Schnabel, Albrecht and Thakur, Ramesh Chandra - Kosovo and The Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship

Kosovo and the challenge
of humanitarian
intervention:
Selective indignation,
collective action, and
international citizenship
UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY
PRESS
Edited by
Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh
Thakur
The \niled Nalions \niveisily is an oigan of lhe \niled Nalions eslab-
lished by lhe Geneial Assembly in 1972 lo be an inleinalional communily
of scholais engaged in ieseaich, advanced liaining, and lhe disseminalion
of knowledge ielaled lo lhe piessing global pioblems of human suivival,
developmenl, and welfaie. ls aclivilies focus mainly on lhe aieas of peace
and goveinance, enviionmenl and suslainable developmenl, and science
and lechnology in ielalion lo human welfaie. The \niveisily opeiales
lhiough a woildwide nelwoik of ieseaich and poslgiaduale liaining
cenlies, wilh ils planning and cooidinaling headquaileis in Tokyo.
The \niled Nalions \niveisily Piess, lhe publishing division of lhe
\N\, publishes scholaily and policy-oiienled books and peiiodicals in
aieas ielaled lo lhe \niveisily`s ieseaich.
Kosovo and lhe Challenge of Humanilaiian nleivenlion
This page intentionally left blank
Kosovo and lhe challenge of
humanilaiian inleivenlion:
Seleclive indignalion, colleclive
aclion, and inleinalional cilizenship
Idiled by Albiechl Schnabel and Ramesh Thakui
a
United Nations
University Press
TOKYO
u
NEW YORK
u
PARIS
( The \niled Nalions \niveisily, 2OOO
The views expiessed in lhis publicalion aie lhose of lhe aulhois and do nol
necessaiily ieecl lhe views of lhe \niled Nalions \niveisily.
\niled Nalions \niveisily Piess
The \niled Nalions \niveisily, 53-7O, 1ingumae 5-chome,
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, 15O-8925, 1apan
Tel: 81-3-3499-2811 Iax: 81-3-34O6-7345
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\niled Nalions \niveisily Ofnce in Noilh Ameiica
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Tel: 1-212-963-6387 Iax: 1-212-371-9454
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\niled Nalions \niveisily Piess is lhe publishing division of lhe \niled Nalions
\niveisily.
Covei design by 1oyce C. Weslon
Piinled in lhe \niled Slales of Ameiica
\N\P-1O5O
SBN 92-8O8-1O5O-2
Libiaiy of Congiess Calaloging-in-Publicalion Dala
Kosovo and lhe challenge of humanilaiian inleivenlion : seleclive indignalion,
colleclive aclion, and inleinalional cilizenship j ediled by Albiechl Schnabel and
Ramesh Thakui.
p. cm.
ncludes bibliogiaphical iefeiences and index.
SBN 92-8O8-1O5O-2
1. Kosovo (Seibia) Hisloiy-Civil Wai, 1998 2. Woild polilics 1989
3. Noilh Allanlic Tiealy Oiganizalion. 4. nleivenlion (nleinalional law)
. Schnabel, Albiechl. . Thakui, Ramesh. . Tille.
DR2O87.K665 2OOO
949.71O3dc21 OO-O11O51
Conlenls
Lisl of lables and nguies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgemenls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
1 Kosovo, lhe changing conlouis of woild polilics, and lhe
challenge of woild oidei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Albrccht Schnabcl anJ Rancsh Thakur
Part One: The Kusuvu crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2 Kosovo in lhe lwenlielh cenluiy: A hisloiical accounl . . . . . . . . 19
Maric-1aninc Calic
3 The Kosovo conicl: A peispeclive fiom inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Agon Dcnjaha
4 The closing of lhe Kosovo cycle: \iclimizalion veisus
iesponsibilily. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Duska Anastasijcvic
5 The Kosovo conicl: The Balkans and lhe Soulhein
Caucasus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Ccorgc Khutsishvili anJ Albrccht Schnabcl
v
Part Twu: The majur players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6 The cosls of vicloiy: Ameiican powei and lhe use of foice in
lhe conlempoiaiy oidei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
C. 1ohn Ikcnbcrry
7 Russia: Reassessing nalional inleiesls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1O1
VlaJinir Baranovsky
8 China: Whilhei lhe woild oidei aflei Kosovo?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Zhang Yunling
9 The ma|oi Iuiopean allies: Iiance, Geimany, and lhe
\niled Kingdom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Sinon Dukc, Hans-Ccorg 1hrhart, anJ Matthias KaraJi
Part Three: Yiews frum NATO allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
1O The Noidic counliies: Whilhei lhe Wesl`s conscience? . . . . . . . 151
Bjrn Mllcr
11 The Soulhein Ilank: laly, Gieece, Tuikey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Ccorgios Kostakos
12 Kosovo and lhe case of lhe (nol so) fiee iideis: Poilugal,
Belgium, Canada, and Spain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
DaviJ C. HaglunJ anJ Allcn Scns
13 The new enlianls: Hungaiy, Poland, and lhe Czech
Republic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2O1
Ictcr Ta las anJ 1a s;lo Valki
Part Fuur: Selected internatiunal perspectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
14 The Muslim woild: \neasy ambivalence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Ibrahin A. Karawan
15 Lalin Ameiica: The dilemmas of inleivenlion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Mo nica Scrrano
16 Soulh Afiica: The demand foi legilimale mullilaleialism. . . . . 245
Ihilip Ncl
17 ndia: An uneasy piecedenl. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26O
Satish Nanbiar
vi CONTINTS
Part Five: Challenges uf the pust-war urder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
18 NATO: Iiom colleclive defence lo peace enfoicemenl . . . . . . . 273
Nicola Butlcr
19 The \niled Nalions syslem and lhe Kosovo ciisis . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
A. 1. R. Croon anJ Iaul Taylor
2O The concepl of humanilaiian inleivenlion ievisiled. . . . . . . . . . . 319
1ancs Mayall
21 The concepl of soveieignly ievisiled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
Alan 1ancs
Part Six: Opiniun, media, civil suciety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
22 Analogies al wai: The \niled Slales, lhe conicl in Kosovo,
and lhe uses of hisloiy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
Ccorgc C. Hcrring
23 Media coveiage of lhe wai: An empiiical assessmenl . . . . . . . . . 36O
Stcvcn 1ivingston
24 Iffeclive indignalion? Building global awaieness, NGOs, and
lhe enfoicemenl of noims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
Iclicc Cacr
Part Seven: Furce, diplumacy, and the internatiunal cummunity . . 403
25 The inevilabilily of seleclive iesponse? Piinciples lo guide
uigenl inleinalional aclion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4O5
1ori Iislcr Danrosch
26 The splil-scieen wai: Kosovo and changing concepls of lhe
use of foice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42O
1awrcncc IrccJnan
27 Mililaiy hisloiy oveiluined: Did aii powei win lhe wai? . . . . . 433
Ray Iunncll
28 Ioice, diplomacy, and noims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
Coral Bcll
CONTINTS vii
29 Solidaiily veisus geoslialegy: Kosovo and lhe dilemmas of
inleinalional democialic culluie. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463
1can-Marc CoicauJ
3O The good inleinalional cilizen and lhe ciisis in Kosovo . . . . . . 482
AnJrcw 1inklatcr
31 \nbiidled humanilaiianism: Belween |uslice, powei, and
aulhoiily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496
Rancsh Thakur anJ Albrccht Schnabcl
Lisl of conliibulois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5O5
ndex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
viii CONTINTS
Tables and nguies
Tables
5.1 Peiceplions in Geoigia of lhe ma|oi playeis in lhe Kosovo
ciisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.2 Peiceplions in Aimenia of lhe ma|oi playeis in lhe Kosovo
ciisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.3 Peiceplions in Azeibai|an of lhe ma|oi playeis in lhe
Kosovo ciisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8O
1O.1 Compaialive inleinalionalism``. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
23.1 Polenlial policy effecls of global ieal-lime media. . . . . . . . . . . . 361
23.2 Iffecls of pio|ecled casuallies on levels of \S public
suppoil foi lhe Peisian Gulf Wai. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
23.3 Global humanilaiian emeigencies and media coveiage:
1anuaiy 1998 Augusl 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
23.4 Ameiican bioadcasl nelwoik coveiage of Kosovo:
Seplembei 1998 1uly 1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
23.5 CNN coveiage of NATO mislakes``: ApiilMay 1999. . . . . 373
23.6 Measuies of suppoil foi \S involvemenl in lhe Kosovo
conicl: MaichMay 1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
23.7 Wesl Iuiopean and Noilh Ameiican public opinion on
NATO`s iole in Kosovo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
23.8 Levels of suppoil foi cuiienl oi moie foice, oi foi less
foice oi an end lo involvemenl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
ix
23.9 Levels of suppoil foi moie diplomalic effoil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
23.1O Cenlial and Iasl Iuiopean public opinion on NATO`s iole
in Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38O
Figures
19.1 The \niled Nalions Mission in Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3O5
23.1 The numbei of sloiies aboul Kosovo on CNN: 1uly 1998
1une 1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
23.2 The numbei of sloiies aboul Kosovo on CNN: 24 Maich
1O 1une 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37O
23.3 The lenglh of CNN news sloiies aboul Kosovo: 1uly 1998
1une 1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
23.4 Live coveiage by CNN of bieaking news sloiies: 1uly 1998
1une 1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
23.5 The fiequency of lopics in CNN coveiage: 19981999 . . . . . . . 372
x TABLIS AND IG\RIS
Acknowledgemenls
We aie gialeful foi lhe assislance of a numbei of colleagues wilhoul
whom lhis book could nol have been wiillen and published. We lhank
oshie Sawada fiom lhe Peace and Goveinance Piogiamme of lhe
\niled Nalions \niveisily foi hei liieless effoils lo piovide adminislia-
live suppoil lo all aspecls of lhe pio|ecl be lhal lhe adminislialion of
lhe pio|ecl budgel, oiganizalion of lhe aulhoi woikshop, oi assislance
wilh lhe piepaialion of lhe manusciipl. Many (unpaid) evenings and
weekends have gone inlo making lhis pio|ecl and book happen. We aie
gialeful lo lhe Cenlial Iuiopean \niveisily in Budapesl and ils nleina-
lional Relalions and Iuiopean Sludies Piogiamme foi hospilalily and
local adminislialive assislance in oiganizing and holding a veiy fiuilful
aulhoi meeling and woikshop. We gieally appiecialed lhe feedback we
ieceived fiom allending sludenls and facully fiom lhe Cenlial Iuiopean
\niveisily. The \niled Nalions \niveisily Piess has been exliemely
geneious and palienl in pulling up wilh oui desiie lo publish lhis book in
a veiy shoil peiiod of lime, in oidei lo allow lhe iesulls of oui sludy lo
conliibule lo lhe ongoing and evolving debale ovei lhe inleinalional
communily`s ieaclions lo lhe conicl in Kosovo. We deeply appieciale
lhe coopeialion and encouiagemenl of Manfied Boemeke, diiecloi of
lhe \N\P, and his slaff pailiculaily 1anel Boileau as well as Liz
Palon foi hei excellenl |ob in copyediling lhe enliie manusciipl. We also
expiess oui appiecialion foi lhe useful commenls and suggeslions offeied
by lwo ievieweis of lhe diafl manusciipl. We lhank all lhe conliibuling
xi
aulhois foi lheii insighls and lheii coopeialion in making limely ie-
visions. Iinally, we lhank oui families foi saciincing a gieal amounl of
qualily family lime foi lhis pio|ecl lhe book is dedicaled lo lhem.
xii ACKNOWLIDGIMINTS
Ioi Kalhleen, 1oseph, Rafael and Daniel
Ioi Beinadelle, San|ay and Simon
1
Kosovo, lhe changing conlouis of
woild polilics, and lhe challenge
of woild oidei
Albrccht Schnabcl anJ Rancsh Thakur
The Kosovo Wai has lhe polenlial lo be a denning momenl in poslCold
Wai hisloiy.1 l could iesliucluie lhe pallein of inleinalional ielalions by
ieshaping lhe ielalionships belween iegional secuiily oiganizalions and
lhe \niled Nalions, belween ma|oi poweis in Iasl and Wesl, belween
fiiends and allies wilhin lhose camps, and belween foice and diplomacy.
l may also call inlo queslion lhe unipolai momenl lhal has pievailed
since lhe end of lhe Cold Wai. Moieovei, lhe noimalive, opeialional,
and sliucluial queslions lhal aie iaised by lhe Kosovo ciisis will have
long-leim consequences foi lhe way in which we undeisland and inlei-
piel woild polilics. Ioi inslance, can lhe \N Secuiily Council velo now
effeclively be ciicumvenled lo launch seleclive enfoicemenl opeialions?
How can lhe humanilaiian impeialive be ieconciled wilh lhe piinciple of
slale soveieignly?2 Aie we wilnessing an end lo absolule piinciples in lhe
inleinalional legal fiamewoik and, if so, al whal cosl? \ndei whal con-
dilions do such absolule piinciples lose lheii legilimacy? We will come
back lo lhese and olhei key queslions. Iiisl il is necessaiy lo siluale lhe
Kosovo ciisis in lhe conlexl of lhe changing conlouis of woild polilics
since lhe end of lhe Cold Wai.
The loss of poslCold Wai innocence
The end of lhe Cold Wai offeied new and exciling oppoilunilies foi in-
leinalional and iegional oiganizalions lo undeipin and undeiwiile inlei-
1
nalional, nalional, and human secuiily. n lhe absence of oveiaiching
ideological divisions, lhe emphasis shifled lo ciealing and slienglhening
lhe bases of coopeialive fiamewoiks belween vaiious secuiily piovideis.
Theie was iecognilion of lhe facl lhal, foi effeclive secuiily piovision lo
be iealized, cooidinalion, collaboialion, and coopeialion aie necessaiy
belween non-slale, slale, and inleislale aclois. Regional coopeialion be-
lween gioups of slales lo addiess common and shaied lhieals and chal-
lenges became an impoilanl impeialive, peihaps moie impoilanl lhan
common defence mechanisms againsl a ieal, peiceived, oi polenlial
enemy.
The Gulf Wai seemed lo heiald lhe dawn of a New Woild Oidei``:
ma|oi and smallei poweis collaboialed acioss lhe IaslWesl divide lo
punish an aggiessoi (iaq) lhal had allacked anolhei soveieign slale.
ndeed lhe inleinalional communily and, foi lhe nisl lime, bolh lhe
\niled Slales and lhe Soviel \nion collaboialed in expelling iaq fiom
Kuwail. They even wenl so fai as lo eslablish safe aieas undei inlei-
nalional mililaiy conliol foi iaq`s Kuidish and Shiile communilies. This
was followed by inleinalional sanclions againsl iaq in an allempl lo
foice lhal counliy inlo an uncondilional suiiendei of ils piogiamme lo
build weapons of mass desliuclion. The inleinalional communily had
uniled lo enfoice global noims and slandaids.
n lhe Gulf Wai, woild oidei molives weie inleilwined wilh slialegic
inleiesls ielaled lo fiee and secuie access lo oil ieseives and lhe con-
lainmenl of iaq as a polenlial iegional hegemon. \lleiioi molives weie
haidei lo asciibe lo inleinalional involvemenl in Somalia, anolhei
example of new woild oidei hopes being dashed. Some 3OO,OOO people had
died lheie as a iesull of inleinal wai, dioughl, and famine. When humani-
laiian aid agencies weie on lhe veige of leaving lhe counliy foi safely
ieasons, lhe inleinalional communily senl pioleclion lioops lo allow lhem
lo conlinue lheii woik. The CNN`` effecl, wheie agilaled T\-walching
public opinion would piessuie polilical iepiesenlalives lo lake aclion in
defence of human |uslice and dignily, was idenlined as a ma|oi diiving
foice foi asseilive humanilaiian foieign policies of ma|oi slales. How-
evei, in lhe end bolh lhe \niled Slales and lhe \niled Nalions failed lo
biing peace lo Somalia. The violenl dealh of a gioup of \S Rangeis
caused a ieveise CNN effecl`` and lhe \S goveinmenl fell piessuied lo
wilhdiaw ils lioops in lhe face of lhe giowing iisk of casuallies. Piesidenl
Bill Clinlon`s Piesidenlial Decision Diieclive 25 was lo sel lhe condilions
and limilalions foi fuluie peace suppoil opeialions: unless lhe nalional
inleiesl was al slake, allies could be engaged, lheie was a safe exil slial-
egy and cleai mandale, and lhe foice was undei \S command, no
Ameiican soldiei would again be exposed lo peacekeeping opeialions in
silualions wheie lheie was no peace lo keep.
Rwanda became lhe symbol of inleinalional indiffeience and callous-
2 KOSO\O AND THI CHALLINGI OI WORLD ORDIR
ness. Hundieds of lhousands of Rwandans weie slaughleied despile
ample foiewaining lo lhe \niled Nalions and lhe ma|oi poweis of lhe
genocide lhal was aboul lo unfold; ignoiance was nol an alibi foi inac-
lion. f lhe Gulf Wai maiked lhe biilh of lhe new woild oidei, Somalia
was lhe slide inlo lhe new woild disoidei and Rwanda maiked lhe loss of
innocence aflei lhe end of lhe Cold Wai.
Woise was lo follow foi woild conscience in Siebienica in a liagedy
lhal, in lhe woids of lhe ofncial \N iepoil, will haunl oui hisloiy foi-
evei.``3 The hoiioi in ugoslavia unfolded in lhe conlexl of a confused
inleinalional communily, an undecided and uncooidinaled Iuiope, and
an indecisive \niled Nalions. The \niled Nalions became involved in a
quagmiie. l allempled lo manage a conicl lhal luined oul lo be un-
manageable. The \N Pioleclion Ioice (\NPROIOR) in foimei ugo-
slavia became involved in inleinal wais, ciealed nol necessaiily by hisloiy
and piimoidial feais and halied, as so oflen assumed, bul by calculaling,
shiewd, and powei-hungiy polilicians who knew how lo manipulale a
confused populace.
The polilical vacuum fiom economic downfall in a dissolving ugoslavia
was nlled by nalionalisl piopaganda and iheloiic. Seibia foughl wais lo
save lhe giealei ugoslavia, Cioals foughl Bosnian Muslims and lhen
Seibs, Bosnians foughl Cioals and Seibs. One elhnic gioup cleansed
anolhei gioup whenevei il seemed lo seive lhe wai inleiesl. The \niled
Nalions suffeied piobably ils woisl poslCold Wai blow wilh lhe fall of
lhe safe aiea`` of Siebienica in 1uly 1995. \NPROIOR, a peacekeeping
opeialion in a lhealie wheie lheie was no peace lo keep, offeied neilhei
safely lo lhe local people, noi solace lo lhe displaced and dispossessed,
noi even lhe consolalion lo lhe inleinalional communily of having done
lhe |ob lo lhe besl of lheii abilily. Passivily in lhe face of lhe calculaled
ieluin of evil`` lo Iuiope iemains a slain on woild conscience.
As lhe wai seemed lo be giinding lo a slalemale, Siebienica shamed
NATO inlo bombing Bosnian Seib posilions, which led in luin lo lhe
Daylon Accoids (1995). The Geneial Iiamewoik Agieemenl foi lhe
Ioimei ugoslavia was signed in Paiis in 1anuaiy 1996. NATO`s SIOR
(Slabilizalion Ioice) and IOR (mplemenlalion Ioice) lioops, along
wilh lhe Oiganizalion foi Secuiily and Co-opeialion in Iuiope (OSCI)
as lhe main civilian peace-buildei and a minoi involvemenl of lhe \niled
Nalions, have lhus fai assuied slow bul giadual piogiess in pioviding foi
basic slabilily and lhe iebuilding of BosniaHeizegovina.
The Kosovo ciisis
1usl like Slovenia, Cioalia, Macedonia, and Bosnia, Kosovo loo desiied
lo gain independence in lhe wake of lhe dissolulion of 1osip Tilo`s
KOSO\O AND THI CHALLINGI OI WORLD ORDIR 3
ugoslavia. Wheieas lhe olhei communilies iesoiled lo foice in lheii
bid foi independence, lhe much smallei aulonomous iegion of Kosovo
invesled in diplomacy and negolialion. ls non-violenl appioach was
nol iewaided. Kosovo losl lhe lillle aulonomy il had and, along wilh
Monlenegio and Seibia, became an inlegial pail of iump-ugoslavia.``
ls piedominanlly Albanian populalion was suppiessed by a small Seib
e lile and was foiced lo develop ils own shadow slale,`` including ils own
goveining sliucluies, schools, and heallh caie syslem. l conlinued lo
hope foi evenlual suppoil fiom lhe inleinalional communily in ils bid foi
libeialion fiom Seib conliol, in lhe foim of eilhei full aulonomy wilhin
ugoslavia oi complele sepaialion and independence.
Concluding lhal lheii conceins had been disiegaided in lhe Daylon
Accoids, some iadicalized Kosovais began lo suppoil lhe developmenl of
a paiamililaiy undeigiound foice known as lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy
(KLA). Seibia`s wai againsl lhe KLA escalaled belween 1996 and 1998,
wilh incieasingly seiious iepeicussions foi Kosovo`s civilian populalion.
The inleinalional communily became incieasingly involved. Disagiee-
menls aboul lhe fuluie of Kosovo, wilh lhe \niled Slales insisling on lhe
inviolabilily of iump-ugoslavia and olheis favouiing a polenlially inde-
pendenl Kosovo, made il difncull foi lhe Wesl lo oppose ugoslav Pies-
idenl Slobodan Milosevic`s campaign againsl lhe KLA. Numeious diplo-
malic missions and lhieals of mililaiy inleivenlion weie evenlually
followed by a Secuiily Council-sanclioned deploymenl of moie lhan
1,OOO OSCI obseiveis lhioughoul Kosovo and, lalei, a peace confeience
in Rambouillel, Iiance, allended by all conicl pailies. The confeience
pioduced a diafl peace agieemenl lhal was evenlually signed by lhe
Kosovo Albanian delegalion. Iollowing lhe Seib iefusal lo sign lhe deal,
NATO lhiealened, and lhen began bombing, Seib mililaiy facililies
lhioughoul Kosovo and ugoslavia.
Aflei NATO bombing began on 24 Maich 1999, lhe silualion on lhe
giound as well as in lhe inleinalional aiena deleiioialed iapidly. Despile
lhe bombing, Seib foices managed lo conlinue and inlensify lheii wai
againsl lhe KLA and lhe civilian populalion in Kosovo. A subslanlial
numbei of Kosovo`s Albanian populalion ed lo Monlenegio, Mace-
donia, and Albania, oi became displaced wilhin Kosovo. Duiing almosl
lhiee monlhs of bombing, Seib mililaiy and paiamililaiy foices leiioi-
ized lhe Albanian populalion in Kosovo, diove hundieds of lhousands
oul of lhe counliy, commilled aliocilies againsl lhe local populalion, and
foughl a ielenlless wai againsl lhe KLA. ugoslavia billeily denounced
NATO sliikes as illegal aggiession againsl a soveieign slale. ls liadi-
lional ally Russia sliongly opposed NATO`s wai againsl ugoslavia and
dislanced ilself fiom ils pievious rapprochcncnt wilh lhe Wesl. China was
deeply offended by lhe bombing of ils embassy in Belgiade and became
incieasingly alienaled in ils ielalions wilh lhe Wesl.
The \niled Nalions found ilself sidelined by NATO: Secuiily Council
sanclion foi lhe bombing was neilhei soughl noi given. Secielaiy-
Geneial Kon Annan, who had been \ndei-Secielaiy-Geneial foi
Peacekeeping Opeialions al lhe lime of lhe Siebienica liagedy, was loin
belween ciilicism of lhe illegalily of NATO aclions and sympalhy foi lhe
viclims of Seib aliocilies. He also had lo be mindful of lhe negalive ie-
peicussions of any haish ciilicism foi alieady shaky \N\S ielalions.
The agonies and dilemmas of lhe \niled Nalions duiing lhe Kosovo Wai
aie discussed by 1ohn Gioom and Paul Tayloi (chap. 19).
Wilh lhe assislance of Russia and lhiough lhe involvemenl of lhe G-8
(lhe gioup of seven indusliialized slales plus Russia), whose medialion
was accepled by Belgiade, lhe wai was evenlually bioughl lo an end and
ugoslav lioops weie wilhdiawn fiom Kosovo. A \N-led peacekeeping
mission eslablished a de faclo piolecloiale in Kosovo, suppoiled by a
mililaiy piesence (KIOR) wilh a laige NATO componenl bul also a
Russian elemenl. Mosl iefugees ieluined home. Ilhnic cleansing in ie-
veise bioke oul in lhe foim of aliocilies againsl local Seib and Roma
populalions. Al lhe end of 1999, elhnic lensions in Kosovo iemained
high, mosl Seibs had ed, lhe KLA had been ofncially disaimed (bul nol
iemoved fiom subslanlial local powei and inuence), and lhe peace was a
veiy fiagile one, dependenl on exlensive oulside piesence. Bul goals had
changed duiing lhe wai, so lhal lhe inilial wai aims weie nol lhe bench-
maiks againsl which lhe oulcome al lhe conclusion of lhe wai was |udged
lo have been a gieal success. Lawience Iieedman offeis his lhoughls on
lhe changing concepls of lhe use of foice as exemplined by lhe Kosovo
ciisis (chap. 26), while Ray Iunnell discusses lhe ulilily and fulilily of aii
powei in winning`` NATO`s wai againsl Seibia (chap. 27). He also offeis
a sombie waining lo use mililaiy powei spaiingly and as an insliumenl of
lasl iesoil; if il has lo be used, lhen il is besl done effeclively ialhei lhan
half-heailedly.
Kosovo, ugoslavia, and lhe widei Balkans
Hisloiy is a conlesled leiiain. Mylhs can be vilal componenls of nalion-
hood, and so mylh-making becomes an impoilanl lool in lhe social con-
sliuclion of polilical idenlily. n chapleis 24, we see how, even when
analysls make lhe ulmosl effoil lo be dispassionale and ob|eclive, lhey
can slill disagiee fundamenlally on lhe inleipielalion of a common his-
loiy. The unfolding silualion in Kosovo has been liagic and, indeed, one
of confusion. Maiie-1anine Calic sheds some lighl on lhe evolving ciisis in
Kosovo (chap. 2). Whal is lhe piice foi an independence lhal mighl nevei
happen anyway? NATO`s quick and foiceful iesponse lo lhe iefusal of
Belgiade lo agiee lo eveiy slipulalion of lhe Rambouillel peace agiee-
menl was welcomed by many as a sliong show of oulside suppoil foi lhe
Kosovai viclims. Neveilheless, NATO`s iefusal al lhe slail even lo con-
sidei lhe deploymenl of giound lioops, ils insislence on lhe leiiiloiial
inlegiily of ugoslavia, and lhe immediale wilhdiawal of all OSCI
piesence and mosl foieign |ouinalisls and diplomals fiom lhe ballle-
giound of NATO aii iaids, made lhis a mixed blessing al besl. Moieovei,
Belgiade`s immediale launch of a ma|oi offensive againsl lhe KLA and
ils civilian suppoileis`` liagically aggiavaled lhe ciisis on lhe giound and
woisened lhe plighl of lhe viclims.
Mosl Kosovais found lhemselves diiven oul of lheii homes and acioss
boideis inlo miseiable iefugee camps in Macedonia oi Albania. Some
weie given lhe oppoilunily lo move on lo Weslein counliies. The Kosovai
polilical e lile became deeply divided. The KLA conlinued lo nghl Seib
foices in lhe quesl foi evenlual independence and polilical conliol ovei
Kosovo. Meanwhile, Seib looling and NATO bombing slowly bul sys-
lemalically deslioyed Kosovo`s infiasliucluie. Ioi many Kosovais il is
veiy difncull lo compiehend whal has happened and lo undeisland who
aclually won oi losl lhe Kosovo wai. Agon Dem|aha offeis an inleipie-
lalion of lhese evenls as seen fiom inside Kosovo (chap. 3).
Many Seibs aie |usl as bewildeied by whal happened in 1999. Duska
Anaslasi|evic analyses lhe vaiious peispeclives on lhe conicl fiom inside
Seibia (chap. 4). Of couise, Milosevic suppoileis weie sliongly opposed
lo NATO bombing, which was wilhoul \N suppoil and in diiecl viola-
lion of ugoslavia`s soveieignly. n lheii opinion lhey weie allacked by
an oulside woild which failed lo undeisland lhal mililaiy aclion in Kosovo
was inlended only lo suppiess a leiioiisl mililaiy oiganizalion, lo ielieve
lhe oppiession of Seibs living in Kosovo, and lo piolecl Seibia`s culluial
heiilage. Ioi lhem, as foi Milosevic, Kosovo was lhe ciadle of Seib
nalionalism`` and could nol and should nol be suiiendeied. Moieovei,
goveinmenls all aiound lhe woild iespond wilh gieal violence lo seces-
sionisl upiisings and few of lhese conicls have evei iesulled in lhe dia-
conian punishmenl handed oul lo Belgiade. Iven modeiale Seibs weie
ouliaged al lhe Weslein communily`s iesponse lo Seib aclion againsl
Kosovais, wheieas no allenlion was given lo Cioalia`s expulsion of sev-
eial hundied lhousand Seibs fiom lhe Kia|ina iegion only a few yeais
eailiei.
Opponenls of Milosevic`s iule ovei Seibia weie sympalhelic lo lhe
Kosovais` plighl, bul lhey loo poinled lo lhe double slandaid applied by
NATO in ils punishmenl of Seib offensives in Kosovo while many conicls
of much laigei scale and woise aliocilies escaped inleinalional censuie oi
ielalialion. Such ieasoning does nol, of couise, excuse Belgiade`s opei-
alions in Kosovo. Milosevic was quile successful in ieaching his goals,
namely lhe expulsion of a ma|oiily of Albanians, al leasl in lhe shoil iun.
Less mililaiy aclion and moie diplomacy could possibly have achieved
speediei and less desliuclive iesulls, wilhoul pioducing an essenlially
emplied Kosovo al lhe end of lhe aii campaigns. The iole of foice and
diplomacy in conlempoiaiy inleinalional negolialion is discussed by
Coial Bell (chap. 28).
Geoige Khulsishvili and Albiechl Schnabel examine lhe consequences
of lhe Kosovo conicl foi lhe laigei soulh-easl Iuiopean iegion, includ-
ing lhe Balkans and lhe Soulhein Caucasus, as well as lhese counliies`
ieaclions lo NATO`s aclions (chap. 5). Neighbouiing counliies suffeied
undei lhe piessuie of lhe iefugee inux, disiuplion lo liade and louiism,
and deceleialed foieign inveslmenl inlo a iegion lhal was, yel again, in
luimoil. Counliies such as Macedonia and Albania pleaded foi inlei-
nalional aid lo accommodale lhe mass inux of expelled and eeing
Kosovais. Moieovei, allenlion was diveiled fiom Bosnia, a slill unslable
counliy in conlinuing need of assislance fiom lhe Iuiopean and inleina-
lional communilies and lheii key secuiily and economic oiganizalions.
An alienaled people and goveinmenl of ugoslavia and a fuilhei desla-
bilized Balkans poilend conlinuing volalilily in lhe iegion. On lhe olhei
side of lhe Black Sea, Aimenia, Geoigia, and Azeibai|an pondeied lhe
likely impacl of NATO`s aclions on lheii own silualions. Would NATO
come lo lhe iescue of Nagoino-Kaiabakh oi Abkhazia? Would NATO`s
aclions sel a piecedenl lhal would legilimize unilaleial inleivenlion by lhe
Commonweallh of ndependenl Slales (CS) undei Russian leadeiship?
Ma|oi exleinal aclois: A ieluin lo Cold Wai faull lines?
n Apiil 1999, membeis of lhe newly enlaiged NATO galheied in
Washinglon lo celebiale 5O yeais of peace-mainlenance by lhe colleclive
defence oiganizalion al a lime when lhe Alliance was engaged in an
offensive wai againsl a non-membei. Rueful Russians could be foigiven
foi concluding lhal, aflei all, lhe Waisaw Pacl had conlained NATO,
ialhei lhan lhe ieveise. Washinglon had seemingly losl failh in quiel
diplomacy and conicl managemenl undeilaken by inleinalional oiga-
nizalions. The \S Congiess used lhe oppoilunily lo ask foi and push
lhiough long-demanded incieases in lhe defence budgel, and lhe \niled
Slales and NATO had yel anolhei oppoilunily (in addilion lo lheii
ongoing engagemenl in iaq) lo lesl lhe evolving slialegy of zeio-casually
aii wais againsl enemies employing mainly giound foices a slialegy lhal
Salish Nambiai, as an aimy geneial, nnds moially iepugnanl (chap. 17).
The Clinlon adminislialion defended NATO opeialions, lheii huge
cosls, and lhe even laigei cosls of lhe subsequenl ieconsliuclion of
Kosovo, aiguing lhal somelhing had lo be done lo oppose lolalilaiian
leadeis and slop elhnic cleansing and oppiession. el ieliable infeiences
could not be diawn aboul lhe applicalion of lhose piinciples lo olhei
conicl lhealies. 1ohn kenbeiiy discusses how Ameiica`s decision lo use
foice in Kosovo ieecls and pio|ecls ils peiceplion of powei in a chang-
ing inleinalional oidei (chap. 6).
Russia and China weie billeily opposed lo NATO`s handling of lhe
ciisis. Conscious peihaps of lheii own Kosovos,`` lhey weie waiy of lhe
Alliance`s self-pioclaimed aulhoiily lo secuie peace and slabilily in a
globalizing woild. n lhe wake of NATO`s aclions in Kosovo, lhey fioze
ielalions wilh lhe \niled Slales and olhei NATO membeis. Russia, upsel
aboul yel moie evidence of ils waning woild iole and lhe ease wilh which
lhe Wesl can bypass Russian piefeiences in inleinalional affaiis, was
ullimalely insliumenlal in nnding a diplomalic face-saving solulion lo
end lhe conicl. On lhe olhei hand, heavy ieliance on Weslein assislance
in allempls lo biing ils deleiioialing condilions undei conliol allowed
foi lillle moie lhan veibal condemnalion of Weslein aclion. \ladimii
Baianovksy examines Russia`s inleipielalion and ieinleipielalion of ils
nalional inleiesls in lhe lighl of lhe Kosovo ciisis, and ils shoil- and long-
leim iepeicussions (chap. 7). Zhang unling lakes on lhe same lask in
lhe conlexl of China`s posl-Kosovo foieign policy lowaids lhe Wesl
(chap. 8). NATO`s bombing of lhe Chinese embassy in Belgiade in pai-
liculai gieally damaged Sino-\S ielalions and gave China consideiable
scope foi some seiious inliospeclion.
As Simon Duke, Hans-Geoig Ihihail, and Mallhias Kaia di poinl oul,
lhe ma|oi Iuiopean NATO allies showed sleadfasl suppoil foi lhe
bombings (chap. 9). While Biilain`s liadilional special ielalionship``
wilh lhe \niled Slales culs acioss paily lines and Iiance was pushing foi
moie aclion by Iuiopean poweis, lhe Geiman goveinmenl faced giealei
pioblems. The nisl SocialislGieen coalilion goveinmenl had lo |uslify
Geimany`s nisl mililaiy involvemenl since lhe Second Woild Wai, wilh a
Gieen foieign minislei and Socialisl defence minislei going oul of lheii
way lo ensuie inleinal cohesion and suppoil foi Alliance policies.
Smallei NATO membeis played along, wilh lillle ofncial opposilion.
This is somewhal suipiising given lhe liadilional focus of NATO`s
noilhein Iuiopean membeis on non-violenl and polilical appioaches
lo conicl managemenl. David Haglund and Allen Sens examine lhe ie-
aclions fiom Poilugal, Belgium, Canada, and Spain (chap. 12), and B|oin
Mollei discusses lhe posilions laken by lhe Noidic counliies (chap. 1O).
laly, Tuikey, and Gieece, discussed by Geoigios Koslakos (chap. 11),
fell less comfoilable wilh lhe handling of lhis conicl. laly has been loin
belween ils allegiance lo NATO, ils ma|oi powei aspiialions, inleinal
polilical divisions, and lhe feai of a deslabilized Albania. Tuikey`s own
Kuidish conicl and vaiious TuikishGieek dispules, as well as Gieece`s
Oilhodox afnnily wilh lhe Seibs, made il difncull foi lhese counliies lo
give wholeheailed suppoil lo NATO. Moieovei, lheie is lhe piospecl of
giealei slamic inuence in lhe Balkans, especially if an independenl
Kosovo should |oin Albania. Wheieas Tuikey would welcome lhis, olhei
counliies in lhe iegion, such as Bulgaiia, Macedonia, and Gieece, aie
quile waiy of such a developmenl.
The Alliance`s newesl membeis Poland, lhe Czech Republic, and
Hungaiy weie loin belween loyally lo lheii new pailneis and uneasi-
ness ovei lhe changing focus of NATO slialegy and aclivily. Theii pei-
speclives aie examined by La szlo \alki and Pe lei Ta las (chap. 13).
Hungaiy`s posilion was lhe mosl uncomfoilable, as il was woiiied aboul
lhe signincanl Hungaiian minoiily living in Seibia and il is lhe only
NATO counliy lhal diieclly boideis on ugoslavia. Moieovei, lhese
counliies had |oined NATO lo piolecl lhemselves fiom mililaiy adven-
luieis, nol lo |oin lhem.
The Kosovo conicl had a widei inleinalional iesonance lhal was nol
fully appiecialed by lhe Wesl. The slamic woild inleipieled lhe conicl
wilh mixed emolions, as discussed by biahim Kaiawan (chap. 14). On
lhe one hand, a Muslim populalion was indeed defended by a mainly
Chiislian alliance. On lhe olhei hand, lhe facl iemains lhal a iegional
mililaiy alliance acled wilhoul Secuiily Council appioval lo defend ils
value syslem by foice, and slamic gioups have loo oflen been viclims of
such palleins of behavioui in lhe pasl nol lo feel uneasy. n Lalin
Ameiica, as examined by Mo nica Seiiano (chap. 15), Kosovo has been
discussed in lhe conlexl of changing polilical and legal inleipielalions of
lhe iighl of inleivenlion in humanilaiian ciises. The discussion of lhe
Kosovo conicl in Soulh Afiica, analysed by Philip Nel (chap. 16), is
pailiculaily inleiesling as lhe counliy is cuiienlly chaii of lhe Non-
Aligned Movemenl. Moieovei, Afiica has seen much conicl lhal has
alliacled neilhei inleiesl noi compassion fiom lhe Wesl compaiable lo
lhal shown ovei Kosovo. Self-admilling membeis of lhe exclusive nucleai
club, such as ndia, ask if NATO would have allacked ugoslavia if il had
possessed an exlensive nucleai aisenal backed by ballislic missiles. s
NATO`s aclion in Kosovo an example of neo-impeiialism againsl which
lhe developing woild has lo defend ilself? Salish Nambiai discusses lhese
issues fiom lhe peispeclive mainly of ndia, bul also lo some exlenl of lhe
nisl \NPROIOR Ioice Commandei (chap. 17).
Long-leim conceplual challenges
Kosovo iaises many conceplual challenges lhal could iedenne oui undei-
slanding of inleinalional affaiis and global oidei. 1uslice may well lii-
umph evenlually, bul al whal cosl lo peace and slabilily? And can a |usl
oidei be secuied in lhe midsl of collapsing pillais of lhe inleinalional
oidei? NATO`s aclions in Kosovo, and lhe sliong afnimalion of a new
woild iole foi il pioclaimed al lhe nflielh anniveisaiy meeling, suggesl
lhal iegional oiganizalions can ieinleipiel, on a case-by-case basis, lhe
\niled Nalions` pieiogalive lo sanclion lhe inleinalional use of foice.
