1 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS ATTY.

EVALYN URSUA 1st SEM SY 2009-2010

I. PRELIMINARY TITLE, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (RA 386) Effect and Application of Laws (Arts. 2-18, Civil Code) Art 2: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

o Taada v Tuvera (1986) o Facts: original petition was for writ of mandamus; new petition was Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification o Is publication a necessary requirement for a law to be effective? YES. Due process, right to information. The phrase unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot be omitted. This clause does not mean the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. o Where and when should publication be done? Published in full in the Official Gazette, immediately thereafter approval of law. Why? The former is what is required by law (Art 2), although justices recognize that newspapers of general circulation may better serve the purpose of publication. o What kinds of laws must be published? The term laws should refer to all laws and not only those of general application. To be valid, the law must affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable to only one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application, city charters and private laws, and presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers must be published. Same with administrative rules and regulations if their purpose is to enforce or implement an existing law. Internal regulations, such as those regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency, need not be published. o EO 200: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. (Approved June 18, 1987. Took effect immediately after publication in Official Gazette.)

o State Prosecutors v Muro (1994) o Facts: On Aug. 13, 1992, Muro dismissed 11 criminal cases of violation of CB Foreign Exchange Restrictions against Imelda Marcos, based on newspaper reports on announcement by the President of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions (decided by the Monetary Board). Muro contended that there was no need to wait for the actual publication of the law repealing the existing lawthe Presidents announcement was enough; the new law deprived the court of jurisdiction over Imeldas cases. o Should the judge have taken judicial notice of the newspaper announcement? No. Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites: the matter must be one of common & general knowledge it must be well & authoritatively settled, not doubtful & uncertain it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court o Dadole v Commission on Audit (2002) o Facts: RTC & MTC judges of Mandaue City were receiving 1,260, then 1,500 a month. DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 55, which declared allowances in excess of 1,000 as conditional and also provided for its own immediate effectivity. This circular prompted Mandaue City Auditor to issue notices of disallowance & reimbursement. Judges protested, COA denied. o Is LBC 55 issued by the DBM valid and enforceable, considering that it was not duly published in accordance with law? No. LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication, in violation of ruling in Taada v Tuvera: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. o Republic v Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (2008) o Facts: DOE/ERB wanted Shell to pay not just underpayments and risk fees, but surcharges, as per MOF Circular 1-85, as amended by DOF Circular 2-94. MOF Circular 1-85 has been neither published nor filed at the Office of the National Administrative Register. o Is MOF Circular 1-85 rendered invalid by the subsequent enactment of a law requiring registration at the ONAR? As per Taada v Tuvera, MOF Circular 1-85 should have been published since it is intended to enforce PD 1956. It should also comply with the requirement stated in Sec 3, Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987: filing with the ONAR in the UP Law Center. Existing rules must be filed w/in 3 months of Admin Code, lest they lose their effectivity. Failure to comply with the requirements of publication & filing of administrative issuances renders MOF Circ 1-85 ineffective.

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2 Art 3: Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. o Kasilag v Rodriguez (1939) o Facts: Emiliana Ambrosio & Marcial Kasilag entered into a mortgage agreement, and then a verbal contract which gave Kasilag possession of the land as well as the benefit of receiving the fruits of the land. o Is the contract legal? No. Possession of the land and enjoying its fruits is a contract of antichresis, which is a lien and is prohibited by Sec 116, Act 2874. o Given that the contract was illegal, could Kasilag be held accountable for its illegality? Did he act in bad faith? No. Court said that even if Kasilags contract was antichresis, it was made in good faith. He was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated. He was excusably ignorant as he was neither highly educated nor a lawyer, and could not be expected to know and properly interpret provisions of law. o Alfonso-Cortes v Maglalang (1993) o Facts: Judge Maglalang was charged with misconduct for failing to decide Civil Case No. 3810, regarding foreclosure and sale of a Bataan fishpond, within the 90-day period prescribed by lawhe decided the case more than a year after the case was submitted. Maglalang contends that the case was not submitted as dated (April 10, 1986), that he had double his normal workload since April 14, 1987 because he was handling two courts (Branches 1 and 2 of RTC Balanga, Bataan), and that the civil case involved difficult questions of law on his part. o Is the judge excused from noncompliance with the law requiring that civil cases in RTCs be decided within 90 days? No. It was held in Marcelino v Cruz, Jr. that failure to observe the rules constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. In Diputado-Baguio v Torres, it was held that certain factors could mitigate a respondent judges liability: congestion of docket, lack of personnel, detail in other courts, and illness. Art 4: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. retroactive application of the time-bar under Sec 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: DENIED Lacson contends that Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservation because it is favorable to the accused. He insists Sec 8 was crafter to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his casea check on the State to prosecute criminal cases diligently, lest it loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. Rule should have retroactive application because it is a procedural rule. March 29, 1999: dismissal of cases by RTC Dec. 1, 2000: RRCP took effect Thus, cases were revived in the RTC beyond two-year bar, in violation of his right to a speedy trial, in derailment of his Senate bid. Petitioners contend that prospective application of Sec 8 is in keeping with Sec5(5), Art 8 of the 1987 Constitution: rules of procedure shall not diminish, increase or modify substantial rights. Sec 8 secures rights of the accused but should not preclude the right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right and work injustice, the rule may not be given a retroactive application. Lacson replies that State had reasonable opportunity to refile the cases before the two-year bar but failed to do so. The operational act was the refilling of the Informations with the RTC on June 6, 2001, beyond the two-year bar. o Does the time-bar apply? NO. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to Sec5(5), Art 8 of Consti. The Court is not mandated to apply Sec 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The new rule was approved not just to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused: time-bar was fixed by the Court for the benefit of both the State and the accused. The State also has a right to due process. Time-bar: can only revive criminal cases one to two years after they are provisionally dismissed. Supposed to be a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The Court may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation make the rule prospective. The retroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined by the Constitutional provision on which it is based. Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute. The Court intended Sec 8 to be applied prospectively and not retroactively. Cases are governed by existing rules, not by rules yet to exist. Petitioners had until Dec. 1, 2002 to revive the cases. Cases were revived June 6, 2001well within the time-bar. Statutes regulating procedure will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. It is in this sense that procedural laws are retroactive. o Did Lacson fail to comply with requisites of Sec 8, Rule 117 of RRCP? Lacson contends that CA case (double jeopardy for being charged with murder Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

o People v Lacson (2003) o Facts: In 1999, 11 members of Kuratong Baleleng were killed by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, led by Panfilo Lacson. In this case, he prayed o (1) that certain justices be inhibited from participating in deliberations (omnibus motion): DENIED o (2) for a motion to set the case for oral arguments: DENIED o (3) for reconsideration of an earlier resolution regarding the prospective and

3 in some cases despite dismissal of other cases) and SC case (if prosecution of criminal cases was barred by Sec 8, Rule 117) are on different issues and thus, any admissions he made in CA are not judicial admissions in SC. The Court held that the issues in the CA case and in the SC are the same. Lacson invoked the same Sec 8, Rule 117 and the Constitution in both cases. Sec 4, Rule 129 of Revised Rules of Court: an admission made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case does not require proof. The Court held that when Lacson admitted that he did not move for dismissal of some of his criminal cases in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he did not give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases, he in fact admitted that one of the essential requisites of Sec 8 Rule 117 was absent. No need to remand the case to RTC. Judge Agnir could not have complied with the mandate under Sec 8 because said rule had yet to exist. o Sandoval-Gutierrez: Dissent: When a new law will be advantageous to the accused, the same shall be given retroactive effect. Also, Sec 8 Rule 117 was meant to protect the accused against protracted prosecution. Statement of Atty Fortun during CA proceedingsthat the dismissal of Lacsons case was without his express consentcannot be taken as a judicial admission. o Ynares-Santiago: Dissent: State doesnt have rights, only powers. Rule should be retroactiveprotect the individual. o Harrison Motors Corporation v Navarro (2000) o Facts: In June 1987, Renato Claros sold 2 Isuzu Elf trucks to Rachel Navarro of RN Freight Lines, saying all taxes & customs duties had been paid for. In September 1987, the BIR and the LTO entered into a MOA providing that prior to LTO registration of any re-/assembled motor vehicle, a Certificate of Payment should first be obtained from BIR. In October 1987, the Bureau of Customs issued a Customs Memorandum promulgating regulations for payment of duties and taxes on imported motor vehicles assembled by non-assemblers. In December 1987, BIR issued a Memorandum Order on the procedure governing processing and issuance of the Certificate of Payment. In June 1988, BIR, BOC and LTO entered into a MOA which provided that prior to LTO registration, a CP should first be obtained from the BIR and BOC to prove that all existing taxes and customs have been paid. In December 1988, government agents seized and detained Rachel Navarros 2 Elf trucks. She paid the taxes and customs duties and asked for reimbursement from Harrison Motors, but was refused. RTC and CA both ruled that Harrison Motors needed to reimburse Navarro. o Harrison Motors contends that it was no longer obliged to pay taxes and duties imposed by the Memorandum Orders and MOAs because these administrative regulations only took effect after the execution of its contract of sale with Navarro. Holding it liable for payment would violate the non-impairment clause of the Consti and Art 4 of the Civil Code. o Does the set of admin regulations violate the principle of retroactivity? No. The admin regulations in question do not impose any new taxes. They merely enforce payment of existing taxes and duties at time of importation. The Court held that Harrison Motors is obliged to paynot because of the administrative regulations but from the tax laws existing at the time of importation. Even if Navarro now owned the trucks, it was still Harrison Motors that was obliged to pay the taxes and duties. o Morales v People (2002) o Facts: Eulogio Morales, General Manager of the Olongapo City Water District, sold a company-owned car to Wilma Hallare, Finance Officer, who in turn sold it to Rosalia Morales, Eulogios wife. The car was valued at P75,000 and yet was sold for only P4,000. The car was in good running condition. The sale was done in violation of an existing Board Resolution, and no new board resolution authorized the sale of the 1979 Gallant car Sigma. Sales Dept manager filed the complaint. o Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction? Is the Olongapo City Water District a government-owned or controlled company? YES. Feb. 20, 1984: Baguio Water District: water districts fall under the general term government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and are covered by the Civil Service Law August 18, 1986: commission of crime April 17, 1989: Tanjay Water District echoed Baguio Water District May 16, 1990: Metro Iloilo Water District: water districts were private corporations Sept 13, 1991: Davao City Water District: returned to ruling in Baguio Water Petitioners contend that Metro Iloilo should be applied because it was the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime charged. The Court held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the crime. When the Information in this case was filed, it was 1992: the Davao City Water was the prevailing ruling, which makes Olongapo City Water District a government-owned/controlled corporation, and thus, under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. o Other issues: The sale was grossly disadvantageous to the government, because the book value was P75,000 when the sale value was P4,000. The car was not junk, as petitioners contend, but was in good condition. It was the second salethe sale to Rosalia Moralesthat violated Section 3(h) of the AntiGraft Law, as it is reasonable to suppose that Rosalia bought the car with her husbands knowledge and consent. o PNB v Office of the President (1996) o Facts: A Marikina subdivision developer mortgaged its subdivision lots in favor of PNB. Buyers of the subdivision lots were unaware of this and continued to pay for their lots and construct their houses. The subdivision developer then defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank got the lots. The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

4 Board (HLURB) said that PNB could collect only the remaining amortization of the lot buyers. The Office of the President affirmed this decision, invoking PD 957, which protects condo and subdivision lot buyers from fraud. o PNB contends that PD 957 was enacted on July 12, 1976, while the mortgage was executed on Dec. 18, 1975, and that PNB is not privy to the contracts between the lot buyers and the subdivision developer. o Is the application of PD 957 valid? YES PD 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity, but this could be inferred from the intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from unscrupulous subdivision developers. Besides, PNB should have done their due diligence in checking the foreclosed lots. Sec 21, PD 957: In cases of lots sold prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condo to complete compliance with its obligations within two years from the date of this Decree. Justice Cruz: A contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of police power, it will prevail over the contract. o Can PNB take the developers place & accept remaining payment? YES Sec 18, PD 957 obliges PNB to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid amortizations of the lot buyers. Art 5: Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. o Far East Bank & Trust Co. v Marquez (2004) o Facts: Arturo Marquez entered into a contract to sell a 52.5 sq. m. lot in Diliman, which is a portion of the property covered by TCT No. 156254 (now 3833697), with Transam Sales & Exposition through the latters owner and GM, Engr. Jesus Garcia. On May 22, 1989, TSE loaned P7,650,000 and mortgaged the property covered by the TCT. TSE couldnt pay, so the bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage and became the highest bidder in the subsequent auction sale. Marquez had already paid P600,000 and his townhouse unit was under construction. Marquez filed a case with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the HLURB on Jan 29, 1991 to compel TSE to complete construction of his townhouse, prevent the extrajudicial foreclosure, and have the TSE/FEBTC mortgage declared invalid, because the mortgage violated Sec 18 of PD 957. The OAALA ruled in Marquezs favor, and so did the CA, who found that the bank had known about the subdivision and that the Certification against forum shopping attached to the Petition had not been made under oath, in violation of the Rules of Court. Petition was denied, CA ruling affirmed. o Did the mortgage contract violate Sec 18 of PD 957? Yes, even if the lot itself was just part of a bigger parcel of land. PD 957 aims to protect innocent lot buyers, and Sec 18 addresses the problem of fraud committed against buyers when the lot is mortgaged without their knowledge. The lot was mortgaged in violation of Sec. 18 of PD 957. Marquez was not notified of the mortgage before the release of loan proceeds by Far East Bank. Sec 18 of PD 957 is prohibitory. Acts contrary to it are void. Far East Bank already knew about the subdivisionwhen they took on the mortgage, it was not with good faith. They were negligent in finding out what Marquezs rights really were as to the lot. o Assuming there was a violation of PD 957, was the remedy granted by HLURB/Office of the President/Court of Appeals the proper one? The remedy granted by the HLURB and sustained by the Office of the President was proper only in its reference to the lot of Marquez. The mortgage contract is void as against him. The rest of the land is none of his business. o Does the failure of the notary public to sign the Certification against forum shopping provide sufficient basis for dismissal of the appeal? SC upheld CA ruling; no more need to pass upon this issue. CA ruling: certification had not been made under oath, and is thus in violation of the Rules of Court. o Republic v Court of Appeals (2003) o Facts: On Nov. 27, 1985, the DPWH Minister asked Marcos for P800 million for dredging, flood control & related projects in Metro Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga and Leyte. P615 million was allocated to 21 contracts, 4 of which were with the Navotas Industrial Corp (NIC). NIC says it did 95.06% of the work, but DPWH paid only 79.22%, so NIC filed a complaint for sum of money (civil case). They were denied because (1) the DPWH fact-finding committee discovered that the dredging contracts were null and void, (2) NIC worked on the projects 5 to 6 months before they were awarded the DPWH contracts, (3) NIC got the contracts without bidding for them, and (4) NIC falsified documents so it seemed theyd worked when they hadnt. DPWH filed a case of estafa (criminal case) against NIC with the Tanodbayan. Contentions were the falsification of documents and that the former DPWH minister violated RA 3019 (Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act). Petitioner filed a motion to consolidate the collection and estafa cases, because the cases arose from the same incidents and involved the same facts. The consolidation petition and its reconsideration were denied. The CA ruled that the RTC could not rule on the violations of RA 3019, and that the Sandiganbayan could not rule over collection cases. The Sandiganbayan would have no authority to order the defendant in the civil case to pay NIC their money. o Was the petition filed on time? YES NIC said petition was sent by registered mail only on Sept. 12. Deadline for filing was Sept. 11, a Sunday. However, Sec 1 Rule 22 of the Rules of Court Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

