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The rising mafioso capitalists, opportunities, and the case of Turkey

Fatma lk Seluk Capital & Class 2011 35: 275 DOI: 10.1177/0309816811407298 The online version of this article can be found at: http://cnc.sagepub.com/content/35/2/275

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The rising mafioso capitalists, opportunities, and the case of Turkey

Fatma lk Seluk
Atlm University, Ankara, Turkey

Capital & Class 35(2) 275 293 The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub. co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0309816811407298 c&c.sagepub.com

Abstract This article attempts to examine the mafiosis potential economic and political power with the help of two analytical tools: the mafioso mode of production, and mafioso capitalists. In evaluating the actual power of the mafiosi, the article presents empirical information on Turkey and other countries. It acknowledges that although the mafioso (capitalist) bosses hold the direct command of armed power, neither their antagonism nor their alliance with the conventional bourgeoisie can be essentialised. The results and prospects are evaluated in a way that stresses the need for a change in our worldviews in order to construct a more compassionate world. Keywords social classes, mode of production, violence, mafia, criminal business

Introduction
Property ownership, resources received and authority distributed have been among the criteria widely used in the literature on social classes. Along with their other contributions, Marxs analysis of exploitation relations and Webers analysis of status have contributed much to the social classes literature. Yet studies inspired by Marx and Weber have for the most part been on capitalists, workers, peasants, the middle class, the underclass, bureaucracy and managers. Today, there is a need to study a rising social class that of the mafioso capitalists, who hold not only economic resources but also substantial armed power, with implications for social, political, and economic life. In Turkey, debates on counter-guerrilla operations in the late-1970s, extensive political torture in the early 1980s, political killings by unknown perpetrators in the 1990s, and shadow paramilitary
Corresponding author: Fatma lk Seluk, Atlm University, Ankara, Turkey Email: fuselcuk@atilim.edu.tr

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organisations in the early 2000s have made it necessary to reconsider the mafiosi in relation to those authoritarian practices and trans-legal formations. Scandals over the past few decades have brought to light the illegitimate relationships of politicians, police chiefs and army members with the mafiosi. However, the power of the mafiosi is not restricted to Turkey. There has been a growing body of literature on illicit business, especially in ex-Eastern Bloc countries. Indeed, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been significant analytical interest in illicit business. Several authors have directed their interest at Russia, following the implementation of Jeffrey Sachss shock therapy there.1 Whether the chaos and poverty there has been attributed mainly (if not exclusively) to the transition to market economy (e.g. Burawoy, 1999; Gowan, 1995; Holmstrom and Smith, 2000) or to the so-called red legacy of the communist regime (e.g. Anderson, 1995; Dempsey and Lukas, 1998), there has been a consensus on the substantial share of illicit business in post-collapse Russian economic and social life. Inspired by the chapter on primitive accumulation in Capital Vol. 1 (Marx, 1867), Holmstrom and Smith (2000) associated this process with primitive accumulation, calling it gangster capitalism and a necessary phase for the transition to capitalism. In terms of the presence of mafioso capitalists, Holmstrom and Smith concluded that Sachss programme has had considerable responsibility for the creation of criminal capitalists, while the privatisation process in Russia was drafted essentially criminally by the underground mafiosi, the nomenklatura, top managers of certain industries, and segments of the intelligentsia. As for Burawoy (1999), having reconstructed Karl Polanyis argument in The Great Transformation, he analysed the destructive consequences of market economy in Russia, calling the process in effect economic involution. Rather than seeing the process as a stage of transition to further industrialisation, he called attention to the return to a barter economy and the deindustrialisation process in Russia, which, according to him, implied a future possibility of neo-feudalism. According to him, the Russian case of primitive disaccumulation will turn out to have been no less destructive than original primitive accumulation (p. 9). As for those liberal arguments attributing the chaotic atmosphere in Russia to the legacy of red bureaucratic control rather than to the market economy, the solutions they propose revolve around so-called liberal governance with the tasks of prevention of harm and the protection of property rights (Dempsey and Lukas, 1998) or the rule of law and reducing the illegal markets produced by the communist economy (Anderson, 1995). Regardless of different approaches to evaluating the process in ex-Eastern Bloc countries of the post-Cold War era, the growing wealth and strength of mafioso capitalists gives the impression that the mafioso mode of production is likely to last longer than anticipated by several Marxist and liberal academicians who, whether in this or that way, see the stage in temporary, rather than relatively permanent terms. For that reason, this article analyses the empirical data from various countries and attempts to improve the conceptualisation of the mafioso capitalist class. Exploring the distinguishing features of the mafioso capitalists helps to decipher the past and future political developments better. For that purpose, firstly I offer a new conceptualisation of the mafiosi and attempt to highlight the economic and political power they potentially hold. In order to understand their actual power, empirical data from different parts of the world is presented. Since a closer look provides further details, I also analyse the case

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of Turkey, where authoritarian politics has not been the exception. Lastly, the results and prospects are evaluated.