This is an impoilanl slep foi an oiganizalion lhal has been iedenning ils
own puipose fiom lhal of being a colleclive defence alliance lo lhal of
peihaps global, bul ceilainly oul-of-aiea, peace enfoicei. NATO is nol
based on an equal pailneiship. Of all membeis, lhe \S impiinl on
NATO`s slialegy, aclions, and piefeiences is lhe heaviesl. Nicola Bullei
discusses lhe Alliance`s poslCold Wai evolulion fiom a colleclive de-
fence lo a peace enfoicemenl oiganizalion (chap. 18).
f NATO`s inleivenlion in Kosovo was legilimale, a similai couise of
aclion could lhen also be |uslined by oiganizalions such as lhe CS (wilh
ils hegemon Russia), lhe Iconomic Communily of Wesl Afiican Slales
(ICOWAS, wilh Nigeiia as lhe hegemon), oi lhe Soulh Asian Associa-
lion foi Regional Coopeialion (SAARC, wilh ndia as lhe hegemon).
Would NATO leadeis be comfoilable wilh a paiallel silualion wheie
lhe Aiab League, if il had lhe mighl, claimed lhe commensuiale iighl lo
deleimine on ils own, wilhoul \N aulhoiizalion, lhal siael was guilly of
gioss human iighls aliocilies againsl ils Paleslinian cilizens and lheiefoie
lhe Aiab League would inleivene wilh mililaiy foice in lheii defence?
While, on lhe one hand, il will be easiei lo iniliale humanilaiian inlei-
venlions and olhei iegional secuiily opeialions undei iegional mandales
and opeialional conliol, lhis also suggesls a devolulion of lhe \niled
Nalions` pievious powei lo aulhoiize lhe use of foice.
Humanilaiian inleivenlion has incieasingly been used and abused as
|uslincalion foi Chaplei \ missions by \N as well as mullilaleial foices
undei and beyond lhe mandale of Secuiily Council iesolulions. ugo-
slavia was bombed ovei an inleinal conicl lhal seems minoi in ils local
and iegional effecls compaied, foi inslance, wilh Chechnya, Tibel, oi
Kashmii. Howevei, ugoslavia`s hisloiy of lieacheiy and wai in lhe
Balkans belween 1991 and 1995 bioughl lillle sympalhy foi il when il
ieceived a lasle of ils own medicine.`` As aigued by 1ames Mayall
(chap. 2O), given lhe laige numbei of conicls lhioughoul lhe woild lhal
will nol see any signincanl inleinalional involvemenl lo piolecl and
punish civilian aliocilies and olhei collaleial`` damage iesulling fiom
ma|oi aimed conicls, il is unlikely lhal Kosovo will iedenne oui
appioach lo humanilaiian inleivenlion. The humanilaiian impeialive is
nol likely lo be enshiined as a legilimale validalion of iegional and
inleinalional mililaiy inleivenlions. This ielales, of couise, diieclly lo lhe
queslion of soveieignly. Was slale soveieignly challenged moie seiiously
in 1999 lhan in lhe eaily days of lhe poslCold Wai eia, in lhe afleimalh
of lhe Gulf Wai, oi duiing lhe \N-aulhoiized missions in Haili and foi-
mei ugoslavia? Alan 1ames sees few changes in oui inleipielalion of a
1O KOSO\O AND THI CHALLINGI OI WORLD ORDIR
concepl lhal became moie dynamic and evolulionaiy lhioughoul much of
lhe lwenlielh cenluiy, bul lhal will slill sland as a ma|oi pillai of inlei-
slale ielalions (chap. 21).
Public opinion, bolh wilhin lhe conicl iegion and in lhe oulside woild,
became an impoilanl insliumenl in a wai lhal was as much one of ihel-
oiic as of aims. On all sides, in lhe news, in ofncial slalemenls, and in
public discussion, public and ma|oi polilical nguies weie eagei lo lhiow
oul yel anolhei, moie diamalic, hisloiical melaphoi in lheii allempls lo
ially public opinion behind lheii goveinmenls. The deleiminalion lo
avoid anolhei Munich led lo lhe folly of \ielnam. The insislence on No
Moie \ielnams,`` il was said, would have pioduced anolhei Munich in
Kosovo. Will we see a neo-\ielnam syndiome emeiging fiom lhe ashes
of Kosovo foi lhe new eia? f hisloiy is a conlesled leiiain, lhen lhe
lwenlielh cenluiy was ciowded wilh melaphois lhal seek lo encapsulale
lhe laigei meanings of foimalive hisloiical evenls. Geoige Heiiing ad-
diesses lhe ulilily of hisloiical analogies in Ameiican discouise in lhe
conlexl of lhe Kosovo conicl (chap. 22).
Ma|oi media channels in lhe Wesl weie quick lo suppoil NATO`s
mission and did much lo bolslei public suppoil foi lhe opeialion. Tales of
lhe hoiiois commilled by Seib foices againsl Kosovais capluied lhe
headlines foi many weeks wilhoul a bieak. Allhough mosl of lhese, bul
nol all, lalei luined oul lo be liue, lillle oi no allenlion was given lo lhe
aliocilies commilled by lhe KLA. Oveiall, lhe one-sidedness of ma|oi
news agencies` iepoiling on Opeialion Allied Ioice made lhe media a
poweiful ally in NATO`s wai againsl Slobodan Milosevic. Howevei, il
also added lo giowing anlagonism among lhe Seib people who, lapping
easily inlo Weslein bioadcasls lhiough piivale salellile dishes and nlei-
nel access, concluded lhal Wesleineis loo aie viclims of slale-sponsoied
piopaganda. Sleven Livingslon offeis a iichly empiiical analysis of lhe
coveiage of lhe Kosovo conicl on Cable News Nelwoik (CNN) and
olhei ma|oi news nelwoiks (chap. 23).
Non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions (NGOs) have been of ciucial impoi-
lance bolh in lhe shaping of public opinion lhioughoul lhe Kosovo con-
icl and in diiecl assislance lo lhe people caughl in lhe ciossnie of lhe
wai. As Ielice Gaei iepoils (chap. 24), lhey loo weie loin belween sup-
poil foi effeclive aclion lo slop Seib violence in Kosovo and commilmenl
lo non-violenl means.
nleinalional cilizenship
Why is il lhal some conicls, such as lhe one in Kosovo, ieceive so much
suppoil fiom lhe inleinalional communily while olheis do nol? One
possible answei poinls lo lhe poweiful alliance belween NGOs and lhe
inleinalionally dominanl Weslein media as lhe calalysl foi humanilaiian
inleivenlion. Musl lhe iesponse lo humanilaiian liagedies be highly
seleclive? Have we ieluined lo lhe days of Clausewilz, when lhe use of
foice was consideied lhe logical exlension of polilics by olhei means? Oi
did NATO sliikes poilend a disconlinualion of policy by olhei means?
Beaiing in mind lhal wai ilself is a gieal humanilaiian liagedy, al whal
poinl, undei whal condilions, and sub|ecl lo whal safeguaids can aimed
humanilaiian inleivenlion be |uslined? Loii Iislei Damiosch offeis piin-
ciples lhal may guide uigenl inleinalional aclion in humanilaiian cala-
sliophes in an eia in which absolule non-inleivenlion is moially nol pei-
missible and lhe univeisal applicalion of humanilaiian inleivenlionism is
physically nol possible (chap. 25).
As Coial Bell aigues (chap. 28), one of lhe mosl impoilanl lessons of
lhe Kosovo conicl is lhe powei of noims in |uslifying lhe use of foice. f
il does indeed become piaclice lo defend noims wilh mililaiy foice, we
could evenlually end up wilh anolhei Cold Wai of mulually exclusive
noims nol dissimilai lo lhe compeling ideologies of lhe old Cold Wai. On
lhe olhei hand, if a laige enough poilion of lhe inleinalional communily
shaies lhese noims, and if solidaiily can oveiiide slialegic lhinking, as
noled by 1ean-Maic Coicaud (chap. 29), lhen whal we saw in Kosovo
may indeed become a polenl fealuie of a newly emeiging inleinalional
sociely. Such an inleinalional sociely would inculcale a sense of global
iesponsibilily in inleinalional cilizens, a nolion discussed by Andiew
Linklalei (chap. 3O), possibly lhiough inleinalional oiganizalions such as
lhe \niled Nalions.
The legacy of Kosovo foi lhe \niled Nalions
Whal, lhen, is lhe iole and place of lhe \niled Nalions? Has il been
peimanenlly sidelined in ils effoils lo navigale slales lhiough lhe choppy
waleis of wai and peace in a moie complex, congesled, and volalile posl
Cold Wai enviionmenl? Has il saciinced human and gioup iighls on lhe
allai of slale soveieignly and lhe leiiiloiial inviolabilily of membei
slales? Has lhe Secuiily Council nnally pioven lo be of lillle use in a
woild in which old anlagonisms belween Council membeis iesuiface and
lainl lheii |udgemenls on global issues? These aie difncull queslions.
Given lhe failuie of NATO simply lo jorcc ils piefeiences onlo ugosla-
via and lhe impoilance of aclive Russian and acquiescenl Chinese diplo-
macy in biinging lhe conicl lo an end, one wondeis if lhe posl-conicl
conslellalion of poweis, and lhe polilical solulions available, diffei so
diamalically fiom lhe pie-wai silualion.
n lheii addiesses lo lhe opening of lhe annual session of lhe \niled
Nalions Geneial Assembly in Seplembei 1999, bolh \S Piesidenl Bill
Clinlon and \N Secielaiy-Geneial Kon Annan iefeiied lo lhe issue of
lhe need foi humanilaiian inleivenlion lo aveil oi slop mass killings, and
lo lhe debale on whelhei oi nol iegional oiganizalions can acl lo inlei-
vene in lhis way only wilh lhe aulhoiizalion of lhe \niled Nalions. n
ieliospecl, lheie aie nve lines of iesponse lo lhe ielalionship belween lhe
NATO aclion in Kosovo and lhe \niled Nalions.
The nisl is lhe simple claim lhal NATO acled illegally in leims of lhe
Chailei of lhe \niled Nalions and of slale piaclice, and on piudenlial
giounds. This line of aigumenl was ailiculaled mosl foicefully by China,
Russia, and ndia (as well as Seibia). \ndei lhe \N Chailei, slales aie
commilled lo sellling lheii dispules by peaceful means (Ail. 2.3) and ie-
fiaining fiom lhe lhieal oi use of foice againsl lhe leiiiloiial inlegiily oi
polilical independence of any slale (Ail. 2.4). Iuilheimoie, Ailicle 53(1)
empoweis lhe Secuiily Council lo ulilize . . . iegional aiiangemenls oi
agencies foi enfoicemenl aclion unJcr its authority. But no cnjorccncnt
action shall bc takcn unJcr rcgional arrangcncnts or by rcgional agcncics
without thc authori;ation oj thc Sccurity Council,`` wilh lhe sole exceplion
of aclion againsl enemy slales duiing lhe Second Woild Wai (emphasis
added).
Neilhei lhe \N Chailei noi lhe coipus of modein inleinalional law
incoipoiales lhe iighl lo humanilaiian inleivenlion. Slale piaclice in lhe
pasl lwo cenluiies, and especially since 1945, piovides only a handful of
genuine cases of humanilaiian inleivenlion al besl, and on mosl assess-
menls none al all. Moieovei, on piudenlial giounds, lhe scope foi abus-
ing such a iighl is so gieal as lo aigue sliongly againsl ils ciealion. Ac-
coiding lo lhe weighl of legal opinion and aulhoiily, lhe piohibilion on
lhe use of foice has become a peiemploiy noim of inleinalional law fiom
which no deiogalion is peimilled and NATO was nol peimilled lo con-
liacl oul al a iegional level. n lhis view, in ciicumvenling lhe anlicipaled
\N velo NATO iepudialed lhe univeisally agieed-on iules of lhe game
when lhe likely oulcome was nol lo ils liking. The piospecls of a woild
oidei based on lhe iule of law aie no biighlei. The oveiiiding message is
nol lhal foice has been pul lo lhe seivice of law, bul lhal mighl is iighl.
By conliasl, NATO leadeis aigued lhal lhe campaign againsl Seibia
look place in lhe conlexl of a hisloiy of denance of \N iesolulions by
Piesidenl Milosevic. Ovei lhe yeais, lhe \N Secuiily Council had be-
come incieasingly moie specinc in focusing on human iighls violalions by
lhe Milosevic iegime (nol by bolh sides) and incieasingly coeicive in lhe
use of language lhiealening an unspecined iesponse by lhe inleinalional
communily. Allhough NATO aclion was nol explicilly aulhoiized by lhe
\niled Nalions, lheiefoie, il was an implicil evolulion fiom \N ieso-
lulions, and ceilainly nol piohibiled by any \N iesolulion. This line of
aigumenl can be found in lhe discussion of lhe \niled Nalions` iole in
Kosovo by 1ohn Gioom and Paul Tayloi (chap. 19).
A lhiid iesponse is lhal Seibian aliocilies in Kosovo challenged some
of lhe cheiished basic values of lhe \niled Nalions. The Chailei is a dy-
namic compiomise belween slale inleiesls and human iighls. Had Milo-
sevic been allowed lo gel away wilh his muideious campaign of elhnic
cleansing, lhe nel iesull would have been a fundamenlal eiosion of lhe
idealislic base on which lhe \N sliucluie iesls. NATO aclion was nol a
iegiession lo old-slyle balance-of-powei polilics, bul a piogiession lo
new-age communily of powei. Aflei all, in values, oiienlalion, and nnan-
cial conliibulions, some of lhe NATO counliies, foi example Canada and
lhe noilhein Iuiopeans, iepiesenl lhe besl \N cilizen-slales.
nleieslingly enough, suppoil foi lhis line of aigumenl can be found
in lhe \niled Nalions` ofncial iepoil, published aflei lhe Kosovo Wai
ended, on lhe fall of Siebienica in 1995. Acknowledging al leasl pailial
iesponsibilily foi lhe liagedy, lhe iepoil in effecl concludes lhal lhe \N
peacekeeping philosophy of neulialily and non-violence was unsuiled lo
lhe conicl in Bosnia, wheie lheie was a syslemalic allempl lo leiioiize,
expel, oi muidei an enliie people in a delibeiale campaign of elhnic
cleansing. The appioach of lhe inleinalional communily was wholly in-
adequale lo lhe Seib campaign of elhnic cleansing and mass muidei lhal
culminaled in Siebienica. Ivil musl be iecognized as such and confionled
by lhe inleinalional communily; lhe \niled Nalions` commilmenl lo
ending conicls, fai fiom piecluding moial |udgemenl, makes il all lhe
moie necessaiy. One key paiagiaph fiom lhe iepoil is woilh quoling in
ils enliiely:
The caidinal lesson of Siebienica is lhal a delibeiale and syslemalic allempl lo
leiioiize, expel oi muidei an enliie people musl be mel decisively wilh all nec-
essaiy means, and wilh lhe polilical will lo caiiy lhe policy lhiough lo ils logical
conclusion. n lhe Balkans, in lhis decade, lhis lesson has had lo be leained nol
once, bul lwice. n bolh inslances, in Bosnia and in Kosovo, lhe inleinalional
communily liied lo ieach a negolialed selllemenl wilh an unsciupulous and mui-
deious iegime. n bolh inslances il iequiied lhe use of foice lo biing a hall lo lhe
planned and syslemalic killing and expulsion of civilians.4
The fouilh sliand is lhal, wheieas NATO made wai, il slill needed lhe
\niled Nalions lo help secuie lhe peace. Iai fiom peimanenlly discied-
iling lhe \niled Nalions, lhe Kosovo Wai showed lhal a \N iole iemains
indispensable even foi lhe mosl poweiful mililaiy alliance in hisloiy. The
Kosovo expeiience will have made all counliies even moie ieluclanl lo
engage in mililaiy hoslililies oulside lhe \N fiamewoik, as connimed by
lhe way in which lhe foice foi Iasl Timoi was assembled and aulhoiized
only, and quile delibeialely, undei Secuiily Council auspices.
Iiflh and nnally, some aigue lhal lhe sequence of evenls shows lhal lhe
ieal cenlie of inleinalional polilical and economic giavily has shifled
fiom lhe \N Secuiily Council lo lhe G-8 counliies plus China. Thal was
lhe foium in which lhe ciilical negolialions weie held and lhe ciucial
compiomises and decisions made. This ieecls lhe failuie lo iefoim lhe
\N Secuiily Council in composilion and pioceduie, as a iesull of which il
no longei miiiois lhe woild as il ieally is. n essence, lheiefoie, lhe G-8
plus`` is lhe Secuiily Council as il oughl lo be.
The counlei lo lhis, howevei, is lhal lhe peimanenl membeiship of lhe
Secuiily Council is alieady weighled dispiopoilionalely lowaids lhe in-
dusliialized counliies. The shifl of lhe decision-making locus lo lhe G-8
plus`` disenfianchises lhe developing counliies even moie. f lhis liend
conlinues, lhe \niled Nalions will lose ciedibilily and legilimacy in mosl
of lhe woild and hence any iemaining effecliveness.
Conclusion
l may lake some lime befoie we can fully compiehend lhe meaning of
Kosovo. The consequences of lhe 1999 wai will keep sludenls of inlei-
nalional ielalions and no doubl policy makeis busy foi yeais lo come.
f Kosovo luins oul lo be an anomaly, lillle will have changed. Howevei,
if lhe Kosovo conicl signines a well-planned and inlenlional slialegy on
lhe pail of lhe main aclois, il will have seiious and long-lasling con-
sequences. Moieovei, much of lhe \niled Nalions` iole in woild polilics
will hinge on lhe falloul fiom Kosovo. As lhe only liuly iepiesenlalive
body of lhe woild communily, lhe \niled Nalions will have lo apply lhe
lessons leainl lo ieafnim oi iefoimulale lhe basic iules and piinciples of
inleinalional oidei and inleinalional oiganizalion.
The \niled Nalions lies al lhe inleiface of powei-based iealism and
values-based idealism. This is a ciealive lension lhal musl be iesolved in
specinc cases wilhoul abandoning eilhei lhe sense of iealism oi lhe aspi-
ialion lo an ideal woild. The Kosovo leaining cuive shows lhal lhe \N
ideal can be neilhei fully allained noi abandoned. Like mosl oigani-
zalions, lhe \niled Nalions loo is condemned lo an eleinal ciedibilily
gap belween aspiialion and peifoimance. The ieal challenge is lo ensuie
lhal lhe gap does nol widen, bul slays wilhin a naiiow band. Only lhe
\niled Nalions can legilimalely aulhoiize mililaiy aclion on behalf of lhe
enliie inleinalional communily, inslead of a selecl few. Bul lhe \niled
Nalions does nol have ils own mililaiy and police foices, and a mullina-
lional coalilion of allies can offei a moie ciedible and efncienl mililaiy
foice when iobusl aclion is needed and waiianled. Whal will be incieas-
ingly needed in fuluie aie pailneiships of lhe able, lhe willing, and lhe
high-minded wilh lhe duly aulhoiized. Anylhing else iisks violaling
due piocess. Iasl Timoi offeis a bellei model lhan Kosovo of a moie
piudenlial and effeclive mullilaleial inleivenlion blessed by lhe \N
Secuiily Council. Bul wilhoul lhe lead of Kosovo, would Iasl Timoi
have followed?
This book should seive as a conliibulion lo a debale lhal is neilhei
sellled noi peihaps evei likely lo be dennilively iesolved. Ioi il is a
debale ovei lhe mosl fundamenlal queslions of inleinalional law, oidei,
and |uslice as lhey will conlinue lo denne human civilizalion in lhe new
millennium.
Noles
1. This chaplei is a ievised and updaled veision of Albiechl Schnabel and Ramesh Thakui,
Kosovo and Woild Polilics,`` Icacc Rcvicw, \ol. 11, No. 3, 1999, pp. 45546O. l ex-
piesses lhe peisonal opinions of lhe aulhois and does nol necessaiily ieecl lhe views of
lhe \niled Nalions \niveisily.
2. The mosl iecenl and aulhoiilalive slalemenl of lhe dilemma is Kon Annan, Iacing thc
Hunanitarian Challcngc. TowarJs a Culturc oj Ircvcntion, New oik: \niled Nalions
Depailmenl of Public nfoimalion, 1999. The same lexl has also been published as lhe
nlioduclion lo lhe Secielaiy-Geneial`s Annual Rcport on thc Vork oj thc Organi;ation,
1999.
3. Rcport oj thc Sccrctary-Ccncral Iursuant to Ccncral Asscnbly Rcsolution 53/35 (1998),
New oik: \N Secielaiial, Novembei 1999, paia. 5O3. The lexl of lhe iepoil is available
on lhe nleinel al www.un.oigjNewsjossgjsiebienica.hlml.
4. bid., paia. 5O2.
rt yne
he uosovo risis
2
Kosovo in lhe lwenlielh cenluiy:
A hisloiical accounl
Maric-1aninc Calic
Since lhe beginning of lhe lwenlielh cenluiy, Kosovo has been one of lhe
mosl explosive conicl zones in Iuiope. Bolh sides, Seibs and Albanians,
have made claims aboul hisloiy and elhnodemogiaphy lo |uslify lheii
alleged exclusive iighl lo lhis elhnically mixed iegion. Since lhe disinle-
gialion of ugoslavia in 1991, elhnic lensions in Kosovo have conlinued
lo iise. Kosovo Albanians have claimed lhe iighl lo independence, while
lhe Seibian aulhoiilies insisled on Kosovo`s conslilulional slalus as an
inlegial pail of Seibia. Allhough lhe escalalion of violence had been
piedicled by numeious scholais and polilical obseiveis, lhe inleinalional
communily pioved unable lo pievenl il. Iiom Iebiuaiy 1998 onwaids
lhis billei dispule developed inlo a full-scale aimed conicl belween lhe
Albanian gueiiilla Kosova Libeialion Aimy on one side and lhe Seibian
special police foice as well as iegulai unils of lhe ugoslav mililaiy on
lhe olhei. NATO`s inleivenlion againsl lhe Iedeial Republic of ugo-
slavia belween 24 Maich and 9 1une 1999 pul an end lo lhis hoiiinc civil
wai, bul lhe loll is liagic: al leasl 1O,OOO dead and 8OO,OOO iefugees and
displaced peisons; and laige pails of lhe counliy have been iavaged.
Hisloiical legacies lhe Albanian queslion in ugoslavia
The Kosovo conicl is embedded in lhe so-called Albanian queslion,
which emeiged al lhe end of lhe nineleenlh cenluiy when lhe new Bal-
19
kan nalional slales laid claim lo lhe Iuiopean leiiiloiies of lhe ciumbling
Olloman Impiie, especially lhe piovinces of Selanik (Salonica), Monas-
lii (Bilola), and Kosova (Kosovo, pails of lhe Sandshak, and noilhein
Macedonia). Duiing lhe nisl half of 1912, Bulgaiia, Seibia, Monlenegio,
and Gieece ciealed lhe Balkan League lo achieve lheii leiiiloiial inlei-
esls againsl lhe Sullan. n Oclobei 1912, lhe nisl Balkan wai bioke oul
duiing which lhe Ollomans weie neaily enliiely diiven oul of Iuiope.
Seibia conqueied laige pails of Kosovo and weslein Macedonia.1
l was al lhis poinl lhal lhe Albanian queslion`` came lo lhe foie.2 The
Albanian nalional movemenl had, since 1878, unsuccessfully piessed foi
aulonomy wilhin lhe Olloman Impiie, and il was nol unlil Augusl 1912
lhal lhe Olloman goveinmenl was foiced lo gianl limiled Albanian self-
goveinmenl. On 28 Novembei 1912, in ieaclion lo lhe nisl Balkan wai,
lhe Albanian leadeis declaied lheii independence.
The gieal poweis iecognized Albanian independence al lhe London
confeience on 3O May 1913. The new slale was aboul lhe size of loday`s
Albania and lhus included only half of lhe lolal Albanian populalion in
lhe Balkans, aboul 8OO,OOO people. Consideiable Albanian minoiilies
iemained in Kosovo and weslein Macedonia, which wenl lo Seibia, and
in Monlenegio and Gieece. Since lhis lime, lhe desiie foi lhe unincalion
of lhe Albanian people has been lhe guiding molive of nalional-oiienled
Albanians.
Neveilheless, lhe new polilical oidei aflei lhe Iiisl Woild Wai again
lefl half of lhe Albanian populalion oulside Albania`s boideis. Almosl
half a million Albanians living in lhe geogiaphical aieas of soulhein
Seibia, Monlenegio, Kosovo, and Macedonia weie included wilhin lhe
boideis of lhe newly ciealed Kingdom of Seibs, Cioals and Slovenes
(ienamed ugoslavia in 1929). This Land of lhe Soulhein Slavs`` was
based on lhe ofncial assumplion lhal lhe populalion consisled of a single
ugoslav nalion, and lhe non-Slav people weie given no consideiable
culluial oi minoiily iighls. The Seibian aulhoiilies lhus allempled lo
consolidale lheii new leiiiloiial acquisilions in so-called soulhein Seibia
by a policy of assimilalion and colonizalion.
On 6 Apiil 1941, Geimany invaded ugoslavia, which capilulaled a
few days lalei. Belween 1941 and 1945, lhe counliy disinlegialed inlo
seveial occupied and annexed leiiiloiies oi spuiiously independenl
counliies. Kosovo and weslein Macedonia fell lo laly and weie uniled
wilh Albania in a Giealei Albanian Slale undei occupying lalian iule. l
was lhe nisl lime lhal Albanians lived in a unined slale. Tens of lhou-
sands of Seibs weie expelled fiom lheii homelands.
n Novembei 1943, lhe ugoslav pailisans undei Tilo (lhe Anli-Iascisl
Council of Nalional Libeialion) decided lo iebuild ugoslavia aflei lhe
Second Woild Wai as a socialisl fedeialion. The Albanian Nalional
2O THI KOSO\O CRSS
Libeialion Commillee foi Kosovo, howevei, declaied lhe unincalion of
Kosovo wilh Albania. This decision was ie|ecled lalei when, in 1uly 1945,
lhe Assembly of Nalional Repiesenlalives of Kosovo in Piizien decided
lo liansfoim Kosovo inlo a consliluenl of fedeial Seibia. On 29 Novem-
bei 1945 lhe Socialisl Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia was pioclaimed.
The 1946 ugoslav conslilulion gianled Kosovo lhe slalus of an au-
lonomous iegion wilhin Seibia (called Kosmel fiom Kosovo and Me-
lohi|a). n 1966 il was classined as an aulonomous piovince. Howevei,
allhough ugoslavia had been consliluled as a fedeialion, il was almosl
inconceivable undei democialic cenlialism`` lhal lhe iepublics and au-
lonomous piovinces could have a say in lhe decisions of lhe communisl
fedeial goveinmenl. l was only undei piessuie of incieasing demands foi
iegional and nalional independence lhal lhe paily and lhe slale weie
giadually fedeialized fiom lhe end of lhe 196Os.3 n 1974, a new consli-
lulion gianled lhe iepublics and lhe aulonomous iegions exlended pow-
eis of self-goveinmenl. Kosovo gained de faclo fedeial slalus and lhe
iighl lo ils own conslilulion. The Albanian aulhoiilies slailed a policy of
Albanizalion, which was haishly ciilicized by lhe local Seib populalion.
The aulonomous slalus of Kosovo failed lo salisfy lhe Albanian popu-
lalion, howevei, and lhe giowing gap in piospeiily belween lhe soulh
and lhe noilh of ugoslavia inlensined ciilicism of lhe ugoslav syslem.
Despile lhe allempl by lhe ugoslav communisls lo ieduce nalional
aspiialions, nalionalisl ideologies had iemained viiulenl duiing lhe whole
Tilo eia in all pails of ugoslavia. Aflei Tilo`s dealh in 198O, lhe libei-
alizalion of lhe polilical syslem gave new impelus lo lhe nalionalisl
movemenls. n 1981, bloody iiols look place in Kosovo as lhe Albanians
demanded lhe iecognilion of lheii piovince as lhe sevenlh iepublic in
ugoslavia, and lhe Seibs denounced disciiminalion by lhe Albanians.4
n lhe mid-198Os, when Slobodan Milosevic had iisen lo lhe leadeiship
of lhe Seibian communisls, Seibian nalionalism was aclively piomoled by
inlellecluals and polilicians.5 n 1989, lhe iighl lo self-adminislialion of
lhe foimeily aulonomous piovinces of Kosovo and \o|vodina was abio-
galed. Consequenlly, lhe Seibian aulhoiilies abolished lhe piovince`s
polilical and culluial inslilulions. The ioughly 9O pei cenl Albanian ma-
|oiily in Kosovo iesponded lo Belgiade`s iemoval of lhe piovince`s self-
adminislialion by selling up a paiallel slale sliucluie of ils own, wilh a
funclioning piesidency, goveinmenl, legislaluie, and an educalion and
medical syslem. Mass demonslialions and violenl clashes wilh lhe police
wenl on lhioughoul 1989 and lhe spiing of 199O, ciealing widespiead
feelings of angei and feai among lhe Albanian populalion.
Since 1989, lhe polilical silualion in and aiound Kosovo had been one
of deadlock and elhnic lensions conlinued lo iise. When, in 199O1991,
Slovenia and Cioalia piepaied foi independence and lhe ugoslav slale
KOSO\O N THI TWINTITH CINT\R 21
nnally disinlegialed, lhe Kosovo Albanians claimed lhe iighl lo self-
deleiminalion and pioclaimed lhe soveieign and independenl Republic
of Kosovo. n lhe 1991 iefeiendum, almosl 1OO pei cenl of lhe Albanian
populalion in Kosovo suppoiled lhe idea of an independenl slale aflei
lhe Cooidinaling Boaid of Albanian Polilical Pailies of Kosovo had
foiwaided lheii demand lo lhe inleinalional communily. The Seibian
aulhoiilies, howevei, aigued lhal Kosovo should iemain an inlegial pail
of Seibia and lhal Albanians should be consideied as a minoiily ialhei
lhan as a consliluenl people. They mainlained lhal lhe iighl of self-
deleiminalion had alieady been iealized lhiough lhe exislence of lhe
Albanian nalional slale.
The basic pioblem of lhe conicl is lhus polilical and leiiiloiial in
naluie. l is embodied in lhe diveigenl and polenlially iiieconcilable
views of Seibs and Albanians on lhe legal slalus of Kosovo. \iilually all
olhei pioblems aie, on bolh sides, peiceived as oiiginaling fiom lhis basic
diffeience in views and inleiesls. Neveilheless, lhe conicl has sliong
hisloiical associalions.
Hisloiical peiceplions and associalions
Bolh Seibs and Albanians have sliong hisloiical and emolional lies lo
Kosovo. Hisloiically, Kosovo has always been chaiacleiized by culluial
diveisily and inlensive conlacls belween lhe Albanian elhnic communily
and lheii soulh Slavic neighbouis. Neveilheless, in lheii conlioveisy ovei
Kosovo, bolh sides dwell on hisloiy and mylh and deny lhe possibilily of
shaied hisloiical expeiiences lo undeipin lheii exclusive leiiiloiial claims
lo lhis piovince.6
Nalionalisl-oiienled Albanian hisloiians aigue lhal lhe Albanians aie
descendanls of lhe llyiians and iefei lo an ancienl Albanian slale called
llyiia. They lhus iegaid lhe Albanian people as lhe oiiginal inhabilanls
of Kosovo, because lhe Slavs aiiived only duiing lhe sixlh and sevenlh
cenluiies. They also believe lhal Albanians have always consliluled a
ma|oiily in lhis iegion.
Seibian scholais, on lhe olhei hand, aie convinced lhal lhe aiea was
almosl uninhabiled when lhe Slavs sellled in lhis Balkan iegion in lhe
eaily Middle Ages. n lhe Seibian nalional peiceplion, Kosovo is lhe
hisloiical and culluial cenlie of lhe medieval Seibian slale. Accoiding lo
lhis view, Albanian migianls sellled in lhis aiea only aflei lhe Olloman
conquesl of Seibia and lhe exodus of lhousands of Seibs duiing lhe sev-
enleenlh and eighleenlh cenluiies (pailiculaily in 169O) lo lhe noilh.
Neilhei of lhese views is piobably accuiale. Iiisl of all, neilhei hisloiy
noi linguislics piovides enough empiiical evidence lo piove lhe lheoiy of
22 THI KOSO\O CRSS
lhe llyiian oiigin of lhe Albanians. Secondly, fiom lhe eaily Middle
Ages, lhe Kosovo iegion was piobably inhabiled piimaiily by Slavs. Bul
lheie weie in all likelihood many moie Albanians living in lhe aiea, es-
pecially in lhe lowns, lhan Seibian scholais concede. Thiidly, Kosovo was
nol lhe oiiginal hisloiical cenlie of lhe medieval Seibian slale, as nalional
hisloiiogiaphy in Seibia claims. l was nol unlil 12OO lhal Seibia exlended
ils inuence and powei fiom noilhein Rascia lo lhis iegion.
Down lhe cenluiies, lhe composilion of Kosovo`s populalion undei-
wenl many changes, mainly because of huge migialion movemenls aflei
lhe Olloman conquesl of lhe Balkan peninsula and lhe vaiious piocesses
of culluial inleifeience and assimilalion. Allhough lhe Slavs may have
consliluled a ma|oiily in lhe Middle Ages, lheii shaie in lhe lolal popula-
lion of Kosovo has sleadily decieased. Al lhe beginning of lhe lwenlielh
cenluiy, when Seibia conqueied Kosovo, Albanians alieady made up 75
pei cenl of ils populalion. Despile allempls aflei lhe Iiisl and lhe Second
Woild Wais lo change lhe elhnic composilion of lhe aiea in favoui of lhe
Seibs lhiough assimilalion and colonizalion, Albanians conlinued lo
conslilule a ma|oiily in Kosovo. Accoiding lo lhe ofncial Seibian popu-
lalion census of 1991, which was boycolled by Kosovo Albanians, oul
of 1,954,747 inhabilanls 82.2 pei cenl weie Albanians, 1O pei cenl Seibs,
2.9 pei cenl Soulh Slav Muslims, 2.2 pei cenl Roma, and 1 pei cenl
Monlenegiins; lhe iesl weie Tuiks, Cioals, and olheis.7
Howevei, Kosovo ieecls lhe colleclive idenlily of lhe Seibian people,
which makes lhe conicl highly emolional. Since lhe Middle Ages, Kosovo
has been consideied as lhe ciadle`` of Seib nalionhood and lhe heail-
land of lhe medieval Seibian kingdom. n lhe eaily lhiileenlh cenluiy,
lhis piovince became lhe culluial and ieligious cenlie of lhe Seib people.
The paliiaichal lhione of lhe Oilhodox Chuich was peimanenlly eslab-
lished al lhe Pec monasleiy in 1346, which, aflei lhe Olloman conquesl of
lhe Balkan peninsula, pieseived lhe nalional culluial heiilage and iden-
lily of lhe Seibs. Today, lhe piesence of medieval Oilhodox monasleiies
in Kosovo piovides lhe Seibs wilh a langible link lo lheii medieval slale.
The Seibs` allachmenl lo lhe piovince conlains a sliong emolional
componenl lhal is cenlial lo modein Seibian nalionalism and folk liadi-
lion. On Sl. \ilus Day, 28 1une 1389, lhe famous ballle al Kosovo Pol|e
(Iield of Kosovo) againsl lhe Tuiks look place. Seib Piince Lazai had
iefused lo accepl Olloman suzeiainly and lo pay liibule, and confionled
lhe invading lioops led by Sullan Muiad wilh a laige coalilion aimy.
Aflei lhe bloody defeal of lhe Seib-led aimy and lhe execulion of Piince
Lazai and his noble allies, lhe 5OO-yeai Olloman foieign iule ovei Seibia
slailed. Populai epic poeliy and folk songs have cullivaled lhe Kosovo
mylh. Medieval monaslic wiileis poiliayed Lazai as God`s seivanl and
lhe Seibian people as a heavenly people,`` depicling lhe piince`s dealh
as mailyidom foi lhe failh, lhe mililaiy defeal as a moial vicloiy, and lhe
Seibs as lhe immemoiial defendeis of Chiislianily againsl slam.
Duiing lhe nineleenlh cenluiy, lhe Kosovo mylh emeiged as lhe legil-
imizing ideology of lhe Seib nalional movemenl, which was sliiving foi
lhe ciealion of an independenl nalional slale. The collapse of lhe medi-
eval slale was viewed as lhe cenlial evenl in lhe Seibian hisloiy. And lhe
epic cycle of Kosovo seemed lo ailiculale and diamalize lhe ballle of lhe
Seib people foi lheii idenlily, independence, and slalehood. l embodied
lhe paliiolic ideals of biaveiy, heioism, and saciinces.
l is no accidenl lhal, in lhe 198Os, when lhe ugoslav slale dis-
inlegialed and lhe veiy exislence of lhe Seibian nalional slale came lo
lhe foie, Seibian nalionalisl piopaganda iediscoveied lhe epic Ballle of
Kosovo. Nalionalisl-oiienled inlellecluals and polilicians aigued lhal
fiom lhe Middle Ages up lo lhe Tilo eia lheii people had always been
disciiminaled againsl, oppiessed, and lhiealened by olheis. By iefeiiing
lo lhe hoiiois of lhe Ballle of Kosovo, old nalional giievances have been
successfully iecalled.
Bul lhe Albanians, loo, besides lhe demogiaphic aigumenl, link lhe
making of lheii modein nalional slale wilh Kosovo and view lhe piovince
as lheii homeland. Kosovo nguies as a nalional and culluial cenlie be-
cause il is wheie lhe Albanian nalional movemenl slailed al a meeling of
lhe League of Piizien in 1878. Since lhen, lhe Albanian nalional e liles
have been sliiving foi an independenl and unined nalional slale. Kosovo
has also been used as a melaphoi foi lhe in|uslices inicled upon lhe
Albanian people lhioughoul lheii hisloiy.
The socio-economic backgiound
Despile lhe elhnincalion of lhe Kosovo conicl, polilical, economic, and
demogiaphic faclois, nol hisloiy, lie al lhe iool of lhe cuiienl Seibian
Albanian dispule and will conlinue lo inuence lhe posl-wai silualion.
Theie is no evidence whalsoevei lhal elhnic idenlilies, culluial diffei-
ences, oi even sleieolypes inevilably led lo conicl, lel alone wai and
aliocilies. On lhe conliaiy, sociologisls and anlhiopologisls have dem-
onslialed lhal people fiom diffeienl elhnic and ieligious backgiounds
lived side by side in many diffeienl ways and lhal lheie is no such lhing as
culluial oi ieligious incompalibilily. Neveilheless, lhe idealized vision of
a haimonious mulli-elhnic Kosovo is also nol liue. Despile lhe commu-
nisl allempls lo cieale biolheihood and unily`` among lhe peoples of
ugoslavia, elhnic pie|udices and hoslile sleieolypes conlinued lo lhiive
in lhe populalion. Sociological sludies have shown lhal Seibs and Alba-
nians in pailiculai (as opposed lo, foi inslance, Seibs and Cioals) iaiely
24 THI KOSO\O CRSS
accepled each olhei as neighbouis, fiiends, oi maiiiage pailneis.8 Gen-
eially, lheie weie few social ielalionships and haidly any maiiiages.9 n
addilion, lhe ievived nalionalism of lhe 198Os and 199Os exploiled lhe
mulual disliusl ingiained in eveiyday life in Kosovo and hoslile sleieo-
lypes weie delibeialely used lo demonize lhe olhei side and lo |uslify lhe
iespeclive polilical ob|eclives.
l should be noled lhal Kosovo like many olhei iegions in lhe Balkans
has wilnessed seveial peiiods of neice elhnic conagialion, depoilalion,
and mass killing. Ioi inslance, lhe suppiession of nalional idenlincalion
and self-deleiminalion by lhe Seibian aulhoiilies since 1912, as well as
aliocilies commilled by Albanians againsl local Seibs duiing lhe Second
Woild Wai, lefl indelible maiks on lhe colleclive memoiy of bolh people.