5 states that in this case, time shall not run until the next working day. o Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the consolidation? NO Consolidation happens only when the cases involve similar questions of fact & law. Its purpose is to avoid multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, simplify the work of the trial court, and so on. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over civil collection cases. Rules of Court do not allow filing of a counterclaim or a third-party complaint in a criminal case. Normally, Article 31 of the Civil Code would apply: civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. However, when the action is based on a contract that is illegal, as when the contract violates the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Art 31 does not apply. Under Section 3 of the aforementioned Act, entering into a contract that is grossly disadvantageous to the governmentlike the dredging contractsis unlawful. The act purporting to create the obligation to pay NIC is assailed as a crime in itself. Thus, a contract executed against the provisions of prohibitory laws is void, and if the contracts are illegal, then no valid obligation to pay can arise from it. o Petition denied, CA decision affirmed with modification. Civil case was suspended until termination of civil cases to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions on the validity of NICs dredging contracts. o BPI v IAC (1998) o Facts: Rizaldy Zshornack and his wife maintained a dollar savings account and a peso current account at COMTRUST Bank, which was later absorbed by BPI. Virgilio Garcia, COMTRUST Asst. Branch Manager, withdrew $1,000 from the Zshornacks dollar savings account without the couples authorization. o The Zshornacks had originally entrusted $3,000 cash for safekeeping, and this agreement had been embodied in a document. Despite demands, the bank refused to return the money. COMTRUST also did not deny the authenticity and execution of said document. o BPI argues that the document is a contract of depositum, which banks do not enter into. Garcia was alleged to have exceeded his powers when entering into that transaction. Thus, the bank could not be held liable under the contract, and the obligation is purely personal to Garcia. o Court held that COMTRUST could have denied under oath the due execution of the document if it had so desired, according to the Rules of Court: they couldve questioned the authority of Garcia to bind the corporation, and denied its capacity to enter into such a contract. But they didnt, so the bank admitted both Garcias authority and the banks power to enter into the contract in question. o Court held that the mere safekeeping of greenbacks is a transaction not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, as amended by CB Circular No. 281, and thus falls under the general class of prohibited transactions. Pursuant to Art 5 of the Civil Code, the safekeeping of greenbacks is void. o Because the contract was void, neither party can have a cause of action against each other, according to Art 1411 of CC. The only remedy is to prosecute the parties for violating the law. Thus, Zshornack cannot recover damageshas no cause of action. o Decision modified. BPI ordered to repay $1,000 to bank account and pay damages. o Nicolas v Court of Appeals (1987) o Facts: Madlangsakay bought 3 parcels of land from Felipe Garcia in 1951. At the time of the purchase, the petitioners were living on one of the lotsLot 8. In 1958, Madlangsakay entered negotiations for the sale of Lot 8 to petitioners, and Madlangsakay promised to subdivide the land among them, but nothing happened. In 1961, petitioners filed an amended complaint in CFI Bulacan for Madlangsakay to quiet title over Lot 8, saying that in a 1958 affidavit, he had agreed to sell the property to them at P0.70 per sq. m., and that he had executed several deeds of sale transferring the land to the petitioners, plus an affidavit to facilitate the registration of the deeds of sale. Madlangsakay had filed criminal cases against the petitioners when they had cut and cleared bamboo groves near their houses; petitioners countered with criminal complaints of perjury. Madlangsakay said that all the deeds of sale and all affidavits were forgeries. He said that the land was conjugal property, registered under the Torrens system & mortgaged with PNB. o Did the CA err in concluding that the deeds of sale were spurious? NO There was evidence that the deeds of sale were falsified; the notary knew nothing and could not actually vouch for credibility of petitioners. Contract said the land was not registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law but it was. The land was conjugal property & was heavily mortgaged with PNB. The land was titled property, and any conveyance affecting titled property must be registered under Act 496 and not under Act 3344, which is what the petitioners did. The very conspicuous absence of the wifes conforme to the disposition of the property renders the alleged sale void ab initio because it contravenes the mandatory requirements of Art 166 CC. o Decision affirmed. Decision immediately executory. Art 6: Rights may be waived, except when the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs, or is prejudicial to a third party with a right recognized by law.

o For a waiver of rights to exist: o existence of a right o knowledge of the evidence thereof o intention to relinquish said right

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6 o A waiver must be a voluntary, intelligent and informed decision a person can only waive his/her rights if he/she has sufficient awareness of relevant circumstances. o Corpuz v Spouses Grospe (2000) o Facts: Gavino Corpuz was a farmera beneficiary of the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of DAR. Pursuant to PD 27, he was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over 2 parcels of agricultural land. After Corpuzs mortgage contract with Virginia de Leon expired, he mortgaged it to Mrs. Grospe. They had an agreement (Kasunduan sa Pagpapahiram ng Lupang Sakahan) which allowed the Grospes to use or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage. Before the DAR, Corpuz instituted action for recovery of possession the Grospes had allegedly entered the land by force & destroyed his palay. o The Grospes claimed the Kasunduan allowed them to take possession of the land until the loan was paid. Instead of paying the mortgage, Corpuz had allegedly executed a Waiver of Rights. Corpuz denied having waived his rights and interest over the land and said the signatures therein were forgeries. o Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Ernesto Tabara ruled that Corpuz had abandoned and surrendered the land to Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had recommended the reallocation of the lots to the Grospes, who were the most qualified farmer-beneficiaries. o CA ruled that Corpuz had abandoned the landholding and forfeited his right as a beneficiary. The waiver of rights and conformity to Samahang Nayon resolutions are evidence of his abandonment and voluntary surrender of his rights as beneficiary under the land reform laws. Also, he failed to prove that signatures were forgeries. o Was appellate court correct in finding that the signatures were not forged? YES. Petitioner failed to prove forgery. o If signatures were genuine, was waiver null & void for being contrary to agrarian laws? YES. Sale or transfer of rights over property covered by CLT is void, except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through hereditary succession. Thus, waiver was void. o Did Corpuz abandon his rights, under PD 27? NO. There was no abandonment because the waiver of rights was void. o Did Corpuz forfeit his right as a beneficiary? YES. Corpuz voluntarily surrendered his landholding. PD 27: Title to land acquired pursuant to land reform program shall not be transferable except through hereditary succession or to the government. RA 3844 Sec 8: The agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished by voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee. The land was surrendered to the government, not to a private person. It was the government that awarded the land to the Grospes. o Spouses Valderama v Macalde (2005) o Facts: In 1977, Albano acquired a lot in Tondo, Manila, that was being rented by the Macaldes, who had an ancestral home on two-thirds of said lot. The Macaldes leased the property from Albano and paid monthly rentals; the remaining one-third of the land was leased by the spouses Valderama. In 1978, Marcos issued PD 1517 proclaiming Urban Land Reform Zones. A subsequent Marcos proclamation included Albanos property in the Urban Zones. In 1990, Albano offered to sell the property to the Macaldes. The Macaldes offered to buy Albanos property but Albano did not respond; the Macaldes continued paying rent. In 1991, Albano told Macalde she sold the property to Valderama. Albano and Valderama rejected Macaldes offer to buy the property on which their ancestral home stood. Macalde invoked PD 1517, saying they had a preferential right to buy the property. Albano said the land was not covered by PD 1517; the Valderamas said the Macaldes had waived their preferential right since they failed to exercise it when Albano first offered the property to them. o Did the Macaldes waive their rights to the property? NO. Sec 6, PD 1517: the Macaldes did have the right of first refusal. The Macaldes exerted every effort to stop the sale to the Valderamas. There was no intent to let go of the property. Albano failed to respond to the Macaldes offer to buy, and concealed the identity of the buyer of the lot from the Macaldes. Under Sec 9, PD 1517, Albano was mandated to declare to the Land Management Committee her proposal to sell the property, but she didnteven the government was deprived of its preemptive right to acquire the property. Herminia Albano forged the signature of her dead husband for some of the legal documents. LOL! o Borromeo-Herrera v Borromeo (1987) o Facts: Vito Borromeo died in 1952, leaving behind several properties in Cebu. In 1969, the Regional Trial Court invoked Art 972 of the Civil Code and listed 9+ heirs to the Borromeo estate. In 1972, Fortunato Borromeo, an acknowledged illegitimate son, filed a petition praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate, asserting and incorporating a Waiver of Hereditary Rights, dated 1967 and supposedly signed by the Borromeo heirs. In the waiver, 5 of the 9 heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. o Is the Waiver of Hereditary Rights valid? NO. o For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential. o The intention to waive a right must be shown clearly and convincingly. When the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage such that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. o In this case, the signatories to the waiver did not have clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights.

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7 o Treaties may also be used in determining a case. o Van Dorn v Romillo: It was the Filipino who initiated divorce proceedings in the US. When this case was decided, there was no Art 26 of the Family Code yet, but the court did not refuse to rule. They ruled with the principle of equity as their basis. Art 10: In case of doubt in the determination or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

Art 7: Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. o Look at the effectivity clause and the repealing clause of a law. Example: Art 254 of Family Code is a repealing clause. o Laws not usually followed: o law against concubinage o law against discussing cases pending in court o law against premature marriage: widows are not allowed to marry within 300 days of the death of spouse or the end of the marriage o Art 7 tells us of the hierarchy of laws: o the Constitution is the fundamental law; all laws must conform to it as it is a direct enactment of the people o statutes and treaties must conform to the Constitution o administrative orders and executive acts must conform to statutes Art 8: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. o This is judicial/interstitial legislation. o Follow the principle of stare decisis: judical decisions as precedents. o Stare decisis is a matter of agreeing on what are relevant facts. Art 9: No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of laws.

o This is a general principle of law. o Van Dorn v Romillo: She cannot be discriminated against in her own country. Art 11: Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. Art 12: A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. Art 13: When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights o Sec 31, Book 1, Executive Order 292: Instituting the Administrative Code of 1987 o Section 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise. o There is a conflict between the Civil Code and the Admin Code in the definition of a year: follow the Civil Code. The Admin Code only applies to administrative agencies; generally, the Civil Code applies. o Non-working days and legal holidays are included ONLY according to rules of procedure, such as the Rules of Court. Art 14: Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.

o Note also that we now have international human rights laws. Basic human rights: liberty, privacy. o Courts may use international human rights decisions in making their own.

o Art 2, Revised Penal Code o Art. 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

8 not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. Is an international official is immune from criminal jurisdiction for all acts, whether private or official? The generally accepted principles which are now regarded as the foundation of international immunities are contained in the ILO Memorandum, which reduced them in three basic propositions, namely: (1) that international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; (2) that no country should derive any financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and (3) that the international organization should, as a collectivity of States Members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States. The thinking underlying these propositions is essentially institutional in character. It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. Is the authority to determine if an act is official or private is lodged in the courts? Positive international law has devised three methods of granting privileges and immunities to the personnel of international organizations. (1) by simple conventional stipulation, as was the case in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (2) by internal legislation whereby the government of a state, upon whose territory the international organization is to carry out its functions, recognizes the international character of the organization and grants, by unilateral measures, certain privileges and immunities to better assure the successful functioning of the organization and its personnel. In this situation, treaty obligation for the state in question to grant concessions is lacking. Such was the case with the Central Commission of the Rhine at Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. (3) by a combination of the first two. In this third method, one finds a conventional obligation to recognize a certain status of an international organization and its personnel, but the status is described in broad and general terms. The specific definition and application of those general terms are determined by an accord between the organization itself and the state wherein it is located. This is the case with the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of Justice, and the United Nations. The privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal foundations. Those immunities awarded Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

o There are treaties, like the Vienna Convention, that exempt certain people, like diplomats. o Liang v People (2000) o Facts: Liang was an ADB economist who uttered defamatory words against his co-worker, Joyce Cabal. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong issued a warrant of arrest, as Liang was charged with 2 counts of oral defamation. The DFA sent an office of protocol stating that Liang was immune from the legal process, according to Sec 45 of an Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. o Does Liang have immunity from the legal process? NO. DFAs determination that a person is covered by immunity is only preliminary, which has no binding effect in courts. The DFAs advice to dismiss the criminal cases, as well as the actual dismissal of the criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, violated the latters right to due process. Sec 45 of the Agreement pertains to immunity that is not absoluteit is subject to the exception that the act was done in official capacity. Slandering a person is not covered by the immunity of the Agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime , such as defamation, in the name of official duty. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent has immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state, except in cases relating to actions outside his official functions. o J. Puno: concurring opinion: Does Liang, as an official of an international organization, is entitled to diplomatic immunity? A perusal of the immunities provisions in various international conventions and agreements will show that the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is.

9 to diplomatic agents are a right of the sending stated based on customary international law, those granted to international officials are based on treaty or conventional law. Is the certification by the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner is covered by immunity is a political question that is binding and conclusive on the courts? The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel of international organizations to a minimum. The wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations, which enjoy absolute immunity. In strict law, it would seem that even the organization itself could have no right to waive an officials immunity for his official acts. This permits local authorities to assume jurisdiction over and individual for an act, which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act at all. It is the organization itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own immunity and appear in court, not the individual, except insofar as he appears in the name of the organization. The current status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives. Who is competent to determine whether a given act is private or official? The trend is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act as private or official in the courts of the state concerned. Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of immunity from every form of legal process accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official acts. The authority of the Department of Affairs, or even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official capacity. 1998: FVR approved the VFA. October 5, 1998: Erap, through Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. October 6, 1998: Erap, through Exec Sec Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate the VFA for concurrence. May 27, 1999: Senate approved the VFA by a 2/3 vote. June 1, 1999: VFA officially entered into force. o The VFA is considered a treaty in the Philippines; it has been ratified in accordance with Philippine laws. The power to ratify is vested in the President; the legislature is limited to giving or withholding its consent to the ratification. o It is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, it is to be taken equally as a treaty. o Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty? Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US personnel? The Court did not answer this, but I think the answer is YES. Is the SC deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher? The Court did not answer this, but I think the answer is YES. o J. Puno: dissenting opinion: o The absence in the VFA of the slightest suggestion as to the duration of visits of US troops in Phil. territory, coupled with the lack of a limited term of effectivity of the VFA itself, justify the interpretation that the VFA allows permanent, not merely temporary, presence of US troops on Philippine soil. o The 1947 RP-US Military Bases Agreement was ratified by the Philippine Senate, but not by the US Senate. In the eyes of Phil law, the Military Bases Agreement was a treaty, but by the laws of the US, it was a mere executive agreement. o Fr. Bernas: require that the US Senate concur in the treaty because under American constitutional law, there must be concurrence on the part of the US Senate to conclude treaties. o VFA doesnt fall under the category of an executive agreement made by the US president pursuant to authority conferred in a prior treaty. o The Court should not place a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the same constitutional plateau as a treaty. It falls short of the RP constitutional requirement that the agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops on Philippine soil must be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. Art 15: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

o Bayan v Zamora (2000) o NOTE: This case tells us that certain acts may be prosecuted under certain laws, in certain jurisdictions. o Facts: March 14, 1947: RP and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement formalizing the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel. The Agreement was due to expire in 1991. August 30, 1951: Mutual Defense Treaty September 16, 1991: RP Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.