On class analysis, the mafioso (capitalist) class and mode of production

The majority of those making analyses with reference to social classes are influenced by Karl Marx and/or Max Weber. As for those making their analysis with reference to the ownership of means of production (e.g. Mandel, 1982; 1991), the production of use value (e.g. Poulantzas, 1975), or the process of proletarianisation (e.g. Braverman, 1974), they can all be considered as being influenced by various points (not necessarily identical points) in classical Marx and Engels texts (e.g. Marx, 1857; 1867). As for those defining the concept of class in terms of authority relations (e.g. Dahrendorf, 1965; though with some Marxist influence) or lifestyle and market positions (e.g. Goldthorpe, 1979; 1987; 1988), they can be considered as belonging mainly to the Weberian tradition. There are also combinations of Marxist and Weberian approaches inserting the control of the means of production, of the production process, and/or domination in the production process into a Marxist framework of analysis arising on the basis of the ownership of means of production and exploitation in production process (e.g. Callinicos and Harman, 1987; Wright, 1982; 1984; cf. 1989). Therefore, it is apparent that meanings attributed to social classes vary from one theoretical standpoint to another. In escaping from any conceptual fetishism and with the acknowledgment that it is possible to define social classes in various ways, only for the purpose of differentiating certain domination and exploitation relations shared by a considerable number of people from others as regards the distance to private/collective ownership of means of production and antagonistic conditioning on account of her or his structural bipolar locations in the production process the position adopted here can be considered as belonging mainly (if not exclusively) to the Marxist terrain. Here, the precondition of the class relationship is conceptualised as the exploitation relationship between the exploiter and the exploited at the instance of production, where the means of production is owned not by the exploited, but by the exploiter, who at the same time appropriates some part of the output (goods/services) produced by the exploited. I hold that class is an analytical category useful for analysing the nature of production relations and power relations only in part, conceding that there are, in fact, various types of economic positions and power relations denoting inequality and oppression beyond those that can be explained by the class categories conceptualised here, since a non-class member can be even poorer than the exploited class member, and a non-class power relation may be even more oppressive than the oppression of the exploited class member. However, if the category of class is reduced to all economic positions or power relations, it loses its analytical power, making the analysis of at least a few of the macro aspects of the production and power relations along with the structurally antagonistic economic interests impossible. Then, if the status of self-employed is to be addressed as being class, the status of wage-worker in relative (if not absolute2) structural antagonism to the capitalist should not be addressed as class. Here, I hold that the set of production relations locations includes several subsets, some of which have intersection fields with each other.