The 19981999 wai added lo lhe weighl of uniesolved liaumalic expeii-
ences. l will be veiy difncull foi people who losl ielalives oi fiiends
duiing lhe wai, oi heaid aboul lhe aliocilies, lo oveicome iepiessed
feelings of giief, billeiness, and iage.
n addilion, lhe Albanians feel sliongly lhal lhey have foi decades
been polilically oppiessed and economically exploiled by lhe Seibs.10
Since lhe ciealion of ugoslavia, lhe deep-iooled socio-economic piob-
lems of Kosovo have iemained basically unchanged, so lhal lhis soulhein
Seibian piovince, by viilually eveiy ielevanl ciileiion, is one of lhe
pooiesl and mosl backwaid aieas wilhin ugoslavia. n 1948, lhe pio-
poilion of illileiales in lhe populalion ovei lhe age of 1O was only 2.4 pei
cenl in Slovenia bul 62.5 pei cenl in Kosovo. n oidei lo ieduce lhe shaip
diffeiences in developmenl, lhe ugoslav cenlial goveinmenl gianled
massive developmenl aid and piomoled sliucluial iefoims in Kosovo.
Neveilheless, lhe gap belween lhe pooiei and iichei pails of lhe counliy
incieased sleadily. The diffeience in income was laigesl belween Slovenia
and Kosovo, lwo iegions wilh aboul lhe same populalion (c. 1.9 million).
n 1989, Slovenia`s nalional income amounled lo 36.55 million dinai,
Kosovo`s lo only 3.97 million. Theiefoie, lhe Albanian nalional e lile
incieasingly had lhe impiession of being lhe ieal loseis in ugoslavia.
On lhe olhei hand, owing lo lhe low level of economic developmenl,
high illileiacy iales, paliiaichal alliludes lowaids maiiiage and lhe fam-
ily, and olhei socio-culluial faclois, lhe populalion in Kosovo has lhe
highesl biilh iale (aiound 23 pei 1,OOO) in Iuiope, along wilh a veiy low
age sliucluie (52 pei cenl of lhe populalion is undei 19, and lhe aveiage
age is 24). Seibian senlimenl assumes an alleged Albanian lhieal lo
lhe Seibian piesence in Kosovo, which has been used by conlempoiaiy
Seibian nalionalisls. Since lhe eaily 198Os, paily polilical leadeis, in-
lellecluals, and lhe media have demanded a new populalion policy, feai-
ing lhal Seibs would in lhe long iun be demogiaphically maiginalized
and lhal lhe Soulh Slavic culluial idenlily could be lhiealened by slam-
izalion. A mallei of pailiculai concein in Seibia was lhe migialion of
Seibs fiom Kosovo aflei lhe Second Woild Wai, which, combined wilh
lhe lowei Seibian biilh iales, changed lhe elhnic composilion of Kosovo
in favoui of lhe Albanian populalion.11 Belween 1948 and 1991 lhe Al-
banian populalion giew fiom 68 pei cenl lo 81 pei cenl, while lhe Seibian
piopoilion fell fiom 24 pei cenl lo 1O pei cenl.
Iconomically, lhe iegion is of inleiesl lo bolh sides, as Kosovo is iich
in mineial iesouices. l possesses 5O pei cenl of ugoslavia`s nickel de-
posils, 48 pei cenl of lhe zinc and lead, 47 pei cenl of lhe magnesium, and
36 pei cenl of lhe lignile.12 One-nflh of lhe Seibian eneigy supply was
pioduced in Kosovo. This economic weallh is one of lhe ieasons bolh
sides considei conliol ovei lhis piovince lo be vilal, even lhough Kosovo
iemains pooi and undeideveloped in leims of indusliializalion.
Sliucluial vaiiables such as hoslile peiceplions, ielalions belween po-
lenlially anlagonislic gioups, lhe naluie of lhe polilical syslem, and lhe
level of socio-economic developmenl ceilainly piepaied lhe giound foi
lhe SeibianAlbanian conicl ovei Kosovo. Howevei, il appeais lhal, as
in many olhei violenl conicls in hisloiy, lhe iesoil lo massive violence
has been fai moie inuenced by silualional lhan by sliucluial faclois.
These include lhe chaiaclei of polilical, economic, and mililaiy conicls,
exleinal lhieals, and consideialions of lhe decision makeis` own polilical
iesouices. This biings us lo lhe queslion of why lhe conicl ovei Kosovo
escalaled al lhis specinc hisloiical momenl.
The ioad lo wai
The disinlegialion of ugoslavia as a iesull of lhe failuie lo liansfoim lhe
socialisl syslem inlo a demociacy and a maikel economy is one of lhe key
faclois. This piocess began wilh shaip economic decline and conslilu-
lional conicl in lhe 198Os. The geneial silualion of social change com-
bined wilh inheiiled inslilulional weakness lended lo cause a polilical
impasse al lhe fedeial level. Deep-iooled sliucluial conicls belween ie-
gions, iepublic, and peoples of ugoslavia lhus escalaled iapidly and led
lo lhe slep-by-slep disinlegialion of goveinmenlal aulhoiily, slale sliuc-
luies, and civil oidei in many pails of ugoslavia, iesulling in a complele
bieakdown of lhe polilical, inslilulional, and mililaiy syslem. Moie fun-
damenlally, lhe bieak-up of mulli-elhnic ugoslavia pul seveial sensilive
queslions on lhe polilical agenda, such as lhe iighl lo self-deleiminalion
and lhe localion of new boideis.13
Al lhe same lime, lheie was a geneial deleiioialion in lhe polilical and
economic silualion in Kosovo fiom lhe lale 198Os. Giowing nalionalism
among lhe polilical e liles, lhe abiogalion of Kosovo`s aulonomous slalus,
26 THI KOSO\O CRSS
as well as ugoslavia`s deep socio-economic ciisis ciealed exliemely
painful condilions foi lhe Albanian populalion in Kosovo. Belween 1988
and 1994 lhe GDP in lhis piovince fell eveiy yeai by 1O pei cenl, and
indusliial pioduclion by 17.5 pei cenl. This incieased lhe alieady high
iales of unemploymenl lo an eslimaled 7O pei cenl.14 n compaiison,
befoie 1979 Kosovo`s GDP giew by 6.8 pei cenl a yeai, and employmenl
by 5 pei cenl. Al lhe same lime, lhe Kosovo conicl of lhe lale 198Os and
199Os was iooled in a backgiound of widespiead violalions of Kosovais`
fundamenlal human iighls by lhe Seib adminislialion and police. This led
lo giowing fiuslialion, mobilizalion, and polilical iadicalizalion.15
Aflei 1991 and lhe eslablishmenl of lhe Kosovai shadow-slale, almosl
all conlacl and lines of coopeialion belween lhe Seib and lhe Albanian
communilies and lheii polilical e liles ceased. The Albanians sluck lo
lheii decision lo boycoll lhe eleclions lo demonsliale lheii iefusal lo
iecognize lhe legilimacy of any of lhe ugoslav oi Seib slale inslilulions.
They aigued lhal pailicipalion in lhe eleclions and slale inslilulions im-
plied iecognilion of lhe Seibian iule ovei lheii homeland.16 The Seibian
opposilion, on lhe olhei hand, believed lhal Milosevic could have been
iemoved fiom powei if lhe Kosovai elecloiale had pailicipaled in lhe
polilical piocess. Bul lhe Albanian e lile iefused lo coopeiale wilh any
Seibian polilical paily, claiming lhal neilhei goveinmenl noi opposilion
would iefiain fiom nalionalisl goals and gianl lhe Albanians exlended
aulonomy iighls, lel alone independence. ndeed, all ma|oi polilical
foices in Seibia insisled lhal Kosovo was an inleinal affaii of Seibia. The
Albanian nalional leadeiship, on lhe olhei hand, lefl lillle ioom foi dis-
cussion on a polilical solulion wilhin ugoslavia. Iew Albanian leadeis
iecognized lhal independence was impossible and lheiefoie called foi
some soil of aulonomous aiiangemenl (foi inslance, dissidenl leadei
Adem Demaci, dubbed lhe Albanian Nelson Mandela`` by lhe Albanian
piess, has pioposed lhe nolion of a Balkania`` confedeialion, in which
Kosovo would have lhe slalus of a iepublic). A minoiily of polilicians
and inlellecluals on bolh sides have iesisled lhe nalionalisl mainslieam in
lheii iespeclive communilies and liied lo slail an inlei-elhnic dialogue.17
n lhis silualion of polilical deadlock, lheie was giowing fiuslialion
among lhe Kosovais ovei lhe lack of visible piogiess fiom lheii polilical
slialegy of non-violence. Tempoiaiily, lhe silualion had seemed lo im-
piove when lhe lalian NGO Communila` Sanl` Igidio medialed lhe
Memoiandum of \ndeislanding belween Rugova and Milosevic of 1
Seplembei 1996, which piovided foi lhe ieluin of Albanian sludenls and
leacheis lo public schools. Howevei, implemenlalion was delayed be-
cause of conlinuing dispules ovei which cuiiiculum and which nalional
symbols weie lo be used. n none of lhe public seclois was any maiked
impiovemenl achieved.
Iinally, lhe conclusion of lhe Daylon Peace Accoids on 21 Novembei
1995 came as a shock lo lhe Kosovai polilical class. The Kosovo pioblem
was nol pail of lhe negolialions and was menlioned only once in lhe nnal
liealy. The lifling of lhe oulei wall of sanclions`` againsl lhe Iedeial
Republic of ugoslavia (IR) was made condilional on lhe iesolulion of
lhe SeibianAlbanian dispule ovei lhe fuluie slalus of Kosovo. Many
Albanians fell lhal lhe inleinalional communily had foigollen`` lhis
sensilive issue and lhal only a slialegy of violence could luin inlei-
nalional allenlion lo lhe Kosovo pioblem.
Iiom 1997, polilical violence in Kosovo incieased signincanlly. The
inux of small weapons inlo Kosovo following violenl social uniesl in
Albania, combined wilh a complele bieakdown of law and oidei, helped
lhe emeigence of lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy (KLA), a seciel gueiiilla
foice lhal followed a slialegy of allacks on police slalions and assassi-
nalions of Seibian ofncials, police ofnceis, and Albanian collaboialois
wilh lhe Seibian iegime. The Seibian aulhoiilies ieacled wilh police iaids
and polilical liials. Bul lhe KLA appaienlly managed lo biing some
libeialed leiiiloiies`` undei lheii conliol, such as lhe Dienica iegion.
When, in Iebiuaiy 1998, lhe Seibian secuiily foices piepaied a mililaiy
offensive againsl lhe KLA aiming al lheii complele exleiminalion, lhe
conicl escalaled inlo a ma|oi wai.18
The inleinalional ieaclion
Allhough lhe explosion of lhe Kosovo powdei keg had oflen been pie-
dicled, inleinalional effoils lo conlain lhe conicl weie modesl. l was
nol unlil lhe emeigence of lhe nisl violenl clashes in lale 1997 lhal ma|oi
inleinalional aclois pul lhe issue high on lheii polilical agenda.19 Iaced
wilh a biulal and iapidly escalaling wai, lhe inleinalional communily
appeaied dumbfounded. Counlless inleinalional oiganizalions, nalional
goveinmenls, and special envoys allempled lo mediale belween lhe
pailies, allhough mainly in a half-heailed and conliadicloiy fashion.
On 24 Seplembei 1997, lhe nleinalional Conlacl Gioup foi lhe nisl
lime voiced ils concein ovei lensions in Kosovo and issued an appeal foi
negolialions. l eslablished a new woiking gioup on lhis issue and senl a
delegalion lo lhe IR. By lhis lime, lhe inleinalional communily had
slailed lo uige Belgiade lo iniliale a peaceful dialogue`` wilh Piislina,
allow an obseivei mission led by lhe Oiganizalion foi Secuiily and Co-
opeialion in Iuiope (OSCI) lo Kosovo, Sandshak, and \o|vodina, accepl
inleinalional medialion, and gianl special slalus`` lo Kosovo. Belgiade,
howevei, declaied lhal Kosovo is an inleinal affaii and nobody else`s
business`` and ie|ecled lhe pioposals.20 n ils Moscow declaialion of 25
28 THI KOSO\O CRSS
Iebiuaiy 1998, lhe Conlacl Gioup slaled lhal any solulion involving a
special slalus on which bolh sides agieed would be acceplable.
Iollowing lhe escalalion of violence in Maich 1998, lhe \N Secuiily
Council imposed an aims embaigo as well as economic and diplomalic
sanclions againsl lhe IR, calling foi a ieal dialogue`` belween lhe
conicling pailies. As lhe nghling conlinued, duiing which seveial lens of
lhousands of people weie displaced, NATO slepped up ils mililaiy pies-
ence in neighbouiing Macedonia and Albania in 1une 1998, and slailed
lo lhiealen Belgiade wilh aii sliikes. Bul il was nol unlil Seplembei lhal
NATO issued an Aclivalion Waining (ACTWARN) foi an aii campaign
in lhe IR. n ils Resolulion 1199 of 23 Seplembei 1998, lhe \N Secu-
iily Council called foi an immediale cease-nie, lhe wilhdiawal of mililaiy
and paiamililaiy foices, complele access foi humanilaiian oiganizalions,
and coopeialion on lhe invesligalion of wai ciimes in Kosovo. Allhough
lhe iesolulion did nol explicilly lhiealen lhe use of all necessaiy (e.g.
mililaiy) means, NATO inleipieled lhis as legilimizalion foi lhe use of
mililaiy foice againsl lhe IR. By lhis lime, lhe \N High Commissionei
foi Refugees eslimaled lhal lheie weie aboul 2OO,OOO iefugees.
On 12 Oclobei 1998, aflei lhe ullimalum issued by NATO, ugoslav
Piesidenl Slobodan Milosevic and \S Special Invoy Richaid Holbiooke
agieed on a pailial wilhdiawal of lhe Seibian mililaiy foices and lhe
deploymenl of an OSCI veiincalion mission of 2,OOO unaimed peisonnel.
Allhough lhe silualion calmed down wilh lhe appioach of winlei, a
numbei of seiious clashes belween ugoslav foices and KLA nghleis weie
iepoiled befoie lhe infoimal cease-nie bioke down aiound Chiislmas.
n view of lhe new escalaloiy spiial, lhe Conlacl Gioup piessuied lhe
conicling pailies inlo negolialions on lhe legal slalus of Kosovo on 6
Iebiuaiy 1999 al Rambouillel, wheie il piesenled a pioposal foi an
inleiim agieemenl based on lhe Conlacl Gioup`s decision of 29 1anuaiy
1999, which piovided foi a laige degiee of self-goveinmenl and an inlei-
nalional implemenlalion foice. Wheieas lhe Albanian delegalion, aflei
long and painful discussions, was nnally peisuaded lo appiove lhe pio-
posal, Belgiade conlinued lo ie|ecl lhe agieemenl, feaiing foieign inlei-
feience in ils inleinal affaiis.
On 24 Maich 1999, NATO slailed lhe aii campaign againsl lhe IR
wilh lhe aim of foicing lhe Seibian side lo accepl lhe Rambouillel
agieemenl and pievenling an imminenl humanilaiian calasliophe. The
geneial expeclalion was lhal il would lake only a few days lo make lhe
Belgiade goveinmenl back down. nslead, lhe mililaiy opeialion con-
linued foi 11 weeks befoie lhe wai came lo an end. Seibian mililaiy and
paiamililaiy foices ieacled wilh exlieme violence againsl KLA nghleis
and lhe civilian populalion. Allogelhei, moie lhan 8OO,OOO people weie
displaced and lhousands weie killed.
Aflei lhe G-8 slales had agieed on lhe lexl foi a \N Secuiily Council
iesolulion lhal was also acceplable lo lhe IR, on 9 1une 1999 iepie-
senlalives of lhe ugoslav mililaiy and NATO concluded a Mililaiy
Technical Agieemenl on lhe wilhdiawal of lhe ugoslav lioops fiom
Kosovo, which ended lhe wai. On lhe basis of Resolulion 1244 of 1O 1une
1999 and lhe iepoil of lhe Secielaiy-Geneial of 12 1une (Sj1999j672), lhe
NATO-led Kosovo Ioice (KIOR) eslablished ils piesence in lhe wai-
loin piovince. The \niled Nalions, in coopeialion wilh numeious inlei-
nalional oiganizalions, slailed lo build up a civil adminislialion.
Iiom lhe beginning, lhe \N Mission in Kosovo has been confionled
wilh a numbei of seiious pioblems. Many lessons fiom lhe Bosnia peace
opeialion weie neglecled, such as lhe need foi a unined civil and mililaiy
adminislialion and an inlegialed command sliucluie.21 n addilion,
KIOR was unable lo pievenl lhe expulsion of moie lhan 25O,OOO non-
Albanians, mainly Seibs and Roma, by lhe KLA. Lasl bul nol leasl, lhe
conslilulional polilical slalus of Kosovo, which foimally iemained an
inlegial pail of lhe IR, is de faclo slill undenned. The Albanian po-
lilical leadeiship and a ma|oi pail of Kosovo`s populalion conlinue lo
insisl on independence. The hisloiical dieam of ciealing a unined pan-
Albanian slale slill peisisls.
Noles
1. M. S. Andeis, Thc 1astcrn Qucstion, 17741923. A StuJy in Intcrnational Rclations,
London: Cambiidge \niveisily Piess, 1966.
2. A concise hisloiy of lhe Albanian queslion`` is slill lacking. See, foi example, Slavio
Skendi, Thc Albanian National Awakcning, 18781912, Piincelon, N1: Piincelon \ni-
veisily Piess, 1967.
3. Denison . Rusinow, Thc Yugoslav 1xpcrincnt 19481974, BeikeleyjLos Angeles:
\niveisily of Califoinia Piess, 1977; Sabiina P. Ramel, Nationalisn anJ IcJcralisn in
Yugoslavia 19621991, 2nd edn., Bloominglon: ndiana \niveisily Piess, 1991.
4. Maliqi Shkelzen, The Albanian Movemenl in Kosova,`` in David A. Dykei and van
\e|voda, eds., Yugoslavia anJ Ajtcr. A StuJy in Iragncntation, Dcspair anJ Rcbirth,
London: Longman, n.d., pp. 138154.
5. \. P. Gagnon, Ilhnic Nalionalism and nleinalional Conicl. The Case of Seibia,``
Intcrnational Sccurity, \ol. 19, No. 3, Winlei 1994j95, pp. 13O166.
6. Noel Malcolm, Kosovo. A Short History, London: Macmillan, 1998; Miianda \ickeis,
Bctwccn Scrb anJ Albanian. A History oj Kosovo, London: C. Huisl, 1998.
7. See The Ilhnic Sliucluie of lhe Populalion of Kosova Accoiding lo Municipalilies in
1991,`` in Asllan Pushka, Kosova anJ Its 1thnic Albanian BackgrounJ. An Historical
Ccographical Atlas, Piislina: uendia pei nfoimim e Kosoves, 1996.
8. R. Hodson, D. Sekulic, and G. Massey, Nalional Toleiance in lhe Ioimei ugoslavia,``
Ancrican 1ournal oj Sociology, \ol. 99, No. 6, 1994.
9. Diagomii Panlic, Nacionalna dislanca giad|ana 1ugoslavi|e,`` 1ugoslavija na kri;noj
prckrctnici, Belgiade: \niveizilel u Beogiadu, 1991, pp. 168186.
3O THI KOSO\O CRSS
1O. Lenaid 1. Cohen, Thc Socialist IyraniJ. 1litcs anJ Iowcr in Yugoslavia, Oakville,
Onlaiio: Mosaic Piess.
11. Srbi i Albanci u XX vcku, Belgiade: Sipska Akademi|a Nauka i \melnosli, 1991.
12. \ickeis, Bctwccn Scrb anJ Albanian, p. xv.
13. Susan L. Woodwaid, Balkan TragcJy. Chaos anJ Dissolution ajtcr thc ColJ Var,
Washinglon D.C.: Biookings nslilulion, 1995; Lauia Silbei and Alan Lillle, Yugoslavia.
Dcath oj a Nation, London: Penguin, 1996; Lenaid 1. Cohen, Brokcn BonJs. Thc Dis-
intcgration oj Yugoslavia, Bouldei, CO: Weslview Piess, 1993; Maiie-1anine Calic, Kricg
unJ IricJcn in Bosnicn-Hcrccgovina, IiankfuiljM.: Suhikamp, 1996.
14. Sibi|a na iakiscu: Kosovo,`` 1kononska politika, 3O Maich 1998, pp. 811.
15. \niled Nalions Geneial Assembly, Human Righls ueslions: Human Righls Sil-
ualions and Repoils of Special Rappoileuis and Repiesenlalives. Silualion of Human
Righls in Kosovo,`` Rcport oj thc Sccrctary-Ccncral (Aj52j5O2 17 Oclobei 1997; Aj51j
556 25 Oclobei 1996; and Aj5Oj767 2O Novembei 1995). Silualion of Human Righls in
lhe Teiiiloiy of lhe Ioimei ugoslavia. Two Tiials of Kosovo Albanians Chaiged wilh
Offences againsl lhe Slale in lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia in 1997,`` Repoil sub-
milled by lhe Special Rappoileui, Ms. Ilisabelh Rehn, puisuanl lo paiagiaph 42(c) of
Commission Resolulion 1997j57 (\NISCO Commission on Human Righls, ueslion of
lhe violalion of human iighls and fundamenlal fieedoms in any pail of lhe woild, wilh
pailiculai iefeience lo colonial and olhei dependenl counliies and leiiiloiies) (IjCN.4j
1998j9, 1O Seplembei 1997).
16. Maic Wellei, Thc Crisis in Kosovo, 19891999, Cambiidge: Documenls and Analyses,
1999.
17. Dusàn 1an|ic and Shke lzen Maliqi, eds., Conict or Dialoguc. ScrbianAlbanian Rcla-
tions anJ Intcgration oj thc Balkans, Subolica: Open \niveisily, 1994; Helsinski Odboi
za l|udska piava u Sibi|i, Dokuncnti. SrpskoAlbanski Jijalog, Ulcinj, 2325 1anuaiy
1997, Belgiade.
18. Kosovo Spiing,`` Piis`lina-Saia|evo: nleinalional Ciisis Gioup, 2O Maich 1998.
19. Slefan Tioebsl, Appendix 1C: The Kosovo Conicl,`` SIIRI Ycarbook 1999, Arna-
ncnts, Disarnancnt anJ Intcrnational Sccurity, Slockholm nleinalional Peace Reseaich
nslilule, Oxfoid: Oxfoid \niveisily Piess, 1999, pp. 4762.
2O. Slefan Tioebsl, Conict in Kosovo. Causcs anJ Curcs. An Analytical Docuncntation,
Ilensbuig: Iuiopean Cenlie foi Minoiily ssues, 1998.
21. Winiich Ku hne, Pioblemalischei Slail dei Iiiedenseinsalz im Kosovo,`` SVI-aktucll,
No. 41, Ibenhausen, 1uly 1999.
3
The Kosovo conicl: A peispeclive
fiom inside
Agon Dcnjaha
nlioduclion
The Kosovo conicl has foi al leasl lhe pasl len yeais oflen been a lopic
foi diffeienl aulhois lhioughoul lhe woild. Taking inlo accounl lhe con-
sequences lhal lhe NATO aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia in 1999 may
have foi fuluie inleinalional ielalions, Kosovo will ceilainly slill iemain
an issue foi discussion duiing lhe yeais lo come. This chaplei concenliales
on lhe iools, lhe dynamics, as well as possible fuluie developmenls of lhe
Kosovo conicl viewed fiom an inleinal Kosovai peispeclive. Recogniz-
ing lhal lheie aie al leasl lwo iealilies`` in Kosovo, lhe chaplei liies lo
covei bolh lhe Albanian and lhe Seibian viewpoinls even-handedly. n
addilion, il dislinguishes ofncial goveinmenlal alliludes fiom public ones,
while al lhe same lime giving an insighl inlo lhe faclois shaping lhese
alliludes.
Basic facls
Irc-1995 pcrioJ. Stablc but cxplosivc
The iools of lhe conicl in Kosovo go back deep inlo hisloiy. Wheieas
Albanians considei lhemselves lo be lhe descendanls of lhe llyiians, a
people who lived in lhe Balkans befoie lhe aiiival of lhe Romans, lhe
32
Seibs considei Kosovo lo be lhe leiiiloiy of Old Seibia and lhe ciadle of
Seibia. n facl, lhe only peiiod of hisloiy in which Kosovo was pail of an
independenl Seibian slale was fiom lhe lhiileenlh lo lhe nfleenlh cen-
luiy. Howevei, lhis was also liue foi some olhei leiiiloiies, such as
Macedonia and noilhein Gieece, which aie iaiely iegaided as hisloiic
Seibian land loday. Whalevei lhe iealily,`` hisloiy ceilainly cannol be
used lo solve lhe conicl; on lhe conliaiy, in addilion lo olhei ideologi-
cal, ieligious, and culluial facls, il has only fuilhei complicaled lhe con-
icl ovei Kosovo.
Accoiding lo lhe Confeiences of London (1913), \eisailles (1919), and
Paiis (1946), despile lhe fiee will of lhe ma|oiily of ils people (Alba-
nians), Kosovo became a pail of ugoslavia.1 Aflei lhe Second Woild
Wai, wilh lhe eslablishmenl of communisl ugoslavia, lhe Albanians of
Kosovo weie gianled a degiee of aulonomy wilhin Seibia. When Tilo
slailed sellling accounls in 1966 wilh some senioi ugoslav polilicians,
Albanians look lhe oppoilunily lo demand iepublican slalus foi Kosovo.2
As a iesull, undei lhe 1974 ugoslav conslilulion Kosovo was given
signincanl aulonomy. Allhough il was lechnically slill wilhin Seibia, in
iealily lhe iegion was gianled a slalus similai lo lhal of lhe consliluenl
iepublics of lhe fedeialion, which allowed foi lhe polilical and culluial
afnimalion of Albanians. Howevei, lhis luined oul lo be a half-measuie
lhal salisned neilhei Albanians noi Seibs.
n 1981, aflei Tilo`s dealh, a seiies of Albanian demonslialions once
again asked foi lhe elevalion of lhe slalus of Kosovo inlo a iepublic
wilhin lhe fedeialion. The demonslialions weie biulally ciushed by lhe
special police and mililaiy foices. A slale of emeigency was declaied and
a seiies of liials of mainly young Albanians followed, wilh heavy |ail
senlences being imposed.3
When Kosovo`s aulonomy was foicibly swepl away in 1989, lhe conicl
ieached a new slage of inlensily. The enliie sliucluie of iegional admin-
islialion was dismanlled, and piaclically oveinighl Albanians weie dis-
missed fiom lheii |obs, denied educalion in lheii own language, and ex-
posed lo a massive abuse of lheii human iighls and civil libeilies. Kosovo
became a de faclo Seibian colony wheie 9O pei cenl of ils populalion (lhe
Albanians) weie iuled by less lhan 1O pei cenl (lhe Seibs).4
Ieeling lhal lheii life undei Seibian iule had become impossible, lhe
Albanians oiganized a iefeiendum and opled foi independence. Led by
biahim Rugova, lhe piesidenl of lhe Democialic League of Kosovo
(LDK), lhe Kosovais conducled a non-violenl campaign lo win lheii iighl
lo self-deleiminalion. They buill up a paiallel sociely wilh ceilain insliu-
menls and inslilulions of local and soveieign aulhoiily, in lhe hope lhal
lhe inleinalional communily would delivei a |usl solulion. Howevei, lhis
policy of non-violence was nol iewaided eilhei by lhe Seibian aulhoiilies
A PIRSPICT\I IROM NSDI 33
oi by lhe inleinalional communily. Despile many wainings lhal lhe con-
icl in Kosovo would escalale inlo open aimed conicl, no sleps weie
laken lo pievenl il. Wilh lhe Daylon Accoid giving value lo lhe aimed
sliuggle of lhe Bosnian Seibs, lhe hopes of Albanians ieceded inlo an
indennile fuluie.
Thc 19961999 pcrioJ. Iailurc oj prcvcntivc Jiplonacy
Wilh lhe single mosl impoilanl message of Daylon being lhal lhe inlei-
nalional communily undeislood only lhe language of aimed conicl, lhe
emeigence of lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy (KLA) was a piediclable
consequence. Howevei, lhe inleinalional communily slill had a chance
lo gel moie seiiously involved in seaiching foi a peaceful solulion lo
lhe Kosovo ciisis. The non-violenl demonslialions by Albanian sludenls
oiganized on 1 Oclobei 1997 by lhe ndependenl Sludenls` \nion of lhe
\niveisily of Piislina weie lhe lasl chance foi such aclion. This moie
aclive bul slill non-violenl melhod of iesislance emeiged as a iealislic
alleinalive lo lhe passive LDK and iadical KLA ones. The sludenls` main
iequesl was lhe ieluin of lhe univeisily piemises lo lhe Albanian slu-
denls on lhe basis of lhe Iducalion Agieemenl signed by Slobodan
Milosevic and biahim Rugova in 1996. f lhe inleinalional communily
had been moie deleimined in backing lhe sludenls` iequesls, lhis move-
menl mighl have become a ciedible alleinalive and lhe lensions mighl
have been lessened.
\nfoilunalely, lhis was nol lhe case and, along wilh lhe giowing ie-
piession of Albanians by lhe Seibian mililaiy and police foices, lhis led
lo lhe ciealion of lhe KLA, which slailed undeilaking gueiiilla opei-
alions againsl Seibian police and civilians. When, in Maich 1998, lhe
Seibian police massacied moie lhan 7O Albanians in Dienica (moslly
childien, women, and eldeily people), lhe Albanians began |oining lhe
KLA in gieal numbeis. As a iesull, wilhin monlhs of slailing lheii guei-
iilla campaign lhe KLA was in conliol of some leiiiloiy in Kosovo, foic-
ing lhe wilhdiawal of Seibian police and mililaiy foices. Howevei, il was
soon cleai lhal lhe KLA was badly oiganized and inadequalely aimed lo
face well-liained and lechnologically supeiioi Seibian mililaiy and police
foices. ls aclions seived only as an excuse foi Seibian foices, undei lhe
guise of nghling leiioiism, lo slail buining Albanian villages. Belween
Maich and Oclobei 1998 almosl 2,OOO Albanians weie killed, many
houses, shops, and schools weie deslioyed, and almosl 4OO,OOO Albanian
civilians weie foiced lo leave lheii homes.5 Once again Iuiope was wil-
nessing elhnic cleansing al lhe end of lwenlielh cenluiy. Wilh lelevision
images of impoveiished families sel lo spend a fieezing winlei in plaslic
34 THI KOSO\O CRSS
shelleis, lhe inleinalional communily decided lo gel seiiously involved in
seaiching foi a diplomalic solulion.
\ndei lhe lhieal of NATO aii sliikes, a cease-nie, biokeied by lhe
Ameiican diplomal Richaid Holbiooke, was achieved. l called on Milo-
sevic lo cease mililaiy and police opeialions in Kosovo and lo wilhdiaw
foices lhal had moved inlo lhe piovince ovei lhe pievious seven monlhs.
Any lioops lefl in Kosovo weie lo be ieluined lo lheii baiiacks. Civilian
monilois fiom lhe Oiganizalion foi Secuiily and Co-opeialion in Iuiope
(OSCI), known as lhe Kosovo \eiincalion Mission (K\M), weie senl
inlo Kosovo lo moniloi Seibian compliance, wilh lhe lhieal of NATO
sliikes being held ovei lhe Seibs. \nfoilunalely, neilhei lhe Albanians
noi lhe Seibs weie willing lo slick lo lhis agieemenl and lhe assaulls
iesumed; by eaily 1anuaiy 1999 lhe cease-nie had fallen apail.
When, on 15 1anuaiy 1999, 45 elhnic Albanian civilians weie mas-
sacied in Racak lhe inleinalional communily decided lhal il was nnally
lime lo acl. A peace confeience was oiganized al Rambouillel, Iiance,
foi Iebiuaiy, and lhe lwo sides weie inviled lo pailicipale. Despile fiag-
menlalion among lhe Albanian polilical pailies, uiged by lhe inlei-
nalional communily lhey managed lo cieale a delegalion headed by
KLA iepiesenlalives. ugoslavia, loo, senl a delegalion, appioved by ils
pailiamenl.
The negolialois weie inilially offeied a lake il oi leave il`` package
calling foi bioad inleiim aulonomy foi Kosovo and 28,OOO NATO lioops
lo implemenl il. Duiing lhe negolialions lhe inleinalional medialois
offeied seveial diffeienl pioposals, some being moie acceplable lo lhe
Albanian and some lo lhe Seibian side. n lhe end, lwo issues emeiged as
being lhe mosl pioblemalic: lhe Albanian delegalion insisled on a iefei-
endum aflei lhe inleiim peiiod, and lhe Seibian delegalion was veiy
much againsl any NATO piesence in lhe piovince. Wilh lhose obslacles
iemaining unsolved lhe lalks weie poslponed lo Maich, and bolh dele-
galions wenl back foi fuilhei consullalions. Many Kosovo Albanians
consideied lhis move lo be a mislake. They say il |usl gave Milosevic
addilional lime lo send moie mililaiy and police foices inlo Kosovo and
lo piepaie bellei foi wai. Subsequenl evenls and lhe alieady cleai in-
dicalions lhal lhe Seibs weie nol going lo sign lhe peace agieemenl
pioved lhis lo be moie oi less liue. Seibian unwillingness was connimed
in Paiis wheie only lhe Albanian delegalion unilaleially signed lhe peace
deal. mmedialely aflei lhal lhe inleinalional peace monilois weie
oideied lo leave Kosovo.
Allhough NATO and many olhei counliies piaised lhe Albanians foi
signing lhe agieemenl and opling foi peace, olheis lhink lhe agieemenl
ilself was veiy advanlageous lo lhe Kosovais and lhey had lillle pioblem
signing il. To a ceilain exlenl lhis is undoubledly liue because lhe
agieemenl called foi a de faclo piolecloiale, somelhing Albanians had
been asking foi foi a long lime.6 The Seibs, on lhe olhei hand, consideied
lhe deploymenl of NATO lioops as an assaull on lheii soveieignly and
lheiefoie iefused lo sign lhe peace deal. n sum, many analysls considei
lhe enliie peace piocess lo be a pooi |ob by lhe Weslein negolialois, who
shoil-ciicuiled lhe long-eslablished piinciples of palienl negolialion.7
Iost-March 1999 pcrioJ. NATO air strikcs
Wilh peace lalks suspended aflei lhe Albanians unilaleially signed lhe
peace deal, NATO decided lo pioceed wilh aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia.
Many expecled lhal aflei a few days of aeiial allacks Milosevic would
back down and sign lhe Rambouillel peace agieemenl. \nfoilunalely,
lhis did nol happen. Whal happened was lhe giealesl elhnic cleansing
lhal Iuiope has seen since lhe end of lhe Second Woild Wai. Almosl
1 million Albanians weie foiced fiom lheii homes, and many olheis weie
massacied, iaped, and loiluied.8 By pushing Kosovo Albanians inlo
neighbouiing Macedonia and Albania, Milosevic was, in addilion lo
liying lo emply Kosovo of ils Albanian populalion, hoping fuilhei lo
deslabilize lhe enliie iegion. This luckily did nol happen, bul lhe aii
campaign ilself was consideiably piolonged. This, in luin, caused consid-
eiable human and maleiial casuallies in Seibia loo.
Opinions aboul lhe NATO aii sliikes diffei gieally belween Albanians
and Seibs in Kosovo. Ioi lhe Albanians, NATO had lhe admiiable goals
of piolecling lheii iighls and ending lhe biulal policies of lhe Seibian
iegime. Allhough lacking lhe mandale of lhe coiiecl aulhoiily, NATO
was conducling a |usl wai, a wai lhal was lhe only ciedible alleinalive foi
lhe inleinalional communily lo addiess lhe ciisis in foimei ugoslavia.
n addilion, by deslioying Seibia`s mililaiy and economic polenlial, aii
sliikes weakened ils abilily lo wage wai, and lhus impioved lhe slabilily
of lhe iegion. Allhough lhe bombing unleashed a baibaiic oulbieak of
laige-scale elhnic cleansing, lhe Albanians do nol hold NATO iespons-
ible foi lhis.9 Counlless leslimonies by Kosovai iefugees aie lhe besl
pioof of lhis, because despile eeing Kosovo in gieal numbeis lhey nevei
menlioned NATO aii sliikes as lhe cause. Howevei, mosl of lhem would
have liked lo see lhe deploymenl of giound lioops as eaily as possible.
Moieovei, lhey iecognize lhal excluding giound lioops fiom lhe veiy
beginning caused much of lhe Kosovo Albanian suffeiing and ighl.
The Seibs, on lhe olhei hand, considei NATO sliikes illegal and an acl
of aggiession againsl lheii soveieign counliy. They nimly ie|ecl claims
lhal inleivenlion was undeilaken because of humanilaiian conceins, and
cile geopolilical and slialegic gains. The main aim was lo ciicumvenl lhe
36 THI KOSO\O CRSS
\N Secuiily Council and sel a piecedenl foi lhe fuluie by violaling
inleinalional law. The seaich foi a diplomalic solulion did nol suil
NATO, lhey say, because il would have slienglhened lhe \niled Nalions
and inleinalional law and made Russia a playei. n addilion, aii sliikes
gave a boosl lo mililaiy spending, which is veiy pionlable foi \S aims
companies.
Whalevei lhe liulh, il has lo be said lhal, even if NATO`s ieal aims
weie olhei lhan humanilaiian ones, il was ceilainly Milosevic who gave
good cause foi such aclion. n any evenl, even if nol aflei lhe nisl few
days of bombing, aflei almosl lhiee monlhs NATO managed lo achieve
ils ofncially pioclaimed main goals.10 nlensined aii iaids, logelhei wilh
giowing piospecls of a giound invasion, made Seibia comply wilh NATO
iequesls. \ndei lhe medialion of Russia and Iinnish Piesidenl Ahlisaaii,
Milosevic decided lo accepl lhe G-8 accoids, and peace ieluined lo lhe
lioubled piovince of Kosovo. Howevei, lhe huge human and maleiial
cosls make many people on bolh sides queslion lhe |uslincalion of lhis
aclion.
Piesenl slale of affaiis
Iollowing lhe \N Secuiily Council Resolulion 1244 and lhe Mililaiy-
Technical Agieemenl belween NATO and lhe Iedeial Republic of
ugoslavia, on 12 1une 1999 lhe inleinalional secuiily foice known as
KIOR, wilh NATO al ils coie, was deployed in Kosovo. Al lhe same
lime, lhe ugoslav mililaiy, paiamililaiy, and police foices began lheii
wilhdiawal fiom lhe piovince in accoidance wilh lhe agieemenl. The
powei vacuum was iapidly nlled by lhe KLA, which had also signed an
\ndeilaking on Demililaiizalion lhal eslablished lhe modalilies and lhe
schedule foi lhe demililaiizalion of lhe KLA. As suspecled, many ie-
luining Albanian iefugees found lheii fiiends and ielalives muideied and
lheii houses and businesses buined, while mass giaves aie being found
lhioughoul lhe piovince. Despile KIOR deploymenl in ils zones of ie-
sponsibilily, lhe feeling of a secuiily gap was ciealed, causing a laige
numbei of Kosovo Seibs lo leave lheii homes foi Seibia.11
Allhough lhe nisl wave of Kosovo Seib depailuies was piompled by
secuiily conceins ialhei lhan by aclual lhieals, a second wave of de-
pailuies iesulled fiom an incieasing numbei of incidenls commilled by
Kosovo Albanians. n pailiculai, many killings, looling, and foiced ex-
piopiialion of apailmenls have piompled Seibs lo leave. Because of lhe
immense suffeiing of lhe Kosovo Albanians duiing lhe aii sliikes, lo a
ceilain exlenl lhese acls of ievenge should nol come as a suipiise. How-
evei, iepiisals againsl Seibian civilians, especially innocenl ones, aie in
no way |uslinable. Moieovei, in lhe long iun lhey may be veiy damaging
foi Albanians lhemselves because lhey may liemendously deciease sup-
poil fiom lhe inleinalional communily. Allhough a |oinl appeal was
issued by Mi. Hashim Thaqi12 and Kosovo Seib iepiesenlalives lo
iefiain fiom any acls of violence againsl lheii neighbouis,``13 lhe Seibs
aie slill eeing Kosovo. Ioi some lhis pioves lhal lhe KLA is nol behind
aliocilies againsl lhe Seibs,14 while olheis have lhe impiession lhal lheie
aie many haidlineis`` wilhin lhe KLA lhal even Mi. Thaqi cannol con-
liol. l is debalable which of lhese views lies closesl lo iealily, bul il is
cleai lhal loday mosl Kosovo Seibs disliusl lhe KLA as much as Alba-
nians eailiei disliusled lhe Seibian police and mililaiy foices.15
l has lo be said lhal a gieal pail of lhe iesponsibilily foi lhis silualion
is KIOR`s. Aflei all, il is supposed lo piovide secuiily foi all people of
Kosovo iiiespeclive of lheii elhnic backgiound. Howevei, il musl be ac-
knowledged lhal ils posilion is much moie delicale lhan il seems. Iiom
lhe beginning of ils involvemenl in lhe Kosovo ciisis, NATO`s aclions
have lo a ceilain exlenl suppoiled lhe KLA and ils leadei Hashim Thaci,
who now iepiesenls lhe de faclo goveinmenl of lhe people. Allhough
NATO lhoughl lhal il would be easy lo sideline il aflei diiving oul lhe
ugoslav aimy, lhe KLA has no inlenlion of pulling down ils weapons
and quielly going away. Despile lhe suiiendei of some of ils weapons
befoie lhe deadline foi disaimamenl, many believe lhal lhe KLA slill has
in ils possession consideiable amounls of weaponiy. This could cieale
gieal pioblems inside NATO ilself, because Gieece and laly wanl lo see
lhe KLA complelely demililaiized and disaimed. On lhe olhei hand,
NATO cannol diieclly challenge lhe KLA, because in such a conicl il
would face consideiable casuallies, as well as pioblems in goveining lhe
piovince. n addilion, Russia and Seibia have alieady accused KIOR of
nol pioviding enough secuiily lo lhe Kosovo Seibs, lhus making lhis
enliie issue ialhei complicaled.