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10 filed with the RTC a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC gave due course to Paulas petition, without terminating Alicias testate proceedings. Alicia appealed to the Court of Appeals, which declared Alicia as co-owner of whatever conjugal properties she and Lorenzo had. Paula brought the case up to the SC after being denied by the CA. o Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenze Llorente? o Art 15: Lorenzo became an American citizen before and at the time of his divorce, 2nd marriage, execution of will and death. Thus, this issue is governed by foreign law. o Our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. o Quita v CA: once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could lose her right to inherit from him. o Pilapil v Ibay-Somera: Divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in RP civil law on persons. o Thus, the divorce was legal. o Art 17: The forms and solemnities of contracts shall be governed by laws of the country in which they are executed. o The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his 2nd wife and children is manifest in the will he executed. SC has no wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, and not covered by Art 15 ( citizens of the Philippines). o Is the will intrinsically valid? Who shall inherit from Lorenzo? These issues are best answered by foreign law, which must be pleaded and proved. o Was the will executed in accordance with the formalities required? YES. It fulfilled the necessary requirements of Philippine law, as per Art 16 (laws of the country in which they are executed). o Garcia-Recio v Recio (2001) (Grace Garcia-Recio v Rederick Recio) o Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They were divorced through an Australian family court in 1989. On June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen, and in 1994 married Grace, a Filipina. In their application for a marriage license, Rederick was declared single and Filipino. In 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, on the ground of bigamyRederick allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time of their marriage. Rederick said he had legal capacity to marry, as the Australian divorce was valid. While suit for declaration of nullity was pending, Rederick secured an Australian divorce decree. The RTC ruled that the marriage was dissolved, as the divorce issued in Australia was valid. RTC said the marriage ended not because Rederick had a lack of legal capacity to remarryrather, it was because of the new Australian divorce decree. Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

o This law follows the nationality principlewhat applies is ones personal national law, which is decided by his citizenship. o An example of a condition of a person is his mental capacity. o Art 26, Family Code: Any marriage abroad is valid in the Philippines, as long as: o the marriage is valid abroad o the marriage complies with our laws o Art 15 refers to absolute divorce, which terminates marriage, as opposed to limited divorce, which suspends (Garcia v Recio). o Van Dorn v Romillo, Jr. (1985) o Facts: Alice Reyes, a Philippine citizen, married Richard Upton, a US citizen, in Hong Kong in 1972. In 1982, the couple divorced in Nevada, US, and Alice remarried in Nevada, to Theodore Van Dorn. Upton filed a suit against Alice, stating that the latters business was conjugal property and asked for an accounting of the business as well as the right to manage it. Alice moved to dismiss the case, saying that in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, Upton had acknowledged that he and Alice had no community property. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, saying that the property involved is located in the Philippines, so the divorce decree has no bearing in the case. o Is a foreign divorce valid and binding in the Philippines? There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in the US. The decree is binding on Upton as a US citizen. Upton cannot sue petitioner as her husband in any US state. What he contends in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in the Philippines, as it is contrary to local law and public policy. Art 15 of the Civil Code: Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, under American law, divorce dissolves the marriage. o Llorente v Court of Appeals (2000) (Paula Ll. v CA and Alicia Ll.) o Facts: Lorenzo Llorente was an enlisted US Navy serviceman who married Paula on Feb. 22, 1937 at Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula stayed at the conjugal home in Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo became a US citizen. When he got back to the Philippines in 1945, he discovered that Paula was pregnant and was living in with his brother, Ceferino. They made a written agreement and Lorenzo filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California, San Diego County. The divorce became final on Dec. 4, 1952. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament, leaving everything to Alicia and their 3 children. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died. On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula

11 o Was the divorce between Rederick and Editha Samson proven? o A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved by divorce obtained abroad. Art 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. o Art 26 of the Family code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. o A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. o A writing or document may be proven as a public record of a foreign country by: o an official publication o a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document o If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the copy must be o accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept o authenticated by the seal of his office o Was the divorce proven? NO. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. Redrick must prove the divorce according to pertinent Australian laws. The divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. o There are two basic types of divorce: o absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii: terminates marriage o limited divorce or a mensa et thoro: suspends marriage, leaves the bond in full force o Was Rederick proven to be legally capacitated to marry Grace? NO. o Art 21 of FC: certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage o Rederick did not have any evidence proving his legal capacity to marry Grace. o Case remandedneed more evidence. o Roehr v Rodriguez (2003) o Facts: Roehr married Rodriguez in Hamburg, Germany, on Dec. 11, 1980. The marriage was ratified on Feb. 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. On Aug. 28, 1996, Rodriguez filed a declaration for nullity of marriage. On Dec. 16, 1997, Roehr got a decree of divorce from Hamburg-Blankenese.

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12 II. PERSONS CIVIL PERSONALITY: Art 37-47, Civil Code GENERAL PROVISIONS o Juridical capacity (Art 37) (AKA legal capacity, and personality) o the fitness to be the subject of legal relations o inherent in natural persons o lost only through death o aptitude for the holding and enjoyment of rights o Capacity to act (Art 37) o the power to do acts with legal effect o is acquired o may be lost o aptitude for the exercise of rights o Juridical capacity can exist without capacity to act, but the existence of the latter implies that of the former. o Art 38: There is no such thing as full capacity to act. Yet, restrictions on capacity to act do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, such as those arising from his acts or property relations. o Art 39: Some modifications or limitations on capacity to act: age, mental capacity, physical capacity (state of being a deaf-mute), family relations, alienage, absence. NATURAL PERSONS o Art 40: Birth determines personality o Art 40 remains the same, although superseded by Article 5 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (PD 603, effective 6 months after Dec 10, 1974): The civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of his conception , for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code. o Birth means the removal of the fetus from the womb (Tolentino). This may take place either through natural or artificial means. o Fetus is considered born alive if: o completely delivered after seven months o if less than 7 months, has to live for 24 hours (even if aided by medical equipment) o Test for life: complete respiration. o The child need not be viable. It just needs to be alive for an instant. o Personality of a conceived child is: o limited: only for the purposes favorable to the child o provisional: it depends on the child being born alive later (Art 41) o It is presumed that a child is born alive. o Art 42: Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. o The estate continues personality. o Art 43: Applies only when 2 people are called to succeed each other. o Presumption of Death in the Rules of Court in the state of calamity: Who is presumed to have survived? o if both below 15: older o if both over 60: younger o if one is under 15 and the other is over 60: younger o if both over 15 and under 60, and the sexes are different: male o if both over 15 and under 60, and the sexes are the same: older o if one under 15, one over 60 and one in between: one in between o Presumption of death is based on strength, age and sex. JURIDICAL PERSONS o Juridical persons (Art 44, 45): o the State o governed by specific laws o public interest entities o personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law o governed by specific laws o private interest entities o juridical personality of entity is distinct from that of its individual components o may be constituted by 5 to 15 people, with the majority residing in the Philippines o created by filing in the Securities and Exchange Commission o juridical personality begins when certificate of incorporation is issued by SEC o governed by laws of general application o partnerships and associations are governed by the Civil Code provisions concerning partnerships o Art 46: Juridical persons may o acquire and possess property of all kinds o incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

13 o Facts: Oscar Lazo, husband of Nita Villanueva, instituted action against physician Antonio Geluz for giving his wife an abortion. It was Nitas 3rd abortionthe first had been a baby conceived out of wedlock, the second had been due to her work and because the husband was away in a province, campaigning for an election. Lazo was aware of the first two abortions, but not the third. He sued for damages on behalf of the fetus, and the CA gave damages of P3000 to Lazo, citing Art 2206 of the Civil Code. o The SC said this was done in error, as Art 2206 does not cover the death of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality. There is also no defense in citing Art 40 of the Civil Code because the fetus must be born alive, as per the conditions of Art 41. o The SC said that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the fetus on account of its injuries, no such right of action could be transferred to its parents or heirs. Even if a cause of action did happen on behalf of the fetus, it was extinguished by its pre-natal death (Art 41). o No transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality/capacity. o Does the fetus have legal personality? NO. It died before being born. o Can Oscar Lazo get damages on behalf of the fetus? NO. o Can Lazo get damages for himself? Normally, yes: moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus, anguish attendant to its loss, disappointment of parental expectations (Civil Code Art 2217). But in this case, there was no factual or legal basis for the awarding of damages. So, NO. USE OF SURNAMES: Art 364-380, Civil Code WHAT IS THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ONES NAME? o Republic v CA (1992) o It is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is the combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals, and it is how he is addressed by the world at large. It is one method of indicating the identity of persons. It is a right of personality (Tolentino). o A name usually has two parts: the given name and the surname. The given name, given at birth or baptism, distinguishes him from other individuals. The surname identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The surname is fixed by law. o A name has the following characteristics: o absolute, intended to protect one from being confused with others o obligatory, for no one can be without a name o fixed, unchangeable, immutable: may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

o Art 47: Upon dissolution of a public interest entity, their assets shall be disposed of as according to law, or applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the area that benefited from the entity during its existence. o 1987 Constitution o Art 2, Sec 12 (Principles and State Policies): The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. o This state policy keeps the SC from declaring unconstitutional the antiabortion provisions in the Revised Penal Code. o This was originally supposed to be in the Bill of Rights. It would have changed the concept of persons. o Art 2, Sec 13 (Principles and State Policies): The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. o Art 3: Bill of Rights o RA 7192 (Feb. 12, 1992): Women in Development and Nation-Building Act o Sec 14, Art 3, 1987 Constitution: The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provide women rights and opportunities equal to that of men (RA 7192). o Sec 3, Sec 4, RA 7192: NEDA, with the assistance of the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, has the mandate to affect the participation of women in national development and their integration therein. o Sec 5, Equality in Capacity to Act : Women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances. In all contractual situations where married men have the capacity to act, married women shall have equal rights. o This repeals Par 2 of Art 39 of the Civil Code , which pertains to the modifications and limitations on the capacity to act . Par 2 reads: A married woman, 21 years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law. o Sec. 13, Effectivity Clause: The rights of women and all the provisions of this Act shall take effect immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. o Geluz v Court of Appeals (July 20, 1961)

14 o inalienable and intransmissible: outside of the commerce of man o imprescriptible o Only the name in the civil register can be changed. The name in the civil register is considered the true name of an individual. (Yasin v Judge, Sharia District Court) CHANGE OF NAME o Valid grounds for change of name (Republic v Marcos, 1990): o the name is ridiculous or tainted with dishonor o the change of name is a consequence of a change in legal status o the change is meant to avoid confusion o being unaware of alien parentage (In the case of Josefina Ang Chay v Republic, continuous use of the Filipino surname was also a valid reason for change of name.) o erase all former alienage (Uy v Republic: the alien name Uy caused his business to suffer and made it difficult for him to entertain civil organizations) o NOTE: The change of name must not be for fraudulent purposes, and must not prejudice public interest. It must not erase evidence of ancestry (Naldoza v Republic), or create confusion in paternity and discredit the legality of ones paternity (Padilla v Republic). o NOTE: The change of name is meant to provide an opportunity to a person to improve his personality and to provide his best interest (Republic v CA). o A change of name does not alter family relations nor create new rights. What is altered is only the label by which a person is known (Tolentino). o Petition for a change of name must include all names and aliases; otherwise, it defeats the purpose of publication (Telmo v Republic: title of case and order setting for hearing were deficient, as Milagros Telmo did not say she wanted to change her name to Thelmo). o Sec 1, CA 142, prior to amendment by RA 6805: a person is allowed to use the name with which he was christened of by which he has been known since childhood. RA 6085 regulates the use of aliases; it was approved on Aug. 4, 1969 (Tan v Civil Registrar of Cebu City). o CA 142 (An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases), before amendment, was originally meant to stop confusion and fraud in business transactions. It is a penal statute and should be construed in favor of the accused (Ursua v CA). (Personal note: CA 142 happened because the Chinese businessmen kept changing their names.) o An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to his real name (Ursua v CA). o The purpose of statutory procedure authorizing the change of name is to have a record of the change (Republic v CA). However, a clerical/typographical error can be corrected, and a first name or nickname can be changed in the civil registry, without need of a judicial order (RA 9048). o The State has an interest in the change of name for purposes of identification; it is a matter of sound judicial discretion, and not a right. (Republic v CA) MIDDLE NAME o A middle name is not required by law. However, if it is already part of ones name, it cannot be dropped (In re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang). o The question in the case of In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia (2005) was, Can an illegitimate child, upon adoption by the natural father, use the natural mothers surname as her middle name? YES. The Court held that the use of a surname is fixed by law, but the law is silent as to the use of a middle name. However, the OSG pointed out that in drafting the Family Code, the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name was recognized. The committees approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Justice Caguioa commented that the use of the surname of the father is mandatory, while the use of the surname of the mother is permissive. Because the intention of the adoption process is to make a child possess rights accorded to a legitimate child, and one of the rights of a legitimate child is the right to bear the surnames of both parents, Steph is entitled to use both her parents surnames. It preserves her filiation with her mother, as she remains an intestate heir of the latter, and removes the stigma of her illegitimacy. Also, adoption statutes are construed liberally in favor of adoption: it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail (Art 10, CC). USE OF NAME: CHILDREN o Principally (but not exclusively) uses the surname of the father: o natural child, but if recognized by only one parent, uses that parents surname o natural child by legal fiction o legitimate and legitimated children o Art 164, Family Code: legitimate children are those conceived or born during the marriage o Art 177, FC: legitimated children are those conceived out of wedlock, but whose parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other. Legitimation takes place by a subsequent valid marriage between the Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