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Those positions denoted with the term class constitute only one subset of the broader set of production/economic relations locations, while the latter includes further positions such as self-employed people and rentiers, among others. This definition implies that those property owners who do not occupy structurally polar locations in the production process as against the worker may be considered as the elements of the broader category of capitalist, but not as the elements of the capitalist class. In this respect, those who are pure rentiers,3 for example, not exploiting wageworker labour for profits in the means of production they own, whether rich or not, do not denote a class position in my terminology. The same is true of the richer or poorer self-employed, also not denoted as class positions, given that a self-employed person may be richer than a capitalist class element. Here, both the appropriation of a part of the goods/services produced by the labourer in the production process and the de facto ownership of the means of that production are treated as being the prerequisites of the category of exploiter class, while the de facto ownership here refers to the actual control over what to do with the means of production on such issues as to whom to give or sell them, which is distinct from de jure ownership. For example, if a dependent peasants product is in part appropriated by the landlord in the tax form, as the landlord owns the land or has determinant control over the decisions of the peasant as regards what to do with the land, then, here, that peasant is considered as a class member; while if that peasant has the possession of the land and has the power to decide what to do with the land (give, sell, burn, or whatever), here, that peasant is considered as a member of the exploited peasant category, but not class. The distinction made here is useful not only because certain exploiting class members may appoint particular individuals as the legal owners of their means of production for the purposes of tax reduction or escape from other legal sanctions (as several mafiosi do), but also in distinguishing the class status of the executives and ordinary wage- (including the salaried-) workers in state positions (including state enterprises) from those in nonstate sectors. Now, for the purpose of clarifying the intersecting and non-intersecting aspects of the mafiosi and the bourgeoisie, I will briefly explain what I mean by capitalist and bourgeoisie. To begin with, the concept bourgeoisie, to which a number of different meanings have been attributed in relation to its members world view, lifestyle, social origin, and location in the production process, 4 is used here as a synonym for capitalist, regardless of the words etymological and other associated meanings. Here, the working-class and capitalist classes are defined in terms of their location in the production process vis--vis each other. As for the capitalist class, its members own the means of production, while the unpaid part of the labour of the wage worker is a major source of their profit. As for the capitalists (whether as a member of the capitalist class in particular or the category of capitalist in general) tendential (not fixed, absolute, or unchallenged) common point on account of their structural location in the economy, it covers both their anti-anti-capitalist motive (including anti-communist motives) and their motive of securing their revenue. Yet, apparently, the capitalist class is far from being a homogeneous entity in spite of the characteristics, structural constraints and motivations its members share (this heterogeneity is also the case for the mafiosi). Meanwhile, with the proviso that the following statement is not held to be an essential characteristic of the bourgeoisie, it must be stated that, today, many capitalists do not hold the direct command of armed power (I will call them conventional capitalists/bourgeoisie)
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in several capitalist societies. Yet this state of being unarmed (or at least, the lack of direct command) cannot be generalised to all capital holders while there is a rising exploiting class, deriving revenues mainly through its direct command of armed power, which has also entered into capitalist production (production for markets exploiting the labour of wage-workers working under mainly economic coercion). These exploiting class elements have a substantial share in the economic domain, and they are the mafioso capitalists. To begin with, it should be made clear that profit, in capitalist societies, is not always derived from legal businesses, while economic activity does not necessarily have an ethically positive content, meaning that the production and consumption of a good or service may challenge the mainstream norms, though it may be at the utility of even a single individuals relatively temporary/permanent unethical need/desire. The inclusive conceptualisation of the economy that I propose refers to the realm of the production and distribution of goods and/services which meet or which are thought to meet relatively individual or collective short-/long-term desires, whether perceived to be ethical or unethical, whether the products are tangible or intangible, and whether they actually meet those desires or not. While not only the production of tangible goods, but also services with market orientation are treated as a part of the economic realm, I see no legitimate theoretical grounds to exclude the non-commodity forms of goods and services (without market orientation) from the realm of the economy, in so far as utility is the major criterion, while the criterion of scarcity is itself a matter in question (for example, consider the activity of a person who talks to his only friend once a year isnt this a sort of scarcity?).5 Besides, for example, given that both the slave working to clean the house of his owner and the slave cultivating his owners land are seen as being engaged in economic activity; and also given that a person cultivating his own land not for the market but for self-subsistence is considered to be engaged in economic activity, there is again no legitimate theoretical grounds for excluding an individuals labour spent in cleaning the house or cooking a meal from the category of economic activity (whether only she/he benefits or others [also] benefit from that activity). Therefore, in my conceptualisation, economic activity is neither restricted to market-oriented activities nor to the production/distribution of tangible goods. While whether relatively individual or collective, whether relatively short-lasting or long-lasting the major criterion is utility, since the human being is not necessarily composed of harmonious desires with respect to his or her multiple orientation (with respect to the multiplicity of desires/impulses) and/or time, meeting a particular desire may at the same time cause harm to the individual, both simultaneously or later. More importantly, human desires in need of fulfilment are not necessarily held to be in line with the ethical norms of the individual/group/society. Although there is much to examine about the nature of economic activity/relations, it is sufficient for now to continue the discussion about the nature of the mafioso mode of production and the mafioso (capitalist) boss class. As for the illegality of the goods and services, it is apparent that those who produce, transport or sell illegal services or goods can also make profits from such activities, the extent of which has already been considered, especially by those who study the so-called informal economy. In certain instances, the illegal characteristic of the goods/services can make the profit bigger than would be the case if that particular good/service were legal. For example, the price of producing, transporting or selling heroin would be much lower if heroin were a legal product. This type of illicit business makes up a huge part of
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the world economy, with an important number of entrepreneurs engaged in it. For example, the main source of the unofficial revenue of Afghanistan a big opium producing country is the drugs trade (Goodhand, 2000: 267). Besides, Russian organised crime is estimated to control around 50 per cent of the Russian economy (Jamieson, 2001: 381; Lindberg, Petrenko, Gladden and Johnson, 1998a: 240). A United Nations report in 1995 estimated that about 3 million organised criminals were employed in about 5,700 gangs in Russia (Shvarts, 2003: 376). Meanwhile, the illegal profits of just one gambling racket in Chicago, New York and Houston were estimated to be around $11.5 million between 1974 and 1990 (Lindberg et al., 1998a: 223). As for the approaches to illicit business, certain authors (for example Donais, 2003: 372; Lindberg et al., 1998a: 223, 224; Shelley and Picarelli, 2002: 308) prefer to call legal business legitimate business, implying that illicit business is illegitimate business. Similarly, Granville (2003) makes a comparison and suggests that the Russian billionaire oligarchs and the 19th-century American robber barons are in no way like each other, since the former made fortunes not by creating new enterprises that increased their countrys wealth, as did Carnegie (steel), Rockefeller (oil), Ford (automobiles), and Morgan (finance) (p. 324). However, conceptualising legal business as legitimate business may result in seeing the profit not as a type of exploitation of labour (thus, illegitimate), but as the rightful gain of capital. Thus, in this essay, the concept of illicit business will be used to address criminalised business. On the other hand, defining illicit business is not easy. In fact, an important number of capitalists violate labour laws, occupational health and safety regulations, commercial laws and tax laws during the production process, and become a part of the informal economy. Their activities are partially illegal. However, here, what is meant by illicit business is the business of producing, transporting, or selling illegal goods or services rather than the illegal procedures followed in the production, transportation, or sale of legal goods or services. Illicit business makes up an important part of the world economy. Those who are engaged in this sort of business can be organised or not. For example, if a person steals something on his/ her own in an unorganised fashion, then this is his/her own illegal individual business, just like the individual street vendors legal individual business. If this action is planned and/or carried out by a group of people in an organised manner, this refers to illegal organised business, just like the legal business of organised street vendors. This may also be called organised crime.6 Organised crime covers such activities as organised illegal gambling, prostitution, pornography, narcotics, racketeering and extortion, public corruption, car theft, financial and document frauds, smuggling, money laundering, and contract killings. Organised criminal groups have even entered into the healthcare industry and stock manipulation. Thus, the organised crime sector amounts to billions of dollars. As Jamieson (2001) suggests, on the basis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures, around one billion dollars of crime proceeds are transferred through the worlds financial markets every day between $300 and $500 billion each year (p. 379). As for the mafioso (capitalist) bosses, their activities should be mainly (but not exclusively) evaluated in terms of this illegal organised business, although all exploiting class members engaged in this illegal organised business cannot be considered as mafioso (capitalist) class elements, since several of them must be considered as elements of the conventional bourgeoisie, deprived of the direct command of armed power. The major distinguishing feature of the mafioso (capitalist) bosses is their command of