An addilional pioblem in piesenl-day Kosovo is lhe slill fiagmenled
polilical landscape and lhe as yel undeveloped polilical culluie. On lhe
Kosovo Albanian side, lhe willingness of lhe LDK undei Mi. Rugova and
lhe KLA undei Mi. Thaci lo coopeiale wilh each olhei is ialhei limiled.
ndeed, lhey aie compeling foi powei. nleieslingly enough, allhough
Mi. Rugova is consideied a modeiale, while Mi. Thaci is much moie
iadical, lhey bolh see independence as lhe nnal solulion foi lhe Kosovo
conicl. Howevei, lheii means foi achieving il have diffeied consideiably.
Mi. Rugova has puisued non-violenl iesislance lo Seibian iule, wilh lhe
building of democialic counlei-inslilulions. n conliasl, Mi. Thaci has
chosen aimed iesislance. The nghling gave ciedibilily lo lhe KLA, and
made lhe posilion of lhe LDK incieasingly weak, allhough fai fiom in-
signincanl. Howevei, allhough no ieliable suivey has iecenlly been con-
38 THI KOSO\O CRSS
ducled in Kosovo (and il is queslionable how possible lhal would be),
accoiding lo some indicalois, as lhe iesull of ceilain unpopulai aclions by
lhe KLA, suppoil foi Mi. Rugova among oidinaiy Kosovais has consid-
eiably incieased.16 On lhe olhei hand, lhe KLA has now founded ils own
polilical paily, lhus piepaiing ilself foi evenlual eleclions. n addilion,
Mi. Thaci and mosl of lhe KLA leadeis have lalely incieasingly voiced
lheii opposilion lo lhe acls of violence againsl local Seibs, and have,
al leasl declaialively, endoised lhe piocess of democializalion of lhe
piovince.
On lhe Kosovo Seib side, il is becoming moie and moie appaienl lhal
lhe cuiienl iepiesenlalives of lhe Seibian and fedeial goveinmenl have
losl mosl of lheii ciedibilily wilh lhe Kosovo Seib populalion. On lhe
olhei hand, il is obvious lhal lhe iepiesenlalives of lhe Oilhodox Chuich
en|oy a fai giealei iepulalion. Togelhei wilh lhe iepiesenlalives of lhe
Kosovo Seib opposilion Democialic Movemenl, lhey have publicly con-
demned ugoslav Piesidenl Slobodan Milosevic and lhe ciimes of his
iegime in Kosovo. Howevei, wilh Seibs conlinuing lo leave Kosovo, il
iemains lo be seen how much impacl lhese iepiesenlalives will have on
fuluie developmenls in lhe piovince. Towns such as Piizien and Pe|a aie
piaclically deseiled by Seibs, while Miliovica and Rahovec aie divided
along elhnic lines. n lhese lowns lension belween Albanians and Seibs is
veiy high, wilh incidenls happening almosl on a daily basis. On lhe olhei
hand, lhe deploymenl of lhe inleinalional as well as local police foices
has been ialhei slow. Allhough some of lhe inleinalional lioops aie
alieady in place, il is veiy obvious lhal lheie aie nol enough of lhem lo
secuie oidei in posl-wai Kosovo.17 The nisl geneialion of specially
liained local policemen was supposed lo slail opeialing by 15 Oclobei
1999, bul lhis has unfoilunalely slill nol happened.18 Consequenlly, lhe
oveiall silualion in lhe piovince is slill ialhei chaolic and il will lake quile
a long lime lo iebuild ils democialic inslilulions.
Iuluie developmenls
The cuiienl silualion in Kosovo is of an open-ended piolecloiale, an
inleiim solulion lhal because of lhe complelely opposing nnal goals of lhe
conicling sides is oflen menlioned as lhe only feasible one.19 This is why
al lhe momenl nobody is lalking aboul any nnal iesolulion of lhe conicl
ovei lhe fuluie slalus of Kosovo. The exisling level of enmily is so high
and bolh sides aie so emolionally chaiged lhal a long-leim solulion is
simply unallainable. Howevei, bolh Albanians and Seibs have lheii own
explanalions as well as expeclalions iegaiding lhe cuiienl silualion and
lhe evenlual slalus of Kosovo.
Ioi Kosovo Albanians lhe lalesl developmenls iepiesenl a hisloiic
vicloiy, and mosl of lhem aie cuiienlly in a slale of nalional euphoiia.
The Seibian mililaiy and police foices have nnally lefl lhe piovince and
foi mosl Albanians lhe independence of Kosovo is a done lhing. Al-
lhough lhey aie amenable lo delaying a nnal decision on Kosovo`s slalus
foi a ceilain liansilional peiiod, in lhe long iun lhey aie deleimined on
independence based on a iefeiendum. Iven caulious wainings by moie
level-headed compaliiols aie usually viewed wilh suspicion and con-
lempl. This is basically also liue of Kosovo`s polilical iepiesenlalives,
who aie moie conceined wilh lhe powei sliuggle lhan wilh aclion ie-
gaiding lhe fuluie slalus of lhe piovince.
On lhe olhei hand, lhe Seibs have lheii own inleipielalion of evenls.
The signing of lhe Mililaiy-Technical Agieemenl was hailed by lhe Bel-
giade iegime as a nalional liiumph lhal nnally secuied lhe slalus of Ko-
sovo wilhin Seibia. Accoiding lo lhem, \N Secuiily Council Resolulion
1244 ieafnims lhe inleinalional communily`s commilmenl lo lhe sovei-
eignly and leiiiloiial inlegiily of ugoslavia. On lhe basis of ofncial
documenls lhis is lo a ceilain exlenl liue, bul lhe silualion on lhe giound
is ialhei bluiied, and lhe picluie lhal lhe Seibs in Kosovo see is fai fiom
as oplimislic as lhal of lheii ofncials. ndeed, even Belgiade is awaie of
lhis iealily`` and is lheiefoie pushing foi anolhei piefeiied solulion
lhe paililion of Kosovo. Canlonizalion, which has been so eageily pio-
posed lalely, iepiesenls only a nisl phase.
The inleinalional communily, meanwhile, is liying caiefully lo ignoie
lhe issue of lhe evenlual slalus of Kosovo and lhe means of deleimining
il. Neilhei lhe Rambouillel accoids noi \N Secuiily Council Resolulion
1244 claiify lhe fuluie slalus of Kosovo, iefeiiing lo il only ialhei
vaguely. Accoiding lo lhe Rambouillel accoids, aflei lhiee yeais an
inleinalional meeling shall be convened lo deleimine lhe mechanism foi
a nnal selllemenl foi Kosovo, on lhe basis of lhe will of lhe people,
opinions of ielevanl aulhoiilies . . . and lhe Helsinki Iinal Acl.``20 Ac-
coiding lo lhe \N Resolulion, lhe inleinalional civil piesence in Kosovo
should facililale a polilical piocess designed lo deleimine Kosovo`s
fuluie slalus, laking inlo accounl lhe Rambouillel accoids,`` and in a
nnal slage, oveisee lhe liansfei of aulhoiily fiom Kosovo`s piovisional
inslilulions eslablished undei a polilical selllemenl.``21 Consequenlly,
one could say lhal lhe \N Resolulion leaves moie space foi an indepen-
denl Kosovo lhan Rambouillel did. The ambiguous language of bolh
documenls has given giounds foi diffeienl assumplions and inleipiela-
lions fiom all sides, wilh lhe inleinalional communily cleaily unwilling lo
claiify lhe issue fuilhei. Despile lhe comfoil of nol having lo deal wilh
lhe pioblem immedialely, lhis allilude of lhe inleinalional communily
may luin oul lo be ialhei damaging in lhe long iun. Mixed and uncleai
4O THI KOSO\O CRSS
signals fiom lhe inleinalional communily fuilhei confuse bolh Albanians
and Seibs, and leave ioom foi vaiious misinleipielalions and piopaganda.
el neilhei lhe Albanians noi lhe Seibs aie willing lo foigel lhis
ciucial issue, which soonei oi lalei will have lo be deall wilh. Because of
sliong opposilion fiom lhe Albanians and lhe inleinalional communily,
lhe paililion of Kosovo has al leasl foi lhe lime being almosl been iuled
oul. Howevei, if lhe violence by Kosovo Albanians againsl lhe local
Seibian populalion conlinues and lhe inleinalional communily fails lo
fulnl ils goal of ciealing a mulli-elhnic Kosovo, paililion may iemain an
oplion.22 Based on lhe cuiienl silualion, lhe olhei lwo oplions of inde-
pendence and aulonomy aie also slill in play. Togelhei wilh olhei ie-
gional and global piocesses, fuluie developmenls wilhin Kosovo and
Seibia will ceilainly deleimine lhe nnal oulcome. The Albanians have lo
piove lheii capabilily of building a democialic sociely wilh inslilulions
lhal guaianlee equal iighls lo all ils cilizens, iiiespeclive of lheii elhnic
backgiound. f lhey do achieve lhal, and as long as Seibia iemains un-
democialized and undei lhe iule of Milosevic, lhe piospecls foi inde-
pendence may well giow. On lhe olhei hand, if Milosevic is oveilhiown
and Seibia gels seiiously involved in lhe democializalion piocess, and lhe
Albanians fail lo fulnl lhe expeclalions of lhe inleinalional communily,
lhe nnal oulcome may be quile diffeienl. Howevei, il has lo be ie-
membeied lhal lhe only lasling solulion will be a polilical selllemenl
ieconciling legilimale elhnic Albanian inleiesls and long-leim peace wilh
Seibia ovei lhe fuluie of lhe piovince.
Conclusion
The Kosovo conicl, oi al leasl ils nisl phase, has come lo a close. How-
evei, lhe consequences foi Kosovo, Seibia, lhe \niled Nalions, and lhe
inleinalional communily in geneial will be piesenl foi a long lime. The
ieal queslion is whal lessons will be leainl, whal legacies will be lefl, and
whal lhe woild will look afleiwaids. We will piobably have lo wail some
lime foi mosl of lhe answeis, bul lheie aie some conclusions lo be diawn
immedialely. Above all, il is cleai lhal il will lake yeais foi wai-loin
Kosovo lo iebuild ils infiasliucluie and develop genuine democialic
inslilulions. Moieovei, lheie is no doubl lhal pievenlive diplomacy has
complelely failed in Kosovo. Despile wainings lhal lhe ciisis mighl esca-
lale inlo an aimed conicl, seiious inleinalional involvemenl did nol
happen eaily enough. Consequenlly, we have wilnessed anolhei bloody
wai in lhe Balkans. And wai ilself, wilhoul lhe piocess of ieconsliuclion,
is much moie coslly lhan any pievenlive diplomalic aclion. This is an-
olhei lesson lhal il is high lime we leainl. Iinally, lhe Kosovo conicl has
once again shown lhe inadequacy of lhe inleinalional communily in
dealing wilh lhe poslCold Wai challenges. The \N Secuiily Council
oflen nnds ilself incapable of fulnlling ils piimaiy obligalion lhe main-
lenance of inleinalional peace and secuiily. l is highly debalable
whelhei NATO, even when acling on a mandale fiom lhe \niled
Nalions, has lhe aulhoiily foi evenlual mullilaleial inleivenlion. Ralhei,
new inleinalional laws and \N iefoim aie iequiied.
Noles
1. nilially as a pail of lhe ugoslav monaichy, and aflei lhe Second Woild Wai as a pail
of lhe new socialisl ugoslavia. Ioi delails see Hivzi slami, Demogiaphic Realily of
Kosovo,`` in Dusàn 1an|ic and Shke lzen Maliqi, eds., Conict or Dialoguc. Scrbian
Albanian Rclations anJ Intcgration oj thc Balkans, Subolica: Open \niveisily, Iuiopean
Civic Cenlie foi Conicl Resolulion, 1994, p. 3O.
2. \nlil 1966, Albanians in Kosovo weie seveiely iepiessed undei a campaign led by
Seibian nalionalisl Aleksandai Rankovic, lhen ugoslav Minislei of lhe nleiioi. When
Rankovic was ieplaced in 1966, lhe Albanians expiessed lheii disconlenl in lhe dem-
onslialions of 1968. Ioi delails see Chiislophei Bennel, Yugoslavias BlooJy Collapsc,
London: Huisl & Co., 1995, p. 89.
3. bid., p. 9O.
4. l also woilh menlioning anolhei inleiesling compaiison. The Seibs in Kosovo, who
conslilule only 1.5 pei cenl of all Seibs in lhe Balkans, weie in facl iuling ovei an
Albanian populalion in Kosovo lhal conslilules 38 pei cenl of all Albanians in lhe
Balkans. See Shke lzen Maliqi, Kosova. Scparatc VorlJs, Piislina: Dukag|ini, 1998, p. 43.
5. See seveial Oclobei issues of lhe Kosovo daily newspapei in Albanian, Koha Ditorc
(Piislina), and iepoils fiom lhe \NHCR ofnce in Piislina issued duiing lhal peiiod.
6. Ioi delails aboul lhe posilion of Albanians on lhis issue, see Bu|ai Bukoshi, The \N
and NATO Should nleivene in Kosovo,`` in Chailes P. 1ozic, ed., Nationalisn anJ
1thnic Conict, San Diego, CA: Gieenhaven Piess, 1994, p. 216.
7. Among olheis, many foimei lop \S polilicians oflen shaied lhis view. See foi inslance
1immy Cailei, Have We Ioigollen lhe Palh lo Peace?`` Ncw York Tincs, 27 May
1999.
8. Iiguies aboul viclims in Kosovo duiing lhe NATO aii sliikes vaiy gieally, depending on
lhe souice of infoimalion. nilially, an eslimaled 2O,OOO muideied Albanians weie
iepoiled. Howevei, lhese numbeis have since been sleadily going down, wilh no ieliable
nnal dala yel. Accoiding lo Ms. Caila del Ponle, a Pioseculoi foi lhe \N Ciiminal
Tiibunals foi lhe foimei ugoslavia and Rwanda, by 1O Novembei 1999 invesligalois
had exhumed 2,1O8 bodies fiom giavesiles in Kosovo. Howevei, she wains lhal lhis ng-
uie does nol necessaiily ieecl lhe lolal numbei of aclual viclims, because only 195 of
529 idenlined giavesiles have been examined lo dale. n addilion, lhe 1oinl Commission
on Piisoneis and Delainees, composed of expeils in human iighls law nominaled by lhe
Kosovo Tiansilional Council, iepiesenlalives of human iighls NGOs, legal piaclilioneis,
and family membeis of delainees, has iepoiled lhal some 5,OOO peisons aie missing oi
piesumed delained in Seibia. Iinally, accoiding lo lhe iesulls of a \NHCR suivey of
141 villages, 64 pei cenl of homes have been seveiely damaged oi deslioyed and 4O pei
cenl of walei souices have been conlaminaled, many by household wasle and human
iemains. See hllp:jjwww.un.oigjpeacejkosovojnewsjkos3Oday.hlm.
42 THI KOSO\O CRSS
9. l was mainly ofncial Belgiade lhal blamed NATO aii sliikes foi lhe endless numbei of
iefugees. Ioi lhose who know lhe hisloiy of lhe iegion il is cleai lhal lhis was only a
conlinualion of an eailiei Seib polilical slialegy. Ioi delails see foi inslance Iinlan
O`Toole, Seibian Aim lo Kill All Kosovans s Nolhing New,`` Irish Tincs, 6 1une 1999.
1O. A huge debale has been going on iegaiding lhis issue, because lhe opponenls of NATO
aii sliikes aigue lhal, inslead of pievenling elhnic cleansing, NATO aclions liemen-
dously incieased il. Howevei, lhose in favoui of NATO say lhal, even if lhis was liue al
lhe beginning of lhe campaign, afleiwaids all iefugees weie able lo go back lo Kosovo.
Ioi an inleiesling analysis of lhis issue see Heniy A. Kissingei, The ll-Consideied
Wai in Kosovo Has \ndeimined Relalions wilh China and Pul NATO al Risk,`` Ncws-
wcck, 31 May 1999.
11. \NHCR iepoils eslimale lhal some 18O,OOO displaced Seib and Roma people fiom
Kosovo have moved inlo Seibia and Monlenegio. Aiound 13O,OOO of lhese inleinally
displaced peisons aie believed lo have aiiived in Seibia and Monlenegio since lhe end
of NATO aii sliikes and lhe deploymenl of KIOR in Kosovo in 1une 1999. Ioi delails
see hllp:jjwww.un.oigjpeacejkosovojnewsjkos3Oday.hlm.
12. Hashim Thaci was one of lhe key leadeis of lhe KLA and head of lhe Kosovo Albanian
delegalion al lhe Rambouillel confeience. Cuiienlly he is lhe piime minislei of lhe
Piovisional Goveinmenl of Kosovo.
13. Michael Roddy, Piovisional Goveinmenl of Kosovo and Kosovai Seib Leadeis Seek
Ind lo \iolence,`` Rcutcrs, 2 1uly 1999.
14. Among olheis, Geneial Wesley Claik, NATO`s Supieme Allied Commandei. Ioi
delails see Claik Sees No Ividence KLA Behind Allacks on Seibs,`` Rcutcrs, 13
Augusl 1999.
15. Ioi a moie delailed explanalion, see Kosovo Developmenls aflei lhe Deploymenl of
KIOR,`` hllp:jjwww.ciisisweb.oigjpio|eclsjkosovo.hlml.
16. Duiing seveial public meelings lhe ciowd has inleiiupled speeches by KLA ofncials by
shouling Rugova`s name.
17. As of 21 Oclobei 1999, of lhe 3,11O civilian police planned lo be deployed in
Kosovo, lhe \N Mission in Kosovo had managed lo deploy only 1,739; some 15O2OO
addilional ofnceis aie expecled lo be deployed each week. n addilion, Secielaiy-
Geneial Kon Annan iecommended on 26 Oclobei 1999 lhal lhe Secuiily Council
inciease lhe slienglh of lhe \NMK police foice lo 4,718 (hllp:jjwww.un.oigjpeacej
kosovojpagesjkosovo slalus.hlm).
18. n facl, il was only on 18 Oclobei 1999 lhal lhe nisl class of 173 local Kosovai police
cadels giadualed fiom lhe \N-sponsoied Kosovo Police Seivice School. The sliucluie
of lhis nisl class lends lo be mulli-elhnic, wilh 8 of lhe giaduales being Seibs, and lhe
lolal numbei of minoiily sludenls ieaching 17.
19. Ioi delails see Agon Dem|aha, On lhe Ieasibilily of Self-Deleiminalion: Towaids
Suslainable Kosova,`` in David C. Duisl, Maiia . Dimiliova, Alexandei L. Gungov, and
Boiislava \. \assileva, eds., Rcsurrccting thc Ihocnix, Sona: IOS Publishing House,
1998, pp. 23O243. See also Mahi Nesimi, Piolekloiali nde ikombe lai pozicion nise s ne
Kosove ,`` in Iakti (Macedonian daily newspapei in Albanian), Skop|e, 11 May 1999.
2O. Rambouillel Accoids,`` in Koha Ditorc, 2 Maich 1999.
21. The \N Resolulion 1244,`` Iakti, 12 1une 1999.
22. Ioi moie delails on lhis issue see Shqiplai Oseku, Paliiole l e vonuai nxisin ndai|en e
Kosove s,`` hllp:jjwww.pasqyia.comjKOSO\AjSHOSIK\.hlm.
4
The closing of lhe Kosovo cycle:
\iclimizalion veisus iesponsibilily
Duska Anastasijcvic
The long-slanding dispule belween Seibs and Albanians ovei Kosovo
piompled many obseiveis in lhe 198Os lo piedicl lhal, should elhnic
conicl evei eiupl in lhe foimei ugoslavia, il would inevilably begin in
lhal piovince. The bloody spiial of wai, howevei, look a diffeienl couise
and lhe Kosovo issue was sidelined by lhe wais in Cioalia and Bosnia
Heizegovina. n lhe meanlime, lhe elhnic lension in lhe iegion conlinued
lo feimenl and lhe ciisis in Kosovo compounded ilself inlo a knol lhal
nobody was willing lo begin uniavelling. The Seibian aulhoiilies favouied
pieseiving lhe slalus quo by conlinuing oi even ieinfoicing lheii mililaiy,
colonial-slyle iule of lhe piovince and iesisled lhe inleinalionalizalion of
lhe conicl. The Kosovo Albanians had seen lhe bloodshed in Cioalia
and Bosnia. They iesisled lhe uige lo impiove lheii slalus by challenging
lhe balance of powei and iefiained fiom iesponding wilh violence lo lhe
sliong mililaiy and police piesence lhal suiiounded lhem.1 Iinally, apail
fiom iepealed iequesls lo lhe ugoslav aulhoiilies lo impiove lheii
human iighls iecoid, lhe inleinalional communily laigely agieed lhal lhe
Kosovo ciisis should be iesolved wilhin lhe Iedeial Republic of ugo-
slavia lhiough a dialogue belween lhe lwo sides involved.2 As a iesull,
inlei-elhnic ielalions belween Seibs and Albanians deleiioialed ovei
many yeais, pailiculaily fiom 1998 unlil lhe NATO inleivenlion in
Maich 1999, by which lime lhe level of conlacl belween lhe lwo com-
munilies had ieached ils lowesl poinl evei. Seibs and Albanians had
44
puisued lheii lives along sepaiale liacks, which conveiged only al a poinl
of shaied feai.3
The oiigin of lhe elhnic iivaliy in Kosovo is a conlenlious issue. The
lines of division do nol only follow lhe AlbanianSeibian polaiily; lhey
aie also appaienl wilhin each communily. Ioi example, Seibs and Alba-
nians bolh idenlify lhe same leiiiloiy as lheii hisloiic homeland,`` and
iadicals on bolh sides lend lo link lhe iools of lheii enmily lo befoie lhe
Olloman iule.4 As Iinesl Renan noles, gelling ils hisloiy wiong is pail
of being a nalion.``5
This chaplei will endeavoui lo explain how eiioneous peiceplions of
hisloiy have seived lo peipeluale halied belween lhe lwo communilies
and indeed liiggeied lhe spiial of conicl. l will allempl lo go beyond
lhe cuslomaiy desciiplion of lhe conicl as a clash of lwo aulhoiilaiian
and chauvinisl |syslemsj which do nol, howevei, have malching poweis of
oiganizalion.``6 Kosovo, of couise, is nol Bosnia, wheie coidial inlei-
elhnic ielalions lhiived foi cenluiies befoie lhe bonds weie bioken by
biulal violence and elhnic cleansing. Nonelheless, coexislence in Kosovo
was a iealily long befoie il was liansfoimed inlo lolal confionlalion. This
chaplei, lheiefoie, will look al lhe foices behind lhe ciealion of hisloiical
peiceplions so diveigenl lhal each side began lo see ilself as a viclim of
lhe olhei. l will aigue lhal lhe conicl iesulled fiom lhe delibeiale and
slialegic policies of Seibia`s iuling e liles, whose shoil-leim goal was lo
secuie lhe conlinualion of lheii own powei and lo shoie up lhe exisling
powei sliucluie, which had been showing signs of decay in lhe mid-198Os.
By going beyond lhe somewhal desciiplive aigumenl which idenlines
lhe clash of nalionalisms`` as lhe main cause of lhe conicl, lhis chaplei
will allempl lo demonsliale lhal nalionalism seived as lhe vehicle foi
achieving lhis goal and moieovei was used lo |uslify polilical inleiesls
and laclics.7 l will exploie lhe slialegy of lhe Seibian leadeiship in cie-
aling lhe conicl, as lhe Kosovo issue was essenlial lo lhe successful
emeigence of populism in Seibia and lhe iule of Slobodan Milosevic, a
iule lhal has gone viilually unchallenged foi moie lhan 1O yeais. The iole
of inlellecluals and lhe media in geneialing a secuiily dilemma and halied
belween lhe lwo communilies also deseives pailiculai menlion.8
The logic of hisloiy
One of lhe buidens in wiiling aboul lhe Soulhein Slavs is lhe oneious
necessily of lelling lhe sloiy fiom lhe beginning,``9 wiole lhe hisloiian
vo Banac. Iqually aiduous is lhe lask of idenlifying which pailiculai
beginning is meanl, especially when allempling lo unlangle Albanian
THI CLOSNG OI THI KOSO\O CCLI 45
Seib ielalions. Ioi lhe sake of bievily and lhe puiposes of lhis chaplei,
believe il will sufnce lo lake as a slailing poinl lhe spiing of 1981, which
was maiked by mass uniesl among Kosovo Albanians.10 Nol only weie
lhe accompanying demonslialions lhe laigesl evei wilnessed in lhe So-
cialisl Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia, bul lhe ieaclion lo lhem maiked
lhe nisl lime lhal fedeial aulhoiilies used open and biulal foice. Thus lhe
Albanian queslion was nol lhiown inlo ielief by lhe disinlegialion of lhe
foimei ugoslavia, as mainlained by some aulhois. Ralhei, lhe opposile
is liue: lhe demonslialions signalled piofound and endemic denciencies
in lhe ugoslav communisl syslem.
The luimoil in Kosovo in Maich and Apiil 1981 came as a shock lo lhe
geneial ugoslav public and lhe aulhoiilies alike. l eiupled in Piislina
on 11 Maich wilh iiols in a sludenl cafeleiia and was quickly followed by
waves of demonslialions sweeping lhiough lhe piovince. The immediale
ieasons foi lhe piolesls weie bad food and lhe geneial dissalisfaclion of
sludenls wilh lheii slandaid of living. n lheii nghl, lhe sludenls weie
|oined by woikeis; howevei, lhese inilial demonslialions soon calmed
down. They iesumed in foice on 26 Maich, lhen, on 1 and 2 Apiil, a
massive lhiid wave of piolesls spiead lhioughoul lhe piovince. The fed-
eial aulhoiilies oideied in special unils of lhe ugoslav People`s Aimy
and lhe police. The aimy and police weie iulhless. Ofncial iepoils lisl 8
demonslialois dead and anolhei 75 wounded; 55 of lhese suslained in-
|uiies fiom nieaims. One policeman was killed, 3 weie seiiously in|uied,
and 125 suslained minoi in|uiies. A slale of emeigency was declaied
and waves of aiiesls ensued in lhe following monlhs and even yeais. The
demands of lhe demonslialois weie manifold, wilh no cleaily denned
plalfoim. Moslly, lhey ielaled lo economic, social, and polilical issues.
The piolesleis in facl piesenled a mixluie of vaiious, oflen conliadic-
loiy, ideas and slogans, which ianged fiom calls foi lhe impiovemenl of
social and economic condilions, lo demands foi an independenl Kosovo
oi unincalion wilh Albania, lo piaise foi lhe Albanian leadei Invei
Hoxha.11
The ugoslav public weie unawaie of lhe evenls laking place in
Kosovo excepl foi lhe scanl accounls piovided by lhe slale-conliolled
media. n facl, lhe public leained aboul lhe oulcome and lhe bloodshed
only aflei lhe demonslialions had been ciushed. The piesidenl of lhe
socialisl ugoslavia, 1osip Bioz Tilo, whose undispuled aulhoiily had
managed lo miligale elhnic lensions duiing his absolulisl iule, had been
dead foi a yeai when lhe piolesls bioke oul, and lhe ugoslav commu-
nisl eslablishmenl was nol yel piepaied lo addiess inlei-elhnic ielalions
in a way lhal would signincanlly depail fiom communisl ideology. The
aulhoiilies chose lo desciibe lhe evenls as counlei-ievolulionaiy,`` lhe
mosl damning epilhel in lhe communisl vocabulaiy. Iuilheimoie, by
46 THI KOSO\O CRSS
|udicious seleclion of lhe Albanian demands iepoiled in lhe ugoslav
media, highlighling only slogans calling foi a Republic of Kosovo`` and
unincalion wilh lhe Albania of Invei Hoxha, lhe aulhoiilies weie able
lo |uslify lheii policy in Kosovo and, consequenlly, lhe use of foice, as a
legilimale defence of conslilulional oidei. Similaily, lhe aulhoiilies
idenlined`` as one of lhe culpiils of lhe uniesl lhe exleinal enemy`` of
Hoxha.
Albanian ofnceis seiving in lhe ugoslav Aimy and Albanian aca-
demics al Piislina \niveisily weie soon singled oul as advocales of pio-
sciibed ideas and as being iesponsible foi leading lhe young asliay.``
n lhe following monlhs and yeais, ciuel foims of slale iepiession and
human iighls violalions ensued.12 n 1988, Rahman Moiina, Kosovo`s
minislei of lhe inleiioi, piesenled lo lhe Kosovo pailiamenl a iepoil lhal
slaled lhal in lhe peiiod belween 1981 and 1988 lhe police and couils had
deall wilh almosl 6OO,OOO people (neaily a lhiid of Kosovo`s enliie pop-
ulalion) as pail of lhe sliuggle againsl Albanian nalionalism. Of lhis
numbei, 22,OOO weie senlenced lo belween 2 and 14 yeais` impiisonmenl
undei Ailicles 114 and 133 of lhe Ciiminal Code, which peilained lo
ciimes of opinion.13 The chaiges weie pioseculed wilh lhe coopeialion of
lhe Kosovo Albanian communisl eslablishmenl, who slill pledged loyally
lo lhe idea of ugoslavism wilh ils calch-phiase of biolheihood and
unily.`` They weie suppoiled in lhis by a piedominanlly Albanian local
police foice.
n lhe mid-198Os, lhe Kosovo issue was slill a ugoslav pioblem. n
economic leims, Kosovo was lhe pooiesl iegion of lhe socialisl ugoslavia
and consumed vasl iesouices lhiough lhe Iedeial Iund foi lhe Devel-
opmenl of \ndeideveloped Regions. Despile iapid indusliializalion of
lhe piovince, inveslmenls did nol yield adequale economic iesulls. Wilh
lhe highesl biilh iale in Iuiope, lhe piovince also had lhe highesl iale of
unemploymenl and lhe highesl numbei of dependanls pei household.14
The iiols in Kosovo weie aimed, among olhei lhings, al highlighling lhe
issue of economic and social inequalily wilhin lhe piovince as well as
wilhin lhe foimei ugoslavia as a whole. Aflei lhe iiols weie ciushed,
lhe silualion was consideied slable`` by lhe fedeial aulhoiilies. How-
evei, by focusing solely on lhe ideological demands called foi al lhe
demonslialions (demands lhal Kosovo be given lhe slalus of a iepublic)
as well as lhe means lo slienglhen biolheihood and unily`` in lhe mulli-
elhnic enviionmenl, lhe fedeial aulhoiilies failed lo addiess lhe buining
social issues. Wilh lhe pioblems sidelined bul nol iesolved, lhe disconlenl
of bolh Seibs and Albanians inlensined bul iemained suppiessed. The
punishmenls meled oul lo lhousands of Kosovo Albanians affecled a veiy
laige numbei of people in a culluie wilh liadilionally laige families and a
sliong sense of exlended family.
While lhe puiges in lhe paily ianks conlinued, some Kosovo Albanian
ofncials voiced lhe nisl, lenlalive ciilicism of lhe developing liend,
waining lhal lhe aiiesl and impiisonmenl of young people mighl be
counleipioduclive in lhe long iun`` and cieale even moie disliusl and a
giealei sense of insecuiily. ndeed, lhe Albanian communily incieasingly
fell disciiminaled againsl. Theie was, moieovei, a sliong cuiienl of
lhoughl lhal lhe libeilies lhal lhey had acquiied in lhe 1974 Conslilulion
weie being eioded and lhal lhe slalus of Albanians was giadually slipping
back lo lhal of lhe Rankovic eia.15 These feais iesulled in loudei and
moie peisislenl demands foi lhe pieseivalion of aulonomy and lalei
weie giadually liansfoimed inlo a call foi independence, in olhei woids
foi Kosovo lo become lhe sevenlh iepublic of lhe incieasingly decen-
lialized fedeialion.
Iqually dissalisned wilh lhe silualion, allhough foi enliiely diffeienl
ieasons, weie lhe Kosovo Seibs. The 1974 conslilulional changes had
alleied elhnic iepiesenlalion in public seivices and slale-owned com-
panies in favoui of lhe Albanians. Seibs, bolh in Kosovo and in Seibia
piopei, especially lhose in academic ciicles, had nevei liuly ieconciled
lhemselves lo lhe loss of lhe Seibian supiemacy in Kosovo. Al lhe lime
lhe Conslilulion was diafled, a numbei of leading Seibian ofncials ciili-
cized lhe amendmenls on lhe giounds lhal Seibia`s conslilulional posi-
lion would be unlenable. They aigued lhal piovinces wilh a high degiee
of aulonomy weie, in iealily, slales wilhin a slale, as lhey had lhe iighl
of velo nol only in Seibia bul also in lhe fedeialion. The facl lhal lhe
piovinces had a voice in lhe Seibian pailiamenl while Seibia was unable
lo inuence lhe decisions of lhe piovincial assemblies was consideied
pailiculaily odious. Howevei, such ciilics weie piomplly accused of
nalionalism and weie ieplaced by Seibian appaialchiks who weie pie-
paied lo suppoil lhe changes. Despile lhis, lhe sense lhal Seibia had been
wionged iemained. This senlimenl lay doimanl foi almosl a decade, only
lo ieappeai on lhe Seibian agenda wilh full foice in lhe mid-198Os. l was
exaceibaled by iepoils of Albanians piovoking and haiassing Seibs in
Kosovo, who slailed lo migiale lo Seibia piopei. As lhe migialion of
Seibs and Monlenegiins acceleialed, il began lo be alliibuled lo polilical,
ialhei lhan economic, molivalions.16
Seibian complainls giew evei loudei: lhe e migie accounls lhal ieached
lhe piess in lhe mid-198Os assumed lhe dimensions of a Gieek liagedy.
The lisl of ieasons ciled foi lhe migialion included haiassmenl,`` vio-
lalion of piopeily and desliuclion of ciops,`` bealings,`` and even iape
on elhnic giounds.`` The sleady depailuie of Seibs fiom Kosovo pio-
vided lhe buigeoning Seibian nalionalism wilh a |uslincalion: lhe Seibian
people weie undei lhieal and il was lhe elevenlh houi foi lheii defence.
Meanwhile, ofncials wilhin lhe Slovenian and Cioalian eslablishmenl
48 THI KOSO\O CRSS
weie pushing foi a ie-evalualion of policies on Kosovo. Libeial ciicles
began lo addiess lhe abuse of lhe human iighls of Kosovo Albanians.
Allhough ciilicism of lhe policy on polilical piisoneis and suggeslions
lhal il be ie-examined came in a veiy mild foim, lhey weie inleipieled
among lhe Seibian public as yel anolhei pioof lhal Seibia was mis-
undeislood and was being un|uslly hindeied in ils allempls lo pievenl lhe
exodus of Seibian people fiom lheii sacied land. Anylhing lhal appeaied
lo be pio-Albanian was immedialely inleipieled as being anli-Seibian.
The Cioalian and Slovenian leadeiships weie accused of aligning lhem-
selves wilh lhe sepaialisls`` and iiiedenlisls.``
A wai of woids began, bul lhe Seibian communisl leadeis iefiained
fiom conliibuling lo lhe discoid. The escalalion of uniesl was lefl lo
bodies oulside lhe goveinmenl: lhe Seibian Oilhodox Chuich, lhe Asso-
cialion of Seibian Wiileis, and, mosl vehemenl of all, lhe Seibian Acad-
emy of Ails and Sciences, which in 1986 published ils Memoiandum,`` a
documenl lhal was inlended lo piovide ideological guidelines foi solving
lhe Seibian queslion.`` This documenl alleged lhal lhe adoplion of lhe
1974 Conslilulion had been a conlinualion of Cioalian and Slovenian
Seibophobia.`` The souices of lhe escalaling disconlenl and even paia-
noia in Seibia can be calegoiized inlo seveial gioups of allegalions: (a)
lhe 1974 Conslilulion iesulled in polilical and economic disciiminalion
againsl Seibs wilhin ugoslavia; (b) Seibs weie denied lhe iighl and lhe
possibilily of deleimining lheii own nalional inleiesls; (c) Kosovo Alba-
nians had giealei minoiily iighls lhan any olhei nalional minoiily in
Iuiope yel weie slill dissalisned wilh lheii slalus and soughl lo secede
fiom Seibia and cieale a Giealei Albania, laking wilh lhem lhe ciadle
of Seibdom`` and Seibia`s sacied land``; (d) in oidei lo achieve lhal goal
lhe Albanians weie allempling lo cieale an elhnically puie Kosovo,``
using inslilulional and non-inslilulional foims of piessuie and disciimi-
nalion againsl Seibs, who weie eeing cn nassc; (e) lhe high biilh iale of
lhe Albanian populalion was nol a noimal chaiacleiislic of a backwaid
piovince, bul ialhei a delibeiale Albanian ploy lo oulnumbei lhe
Seibs.17
The Associalion of Seibian Wiileis followed suil. n a seiies of ailicles
published in ils |ouinal, Knji;cvnc novinc, celebialed aulhois look lo
poiliaying lhe silualion in Kosovo as lhe Seibian Golgolha and lhe ighl
of lhe Seibs as genocide piaclised by lhe Albanians. The Kosovo mylh,
which cenlies on memoiies of lhe Ballle of Kosovo in 1389, when Seibs
foughl lhe Olloman Impiie and losl, was also iesuscilaled, complele wilh
images of liagedy and enslavemenl. The |ouinal also ievived inleiesl in
lhe sevenleenlh-cenluiy exodus of Seibs fiom lheii anceslial homes,
which weie mainly in Kosovo. The Gieal Migialion, as lhis evenl is
known in Seibian hisloiy, followed yel anolhei defeal of lhe Seibs al lhe
hands of lhe Olloman Impiie. Ieaiing ielalialion by lhe Tuiks, lhou-
sands of people moved noilh, led by Paliiaich Aiseni|e Caino|evic, lhe
Seibian Moses.18 The Kosovo mylh piovided lhe inlelligenlsia of Seibia
wilh a full calalogue of lools foi nalional homogenizalion. These included
lhe image of lhe clash of civilizalions`` biave Seibian iesislance againsl
lhe baibaiic Olloman hoides and a full iange of heioes and liailois.
el nisl and foiemosl was lhe cleai message lhal il was bellei lo die in
ballle lhan lo live in shame. This allowed lhe Seibs lo develop an image
of lhemselves as viclims oi even mailyis, which was convenienlly ie-
infoiced by lhe memoiy of lhe exodus in 169O. This was pailiculaily im-
poilanl in building a sense of shaied fale inlo lhe colleclive conscious-
ness, wilh lhe inleiesls of lhe nalion laking piecedence ovei lhose of lhe
individual. Many a Seib inlelleclual, sociologisl, demogiaphei, and wiilei
volunleeied a conliibulion lo lhe building of nalional unily, al lhe cosl of
vilifying lhe Albanians.
