Clinton administration's strategic
approach to countering the threat posed by AQ, from 1993 to the Millennium plot?

Day Three: Diplomacy. Force, and Strategy

• AM (Bergr continued): What was the Clinton administration's strategic approach to
countering AQ from Jan. 2000 to Jan. 2001? What lessons can we learn?
• PM (1) (Powell): How did the U.S. State Department see the AQ threat in 2001 before
9-11? What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the AQ threat in 2001 before 9-
11? How did other nations and organizations respond?
• PM (2) (Rwsfild, Myers): How did the U.S. military see the threat posed by terrorism in
2001 before 9-11? What did the military do to counter that threat before 9-11?

Day Four: Strategy and the War on al-Qa'ida

• AM (Rice— andperhaps Hadleyf): What was the Bush administration's strategic approach
to countering AQ in 2001 before 9-11?
• PM (1) (Ri(£ continued): What was the Bush administration's strategic approach to
countering AQ in 2001 immediately after 9-11? What lessons can we learn?
• PM (2) (Clarke}: What lessons can we learn from U.S. counterterrorism policy from
both the Clinton and Bush administrations?
 Day One: The Gathering Storm

9:00-12:30 George Tenet, director of central intelligence

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD

Key Questions:
• How well did the intel community understand AQ? Did we take the threat seriously
enough?
• Was your 1998 "declaration of war" backed up, over time, with action and resources?
• What were the limits on U.S. intelligence collection on AQ?
• Did we do enough to understand/block AQ's WMD capabilities?
• What was done (unilaterally and otherwise) to disrupt AQ cells, its network and
infrastructure?
• Did the 1C have the legal authorities it needed to do the job?
• What should have been learned from the 1998 bombings, the Millennium plot, and
the USS Cole? Did we respond adequately to the threat over time?
• What was the QA role in debates over Predator?
• How did the intel community perform during the 2001 "summer of threat"?
• Why didn't we know about the 9-11 plot? What did we know about the use of
airplanes as weapons? What warnings did policymakers get?

12:30-2:00 Break

2:00- 5:30 Richard A. Clarke, former national coordinator for counterterrorism

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD

Key Questions:

• How did the NSC see the AQ threat?

• Did other policymakers grasp the gravity of the UBL threat?
• What efforts did the National Coordinator undertake to counter the AQ threat (diplomacy,
disruptions, law enforcement, financial controls, 1C actions, public diplomacy,
preparedness, etc?)
• How well did the USG perform? Did the interagency process work?
• Was there a strategy? What were its goals? Could it have worked?
• How well did the U.S. intelligence community perform? Did it work effectively with
policymakers?
• How well did U.S. law enforcement perform? Did it work effectively with policymakers?
• How well did DOD perform? Did the military work effectively with policymakers?
• Did the USG anticipate attacks on U.S. soil? Did the USG anticipate mass-casualty
attacks?
 Day Two: Diplomacy. Force, and Strategy

9:00-11:00 Madeleine Albright, former secretary of state

Thomas Pickering, former undersecretary of state for policy

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD

Key Questions:
• Was terrorism a high enough priority for the State Department during your tenure?
• What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of UBL/AQ?
• Could diplomacy ever have split the Taliban off from UBL? Did we spend time pursuing
futile options?
• Did U.S. diplomacy toward Pakistan appropriately address the UBL issue?
• Did U.S. diplomacy toward Saudi Arabia appropriately address the UBL issue?
• How did State's leaders feel about the use of force after the August 1998 embassy
bombings and the 2000 attack on the Cole?
• Were U.N. sanctions useful tools for changing Taliban behavior?
• Was the office of the S/CT powerful enough within the State Department?
• Are our embassies and consulates safe enough?
• Did U.S. diplomacy toward Sudan appropriately address the terrorism issue?
• Were we too cautious about reaching out to the Northern Alliance?

11:30-1:30 William Cohen, former secretary of defense

Gen. Hugh Shelton (ret), former chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD

Key Questions:
• Did the U.S. military think terrorism was its problem?
• Did the military focus too much on force protection and too little on carrying the fight to
AQ?
• Did DOD and JCS produce the military options they were asked to?
• Were the August 1998 strikes effective?
• Did DOD/JCS think follow-on strikes were in order?
• Did DOD offer enough options for attempts to target UBL after 1998, including
submarines?
• Did DOD/JCS want to strike AQ targets after the Cole attack5
• Was the U.S. military's CT budget spent effectively?
• Did DOD and QA cooperate effectively on UBL?
• Did DOD work effectively with the NSC?
• What role did DOD pky in protecting American soil? Did DOD plan and prepare
adequately for terrorist attacks in America? Was NORAD ready for the full range of
threats?
1:30-3:00 Break