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armed power in their economic activities. Although organised crime is generally accompanied by armed power, armed power is not the prerequisite of all organised criminal activities. For example, smuggling can be done in an organised manner without the holding of any arms. However, the mafioso (capitalist) boss does command armed power. Direct command of armed power is the essential feature of a mafioso group. Just like many lords of the feudal era, there might be a hierarchy of wealth and power in a mafioso group, with the acknowledgment that several mafia groups run their businesses in an autonomous fashion. Again, just like the serfs of the feudal era, those who carry out the illicit business such as the workers in a heroin factory, or the transporters or the street sellers of heroin are the labourers in this illegal activity. However, although just like wage workers, who are considered both as a category and as a class subsumed under that category, all labourers (the concept labourer should not be attributed an essentially positive meaning) of the mafia business are not evaluated as a part of the mafia labourer class. However, rather than subsuming them under a vague category of lumpen proletariat or underclass whether defined in terms of structural or behaviourist terms which denotes a category mainly rising on the basis of poverty in addition to exclusion, unethical way of life, or lack of integration mafioso labourers should be treated as a distinct category/class without making any theoretical discrimination on account of the unethical content of their jobs. Meanwhile, as for market orientation, although capitalists aim to sell or barter the goods/services produced by the wage worker in the market, all of those exploiting elements orienting the production (the means of which they own) towards exchange in the market are not considered here as capitalists (cf. Wallerstein, 1979). Actually, many mafioso bosses resemble the bourgeoisie, for they generally attempt to sell or barter the goods/ services produced by the labourers they exploit in the market. However, there are also several differences, which make one think that those differences may be the indicator of the presence of a distinct (if not everywhere a dominant) mode of production. First, mafioso bosses widely use violently forced or semi-forced labour during the production process. It is not as easy for a labourer employed in a mafia business to quit a job as it is for a worker employed in a conventional capitalist business. While the former is under the threat of possibly even being killed if he/she quits the job or tells the police what is going on, the latter works principally on account of economic coercion rather than the threat of physical violence (this resembles not only the exploitation terms of serfs, but also slaves). Secondly, the mafioso boss is the commander of an armed group just like feudal lords commanding their own armies. Whereas the conventional bourgeoisie does not make profits by using (or using the threat of ) armed power that they directly command in such a way as to move beyond legal rules in this case, owners of legal security companies are not considered as mafioso (capitalist) bosses the mafioso (capitalist) bosses privately own and/or directly command armed groups, which become the major source of their revenues. That is why the conventional bourgeoisie may seek strategies to control the states armed power not only against possible worker or anti-capitalist rebellions, but also against the directly armed elements of the society who can become a threat to their lives or wealth at the national or international level. For an exploited labourer of the mafioso business, a proper name denoting the core of her terms of exploitation might be violently forced labourer, meaning that she works not on account of mainly/merely economic coercion in the mafioso business, but because
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otherwise she (or those she cares about) would be physically wounded or killed by mafioso forces.7 However, members of the mafioso (capitalist) boss class/category seem to resort to several exploitation terms. For example, provided that the mafioso boss is the owner of the means of production (for example, a brothel, whether that brothel is legal or illegal, meaning that even if the mafioso enters into legal business, the exploitation terms may still be those of the mafioso mode) and the labourers (or the people the labourers care about) are physically threatened by the mafiosos forces to make those labourers work in the enterprise, 1) if the mafioso boss appropriates the whole revenue and then returns a part without any pre-fixed terms, the exploited labourers of the production process can be considered as slaves (as in the case of slaves of antique civilisations). Then 2) if the mafioso boss appropriates a pre-determined amount of the revenue at the end of the production process (for example, 30 per cent of the days revenue), the labourers can be considered as serfs (but different from those of the feudal mode of production of the Middle Ages in the sense that the production process in the mafioso business is today oriented mainly towards the market,8 and the taxes collected are not legal and in kind, but illegal and in money; but they are similar to feudal mode of production in another way, in that sometimes the labourers are forced to serve the exploiter without receiving any money, as in the case of forced labour in feudal lords estates). If 3) the mafioso boss appropriates the whole revenue and then returns back a part in the wage form (for example, US$1 to the labourer every day, and/or premiums in terms of piecework), the labourers of the job can be considered as dependent wage-workers (dependent in the sense that they are physically forced to stay in the enterprise, and different from those wage-workers exploited by the capitalist who sell their labour power mainly on account of economic coercion. In other words, those who sell their labour power for wages mainly on account of economic coercion in a brothel have to be evaluated as wage-workers; while if the labourer works on his own, then he is to be considered as having self-employed status). The features listed above illustrate a few of the possible forms the mafioso mode of production can take. Although the mafiosos major source of revenue is the production of illegal goods and services under the protective umbrella of his/her armed gang, he/she can also make investments in the legal sectors and derive profits from the labour of the wage-worker working under mainly economic coercion. This becomes a factor in evaluating a person with mafioso traits as a sector of the capitalist class, and denotes the amalgamation of two different but not structurally antagonistic class positions (with the acknowledgment that this fusion can denote a separate class formation). Today, the Sicilian and Calabrian mafia families are engaged in gaining public contracts (Paoli, 2004: 28), constituting an example of the mafiosi doing business in legal sectors. Another example is the organised criminal gangs that control or own 40,000 businesses in Russia, including 2,000 in the state sector (Volkov, 1999: 747). Thus, as Jamieson (2001) illustrates, there are close ties between the illicit and legal businesses (p. 380). Shelley and Picarelli (2002) suggest that it is hard to detect where criminal funds end and the legitimate funds begin (p. 308). Lindberg et al. (1998b) put forward two reasons for mafioso infiltration into so-called legitimate business: first, for the investment of the vast resources it has accumulated; and second, as a means to launder the profits from illegal activities (p. 51). Consequently, the mafioso (capitalist) bosss power seems to grow further via entering into legal businesses (and/or further illegal businesses) that do not require the direct command
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of armed power, the source of profit of which is derived mainly by the wage-workers unpaid labour in the production process, who works mainly on account of economic coercion and is physically (if not economically) free to quit the job. This makes the class position occupied by such mafioso (capitalist) bosses intersect with the class position occupied by the bourgeoisie; while in the present essay, the term mafioso capitalist (or mafioso bourgeoisie) denotes that intersection field. Meanwhile, new technologies provide opportunities for increasing the wealth of the mafioso (capitalist) bosses.9 As Lindberg et al. (1998a) suggest, The growth of technology has enabled emerging organised crime to operate on a world-wide scale at a time when law enforcement agencies are under resourced, ill-equipped and staffed, and lacking in expertise (p. 253). The internet in particular provides new opportunities for the organised criminal sectors.10 About 1,800 internet gambling sites worldwide are estimated to generate a total of $4.2 billion, which also cover various illegal types of gambling and enable money laundering and fraud (Albanese, 2004: 15, 16). Indeed, Internet-based businesses could make a perfect front for moving money all around the world through phony transactions that are difficult to track and difficult to document (Lindberg et al., 1998b:. 52). Just like the legal conventional bourgeoisie, the mafioso (capitalist) bosses also have international links. Mafioso business also transcends the national boundaries. As Jamieson (2001) states, there have been a number of partnerships and meetings between mafia groups from different nations. For example, the formal agreements between the Colombian narcotics traffickers and Russian mafia groups date back to 1988. Besides, the police and intelligence circles have found out about a series of meetings between major criminal groups (with different countries of origin) in Warsaw (in 1991), Prague (in 1992), and Berlin (in 1993). Furthermore, in 1994, a meeting was organised between the representatives of the Italo-American Gambino family, the Japanese Yakuza, and the Colombian, Russian and Chinese mafia bosses in France (pp. 380, 381). Therefore, it is apparent that international strategic alliances occur among mafioso (capitalist) bosses.