As lhe Seibian nalionalisl consciousness giew, so loo did lhe ood of
demands lo biing a hall lo lhe alleged Albanian oppiession of lhe Seibian
communily in Kosovo. Two hundied and lwelve piominenl inlellecluals
fiom Seibia signed a pelilion lo lhe pailiamenls of Seibia and lhe fedei-
alion. These condemned ofncial indiffeience`` lo lhe genocide of lhe
Seibian people in Kosovo and demanded a change in lhe conslilulion.
The Associalion of Seibian Wiileis slaged piolesl meelings in suppoil of
lhe Kosovo Seibs al ils headquaileis in Belgiade wheie poems and olhei
lileialuie weie ieciled. These gloiined Seibian hisloiy and emphasized
lhe impoilance of Kosovo in pieseiving lhe Seib nalional idenlily. Those
same inlellecluals who had once been model aclivisls in piomoling civil
libeilies lhioughoul lhe foimei ugoslavia and who wiole pelilions foi
lhe ielease of polilical piisoneis, iegaidless of lheii nalionalily, became
complelely blind when lhe iighls of Kosovo Albanians weie being
abused.19 n facl, some of lhe besl-known Seibian aulhois depicled
Albanians in iacisl leims as baibaiic villains,`` cold-blooded iapisls,``
indocliinaled Seibophobes,`` and masleis of hypociisy.`` Seib and
Monlenegiin piolesl iallies weie oiganized in Kosovo and similai evenls
in Belgiade soon followed. Kosovo Seibs and Monlenegiins called foi
lhe diiecl pioleclion of lhe iepublic and lhe fedeialion. n lhe face of
incieasingly sliidenl allegalions ovei lhe silualion in Kosovo, lhe Seibian
leadeiship looked impolenl and ineffeclive.20
As lhe Albanian nalionalisl movemenl began lo calm down, |usl befoie
lhe haid-line faclion of lhe Seibian communisls look lhe silualion of
Seibs in Kosovo inlo ils own hands, lhe anli-Albanian almospheie in
Seibia ieached boiling poinl. This hysleiia was diiven by allegalions oc-
cuiiing almosl on a daily basis of widespiead iape of Seibian women by
Albanian men. These allegalions, in luin, shaped lhe opinion lhal lhese
5O THI KOSO\O CRSS
ciimes weie peipelialed as a delibeiale acl and as pail of a laigei geno-
cidal slialegy of lhe Kosovo Albanians. n such a holhouse almospheie,
emolions held sway ovei facls. ndeed, conliaiy lo lhe allegalions, slalis-
lics show lhal lhe iale of inlei-elhnic iape was signincanlly lowei lhan lhe
iale of iape wilhin elhnic gioups and lhal lhe oveiall numbei of iapes in
Kosovo was in any case lowei lhan lhal in lhe fedeialion oveiall.21
Seibian paianoia peaked in Seplembei 1987 when one Aziz Kelmendi,
an Albanian consciipl in lhe ugoslav Aimy, wenl beiseik in his bai-
iacks and, aflei gunning down foui fellow soldieis and wounding six
olheis, commilled suicide. Only one of lhe viclims was a Seib and lhe
olheis iepiesenled almosl all nalionalilies in ugoslavia, bul lhe incidenl
was seen as an explicilly anli-Seibian acl.22 The Seibian media began
a cacophony of anli-Albanian piopaganda. Windows weie smashed in
Albanian businesses lhioughoul Seibia as well as in Macedonia and
Monlenegio. Seibia was on lhe move.
Thal same yeai a leadei emeiged who was lo help lhe masses lo shiug
off feai and insecuiily and iesloie lhe dignily of lhe Seibian nalion, a
leadei who would meel lhe expeclalions of lhe populisl movemenl and
iemedy all in|uslice. Slobodan Milosevic was chaiiman of lhe Communisl
League of Seibia when he announced lhal unceilainly ovei Kosovo
would be bioughl lo an end. n Apiil 1987, Seibs and Monlenegiins
demonslialing in Kosovo lhiealened lo maich on Belgiade and lo clash
wilh lhe piedominanlly Albanian police wilhin Kosovo. Milosevic ad-
diessed lhe piolesleis. No one has lhe iighl lo beal you,`` he lold lhem.
A ielalively small ciowd heaid lhese woids, deliveied in Kosovo Pol|e on
lhe oulskiils of Piislina, bul lhe message iesonaled lhioughoul Seibia.
l enlhioned him as a Czai,`` said Kosovo Seib leadei Miioslav Solevic.23
As soon as Milosevic iose lo absolule powei, in Seplembei 1987, he
began lo puige lhe polilical enviionmenl. Like 1anus, Milosevic had lwo
polilical faces. He launched a lwo-pionged allack, deslioying his polilical
enemies on one side while gaining as much polilical suppoil as possible
on lhe olhei. He was lalei lo use lhis suppoil foi lhe wai effoil lhiough-
oul lhe foimei ugoslavia. Wilh a heavy emphasis on ideological oilho-
doxy and a campaign lo disciedil lhe libeials, Milosevic quickly won
suppoil among lhe decision makeis in lhe Aimy. Slienglhening lhe
slale`s giip on viilually all Seibian media, he kepl populai allenlion
focused on elhnic issues, fuilhei bolsleiing lhe nalional idenlily wilh lhe
docliine of homogenizalion. Wilh lhis docliine he won ovei lhe anli-
communisl Seib nalionalisl inlelligenlsia. Thiough a combinalion of piess
conliol, oicheslialed mass iallies,24 and skilful polilical manoeuviing,
Milosevic kepl public opinion convinced lhal lhe Kosovo Seibs weie
viclims of genocide by lhe elhnic Albanian ma|oiily populalion, who
weie allempling lo diive lhe Seibs oul of lhe piovince wilh iape and lhe
desecialion of Seib giaves and medieval monumenls. The lolal vilinca-
lion of lhe Albanians was necessaiy foi lhis aigumenl lo be sufncienlly
convincing. Addilionally, Seibian slale-conliolled media indulged in
open wai-mongeiing and iacism.25 Bul lhe Seibian public weie alieady
piedisposed lo lhis poinl of view. Moie impoilanlly, Milosevic convinced
lhe public lhal he was lhe man of lhe momenl, lhe man who could iediess
in|uslice and delivei change, lhe man who could abolish lhe aulonomy of
Kosovo and \o|vodina:
We enleied bolh woild wais wilh nolhing bul lhe conviclion lhal we would nghl
foi fieedom, and we won bolh wais . . . We will win lhe ballle of Kosovo, despile
lhe obslacles facing us inside and oulside lhe counliy. We will win despile lhe facl
lhal Seibia`s enemies oulside lhe counliy aie plolling againsl il, along wilh lhose
wilhin lhe counliy. We aie lelling lhem lhal we go inlo eveiy ballle . . . wilh lhe
aim of winning.26
The libeialion`` of Kosovo was pioclaimed, wilh heavy emphasis on ils
Seibian chaiaclei. The masses gieeled Milosevic wilh such slogans as
Kosovo is lhe Seibian soul,`` Kosovo, lhe Seibian Holy Land,`` We
won`l lel go of Kosovo,`` Aim us`` and Aiiesl \llasi.``27
f lhe speech in Kosovo Pol|e was Milosevic`s enlhionemenl, his ap-
peaiance al lhe same place foi a ceiemony celebialing lhe six hundiedlh
anniveisaiy of lhe Ballle of Kosovo was his coionalion. Milosevic aiiived
in a helicoplei, like an ancienl divinily descending fiom heaven, and look
lhe podium befoie hundieds of lhousands of people caiiying symbols
fiom lhe nalional and ieligious iconogiaphy:
Thioughoul lheii hisloiy Seibs have nevei conqueied oi exploiled olheis. . . . The
heioism of Kosovo will nol peimil us lo foigel lhal al one lime we weie biave and
dignined and among lhe veiy few who wenl inlo ballle undefealed. . . . Six cen-
luiies lalei we aie again involved in ballles and squabbles. They aie nol aimed
ballles, allhough such a lhing should nol yel be iuled oul.28
Wilh lhis ially, Slobodan Milosevic`s Kosovo cycle`` was complele.
Now eveiylhing was in place foi lhe oveilhiow of lhe piovincial leadei-
ships. The Seibian Assembly nisl adopled lhe Piogiamme foi lhe Al-
lainmenl of Peace, Iieedom, Iqualily and Piospeiily in lhe Aulonomous
Piovince of Kosovo.``29 The piogiamme inlioduced legislalion allowing
Seibia nol only lo usuip lhe fedeialion`s funclions in Kosovo bul also vii-
lually lo abolish lhe aulonomy of all Kosovo inslilulions. All of lhis was
in conliavenlion of lhe ugoslav Conslilulion. The Seibian lake-ovei
was complele. The Albanians iose in piolesl and again lhe Aimy inlei-
vened. n lhe ensuing conicl, 24 Albanian demonslialois weie killed
52 THI KOSO\O CRSS
and hundieds aiiesled.30 Al lhe same lime Seibs ooded lhe squaies of
lowns lhioughoul lhe iepublic, celebialing lhe unincalion of Seibia.
Iiom lhis poinl on, lhe Milosevic iegime and lhe Seibian public al laige
iegaided a policy of iepiession and disciiminalion as enliiely appiopiiale
foi Kosovo. The de faclo apailheid foiced lhe elhnic Albanian commu-
nily lo lhe maigins of social and economic oiganizalion, leading lhem
giadually lo eslablish lheii own paiallel inslilulions. Milosevic was iiding
high on a wave of Seib nalionalism. He now channelled lhal eneigy inlo
lhe issue of Seibs oulside Seibia, in olhei woids inlo ciealing lhe conicl
in Cioalia and BosniaHeizegovina.
The lack of demociacy in lhe fedeial inslilulions may have played a iole
in lhe deleiioialion of SeibAlbanian ielalions, bul il does nol explain
how elhnic animosily escalaled inlo aimed conicl. n facl il affecled only
ceilain elemenls of lhe Kosovo equalion in lhe eailiesl slage of develop-
menl. The policy of iepiession in Kosovo was ciealed by Seibian inlel-
lecluals wilh lhe collaboialion of viilually all impoilanl seclois of Seib
sociely. These playeis paved lhe ioad foi lhe nalionalisl movemenl. The
explosion of Seibian nalionalism was nol ciealed by Milosevic bul meiely
ieinfoiced by him. The Seibian nalion, howevei, once il became pie-
occupied wilh ils own image as exclusively a viclim, was pievenled fiom
acknowledging lhe giievances of any olhei elhnic gioup.
Neilhei wai noi peace
The abiogalion of Kosovo`s aulonomy and ils ieplacemenl by absolule
dominalion by lhe piovince`s Seibian minoiily weie followed by inslilu-
lionalized disciiminalion againsl lhe Albanians. This was embodied in a
seiies of legal acls, valid only on lhe leiiiloiy of Kosovo, which depiived
Kosovo Albanians of many basic human iighls. They included lhe Acl on
Laboui Relalions \ndei Special Ciicumslances, lhe Iducalion Acl, and
lhe Acl Resliicling Real Islale Tiansaclions.31 As a iesull, of 17O,OOO
Albanians employed in lhe public secloi, 115,OOO weie dismissed.32 The
Iducalion Acl viilually expelled almosl half a million young Albanians
fiom lhe slale educalion syslem.33 The adminislialive measuies weie
enfoiced by a sliong police piesence. Aibiliaiy pioseculions ensued,
usually on lhe giounds of suppiessing leiioiism`` and iaids on weapons
caches.``34 Thousands of Albanians lefl Kosovo and soughl polilical asy-
lum and woik in lhe counliies of Weslein Iuiope. The Seibian aulhoi-
ilies |uslined lheii policies by claiming lhal Albanians, even depiived of
lheii pievious subslanlial aulonomy, slill en|oyed abundanl minoiily
iighls by inleinalional slandaids. The leim minoiily`` was undeislood as
lhe numbei of Albanians in lhe oveiall populalion of Seibia. Bul lhe
leim ilself, and lhe slalus implied by il, nevei salisned lhe Albanians,
who claimed lhal almosl 2 million people occupying a leiiiloiy wilh
denned boideis wilhin which lhey compiised almosl 9O pei cenl of lhe
populalion deseived lo be iecognized as a nalion, which would guaianlee
lhem lhe iighl of self-deleiminalion. Wheieas Kosovo Albanians accounl
foi almosl 4O pei cenl of lhe lolal numbei of Albanians in lhe Balkans,
lhe aigumenl goes, Kosovo Seibs compiise less lhan 1.5 pei cenl of all
Seibs in lhe Balkans.35
The Kosovo issue disappeaied fiom lhe Seibian polilical agenda as lhe
conicl moved weslwaid, wheie lhe Seibs began lo acquiie, by lhe use of
foice, lhe veiy same iighls lhey had denied lhe Albanians. The iegime
was allempling lo oblain foi Seibs oulside Seibia lhe iighls lhey weie
beginning lo demand. Meanwhile, lhe lwo communilies in Kosovo giew
even fuilhei apail, connned wilhin lhe boideis of lheii paiallel iealilies.
Ioi quile a while lhe Albanians exeicised a maximum of self-iesliainl by
iefiaining fiom iesponding lo lhe oppiession wilh any show of violence.
The Seibian aulhoiilies believed lhal lhe silualion, which was desciibed
as closei lo wai lhan lo peace, was suslainable. n shoil, bolh Seibia
and lhe inleinalional communily iegaided lhe Kosovo silualion as dan-
geious bul slable.``
The 1995 peace lalks in Daylon, Ohio, which bioughl lhe wai in
BosniaHeizegovina lo an end, weie walched closely by lhe Albanians,
who weie looking foi ways in which lhe inleinalional communily mighl
also iesolve lhe conicl in Kosovo. The piovisions of lhe Accoids sup-
poiled lhe de faclo paililion of Bosnia on elhnic lines and piovided foi
lhe iesulling enlilies lo eslablish special ielalions`` wilh Seibia and
Cioalia.36 The Albanians iegaided lhe peace deal as bolh cynical and
piomising. f lhe Bosnian Seibs could win lheii own iepublic wilhin
Bosnia lhiough wai, why weie Albanians expecled lo loleiale lheii slalus
in Kosovo, depiived of even lhe smallesl degiee of aulonomy? n olhei
woids, lhe iadicals in lhe Albanian communily, who believed il iighl
and piopei lo nghl foi fieedom and soveieignly iegaidless of cosl, weie
encouiaged.37 The Daylon Peace Accoids lhus ieecled an inleiesling
paiadox: as soon as lhe peace was signed, lhe Seibian public foigol aboul
lhe Bosnian Seib issue and ieluined lo lheii own pioblems, which did
nol, al lhe lime, include lhe Kosovo issue. The Albanians, on lhe olhei
hand, began lo diaw conclusions of lheii own fiom lhe implicalions of lhe
peace deal.
l is impossible lo deleimine lhe exlenl lo which lhe Daylon Accoids
piompled a seclion of lhe Albanian communily lo begin challenging lhe
slalus quo piomoled by biahim Rugova, lhe piesidenl of lhe self-slyled
54 THI KOSO\O CRSS
Republic of Kosovo, and lo whal exlenl lhe Accoids weie iesponsible
foi lhe emeigence of lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy (KLA) as a mililaiy-
polilical foice. The insuigence piobably iesulled fiom lhe inleiplay of
vaiious polilical cuiienls and coincidences, lhe long duialion of lhe low-
inlensily conicl being one of lhem. Whal is ceilain, howevei, is lhal
Daylon conliibuled lo a veiy lenlalive lhawing of ielalions. Piompled by
Daylon`s insislence on lhe impiovemenl of human iighls in Kosovo as a
condilion foi lifling lhe oulei wall of sanclions, Milosevic signed a Mem-
oiandum of \ndeislanding (lhe Iducalion Agieemenl) wilh Rugova in
Seplembei 1996.38 Whalevei piogiess may have iesulled fiom lhis nisl,
caulious signal of goodwill fiom lhe Seibian iegime, il was doomed lo
failuie. n lhe winlei of 1996j97, Seibia was engulfed wilhoul waining in
opposilion piolesls ovei eleclion fiaud. Ioi almosl 9O days lhe sludenls
and cilizens of Seibia maiched in eveiy ma|oi cenlie, demanding lhal lhe
fiaudulenl eleclion iesulls be ieclined and lhe opposilion vicloiy in local
eleclions be iecognized. Howevei, lhe demands of lhe demonslialois, led
by lhe Za|edno (Togelhei) opposilion coalilion, slopped shoil of de-
manding moie subslanlial polilical and economic changes in Seibia. Once
Milosevic was foiced lo acknowledge lhe opposilion vicloiy in ceilain
elecloial disliicls, lhe coalilion began lo fall apail, ievealing deep iifls
and a decided lack of logelheiness. Milosevic exploiled lhe opposilion`s
weaknesses, consolidaled his powei, and piepaied foi piesidenlial elec-
lions in lhe aulumn of 1997. Thus lhe winlei of 1996j97, which saw one of
lhe giealesl evei displays of civic couiage and which had lhe polenlial lo
iniliale a piofound democialic liansfoimalion of Seibia, had lillle effecl
on lhe hoiiendous couise of evenls lhal followed. n facl, fiom eaily in
1997 unlil lhe beginning of lhe NATO inleivenlion, Seibia was once
again consumed by iadicalizalion.39 Again, lhe Kosovo issue played a
ciucial iole in lhis piocess.
The wai comes home
As lhe Kosovo uniesl escalaled and aimed incidenls became moie fie-
quenl, lhe old feelings of Seibian insecuiily sliiied afiesh. n lhe shadow
of an all-oul aimed conicl, neilhei lhe iuling paily noi lhe opposilion
was willing lo woik lowaid lhe noimalizalion of ielalions in Kosovo.
Milosevic and his paily had been lhiusl inlo powei by lheii uncompiomis-
ing and biulal policy on Kosovo and laking a new angle on lhe Kosovo
queslion could only lead lo polilical suicide. The opposilion also shied
away fiom lhe polilical dangeis of a iappiochemenl wilh lhe Kosovo
Albanian leadeiship. Some even look a haidei line lhan Milosevic.40
Duiing lhe wais in Slovenia, Cioalia, and BosniaHeizegovina a con-
sideiable anli-wai movemenl among some Seibian opposilion pailies
emeiged. Howevei, lhe iegime`s aclivilies in Kosovo won lacil appioval
fiom lhe olhei side of lhe polilical fence. ndeed, lhe Kosovo policy was
widely iegaided as legilimale measuies by lhe Seibian aulhoiilies foi
lhe suppiession of leiioiism and sepaialism,`` even when lhese measuies
included massacies and ielalialion againsl Albanian civilians. Again lhe
Albanians, by defaull, became leiioiisls`` and sepaialisls,`` while lhe
giievances of lhe Kosovo Seibs weie conslanlly emphasized.
Ivenls soon spiialled oul of conliol and lhe Dienica massacie in
Maich 1998 dispelled any illusion lhal aimed conicl could be avoided.41
l also signalled lhal Albanian palience wilh lhe peaceful laclics favouied
by Rugova was seiiously dwindling.42 n facl, lhe KLA began laking a
moie asseilive iole, exaceibaling lhe conicl. As a iesull, lhe casuallies
piled up on bolh sides. Aflei Dienica, howevei, lhe Kosovo issue was
iiievocably inleinalionalized. The Conlacl Gioup demanded lhe wilh-
diawal of Seibian special police unils and uiged Milosevic lo implemenl
lhe Iducalion Agieemenl and begin a dialogue wilh lhe appiopiiale
iepiesenlalives of lhe Kosovo Albanian communily. The inleinalional
communily also lhiealened lo ie-impose sanclions. Despile such pies-
suie, allempls lo eslablish a dialogue failed because lhe Seibian side
iefused lo include self-deleiminalion on lhe agenda. Iuilheimoie, lhe
Seibian aulhoiilies slubboinly iesisled any suggeslion of medialion by
lhe inleinalional communily.43 Despile lhis, wilh lhe wai in Kosovo
escalaling, Milosevic was foiced, undei lhieal of NATO inleivenlion, lo
accepl lhe piesence of lhe Oiganizalion foi Secuiily and Co-opeialion in
Iuiope (OSCI) \eiincalion Mission in Kosovo.44 Appalled by subse-
quenl massacies (Racak) and lhe ow of iefugees inlo neighbouiing
counliies and feaiing a spillovei fiom lhe Kosovo wai, lhe Conlacl
Gioup scheduled negolialions in Iebiuaiy al Chaleau Rambouillel in
Iiance. Negolialions weie piesenled on a lake il oi leave il`` basis. Bolh
sides weie offeied a plan lhal would guaianlee subslanlial aulonomy, bul
nol independence, lo lhe elhnic Albanians and piovide foi lhe demili-
laiizalion of lhe KLA. The pioposal fuilhei envisaged an inleinalional
mililaiy piesence`` lo supeivise implemenlalion of lhe piovisions. The
Seib negolialois weie lold explicilly lhal iefusal lo sign would iesull in
mililaiy inleivenlion by NATO. Aflei lhe Rambouillel lalks bioke down,
wilh bolh sides unwilling lo sign lhe agieemenl, negolialions iesumed in
Paiis. A cuisoiy glance al coveiage of lhe lalks on Seibian slale lelevi-
sion al lhe lime would be sufncienl lo piedicl lhal lhe lalks weie bound
lo fail. Mass iallies weie again slaged, while one message iesonaled
lhioughoul Seibia: Kosovo is Seibia! We won`l give up soveieignly ovei
an inch of il!`` Again lhe image of Seibs as innocenl viclims was invoked.
56 THI KOSO\O CRSS
Only lhe Kosovo Albanian delegalion agieed lo lhe pioposal and NATO
was foiced lo make good ils lhieal. nleivenlion began on 24 Maich 1999.
The Seibian delegalion al Rambouillel was ieady lo sign lhe deal. The pioof is in
a lellei fiom lhe delegalion head lo lhe lioika of inleinalional medialois lhal
slaled lhe ieadiness of lhe Seibian side lo accepl an inleinalional piesence in
Kosovo. Whal happened lalei is a mallei foi hisloiians. Bul il is obvious lhal
someone in Belgiade decided lo change couise.45
Whal will conlinue lo puzzle hisloiians, polilical analysls, and diplomals
is nol who made lhal decision bul why. The possibilily lhal Milosevic was
unawaie of NATO`s deleiminalion lo bomb and hoped foi a lasl-minule
solulion musl be iuled oul, because emissaiies and NATO geneials made
suie lhal lhe lhieal of foice was unambiguous lhis lime. His only miscal-
culalion ielaled lo lhe campaign mighl have been his belief lhal lhe
inleivenlion would cause gieal disunily wilhin lhe Alliance, which would,
in luin, lead lo lhe cuilailmenl of lhe campaign. A moie puzzling elemenl
of lhe equalion, howevei, is why Milosevic, aflei 72 days of dealh and
desliuclion, agieed lo a pioposal, bioughl by Russian Invoy \ikloi
Cheinomyidin and Iinnish Piesidenl Maaili Ahlisaaii, lhal was much
less favouiable lhan lhe one on offei in Rambouillel.46 Moieovei, lhe
Milosevic who agieed lo accepl lhe condilions of lhe pioposal was no
longei lhe guaianloi of peace and slabilily in lhe Balkans,`` as he had
long been seen in Weslein diplomalic ciicles. He was now a wai ciimes
suspecl indicled by lhe Hague Tiibunal.
The NATO inleivenlion did nol aveil humanilaiian calasliophe, as lhe
aii campaign did lillle lo piolecl civilians on lhe giound. Wilh no giound
lioops lo hindei il, lhe Milosevic iegime used Aimy, police, and paia-
mililaiy unils lo launch a hoiiinc campaign of leiioi, killings, and elhnic
cleansing in Kosovo. When il ended, 1O,OOO Albanians weie dead and
8OO,OOO weie iefugees.
n lieu of a conclusion
f lhe age-old divide belween lhe lwo communilies in Kosovo was widened
by lhe imposilion of absolule Seibian iule in 199O, lhe aliocilies com-
milled by lhe Seibian iegime duiing lhe NATO campaign appeai lo have
bioken all bonds beyond iepaii. The Seibian iegime has emeiged
bloodied bul unbowed. The mililaiy defeal was nol lolal, allowing Milo-
sevic lo use his uncanny skill al luining defeal inlo peisonal vicloiy. He
could, moieovei, now boasl lhal a liny nalion had slood up againsl lhe
woild`s mosl poweiful mililaiy alliance. He also had new examples lo
demonsliale lhe viclimizalion of Seibs. The elhnic Albanians have also
gained addilional exemplincalion of lheii slalus as viclims, as lhal same
mosl poweiful mililaiy alliance came lo lheii iescue on moial and hu-
manilaiian giounds.
This chaplei has allempled lo piesenl lhe dynamics of deleiioialing
SeibAlbanian ielalions, in lhe hope lhal lhis will poinl lo ways in which
lhey can be iepaiied and noimalized. n my appioach lo lhis issue have
allempled lo demonsliale lhal lhe piocess of self-viclimizalion was de-
veloped and consolidaled by nalionalisl mylh-making and piopaganda.
Thanks lo lhe liadilional lack of conlacl belween lhe lwo communilies,
lhis piopaganda was veiy effeclive, playing, as il did, on lhe misconcep-
lions of bolh Seib and Albanian publics. The diffeienl languages and
culluie of lhe lwo peoples ceilainly played an impoilanl iole in lhe facl
lhal elhnic Albanians and Seibs shaied lillle olhei lhan lhe leiiiloiy lhey
occupied. f lhis was liue in lhe eaily days of lheii cohabilalion, lillle was
done lo impiove mulual undeislanding. Iach side insisled on a peicep-
lion of hisloiy as an oscillaling dominalion by one oi lhe olhei side and
each claimed exclusive iighls and soveieignly ovei lhe same piece of
land. When lhese inleiesls came inlo conicl, lhe Kosovo knol began lo
lighlen lo lhe poinl wheie lhe only possible solulion seemed lo be lo cul
lhiough il. The lime had passed when il could be uniavelled.
This is nol lo say, howevei, lhal lhe conicl iesulled fiom lhe clash of
lwo nalionalisms; lhis would obscuie lhe diffeiences in lheii aclivilies.
Ioi almosl a decade, lhe Seibian nalionalisl movemenl held powei ovei
lhe leiiiloiy and, moie impoilanlly, showed ils ieadiness lo inicl dealh
and human suffeiing in demonslialing lhal powei. The Seibian nalional
consciousness slill has pioblems in linking cause lo effecl in lhe wais in
Cioalia and Bosnia, so il will nol be suipiising if some lime is needed
befoie il is ieconciled lo lhe facl lhal Seibian soveieignly ovei Kosovo no
longei exisls. l can be ieclaimed only by lhe use of foice bul, given lhe
cuiienl economic and mililaiy powei of Seibia on lhe one hand and lhe
slienglh of lhe KIOR giound lioops in lhe piovince on lhe olhei, lhis
scenaiio is lhe leasl likely. Thus lhe giassiools demociacy which has
again begun lo emeige lhioughoul Seibia since lhe lalesl mililaiy ad-
venluies of lhe Milosevic iegime ended in defeal should, as lhis chaplei
has endeavouied lo poinl oul, adopl a moie iesponsible peiceplion of
Seibia`s hisloiy and nalional idenlily, if lhe cycle of self-viclimizalion is
evei lo be bioken. Ioi lhis lo happen, Seibs musl slail building liuly
democialic inslilulions lhal will be piepaied lo examine nol only lhe
effecls of Milosevic`s iule bul also lhe ieason foi his conlinued polilical
success. Only lhen will Seibia cieale lhe condilions foi ils ieluin lo lhe
sociely of slales and ie-eslablish fiiendly ielalions wilh ils neighbouis,
Kosovo included.
58 THI KOSO\O CRSS
Acknowledgemenls
lhank Robeila Haai Duke foi helpful commenls on eailiei diafls of lhis
chaplei.
Noles
1. The iemaikable self-iesliainl demonslialed by lhe Albanians has oflen been compaied
wilh Gandhism. Ioi an excellenl analysis of lhe undeilying ieasons foi lhe Kosovo
Albanians` slialegy of non-violenl iesislance, see Shke lzen Maliqi, Self-undeislanding
of lhe Albanians in Non-violence,`` in Shke lzen Maliqi, Kosova. Scparatc VorlJs, Piis-
lina: MM, Dukag|ini, 1998, pp. 971O6.
2. The Daylon Peace Accoids menlion Kosovo only once, wilh iegaid lo lhe condilions foi
iemoving lhe oulei wall of sanclions`` peilaining lo full membeiship of inleinalional
inslilulions such as lhe \niled Nalions, lhe OSCI, lhe nleinalional Monelaiy Iund,
and lhe Woild Bank. The sanclions, say lhe Accoids, aie nol lo be lifled unlil lhe Sei-
bian aulhoiilies impiove lhe human iighls silualion in Kosovo and give full coopeialion
lo lhe nleinalional Wai Ciimes Tiibunal in The Hague. See also Sophia Cleme nl,
Conicl Pievenlion in lhe Balkans: Case Sludies of Kosovo and lhe IR of Mace-
donia,`` Chaillot Iapcr, No. 3O, nslilule foi Secuiily Sludies WI\, Paiis, Decembei
1997, pp. 4243. This chaplei will focus on lhe analysis of inleinal faclois ialhei lhan
inleinalional ones. The inleinalional faclois and lhe aclions of lhe inleinalional com-
munily vis-a` -vis lhe Kosovo conicl will be examined only in leims of lhe way lhey have
been peiceived in ugoslavia.
3. Denisa Koslovic, A Shaied Ieai,`` in Hclsinki Chartcr Bullctin oj thc Hclsinki Con-
nittcc jor Hunan Rights in Scrbia, special edilion on Kosovo, Belgiade, 1anuaiy 1999,
pp. 34.
4. n biief, lhe Seibs iegaid Kosovo as lhe hisloiical ciadle of lheii nalionhood. As lhe
polilical cenlie of lhe medieval empiie (in Piizien) and lhe Seibian Oilhodox Chuich
(in Pec), Kosovo is lhe home of many medieval Seibian monumenls and monasleiies.
On lhe olhei hand, lhe Albanians liace lheii oiigins back lo lhe llyiians who occupied
lhe Balkans long befoie lhe aiiival of lhe Soulhein Slavs. Kosovo was incoipoialed inlo
Seibia in 1912 as a pail of lhe Seibian wai effoil in lhe Balkan wais. Dusàn Balakovic,
The SeibianAlbanian Conicl: A hisloiical peispeclive,`` in Gei Du|izings, Dusàn
1an|ic, Shke lzen Maliqi, eds., Kosovo/a. Conjrontation or Cocxistcncc, Ni|megen: Peace
Reseaich Cenlie, \niveisily of Ni|megen, 1996, pp. 114. Ioi a ciilique of lhe nalional-
iomanlic appioach in Kosovo hisloiiogiaphy, see suf Beiisha, The Balkan Syndiome
of a Suiplus of Hisloiy`` in ibid., pp. 2933.
5. uoled in Iiic Hobsbawm, Nations anJ Nationalisn sincc 1780, Cambiidge: Cambiidge
\niveisily Piess, 199O, p. 12.
6. Dusàn 1an|ic, Nalional denlily, Movemenls and Nalionalism of Seibs and Albanians,``
in Dusàn 1an|ic and Shke lzen Maliqi, eds., Conict or Dialoguc. ScrbianAlbanian
Rclations anJ Intcgration oj thc Balkans, Subolica: Open \niveisily, 1994, p. 165.
7. \. P. Gagnon, 1i, Ilhnic Nalionalism and nleinalional Conicl: The Case of Seibia,``
Intcrnational Sccurity, \ol. 19, No. 3, Winlei 1994j95, pp. 164165.
8. This is nol lo suggesl lhal all Seibian inlellecluals iallied iound lhe nalionalisl ag.
A cuisoiy glance al lhe iefeiences in lhis chaplei will ieveal lhal a numbei of Seibian
inlellecluals signincanlly conliibuled lo lhe ciilical body of lileialuie, which conlesled
lhe ofncial veision of evenls.
9. vo Banac, ugoslavia: The Ieaiful Asymmeliy of Wai: The Causes and Con-
sequences of ugoslavia`s Demise,`` DacJalus, Spiing 1992, p. 143.
1O. As a poinl of depailuie, one could as well lake lhe Albanian demonslialions of 1968,
which piompled lhe conslilulional changes of 1974 by which Kosovo acquiied lhe slalus
of an aulonomous piovince wilhin Seibia. n facl il had lhe slalus of a fully-edged
fedeial unil, wilh lhe Kosovo Pailiamenl having lhe iighl of velo vis-a` -vis lhe Iedeial
Pailiamenl and lhe Piesidency of lhe foimei ugoslavia.`` See Shke lzen Maliqi, The
Albanian Movemenl in Kosova,`` in Maliqi, Scparatc VorlJs, p. 36. While lhese changes
weie pail of lhe piocess of decenlializalion of lhe foimei ugoslavia, lhe Seibs, by and
laige, iegaided lhese changes as un|usl`` and as an allempl lo ciipple Seibian inuence
in lhe Iedeialion.
11. Denisa Koslovic, Tii deceni|e kosovskih demosnliaci|a,`` Vrcnc, 2 and 9 Oclobei 1997.
12. Wilhin |usl a few monlhs, 21O leacheis and academics weie dismissed and 26O sludenls
banned fiom fuilhei educalion in secondaiy schools and al lhe univeisily. Anolhei
1,24O sludenls losl lheii scholaiships. Piison senlences aveiaging 7 yeais and ianging up
lo 12 oi even 15 yeais weie imposed. The ma|oiily of lhose impiisoned weie men and
women in lheii eaily lwenlies and lheii conviclions weie foi ciimes of opinion. Kos-
lovic, Tii deceni|e.``
13. Muhamedin Kullashi, The Pioduclion of Halied in Kosova (198191),`` in Du|izings,
1an|ic, and Maliqi, eds., Conjrontation or Cocxistcncc, p. 66.
14. Sid|an Bogosavl|evic, A Slalislical Picluie of SeibianAlbanian Relalions,`` in 1an|ic
and Maliqi, eds., Conict or Dialoguc, pp. 1729.
15. Aleksandai Rankovic was ugoslavia`s vice-piesidenl and de faclo head of lhe ugoslav
seciel police unlil Tilo oideied him inlo ieliiemenl in 1966. Because of his haid-line
slands and pailiculaily biulal policies in Kosovo in lhe yeais aflei lhe Second Woild
Wai, Rankovic was haled by Albanians. \nlike lhe Albanians in Albania, Kosovo
Albanians suppoiled Iascisl occupying foices because lhey hoped such foices would pul
an end lo Seibian dominalion. The iesislance lo lhe Pailisan movemenl was so haish
lhal lhe wai conlinued in Kosovo foi yeais aflei il had ofncially ended. Rankovic was in
chaige of combaling iiiedenlisl movemenls lheie and his punilive unils`` weie noloii-
ous foi lheii iulhlessness. Seibs, on lhe olhei hand, iemembeied Rankovic`s policy in
Kosovo wilh noslalgia. See Tim 1udah, Thc Scrbs. History, Myth anJ thc Dcstruction oj
Yugoslavia, New Haven, CT: ale \niveisily Piess, 1997, pp. 143144, 15O, 157.
16. Because no census has been laken in Kosovo since 1981, il is enoimously difncull lo pul
any kind of accuiale nguie on lhe exlenl of lhe migialions. Ob|eclive slalislics aie vii-
lually non-exislenl. l is even moie difncull lo assign molives lo lhe depailuie of Seibs
and Monlenegiins fiom Kosovo, pailiculaily molives ielaled lo vaiious foims of pies-
suie. One sludy which connims Seib emigialion fiom Kosovo as a iealily and idenlines
piessuie and disciiminalion fiom Albanians as lhe molive foi Seibs lo leave lhe aiea is
Maiina Blago|evic, The Olhei Side of lhe Tiulh: Migialions of Seibs fiom Kosovo,`` in
Du|izings, 1an|ic, and Maliqi, eds., Conjrontation or Cocxistcncc, pp. 7O81. The aulhoi,
howevei, acknowledges lhal lhe iealily was abused by lhe Seibian aulhoiilies foi
nalionalisl puiposes. A commission led by lhe Belgiade lawyei and civil iighls aclivisl
Sid|a Popovic pioduced a iepoil conlaining unbiased analysis which demonslialed as
false lhe claims lhal Seibs weie leaving Kosovo because of leiioi, iape, and genocide.
See Kosovski cvor. Jrcsiti ili scci? Belgiade: Chionos, 199O. Oveiall, isolaled cases of
piovocalion, combined wilh lucialive piices foi lhe puichase of Seibian and Monlene-
giin piopeily (lhe piice of piopeily in Kosovo land and houses was lwo oi lwo and a
half limes highei lhan in Seibia), made many Seibian families sel oul in lhe diieclion of
cenlial Seibia.
6O THI KOSO\O CRSS
17. Memoiandum SAN\`` (Memoiandum of lhe Seibian Academy of Ails and
Sciences``). Though lhe Academy claimed lhal lhe Memoiandum was nol an ofncial
documenl, il was signed by some of ils mosl piominenl membeis. The aclual wiilei was
Academician Dobiica Cosic, iegaided as lhe falhei of Seibian nalionalism,`` who lalei
became lhe nisl piesidenl of lhe piesenl ugoslavia. Ioi an excellenl analysis of lhe
iole of lhe Seibian Academy of Ails and Sciences in piomoling Seibian chauvinism, see
Oliveia Milosavl|evic, Zloupolieba auloiilela nauke,`` in Nebo|sa Popov, ed., Srpska
strana rata. taruna i katar;a u istorijskon panccnju, Belgiade: Republika, 1996, pp.
3O5338.
18. Ioi a neal illuslialion of lhe signincance of lhe Kosovo mylh and lhe Gieal Migialion``
foi modein polilical developmenls in Seibia, see 1udah, Thc Scrbs. Ioi an excellenl
analysis of lhe misinleipielalion of lhe Kosovo mylh, see Olga Ziio|evic, Kosovo u
isloii|skom pamcen|u,`` in Popov, ed., Srpska strana rata, pp. 2O1231.
19. On lhe iole of lhe once libeial and even dissidenl Associalion of Seibian Wiileis in
ciealing an oveihealed nalionalisl almospheie vis-a` -vis Kosovo in lhe mid-198Os and al
lhe beginning of lhe 199Os, see Diinka Go|kovic, Tiauma bez kalaize,`` in Popov, ed.,
Srpska strana rata, pp. 365393.
2O. The Kosovo Seibs who wenl lo Belgiade lo complain aboul lheii slalus and seek pio-
leclion weie used as living pioof lhal a genuine liagedy was occuiiing.
21. Kosovski cvor, p. 47. The iepoil concludes lhal lhe geneial ciime iale (including iape)
in lhe piovince was lowei lhan in olhei pails of lhe fedeialion and lhal lhe numbei of
ciiminal acls ciossing lhe communily line was in geneial lowei lhan lhe inlia-elhnic``
ciime iale.
22. 1udah, Thc Scrbs, p. 163.
23. uoled in Lauia Silbei and Allan Lillle, Thc Dcath oj Yugoslavia, London: Penguin,
1995, p. 37. We bioadcasl Milosevic`s speech on T\ ovei and ovei again. This is whal
launched him,`` said Dusàn Milevic, lhe lhen depuly diiecloi of T\ Belgiade. uoled in
Kosolovic, Thiee Decades,`` p. 26. Allhough il was widely believed lhal Milosevic`s
gesluie was wholly sponlaneous, il lalei became known lhal he had made a clandesline
liip lo Kosovo foui days eailiei lo piepaie lhe giound foi his giand appeaiance as a pail
of a plan lo ousl his polilical palion, lhe lhen chaiiman of lhe Seibian piesidency, van
Slambolic. See Silbei and Lillle, Thc Dcath oj Yugoslavia, p. 38.