3:00-5:30 Samuel Berger, former national security adviser

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD

Key Questions:
• What was the Clinton administration's strategy for countering the threat posed by AQ?
• How dangerous did the president think UBL was? How was that assessment
communicated— to the public and to other policymakers?
• Did the USG have enough resources for CT?
• Did the USG devote enough high-level attention to CT?
• Was die U.S. response to the 1998 embassy bombings effective?
• Was die U.S. response to the 1999 Millennium plot effective? Did die Ressam episode
trigger enough attention to terrorist attacks on U.S. soil?
• Why didn't die Clinton administration respond militarily to die Cole attack?
• Did domestic politics— including the president's political troubles, the Florida recount, and
die transition— affect U.S. responses to UBL?
• Did foreign problems— including die Balkans and Iraq— affect U.S. responses to UBL?
• Did die NSC think UBL had WMD capabilities? What steps were taken in diis regard—
eidier to get more clarity or to interdict mass-destruction arms?
• Did die NSC give die QA die authority for effective steps to disrupt the UBL network5
• Did die NSC task die Pentagon for a more vigorous response?
• Was die NSC preparing for major terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland?
• Did you offer warnings about AQ to die incoming Bush team? How did diey respond?
• Was die U.S. national security structure designed to grapple widi the AQ threat?
• Was Saudi Arabia sufficiently cooperative widi our efforts against AQ?
• Was Pakistan sufficiently cooperative widi our efforts against AQ?
• Did die USG make enough use of the Predator?
• Was die American public ready for more sweeping measures on terrorism?
• Is Iraq helping or hurting die war on terrorism?
• Are we winning die war on terrorism?
 Day Three: Diplomacy, Force, and Strategy
9:00-11:00 Samuel Berger, former national security adviser (continued)

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD

11:30-1:30 Gen. Colin Powell, secretary of state

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD

Key Questions:
• Was terrorism a high enough priority for the State Department during your tenure?
• What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of UBL/AQ?
• Could diplomacy ever have split the Taliban off from UBL? Did we spend time pursuing
futile options and unnecessary policy reviews?
• Did U.S. diplomacy toward Pakistan appropriately address the UBL issue?
• Did U.S. diplomacy toward Saudi Arabia appropriately address the UBL issue?
• How did State's leaders feel about the use of force to respond to the Cole?
• Was the office of the S/CT powerful enough within the State Department?
• Are our embassies and consulates safe enough?
• Did U.S. diplomacy toward Sudan appropriately address the terrorism issue?
• Were we too cautious about reaching out to the Northern Alliance?
• How did U.S. diplomacy change from 9/11 to 9/20?
• Is U.S. CT policy too focused on state sponsors rather than transnational threats?

1:30-3:00 Break

3:00-5:30 Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense

Gen. Richard Myers, chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD

Key Questions:
• Did the U.S. military think terrorism was its problem?
• Did DOD focus too much on force protection and too little on carrying the fight to AQ?
• Did DOD and JCS have options and plans for Afghan operations?
• Did we rely too much on CA and too little on overt force in the pre-9/11 Bush period?
• Did DOD offer enough support for efforts to target UBL, including Predator?
• Did DOD and QA coordinate well over UBL in general and Predator in particular?
• Did DOD/JCS want to strike AQ targets after the Cole attack?
• Was the U.S. military's CT budget spent effectively?
• Did DOD work effectively with the NSC?
• What role did DOD pky in protecting American soil? Did DOD plan and prepare
adequately for terrorist attacks in America? Was NORAD ready for the full range of
threats? What planning had been done for homeland defense?
 Day Four; Strategy and the War on al-Qa'ida
9:00-1:00 Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser
Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD

Key Questions:
• What advice did you receive from the outgoing administration about UBL?
• What was the pre-9/11 Bush administration's strategy for countering the threat posed by
AQ? Why did the administration start developing an NSPD on the issue?
• How dangerous did the president think UBL was? How was that assessment
communicated— to the public and to other policymakers?
• How high a priority was UBL for the pre-9/11 Bush administration?
• Did the USG have enough resources for CT? Did TNT think so?
• Did the USG devote enough high-level attention to CT?
• Who did you think attacked the Cole? When did you get a definitive intel judgment?
• Why didn't the Bush administration respond militarily to the Cole attack''
• Did domestic politics— including the Florida recount and the transition— affect U.S.
responses to UBL?
• Did the USG expect a massive terrorist attack in the summer of 2001? How did it
respond? Were the IC's warnings useful?
• Were homeland defenses adequate to meet the warning levels of the summer of 2001?
• Was the USG expecting terrorist attacks on U.S. soil?
• DidtheNSCthinkUBLhadWMDcapabilitiesbefore9/ll?Whatpre-9/ll steps were
taken in this regard— either to get more clarity or to interdict mass-destruction arms?
• Did the NSC give the QA the authority for effective steps to disrupt the UBL network5
• Did the NSC task the Pentagon for a more vigorous response?
• Was the NSC preparing for major terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland?
• Was the U.S. national security structure designed to grapple with the AQ threat?
• Was Saudi Arabia sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ?
• Was Pakistan sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ?
• Did the USG make enough use of the Predator? Did the interagency process move
efficiently?
• Should the USG have given more assistance to the Northern Alliance pre-9/11?
• Was the American public ready for more sweeping measures on terrorism before 9/11?
• Is Iraq helping or hurting the war on terrorism?
• Are we winning the war on terrorism?

1.40-230 Break
2:30-5:00 Richard A. Clarke, fomier national coordinator for counterterrorism

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD

Key Questions:

• What went wrong?

• Did we get it?
• What still needs to be fixed?
• Over the long term, how do we destroy AQ and dry up its pools of support?
• What short-term and medium-term steps should we be taking?
• Do we have the right 1C for fighting AQ?
• Do we have the right military for fighting AQ?
• Do we have the right FBI for fighting AQ?
• Is DHS making America safer?
• How did the Clinton and Bush administrations see the AQ threat?
• What sort of attacks should we be preparing for?
• Was it possible to move more aggressively against AQ before the shock of 9/11?
• Is Iraq helping or hurting the war on terrorism?
• Are we winning the war on terrorism?

5:00-5:15 Gov. Thomas Kean, chair, 9/11 Commission

Closing Statement

5:15-6:00 Press availability