The Turkish political system and the mafiosi of Turkey

As for Turkey, a considerable amount of mafia activities have come onto the agenda, especially following the scandals of the post-1990 era. In fact, the post-1980 political and economic atmosphere has provided a convenient setting for the growth of mafioso groups in Turkey. In the first place, the armed conflict between PKK (the armed, illegal Kurdish Workers Party) and the Turkish state created a suitable environment for the illegal trafficking of weapons and narcotics. Besides, the neoliberal economic policies increased the number of public contracts awarded, pushing some capitalists to resort to mafioso power. Furthermore, the need for foreign exchange has also led certain chief exercisers of state power to overlook the mafioso activities.11 Therefore, mafioso power has grown stronger during the course of the 1990s. A brief evaluation of the Turkish political system would provide help in understanding why there has been fertile ground for the mafiosi during the past few decades.12 First, it is important to state that the Turkish Republic was established by a revolution from above, led mainly by the military bureaucracy critical of the Ottoman regime. Up to today, it has witnessed three typical and one untypical military intervention. The monoparty era (1923-1945) and the fifteen years of multi-party regime (1945-1960) were
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marked by the authoritarian practices of the ruling parties. During the mono-party era, two rebellious incidents were crushed by the military: the Kurdish Rebellion, with its religious demands and discourse, in 1925; and the reactionary Menemen Incident, with its demand for the restoration of the Sharia in 1930. And while up until 1950, the Republican Peoples Party had been in power, in 1950, the Democrat Party came to power with a liberal programme. Its authoritarian practices proved to be similar to those of its rival, although this time, religious sentiments were exploited selfishly. When the 27 May military coup dtat captured political power, there were several clandestine rival groups ready to intervene in civilian politics. Soon after the coup dtat, three Democrat Party ministers (including the prime minister) were executed. Following the ratification of a pluralistic new constitution introducing relatively solid mechanisms of checks and balances in 1961, transition to a civilian regime came onto the agenda. In the course of the 1960s and early 1970s, several coup attempts were neutralised by the stronger wing of the military, while a good number of those defeated were retired or executed.13 The 1960s and 1970s also witnessed the rise of working-class and socialist struggles, while the Constitution provided convenient grounds for organising and unionisation. Along with the paramilitary forces of the extreme rightwing, the repressive apparatus of the state crushed several protests relentlessly. The police was divided into two, between right- and left-wing organisations. While the military was not totally composed of right-wing commanders, several active left-wing commanders were neutralised systematically, and the hierarchy within the military was restored in the course of the 1960s and early 1970s. Following the 12 March military memorandum of 1971, leftist activists were relentlessly oppressed. The 1970s witnessed anti-democratic legal arrangements along with hundreds of political murders and massacres. Anti-democratic psychological war techniques and torture became common practices, while certain politicians started to believe that the counter-guerrilla was at the heart of those illegal violent actions.14 These violent practices reached their peak when the anti-communist 12 September military coup dtat of 1980 closed many of the political parties, unions and associations. Freedom of expression was severely curbed. Mass arrests and torture became the routine. Nobody heard the voice of the suffering. The military and masses were mainly interested in the restoration of order. The anti-democratic 1982 Constitution was accompanied by parallel laws. The military government prepared the ground for implementing the neoliberal programme that was adopted in 1980 (known as the January 24th Decisions). After a few years, following the transition to a multi-party civilian regime, the right/left cleavage was replaced by ethnic problems. From the mid-1980s, the Kurdish movement became one of the main problems of both the civilian governments and army commanders. The 1990s witnessed political killings whose perpetrators were unknown, and severe restrictions over freedom of expression and organisation. This time, certain Kurds suffered much from such measures, while the PKK was also responsible for many murders. By the end of the 1990s, along with further neoliberal measures, reforms for democratisation came onto the governments agenda, mainly due to its intention to move closer to the European Union (EU). However, military commanders who were growing uneasy about the governments Islamic activities made a memorandum on 28 February 1997, at the National Security Council meeting. Measures were systematically taken against political Islam up until the first AK Party government in 2002. Since then, there has been a
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kind of counter-movement led by the AK Party, making use of religious discourse. During the second half of the first decade of the 2000s, contradictory tendencies coexisted. The structure and certain practices of the military have been systematically criticised by the pro-government mass media, while the governments attempts to strengthen the police have accompanied efforts to put the army under the stricter supervision of the civilian government. Yet at the same time, the government forces telephone tapping of even judges and public prosecutors became routine. Today, there is still a ban on publicising information about the investigation of the Ergenekon case, during which several secularist intellectuals have been detained along with certain members of the military and mafioso-like individuals who were, it was claimed, members of paramilitary forces. As this process goes on, intellectuals critical of government policies grow anxious, since there is an impression that several anti-AK Party intellectuals are being held in prison without solid proof. Although this case has officially been said to be about the coup dtat plans, there is insufficient data to understand the process fully. Democratic reforms concerning the Kurdish ethnic group in Turkey have been in progress, while facing the opposition of certain Kurdish nationalists. Throughout this process, one has to make the analysis not only at the national level, but also at the international level, taking into consideration the process of restructuration of the Middle East. As for the mafiosi, although authoritarian practices may have fed the criminal business to a certain extent, the majority of those within the state networks who are said to be mafiosi have been members of the police or civilian bureaucracy or politicians, while few members of the military have been considered to be mafiosi. Although at the time of the military coup dtat, there was almost no tolerance for mafiosi, the Kurdish conflict has fed both the Turkish and Kurdish mafiosi. Yet since the mid-1990s, systematic police operations against mafiosi and bribery have continued to take place, while the power of the mafiosi is still considerable.