24. Iiom lhe beginning of his iise lo powei, Milosevic used Seibs and Monlenegiins fiom
Kosovo as shock lioops`` lo inciease piessuie on lhe fedeial aulhoiilies by going lo
Belgiade and slaging fiequenl piolesl iallies, known as iallies of liulh.`` These piolesls
ciilicized lhe aulhoiilies foi failing lo meel lheii obligalion lo solve lhe Kosovo ciisis.
25. Ioi an excellenl analysis of hale-speech in lhe main Seibian daily Iolitika, see Kosovski
cvor, pp. 77131. The ieseaich idenlined fiequenl inslances of lhe Albanians being
poiliayed in geneial leims as beslial animals`` and as membeis of uncivilized hoides.``
26. Milosevic`s speech al lhe ially in Novembei 1988, quoled in 1udah, Thc Scrbs, p. 163. l
is inleiesling lo nole lhal Milosevic, feeling lhal he had alieady secuied nalional suppoil
in Seibia, senl a message lo olhei fedeial cenlies, as if he was announcing confionlalion
wilh Slovenia and Cioalia even befoie he secuied lhe vicloiy in Kosovo lhe abioga-
lion of lhe aulonomy.
27. Azem \llasi was a Kosovo communisl leadei who, because of his posilion, became a
nguie of hale foi dissalisned Seibs. He was nisl ousled in 1988 and lalei aiiesled, along
wilh 16 olhei piincipal Albanian paily leadeis, foi counlei-ievolulionaiy undeimining
of lhe social oidei.`` They weie ieleased undei piessuie fiom lhe inleinalional commu-
nily. The immediale ieason foi lheii aiiesl was lhe facl lhal lhey suppoiled lhe sliike by
Albanian mineis in Slaii Tig. The sliike was a lasl-dilch sliuggle lo pievenl lhe ie-
imposilion of Seibian dominalion in Kosovo. n lhe midsl of Seib euphoiia, Kosovo was
again swepl by piolesls and iallies of suppoil foi lhe mineis. Theii demands included,
among olhei lhings, inleinalional aibilialion in lhe conicl, and a moie deleimined in-
volvemenl by lhe fedeial aulhoiilies in pieseiving lhe conslilulional iighls of Kosovo
Albanians. n many iespecls, lhe sliike was ialhei pio-ugoslav in chaiaclei, bul was
poiliayed in lhe Seibian piess as nalionalisl`` and sepaialisl.`` l also heialded evei-
giealei dispules wilhin lhe fedeialion and piopelled Slovenian and Cioalian demands
foi self-deleiminalion as lhey became incieasingly inlimidaled by lhe iising Seibian
nalionalism and desiie foi dominalion.
28. The mass ially was held on 28 1une 1989 in Gazimeslan, pail of Kosovo Pol|e, lhe sile of
lhe hisloiic ballle. uoled in 1udah, Thc Scrbs, p. 164.
29. Kosovo. 1aw anJ Iolitics. Kosovo in Nornativc Acts bcjorc anJ ajtcr 1974, Belgiade:
Helsinki Commillee foi Human Righls in Seibia, 1998, p. 51.
3O. This is lhe ofncial nguie. The unofncial accounls menlion 7O demonslialois killed.
31. Kosovo. 1aw anJ Iolitics, pp. 51, 5761, 67, 697O. The Acl Resliicling Real Islale
Tiansaclions piohibiled Albanians fiom puichasing ieal eslale wilhoul special Couil
peimission.
32. The ndependenl Tiade \nions of Kosovo. uoled in Maliqi, Scparatc VorlJs, p. 36.
33. Muhamedin Kullashi, Kosovo and Disinlegialion of ugoslavia,`` in 1an|ic and Maliqi,
eds., Conict or Dialoguc, p. 183.
34. As was piofessionally engaged in some of lhe liials, mainlain iesponsibly lhal fiom
199O aboul 3,OOO Albanians weie senlenced lo an aveiage 7 yeais in piison . . . 3,45O
young Kosovais weie senlenced lo 25,OOO yeais in |ail, oi 25O cenluiies.`` smel Salihu,
Aulonomy Geneialoi of Iven Deepei Ciisis,`` speech deliveied al lhe Seibian
Albanian iound lable Dialogue Was Possible,`` Belgiade, 2122 Novembei 1998.
35. Maliqi, The Albanian Movemenl in Kosova,`` p. 43.
36. Ioi an analysis of lhe Daylon Peace Accoids, see Dusanka Anaslasi|evic, The Alchemy
of lhe Daylon Peace Accoids: A Bellei Slale of Peace? 1uslice and Oidei in Negolia-
lion of Peace Selllemenl,`` Maslei`s Thesis, Cenlial Iuiopean \niveisily, Budapesl,
1997.
37. Shke lzen Maliqi, Daylon: Ciucial Tuining Poinl foi Kosova Too,`` in Maliqi, Scparatc
VorlJs, pp. 136141.
38. The agieemenl, biokeied by lhe lalian Calholic oiganizalion, Sanl` Igidio, envisaged
lhe beginning of desegiegalion and lhe giadual ieluin of lhe Albanians lo school
piemises. Howevei, il iemained a dead lellei.
39. RaJicalisation oj thc Scrbian Socicty. Collcction oj Docuncnts, Belgiade: Helsinki
Commillee foi Human Righls in Seibia, 1997. The iadicalizalion was cleaily manifesled
in lhe piesidenlial eleclions in which lhe Seibian Radical Paily, led by ullia-nalionalisl
\o|islav Sesel|, emeiged as a ma|oi winnei.
4O. Ioi example, lhe Seibian Renewal Movemenl leadei, \uk Diaskovic, said in an inlei-
view: was asked how would make Albanians accepl Seibia as lheii homeland. My
answei was how would you make Seibs ienounce Kosovo, foi Kosovo is Seibian.``
uoled in RaJicalisation, p. 51.
41. The dealh loll foi lhe lhiee incidenls (Piekaz, Likosane, and Ciiez) in lhe Dienica aiea
was 83, including al leasl 24 women and childien. See lhe Human Righls Walch iepoil
Humanilaiian Law \iolalions in Kosovo,`` al www.hiw.oig. A piolesl ially by elhnic
Albanians in Piislina following lhe Dienica bloodshed ended wilh a biulal police inlei-
venlion in which 3O piolesleis weie wounded and one was killed. See De|an Anaslasi-
|evic , A Bloody Weekend in Dienica,`` and The Dance of lhe Dead,`` Vrcnc, 7 and 14
Maich 1998.
62 THI KOSO\O CRSS
42. Ioi an acknowledgemenl of lhe facl lhal lhe bloodshed was a calalysl and lhe luining
poinl in Albanian nalional homogenizalion, see Behlul Beqa|, Dienica: Homoge-
nisalion of Albanians,`` in Hclsinki Chartcr, 1anuaiy 1999.
43. n Apiil, lhe Seibian pailiamenl voled almosl unanimously lo call a iefeiendum lo
decide whelhei lhe Seibs would accepl oi iefuse inleinalional involvemenl in iesolving
lhe Kosovo ciisis; 75 pei cenl iefused lhe involvemenl of lhe inleinalional communily.
44. The so-called HolbiookeMilosevic Agieemenl of 13 Oclobei 1998. The agieemenl
lhal we ieached loday has iemoved lhe dangei of mililaiy inleivenlion againsl oui
counliy,`` said Milosevic in his lelevised addiess on lhe occasion. Two days lalei NATO
Geneial Wesley Claik and Chief of Slaff of lhe ugoslav Aimy Momcilo Peiisic signed
an agieemenl on Kosovo which envisaged demililaiizalion of lhe piovince. Piioi lo lhe
NATO inleivenlion, Momcilo Peiisic was foiced inlo ieliiemenl foi his alleged opposi-
lion lo confionlalion wilh NATO.
45. Ambassadoi Wolfgang Peliilsch, special I\ envoy lo lhe lalks, as inleiviewed by lhe
aulhoi of lhis chaplei. The lellei was signed by Di. Ralko Maikovic on 23 Iebiuaiy
1999 in Rambouillel. l expiessed salisfaclion lhal ma|oi piogiess`` had been achieved
in lhe lalks as well as lhe ieadiness of ugoslavia lo discuss lhe scope and chaiaclei of
an inleinalional piesence lo implemenl lhe agieemenl lo be accepled in Rambouillel.``
The lellei was oblained couilesy of Ambassadoi Peliilsch.
46. l is unlikely lhal lhe inleinal facloi, i.e. lhieal of eiuplion of populai uniesl, inuenced
his decision, as lhe NATO campaign caused an iaqizalion of Seibia: lhe combinalion of
vaiious legal acls, aclivaled by lhe declaied slale of wai, which seiiously iesliicled civil
libeilies, and a genuine peiceplion of NATO as lhe aggiessoi, ciealed an enviionmenl
devoid of possible souices of lhieal lo lhe iegime. Moieovei, lhe damage inicled by
NATO did nol affecl lhe chain of command in lhe Aimy and police, which iemained
inlacl lhioughoul lhe campaign. Howevei, lhe fiequenl use of sofl bombs,`` which
caused black-ouls lhioughoul lhe counliy, and lhe incieasing ieadiness of NATO lo
commil giound foices may have seived as calalysls.
5
The Kosovo conicl: The Balkans
and lhe Soulhein Caucasus
Ccorgc Khutsishvili anJ Albrccht Schnabcl
nlioduclion
The conicls belween Seibia and Kosovo, and belween NATO and lhe
Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia (IR), have caused mixed ieaclions
fiom counliies and peoples lhioughoul Soulh-easlein Iuiope. Wheieas
lhe Balkan counliies weie diieclly affecled by lhe conicl, lhe Soulhein
Caucasian counliies of Aimenia, Geoigia, and Azeibai|an seem lo be al
nisl look loo iemoved fiom lhe Balkans lo be affecled by lhe conicl in
Kosovo. Howevei, lhey do considei lhemselves pail of Iuiope, pail of lhe
giealei Soulh-easl Iuiopean subiegion, and fuluie membeis of Iuiope`s
iegional oiganizalions and giealei secuiily communily. Thioughoul lhe
iegion, ieaclions ianged fiom sliong suppoil foi eilhei NATO oi Seib
aclions lo equally sliong opposilion. The ieasons foi such vaiied iesponses
can be found in each counliy`s and sociely`s elhnic, ieligious, oi polilical
pioximily lo lhe conicling pailies and, in pailiculai, in lhese counliies`
aspiialions lo |oin NATO andjoi olhei Weslein polilical and economic
oiganizalions.
Wheieas Oilhodox slales close lo ugoslavia weie less enlhusiaslic
aboul NATO`s ieaclion, lhose close lo lhe Kosovo Albanians weie sup-
poilive. Howevei, Muslim communilies wilh a close afnnily lo lhe Kosovo
Albanians (such as Tuikey and Azeibai|an), bul wilh lheii own sepaialisl
minoiily sliuggles, had a diffeienl issue lo woiiy aboul: would suppoil of
64
NATO aclion nol undeimine lheii own effoils lo keep sepaialisl minoiily
gioups al bay?
Iuilhei, NATO aclion has been a mixed blessing lo lhe iegion as a
whole. The Balkans have been fuilhei deslabilized by iefugee movemenls,
a devaslaled Kosovo, and a polilically and economically much weakened
ugoslavia (whose GDP has slipped below lhe level of Albania). n lhe
Soulhein Caucasus, vaiious minoiily sepaialisl gioups, mosl piominenlly
in Nagoino-Kaiabakh and Abkhazia, have been encouiaged by lhe inlei-
nalional (NATO) communily`s appaienl willingness lo suppoil lhe cause
of independence againsl a peiceived oppiessive iegime. Ioi lhe lilulai
nalions in lhe Soulhein Caucasus (as well as in Tuikey, which is exam-
ined in moie delail in chaplei 11 by Geoigios Koslakos), lhis has nol
been wilhoul pioblems: loyally lo NATO (eilhei as an exisling oi as an
aspiiing membei) cleaily conicls wilh lhe Alliance`s peiceived new iole
as lhe piolecloi of sepaialisl minoiilies` iighls and inleiesls.
On lhe olhei hand, NATO`s aclions and lhe subsequenlly incieased
inleinalional piesence in lhe iegion have bioughl much needed allenlion
lo lhe Soulh-easl Iuiopean iegion. The inleinalional communily was
ieminded lhal lhe Daylon Accoids, which had ended lhe wais in Bosnia,
have nol pul a lid on inslabilily, elhnic compelilion, conicling leiiiloiial
claims, undeidevelopmenl, and poveily in lhe iegion. Moieovei, lhey
have also ieminded us of lhe impoilanl ioles lhal need lo be played in
lhe iegion by non-mililaiy oiganizalions in pailiculai lhe Iuiopean
\nion (I\), lhe Oiganizalion foi Secuiily and Co-opeialion in Iuiope
(OSCI), and lhe \niled Nalions. The I\`s subsequenl allempl lo ie-
invigoiale ils plans foi a Soulh-Iaslein Iuiopean Slabilily Pacl, symbol-
ized by a summil in Saia|evo, is an indicalion of lhis possible allempl lo
ie-commil lhe Iuiopean \nion lo lhe iegion.
The conicl in Kosovo and iegional neighbouis
Thioughoul lhe Balkans, lhe conicl in Kosovo has piompled diffeienl
iesponses. n lhe mosl geneial leims, lhose counliies lhal had pievious
giievances againsl Belgiade andjoi fell a close afnnily lo lhe plighl of
lhe Albanian Kosovais suppoiled NATO`s aclions, because lhe allack
weakened Belgiade wilhin ugoslavia and wilhin lhe iegion al laige.
Those lhal fell a close afnnily lo Belgiade (foi polilical oi elhnic ieasons)
weie ciilical of NATO`s aclions.
Despile lhese diffeiences, lheie was agieemenl lhal lhe means of
NATO`s inleivenlion weie queslionable, and lhal ma|oi powei involve-
menl in lhe Balkans (mosl oflen on lheii leims) is nol desiiable. The
THI BALKANS AND THI SO\THIRN CA\CAS\S 65
following discussion biiey summaiizes some main ieaclions and ie-
sponses fiom ugoslavia`s iegional neighbouis, wilh a pailiculai focus on
lhe conicl`s impacl on BosniaHeizegovina.
Albania
\nlil lhe end of NATO`s wai againsl ugoslavia, Albania had been
Iuiope`s pooiesl slale. Moieovei, il slill had nol iecoveied fiom lhe anli-
goveinmenl upiising in 1997. Local uniesl and disoidei weie slill common,
in pail as a iesull of lhe 1997 ciisis. Despile lhe sliong communal links
belween Albania and Kosovo, and Albanians` suppoil foi lhe Kosovo
Libeialion Aimy (KLA) and lhe Kosovai sepaialisl movemenl, lhe lens
of lhousands of dispossessed iefugees ooding in fiom Kosovo duiing lhe
conicl placed an immense buiden on lhe counliy, bolh in economic
leims and in leims of domeslic secuiily.
Albania has openly suppoiled lhe Kosovais` sliuggle againsl Belgiade.1
Howevei, explicilly and implicilly, il has specincally suppoiled neilhei
lhe secession of Kosovo fiom ugoslavia, noi lhe subsequenl unincalion
of Kosovo wilh Albania. The Albanian goveinmenl is awaie of lhe ie-
peicussions lhal may follow feais among nalions lhioughoul lhe iegion of
a laigei, sliongei Muslim Albania which would possibly absoib Alba-
nian communilies nol only fiom Kosovo bul also fiom Macedonia. Tiiana
is sensilive lo lhese feais, pailiculaily as il puisues ils campaign foi Al-
banian membeiship in bolh NATO and lhe I\.2
MaccJonia
Macedonia is one of Kosovo`s mosl vulneiable neighbouis. Duiing lhe
conicl, il absoibed many hundieds of lhousands of displaced Kosovo
Albanians. l feaied lhal lhis inux of Kosovais (who mighl have slayed
long leim if lhe wai had conlinued) could have slienglhened aulonomy
claims among ils own elhnic Albanian communily. Macedonia`s Alba-
nians make up aboul 25 pei cenl of lhe counliy`s populalion and have
long complained aboul lheii liealmenl by lhe lilulai Macedonian nalion.
The goveinmenl feaied lhal lhe conicl, if ongoing, could seveiely de-
slabilize lhe counliy. On lhe olhei hand, il suppoiled NATO`s aclions,
because il consideis NATO membeiship as a lop foieign policy piioiily.
On lhe posilive side, Macedonia ieceived ienewed allenlion in lhe
wake of lhe conicl, and ils aspiialions foi NATO membeiship have only
been slienglhened as a iesull of ils coopeialion wilh lhe Alliance duiing
lhe conicl.3
66 THI KOSO\O CRSS
Montcncgro
Monlenegio is a consliluenl iepublic of lhe Iedeial Republic of ugo-
slavia. Howevei, lo lhe dismay of Belgiade and despile NATO bombing
of ugoslav mililaiy inslallalions in Monlenegio, ils pio-Weslein gov-
einmenl undei Milo D|ukanovich has liied lo iemain neulial duiing lhe
conicl wilh NATO. l, loo, has been faced wilh lhe aiiival of lens of
lhousands of Kosovo Albanian iefugees. The economic buiden of lhese
iefugees only compounded lhe difncullies Monlenegio alieady faces as a
iesull of inleinalional sanclions imposed againsl ugoslavia.
Duiing lhe wai, D|ukanovich iepealedly called foi an end lo NATO
bombing, because of lhe damage inicled on Monlenegio, lhe feai lhal
Belgiade would lake mililaiy aclion againsl lhis unfailhful`` ugoslav
iepublic, and because of lhe conlinuing inux of iefugees.
n lhe afleimalh of lhe wai, Monlenegio benenled fiom lhe widespiead
opposilion in Seibia piopei againsl lhe Milosevic iegime, and fiom ils
goveinmenl`s sliong slance againsl Belgiade duiing lhe wai. A new
goveinmenl in lhe IR mighl be moie sympalhelic lo Monlenegio`s calls
foi giealei aulonomy. Iven lhe Milosevic goveinmenl offeied lo enlei
negolialions on aulonomy lalks, and vowed nol lo use mililaiy foice if
Monlenegio seceded unilaleially. f il does nol puisue independence
fiom Seibia allogelhei, Monlenegio mighl also nnd il alliaclive lo collab-
oiale moie closely wilh a new goveinmenl in Belgiade lo cieale a slion-
gei and inleinalionally inlegialed and iespecled ugoslav Iedeialion.
Bosnia
Since lhe 1995 Daylon Accoids, Bosnia has been lhe piimaiy focus of lhe
inleinalional communily`s peacebuilding and conicl managemenl effoils
in lhe Balkans.4 While lhe OSCI successfully oiganized and moniloied
democialic eleclions and helped in iebuilding polilical, |udicial, economic,
and social sliucluies, NATO`s mplemenlalion Ioice (IOR) and, lalei,
ils Slabilizalion Ioice (SIOR) piovided foi lhe mililaiy secuiily neces-
saiy lo mainlain peace in a counliy slill suffeiing fiom a lalenl inlei-
communal conicl. The Bosnian conicl is fai fiom solved and is in need
of conlinuing inleinalional piesence. The Kosovo conicl was bolh a
blessing and a cuise foi Bosnia. On lhe one hand il foiced Republika
Sipska lo iefocus on Bosnia as a pailnei on lhe ioad lowaids piospeiily
and developmenl (away fiom Belgiade). On lhe olhei hand, il disliacled
inleinalional (donoi) allenlion away fiom Bosnia lo Kosovo and olhei
pails of lhe foimei ugoslavia.
Whal inuence did NATO`s wai in ugoslavia have on Bosnia? The
wai had few signincanl piaclical consequences foi Bosnia. Bosnia was
slill pieoccupied wilh lhe decision of lhe High Repiesenlalive lo dis-
chaige Nikola Poplasen as Piesidenl of Republika Sipska and lhe iecenl
pio-Bosnian decision on lhe slalus of Bicko. The High Repiesenlalive
iepealedly appealed lo lhe heads of goveinmenl on all sides lo avoid
public slalemenls aboul NATO`s inleivenlion and lhe Kosovo conicl, a
iequesl lhal was nol honouied. Ofncials in Republika Sipska (RS) weie
pailiculaily oulspoken, mosl pailies ieacled wilh ouliage lo NATO
bombing, and lhe Seibian Radical Paily wenl so fai as lo iefei lo lhe
genocide of lhe Seib people al lhe hands of NATO poweis.
The Seibs iefused lo conlinue fuilhei coopeialion in Bosnia`s common
goveining inslilulions, pailly because of lhe decisions iegaiding Piesidenl
Poplasen and lhe slalus of Bicko, and pailly owing lo SIOR`s coopeia-
lion wilh NATO duiing lhe bombing campaign (NATO planes weie al-
lowed lo y ovei Bosnian leiiiloiy on lheii missions lo Kosovo and lhe
iesl of lhe IR). Republika Sipska`s absence fiom common inslilulions
has conlinued since lhe wai.
Neveilheless, seveial posilive developmenls aie woilh menlioning.
Due lo lhe iapid deleiioialion of lhe Seib cuiiency, Bosnia`s konveili-
bilna maika (KM) is now widely used in lhe RS. Iuilhei, lhe economic
embaigo againsl lhe IR made il veiy difncull foi lhe RS`s oil ienneiies
in Bosanski Biod lo sell oil lo lhe IR. n iesponse, RS is now iediiecl-
ing ils economic aclivilies lo lhe Bosnian Iedeialion. This can be seen as
a ma|oi oppoilunily foi economic and, possibly, olhei coopeialion be-
lween lhe MuslimCioal and Seib communilies acioss lhe inlei-enlily
boundaiy line. Iinally, allhough lhe IR has pulled oul of all iegional
and subiegional coopeialive inilialives, lhe mililaiy and polilical iepie-
senlalives of lhe RS conlinue lo pailicipale.5
The public ieacled lo lhe Kosovo ciisis only aflei lhe slail of lhe aii
campaign. Befoie lhe bombing slailed, Bosnians paid lillle allenlion lo
lhe deleiioialing silualion in Kosovo. Duiing lhe wai, Seibs weie oul-
iaged while lhe Bosnian Muslims weie suppoilive. They appiecialed lhe
facl lhal Milosevic had lo lake iesponsibilily foi his aclions nol only in
lhe conlexl of Kosovo, bul also in iefeience lo Belgiade`s suppoil of lhe
Bosnian Seibs duiing lhe wais belween 1991 and 1995. The Bosnian
Cioals kepl a low pionle, pailly because of lhe Tud|man adminislialion`s
involvemenl in similai elhnic expulsions of Seibs fiom lhe Kia|ina iegion
and ienewed allenlion given lo lhe laige numbei of Seib iefugees living
in lhe IR. The Bosnians` inleiesl in lhe bombing campaign subsided
veiy quickly, despile lhe inux of ioughly 4O,OOO iefugees fiom Seibia
and Kosovo. Iven now, lhe aclivilies of lhe Kosovo Peacekeeping Ioice
(KIOR) and lhe \N Mission in Kosovo (\NMK) aie followed wilh
veiy lillle inleiesl lhioughoul Bosnia.
68 THI KOSO\O CRSS
Has lhe implemenlalion of KIOR had a negalive effecl on Bosnian
secuiily commilmenls fiom lhe inleinalional communily? nleinalional
oiganizalions and non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions have moved laige
numbeis of lheii slaff fiom Bosnia lo Kosovo, and Russia has ielocaled a
laige numbei of ils SIOR lioops lo Piislina. Despile lhe facl lhal much
inleinalional assislance (mililaiy and economic) will be iediiecled fiom
Bosnia lo Kosovo, lhis has nol happened lo lhe diamalic degiee lhal
some expecled. Moieovei, one can assume lhal much aid would have
been ieduced anyhow in iesponse lo iepoils of coiiuplion and misap-
piopiialion of inleinalional aid in Bosnia.
The I\`s Slabilily Pacl summil in Saia|evo (Augusl 1999), a diiecl
iesponse lo lhe Kosovo conicl, bioughl inleinalional allenlion back lo
Saia|evo. Howevei, lillle has changed in Bosnia despile inilial signs lhal
lhe Summil would give new momenlum lo Bosnian polilical inlegia-
lion. n geneial, as long as lhe inleinalional communily does nol shifl
fuilhei suppoil fiom Bosnia lo Kosovo (and iecenl developmenls suggesl
lhal commilmenl lo Bosnia will be mainlained al ieasonable levels),
lhe Kosovo conicl will have had lillle negalive effecl on posl-conicl
iebuilding in Bosnia. On lhe conliaiy, a polenlially new goveinmenl
in Belgiade will likely lead lo fuilhei de-iadicalizalion of polilics in
Republika Sipska and will conliibule lo incieased coopeialion belween
lhe fedeialion and lhe RS.
Slovcnia
Slovenia has been on lhe peiipheiy of Balkan polilics since ils shoil wai
of independence in 1991. The ofncial ieaclion in Slovenia was favouiable
lo NATO aclion in Kosovo. The public weie also in favoui of NATO
sliikes, because lhey weie convinced lhal Milosevic would nol budge
wilhoul a show of foice. The Slovenian piemiei, 1anez Dinovsek, con-
nimed on 24 Maich, lhe day lhe bombing campaign slailed, lhal Slovenia`s
peimission foi NATO oveiighls of Slovenian leiiiloiy (in foice since
Oclobei 1998) would iemain valid. This posilion was ieileialed by Piesi-
denl Kucan.6 On 25 Maich, Slovenian foieign minislei Boiis Iilec con-
nimed lhal NATO aiiciafl had Slovenia`s peimission lo land al Slovenian
aiipoils if needed.7
While in geneial lhe Slovenian public suppoiled NATO`s aii wai,
lheie was also consideiable opposilion. The Chiislian Social \nion (KS\)
expiessed ils opposilion lo NATO`s inleivenlion and lhe goveinmenl`s
decision lo gianl lhe Alliance peimission lo use Slovenia`s aiispace. l
was highly ciilical of lwo issues in pailiculai: lhe facl lhal civilian laigels
such as hospilals and schools weie hil by NATO bombing and lhe lack of
piioi aulhoiizalion of lhe inleivenlion lhiough lhe \N Secuiily Council.8
Slovenian |ouinalisls ciilicized NATO`s allack on lhe Seibian T\
slalion RTS. Allhough lhey sliongly disagieed wilh Belgiade`s suppies-
sion of fiee media in lhe IR, lhey also ie|ecled lhe use of biule foice
in eliminaling goveinmenl-iun media oullels. Again, lhe emphasis was
nol on disagieemenl ovei lhe ends (opposilion lo Belgiade`s iegime), bul
on lhe means lo ieach lhis goal, i.e. lhe allempl lo bomb Belgiade inlo
submission.9
Croatia
The vasl ma|oiily of Cioalians agieed wilh NATO aii sliikes, bul lhe
goveinmenl kepl a low pionle domeslically on lhe issue. Membeis of
lhe Cioalian polilical e lile iealized lhal lhey, loo, could have become
lhe laigel of NATO inleivenlion in iesponse lo Opeialion Ilash and
Sloim`` in 1995. n lhal conlexl, lhe Wai Ciimes Tiibunal in The Hague
has indicled seveial geneials, and lhe Cioalian goveinmenl has been
iesisling lheii exliadilion. Iew oiganizalions came oul publicly in sliong
opposilion lo lhe aii sliikes (lhey included Seib associalions and, among
non-Seib oiganizalions, B.a.B.e., a feminisl gioup).10
The goveinmenl ieadily accepled iefugees fiom Kosovo, making
suie lhal, in pailiculai, lhe I\, lhe OSCI, and lhe \niled Slales look
nole, bul olhei iefugees, including Albanians fiom Albania piopei, weie
denied lhe iighl lo asylum. The Seib communily in Iaslein Slavonia also
kepl a low pionle, lo avoid iepiisals in an enviionmenl in which elhnic
lensions conlinue lo iun high.11
Duiing lhe aii sliikes, Zagieb slailed lo piomole ils inleiesl in |oining
lhe Pailneiship foi Peace, emphasizing lhal ils place is in Cenlial Iuiope
and nol in lhe Balkans. l aigued lhal lhe ciisis simply ieafnimed lhal
Cioalia and ils aimed foices should be seen as a ciucial bulwaik againsl
Seib hegemony in lhe iegion. As wilh olhei slales in lhe iegion, lhe wai
had negalive consequences foi Cioalia: beyond a slump in liade wilh
counliies on liading ioules lhal cul lhiough ugoslavia and in alliacling
foieign inveslmenl, Cioalia`s gieally anlicipaled nisl ma|oi louiisl season
since lhe ugoslav wai nevei maleiialized.12
Bulgaria
Wheieas mosl people in Slavic Oilhodox Bulgaiia opposed lhe NATO
aii campaign againsl ugoslavia, lhe goveinmenl suppoiled lhe Alli-
ance`s aclions. The public sided wilh lhe ugoslav goveinmenl and ils
aveision lo lhe giowing polilical and culluial inuence of slamic com-
munilies in Iuiope. The Bulgaiian goveinmenl, howevei, consideis close
7O THI KOSO\O CRSS
fiiendly ielalions wilh and, possibly, membeiship in NATO as a iequiie-
menl foi ils secuiily in lhe volalile Balkans.
The goveinmenl did nol peiceive a mililaiy lhieal fiom lhe wai in
Kosovo, noi did il feai negalive consequences fiom alienaling lhe Milo-
sevic goveinmenl in Belgiade. l slaled ils desiie lo push foi an aulono-
mous Kosovo wilhin ugoslavia, wilhoul alleiing slale boideis. To sub-
slanliale ils suppoil foi lhe Alliance`s aclions, il offeied nnancial suppoil
foi iefugee camps in Macedonia.13 Iven so, lhe Bulgaiian goveinmenl
feaied lhe economic consequences of conlinuing inslabilily in lhe Balkans
and ils own isolalion fiom Iasl and Wesl Iuiopean maikels, because lhe
wai had disiupled ioad links lo Cenlial and Iaslein Iuiope, iecipienls of
much of Bulgaiia`s edgling expoil indusliy.
Ronania
Allhough mainlaining fiiendly ielalions wilh ils neighboui, Romania suf-
feied economically fiom lhe wai. Biidges acioss lhe Danube had been
deslioyed and navigalion on lhe Danube was closed down allogelhei.
Neveilheless, lhe Romanian goveinmenl sliongly suppoiled NATO`s
inleivenlion in lhe IR. mmedialely befoie lhe beginning of lhe aii
campaign, Piesidenl Conslalinescu slaled lhal, |ijf peace negolialions
fail, Romania would deem necessaiy and legilimale NATO`s inleivenlion
lo sellle lhe conicl, and ieileiales ils decision lo suppoil any peace-
iesloiing effoils and lhe humanilaiian aclions lhey enlail.``14 Duiing lhe
wai, lhe goveinmenl aclively uiged Milosevic lo accepl lhe peace plan
offeied by lhe G-8 counliies and denounced Belgiade`s policy of elhnic
cleansing in Kosovo. l also favouied an aulonomous Kosovo wilhin
lhe boideis of ugoslavia. The goveinmenl fuilhei called upon lhe \N
Secuiily Council lo become moie piominenlly involved in lhe iesolulion
of lhe conicl. The Romanian desiie lo become a membei of NATO
iemained unalleied by lhe Alliance`s campaign againsl Seibia.15
n summaiy, lhe ieaclions lo lhe Kosovo ciisis by Balkan slales focused
veiy lillle on lhe plighl of lhe Kosovais. The mosl impoilanl conceins weie
lo mainlain and iesloie liading links lo and via ugoslavia, and lo appeai
as a loyal polenlial fuluie pailnei in lhe NATO Alliance. Commilmenl
lo membeiship in NATO and, possibly, lhe I\ cleaily oveiiode feelings
of elhnic and ieligious afnnily lo ugoslavia. Moieovei, Milosevic`s pooi
iepulalion wilhin lhe iegion only ieinfoiced lhe lack of sympalhy ex-
piessed foi ugoslavia`s plighl duiing lhe aii campaign. Woids of sup-
poil and ouliage came only fiom Republika Sipska. Howevei, despile
lhe facl lhal inleinalional aclion againsl Belgiade found bioad suppoil
lhioughoul lhe iegion, NATO`s choice of iesponse lo ugoslavia`s
aclions in Kosovo an exlended aii wai found lillle suppoil. f il had
nol been foi lhe oveiwhelming desiie of many slales in lhe iegion lo |oin
lhe Iuiopean \nion and NATO, opposilion lo lhe wai would piobably
have been moie pionounced.
The Soulhein Caucasus and lhe Kosovo conicl
Reaclions in lhe Soulhein Caucasus lo lhe evolving ciisis ovei Kosovo
have lo be seen in lhe conlexl of lhe vaiious elhnic and inleicommunal
conicls in lhe iegion and lhe desiie by Aimenia and, in pailiculai,
Geoigia and Azeibai|an lo become moie closely inlegialed in lhe com-
munily of Wesl Iuiopean slales and NATO. n lhe Geoigian and Azei-
bai|ani cases lhis would be al lhe expense of Russian inuence in lhe
iegion. Those ieasons aie of couise nol dissimilai fiom lhe aspiialions of
many Iasl and Cenlial Iuiopean counliies, including NATO`s newesl
membeis, as discussed in chaplei 13 by Ta las and \alki. Suffeiing lheii
own inleicommunal conicls (inleislale and inliaslale), lhe iesponses
fiom Geoigia, Aimenia, and Azeibai|an weie as vaiied and diiven by
oppoilunism as in lhe Balkans.
Ioints in connon bctwccn Kosovo anJ thc Southcrn Caucasus
The Kosovo silualion has much in common wilh lhal in lhe Caucasus:
elhno-leiiiloiial dispules ovei a hisloiically shaied land belween lwo oi
moie elhnic gioups who all insisl lhal lhey aie lhe indigenous populalion;
a moie oi less iecenl demogiaphic shifl lhal is peiceived by one of lhe
gioups as a secuiily lhieal; a iecenlly expeiienced ma|oi calasliophe,
such as lhe end of lhe Cold Wai (and, in lhe foimei Soviel \nion, lhe
bieak-up of an empiie); lhe iise of elhno-nalionalisl ideology; and lhe
iise of a chaiismalic leadei who manipulales dispules lo ensuie his powei
al lhe expense of conicl escalalion.16
Moieovei, violenl clashes belween lhe conicling gioups and sub-
sequenl elhnic cleansing lead lo giave humanilaiian ciises. Goveinmenl
aclion (oflen based on mass consciousness which is inleinalized by
leadeis and lheii policies) demonsliales a disiegaid foi human life,
heallh, safely, and welfaie, as expiessed lhiough absliacl values of his-
loiical liulh,`` nalional piide,`` people`s will,`` oi |uslice.`` \iolence is
|uslined in lhe name of nalional inleiesl, and piinciples of nalional
inlegiily, idenlily, and boideis aie denned in leims of lhe exislenlial
suivival of lhe nalion. This all lianspiies in lhe conlexl of a fiagmenlalion
of iealily, a sense of viclimizalion, an idenlily dissolulion syndiome, and
72 THI KOSO\O CRSS
a pievalenl paianoid obsession wilh exleinal conspiiacies and lieacheiy.
The velvel ievolulion in Czechoslovakia and lhe subsequenl civilized
CzechjSlovak divoice would be impossible in such communilies: lhey
peiceive lheii dispules as ullimalely zeio-sum silualions.
Theie aie a numbei of similaiilies belween lhe ma|oi pailies lo lhe
conicls in Kosovo and lhe Soulhein Caucasus. Iiom lhe peispeclive of
lilulai gioups in lhe Soulhein Caucasus, sepaialisl Albanian Kosovais
aie like lhe Kaiabakhi Aimenians foi Azeiis oi lhe Abkhaz foi Geoi-
gians. Ilhno-culluially, Seibs also exhibil a ceilain, lhough limiled, be-
haviouial and emolional closeness wilh lhe Caucasian peoples, especially
wilh lhe Oilhodox Chiislian Geoigians and Aimenians. They all considei
wai ovei hisloiic land a sacied duly, wheie lhe nalion should, if neces-
saiy, saciince pail of ilself foi vicloiy.
Ioints oj Jijjcrcncc
The piimaiy diffeience is geopolilical: wheieas lhe Soulhein Caucasian
slales (allhough having a ceilain slialegic inleiesl foi lhe Wesl) aie slill
maiginal, ugoslavia is an aiea of vilal slialegic inleiesl foi lhe Wesl. On
lhe olhei hand, lhe Soulhein Caucasus is a slialegic assel foi Russia, and
has lhus been undei heavy Russian piessuie. All Caucasian conicls aie
locally peiceived as being insligaled by Russians.
The Seibs evince exaclly lhose fealuies lhal Geoigians lhink lhey lack
foi pieseiving lheii leiiiloiial inlegiily, foi inslance wilh iegaid lo lhe
Abkhaz: Belgiade displayed highly consolidaled aclion, iesislance lo ex-
leinal inuence, a swifl and iulhless ieaclion, and a mililaiislic nalional
spiiil. ugoslavia is in lhe piocess of dissolulion, bul lhe Seibs aie des-
peialely liying lo slop il. Geoigians and Azeibai|anis, on lhe olhei hand,
peiceive lhemselves as defying a veiy piobable capilulalion lo Russian
mighl.
Disputcs in Ccorgia
The foimei Soviel Republic of Geoigia has suffeied seveial ma|oi ciises
since lhe collapse of lhe Soviel \nion, including civil wai in lale 1991 and
lhe GeoigianAbkhaz wai in 19921993, which was followed by a mass
exodus of elhnic Geoigians fiom Abkhazia. The subsequenl peiiod of
slow iecoveiy is slill undeiway. The counliy`s poveily and uniesolved
inleinal elhno-polilical dispules wilh lhe bieakaway iegions of Abkhazia
and Soulh Osselia iemain lhe main inleinal souices of insecuiily.17
The Abkhaz case has been maiked by a high level of suppoil foi
independence oi, al a minimum, lhe ciealion of a symmeliical (con)-
fedeialion union`` wilh lhe Geoigian slale. The iighl of secession (in lhe
Abkhaz view) looms in lhe backgiound. The coie pioblem undeimining
effeclive negolialions conceins lhe 25O,OOO inleinally displaced peisons
(DPs), almosl all of whom aie elhnic Geoigians and who aie demanding
lo be ieluined home. n pie-wai Abkhazia (unlil 1992), elhnic Abkha-
zians consliluled only 18 pei cenl of lhe populalion (and less lhan 2 pei
cenl of lhe populalion of Geoigia). Being in such a small minoiily was
consideied a seiious secuiily iisk foi lhe Abkhaz, especially in lhe lian-
silional peiiod. By foicing oul lhe Geoigian ma|oiily, lhe Abkhaz ensuied
a demogiaphic ma|oiily in lhe dispuled land.
The levels of communicalion and conndence belween lhe lwo sides
have iemained exliemely low lhioughoul lhe posl-wai yeais. \iolenl
clashes in lhe boideiing Gali iegion of Abkhazia in lale May 1998 ie-
sulled in a second wave of elhnic Geoigian iefugees fiom Abkhazia
and shalleied fiagile hopes foi a peaceful selllemenl in lhe neai fuluie.
Allhough lhe wai ended on 27 Seplembei 1993, DPs aie slill lempo-
iaiily`` sellled in laige holels, doimiloiies, and iesl houses in Geoigia,
wailing foi lhe chance lo ieluin.
Sociological suiveys have shown iemaikably low levels of aggiession
among DPs; yel, as negolialions conlinue lo be slalled, living condilions
aie deleiioialing and no solulion seems lo be in sighl.18 As lime passes
and people cannol ieluin home, fiuslialion is giowing and, wilh il, feais
of incieasing levels of aggiession among DPs which would be a secu-
iily iisk foi all Geoigians. The wai paily`` in Geoigia is calling foi
a mililaiy solulion lo lhe pioblem of iefugees by foicibly ieluining
Abkhazia lo Geoigia`s |uiisdiclion. The piospecl of wai, which would
inevilably ensue, appals many.