15 parents (Art 178). This also pertains to children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage (Sutesta v Republic). o Illegitimate children o Art 165, Family Code: illegitimate children are those conceived and born outside of a valid marriage o Art 176, FC: Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. o Sec 1, RA 9255 (approved by GMA on Feb. 24, 2004): Article 176 of the Family Code is hereby amended to read as follows: o "Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child." o Adopted child o bears the surname of the adopter o In Johnston v Republic (1963), Isabel Valdes-Johnston wanted to change her adopted daughters surname to Johnston. However, the adoption was made singly by her, so the SC ruled that the adopted daughter carry the surname of the adopter. Using Johnstons name might mislead people as to the status of family relationships and raise questions of successional rights. o Republic v CA: it may be inferred that the use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a right. USE OF NAME: MARRIED WOMAN o A married woman may use her maiden name and add her husbands name, her first name and husbands surname, or husbands full name: o Grace Garcia-Recio o Grace Recio o Mrs. Rederick Recio o In the case of Telmo v Republic (1976): A married woman cannot change her husbands surname. It is the husband who must file the petition for change of name. o In the case of Legamia v IAC (1984), Corazon Legamia was accused of using the alias Corazon Reyes, in violation of CA 142, which governs the use of aliases. Corazon wasnt married to Emilio Reyesthey lived together and had a child, but Emilio was married to someone else. The legitimate wife was the one who filed the complaint. The Court ruled that Corazon was a wife in all appearances, and that the use of the surname Reyes would be allowed, especially for the benefit of the son. The court did a culture-based interpretation of the case, but Maam Ursua would have used legal principles, such as Sec 14, Art 2 of the 1987 Constitutionon the equal rights of women and men before the lawin order to decide this case. o It is Maam Ursuas opinion that some laws, like the name change laws, prejudice women. The RP entered a treaty on the anti-discrimination of women, which forms part of international human rights laws; thus, the State has an obligation to ensure the equality of men and women before the law (Sec 14, Art 2, 1987 Consti). o In the case of Tolentino v CA (1988), Constancia Tolentino tried to stop Consuelo David from using the Tolentino name, as David and Arturo Tolentino were divorced during the Japanese occupation, due to Davids desertion and abandonment. However, David was using the Tolentino name with the consent of both her ex-husband and his siblings. The Court ruled that NO, Constancia could not stop Consuelo from using the name Tolentino, as the use of a name is not a crime. Changing Consuelo David Tolentinos name would seriously dislocate her; besides, Constancia suffers no injury, as there is no usurpation of her namethere is no usurpation of her status as wife of Arturo Tolentino. The Court also held that the legal possibility of bringing the action to enjoin the divorced wife from using the surname of the former husband determines the starting point of the period of prescription (Tolentino). The Court also held that in his commentary on Art 370 of the Civil Code, Tolentino himself stated, the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it. Art 371 of the same code is not applicable to the case at bar because it speaks of annulment, not divorce. Annulment: it is as if there had been no marriage at all; divorce: it is as if the husband has died. o However, in the case of Yasin v Judge, Sharia District Court (1995), it was held that Art 370 and 371 of CC show that the use of a husbands name is permissive rather than obligatory. When a marriage no longer exists, there is no need for judicial confirmation of a change in civil status in order to revert to the maiden name. o Romeros concurring opinion: No law prohibits a woman from continuing to use her maiden name and surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to resume the same even as she uses her husbands family name during matrimony. o Vitugs concurring opinion: o It is mandatory that the husbands surname should be used during the existence of the marriage. Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

16 o In the case of legal separation, the wife must continue using the names employed before the decree of legal separation. She may not revert to her maiden name. o In the annulment of a marriage, refer to Art 371 of the CC. o In case of death of husband, the widow may use her husbands surname (Art 373, CC) or revert to her maiden name (general rule). o In case of divorce, the rule is the same as that of death of husband (Tolentino v CA). o In case of declaration of nullity of marriage , the general rule applies: she may use only her own maiden name. o Maam Ursuas opinion is that there is no difference in legal effects because annulment, divorce and death all end a presupposed valid marriage. She agrees with the application of Art 371 in Yasin. o Annulment (Art 371) o if wife is guilty: she shall resume her maiden name o if wife is innocent: she may resume her maiden name, or retain husbands surname, except when o court decrees otherwise o one of them gets married again to another person o Legal separation (Art 372) o It is mandatory for the wife to use her name before the legal separation, because legal separation does not dissolve marriage (Tolentino). o Widow (Art 373) o A widow may use husbands surname as though he were still living. The use of the husbands surname is optional, not obligatory (Tolentino). o Identical names (Art 374-375) o if unrelated: younger person uses additional name to avoid confusion o if related: son can use junior, other male descendants either add a middle name or mothers surname, or add roman numerals o Usurpation of name (Art 377): may be subject of action for damages. Usurpation means: injury to the interests of the name owner, and confusion of identity. The following are the elements of usurpation of a name (Tolentino; Tolentino v Court of Appeals): o there is an actual use of anothers name o the use is unauthorized o the use of anothers name is to designate personality or identify a person o Art 378: Unauthorized or unlawful use of another persons surname gives right of action to the latter. o Art 379: Pen names: permitted, provided done in good faith and there is no injury to third persons. These cannot be usurped. o Art 380: Except for pen names, no person shall use different names and surnames.

EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY: Art 234 & 236, FC AGE OF MAJORITY o Art 234, FC: Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of twenty-one years. Emancipation also takes place: o By the marriage of the minor; or o By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by the parent exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be irrevocable. o Sec 1, RA 6809 (Dec 13, 1989): Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows: o "Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years." EMANCIPATION o Art 236, FC: Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. o Sec 3, RA 6809: Art 236 is also hereby amended to read as follows: o "Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases. o "Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twentyone. o "Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twentyone years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code." o Marriage of a person between 18 and 21 years old still requires parental consent. Anomaly: an emancipated person still requires parental consent in order to contract marriage (Tolentino). o Another anomalous situation: Parental authority ceases at 18, while responsibility for a childs torts continues until the age of 21 (Tolentino). ABSENCE: Art 381-396, Civil Code

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17 o intestate heirs o those who may have some right, subordinated to the condition of his death, to the property of the absentee o When does a judicial declaration of absence take effect? (Art 386) o 6 months after publication in a newspaper of general circulation ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY OF ABSENTEE o What authority does the wife-administratrix hold over the absentee husbands property? o She holds all administrative authority o Art 142, FC: The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred to the court to the other spouse (2) when one spouse is judicially declared an absentee. o Except in the sale or encumbrance of property. o Art 388, CC: The wife-administratrix cannot alienate or encumber the husbands property, or that of conjugal partnership, without judicial authority. o When does administration cease? (Art 389) o when the absentee appears, either personally or through an agent o when the absentees death is proven and the in/testate heirs appear o when a 3rd person appears, showing by a proper document that he has acquired the absentees property by purchase or other title PRESUMPTION OF DEATH o When is an absentee presumed dead? o for all purposes, except succession: after a 7-year absence o for succession: after a 10-year absence o for succession: if absentee is over 75 years old and has been absent for 5 years o for re-marriage of spouse present: after a 4-year absence, if spouse present believes absent spouse is already dead (Art 41, FC) o When is death presumed to have occurred? o on the last day of the period of absence required by law o starting date of period of absence: date of last receipt of news o Art 391: MISSING PERSONS o People to be presumed dead for ALL PURPOSES: o 4 years since: o loss of ship during sea voyageperson onboard Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

o Tolentino: Absence is that special legal status of one who is not in his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and it is uncertain whether he is dead or alive. o 2 kinds of absences: o ordinary absence: disappearance under normal circumstances, without apparent danger o qualified absence: disappearance under extraordinary circumstances, or with apparent danger o Stages of absence: o temporary or provisional absence o a person disappears o whereabouts unknown o no administrator of his property o normal or declared absence o judicially declared o after 2 years since the last news was heard from him o after 5 years if he left an administrator o definite absence or presumptive death o takes place when, after the period provided by law, a person is presumed dead PROVISIONAL ABSENCE o When may a representative be appointed? o no news of person who has disappeared after a reasonable period has lapsed o immediate necessity for his representation in specific, urgent matters o Who may be appointed as representative for absentee? (Art 383) o the spouse is preferred, when there is no legal separation and the spouse is not a minor o any competent person o What rules govern the powers, obligations and remuneration of the representative? Rules concerning guardians. (Art 382) DECLARED ABSENCE o When may absence be declared? (Art 384) o after 2 years without any news, or since receipt of the last news o after 5 years if the absentee has left an administrator o Who may ask for the declaration of absence? (Art 385) o spouse present o testate heirs

18 o loss of airplaneperson onboard o participation in war (all military operations or armed fighting)armed forces o disappearance, in danger of death and other circumstancescount from the last day, ex. 3-day earthquake or expedition o only 2 years, if for remarriage of spouse present (Art 41, FC) o Presumptive date of death for missing persons: day of the occurrence of the event, or if it cannot be fixed, the court determines the middle of the period in which the event could have happened. IF SPOUSE PRESENT WANTS TO REMARRY o Art 41, FC: The spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. ABSENTEE APPEARS o Art 392: Absentee can recover all his property in the condition it may be found but cannot claim either fruits or rents. Others possession of property ceases when absentee appears. IN CASE OF SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE, absentee spouse has to terminate spouse presents new marriage. An affidavit of reappearance has to be recorded in the local civil registry, under Art 42 of FC. Without this, the presumption of death continues, regardless of absentees reappearance. ABSENTEES RIGHTS o Art 393: An absentee must prove that he was actually alive at the time that his existence was necessary for the acquisition of a right. Life is not presumed before the date of presumptive death. o Art 394: If an absentee stands to inherit something, his share goes to his coheirs, unless he has heirs, assigns or a representative. They shall all make an inventory of the property. o Art 395: The rights vested in an absentee, his representatives or successors in interest shall not be extinguished save by lapse of time fixed for prescription. o Art 396: Whoever inherited anything shall appropriate the fruits receive in good faith, so long as the absentee does not appear, or while absentees representatives or successors do not bring proper actions. FUNERALS: Art 305-310, Civil Code

o A corpse cannot be the subject of rights, because juridical personality is extinguished by death. Neither is it property. o Why does the State give juridical protection to corpses? o to protect the feelings of those related to the deceased o to avoid dangers to the health of the living o to allow scientific investigation and study o Chapter XXI, PD 856 (Code on Sanitation of the Philippines, December 23, 1975): Disposal of Dead Persons. A body can be scientifically investigated or studied; for example, for health reasons. o Burial grounds requirements o Burial requirements o Disinterment requirements o Funeral and embalming establishments o Licensing and registration procedures o Autopsy and dissection of remains o Donation of Human Organs for Medical, Surgical and Scientific purposes o Use of Remains for Medical Studies and Scientific Research o Special Precautions for Safe Handling of Cadavers Containing Radioactive Isotopes o Responsibility of regional director, local health authority, and local government o Penal provisions o Who have a duty and a right to make funeral arrangements? o Art 305: The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Art 199 of FC. o spouse o direct descendants in the nearest degree, oldest preferred o ascendants in the nearest degree, paternal preferred o brothers and sisters o NOT collateral blood relations o No specific rule on legitimate v illegitimate children in the succession order. o Art 306: Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased. o Art 307: How shall a funeral be done? o in accordance with expressed wishes of deceased, as long as these are not contrary to law, or o his religious beliefs or affiliations, or Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

19 o in case of doubt, it shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements, after consulting the other members of the family o Art 308: What if a person wanted to retain, inter, dispose of or exhume a corpse? o need consent of persons obliged to make funeral arrangements, o except if utterly necessary: if it is in the public interest, or if it is required for justice to prevail, then the law will prevail over the will of persons who have a right to control the burial. o RA 349 recognizes the validity of an authorization given by a person to use parts of his corpse for medical, surgical and scientific purposes (Tolentino). o Art 309: Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral, shall be liable to the family of the deceased for damages both material and moral. o There is no specific provision on what constitutes disrespect for the dead. o Art 310: The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed a part of the funeral expenses, and shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the spouses. o In Eugenio, Sr. v Velez (May 17, 1990), the Court held that the petitioner could not be considered a legal spouse of Vitaliana Vargas as he had no legal capacity to marry her while she was alive, and thus, he had no right to her body as a legal spouse. The body of Vitaliana Vargas went to the nearest of kinher siblings. o o o o o o loss or recovery of citizenship civil interdiction judicial determination of filiation voluntary emancipation of a minor change of name

o Art 409: In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial orders mentioned in the preceding article, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to the civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is functioning. o Art 410: The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence. o Art 411: Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any unauthorized alteration made in any civil register, to any person suffering damage thereby. EXCEPT: if he proves that he has taken every reasonable precaution to prevent the unlawful alteration. o Art 412: No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order. o RA 9048 (March 22, 2001): An Act authorizing the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general to correct a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register without need of a judicial order. o This RA amends Art 376 (change of name, judicial order) and 412 (civil register, judicial order) of the Civil Code. o Sec 4, RA 9048: The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: o The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. o The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that by that first name or nickname in the community. o The change will avoid confusion. o Art 413: All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. o RA 3753 (Civil Registry Law, effective Feb. 26, 1931) o Who is the Civil Registrar-General? The Director of the Bureau of the Census and Statistics o Who is the Manila local civil registrar? An officer of the Philippine Health Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

CIVIL REGISTER: Art 407-413, Civil Code o Art 407: Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. o Art 408: The following shall be entered in the civil register: o births o marriages o deaths o legal separations o annulments of marriage o judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning o legitimations o adoptions o acknowledgments of natural children o naturalization

20 Service, designated by the Director of the said Service. o Who is the local civil registrar for everywhere else? The treasurers. o What are the civil registrar books? o birth and death register o marriage register o legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name, and naturalization register o Registration and certification of births o Death certificate and register o Registration of marriage o Registration of legitimations by subsequent marriage o Registration of acknowledgments of natural children by public instrument o Registration of adoptions, changes of names, and naturalization o Duties of local civil registrars o Documents registered are public documents o CA 625 (June 7, 1941): An Act providing the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen. o Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution1 shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. o Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the statement herein authorized before any officer of the Philippine Embassy or Consulate authorized to administer oaths, and he shall forward such statement together with his oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry of Manila. o Section 3. The civil registrar shall collect as filing fees of the statement, the amount of ten pesos. o PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code, effective 6 months after Dec. 10, 1974): Article 37. The adoption shall be recorded in the local civil register and shall be annotated on the record of birth, and the same shall entitle the adopted person to the issuance of an amended certificate of birth. o PD 651 (effective 45 days after Jan. 31, 1975): Requiring the registration of births and deaths in the Philippines which occurred from January 1, 1974 and thereafter. o WHEREAS, government surveys reveal that every year twenty five to forty per cent of all births and death occurring in the Philippines are not registered in the office of the local civil registrar as required by Act 3753; o WHEREAS, this big number of under-registration adversely affects the program of government in promoting the health and social conditions of the people especially the youth because of difficulty in gathering complete vital statistics due to the under-registration of births and deaths; WHEREAS, to provide primary sources of vital statistics for use in various population studies in order to formulate more effective health and social plan for the country, the immediate registration of unregistered births and deaths is imperative; Section 2. Period of registration of births. The registration of the birth of babies referred to in the preceding section must be done within sixty (60) days from the date of effectivity of this decree without or fee or any kind. Babies born after the effectivity of this decree must be registered in the office of the local civil registrar of the place of birth within thirty (30) days after birth, by the attending physician, nurse, midwife, hilot or hospitals or clinic administrator or, in default of the same, by either parent or a responsible member of the family or any person who has knowledge of the birth. The parents or the responsible member of the family and the attendant at birth or the hospital or clinic administrator referred to above shall be jointly liable in case they fail to register the new born child. If there was no attendant at birth, or if the child was not born in a hospital or maternity clinic, then the parents or the responsible member of the family alone shall be primarily liable in case of failure to register the new born child. Section 5. Period of reporting and registration of deaths . The registration of deaths referred to in the preceding section must be done within sixty (60) days from the date of effectivity of this decree without fine or fee of any kind. Deaths occurring after the effectivity of this decree must be reported by the nearest responsible relative or any person who has knowledge of the death within 48 hours after death to the local health officer of the place of death, who shall then issue the corresponding certificate of death and order its registration in the office of the local civil registrar within thirty (30) days after death. In case the deceased was attended to by a physician, the latter must issue the necessary certificate of death within 48 hours after death and submit the same to the local health officer of the place of death, who shall order its registration in the office of the local civil registrar within the said period of thirty (30) days after death. Section 8. Implementing official. The Civil Registrar General in (sic) hereby authorized to issue rules and regulations, orders or circulars to implement this decree.