Mafioso activities in contemporary Turkey

As for mafioso activities in contemporary Turkey, they are quite extensive. One common type is the collection of money, cheques and bonds by means of violence. This type of activity is said to be mainly dominated by certain lkc-origin individuals who were once part of the anti-communist paramilitary forces, with close relations with the police. Nevertheless, several of them were arrested subsequent to the 12 September 1980 military coup dtat. Another type is the threat or use of violence to secure the awarding of contracts to the bidder employing the mafiosi. Some politicians also take part in mafia contract activities. As for the purchase of certain lands via mafioso power, similar methods are implemented. Protection rackets constitute another common activity. Mafioso gangs are organised even in prisons, despite being under supposedly strict state control and discipline. There are also widespread activities around the illegal trade of humans, uranium, antiques, weapons and narcotics. Trafficking activities have international links, and not only the Turkish mafia but also the Kurdish mafia has had a considerable market share (Bovenkerk & Yes ilgz, 2000: 47-96). In Turkey, mafioso capital has grown so much that these groups have made huge investments in the legal economic sector. Although it is not easy to estimate the exact figures, an incident that reveals the extent of mafioso capital is the Trkbank bidding
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process, which indicates that a powerful mafia boss may possess the financial means sufficient to buy a bank. On the basis of the parliamentary, police, court, and telephone records, S ener (2004) explains the mafia, business and state relationship in this process as follows: in the course of the 1990s, some mafiosi wanted to buy a bank that would help in their monetary operations. In this respect, Alaattin akc, a very powerful mafia boss, got in touch with the businessperson Korkmaz Yig it and supported him in the awarding process. This included threats and assassination plots against other bidders. Although M T (the national intelligence organisation) informed the prime minister, Mesut Ylmaz, of the phone calls between akc and Yig it and explained to the state minister, Gnes Taner, that akc had threatened Yig its rivals, the government took no measures. Emniyets (police force) report, sent to the Central Banks president, Gazi Erel, did not set him into action, either. On 4 August 1998, Korkmaz Yig it won the bidding. However, shortly after the Republican Peoples Party MP Fikri Sag lars presentation of the recorded akc-Yig it phone-calls, at a press conference on 13 October 1998, the government fell. The intricate relations between the chief exercisers of state power and mafioso groups were best revealed in the incident known as the Susurluk Scandal. In Susurluk, a district of Balkesir, a car crashed into a lorry on 3 November 1996, and three of the four travelling in the car died. A police chief (Hseyin Kocadag ), a mafiosi with lkc origins (Abdullah atl, a heroin trafficker on Interpols wanted list, whose fake identity card had the police chief Mehmet Ag ars real signature on it), atls girl friend (Gonca Us), and an MP from the True Path Party (Sedat Edip Bucak, the leader of a large tribe in South East Anatolia) were in the car. Only Bucak survived. Subsequent to the crash, it was reported that registered and unregistered weapons were found in the car. Then, the MP and police chief s relationship with the mafioso, who was accused of narcotics trafficking and the murder of leftists, has long been questioned. The photographs and documents published and broadcasted in the media revealed further relations between atl and the chief exercisers of state power. However, the parliamentary commission for investigating the allegations made little progress on account of difficulties in accessing certain documents. Besides, on 8 December 1997, Judge Akman Akyrek, the Reporter of the Parliamentary Commissions for Imaginary Exportation, Perpetrator Unknown Political Killings and the Susurluk Investigation died in a traffic accident; and on 22 November 1999, Bedri incetahtac, a Virtue Party MP and a member of the Parliamentary Commission for the Susurluk Investigation, also died in a traffic accident. Fikri Sag lar, a member of the same commission, declared that all commission members lives were in serious danger.15 But the story is much deeper than this. Mehmet Eymrs (a former M T [Turkish intelligence service] executive) second M T Report (in nl, 2001) gives an idea of the extent of these relations, suggesting that a special criminal team was established within Emniyet (the Turkish police force) to fight against the PKK and Dev-Sol, the organisations considered by the state authorities as terrorist. The report claims that this team is mainly composed of former lkcs (the anti-communist Nationalist Action Party militants) who later became involved in threatening, racketeering, extortion, narcotics trafficking, and murders. The most crucial point in the report was the allegation that this team was directly linked to the chief of police Mehmet Ag ar,16 and was directed by the 17 consultant chief of police, Korkut Eken. The M T report suggested that Emniyet provided police identity cards and green passports to this group as its members travelled to

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Germany, Holland, Belgium, Hungary, and Azerbaijan under the guise of the fight against terrorism, but in fact engaged in narcotics trafficking. The report continued with details and further names (pp. 151-156). A number of other studies also indicated that the states measures against the socialist and Kurdish movements included illegal operations in which mafioso groups were employed.18 These studies also indicated that some chief exercisers of state power were involved in mafioso activities even in the pre-1980 era,19 while the post-1980 period witnessed a greater growth.

Against the gangs

In fact, the 1990s were the years of a growing mafioso threat to other capitalists in Turkey. A number of businesspeople were threatened, killed or kidnapped.20 Many businesspeople grew uneasy about the rising mafioso power and began to express this, and to make policy proposals against this trend. For example, the prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro (the national hero for his inquiry against corruption in Italy) was invited to make a speech in the TS AD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmens Association) General Council Meeting in 1995 (Alkan, 1998: 315). Following this, the capitalists spoke of the problem in subsequent meetings, conferences and publications. Demands for democratisation and transparency became a major concern for those feeling the actual or potential threat of mafioso (capitalist) bosses. In this process, some sectors of the state also started to take measures against the mafioso gangs. This may be due to both the rival groups in the state and the rising opposition. It was shortly before the Susurluk Incident when the operations of the states armed apparatus started. For example, as Trk (2002) suggests, an operation was carried out against the gang known as Sylemez Kardes ler on 11 June 1996. Among the gangs alleged crimes were an assassination plot against Mehmet Ag ar. An important number of gang members were from the police or army. On 27 May 1997, Meral Aks ener, the minister for internal affairs, stated that between 11 June 1996 and 3 November 1996, except from those in Susurluk, the police caught nine gangs, of which 21 members were from the police force and 6 members were from the army (pp. 40, 54). But it was after the Susurluk Incident that these operations gained momentum. Mafioso leaders and members were arrested one after another in 1997 and 1998. Due to the extensive scope of these arrests, the operations were called the 1997 Gang Operations. In the years 2000 and 2001, a series of operations also took place. While some mafiosi were arrested, an important number of the chief exercisers of state power who were alleged to be the part of these gangs survived with little or no penalty.21 The first decade of the 2000s also saw several gang operations, during which people inside and outside state networks were arrested. This amalgamation of state elements and mafioso power has very important implications for the prospects concerning the capitalist state. The post-1990 gang operations in particular signalled the failure of the conventional bourgeois ideas/values for those who have become part of such gangs. The rising opposition of the big (TS AD) bourgeoisie against corruption and mafia formations can be considered as the forerunner of a serious line of future conflict, including the future possibility for the mafioso mode of production which has already penetrated even the intelligence networks of the state to become the dominant mode.