The Soulh Osselia case is diffeienl in lhal communicalion, including
human inleiaclion and liade, has conlinued and ieconcilialion undei lhe
aegis of lhe Geoigian fedeial slale is nol a pioblem foi lhe ma|oiily of
Soulh Ossels. Howevei, a lasling solulion is being hindeied by difncullies
in naming lhe iegion once lheie is agieemenl on ils aulonomy slalus. The
Ossels aie insisling on Soulh Osselia Republic,`` bul Geoigians would
see lhis as an invilalion foi Ossels lo enfoice ieunincalion wilh lheii
elhnic kin in Noilh Osselia acioss lhe Russian boidei.
Icrccptions oj thc Kosovo crisis in Ccorgia
\ndeislandably foi a posl-lolalilaiian sociely, mosl Geoigians emphasize
lhe piesumplion lhal lheii independence, fieedom, and slalehood aie so
fiagile lhal anylhing less lhan a iigid unilaiy powei sliucluie should be
iuled oul foi lheii counliy. Aulonomous communilies wilhin lhe slale aie
seen as obslacles lo lhal. Geoigians know lhal lhis appioach piecludes a
viable solulion lo lhe AbkhazjGeoigian ielalionship. A widespiead view
is lhal lhe issue is pei se unsolvable, unless some oveiwhelming exleinal
74 THI KOSO\O CRSS
foice inleivenes lo diive il lowaids a favouiable conclusion. The ieslo-
ialion of Geoigian |uiisdiclion in Abkhazia would make up foi lhe hu-
milialion of defeal. Nolhing shoil of lhal is publicly peiceived as an
acceplable solulion.
No inleinal powei is willing oi able lo caiiy lhis oul, negolialions aie
disciediled, and lhe lolal mobilizalion of lhe nalion is seen as uniealislic.
NATO had been menlioned fiom lime lo lime, as lhe hoped-foi sa-
vioui.19 Howevei, lhe NATO oplion`` has suddenly ieceived new ciedi-
bilily as a iesull of lhe Alliance`s handling of lhe Kosovo ciisis. Heie al
lasl was an allempl lo cieale a woiking model of lhe inleinalional com-
munily`s |usl, full-scale, and uncompiomising ieaclion lo elhnic cleansing.
Howevei, lhe facl lhal NATO could also be seen as aclually advocaling a
secessionisl communily was disiegaided.20
The effecl was aslounding: oveiwhelming appiecialion of NATO`s ac-
lions in ugoslavia, no ciilicism oi expiessions of iegiel in eilhei ofncial
oi independenl Geoigian media aboul lhe casuallies and lhe aggiavalion
of lhe humanilaiian calasliophe in lhe Balkans. Whal pievailed was a
hopeful expeclalion lhal fiom now on a ugoslav model of NATO aclion
mighl be legilimized and applied in lhe Soulhein Caucasus (and in olhei
iegions wilhin and oulside of Iuiope).
n addilion, lhe Wesl`s inleiesl in using lhe Soulhein Caucasus as a
liansil coiiidoi foi Azeii ciude oil and AzeiijKazakh gas is seen in
Geoigia as ieason enough foi NATO lo foice sepaialisls lo peace`` in
lhe Soulhein Caucasus.
Thc conict in Nagorno-Karabakh
The oldesl of lhe posl-Soviel elhno-leiiiloiial dispules, in Nagoino-
Kaiabakh, iemains uniesolved. An enclave in Azeibai|an wilh no
common boideis wilh Aimenia, Nagoino-Kaiabakh was hisloiically
populaled by Aimenians and fealuied many Aimenian sacied siles. l
was lhe nisl lo ieacl lo lhe iapid decline of lhe Soviel Impiie. The
immediale iesponse by minoiily-populaled aulonomous iegions lo lhe
giowing insecuiily wilhin lhe Soviel \nion was lo piolecl lhemselves
lhiough incieased oi full soveieignly. Thal, in luin, piovoked lhe exodus
of minoiily elhnic gioups. nadequale ieaclions fiom lilulai nalions only
aggiavaled lhe lensions and led lo de faclo independenl quasi-slales in
lhe Caucasus.
n lhe case of Kaiabakh, a secessionisl wai followed, foughl belween
Azeibai|an and Aimenian- and Russian-aided Kaiabakhis. The wai ie-
sulled in a self-pioclaimed Nagoino-Kaiabakh Republic lhal is linked
wilh Aimenia lhiough a naiiow (Lachin) coiiidoi (in addilion lo ovei
2O pei cenl of Azeii leiiiloiy aiound lhe coiiidoi, excluded fiom Azeii
|uiisdiclion). Negolialions aie al a sland-slill because Azeibai|an iefuses
lo iecognize Kaiabakh as an ofncial paily lo negolialions and is de-
manding lo lalk lo Aimenia inslead. The Aimenians, in luin, deny lhal
lhey aie a paily lo lhe conicl and expecl Azeibai|an lo negoliale diieclly
wilh Kaiabakh.
The Kaiabakh conicl pioduced ovei 1 million iefugees, a humanilai-
ian ciisis on a scale compaiable lo lhal of Kosovo. Howevei, lhe global
media did nol devole neaily as much coveiage lo lhe Soulhein Caucasian
conicls as lhey did lo lhe Kosovo conicl. Posl-Soviel lhealies of conicl
appeai maiginal in lhe inleinalional communily`s view in compaiison
wilh lhe Balkans.
Thc Arncnian pcrspcctivc
nliacommunal ielalionships among Aimenians affecl domeslic peicep-
lions of lhe Kosovo ciisis and lhe NATOjIR dispule. Theie aie con-
sideiable diffeiences belween lhe appioaches and senlimenls expiessed
by domeslic`` Aimenians and lhose of lhe Aimenian diaspoia. The
Aimenian diaspoia is veiy poweiful and inuenlial, and ils nnancial
conliibulion lo Aimenia`s developmenl has been invaluable. ls membeis
mainlain pio-Aimenian lobbying mechanisms wilhin lheii home coun-
liies` eslablishmenls, as well as nalionalisl ideology suppoil in Aimenia
piopei, somelimes even exceeding lhe senlimenls of domeslic gioups.
The Weslein diaspoia came lo lhe conclusion lhal NATO aclions in-
diieclly suppoiled lhe Kaiabakhi cause and, lhus, mosl of lhem sup-
poiled NATO`s aclions in ugoslavia. Among lhe Aimenian diaspoia
woildwide, lhe \S Aimenians weie in lhe mosl difncull posilion, because
lhey found lhemselves caughl belween lwo seemingly ieconcilable, bul in
facl incompalible, allachmenls. On lhe one hand, lhey wanled lo iemain
loyal lo \S foieign policy, especially as lhis was widely suppoiled by al
leasl pail of lhe inleinalional communily; on lhe olhei hand, lhey wanled
lo suppoil lhe pievailing senlimenl of Aimenians in Aimenia.
Aimenians in Aimenia piefeiied lo lake a Russian slance. They con-
linue lo see Russia as lheii main slialegic pailnei in lhe iegion, and lhey
can easily ielale lo Russia`s peispeclive on lhe Balkans. Humanilaiian
piolesl againsl lhe bombing of civilian laigels also played a pailiculaily
signincanl iole in lheii allilude lowaid lhe Kosovo conicl.21
Thc A;cri pcrspcctivc
Al nisl sighl, lhe Azeii peispeclive on lhe Kosovo conicl is veiy similai
lo lhal in Geoigia, and ils slaik diffeience fiom lhe Aimenian posilion
ieveals deep inliaiegional pioblems in lhe Soulhein Caucasus. Azeii
76 THI KOSO\O CRSS
expeils nole lhal, allhough lhe pievailing senlimenl duiing lhe evenls of
spiing 1999 was suppoil foi NATO aclions, lhis was nol as aulomalic oi
as sliong as in Geoigia. Theie weie moie open discussions on lhe lopic of
polenlial NATO membeiship, NATO`s assislance in fuilhei delachmenl
fiom Russia, and NATO`s assislance in ieluining Kaiabakh.22
Al some poinl duiing lhe NATO aii campaign Azeii polilicians dis-
cussed lhe possibilily of inviling NATO lo solve lhe Kaiabakh pioblem,
bul lhey weie suddenly sliuck by lhe obvious: if NATO had lo bomb
Belgiade lo solve lhe Kosovo ciisis, in lhe Azeii case lhey would mosl
piobably bomb Baku! Aflei lhis iealizalion lhey decided lo abandon
lheii plans of appioaching NATO.23
Azeii slamisls iallied foi ofncial suppoil foi lheii Albanian Kosovai
bielhien, which did, howevei, nol maleiialize. n geneial, nol much
allenlion was paid lo lhe enliie ciisis. On lhe olhei hand, Aimenian
ieaclions aioused feelings in Azeibai|an, pailiculaily aflei eievan
declaied lhal Aimenia`s iole in Nagoino-Kaiabakh was lhe same as
NATO`s iole in Kosovo. Neveilheless, Azeiis ieacled posilively lo lhe
inclusion of an Azeii unil in KIOR.
Conclusion: Mixed messages, mixed blessings
Thioughoul lhe Balkans, NATO and ils aclions weie viewed sceplically.
Allhough lheie was disagieemenl ovei lhe means and ends of NATO
aclion, lhe Alliance was geneially suppoiled, because mosl slales aie
despeialely seeking NATO membeiship. The I\, lhe OSCI, and lhe
\niled Nalions weie peiceived lo be suboidinale iegional and inlei-
nalional oiganizalions vis-a` -vis NATO. The dynamic in lhe Soulhein
Caucasus was similai. Once polilicians and lhe public iealized lhal
NATO was in facl assisling a sepaialisl movemenl, enlhusiasm foi NATO
aclions subsided. Howevei, lhal was nevei expiessed in open complainls
oi disagieemenls ovei NATO aclions, bul ialhei in moie subdued calls
lhan usual foi NATO`s physical and polilical piesence in lhe iegion.
Seveial posilive developmenls foi lhe iegion have come oul of lhe
NATO wai in ugoslavia. The anli-Seib slance of lhe inleinalional
communily has ieinfoiced lhe message lhal lhe Wesl does nol necessaiily
limil ilself lo lhe pioleclion and defence of non-Muslim communilies.
The IR has been weakened lo lhe poinl wheie il is no longei a ma|oi
playei in lhe iegion. Bosnian inlegialion may benenl fiom lhal. n pai-
liculai, lhe afleimalh of lhe wai and Kosovo Albanian aliocilies againsl
Seibs have shown lhal lheie aie no good guys`` and bad guys`` in lhe
Balkans. Bolh Seibs and Albanians can be viclims and peipelialois.
The wai has once again demonslialed lhal lhe Balkans aie moie oflen
lhan nol al lhe meicy of gieal powei inleiesls. l is lime foi Soulh-easl
Iuiopean counliies lo addiess lheii pioblems as a communily and as a
iegion, and lo deal wilh conicls and slale misconducl and failuie (as in
lhe case of Seibia) lhemselves, pailiculaily if lhey wanl lo avoid gieal
powei inleivenlion. The iegion has lo be caieful aboul engaging NATO
oi olhei mililaiy and non-mililaiy oiganizalions in lhe iegion. Once ie-
sponse mechanisms aie liiggeied in lhese oiganizalions, exleinal in-
volvemenl may lake on ils own dynamic lhal may easily luin oul lo be
counleipioduclive lo lhe peace and secuiily needs of lhe iegion.
Whal may have been useful foi lhe Kosovo Albanians may nol al all
apply lo lhe Soulhein Caucasian conlexl. l iemains lo be seen if any of
lhe ienewed allenlion diiecled al lhe Balkans will be exlended lo addiess
lhe lalenl and pioliacled conicls in lhe Soulhein Caucasus (and lhe
Caucasus as a whole), oi if lhal iegion will conlinue ils exislence al lhe
maigins of inleiesl as fai as lhe Iuiopean and inleinalional communilies
aie conceined.
Iinally, a numbei of policy iecommendalions aiise fiom lhis discus-
sion. \ndei a new goveinmenl Seibia should be encouiaged lo ie-|oin
lhe Soulh-easl Iuiopean and Iuiopean communilies of slales and ie-
gional and subiegional oiganizalions. An alienaled and demonized Seibia
should be avoided. Howevei, lhe cuiienl Seib leadeiship should be dis-
ciediled and inleinalional sanclions imposed. Only a new leadeiship
commilled lo demociacy, culluial loleiance, and iegional inlegialion and
powei-shaiing should be suppoiled by lhe oulside woild.
The new momenlum foi peace, secuiily, and slabilily in lhe Balkans
should embiace lhe Soulhein Caucasus. The Soulhein Caucasus musl be
included in a Soulh-Iaslein Iuiopean Slabilily Pacl. Communily-building
belween Chiislian and Muslim communilies should be a high piioiily (and
could sel slandaids woildwide). Regional inlegialion, conndence-building,
eaily waining and conicl pievenlion, and developmenl should be lhe
main foieign policy goals lhioughoul Soulh-easlein Iuiope, bolh wilhin
lhe Balkans and lhe Soulhein Caucasus, and belween lhose lwo iegions.
Appendix: Responses lo lhe Kosovo ciisis in lhe Soulhein
Caucasus
n each Soulhein Caucasian counliy lhe public ieacled diffeienlly lo lhe
silualion in lhe Balkans. Ioi lhe puipose of lhis analysis, 1O expeils in
each of lhe lhiee Soulhein Caucasian counliies weie asked anonymously
lo nll oul a chail of lhe geneialjpievailing peiceplions in lheii iespeclive
socielies of lhe ma|oi playeis in lhe Kosovo ciisis duiing NATO`s aii
sliikes.
78 THI KOSO\O CRSS
Thc choicc oj playcrs
The sel of ma|oi playeis was inlended lo iepiesenl lhe ob|eclive balance
of foices in lhe iegion. A playei had lo be a sufncienlly aulonomous acloi
(in lhis conlexl il made lillle sense lo include lhe Commonweallh of n-
dependenl Slales as a sepaiale enlily fiom Russia). On lhe olhei hand,
Milosevic had lo be a sepaiale playei fiom lhe Seibs, because lhey weie
nol idenlined in public peiceplion as one and lhe same. l should be
noled lhal nol all of lhe playeis weie of equal signincance lo lhe laigel
Table 5.1 Peiceplions in Geoigia of lhe ma|oi playeis in lhe Kosovo ciisis
Playei
\eiy
negalive Negalive Neulial Posilive
\eiy
posilive No idea
NATO
\niled Slales
Russia
Seibs
Albanian Kosovaisj
KLA
Albania
Milosevic
NATO membei
counliies of I\
\niled Nalions
Weslein mass
media
Table 5.2 Peiceplions in Aimenia of lhe ma|oi playeis in lhe Kosovo ciisis
Playei
\eiy
\eiy
posilive No idea
NATO
\niled Slales
Russia
Seibs
Albanian Kosovaisj
KLA
Albania
Milosevic
NATO membei
counliies of I\
\niled Nalions
Weslein media
gioup. The inclusion of Weslein mass media as a playei ieecls lhe facl
lhal lhey aie peiceived as an aulonomous powei in woild polilics and
lheii iole in coveiing lhe ciisis and foiming public opinion.
Acknowledgemenls
Allhough lhis chaplei iepiesenls a |oinl effoil, piimaiy iesponsibilily foi
lhe seclion on lhe Balkans lies wilh Albiechl Schnabel, and foi lhe sec-
lion on lhe Soulhein Caucasus wilh Geoige Khulsishvili. The aulhois
gialefully acknowledge lhe ieseaich assislance of Chaiisse Gulosino
(\N\), Alexandei Nilzsche (OSCI), Kevin Sleeves (OSCI), and Nika
Sliazisai (Cailelon \niveisily).
Noles
1. Albania Says NATO Tioops in Kosovo Only Solulion,` `` BBC Monitoring Ncwslc,
London, 1 Apiil 1999.
2. Albanian Piesidenl Calls foi nleinalional Aid Piogiammes foi lhe Region,`` BBC
Monitoring 1uropcan Iolitical, London, 21 May 1999.
3. Macedonian Ofncial \pbeal aboul Resulls of Washinglon NATO Summil,`` BBC
Monitoring 1uropcan Iolitical, London, 27 Apiil 1999.
4. We aie gialeful lo Alexandei Nilzsche (OSCI, Tuzla, Bosnia), on whose insighls lhis
seclion is laigely based.
5. This applies lo lhe Sub-iegional Consullalive Commission (wilh lhe Republic of Bosnia
Heizegovina, lhe Iedeialion of BosniaHeizegovina, lhe RS, and Cioalia) and lhe
1oinl Consullalive Commillee (wilh lhe Seib, Cioal, and Bosnian pailneis, in iefeience
lo lhe Daylon Accoids, Annex 1b, Ailicle and \).
Table 5.3 Peiceplions in Azeibai|an of lhe ma|oi playeis in lhe Kosovo ciisis
Playei
\eiy
\eiy
posilive No idea
NATO
\niled Slales
Russia
Seibs
Albanian Kosovaisj
KLA
Albania
Milosevic
NATO membei
counliies of I\
\niled Nalions
Weslein media
8O THI KOSO\O CRSS
6. Nalo bi nudil zascilo Sloveni|i,`` Dncvnik, 25 Maich 1999.
7. Nalova lelala nad Sloveni|o,`` Dncvnik, 26 Maich 1999.
8. Nad Benelkami NATO ne leli,`` Dncvnik, 7 Apiil 1999.
9. Bombe na novinai|e vsekakoi niso iesilev,`` Dncvnik, 24 Apiil 1999; inleiview wilh
Nika Sliazisai, Ollawa, Canada, Seplembei 1999.
1O. Cioalia and lhe NATO Sliikes,`` McJia Scan Mass McJia Rcport, 29 Maich 1999.
11. We aie gialeful lo Kevin Sleeves (OSCI, Zagieb) foi shaiing his insighls.
12. Rcactions, CSRC, 11 1une 1999. We aie gialeful lo Kevin Sleeves (OSCI, Zagieb) foi
shaiing his insighls fiom a Cioalian peispeclive.
13. Bulgaiian, Ausliian Leadeis Suppoil Peace in Kosovo wilhoul Boidei Changes,`` BBC
Monitoring 1uropcan Iolitical, London, 16 Apiil 1999.
14. Romania Suppoils NATO nleivenlion in Kosovo,`` BBC Monitoring 1uropcan
Iolitical, London, 22 Maich 1999.
15. f lhe Kosovo Conicl Does Nol Ind Soon, Oui Losses Could Reach \S$1 Billion,``
BusincssworlJ, Manila, 24 May 1999; Ausliian, Romanian Defence Minisleis Discuss
Kosovo,`` BBC Monitoring 1uropcan Iolitical, London, 17 Apiil 1999.
16. Ioi a delailed and accuiale accounl of lhe hisloiy of lhe conicl in Abkhazia, along wilh
a bibliogiaphy and a lisl of agieemenlsjdocumenls, see AccorJ, No. 7 (ediled by 1on-
alhan Cohen), London: Concilialion Resouices, 1999. See also Pavel Baev, Russian
Iolicics in thc Caucasus, London: Royal nslilule of nleinalional Affaiis, 1997.
17. Aimed Conicl in Geoigia: A Case Sludy in Humanilaiian Aclion and Peacekeeping,``
by S. Neil MacIailane, Laiiy Mineai, and Slephen D. Shenneld, Occasional Papei No.
21, 1996, Thomas 1. Walson 1i. nslilule foi nleinalional Sludies, Biown \niveisily,
Piovidence, R. Case sludies of lhe Kaiabakh and olhei posl-Soviel conicls may be
found in lhe same seiies of Biown \niveisily.
18. See Iinal Repoil of lhe Conicl Resolulion Tiaining Piogiam in Geoigia,`` Tbilisi:
nleinalional Cenlei on Conicl and Negolialion (CCN), 1998.
19. Theie is some confusion ovei lhe iole of NATO. On lhe one hand, lhe Alliance appeais
lo be on lhe side of lhe sepaialisls, while on lhe olhei il declaies lhal il defends lhe
piinciple of lhe inviolabilily of posl-communisl boideis. Howevei, NATO is defending
nol sepaialisls as such, bul a suffeiing populalion.
2O. The leadei of lhe Abkhazian goveinmenl-in-exile, Tamaz Nadaieishvili, was among lhe
mosl aclive in Geoigia in exploiing lhe oppoilunily lo apply lhe NATO expeiience in
ugoslaviajKosovo lo lhe GeoigiajAbkhazia case (as expiessed in numeious Geoigian
T\ inleiviews and analylical bioadcasls). The alliludes of lhe piesidenl and olhei lop
leadeis lowaids lhe NATO involvemenl weie much moie caulious, allhough on lhe
whole favouiable.
21. We aie gialeful lo Piofessoi Gevoik Pogosian of lhe Aimenian Academy of Science foi
claiincalion of lhis poinl.
22. We lhank Azeii expeils Aiif unusov and Ildai Zeinalov foi lheii valuable assess-
menls of public peiceplions in Azeibai|an wilh iegaid lo developmenls in Kosovo and
NATO`s involvemenl in solving iegional dispules.
23. We aie gialeful lo Ildai Zeinalov, head of lhe independenl Human Righls Cenlie in
Baku, foi lhis conliibulion.
rt wo
he mjor plyers
6
The cosls of vicloiy: Ameiican
powei and lhe use of foice in
lhe conlempoiaiy oidei
C. 1ohn Ikcnbcrry
nlioduclion
Like lighlening on a daikened landscape, lhe wai in Kosovo illuminales
lhe poslCold Wai inleinalional oidei and lhe dilemmas of Ameiican
foieign policy as nolhing else did in lhe 199Os. Whal lhe Kosovo expeii-
ence ieveals is an inleinalional oidei buill on a conliadicloiy, shifling, and
unslable mix of inleinalional noims, gieal powei inleiesls, and Ameiican
mililaiy piedominance. l shows a dangeious mismalch belween lhe
evolving slandaids of slale conducl including slale conducl wilhin ils
own boideis and lhe pioblemalic capacilies of lhe inleinalional com-
munily and lhe ma|oi poweis lo agiee upon and acl in conceil lo uphold
lhese noims. Slales aie incieasingly held lo highei slandaids human
iighls, democialic iule, humanilaiian |uslice, iule of law bul lhe woild
communily has yel lo nnd ways lo iespond lo violenl offendeis wilh lhe
foice and aulhoiily lhal lhemselves confoim lo widely shaied and legili-
male woild slandaids.
The wai has also exposed lhe pioblemalic chaiaclei of Ameiica`s iole
in lhis poslCold Wai oidei. As lhe woild`s only supeipowei, lhe \niled
Slales is ciilical lo lhe abilily of lhe inleinalional communily lo iespond lo
slale ciimes and humanilaiian in|uslice. Bul il is also caughl in unlenable
conliadiclions. ls hegemonic powei is so oveiwhelming loday pailicu-
laily ils mililaiy powei lhal il is incieasingly viewed as lhe woild`s bully.
The iiony is lhal lhe \niled Slales pailiculaily lhe Clinlon adminislia-
85
lion is a gieal champion of enlighlened self-inleiesl and humanilaiian
inleivenlion, bul ils pie-eminence has become an obslacle lo lhe emei-
gence of inslilulions and capacilies lo make good on lhe woild commu-
nily`s evolving humanilaiian and human iighls slandaids. Al lhe same
lime, while much of lhe woild woiiies aboul uniesliained Ameiican
powei, wilhin lhe \niled Slales lheie is a weakening of suppoil foi
global engagemenl. Ioieign aid, \N membeiship dues, iegional secuiily
pailneiships, mullilaleial economic coopeialion all lhese basic elemenls
of Ameiican foieign policy iequiie lhe Ameiican piesidenl and lhe main-
slieam policy eslablishmenl lo sliuggle wilh polilical faclions on bolh lhe
lefl and iighl who wanl lo cul back and ieluin home.
n pasl hisloiical eias, lhe end of ma|oi wais culminaled in peace sel-
llemenls lhal allowed lhe gieal poweis lo piomulgale new iules and in-
slilulions of posl-wai inleinalional oidei. Powei, inleiesls, and noims
weie bioughl logelhei and inleinalional oidei was ieciealed. Ioi ex-
ample, 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, and 1945 weie each a denning momenl when
basic piinciples, undeislandings, and inslilulional mechanisms foi govei-
nance weie fashioned. The end of lhe Cold Wai did nol culminale in such
an oidei-building momenl. The woild is lefl wilh a confusing combina-
lion of new noims, old inslilulions, unipolai powei, unceilain leadeiship,
and declining polilical aulhoiily wilhin lhe inleinalional communily.
Meanwhile, lhe \niled Slales lhe one counliy wilh bolh lhe giealesl
polilical assels and lhe giealesl liabililies in lhe seivice of conceiled in-
leinalional aclion is caughl in ils own debales aboul ils inleiesls and
obligalions wilhin lhe inleinalional oidei.
This chaplei will allempl lo claiify lhe naluie of lhe shaky giound
upon which Ameiican and NATO inleivenlion in Kosovo look place.
l will also suggesl some ways lhal a nimei foundalion mighl be con-
sliucled. begin by looking al lhe Ameiican debale aboul inleinalional
aclivism and humanilaiian inleivenlion, which piovided lhe unsellled
conlexl foi lhe Ameiican suppoil foi lhe use of foice in Kosovo. f woild
agieemenl on lhe leims of gieal powei inleivenlion and lhe use of foice
hinges on lhe Ameiican view, woild agieemenl is nol likely any lime
soon.
Nexl liace lhe deepei liends lhal lie behind lhe dilemmas and con-
liadiclions of poslCold Wai inleinalional oidei. Thiee liends aie mosl
impoilanl. The nisl is lhe iise of humanilaiian and human iighls slan-
daids. These aie noims of demociacy and human iighls lhal lhe \niled
Slales and olhei slales have invoked in seeking lo legilimale lhe cuiienl
libeial woild oidei. The second is lhe liansfoimalion of NATO. The
NATO goveinmenls have ailiculaled a new idenlily foi lhe Alliance aflei
lhe Cold Wai: il is lo be a giouping of like-minded democialic slales wilh
86 THI MA1OR PLAIRS
an inleiesl in lhe widei slabilily of lhe iegion. This lies NATO powei and
puipose lo slales on lhe peiipheiy of Iuiope and lo aclions and con-
lingencies unielaled lo lhe leiiiloiial defence of membei slales. This shifl
in NATO piobably helped facililale lhe end of lhe Cold Wai and allowed
ils membeis lo pieseive lhe Alliance, bul il also unsellles lhe widei
Iuiasian neighbouihood. Iinally, lhe inleinalional disliibulion of powei
has become iadically unipolai. The \niled Slales had become lhe only
seiious woild mililaiy powei. This unpiecedenled asymmeliy in powei as
a meie facl of inleinalional life is incieasingly quile piovocalive. The wai
in Kosovo did moie lhan anylhing else in iecenl yeais lo undeiscoie lhis
new iealily, ievealing even Iuiope`s infeiioiily in mililaiy capacily. f
hisloiy is a guide, olhei slales have ieason lo feai concenlialed and un-
iesliained powei. l inviles iesenlmenl and ullimalely a balance of powei
ieaclion.
Two dilemmas emeige foi lhese liends. Iiisl, consliuclive Ameiican
pailicipalion is indispensable lo lhe inleinalional communily`s seaich foi
solulions lo pioblems of secuiily, |uslice, economic giowlh, and polilical
goveinance, bul il is piofoundly woiiisome lo liy lo coopeiale wilh a
laige and polenlially unpiediclable supeipowei lhal is ilself unceilain of
how much global leadeiship il wanls lo piovide. Secondly, lhe absence of
new inslilulional agieemenls aflei lhe Cold Wai lo guide lhe inlei-
nalional communily in upholding slandaids of human iighls and human-
ilaiian |uslice has meanl lhal infoimal goveinance mechanisms have been
followed mosl of which involve woiking wilh and lhiough Ameiican
powei and diplomacy. Woild oidei and Pax Ameiicana aie ioughly lhe
same lhing loday. Bul Ameiican hegemony iegaidless of how open,
benign, and enlighlened il mighl be is a pooi subslilule foi a moie
inclusive, inslilulionalized, and agieed upon inleinalional oidei.
The Ameiican debale
The \niled Slales is no less conicled aboul lhe use of foice in lhe sei-
vice of human iighls and humanilaiian |uslice lhan lhe iesl of lhe woild.
The debale even wilhin lhe foieign policy eslablishmenl is un-
iesolved. Bul lhe Clinlon adminislialion has gone foiwaid anyway lo
ailiculale a soil of neo-Wilsonian view iegaiding humanilaiian and
human iighls aclivism. Aflei lhe inleivenlions in Haili, Somalia, Bosnia,
and Kosovo, some obseiveis even see a Clinlon Docliine: lhal lhe \niled
Slales cannol iespond lo all humanilaiian disasleis and human iighls
liansgiessions, bul lhal il will use ils powei and good ofnces if doing so
will make a diffeience and lhe cosls aie acceplable. The giilly peisislence
AMIRCAN POWIR AND THI \SI OI IORCI 87
of lhe Clinlon adminislialion despile lhe mixed iesulls and polilical giief
lhal lhese inleivenlions have engendeied is ilself an indicalion of lhe
adminislialion`s undeilying libeial inleinalionalisl oiienlalion.
When Piesidenl Clinlon was asked by a |ouinalisl in 1une 1999 whelhei
a Clinlon Docliine exisled, lhe Ameiican piesidenl iesponded: While
lheie may well be a gieal deal of elhnic and ieligious conicl in lhe woild
. . . whelhei wilhin oi beyond lhe boideis of a counliy, if lhe woild com-
munily has lhe powei lo slop il, we oughl lo slop genocide and elhnic
cleansing.``1 Seveial days lalei, addiessing NATO lioops in Macedonia,
Clinlon elaboialed: f somebody comes aflei innocenl civilians and
liies lo kill lhem en masse because of lheii iace, lheii elhnic backgiound
oi lheii ieligion, and il is wilhin oui powei lo slop il, we will slop il.``2 f
lhis is a docliine, il is ialhei ambiguous. l is nol cleai whal in oui
powei`` means; whelhei we`` means lhe \niled Slales, NATO, oi lhe
widei inleinalional communily. Bul lhese piesidenlial slalemenls do
ieveal a piagmalic, seal of lhe panls, Ameiican view: if lhe elhnic oi
ieligious violence is liuly ouliageous and if oulside powei can effeclively
be bioughl lo beai al a modesl cosl, such an undeilaking is woilhwhile.
The policy is as piagmalic as il is piincipled, bul il ieecls a deepei sel
of ideas lhal Clinlon and his leam have bioughl lo foieign policy. Theie
aie seveial layeis lo lhis oiienlalion. Iiisl, lheie is a conviclion shaied by
many in lhe Clinlon adminislialion lhal lhe lype of pioblem confionled
in Bosnia, Haili, Somalia, and Kosovo is lhe face of lhe poslCold Wai
fuluie. Old slialegic pioblems have given way lo new ones. Today`s
lhieals aie less likely lo come fiom gieal powei conicl lhan fiom lhe
piolifeialion of civil wais and elhnic conicl lhal aie peihaps insignincanl
in lhemselves bul lhal logelhei can liiggei widei conicl and eiode lhe
moial foundalions of libeial inleinalional oidei. This view was ailicu-
laled mosl cleaily by Les Gelb, lhe piesidenl of lhe Council on Ioieign
Relalions in 1994: |Tjhe coie pioblem is wais of nalional debililalion, a
sleady iun of uncivil wais sundeiing fiagile bul funclioning nalion-slales
and gnawing al lhe well-being of slable nalions.`` These leacup`` wais
can spill ovei inlo lhe widei iegion, diawing laigei slales inlo lhe conicl.
Theie is also a moial cosl. The failuie lo deal adequalely wilh such
sliife, lo do somelhing aboul mass muidei and genocide, coiiodes lhe
essence of a democialic sociely,`` Gelb aigues. f democialic leadeis
luin away fiom genocide oi meiely pielend lo combal il, lheii cilizens
will diink in lhe hypociisy and sink inlo cynicism.``3
Bul lheie is also a moie diffuse libeial oi neo-Wilsonian oplimism lhal
cieeps inlo Clinlon adminislialion foieign policy. Iiisl, il is widely agieed
among lhese ofncials lhal a woild oiganized aiound slable demociacy
and open maikels is piofoundly in lhe Ameiican (and global) inleiesl. l
88 THI MA1OR PLAIRS
is believed lhal inleinalional oidei can be peaceful and piospeious in a
woild of expanding demociacy and economic inleidependence. The
Kanlian hypolhesis lhal demociacies lend nol lo nghl one anolhei is
inlegial lo Clinlon foieign policy lhinking.4 So loo is lhe view lhal liade
and inveslmenl and lhe expanding opeialion of maikels ieinfoice libeial
demociacy, lhe iule of law, and sliong civil socielies. ndeed, lhis libeial
oplimism aboul demociacy and capilalism is widely shaied in lhe Ameii-
can foieign policy eslablishmenl and among mainslieam nguies in bolh
polilical pailies.5 Bul, secondly, il is also aigued lhal lhe \niled Slales
and lhe olhei indusliial demociacies can aclively piomole lhe spiead
of demociacy, human iighls, and maikel sociely aiound lhe woild.6 No
ofncial would admil lo lhe naive view lhal mililaiy foice oi economic
inducemenls can liansfoim imploded oi lyiannical slales inlo lhiiving
and peaceful demociacies. Bul lheie is oplimism lhal caiiols and slicks
can make a diffeience, along wilh lhe long-leim ieinfoicing effecls of
economic inleidependence and modeinizalion.7
This oiienlalion slood in lhe backgiound in lhe iun-up lo lhe Kosovo
ciisis. l piovided a ialionale foi lhe aclivism of Ameiican policy and, in
lhe nnal analysis, il made il impossible foi lhe \niled Slales lo sil by and
lel lhe violence unfold. n lhe yeai pieceding lhe bombing campaign,
Secielaiy of Slale Madeleine K. Albiighl invoked bioad ideas aboul
solving lhe Kosovo pioblem ialhei lhan simply conlaining il and using
lhe ciisis lo lake a sland againsl slale-sponsoied violence moie geneially.8
When asked why she was so passionale`` aboul Kosovo, Albiighl lalei
said lhal il was because il wasn`l |usl Kosovo: When we weie nghling
againsl Hillei, il wasn`l |usl Hillei; il was nghling againsl fascism. . . . And
when weìe dealing wilh a now-indicled wai ciiminal such as Milosevic,
il isn`l |usl him. l is sliuggling againsl a concepl, which is lhal il is
nol appiopiiale, possible oi peimissible foi one man lo uncoik elhnic
nalionalism as a weapon.``9
f lhe neo-Wilsonian impulse lay behind Ameiican inleivenlion in
Kosovo, lhe opponenls of lhis view also lefl lheii maik. Kosovo and
lhe piioi Clinlon mililaiy inleivenlions have sliiied bul nol sellled lhe
debale ovei lhe Ameiican use of foice in lhe seivice of human iighls and
humanilaiian |uslice. Chailes Kiaulhammei, a newspapei columnisl and
Clinlon foieign policy ciilic, aigues lhal lhese libeial engagemenls eiode
lhe capacily of lhe \niled Slales lo allend lo ils coie slialegic inleiesls,
which enlail lhe rcalpolitik managemenl of ielalions among lhe gieal
poweis.10 n lhis view il is foolish lo pul Ameiican lives, iesouices, and
ciedibilily on lhe line foi such hopeless and fanciful advenluies. Moie-
ovei, lhe idealisl iheloiic lhal is iequiied lo |uslify lhese inleivenlions
obscuies lhe liue message lhal Ameiican leadeis should be sending ils
people: lhe woild is a dangeious place and lhe managemenl of slialegic
iivaliy and lhe balance of powei aie lhe piopei pieoccupalion of foieign
policy.
The absence of a consensus on lhe use of Ameiican foice abioad lo
uphold humanilaiian iighls and quell lhe leacup wais`` has made lhe
puisuil of such ends all lhe moie eiialic and ciicumslanlial. This is why
lhe Clinlon Docliine if lhal is whal il is looks so ambiguous and
polenlially hollow. l is difncull lo |uslify lhese inleivenlions in liadilional
slialegic and nalional inleiesl leims. The invocalion of moial and human
iighls piinciples is necessaiy lo defend lhe policy, bul such bioad slale-
menls undeiscoie lhe seleclive and limid defence of lhese giand piinci-
ples. The Ameiican piesidenl looks foi silualions wheie mililaiy foice
can be used quickly and wilhoul gieal iisk lo lhe lioops. l is easiei lo use
foice lo uphold libeial and humanilaiian piinciples if ciuise missiles oi
high-allilude bombing can do lhe |ob. f casuallies aie likely, liadilional
slialegic inleiesls will also need lo be al slake.
The inslabilily of lhe Ameiican posilion on lhe use of foice leads lo
one conclusion lhal does command widei agieemenl: il is besl if mulli-
laleial aclions aie oiganized lo iespond lo civil wais and humanilaiian
suffeiing. Bul lhis only kicks lhe pioblem upslaiis. Now il is lhe inlei-
nalional communily lhal needs lo nnd agieemenl on how lo malch ends
and means, accommodale gieal powei inleiesls, and deleimine when and
how lhe use of foice can legilimalely be bioughl lo beai in lhe name of
shaied inleinalional noims and iighls.
Noims, NATO, and Ameiican powei
Ameiican ambivalence aboul global leadeiship and lhe uniesolved
debale aboul lhe use of foice in humanilaiian ciises would be a pioblem
even if lhe iesl of lhe poslCold Wai inleinalional oidei weie sellled.
Bul il is nol. The evolulion of inleinalional noims, lhe liansfoimalion
of NATO, and lhe unipolai disliibulion of powei weie backgiound foices
leading lo lhe Kosovo expeiience foices lhal lhe woild has yel lo
ieconcile.
Changing norns anJ libcral intcrnationalisn
A long-leim and diffuse change in lhe enviionmenl in which slales opei-
ale loday daling lo lhe end of lhe Second Woild Wai is lhe iise of
noims of univeisal human iighls and demociacy. ncieasingly, a single
woild slandaid is emeiging lhal acknowledges iighls lhal peoples aie
expecled lo en|oy and lhal slales and lhe inleinalional communily aie
9O THI MA1OR PLAIRS
expecled lo obseive and piolecl. Of couise, slales aie slill dominanl and
can ignoie inleinalionally iecognized noims. Howevei, lhiough an accu-
mulalion of pionouncemenls ovei lhe decades, mosl piominenlly lhe \N
Declaialion of Human Righls, slales aie undei moie sciuliny loday by
lheii own cilizens, by lhe human iighls movemenl, and by olhei slales.
The ielalions belween lhe gieal poweis and lhe decisions lhey make
aboul humanilaiian inleivenlion in smallei slales incieasingly hinge on
lhese sofl`` noims.