o PD 766 (August 8, 1975): Amends Sec 2 and Sec 5 of PD 651 o Section 1. Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 651 is hereby amended to read as follows: o "Sec. 2. Period of Registration of births. The registration of the birth of babies referred to in the preceding section including those unregistered births which occurred from March 17, 1975, to November 30, 1975, must be done until December 31, 1975, without fine or fee of any kind. Babies born after November 30, 1975 and thereafter, must be registered within thirty (30) days from birth without fine or fee of any kind by the attending physician, nurse, midwife, hilot or hospital or clinic administrator or, in default of the Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

21 same, by either parent or a responsible member of the family or any person who has knowledge of the birth. "The parents or any responsible member of the family and the attendant at birth or the hospital or clinic administrator referred to above shall be jointly liable in case they fail to register the new born child. If there was no attendant at birth, or if the child was not born in a hospital or a maternity clinic, then the parents or responsible member of the family alone shall be primarily liable in case of failure to register the new born child." o Section 2. Section 5 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows: o Sec. 5. Period of reporting and registration of deaths. The registration of deaths referred to in the preceding Section including those unregistered deaths which occurred from March 17, 1975, to November 30, 1975, must be done until December 31, 1975, without fine or fee of any kind. Deaths occurring November 30, 1975 and thereafter, must be reported by the nearest responsible relative or any person who has knowledge of the death within 48 hours after death to the Local Health Officer of the place of death, who shall then issue the corresponding certificate of death and order its registration in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar within thirty (30) days after death, without fee or fine of any kind. In case the deceased was attended to by a physician, the latter must issue the necessary certificate of death within 48 hours after death and submit the same to the Local Health Officer of the place of death, who shall order its registration in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar within the said period of thirty (30) days after death, without fee or fine of any kind. The attending physician and responsible member of the family or person who has knowledge of the death are jointly liable to report the death to the Local Health Officer, for registration by the Local Civil Registrar of the place of the death. If the deceased was not attended by a physician or did not die in the hospital, the responsible member of the family alone shall be responsible for failure to submit the report of death to the Local Health Officer. o Section 3. The same decree is amended by adding the following section immediately after Section 5 thereof, which read as follows: o "Sec. 5-A. Extension of Registration. The aforecited periods within which to register unregistered births and deaths may be extended in meritorious cases by the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority upon the recommendation of the Civil Registar-General." o PD 1083 (effective Feb. 4, 1977): The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines o EO 121 (Jan. 30, 1987): Reorganizing and strengthening the Philippine statistical system and for other purposes. (Reorganization Act of the Philippine Statistical System.) o National Statistical Coordination Board o National Statistics Office o Statistical Research and Training Center Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013 o Other Statistics Offices o Abolition of NEDA offices

22 III. FAMILY RELATIONS o The definitions of marriage and family are not in the Constitution. We need to refer to other laws. o There is no Constitutional provision against the legalization of divorce. o Remember that a family is not just an institution, but a unit composed of individuals with rights. o Old rule: Spousal Unity Doctrine: womans identity is absorbed into that of the mans o New rule: Separate Spheres Doctrine: home vs outside world o Women used to be considered propertymerely objects of the law. But international clamor for changes in the law, so that women may be recognized as full human beings, prompted the creation of a gender equality provision in the 1987 Constitution. Now, women are almost-subjects of the law. o Classification based on sex is now held suspectthe strict scrutiny standard is applied. o 1987 Constitution o Art 2: National Principles, State Policies o Sec 11: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. o Sec 12: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life o Sec 14: The State recognizes the role of women o Art 3: Bill of Rights o Sec 1: Life, liberty, property, due process and equal protection o Sec 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches o Sec 6: The liberty of abode, changing the same, and right to travel o Art 15: The Family o Filipino family as foundation of the nation o Marriage as an inviolable social institution o Malang v Moson (Aug. 22, 2000) o Neng Malang v Judge Corocoy Moson, 5th Sharia District Court, et al o Facts: o Hadjis 1st marriage: Hadji Abdula Malang married Aida Kenanday Limba in Maguindanao. He bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. He had 2 kids with Aida. o Hadjis 2nd marriage: Hadji Abdula married for the second timeJubaida Kado. They were childless. o Hadjis 1st divorce: Aida had 1 more kid and, while pregnant with the 4 th kid, o Hadji Abdula divorced her. o Hadjis 3rd marriage: 1965: Hadji Abdula married Nayo Omar. They were childless. o Hadjis 4th marriage: he married Hadji Mabai Adziz in Maguindanao. They had a daughter named Fatima. o Hadjis 5th, 6th, 7th marriages: Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai. o Hadjis 2nd, 3rd, 4th divorces: He divorced his last 3 wives. o Hadjis 8th marriage: 1972: Neng Malang, Cotabato City. They were childless, but Hadji acquired lots of land (and rent) in Cotabato. o December 18, 1993: Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. o January 21, 1994: Neng Malang filed with the Sharia District Court a petition for the settlement of his estate, praying letters be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban. Neng Malangs claim: o she was the wife of Hadji Abdula o the other legal heirs were eldest son, second son and daughter by 4 th marriage o 5 of the 7 parcels of land he left behind are titled in his name as the husband of Neng Malang Eldest son Hadji Mohammads claim: o legal heirs: all 4 surviving spouses, all surviving children o he and the second son had helped Abdula in business, and were more competent to be administrators of estate Sharia District Court held: o Eldest son as administrator of properties outside Cotabato City o Neng Malang and second son as joint administrators of estate within Cotabato City Neng Malang filed with the SDC: o all properties within Cotabato City were conjugal (Art 160, CC and Art 116, FC) o all properties outside of Cotabato City were exclusively Abdulas oppositors contend: o Abdula had no conjugal property with Neng Malang because his 8 marriages with different Muslim women violated the monogamous marriage provided for in the Civil Code: a conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage o Abdula had adopted a complete separation of property regime in his marital relations o presumption that properties acquired during marriage were conjugal properties inapplicable: he was married to 4 women o the descriptive phrase married to Neng Malang does not necessarily mean the property was conjugal; if conjugal, property shouldve been in both their names Judge Corocoy Moson held: Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

23 o no conjugal partnership of gains between Neng and Abdula because Abdula married 8 times: CC provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if there is more than one wife o Abdula was breadwinner; also, found that Neng did not contribute to other properties, unlike the other wives o married to Neng Malang is just a description o Civil Code: Assuming that Neng and Abdula had agreed that the property regime between them will be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership property, the agreement would be null and void for it is against the law, public policy, etc. o Art 38, PD 1083: the regime of property relationship is complete separation of property o Neng Malang said the SDC erred in o following the old rule: declaring that there was no conjugal property because of the 3 existing marriages o following the new rule: holding that property was not conjugal because of Islamic law PRIOR TO EFFECTIVITY OF MUSLIM CODE o What law governs the validity of a Muslim marriage before the effectivity of the Muslim Code? o All 8 marriages of Abdula happened under the Civil Code. o Art 78, CC: Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with Article 92. However, twenty years after approval of this Code, all marriages performed between Mohammedans or pagans shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this Code. But the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, may at any time before the expiration of said period, by proclamation, make any of said provisions applicable to the Mohammedan and non-Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces. o This was negated by PD 1083, which took effect on Feb. 4, 1977. o Are multiple marriages prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code considered valid? How do the cases of People v Subano and People v Dumpo affect Muslim marriages prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code? o Prior to the Muslim Code, no law sanctioned multiple marriages. o After the Muslim Code took effect, Art 186: Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution. o The Civil Code upholds and nurtures monogamous marriages. o People v Subano: polygamy is not sanctioned by law o People v Dumpo: bigamy is not sanctioned by law o What laws govern property relationships of Muslim multiple marriages, preMuslim Code? o The Civil Code applies: it was the only law on marriage relations at the time. Art 119, 135, 136, 142, 143 and 144 of CC apply. o Laws governing property relations depends on o when the marriages took place o if parties lived together as husband and wife o when and how the properties were acquired o The Civil Code requires that the man and the woman live exclusively with each other. o According to Art 144 of the Civil Code, Abdula was not capacitated to marry. o Wives in marriages may prove property as exclusively theirs. o Property acquired during a valid subsisting marriage is conjugal property. AFTER THE MUSLIM CODE AND THE FAMILY CODE TOOK EFFECT o What law governs the succession of a Muslims estate after these two Codes took effect? What laws apply to the dissolution of property regime in cases of multiple marriages before the Muslim Code, but dissolved after the Muslim Code? o Because Abdula died in 1993, it is the Muslim Code that will determine the identification of his intestate heirs and succession. It is the Muslim Codes provisions on legal succession that will apply. o The status and capacity of each wife will depend on the law in force at the time of marriage. o The status and capacity of each child will depend on the law in force at the time of conception or birth. Prior to Feb. 4, 1977, it is the Civil Code that determines child legitimacy. From Feb. 4, 1977 to Abdulas death, it is the Muslim Code that determines child legitimacy. o Are Muslim divorces before the Muslim Code valid? o RA 349 authorized absolute divorce from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969. o 4 corollary issues o Just one marriage was valid, because the CC applied. o The children of the valid marriage are legitimate children. o Properties: o Properties acquired during a valid marriage are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code, as MC was in effect when Abdula died. o Properties acquired from Aug 13, 1950 to Aug 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and should be divided between the spouses under the Civil Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

24 Code. o Properties acquired from Aug. 3, 1988 onwards are governed by the Family Codes rules on co-ownership. o Properties not covered by the above are exclusively Abdulas. o Abdulas legal heirs were his legal wife and legitimate children. Succession will be governed by PD 1083. o NOTE: even if the property regime was established before the effectivity of the Family Code, the Family Code applies. Case remanded for additional evidence. o RA 9262: "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" o SEC. 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victims daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. The provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection orders that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO) . The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs: o 1. Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; o 2. Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; o 3. Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence; o 4. Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member; o 5. Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioners or respondents removal of personal belongingness; o 6. Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner; o Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondents employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

MARRIAGE: Art 1-34, Family Code

WHAT IS MARRIAGE? o Art 1: What is marriage? o Special contract o Permanent union o Has to be in accordance with law o Meant to establish conjugal and family life o Foundation of the family o Inviolable social institution (Art 15, 1987 Consti) o Governed by law, not subject to stipulation o May fix property relations within the limits provided by FC o Maam Ursua says that the law heavily regulates marriage . The only things left to the contracting parties are certain aspects of the family relationship and property relations. On the whole, the law governs. o The cases tell us that the law presumes marriage. Such is the order of society. It is because of this presumption that, prior to the Family code, the state policy in Art 2, Sec 12 of the 1987 Constitution was invoked whenever spouses want to separate. However, thanks to Art 36, which is our de facto divorce law, this bias in favor of marriage has lessened. A good example is RA 9262, which defines violence against women and children, gives protective measures for victims and prescribes penaltiesMaam Ursua says that it has a provision against judges influencing women to stay married despite the violence. (I couldnt find it though. I looked. It seems that the RA only regulates courts administration of justice for the victims.)

25 Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court; 8. Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on matter; 9. Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income; 10. Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and 11. Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated family or household member consents to such relief. Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a decree of legal separation or annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the court from granting a TPO or PPO. Sec 19. Legal Separation Cases. In cases of legal separation, where violence as specified in this Act is alleged, Article 58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The court shall proceed on the main case and other incidents of the case as soon as possible. The hearing on any application for a protection order filed by the petitioner must be conducted within the mandatory period specified in this Act. Sect. 24. Prescription Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years. SEC. 33. Prohibited Acts. A Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad or the court hearing an application for a protection order shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly influence he applicant for a protection order to compromise or abandon any of the reliefs sought in the application for protection under this Act. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings where relief is sought under this Act. Failure to comply with this Section shall render the official or judge administratively liable. A FEW NOTES ON THE OLD CIVIL CODE, FROM TOLENTINO o The Civil Code rule was that women could marry at 14, and men, at 16. Marriage used to effect emancipation. However, the age of consent for marriage was raised to 21 for both sexes in the Family Code. It is the age of legal capacity to marry. o The Civil Code rule was that a widow could not remarry 300 days after the death of her husband, unless a child was born in the meantime. The Family Code, however, recognizes the validity of the subsequent marriage of the widow within 300 days after death of the husband, as Art 168 of FC provides for this situation. o Art 168, FC: o child born x < 180 days after subsequent marriage and born 300 days after termination of first marriage was conceived during previous marriage o child born x > 180 days after subsequent marriage even if born within 300 days after termination of first marriage was conceived during subsequent marriage o The old Marriage Law was that the absence of parental consent did not invalidate the marriage. However, under both the Family Code and the Civil Code, the absence of parental consent renders a marriage voidable. o Art 77 of the Civil Code says that In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations of any church, sect or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of chapter I of this Title (for valid marriages) and any ratification so made shall be considered as a purely religious ceremony. This was not included in the Family Code, but it is generally held that this rule still applies. o On period of absence and presumptive death for purposes of remarriage: o Civil Code: 7-year absence for presumption of death o Family Code: 4-year absence for presumption of death o In extraordinary cases, Civil Code: 4 years and Family Code: 2 years. Please see the section on Absence and Presumptive Death. A NOTE ON EO 277 o EO 277 amended Arts 26, 36 and 39 of the Family Code. It became effective when the Family Code became effective, even if it was issued on July 17, 1987. MORE TOLENTINO o What is marriage? o procedure by which a man and a woman become husband and wife o that act by which a man and a woman unite for life, with the intent to discharge towards society and one another those duties which result from the relation of husband and wife o the change of status produced by the act o a status involving duties and responsibilities that are the concern of the Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

o o o

o o o

o o

26 State o the civil status of one man and one woman, legally united for life, with rights and duties which, for the establishment of families and the multiplication of the species are assigned by law to matrimony o What is the purpose of marriage? o reproduction o education of offspring o mutual help o What are the characteristics of marriage? o civil o an institution of public order or policy o natural o What makes marriage a sui generis contract? o only one man and one woman can enter into a marriage contract o the law, and not an agreement with the force of law, fixes the duties and rights of the parties o cannot be terminated o no damages for breach of obligations of a spouse o What does marriage affect? o personal and economic relations o legitimacy o family relationships o penal laws affecting husband and wife o No laws penalize breach of contract to marry. However, damages can be sought if there has been o an abuse of right o unjust enrichment / TOLENTINO WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE? o Essential requisites (Art 2) o legal capacity of male and female o REQUISITES: o 18 and up (Art 5) o Art 35[1] renders void any marriage of those below 18 o age of legal capacity is actually 21 o if 18-21, need parental consent, either by personal appearance before local civil registrar, or affidavit of consent executed in the presence of 2 witnesses (Art 14), otherwise, marriage is VOIDABLE (Art 45, 47); o if 21-25, need parental advice; unfavorable or zero advice delays the issuance of the marriage license til after three months following the completion of publication of the application (Art 15) o not incestuous (Art 37) o not collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree (Art 38) o no subsisting prior marriage; no bigamy, no polygamy (Art 35[4]) (Art 41 renders subsequent marriages void, except in cases of absent spouse presumed dead) o psychological capacity (Art 36; incapacity renders marriage void) o consent freely given in the presence of solemnizing officer o conscious, intelligent, informed, real consent o not vitiated by mistake, duress, fraud, drugs! :D o not contracted through mistake of identity (Art 35[5]) o Formal requisites (Art 3) o authority of solemnizing officer o WHO MAY PERFORM MARRIAGE? o ONE: incumbent member of judiciary within courts jurisdiction (Art 7[1]) o TWO: any priest, rabbi, imam, minister duly authorized by church or religious sect o registered with the Civil Registrar General o acting within limits of written authority granted by his church or sect o provided that at least one contracting party belongs to the same church or sect (all Art 7[2]) o THREE: ship captain or airplane chief (Art 7[3]; note that these guys HAVE to have licenses to prove that theyre captains/chiefs) ONLY if marriage is in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, or during stopovers at ports of call (Art 31) o FOUR: military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned BUT chaplain is absent, DURING military operation (Art 7[4]); IF marriage is in Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