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A remark: No essential antagonism or alliance

However, it is not possible to assert that conventional capitalists never make alliances with the mafiosi. While they can sometimes collaborate with the mafiosi in pursuit of their short-term interests, they may also particularly make such collaborations when their collective long-term interests are threatened. A generalisation might be made as follows: in terms of those forces attacking the private ownership of means of production in general, the exploiting propertied classes are likely to unite against this common threat. However, when such a common threat is weak or perceived to be insignificant, it becomes quite difficult to fix the threshold of a possible bloc of the exploiters. While in Turkey, mafioso power can be considered to be significant, the elements of which at the same time hold substantial state power, the laws and form of the state may seem to favour the not-directly armed bourgeoisie (conventional bourgeoisie), outlawing the mafia business and bands.22 In such a case, to claim that the power bloc is composed of conventional capitalists and mafioso (capitalist) bosses would be quite difficult, especially when large segments of the conventional bourgeoisie try to defeat, rather than collaborate with the mafia gangs. But in such a case, it could also hardly be claimed that the power bloc is restricted to the segments of the conventional bourgeoisie in the face of the real power the mafiosi possesses. Besides, theoretically, there are further difficulties in demarcating those within and without the power bloc, especially when the cement of the power bloc is claimed to be ideology. Indeed, both the dominant and the official ideology in a country may be communism, and there may be a de jure ban on the private ownership of means of production, but the de facto ownership of certain legal and illegal enterprises may belong to certain state elements. It is true that the state structure is biased especially on account of the laws defining the state positions, granting opportunities and putting constraints on the interests/actions of those inside (and sometimes even outside) the country occupying different positions (whether a dictator or a representative assembly makes those laws). However, although official laws generally constitute an important aspect regulating and intervening in social life, the actual power holders may, at least partially and sometimes to a considerable extent, challenge this structural de jure selectivity regardless of the vitality of the laws generally, and considerably (if not always and absolutely) shaping the actions of the state elements. Analysing the de facto power structures without restricting the analysis to the structural de jure selectivity of the state would have the effect of a kind of ultrasound, providing an opportunity to detect further lines of power structures and the factors enabling and threatening further hubs of power. Besides, in analysing the relationship between the conventional capitalists and the mafiosi with reference to state power, we should focus on the questions, who holds how much power on account of which factors, in which context, again in a manner so as to move beyond the examination of the states structural legal selectivity. That would enable a more thorough analysis, as well as enabling the concrete phenomenon to be highlighted with further precision, with the opportunity to draw conclusions for action strategies in a relatively solid way. Shifting the focus of the analysis to also include the factors acting upon the conflict and alliance-generating motives would add further details to the picture, again with implications for strategies for handling those motives, rather than remaining at the level of over-generalisations in strategy formation.

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I agree with the classical Marxist accounts in that, in the face of the rising power of forces with the aim of eliminating the private ownership of means of production, the elements of the exploiting classes that privately own the means of production are likely to (not essentially) unite (though in a contradictory way, as Poulantzas suggested) due to the perceived common threat. For example, feudal lords, conventional capitalists and mafioso (capitalist) bosses may make alliances against the communists, while this alliance may also include those forces defending the short-term interests of the categories that are not part of exploiting classes (e.g. associations of the self-employed, some labour unions). However, it is also possible for the pro-capitalist forces and pro-worker forces to unite against a common perceived threat, as in the case of alliances made between various forces on the side of the short-and/or long-term interests of the conventional (not directly armed) capitalist sectors and wage-workers (in addition to possible other non-class sectors) as against the rising mafia power. The substantial mafioso power, which is in no way restricted to the ex-Eastern Bloc, suggests a considerable probability that the next stage faced by the human race may be marked by brutal mafia practices. Although what comes next will most probably depend on the course of struggles (in case the human race does not come to an end due to nuclear, environmental or any other possible disaster), there is no reason to be optimistic about the future unless the growing destructive capacity of the power holders is destroyed.

Conclusion
In this article, I have presented empirical knowledge on the mafiosi of mainly Turkey along with other countries. The evidence appears to show that although authoritarianism and the non-transparency of governmental processes are likely to feed mafioso activities, mafia activity is not restricted to authoritarian countries. The states repressive apparatus, in particular, is exposed to the penetration of the mafiosi, while cooperation with the mafiosi on the parts of certain civilian politicians, bureaucrats, and armed members of the state outside the officially defined state networks is far from being exceptional. The mafiosis capital has been growing at the international level. Technology provides new opportunities to them, while forced prostitution and organ trafficking are among their most brutal practices. The conceptualisation of mafioso capitalists indicates the intersection of mafioso and capitalist modes of production. Along with the convenient material conditions, we must also consider the corrupt values of the capitalist world in analysing the mafioso mode of production. In so far as limitless individualistic material gains and the worship of power continue to be celebrated, respect for life will remain only as an abstract idea. Although these are not values invented by the mafiosi or the capitalist, the capitalist and mafioso production relations reinforce and spread them further. It is apparent that the mafioso (capitalist) bosses should be considered as an actually or potentially significant factor in analysing the power relations in several countries, including Turkey. They hold something the legal conventional bourgeoisie lacks; that is, the direct command of armed power. The less the conventional bourgeoisie holds the direct command of armed power, the severer it becomes to appeal to ideological means and material resources to control state armed power for realising short and/or long-term capitalist interests. Nevertheless, neither the antagonism nor the alliance between the

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conventional bourgeoisie and mafiosi can be essentialised. As for Turkey, what is to be done against corruption and criminal business should not be restricted to only repressive measures and further transparency of the state. Fighting against greediness and the worship of power should be considered as a part of the solution. Human relations, including the relations of production, that promote solidarity and respect rather than individualism and competition, should cover the world. Yet most probably, the path of struggles with clashing forces, tactics and strategies will determine the future of the direction of the class and other conflicts. Today, it is clear that humankind is in a state of collective insanity. Narcotics bring death, while the organs of the poor are stolen and sold to the rich for transplantation. The flesh of men, women and children is put on the market for money. In all of this, the mafiosi assumes the leading role. As for the conventional capitalists, short-term orientation to profit has been warming the globe, and the pursuit of market advantages has been killing thousands of people. In the arms race, the destructive capacity of the holders of power has been steadily increasing. Today, not only the poor but humankind in general live under the threat of the greediness of human beings. Unless the destructive capacity of the power holders is destroyed, the prospect is not only a state of global insanity but also the extinction of the human species. Given humankinds extremely gloomy prospects, the time spent in analysing capitalist and mafioso power seems time well spent. Acknowledgements
This paper is based on its authors dissertation, Mechanisms for the bourgeois hold of state power and the case of Turkey, which was approved in March 2007 by the Department of Sociology at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. This paper is also, at the same time, a slightly revised version of the paper, The growing mafia: Amalgamation of arms and money, presented at the 24th Conference of the Nordic Sociological Association (Violence and Conflict) in Aarhus, Denmark, 14-17 August 2008.

Endnotes
1. Jeffrey Sachss shock therapy is summarised in What is to be Done? (Sachs, 1990), in which he argues for the need for a rapid transition to private ownership and a market system in Eastern Europe. 2. Not absolute, because sometimes their structural interests may coincide. 3. For a discussion of rent and monopoly, see Wallerstein (1988). 4. For a critical evaluation of the concept bourgeoisie, see Wallerstein (1988) and Poulantzas (1967). 5. Meanwhile, in the mainstream economy, regardless of the widely resorted criterion scarcity, that activity is not considered to be an economic one. But with reference to the conceptualisation proposed here, that activity can be considered as an economic one while the criterion is not scarcity, but production of utility. 6. For definitions of organised crime, see Lindberg et al. (1998b: 48); Donais (2003: 364); Rush and Scarpitti (2001: 529). Also see Dishman (2001: 45); Jamieson (2001: 378, 379); and Shelley and Picarelli (2002: 306) for a comparison of organised crime (specifically the transnational criminal organisations) with terrorism. 7. Note, though, that the wage worker in antagonism to the capitalist also sometimes, but not mainly, works under direct physical threat, as in the case of several workers who were forced to return to their workplaces due to the armed threat of state forces subsequent to the 12 September military takeover of the Turkey in 1980.

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8. Although the production process is mainly oriented towards the market in the contemporary mafioso business, there are also certain mafioso strategies for accumulating wealth that are hardly engaged in production (for example, killing and taking the money of an individual) which recall Marxs conceptualisation of primitive accumulation. However, from the point of view of the inclusive conceptualisation of the economy, even this activity may refer to some sort of production/economic activity insofar as some utility is sought as regards even a single individual (e.g. the killer), regardless of the harm caused in other respects. 9. For the opportunities provided by information technology, see Shelley and Picarelli (2002: 309-311). 10. For computer crime and the Russian mafia, see Serio and Gorkin (2003). 11. Bovenkerk and Yes ilgz (2000) point out an instance that fits this tendency very well. It was Prime Minister zals visit to Shakalarchi, the worldwide master of money laundering, in 1989, in the Grand Dolder Hotel, Zurich, allegedly in order to persuade him to shift his activities to Turkey. It was reported that although zal asked Shakalarchi whether he would like to be a Turkish citizen or not, his answer was no, Minister. In this instance, zal also forgave economic crimes, and this was interpreted as encouraging investments for money laundering (pp. 94, 95). 12. See Ahmad (2000) for a compact political history of modern Turkey. 13. See Akyaz (2002) for the struggle within the Turkish military up to the 1980s. 14. For counter-guerilla activities in Turkey and NATOs secret armies, see Daniel Ganser (2005) and the memories of Talat Turhan (2001), a leftist former colonel reported to have been detained and tortured in 1972. 15. See the interviews in Dzel (2002: 119-174); and the Susurluk chronology in Trk (2002). 16. Following his career in the police, Ag ar became a True Path Party (TPP) MP in December 1995. In the Motherland-TPP coalition government, he served as the justice minister, and he became the minister for internal affairs in the Welfare Party-TPP government. He had to resign from office subsequent to a conflict with Erbakan, the WP leader. After the Susurluk Scandal, he also had to resign from TPP, and his immunity as an MP was lifted. In the April 1999 and November 2002 general elections, he was elected as an independent MP, and in December 2002, he became the leader of the TPP. For further information on Mehmet Ag ar, see <www.kimkimdir.gen.tr>. 17. Korkut Eken started his career in the army. In 1978, he was appointed to the Special War Departments Special Union Commandership (zel Harp Dairesi zel Birlik Komutanlg ). After 1980, he trained the Special Teams (zel Harekat Timleri). In 1987, he resigned from the army as a lieutenant colonel. He started to work in M T as the vice-president of the Security Department, but retired in 1988. Eken worked at Emniyet between 1993 and 1996, at Ag ars invitation, where he participated in a number of operations. For further information on Korkut Eken, see <www.kimkimdir.gen.tr>. 18. For example, see Bovenkerk and Yes ilgz (2000); Gkdemir (2002); S ener (2004); Trk (2002). 19. For example, Mumcu (1998) pointed out a narcotics trafficking case about Kudret Bayhan, a NAP senator, who was caught with 146 kilos of base morphine in Menton, a small town on the Italy-France border, in 1972 (p. 81). A similar case took place in 1979, when the NSP senator Halit Kahraman was sentenced to eight years for narcotics trafficking in Germany (Bovenkerk and Yes ilgz, 2000: 202). 20. See Bovenkerk and Yes ilgz (2000); Gkdemir (2002); S ener (2004); Trk (2002); nl (2001). 21. See Bovenkerk and Yes ilgz (2000); Gkdemir (2002); S ener (2001), S ener (2004); nl (2001).

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22. With the acknowledgment that such laws may have both a positive and negative side for the mafiosi: positive in the sense that an outlawed illegal act may sometimes bring more material gains; and negative in the sense that the state elements empowered to implement those laws constitute a constant threat to the survival/relative freedom of the mafiosi and to mafia business.

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Author biography Fatma lk Seluk is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Atlm University, Ankara, Turkey. Her work prior to her dissertation had been mainly on working-class and labour organisations. During that time she published, amongst other things, a book in Turkish, Organizing the Unorganized: Labour Organizations in the Informal Sector (2002), for which she received the Turkish Social Science Associations Young Social Scientist Award (2005), and an article, Dressing the wound: Organizing informal sector workers (2005), in the Monthly Review. Social theory has become her major research interest since the final year of her dissertation, Mechanisms for the bourgeois hold of state power and the case of Turkey (2007).

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