27 articulo mortis between persons WITHIN zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians (Art 32) o FIVE: consul-general, consul, vice-consul (Art 7[4]) IF marriages are between Filipino citizens abroad; consul also takes care of missing marriage license, duties of local civil registrar and solemnizing officer (Art 10) o SIX: mayors of municipalities and cities can solemnize marriages IF within their cities/municipalities (Local Government Code) o EXCEPT: solemnizing officer NOT legally authorized BUT either or both parties believed in good faith that he did have authority (Art 35[2]). This is a rule from the old Code which was removed in the new one, but which was reinstated in the Family Code. The Family Code provides a retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice vested/acquired rights; thus, it can validate the marriage in question and favors the validity of marriage. o valid marriage license o DEFECTIVE if wrongfully obtained (Tolentino) o DEFECTIVE if filed in a place different from habitual residence of either party (Tolentino) o DEFECTIVE if issued before the expiration of 10 days required for posting (Art 17) o DELAYED if o 18-21 and no certificate from solemnizing officer or marriage counselor that parties have undergone marriage counseling (Art 16) o 21-25 and lack of parental advice, favorable or otherwise (Art 15) o IMPEDIMENT is noted on the application for marriage license (Art 18) o VALID for 120 days in any part of the Philippines, and shall be automatically cancelled at expiration of the said period of the parties have not made use of it (Art 20) o IF FOREIGNER, must submit certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by diplomatic or consular officials in order to obtain marriage license (Art 21) o IF STATELESS, must submit affidavit stating the circumstances showing capacity to contract marriage (Art 21); if stateless, legal capacity should be determined by Philippine laws, and FC provisions apply (Tolentino) o ISSUED by local civil registrar where either party habitually resides (Art 9) after payment of fees prescribed by law or regulations, or be issued free of charge to indigent parties, as long as the indigents prove that they have insufficient income via affidavit or oath before the local civil registrar (Art 19) rites or practices (Art 33); Muslim marriages are governed by PD 1083, since Feb. 4, 1977. two: man and woman have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, without any legal impediment to marry; contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage (Art 34) three: either or both of the parties are at point of death (Art 27; see also Art 31 [ship captain/airplane pilot] and Art 32 [military]) four: if residence of either party is such that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before local civil registrar (Art 28) HOWEVER, for three and four, solemnizing officer must state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that marriage was in articulo mortis or barangay/barrio is such that there is no means of transportation to enable the party to appear personally before the local civil registrar. Affidavit must also state that officer took necessary steps to ascertain ages, relationship of parties and absence of legal impediment to marriage (Art 29). o original affidavit from previous point, together with legible copy of marriage contract, shall be sent by solemnizing officer to the local civil registrar of municipality where it was performed within 30 days after performance of the marriage (Art 30)

o o o

o Need valid marriage license EXCEPT WHEN o one: marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of a marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs,

o marriage ceremony o REQUISITES: o appearance of contracting parties before solemnizing officer o personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife o must be in marriage certificate, signed by parties and witnesses and attested by solemnizing officer (Art 6[1]) o except in articulo mortis: witness can write name of party at point of death, attested by solemnizing officer (Art 6[2]) o 2 witnesses of legal age o no form or religious rite is required for the solemnization of the marriage (Art 6) o marriage has to be solemnized PUBLICLY (Art 8) o chambers of judge or in open court o church, chapel, temple o office of consul-general etc o EXCEPT in cases of marriages in articulo mortis o EXCEPT if one of the parties is in a remote place with no means of transportation (Art 29) o EXCEPT if both parties request to the solemnizing officer, in writing, for a Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

28 different place (Art 8) o DEFECTIVE if solemnized in a place not provided for by law (Tolentino) o DEFECTIVE if solemnizing officer fails to execute and issue marriage certificate (Tolentino) o Art 4: Absence of any essential or formal requisite renders the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Art 35[2]: if solemnizing officer NOT legally authorized BUT either or both parties believed in good faith that he did have authority. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party/ies responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. o void o if 1 essential requisite is absent o declaration of nullity of the marriage o marriage is void from the beginning o declaration of the court terminates the marriage o voidable o if 1 formal requisite is defective o petition for annulment o marriage is valid until annulled o action of the court terminates the marriage o Art 11: Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local registrar o Art 12: Documents required by local civil registrar as proof of age: o original or certified copies of birth certificates o in absence of birth certificates, original or certified copies of baptismal certificates o in absence of baptismal certificates, residence certificate or affidavit of two witnesses o NO DOCUMENTS NECESSARY IF o parents of parties appear personally before local civil registrar and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of parties (Art 12) o local civil registrar can tell, just by looking at parties upon their personal appearance before him, that they are of age (Art 12) o a party was formerly married, but is widowed, divorced, or had a previous marriage invalidated. However, need to present death certificate of deceased spouse, judicial decree of absolute divorce, or judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity. If no death certificate, affidavit setting forth his circumstance, actual civil status and name and date of death of deceased spouse (Art 13). o Art 22: Marriage certificate states: o o o o o o o full name, sex and age of parties citizenship, religion and habitual residence date and precise time of celebration of marriage proper marriage license has been issued according to law parental consent, if 18-21 parental advice, if 21-25 marriage settlementscopy attached

o Art 23: Solemnizing officer has to distribute copies of the marriage certificate: o original copy: either contracting party o 2nd and 3rd copies: local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized, not later than 15 days after the marriage; the local civil registrar has to send receipts o 4th copy: goes to solemnizing officers files, along with original marriage license and affidavit of contracting party regarding solemnization of marriage in a place other than those in Art 8. o Art 24: Duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents and administer oaths o Art 25: The local civil registrar shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a registry book o Art 26: o Foreign marriage is valid if o provisions of foreign law are proven as fact o that marriage is solemnized in accordance with those provisions is proven as fact o and valid here (not incestuous, etc) o EXCEPTIONS: private international law (Tolentino) o if marriage is deemed contrary to the law of nature and good morals as generally recognized in Christian countries o if marriages which the local law-making power has declared shall not be allowed any validity o Mixed marriage o if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law (Art 26) o from 1950-1988, if the Filipino citizen obtains the divorce, the divorce will not be recognized in the Philippines, and the person cannot remarry under our law (Art 15 CC) o HOWEVER, in Van Dorn v Romillo, it was the Filipino who initiated divorce. This was in 1985no FC yetbut the court used equity to declare Van Dorn legally capacitated to remarry (She cannot be discriminated against in her own country). Thus, Art 26 in the FC. Look also at Republic v Orbecido Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

29 III. o Art 38[9]: Marriage is void if spouse, with intention to marry the other, kills the other persons spouse, or own spouse. (LOL) CASES ARTICLE 1 o Perido v Perido (March 12, 1975) (Leonora et al v Maria et al) o On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition." Afterwards, the children of the first marriage filed a complaint against the children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots for them alone. They alleged that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in question through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The RTC annulled the extrajudicial partition document. However, the RTC found that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimat; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. o HELD: The Court of Appeals found that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. Under the circumstances, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900. Lucio and Marcelina were presumed to have been married. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonioalways presume marriage. o Selanova v Mendoza (May 19, 1975) (Administrative complaint) o Administrative complaint in SC. Gross ignorance of the law. Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Mendoza of Mandaue City with gross ignorance of the law for having prepared and ratifying a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of complainant and his wife Avelina Ceniza. o Conditions of liquidation: o either spouse would withdraw complaints for adultery/concubinage theyd filed against each other o waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity o J. Mendoza said he knew document was invalid but did it anyway because the spouses said theyd ask CFI Negros Oriental to approve the agreement. He relied on Art 191 (4) of the CC: husband and wife may agree upon dissolution of conjugal partnership of marriage subject to judicial approval. His mistake was that the judicial sanction for dissolution should be secured beforehand. o HELD: The document was void because it contravenes Art 221 of the Civil Code: any contract for personal separation between H&W, and extrajudicial agreement for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains/propertyeven before the new CC, Court held that extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains without judicial approval was void. Also, even if adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are still crimes: a contract legalizing them is contrary to law, public order, morals, etc. and not judicially recognizable (Panganiban v Borromeo). Renouncing rights and obligations, and not bearing witness against each other in crimes, is ILLEGAL. o Vda de Maraug v Silapan (March 29, 1984) o This case is about the jurisdiction of a Sharia District Court over Muslims in Davao. o Sadin Maraug wanted to be administrator of estates of spouses Sangtan and Taraboka. Sangtans 3rd wife, Manuela Vda de Maraug, said she wanted to be administrator. The RTC judge dismissed this case, as it is not within the RTCs jurisdictionaccording to PD 1083, it is within the Sharia Courts jurisdiction. Manuela and Sadin said no, the RTC has jurisdiction. o HELD: The dismissal was erroneous: at the time of the case, there were no existing Sharia Courts. These had not yet been organized, even if Art 138 and 150 of PD 1083 establish the Sharia District and City Courts. The dismissal was reversed; RTC ordered to proceed with intestate case. It seems that RTC has concurrent jurisdiction with Sharia Courts. o People v Mawallil (June 19, 1984) o Sukarno Mawallil was convicted of parricide by the CFI. He argued that it was not parricide, as he and Sophia were not married according to Art 17 of PD 1083; Sophia had not divorced with her first husband in accordance with the Code. The CFI held that Sophia divorced her first husband on March 7, 1977 before a Muslim leader, and that the divorce was valid according to Muslim customs. Her subsequent marriage to Sukarno was also in accordance with Muslim customs; Sukarno had admitted to the marriage and had referred to Sophia as his wife. o HELD: Always presume marriage; every intendment of law/fact leans towards marriage (Art 220 CC). o Trinidad v CA (April 20, 1998) o In absence of marriage contract and birth certificate, marriage and filiation may be proven by showing a certificate from the Local Civil Registrar, and records of births, deaths and marriages. 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30 ARTICLE 6 o Martinez v Tan (Feb. 5, 1909) o Were Martinez and Tan married on Sept. 25, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in Palompon, Leyte? YES. o Evidence: o expediente de matrimonio civil mutual agreement to enter into marriage contract asked justice to solemnize marriage o signed document attesting to the truth of facts and witnesses o CFI decided in favor of Tan (valid marriage), even if Martinez said she never appeared before the justice and never marriedshe thought the document she signed was a parental consent form: o signed document o Tan testified: Martinez, witnesses and justice were all together at the named time and signed the document o three other witnesses testified to the same, with one testifying that s/he accompanied Martinez to justice after getting away from the latters mother o written evidence: 9 letters written by Martinez, with the last one corroborating with one of the witnesses testimonies o HELD: General Orders, no. 68, Sec 6 say that there is no form required for the solemnization of marriage. A marriage took place, as supported by the following: o justices certificate, signed by both parties o it is presumed that the officer authorized the marriage, and parties declared that they took each other as H&W o both parties could read/write in Spanish, and knew the contents of the documents they signed ARTICLE 7 o Beso v Daguman (Jan. 28, 2000) o Zenaida Beso v Judge Juan Daguman, Jr. Admin matter, SC. Neglect of duty, abuse of authority. o Dec. 12, 1997: Beso charged Daguman with solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction, not retaining a copy of the marriage contract, and not registering the marriage contract with the Local Civil Register. It was alleged that Zenaidas husband took all copies of marriage contract from Judge and abandoned Beso. o Judge said he had to marry them outside of his territory (Sta. Margarita, Samar) because o he was physically indisposed: he couldnt go to Sta. Margarita o ambushed by Beso and husband: need to be married NOW o parties had the appropriate documents o o o o o Beso was an overseas Filipino worker who deserved more attention than under current government policy also said: he had good faith marriage documents were nicked from right under his nose Besos husband had another girl: Lita Danguyan Calbayog, where the marriage was celebrated, was outside the jurisdiction of the MCTC of Sta. Margarita Art 8, FC: when a marriage may be solemnized outside his chambers/sala: o in articulo mortis o residence is in a remote place o both parties write the solemnizing officer to request a different venue Art 23, FC: duty of a person solemnizing marriage to furnish either party original certificate and send duplicate and triplicate copies to LCRno proof that the husband, Bernardito Yman, took the documents HELD: Judge did not follow Arts. 7 (within the courts jurisdiction) and 8 (marriage venue). It was held in Navarro v Domagtoy that judges appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate weddings only there. This judge was careless. o

o o

ARTICLE 26, PAR 2 o In Republic v Orbecido III (Oct. 5, 2005), it was held that, given a valid marriage between 2 Filipino citizens, with one party later naturalized as a foreign citizen, if that party should obtain a valid divorce capacitating him/her to remarry, then the Filipino spouse can also remarry. Art 26 of the FC applies, because what is important is not the citizenship at the time of the marriage, but the citizenship at the time of the divorce obtained abroad. Legislative intent is to avoid a situation where the Filipino spouse stays married to alien spouse who, after divorce, can remarrythis goes back to Van Dorn v Romillo, Jr. o In San Luis v San Luis (Feb. 6, 2007), Felicisimo San Luis married 3 timesthe first wife died in 1963 (leaving 6 kids), married the second in 1968 and got divorced on Dec. 14, 1973 (got child custody), and the third he stayed married to, from 1974 until his death in 1992. The third wife wanted to administer the estate, but a son from the first marriage countered that she had no legal personality to do so because she was just a mistressat the time of death, he contended that his father was still married to the 2nd wife. o HELD: Art 26 of the FC is just a codification of a judicial precedent (Van Dorn v Romillo), so it applies to the case at bar. However, there was insufficient proof of the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage. To prove foreign law: o official publication or o copy attested by officer with legal custody of document; o if no copy in Philippines, must be accompanied by certificate issued by diplomat/consul and authenticated by his seal Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

31 o HELD: Even without marriage, the third wife was co-owner of properties under Art 144 CC. Or, being a couple incapacitated to marry, Art 148 FC applies. o She was thus either a surviving wife (Art 26) or co-owner (Art 144, 148). ARTICLE 34 o In Nial v Bayadog (March 14, 2000), it was held that the nature of cohabitation pertained to in Arts 76 CC and 34 FC should be 5 years of legal union, if not for the absence of marriageit should be characterized by exclusivity, and for an unbroken period of time. There should be no legal impediment to marriage. In the case at bar, Pepito and Norma did NOT have the cohabitation contemplated by law, because the first wife died in 1985 and they got married without a license in 1986only 20 months between the dissolution of the first marriage and the beginning of the second. They were therefore not exempt from the requirement of a marriage license, and thus, this marriage was void ab initio. The kids from the first marriage wanted to file a petition declaring the 2 nd marriage of their deceased father void, but the Code is silent on who can file a petition to declare nullity of marriage. Also, void marriages were held to have no legal effects except with regards to property and children. Ultimately it was held that no marriage existed between Pepito and Norma. VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES: Arts 35-54, Family Code

o For purposes of MARRIAGE, MINOR means BELOW 21. o What are void marriages, apart from the ones enumerated in the FC? o Tolentino says the following are void because they are wanting in some basic element of marriage, even if the FC has not declared them to be void: o no intent to marry o marriages in jest o common-law marriages o marriages by proxy o marriages between persons of the same sex o VOID marriages o petition for declaration of nullity of marriage can be filed by either husband or wife o can be attacked collaterally o may be questioned even after the death of one of the parties o cannot be ratified or confirmed o assailed by anyone if the question becomes material o no conjugal partnership or community property is formed o Art 39: The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe (amended by RA 8533, approved Feb. 23, 1998). o What is RA 8533? This law abolishes the prescriptive period for the annulment of marriage regardless of whether or not they were contracted on or before August 3, 1988 on the ground of psychological incapacity. o VOIDABLE marriages o petition for annulment of marriage can be filed by the parties listed in Art 47 o can be attacked only in a direct proceeding for annulment o can no longer be attacked after one of the parties is dead o made valid by ratification or confirmation, through continued cohabitation o can be attacked only by a party to it o upon declaration of nullity, dissolves and liquidates a community property or conjugal partnership o action for petition for annulment prescribes What if 1 spouse is absent, and spouse present wants to remarry? o Art 40: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the bases solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

32 party turns 21 party was of unsound mind sane spouse, guardian: can file anytime before death of either party insane spouse: can file during lucid interval, or after regaining sanity consent was obtained by fraud injured party can file within 5 years after discovery of fraud consent was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence injured party can file within 5 years after intimidation/undue influence disappeared or ceased continuing and incurable physical incapacity to consummate marriage if continuing and incurable physical incapacity to consummate marriage: injured party, within 5 years after marriage serious and incurable STD if either party had a serious and incurable STD: within 5 years after marriage

o Art 41: A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of previous marriage is null and void, UNLESS o prior spouse was ABSENT for 4 consecutive years o spouse present had WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF that absent spouse was dead o if absent spouse disappeared in extraordinarily dangerous circumstances (Art 391 CC), a 2-year absence will do o To REMARRY, one must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of absent spouse. o BURDEN OF PROOF to show that first marriage had not been dissolved is on the party attacking the validity of the 2nd marriage. What if absent spouse reappears? o Art 42: IF ABSENT SPOUSE REAPPEARS, subsequent marriage is terminated by recording of affidavit of reappearance. o A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in local civil registry of parties of 2 nd marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage. o OTHERWISE, 2nd marriage will be held valid when it is contracted in good faith and with a well-founded belief that absent spouse is dead (Tolentino). o The de facto separation of the spouses in the first marriage would have the same effect as LEGAL SEPARATION, where the marriage ties exist but the rights, obligations and conjugal partnership or absolute community are extinguished, to be revived only after termination of the 2 nd marriage, which will revive all effects of the 1st marriage (Tolentino). What if one of the spouses dies? o GENERALLY, effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. o IF BOTH ACTED IN BAD FAITH (Art 44), marriage is void ab initio, and Art 44 applies even if dissolution is by death of one of the spouses. Who can file a petition for annulment, and when? o Art 45 (& 47): A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: o party who wants annulment is below 21 and no parental consent if 18-21 and no parental consent: can be filed by parents or guardian who did not give consent within five years after married party turns 21 if 18-21: parents or guardian, anytime before married

o o

o What is SANITY? Tolentino says that mere mental weakness is not enoughthe party in question must be unable to understand the nature and consequences of marriage, thus being unable to comply with the essential marital obligations of a husband or wife. He also says that the law presumes sanity, but once insanity has been proven to exist, it is presumed to continue. o What is DURESS? Force, coercion. It cannot be said to have induced a marriage where the induced party had sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation and reflection after the time when the alleged duress was exerted, and before the time of celebration of the marriage ceremony (Tolentino). o What is PHYSICAL INCAPACITY? Impotence: that physical condition of husband or wife in which sexual intercourse with a normal person of the opposite sex is impossible. It is the lack of power to copulate, or the absence of functional capacity for the sexual act. It must: o exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage o continue to the time when annulments are being tried o appear incurable o be unknown to other party. o What is STD? It must: o exist at time of marriage o be a serious disease o be incurable o be unknown to the other party at time of marriage Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

33

o Art 46: What is FRAUD? o NON-DISCLOSURE / CONCEALMENT; exists AT TIME OF MARRIAGE: o of previous conviction by final judgment of other party of a crime involving moral turpitude o of pregnancy at time of marriage by someone other than husband o of STD at time of marriage, regardless of its nature o of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality, lesbianism. How may a voidable marriage become a valid one? o A voidable marriage may become valid if ratified or confirmed by continued voluntary cohabitation even after discovery or recognition of grounds for annulment (Art 45). Ratification only cures a defect in CONSENT, and thus, does not apply to the following cases: o where one spouse is physically incapacitated o where one spouse has an incurable STD o where one party is of unsound mind, although the AM says that if insane spouse, after coming to reason, freely cohabits with spouse, then he/she cannot file a petition for annulment. What happens during pendency of all cases of annulment or declaration of nullity? o THE FISCAL HAS TO BE PRESENT. o Art 48: In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps o to prevent collusion between the parties o to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. o No judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. o THE COURT PROVIDES FOR SUPPORT. o Art 49: During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. This happens also when the Court decides that the provisions of a written agreement are insufficient (Tolentino). o Court will also consider the moral and material welfare of said kids, and if they are over 7 years old, their choice of parent (Title IX: Parental Authority, FC), as well as visitation rights of other parent. A marriage is annulled by final judgment. What are the effects? Art 50: The final judgment provides for the following:

o liquidation (Art 43 [2]) o inventory (Art 102 [1], Art 129 [1]) o pay creditors (Art 102 [2] & Art 94; Art 129 [4] & Art 121 [2]) o partitionprocess where remaining properties will be divided into various portions to be allocated to all parties (Art 43 [2]) o distributiondelivery to spouses and children of the shares or properties allocated to them in the partition (Art 102, 129) o donations propter nuptias (void marriages) by innocent spouse to spouse in bad faith shall be revoked by operation of law and returned to innocent spouse (Art 43 [3], 44) o if both spouses acted in bad faith then all donations by reason of marriage from one to the other, and all testamentary provisions made by one in favor of the other, are revoked by operation of law (Art 44)

o children conceived or born before judgmenteither petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage under Art 36becomes final are considered legitimate (Art 43 [1], 54); judgment provides for their custody and support (Art 50) o presumptive legitime, which is considered an advance on the kids inheritances when the parents die, shall be delivered in cash, property or securities; under CC, legitime of legit kids is estate of parent (Art 51,102, 129) o innocent spouse may revoke designation of the spouse in bad faith as beneficiary in the formers insurance policy (Art 43 [4]) o spouse in bad faith shall be disqualified from testate and intestate succession of estate of innocent spouse (Art 43 [5]) o conjugal dwelling and lot will be given to the spouse with whom the common children choose to remain, unless the parties agree otherwise (Arts 102, 129) o after all of that, the former spouses are free to remarry; otherwise, subsequent marriage shall be null and void (Art 53) Some of the actual provisions of law follow. Art 43 (1) says that for VOID marriages, children of that marriage are considered legit; their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the court in a Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

34 proper proceeding. Art 54 says that for both VOID and VOIDABLE marriages, children conceived or born BEFORE the judgment of (1) annulment or (2) absolute nullity of the marriage under Art 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children born under the subsequent marriage in Art 53after the judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriageshall be legitimate. What are the effects of bad faith? o Art 43 (2): forfeiture of his/her share in the net profits of the AC OR CP in favor of the common children, the legit kids or the innocent spouse o Art 43 (3): donations to spouse in bad faith are revoked by operation of law o Art 43 (4): cannot be beneficiary in insurance policy o Art 43 (5) disqualified from testate/intestate succession o And my personal favorite: spouse in bad faith can be sued for damages using Art 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. CASES o A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC o Enrico v Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli ARTICLE 36 o Salita v Magtolis: Art 36 is on a case-to-case basis. o Santos v CA: Gravity, juridical antecedence, incurability. Art 36 is not meant to cover all cases of psychosis. o Republic v CA and Molina: MAIN GUIDELINES! o Chi Ming Tsoi v CA: No sex (senseless and protracted refusal to have sex) = non-fulfillment of essential marital obligation. o Hernandez v CA: Alcoholism, sexual infidelity, perversionthese are not psychological incapacities per se, but they are grounds for legal separation. These must be manifestations of a disordered personality which make a person unable to discharge essential marital obligations, if they are to be used in an Art 36 case. o Marcos v Marcos: A personal medical exam is not a condition sine qua non for Art 36 cases. The totality of the evidence must be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity. o Republic v Dagdag: This case failed to medically prove root cause. o Pesca v Pesca: Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility are not psychological incapacity. o Choa v Choa: The totality of the evidence presented must be enough to establish incapacity. o Dedel v CA: Sexual infidelity is not psychological incapacity. o Republic v Quintero-Hamano: Abandonment is not psychological incapacity. For Art 36 cases, there is no distinction between alien and Filipino spouses. o Tenebro v CA: Void marriages are not without legal effects. A second marriage is still bigamous, even if declared void under Art 36. o Carating-Siayngco v Siayngco: Art 36 is not meant to cover all cases of psychosis. o Buenaventura v CA: Psychological incapacity means NO moral damages, NO exemplary damages. o Republic v Iyoy o Antonio v Reyes: the case of the pathological liar o Republic v Melgar: The fiscal must appear on behalf of the State. o Zamora v CA o Republic v Tanyag-San Jose o Tongol v Tongol: Petition under Art 36 must allege the complete facts. o Paras v Paras: Marital obligations include obligations to children. o Republic v Cubantug-Baguio ARTICLE 40 o Domingo v CA: A marriage, though void, still needs a judicial declaration under Art 40 FC. This ipso facto carries judgment for liquidation of property, and custody and support.

Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

LEGAL SEPARATION: Arts 55-67, Family Code

35 o Bobis v Bobis: Art 40 requires prior judicial declaration of nullity. o Mercado v Tan: Subsequently obtaining a declaration of nullity is immaterial. o Ty v CA: Prior to FC, no need for a judicial declaration (People v Aragon). However, under the FC, a judicial declaration is needed. o Cario v Cario ARTICLE 41 o Republic v Nolasco: Gives the requisites for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Art 41 FC. o Armas v Calisterio: Under the Civil Code, there was no need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death. o Manuel v People: presumptive death. There is a need to present a judicial declaration of appellant. So ordered. o Aquino v Delizo: The wife was 4 months pregnant at the time of the marriage. ARTICLE 48 o Republic v Iyoy LEGAL SEPARATION: Arts 55-67, Family Code Tolentino characterizes legal separation as a kind of relative divorce. o Art 55: Grounds for legal separation: o repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct o physical violence or moral pressure to change religious or political affiliations o attempt to corrupt or induce, to engage in prostitution o final judgment: imprisonment of more than 6 years; even if pardoned o drug addiction or habitual alcoholism o lesbianism or homosexuality o contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage o sexual infidelity (meaning, adultery or concubinage) or perversion o attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent o abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year o IF IT HAD EXISTED AT TIME OF MARRIAGE, it is probably a ground for annulment. o IF IT OCCURRED ONLY DURING THE MARRIAGE, it is probably a ground for legal separation. o What is SEXUAL INFIDELITY? Sex. Even just once. Thats infidelity. o What is ADULTERY? Wife has sex with anyone other than husband. o What is CONCUBINAGE? Only 3 ways for this to happen: o maintaining a mistress in the conjugal dwelling o sex with other woman under scandalous circumstances o cohabiting with other woman in any other place o Secret sex, without scandalous circumstances, is not concubinage. o Why such a distinction in sexual infidelity? Because of womans child-bearing function (yeah great Tolentino, sure make us sound like robots thanks). If woman produces child via sexual infidelity, the child is considered a legitimate child. Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

o Republic v CA: This case failed to establish well-founded belief. ARTICLE 46 o Buccat v Buccat Godofredo Buccat requests the annulment of his marriage to Luida Mangonon de Buccat on the grounds that, in consenting to the marriage, he did so because the defendant had assured him that she was virgin. The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After several meetings, both were committed on 19 September the same year. On 26 November of the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in Baguio City. After living together for eighty-nine days, the defendant gave birth to a child of nine months, on 23 February 1939. Following this event, Godofredo abandoned his wife and never returned. It is improbable that Godofredo had not even suspected the critical condition of Luida, with her being in a state of advanced pregnancy. There is no room for the fraud argued by Godofredo. His argument that it is not rare to find people with big stomachs seems too silly to merit our consideration, more so because the plaintiff was a novice in law. Marriage is a most sacred institution: it is the foundation on which society rests. To dissolve it, clear and irrefutable evidence is necessary. There is no such evidence in this case. Finding the original ruling in accordance with law, it must be confirmed; as by this we confirm the lower courts ruling in its entirety, with costs against the

36 o What is SEXUAL PERVERSION? All unusual or abnormal sexual practices which may be offensive to the feelings or sense of decency of either husband or wife where one spouse is coerced into the act/s. o What is ABANDONMENT? One spouse leaves the other, without intent to return. After three months, it is presumed that there is a lack of intent to return. o Art 56: Grounds for denying legal separation: o when party condoned, consented, connived, colluded o when both parties have given grounds for legal separation (aka recrimination?) o when the action is barred by prescription o What is CONDONATION? Forgiveness of a marital offense. Breach of condition not to do wrong again will revive the offense as a ground for legal separation. o express: signified by words or writing o implied: inferred from acts o What is CONSENT? Agreement or conformity in advance of commission of act. It may be express or implied, and must be freely given. o test: the intent to pardon, based on knowledge of the offense, must be clear o What is CONNIVANCE? Agreement, express or implied, by both spouses to the ground for legal separation. o test: spouse must not actively provide the opportunity for the wrongdoing o What is RECRIMINATION? Counter-charge in a suit for legal separation, saying that complainant is also guilty of an offense constituting grounds for legal separation. o What is COLLUSION? Agreement between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, in order for the other to obtain legal separation. o Art 57: An action for legal separation shall be filed within FIVE YEARS from the time of occurrence of the cause. o Art 58: An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried BEFORE SIX MONTHS shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. o This is meant to give the spouses a chance to RECONCILE. o Art 59: No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps towards the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such effort, that reconciliation is highly improbably. o Art 60: No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. o There must be PROOF of the offense, which must be specific as to time, person and place. The offense may be proved by circumstantial evidence. What happens AFTER FILING THE PETITION for legal separation? o Art 61: After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the AC or CP. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. o Art 62: During pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Art 49 shall likewise applyin the absence of a written agreement between the spousesto the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children. o What is ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE? Money that the court orders one spouse to give to the other, most probably during the pendency of the petition for legal separation. Applies only to legal separation (I think), because it is CONTINGENT upon the existence of a valid marriage. What happens AFTER DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION? o Art 63: The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: o spouses shall be entitled to live separately o BUT marriage bonds subsist o AC or CP shall be dissolved and liquidated, o BUT offending spouse shall have no right to any share as it is forfeited in accordance with Art 43(2) o custody of minor children goes to innocent spouse, subject to Art 213 Art 213: Court decides where kids go. However, paramount consideration is that everything must be in the best interest of the child. Children under 7 stay with the mother, unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

37 otherwise. offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession creditors o after due hearing, court shall take measures to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries o recording of order in registries of property SHALL NOT PREJUDICE ANY CREDITOR NOT LISTED/NOTIFIED unless debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy creditors claim

o Art 64: After finality of decree of legal separation, innocent spouse may o revoke donations made by him/her in favor of offending spouse o revoke designation of the latter as beneficiary in insurance policy this takes effect upon written notification to the insured o revocation shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located o alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of complaint for revocation in registries shall be respected o action to revoke donation must be brought within FIVE YEARS from the time decree of legal separation becomes final What happens if spouses reconcile? o What is RECONCILIATION? Voluntary mutual agreement to live together again as husband and wife. o Under Civil Code, this could be in any form, express or implied. o Under Family Code, it is necessary that spouses make a joint manifestation signed by them under oath, which must be filed with the court o Tolentino says that revival of former property regime does not necessarily restrict spouses to revival merely of former property regime. He says that the spouses are placed in the same position as before the marriage, and can thus establish the property regime they want, as though making a marriage settlement. If they dont agree on any system, then by law, the regime of separation of property will stand. o Art 65: Consequences: o terminates legal separation proceedings o sets aside final decree of legal separation o BUT does not affect property unless spouses agree to revive property regime o Art 66: agreement to revive property regime o shall be executed under oath o specifies new properties o specifies properties retained as separate o specifies names of all known creditors, addresses and amounts owed to each o filed in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to

CASES o Pacete v Carriaga, Jr o Sabalones v CA: Art 61: The wife can act as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the casewhile the court has not decided upon an administrator. o Gandionco v Pearada: No criminal proceeding of concubinage is necessary. o Lapuz-Sy v Eufemio: Death abates legal separation and a declaration of nullity. o Kiam v Ong o Araneta v Concepcion: Proceedings for custody, alimony and support can happen during the cool-off period of 6 months. o Ocampo v Florenciano: A confession happens in court, or through a pleading. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on such a confession.

Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

38 RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS: Arts 68-73, Family Code o Art 68: The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. o These are the essential marital obligations as pointed out by our cases. o The right of cohabitation, or consortium, means that they shall have a common life, under the same roof, to better fulfill the obligations inherent in the matrimonial status. This includes the domestic and sexual community of the spouses. However, for the purposes of law, only the TANGIBLE and MATERIAL aspect of cohabitation can be taken into account. o Art 69: The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. o Grounds for legal separation are sufficient grounds for a spouse to have a separate domicile, if the latter is preferred to the former. o Civil Code: it was discretionary on the part of the court to exempt the wife, in the face of just cause, from following the husband abroad. o Art 70: The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate properties. o Community property o Income or fruits of separate properties o Separate properties o Art 71: The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Art 70. o Civil Code: Husband was responsible for support. o The better rule is that contribution should be proportionate to the properties of the spouses. o Art 72: When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. o Civil Code: the court may counsel the offender to comply with his or her duties, and take such measures as may be proper. o Family Code: Court has full freedom to determine the kind of relief that may be given (Tolentino) BUT look at Arroyo vs Vazquez de Arroyo.

o Art 73: Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious and moral grounds. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not o 1. The objection is proper o 2. Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection If benefit accrued prior to objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent o No prejudice to the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. o Family first. CASES o Goitia v Campos Rueda (Nov. 2, 1916) o Jose Campos Rueda married Eloisa Goitia on Jan. 7, 1915. One month later, Eloisa went home, because Jose wanted her to perform unchaste or lascivious acts, and she refused. The CFI ruled that Jose Campos Rueda could not be compelled to support Eloisa Goitia, except in his own house, unless it was by virtue of a judicial decree granting Goitia divorce or separation. o Can a spouse be compelled to give support when the other spouse resides outside of the conjugal domicile? o HELD: YES, Rueda can be compelled to support Goitia, because failure to live with the husband is NOT an instance in which the obligation to give support ceases. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support the wife. The law permits no termination of the obligations of marriage via his wrongful acts and in driving his wife to her parental home. Also, the decree of support is not contingent on the ability to grant divorce. The laws governing this marriage were Art 44 to 78 of Law of Civil Marriage of 1870under this law and in this jurisdiction, the only ground for divorce is adultery. o Moreland concurs: the wife is still legally within the conjugal domicile, even if she is physically outside it. o Arroyo v Vazquez de Arroyo (Aug. 11, 1921) o Mariano Arroyo married Dolores Vazquez in 1910. On July 4, 1920, Dolores left the conjugal home; she wanted to live separately. Mariano instituted action to make her come home. Dolores said he gave her cruel treatment; she wanted a decree of separation, liquidation of conjugal partnership, allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The CFI granted Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

39 Dolores petition, giving her separation, alimony and costs. o SC found that Dolores was super jealous, and that her jealousy was the cause of most of their conjugal misery. The exaggerated tales of cruelty do not justify the wifes abandonment of the marital home. o HELD: Art 142-143 of the CC say that the husband is obligated to maintain his wife. This obligation is not conditioned upon divorce. Provision for separate maintenance of wife should NOT be made, UNLESS continued cohabitation has become impossible and separation necessary, through the fault of the husband. In sum, the SC said the petitions of both Mariano and Dolores could not be granted. Mariano, however, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife; she is obligated to return home and cohabit with him. o REAL QUESTION: What relief can be accorded to him by judicial decree? NOTHING. The court cannot compel the spouse to cohabit and render conjugal rights. Property rights, yes, but personal rights, no. In the end, all the court could do was issue a judicial declaration that the wife absented herself without cause and had a duty to return. o Zulueta v CA (1996): The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence (to be) inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order (from a) court or when public safety requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. o The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him/her. o The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. o Ilusorio v CA and Bildner (May 12, 2000) o Erlinda Kalaw married Potenciano Ilusorio on July 11, 1942, and they had 6 kids. In 1972, they separated from bed and boardseparation in fact. On December 30, 1997, 2 of their children said that Erlinda had given Potenciano an overdose of 200mg of Zoloft (anti-depressant), instead of 100mg, while Potenciano was staying in Antipolo with the family. On Feb. 25, 1998, Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over Potenciano with the RTC. On May 31, 1998, Potenciano returned to Makati, and Erlinda subsequently applied for a Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013 writ of habeas corpus for the custody of her husband and the enforcement of consortium. She wanted visitation rights over her husband. The CA dismissed the application for the writ, but granted her visitation rights. o HELD: Can a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her? NO. Each of the spouses has freedom of choice. There was no detention or deprivation of Potenciano that would have justified the issuance of the writ. He cannot be the subject of visitation rights against his free choicethis would deprive him of the right to privacy. The Court thus ruled: NO visitation rights, and NO writ of habeas corpus. o RA 9262 ARTICLE 69 o Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC o Punos concurring opinion o Marriage ipso facto does not cause loss of domicile. The husbands choice of a different domicile is what changes the wifes domicile. o It is Punos opinion that the wife reacquires her personal domicile upon the death of the husband.

PROPERTY RELATIONS: Arts 74-148, Family Code

40 o GENERAL PROVISIONS o Art 74: The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: o By marriage settlements executed before the marriage o By the provisions of this Code o By the local custom. o What are MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS? o Ante-nuptial contract o An agreement entered into before marriage, and in consideration thereof, between an intended husband and wife, by which the enjoyment or devolution of property is regulated. (Madden) o A contract entered into by those who are about to be united in marriage, in order to establish the conditions of their conjugal partnership with respect to present and future property (Manresa). o Stipulations in marriage settlements that are contrary to prohibitive laws are VOID. o The nullity of one provision does not nullify the entire contract. o Marriage settlements CANNOT be changed. The only changes that can be made must be made BEFORE MARRIAGE, or through judicial separation of property. o The Court will always protect the creditors. o Art 75: The future spouses may choose any regime in their marriage settlements. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the chosen regime is void, the system of absolute community of property shall govern. o FC: Default regime: ACP o CC: Default regime: CPG o What if the spouses stipulate in their marriage settlements that ACP shall not exist between them, but do not state the rules or the regime by which their property shall be governed? o Spanish CC: dotal system o FC: custom governs o Follow the intention of the parties, then if that doesnt work out, the court should adopt the most equitable system that is closest to the practice of the parties, always protecting the creditors. Rules on partnerships may also apply. (Tolentino) o Art 76: Any modification in the marriage settlements are valid ONLY IF made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the following provisions: o o o o 66: reconciliation after legal separation, without revival of former property regime 67: revival of former property regime 128: CPG: abandonment: aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, judicial separation of property or authority to be sole administrator of conjugal partnership property 135: sufficient causes for judicial separation of property 136: voluntary dissolution of ACP or CPG and for separation of properties

o Art 77: Marriage settlements and modifications thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered o NO EFFECT on third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry along with marriage contract, as well as in registries of property. When does one need parent/guardian to sign marriage settlements? WHEN THERE IS A LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY OR CAPACITY TO ACT o Art 78: A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Art 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code. o Minor here means below 21. o The parents/guardians HAVE to sign the agreement. o Art 14 says: father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned o Title IX: minors are under the parental authority of father and mother jointly. o So which prevails? Art 14. Title IX may modify the precedence of the father in certain cases. o Art 79: For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto. o Art 80: In absence of contrary stipulation in marriage settlements , property relations shall be governed by Philippine laws, EXCEPT WHEN o Both spouses are aliens o Contracts affect property that is not in the Philippines and are thus executed where the property is located o Contracts affect property not in the Philippines but are executed hereforeign countrys laws require different formalities for validity Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

41 of contracts o Philippine contracts do not apply to foreign property, no matter what (Art 16 CC, Art 80[3] FC, Tolentino). o Art 81: Everything stipulated in the settlements, including donations BETWEEN the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered VOID if the marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend on the celebration of the marriage shall be valid. DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE What are donations propter nuptias? o Art 84: Donations by reason of marriage are those made before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. o This EXCLUDES: Donations made in favor of the spouses AFTER celebration of marriage Those in favor of spouses, before the marriage, but NOT in consideration of the marriage Those in favor of persons OTHER THAN the spouses o Who may donate? Spouses to each other Parents to one or both spouses Third persons to either or both spouses o Art 83: Donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III of CC, INSOFAR AS they are NOT MODIFIED by the following articles. What modifications do the provisions make? o Donations propter nuptias do not require express acceptance by the done o If made by minors (meaning, below 21), they must be with consent of those who are required to consent to the marriage o They cannot exceed 1/5 of the present property of the donor when made by spouses to each other IF they have a regime other than ACP AND donations are made in marriage settlements (Art 84) o Can include future property, which will be governed by provisions on testamentary succession (Art 84) o Not revoked by subsequent birth or appearance of children o Can be subject to encumbrances (Art 85) o Amount for property < obligation: donor pays deficiency o Amount for property > obligation: donee gets excess o Revoked by non-performance of marriage (Art 86) o o o o o o o Marriage is not celebrated (Art 81) Marriage is judicially declared void ab initio (see also Art 81) Marriage takes place without consent of parents or guardian When marriage is annulled and the donee acted in BAD FAITH (Art 43) Legal separation, donee being guilty spouse If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the CC on donations in general Donee comits some offense against donor, wife or children Donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense or act involving moral turpitude Donee refuses to support donor when he is legally/morally bound to give support (Art 765 CC)

Art 87: Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.s o The law seeks to prevent exploitation in marriage. o Matabuena v Cervantes o Bottomline: The law generally does not allow donations inter vivos of spouses to each other. Donations mortis causa are okay.

CASES ARTICLE 85 o Mateo v Lagua o Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained as per Art 908 of the new Civil Code: Deduct any payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death, and add donations subject to collation. o For donation to be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee's share as legitime in the properties of the donor. ARTICLE 87 o Matabuena v Cervantes o The prohibition on donation during marriage applies to common law marriages as well. Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013

42 o The purpose of the law is to inhibit undue influence. The undue influence would still be present even if they are categorically not legally married intimacy of living as husband and wife is still present. o Calimlim-Canullas v Fortun o Arcaba v Vda de Batocael o A donation is void if it was granted during marriage, and it applies to persons living as husband and wife without a valid marriage. o Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one party is no longer interested in sex due to old age. Cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife. (Bitangcor vs. Tan) ARTICLES 105, 116 o Francisco v Francisco: Presumption of conjugality of property. ARTICLES 121, 122 o Ayala Investment & Development Corp v CA o When a spouse acts only as a surety or guarantormeaning, he did not directly receive the money and services to be used for his own business or professionthe conjugal partnership cannot be made answerable for the debt, unless the creditor can prove that the debt actually redounded to the direct and immediate benefit of the family. These benefits must be not indirect, remote, incidental or speculative. o Villaranda v Villaranda: Without the wifes consent, the husbands alienation/encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of FC is voidable only, not void. ARTICLES 121, 124 (96) o Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v Dailo: Must prove it, if claiming something redounded to the benefit of the family. o Uy v CA: No need for summary proceedings for administration of property if the spouse is incapacitated or incompetent. However, the proper remedy is judicial guardianship. ARTICLE 128 o Partosa-Jo v CA o Abandonment implies departure of a spouse with an intent never to return again. It is a ground for judicial separation of property. ARTICLE 134 o Maquilan v Maquilan: COMAG is incompatible with the concept of a void marriage. ARTICLE 144 o Juaniza v Jose o Co-ownership contemplated in Art. 144 requires that parties living together as husband and wife not be incapacitated to marry. Eugenio is legally married to Socorro, which is an impediment to marriage to Rosalia. Rosalia cannot be coowner of the jeepney since this belongs to conjugal partnership of Eugenio with his legal wife. ARTICLE 147 o Maxey v CA: Under Art 147, contributions in the household are considered as actual contribution. o Valdes v RTC o Mercado-Fehr v Fehr: Art 147 applies to void marriages. ARTICLE 148 o o o o Agapay v Palang Tumlos v Spouses Fernandez Saguid v CA Villanueva v CA

o Belcodero v CA: Property acquired during cohabitationshare of married party goes to the conjugal property of subsisting marriage. o Atienza v De Castro: Under Art 148, actual joint contribution must be proven.

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Bobbie Reyes UP Law D2013