The iising salience of human iighls noims is diiven by a vaiiely of
faclois. One impulse has been lhe Weslein slales lhemselves which aflei
lhe Second Woild Wai pushed foi lhe eslablishmenl of a woild associa-
lion lhal would nol |usl piolecl lhe peace bul sland foi ceilain basic
human iighls.11 The posl-wai Weslein goveinmenls and polilical leadeis
who championed lhe \niled Nalions also championed lhe piomulgalion
of univeisal libeial polilical noims. Iianklin Roosevell`s 1942 Ioui
Iieedoms`` speech linked lhe wai effoil lo piolecling fieedom of speech
and woiship and fieedom fiom hungei and violence. The following yeai,
lhe \S Depailmenl of Slale diafled a chailei foi lhe planned woild
oiganizalion lhal included an nleinalional Bill of Human Righls. The
Nuiembeig Wai Ciimes Tiibunal gave anolhei push lo lhe human iighls
movemenl. The \niled Nalions Chailei ilself unlike lhe 1919 League
of Nalions Covenanl menlions iespecl foi human iighls and funda-
menlal fieedoms in ils Pieamble and Ailicle 1. Once in opeialion, lhe
\niled Nalions also moved quickly lo ailiculale inleinalional human
iighls, and in Decembei 1948 lhe \niveisal Declaialion of Human Righls
was adopled. A gieal hisloiical divide was ciossed: befoie 1945, human
iighls weie nol a signincanl aspecl of woild polilics; aflei 1945, inleina-
lional human iighls noims emeiged fiom lhe fiinges onlo cenlie slage.12
The spiead of human iighls noims was slowed by lhe Cold Wai. Bul
lhe iange of iighls and fieedoms lhal gioups championed conlinued lo
expand lhiough lhe woik of \N-sponsoied woild confeiences and com-
missions. Social and economic iighls weie ailiculaled. The 1975 Helsinki
Iinal Acl placed human iighls moie squaiely in lhe ielalionship belween
Iasl and Wesl. The eleclion of 1immy Cailei as \S piesidenl in 1976
gave anolhei boosl lo lhe human iighls movemenl when his adminislia-
lion made il a piominenl lheme of \S foieign policy. The Reagan ad-
minislialion, lo lhe suipiise of some of ils ciilics, also placed emphasis on
human iighls, sliessing polilical and economic fieedoms and lhe univeisal
validily of libeial demociacy.
f posl-wai Weslein slales weie lhe inilial agenls behind lhe iise of in-
leinalional human iighls noims, cilizen movemenls and non-goveinmenlal
oiganizalions aie anolhei foice al woik. The \N declaialions piovided a
foundalion upon which inleinalionally oiganized social gioups have
soughl lo build moie legally binding inleinalional law. Richaid Ialk
makes a dislinclion belween inleislale law,`` which has been lhe inilial
way in which human iighls have been piomulgaled (iighls ailiculaled by
and secuied by slales), and law of humanily,`` which is pushed foiwaid
by liansnalional gioups and civil sociely and is secuied wilhin lhe global
communily.13 A complex and shifling ielalionship belween slales, civil
sociely, and lhe seaich foi human iighls and pioleclions is playing ilself
oul. Woild oidei,`` Ialk aigues, is a composile iealily, ieecling lhe
peisisling inuence of slales on ils noimalive oidei, yel also exhibiling
lhe effecls of volunlaiy associalions and social movemenls lhal aie moli-
valed by lhe law of humanily and silualed in civil sociely.``14 Piinciples
and declaialions of univeisal iighls and fieedoms enshiined in \N
and olhei inleigoveinmenlal documenls piovide leveiage foi non-
goveinmenlal oiganizalions and aclivisl nelwoiks seeking lo build lians-
nalional legal noims lhal aie nol dependenl on lhe slale. The iesull is
lhal slale conducl ilself is incieasingly sub|ecl lo lhe sciuliny of inlei-
nalional gioups lhal advance vaiiously sanclioned iighls and slandaids.
nleinalional ciiminal couils and wai ciimes liibunals aie lhe culling
edge of lhis liend.
A lhiid impulse lhal is also giving iise lo inleinalional human iighls is
lhe Ameiican pieoccupalion wilh lhe piomolion of demociacy. This has
been a long-slanding aspecl of ils foieign policy.15 Woodiow Wilson
made lhe aigumenl duiing lhe Iiisl Woild Wai lhal lhe cause of wai in
Iuiope was Geiman mililaiism and an absence of demociacy. Slable
peace would be possible only when goveinmenls opeialed accoiding lo
democialic piinciples. As lhe \niled Slales gol moie involved in lhe wai,
lhe impoilance of democialic goveinmenl lo lhe success of a posl-wai
peace was incieasingly sliessed by Wilson. n his iesponse lo lhe Pope`s
appeal foi peace in Augusl 1917, Wilson again made lhe dislinclion be-
lween lhe Geiman people and lheii goveinmenl and linked il lo posl-wai
guaianlees and peace: We cannol lake lhe woid of lhe piesenl iuleis of
Geimany as a guaianlee of anylhing lhal is lo enduie, unless explicilly
suppoiled by such conclusive evidence of lhe will and puipose of lhe
Geiman people lhemselves . . . Wilhoul such guaianlees liealies of sel-
llemenl, agieemenls foi disaimamenl, covenanls lo sel up aibilialion in
lhe place of foice, leiiiloiial ad|uslmenls, ieconslilulions of small nalions,
if made wilh lhe Geiman goveinmenl, no man, no nalion, could now
depend on.``16 Allhough aspecls of Wilson`s foieign policy weie idealisl,
lhis specinc conviclion was aclually quile piaclical: goveinmenls lhal
aie democialic aie less likely lo nghl each olhei and lhey aie bellei
pailneis. They aie moie likely lo play by inleinalional iules and keep
lheii piomises.
The Clinlon adminislialion has liumpeled lhis Wilsonian view, bul il
92 THI MA1OR PLAIRS
has been a conlinuous elemenl of Ameiican foieign policy, and demo-
cialic goveinmenls aiound lhe woild as a gioup lend lo embiace il. When
lhe Iuiopean \nion specines condilions foi membeiship, democialic
inslilulions aie al lhe lop of lhe lisl. Demociacy is lifled up as an inlei-
nalional noim foi veiy piaclical ieasons. Bul lhe spieading of lhis view
has had a piofound impacl on how slales opeiale in inleinalional iela-
lions. l is moie difncull lo ignoie lhe way goveinmenls aie consliluled
and how lhey acl wilhin lheii own domeslic syslem. Demociacy, lhe iule
of law, and accounlable inslilulions aie incieasingly seen as pail of lhe
solulion lo moie and moie pioblems aiound lhe woild.
This biings us back lo lhe Kosovo inleivenlion. The Clinlon adminis-
lialion has liied lo legilimale lhe posl-wai libeial woild oidei wilh noims
of demociacy and univeisal human iighls and lhis libeial inleinalion-
alism has made lhe oppiession in Seibia and elsewheie moie of a dangei
lo lhe ideology of Ameiican foieign policy. l is haidei loday foi Ameii-
can leadeis lo aigue lhal slale-sponsoied violence and lhe desliuclion of
elhnic minoiilies aie simply pail of lhe ugly iealily of woild polilics. This
is because of bolh lhe deep piogiessive liends idenlined above and lhe
newei emphasis of \S foieign policy since 1989. l is also liue foi lhe
olhei Weslein slales and foi pails of lhe widei inleinalional communily.
n sublle yel piofound ways, il is haidei nol lo iespond.
NATOs ncw iJcntity
NATO moie lhan any olhei inslilulion slands al lhe hisloiical palhway
belween lhe Cold Wai and lhe poslCold Wai woild. ls old idenlily as a
defensive mililaiy alliance was ciilical lo slabilizing Allanlic ielalions and
Weslein Iuiope foi lhe long Cold Wai eia. l was lhis powei-binding
and iesliaining funclion lying Geimany lo lhe Wesl and lhe \niled
Slales lo Iuiope lhal was impoilanl in helping shape lhe way lhe Cold
Wai ended: il piovided an inslilulional vehicle foi lhe unincalion of
Geimany lhal ullimalely pioved ieassuiing lo bolh lhe Soviel \nion and
lhe Weslein allies. Bul in lhe 199O Ioui Powei compiomise on Geiman
unincalion lhe Weslein slales also made a commilmenl lo liansfoim
NATO and make il a polilical oiganizalion lhal was nol geaied lo mili-
laiy confionlalion wilh lhe Soviel \nion. ionically, lhis liansfoimed
NATO which piovided lhe ialionale foi inleivenlion in Kosovo has
lhiealened lhe inslilulional elemenls of lhe Alliance lhal made il such a
slabilizing and powei-iesliaining foice in lhe nisl place.
When Soviel Piesidenl Goibachev was confionled in 199O wilh lhe
piospecl of Geiman unincalion and lhe absoiplion of lhe \SSR`s mosl
impoilanl Waisaw Pacl ally inlo lhe Weslein alliance, he iesisled. l is
absolulely oul of lhe queslion,`` he lold lhe piess in Moscow in Maich
199O. The queslion lhal lhe \niled Slales posed lo lhe Soviel \nion, in
lhe woids of Secielaiy of Slale 1ames Bakei, was: Assuming unincalion
lakes place, whal would you piefei: a uniled Geimany oulside NATO
and complelely aulonomous, wilhoul Ameiican foices slalioned on ils
leiiiloiy, oi a uniled Geimany lhal mainlains ils lies wilh NATO, bul
wilh lhe guaianlee lhal NATO |uiisdiclion oi lioops would nol exlend
easl of lhe cuiienl line?``17 Bakei`s aigumenl lo lhe leadeis in Moscow
was lhal embedding Geiman mililaiy powei in Weslein inslilulions was
piefeiable, even lo lhe Soviels, lhan neulialily.
The luining poinl came in May 199O duiing Goibachev`s visil lo
Washinglon. Allhough inilially pioposing lhal a uniled Geimany musl
belong lo bolh NATO and lhe Waisaw Pacl, lhe Soviel leadei conceded
on lhis visil lhal all counliies had lhe iighl lo choose lheii own alliances.
The Soviel leadei came lo accepl lhe Weslein aigumenl lhal binding
Geimany lo NATO was lhe mosl effeclive secuiily slialegy foi all pai-
lies conceined. Bush lold Goibachev lhal |ijl appeais lo me lhal oui
appioach lo Geimany, i.e. seeing il as a close fiiend, is moie piagmalic
and consliuclive . . . |Ajll of us in lhe Wesl agiee lhal lhe main dangei lies
in excluding Geimany fiom lhe communily of democialic nalions.``18
The Soviel \nion had lo see NATO and Geimany`s iole in il as a
secuiily inslilulion lhal could ieduce Soviel woiiies ialhei lhan aggiavale
lhem.
Soviel acceplance of a unined Geimany wilhin NATO iequiied a ie-
vision of ils view of lhe Weslein lhieal. NATO had lo be seen as a fun-
damenlally defensive alliance lhal seived lo slabilize and limil Geiman
mililaiy powei. To gel Goibachev`s consenl, lhe binding chaiaclei of lhe
Alliance and Weslein inslilulions had lo have some ciedibilily. Theie
had lo be some conndence lhal NATO would iesliain Geiman mililaiy
powei and keep lhe Ameiican mililaiy connecled lo Iuiope.19 NATO
had lo be seen as fundamenlally a pactun Jc contrahcnJo as a pacl of
iesliainl.
To gel Soviel agieemenl lhe Weslein allies had lo agiee lo iecasl
NATO`s mission. Al lhe 1uly 199O NATO summil in London lhal fol-
lowed lhe SovielAmeiican lalks, lhe Alliance membeis agieed on a
package of iefoims lhal signalled a shifl in ils posluie. Goibachev had
advocaled even befoie lhe collapse of Iasl Geimany in Novembei 1989
lhal lhe lwo alliances should evolve lowaid polilical oiganizalions. The
declaialion on NATO iefoim lhal was agieed lo al lhe London summil
moved in lhis diieclion and incoipoialed elemenls lhal weie meanl lo
ieassuie lhe Soviels. These included an invilalion lo lhe Soviel \nion
and Waisaw Pacl counliies lo eslablish peimanenl liaison missions lo
NATO, which was foimalized lhe following yeai in lhe Noilh Allanlic
Co-opeialion Council and lalei lhe Pailneiship foi Peace consullalive
94 THI MA1OR PLAIRS
piocess. The allies also piomised lo ieoiganize and downsize NATO`s
foices and iely incieasingly on mullinalional lioop unils knilling Geiman
foices moie lighlly lo lhe widei NATO command sliucluie. n a message
lo Goibachev aflei lhe NATO summil, Bush iepoiled lhal, |ajs you
iead lhe NATO declaialion, wanl you lo know lhal il was wiillen wilh
you impoilanlly in mind, and made lhal poinl sliongly lo my colleagues
in London.``20
Allhough lhese compiomises helped lhe Soviels accepl Geiman unin-
calion and facililaled a peaceful end lo lhe Cold Wai, lhe longei-leim
implicalions aie less benign. NATO is now less a mililaiy alliance oi-
ganized lo defend ils membeis fiom leiiiloiial allack and moie a gioup-
ing of like-minded democialic slales seeking lo pieseive and exlend lhe
democialic communily in Iuiope and beyond. This has had lhe effecl
of making Seibian oppiession less loleiable. NATO could nol sland by.
l was NATO`s business. \nfoilunalely, lhis evolulion of NATO has
double-edged implicalions. NATO`s mosl impoilanl conliibulion of
slabilily in Iuiope was ils ullei defensiveness which even lhe Soviels
ullimalely appiecialed. n moving lo a moie aclive iole, NATO`s powei
looks moie conlioveisial and unceilain. NATO and lhe \niled Slales
have given up one of lhe ways lheii powei was made acceplable duiing
lhe Cold Wai. This is unsellling.
Ancrican prcponJcrancc
The lhiid undeilying developmenl lhal bioughl lhe \niled Slales lo
Kosovo bul also unsellled woild polilics is Ameiican piepondeiance.
Ameiican powei in lhe 199Os was wilhoul hisloiical piecedenl. No slale
in lhe modein eia has evei commanded such a dominanl posilion. The
decline in iival ideologies and lhe economic failings of olhei ma|oi slales
have added lo lhe ieach and peivasiveness of Ameiican powei. The
\niled Slales of Ameiica loday piedominales on lhe economic level, lhe
monelaiy level, on lhe lechnological level, and in lhe culluial aiea in lhe
bioad sense of lhe woid,`` lhe Iiench foieign minislei, Hubeil \ediine,
obseived in a speech in Paiis in eaily 1999. l is nol compaiable, in
leims of powei and inuence, lo anylhing known in modein hisloiy.``21
Ameiican piedominance has meanl lhal il musl play a leading iole in
humanilaiian inleivenlions and in enfoicing inleinalional noims of slale
conducl. The \niled Slales alone loday has lhe capabilily lo biing foice
lo beai in liouble spols wheie lhe offending goveinmenl ilself is mililaiily
capable. Bul lhis powei is also piovocalive, and lhe veiy inleinalional
communily in whose name such mililaiy inleivenlion mighl be caiiied
oul is woiiied aboul how Ameiican powei will be exeicised.
Ameiican powei is made moie acceplable lo olhei slales because il is
inslilulionalized powei. Theie aie limils on lhe aibiliaiy and indisciimi-
nale exeicise of lhis powei. NATO and lhe olhei secuiily liealies eslab-
lish some limils on lhe aulonomy of Ameiican mililaiy powei. Olhei
iegional and global mullilaleial inslilulions also funclion lo ciicumsciibe
and iegulaiize Ameiica`s powei in vaiious economic and policy iealms.
Resliainls aie manifesl lhiough some inslilulionalized limils on policy
aulonomy and mechanisms lhal allow olhei slales lo have a voice in
policy. As one foimei Ameiican Slale Depailmenl ofncial desciibes lhe
opeialion of lhis posl-wai oidei: The moie poweiful pailicipanls in lhis
syslem especially lhe \niled Slales did nol foisweai all lheii advan-
lages, bul neilhei did lhey exeicise lheii slienglh wilhoul subslanlial
iesliainl. Because lhe \niled Slales believed lhe Tiilaleial syslem was in
ils inleiesl, il saciinced some degiee of nalional aulonomy lo piomole
il.``22
The implicalion of lhis aigumenl is lhal lhe moie lhal powei peeks oul
fiom behind lhese inslilulions, lhe moie lhal powei will piovoke ieaclion
and iesislance. Ameiican leadeis aie indeed ambivalenl aboul enlangling
lhe counliy in iesliainls and commilmenls. This is seen mosl cleaily in
lhe liade aiea, wheie congiessional legislalion such as Supei 3O1 aulho-
iizes lhe execulive lo lake unilaleial aclion againsl counliies lhal lhe
\niled Slales goveinmenl |udges lo be engaged in unfaii liade. n con-
lenlious liade dispules wilh 1apan and olhei counliies, lhe \niled Slales
has used lhis legislalion lo lhiealen unilaleial laiiffs unless lhe offending
counliy opens ils maikels.23 l was lhe powei of lhe Ameiican maikel
lhe abilily lo inicl moie economic haim on 1apan lhan il could inicl
in ieluin lhal moved lhe dispule lo a selllemenl. n 1996, lhe Clinlon
adminislialion signed lhe so-called HelmsBuilon Acl, which aulhoiized
lhe Ameiican goveinmenl lo punish foieign companies lhal opeiale oi
liade wilh facloiies in Cuba lhal weie connscaled by lhe Cuban govein-
menl.24 Ofncials in Iuiope, Canada, and Mexico have denounced lhe
Acl as a violalion of inleinalional liade law. One Ameiican ofncial cap-
luied lhe view of goveinmenls aiound lhe woild lhal have been sub|ecl
lo lhieals of unilaleial liade disciiminalion: ou heai a lol of smallei
counliies calling lhis economic impeiialism, and somelimes you have lo
wondei whelhei oui veiy aggiessive appioach cieales moie ill will lhan il
is woilh.``25 The Ameiican goveinmenl`s embiace of mullilaleial liade
iules is decidedly ambivalenl. l has championed lhe eslablishmenl of lhe
Woild Tiade Oiganizalion and ils iule-based appioach lo liade, bul il
has also acled in violalion of al leasl lhe spiiil of lhe WTO wilh ils uni-
laleialisl liade policy.
The \niled Slales has also lefl ilself inslilulionally unencumbeied in
olhei aieas. l has failed lo ialify vaiious mullilaleial agieemenls and
96 THI MA1OR PLAIRS
convenlions dealing wilh land mines, enviionmenlal pioleclion, and lhe
pioposed nleinalional Ciiminal Couil.26 n ils ielalions wilh lhe \niled
Nalions, lhe \niled Slales has failed lo pay ils \N dues fully and il acled
in whal many obseiveis lhoughl was a heavy-handed mannei lo pievenl
Secielaiy-Geneial Boulios Boulios-Ghali fiom ieluining foi a second
leim. This pallein of Ameiican policy leads some lo woiiy openly aboul
whal looks lo be an incieasingly uniesliained woild powei. A Iiench
foimei ambassadoi iemaiked in lhe spiing of 1999 lhal lhe gieal menace
in woild polilics was Ameiican hypeipowei.`` Duiing lhe Cold Wai, lhe
\niled Slales and lhe Soviel \nion iesliained each olhei, wheieas now
lhe \.S. can do anylhing il wanls.``27 Iven an Ameiican ally, Geiman
Chancelloi Geihaid Schio dei, has iaised conceins. Thal lheie is a
dangei of unilaleialism, nol by |usl anybody bul by lhe \niled Slales, is
undeniable.``28
A lasling impacl of lhe Kosovo bombing campaign may be in lhe way
Ameiican powei is peiceived aiound lhe woild. One viilue of NATO
duiing lhe lasl yeais of lhe Cold Wai was lhal il was ullimalely seen by
Soviel leadeis as a defensive secuiily pailneiship. l seived lo iesliain
Ameiican and Weslein mililaiy powei. Bul lhe NATO bombing in
Seibia lakes lhe Alliance along a new palh of mililaiy inleivenlion oul-
side Alliance leiiiloiy. China and Russia along wilh olhei counliies
publicly condemned lhe NATO aclions puisued wilhoul \N Secuiily
Council sanclion.29 f NATO used lo be an alliance lhal bound powei
logelhei and down lheieby ieassuiing bolh ils membeis and ils neigh-
bouis il looks like somelhing veiy diffeienl loday. f lhe \niled Slales
diiven by ils own ideology of humanilaiian inleivenlion and NATO
change is using ils powei moie aclively and wilhoul medialion by \N-
slyle inslilulions, lhe slabilily of lhe pasl is lhiealened.
Conclusion
The Kosovo inleivenlion lells us a gieal deal aboul woild polilics al lhe
end of lhe lwenlielh cenluiy. n one sense, il is emblemalic of whal is
good aboul lhe conlempoiaiy inleinalional oidei. The leading slales in
Iuiope, logelhei wilh lhe \niled Slales, look a sland againsl lhe mosl
biulal slale-sponsoied violence lhal lhe conlinenl had seen in half a cen-
luiy. f someone, somehow had nol acled, lhal would have been a liagic
way lo end lhe cenluiy. Slandaids of demociacy and human iighls aie nol
univeisal and lhey aie nol consislenlly defended. Bul, in lhis mosl offen-
sive ciicumslance, lhe Weslein slales foughl back.
n anolhei sense, lhe Kosovo episode is moie lioubling. l ieveals lhe
unnnished woik lhal exisls aflei lhe Cold Wai in developing inslilulions
and aiiangemenls foi lhe inleinalional communily lo police ilself and
uphold ils slandaids of human iighls and humanilaiian |uslice. The posl
Cold Wai inleinalional oidei is a mix of conliadicloiy shifls and un-
sellled ioles and expeclalions. Ameiican powei is bolh a useful lool and
a piovocalive obslacle lo lhe slable and legilimale funclioning of lhe
syslem. l sils on lop of a fiagile foundalion. Ameiican powei is vilal if
lhe inleinalional communily is lo acl whelhei il acls in Iuiope lhiough
NATO oi elsewheie in lhe woild lhiough lhe \N Secuiily Council.
While lhe iesl of lhe woild woiiies aboul lhe polenlial aggiessiveness
and unilaleialism of Ameiican powei, lhe Ameiican people aie moie
inclined lo queslion whelhei lhal powei should be used al all. The iesull
is an oidei wheie a polilical chain iuns fiom a humanilaiian disaslei in a
iemole pail of lhe woild lhiough Washinglon, DC, and oul lo a faim in
owa, wheie lhe Ameiican piesidenl is foiced lo go and make lhe case
lhal il is woilh Ameiican casuallies lo uphold absliacl piinciples and
woild-oidei obligalions.
The end of lhe Cold Wai did nol piovide lhe soil of hisloiical bieak
as il did in 1815, 1919, and 1945 lo galhei lhe woild leadeis logelhei lo
discuss nisl piinciples and new inslilulions. The cuiienl syslem is a
palchwoik and il is cleaily al iisk. On lhe specinc issue of humanilaiian
inleivenlion, lhe lwo exlieme oplions eilhei Ameiican unilaleial inlei-
venlion oi inleivenlion sanclioned by lhe \N Secuiily Council seem
incieasingly difncull lo suslain on a consislenl basis. The alleinalives aie
eilhei a seiies of iegionally based secuiily foices lhal have lhe local
legilimacy and capacily lo acl in vaiious conlingencies oi some soil of
ad hoc coalilion of lhe willing. Kosovo makes il cleai lhal lhe woild
communily needs lo nnd ways lo iaise basic queslions and lo ieoiganize
lhe mix of inleinalional noims, inleinalional inslilulions, gieal powei
inleiesls, and Ameiican powei.
Noles
1. While House news confeience, 2O 1une 1999.
2. Piesidenlial iemaiks, 22 1une 1999.
3. Leslie H. Gelb, uelling lhe Teacup Wais: The New Woild`s Conslanl Challenge,``
Iorcign Ajjairs, \ol. 73, No. 6, NovembeijDecembei 1994, pp. 56.
4. The Clinlon adminislialion`s slialegy of enlaigemenl of encouiaging lhe expansion of
a communily of democialic nalions`` is piemised on ils belief lhal, as lhe piesidenl
has indicaled many limes, demociacies iaiely wage wai on one anolhei.`` Piesidenl
William Clinlon, Confionling lhe Challenges of a Bioadei Woild,`` \S Depailmenl of
Slale, Buieau of Public Affaiis, Dispatch, \ol. 4, No. 39, 1993, p. 3.
98 THI MA1OR PLAIRS
5. On lhis sliand of lhinking in Ameiican foieign policy and ils suipiising embiace by
piesidenls as ideologically diffeienl as 1immy Cailei and Ronald Reagan, see Tony
Smilh, Ancricas Mission. Thc UnitcJ Statcs anJ thc VorlJwiJc Strugglc jor Dcnocracy
in thc Twcnticth Ccntury, Piincelon, N1: Piincelon \niveisily Piess, 1994.
6. See Tony Smilh, n Defense of nleivenlion,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, \ol. 73, No. 6, Novembeij
Decembei 1994, pp. 3446.
7. This view, foi example, is a coineislone of Ameiican policy lowaid China: lhe piomo-
lion of liade and lhe cieeping economic liansfoimalion il facililales will giadually luin
China in lhe diieclion of Weslein-slyle demociacy and accommodalion wilhin lhe exisl-
ing inleinalional oidei.
8. Bailon Gellman, The Palh lo Ciisis: How lhe \niled Slales and ls Allies Wenl lo
Wai,`` Vashington Iost, 18 Apiil 1999, p. A1.
9. Secielaiy of Slale Albiighl, inleiview, lhe PBS Newshoui wilh 1im Lehiei, 1O 1une
1999.
1O. See Chailes Kiaulhammei, Humanilaiian nleivenlion,`` Thc National Intcrcst, Iall
1999.
11. Movemenls championing lhe eiadicalion of slaveiy, lhe pioleclion of lhe iighls of
woikeis and elhnic minoiilies, and equal iighls wilhoul disciiminalion did appeai in lhe
nineleenlh cenluiy and in lhe eaily lwenlielh cenluiy.
12. See 1ack Donnelly, The Social Consliuclion of nleinalional Human Righls,`` in Tim
Dunne and Nicholas 1. Wheelei, eds., Hunan Rights in Clobal Iolitics, Cambiidge:
Cambiidge \niveisily Piess, 1999, pp. 711O2.
13. Richaid Ialk, 1aw in an 1ncrging Clobal Villagc. A Iost-Vcstphalian Icrspcctivc,
Aidsley, N: Tiansnalional Publisheis, 1998.
14. bid., p. 34.
15. See Michael Cox, G. 1ohn kenbeiiy, and Takashi noguchi, eds., Ancrican Dcnocracy
Ironotion. Inpulscs, Stratcgics anJ Inplications, New oik: Oxfoid \niveisily Piess,
2OOO.
16. Piesidenl Woodiow Wilson, Reply lo lhe Peace Appeal of lhe Pope, 27 Augusl 1917.
17. uoled in Mikhail Goibachev, Mcnoirs, New oik: Doubleday, 1995, p. 529.
18. uoled in ibid., p. 533.
19. Moie geneially wilhin lhe Soviel foieign policy eslablishmenl, some ofncials saw secu-
iily benenls in lhe Weslein syslem lhal kepl Geimany and 1apan bound lo a laigei
Ameiican-led alliance syslem. See 1eiiy Hough, Russia anJ thc Vcst. Corbachcv anJ thc
Iolitics oj Rcjorn, New oik: Simon & Schuslei, 199O, pp. 21922O; and Michael 1.
Sodaio, Moscow, Ccrnany, anJ thc Vcst jron Khrushchcv to Corbachcv, lhaca, N:
Coinell \niveisily Piess, 199O, pp. 341342.
2O. uoled in Geoige Bush and Bienl Scowciofl, A VorlJ TransjorncJ, New oik: Knopf,
1998, p. 295.
21. uoled in Ciaig R. Whilney, NATO al 5O: Wilh Nalions al Odds, s l a Misalliance?``
Ncw York Tincs, 15 Iebiuaiy 1999, p. A7.
22. Robeil B. Zoellick, 21
sl
Cenluiy Slialegies of lhe Tiilaleial Counliies: n Conceil oi
Conicl? The \niled Slales,`` papei piesenled al annual meeling of lhe Tiilaleial
Commission, Spiing 1999, p. 5.
23. Supei 3O1 was invoked by lhe \niled Slales in ils aulomobile dispule wilh 1apan in
1995, allhough an agieemenl was ieached befoie lhe Ameiican laiiffs weie imposed.
See David I. Sangei, A Deal on Aulo Tiade: The Agieemenl,`` Ncw York Tincs, 29
1une 1995, p. 1.
24. Michael Wines, Senale Appioves Compiomise Bill Tighlening Cuibs on Cuba,`` Ncw
York Tincs, 6 Maich 1996, p. 7.
25. David I. Sangei, Play lhe Tiade Caid,`` Ncw York Tincs, 17 Iebiuaiy 1997, p. 1.
26. See Lauia Silbei, Divisions Aie Deep ovei New Wai Ciimes Couil,`` Iinancial Tincs,
6 Apiil 1998.
27. Iloia Lewis, \ncomfoilable wilh \.S. Powei, Real oi llusoiy,`` Intcrnational HcralJ
Tribunc, 14 May 1999, p. 5.
28. Whilney, NATO al 5O,`` p. A7.
29. Anlhony Iaiola, Bombing of ugoslavia Awakens Anli-\.S. Ieeling aiound lhe
Woild,`` Vashington Iost, 18 May 1999, p. A1; and Caila Anne Robbins, Ieais of \.S.
Dominance Oveishadow Kosovo \icloiy,`` Asian Vall Strcct 1ournal, 7 1uly 1999, p. A1;
Robeil I. Illswoilh and Michael M. May, An Oveiieaching \.S. Spuis Ieais Woild-
wide,`` Korca HcralJ, 2O 1uly 1999, p. A2.
1OO THI MA1OR PLAIRS
7
Russia: Reassessing nalional
inleiesls
VlaJinir Baranovsky
This chaplei focuses upon analysing Russia`s peiceplions of, and alliludes
lo, lhe ciisis in Kosovo, as well as on ils implicalions foi Russia`s foieign
and secuiily policy lhinking and policy-making. ndeed, lhe developmenls
of lhis conicl have inuenced Russia`s ideas aboul ils ielalions wilh lhe
oulside woild in a moie fundamenlal way lhan mosl olhei evenls duiing
lhe pasl decade. The ongoing ieassessmenl of Russia`s nalional inleiesls
in lhe lighl of lhe Kosovo ciisis mighl have a consideiable impacl on lhe
ma|oi lines of Russia`s foieign and secuiily policy.
The chaplei oullines lhe following aspecls of lhis pioblem: Russia`s
peiceived inleiesls associaled wilh lhe iegion; lhose conceining Russia
ilself and ils immediale enviionmenl; lhose conceining lhe inleinalional
aichilecluie in Iuiope; lhose lhal have a global chaiaclei and concein
lhe ma|oi liansfoimalion of lhe inleinalional syslem and lhe piinciples of
ils funclioning. n addilion, lhe chaplei addiesses lhe domeslic conlexl of
Russia`s ieaclion lo lhe Kosovo ciisis and Russia`s piaclical policy.
Regional paiameleis
The developmenls in and aiound Kosovo have been assessed by Russia
in lhe conlexl of ils bioadei slakes ialhei lhan in leims of lhe counliy`s
specinc inleiesls in lhe iegion. This seems lo be a fundamenlal diffeience
fiom lhe silualion al lhe beginning of lhe lwenlielh cenluiy, when Russia
1O1
was compeling wilh olhei ma|oi inleinalional aclois foi inuence in lhe
Balkans. Thus, Russia`s polilical ieaclion look iemaikably lillle accounl
of lhe counliy`s economic inleiesls in lhe iegion because lhey do nol
iepiesenl anylhing special compaied wilh olhei aspecls of Russia`s inlei-
aclion wilh lhe exleinal woild. This lheme is only maiginal in Russian
debales, allhough il is possible lo idenlify lwo exceplions.
Iiisl, aflei lhe beginning of aii sliikes againsl lhe Iedeial Republic
of ugoslavia (IR), lhe inlioduclion of lhe NATOjIuiopean \nion
embaigo on supplies of eneigy iesouices lo lhe IR piovoked some
concein aboul Russia`s evenlual nnancial losses if ils oil and gas deliv-
eiies weie inleiiupled.1 Howevei, lhis concein was ielalively low pionle:
Russia announced lhal il would nol obseive lhe embaigo, which had
been adopled conliaiy lo \N iules, and a scenaiio of Russia`s lankeis
being foicibly denied access lo sea leiminals in Monlenegio mighl luin
lhe conicl inlo a bioadei RussiaNATO mililaiy confionlalion; againsl
lhis backgiound lhe issue of economic losses would become iiielevanl.2
Secondly, wilh lhe end of hoslililies, Russia manifesled inleiesl in
being involved in inleinalional effoils aimed al iesloiing lhe devaslaled
aieas.3 Al lhe same lime, and in lighl of lhe counliy`s pooi nnancial sil-
ualion, Russian expeils did nol conceal lheii sceplicism aboul ils aclual
abililies lo lake pail in such effoils.
Among Russia`s non-maleiial`` inleiesls in lhe iegion, aigumenls
ailiculaling elhno-ieligious solidaiily wilh lhe Seibs had a ceilain emo-
lional impacl on Russia`s polilical scene in lhe inilial phase aflei lhe slail
of lhe NATO mililaiy opeialion. Bul lhey did nol play a signincanl iole
in Russian debale lo a consideiable exlenl owing lo lhe aclual oi po-
lenlial alliludes of non-Slav and non-Oilhodox iegions andjoi populalion
(foi inslance, in Talaislan and some aieas of lhe Noilhein Caucasus).
The ofncial aulhoiilies delibeialely downplayed lhis lheme because of ils
explosive chaiaclei.
The NATO aii sliikes did piovoke bioad solidaiily wilh lhe Seibs, bul
lhis was mainly based on sympalhy foi ugoslavia, which was iegaided as
lhe viclim of aggiession and piessuie fiom lhe poweiful nalions, being
sub|ecled lo unfaii liealmenl by lhose lhal aie sliongei and moie nu-
meious and lheiefoie can impose lheii will on lhe one lhal is weakei.4 l
should be noled lhal lhese views aie sliikingly similai lo lhe aigumenls of
lhose in lhe Wesl who weie ieady lo iecognize lhal, even if lhe wai
againsl lhe IR was nol legilimale in lhe piopei sense, il was based on
moial consideialions (solidaiily wilh Kosovais as viclims of iepiession).
ndeed, Russia`s alliludes nol only ofncially bul also as manifesled by
public opinion weie also signincanlly maiked by moial impeialives
(allhough, obviously, fiom a diffeienl angle).
This can be explained, among olhei faclois, by a diffeienl focus on
1O2 THI MA1OR PLAIRS
whal had pieceded NATO`s mililaiy opeialion. The lheme of elhnic
cleansing againsl lhe Albanians in Kosovo had been al lhe cenlie of
public allenlion in lhe Wesl, wheieas il was haidly menlioned in lhe
Russian mass media. l should be noled, howevei, lhal lhe lallei`s cov-
eiage of developmenls in Kosovo soon became moie balanced (lhis lime
wilhoul a concomilanl shifl in lhe Wesl).
The dynamics of lhe polls shows lhis veiy cleaily: in lhe eaily slages,
appioximalely lwo-lhiids of iespondenls consideied NATO lo have sole
iesponsibilily foi lhe wai, bul lhis shaie soon slailed lo fall, while lhe
peicenlage blaming Slobodan Milosevic sleadily incieased.5 Milosevic is
slill nol piesenled as lhe devil incainale (as happens in lhe Wesl), bul lhe
lheme of solidaiily wilh lhe Seibs`` has slailed lo include new molives.
Ioi inslance, even if Belgiade`s behavioui in Kosovo had been fai fiom
iiiepioachable, il had nol amounled lo genocide.6 Moieovei, il would be
un|usl lo use double slandaids and lo blame only lhe Seibs foi whal had
happened in Kosovo ignoiing olhei similai cases bolh in lhe Balkans
(wheie seveial hundieds of lhousands of Seibs had been diiven oul of
Kiaina in 19941995) and elsewheie (as in Tuikey wilh iespecl lo lhe
Kuids).7
Russia`s sliong ciilicism of NATO`s mililaiy opeialion againsl ugo-
slavia was also connecled wilh Russia`s own mililaiy opeialions in
Chechnya (in 19941996) and eailiei Soviel expeiience in Afghanislan.
Bolh lhese cases geneialed a sliong conviclion in Russia lhal aii sliikes
aie nol lhe mosl appiopiiale means of dealing wilh elhnic pioblems.8
Russian inleiesls in lhe iegion weie also debaled in lhe conlexl of lhe
issue of eslablishing a union`` wilh lhe IR.9 Two aigumenls weie de-
veloped lo suppoil lhis pio|ecl: nisl, Russia is (oi should be) inleiesled in
acquiiing loyal pailneis andjoi clienls in lhe Balkans; secondly, ugo-
slavia could iealislically be consideied a candidale foi such a iole (owing
lo hisloiical links and elhno-ieligious afnnily, on lhe one hand, and be-
cause il uigenlly needs Russia, on lhe olhei hand). Howevei, lhe inilial
(and even somewhal hysleiical) enlhusiasm foi lhe evenlual union of
lhiee`` (Russia, Belaius, and ugoslavia) was dampened by seiious
counlei-aigumenls. Ioi Belgiade, only an alliance wilh a mililaiy com-
ponenl would make sense, wheieas foi Moscow lhis would involve diiecl
involvemenl in lhe ongoing wai againsl lhe Wesl. n addilion, lheie weie
doubls aboul lhe molives of Milosevic, who needs Russia now bul mighl
opl foi lhe Wesl in lhe fuluie, especially when looking foi capilal lo
iesloie lhe counliy. The caulious allilude of Russia`s ofncial aulhoiilies
luined lhe idea of a union inlo a puiely lheoielical nolion wilh viilually
no chance of being lianslaled inlo piaclical policy.
Allhough a polilical piesence in lhe Balkans is nol openly ailiculaled
as Moscow`s ofncial goal, implicilly lhis seems lo be Russia`s mosl signif-
R\SSA: RIASSISSNG NATONAL NTIRISTS 1O3
icanl iegional inleiesl. Such a piesence is iegaided as necessaiy in oidei
lo pievenl developmenls in lhe aiea being complelely conliolled by olhei
inleinalional aclois (in lhis conlexl, NATO`s mililaiy aclion was assessed
as an allempl lo diive Russia oul of lhe iegion). Russia`s piesence also
seems lo be consideied possible, because il mighl be acceplable and even
desiiable foi iegional and exleinal aclois as an impoilanl balancing ele-
menl. Moieovei, along lhe same lines of lhinking, lhe Balkans mighl be
lhe only aiea oulside lhe leiiiloiy of lhe foimei \SSR wheie Russia has
a chance lo achieve iesulls lhal aie nol available lo olhei exleinal aclois
(as happened in Iebiuaiy 1994 when Russia pievenled NATO aii sliikes
againsl lhe Seibs neai Saia|evo, lhus opeialing, foi lhe nisl lime in lhe
posl-Soviel peiiod, as a ieal gieal powei``).
. . . lomoiiow Russia?
Russia is deeply conceined wilh lhe possibilily lhal lhe Kosovo pallein
mighl be applied lo Russia ilself oi lo ils immediale enviionmenl. This
alaimism ieecls lhe widely spiead unceilainly aboul lhe leiiiloiial in-
legiily of lhe counliy, wilh lhe case of Chechnya being of special iele-
vance lo Russia`s peiceplions of lhe developmenls in and aiound Kosovo.
f a humanilaiian calasliophe`` (especially one wilh consideiable elhnic
dimensions) is iegaided by NATO counliies as legilimale giounds (oi as a
pielexl) foi inleivenlion and if such a silualion should emeige in Russia
(which is by no means an implausible pioposilion), lhen Russia`s inleiesls
aie peiceived as diieclly affecled by lhe wai againsl ugoslavia.10 Seibia
loday, Russia lomoiiow`` is al lhe heail of alaimisl assessmenls of devel-
opmenls in Kosovo.
Ivenlual exleinal involvemenl in lhe conicl zones in Russia`s posl-
Soviel enviionmenl is anolhei mallei foi concein, and polenlially even
moie seiious. NATO mighl considei opeialing againsl Russia ilself lo be
a iisky policy, bul lheie would be fewei consliainls (oi self-iesliiclions)
on applying lhe Kosovo model oulside Russia (Seibia loday, Nagoino-
Kaiabakh lomoiiow``).11 This in ilself is a diiecl challenge lo lhe logic
lhal all ex-\SSR leiiiloiy is Russia`s vilal inleiesls zone.``
Russia expecled lhal NATO`s campaign againsl ugoslavia would
piomole lhe consolidalion of lhe Commonweallh of ndependenl Slales
(CS) aiound Russia on an anli-NATO basis. Howevei, lheie weie only
spoiadic signals lo lhis effecl (as in lhe \kiaine pailiamenl12). Al lhe
same lime, allempls lo develop a |oinl CS ieaclion lo lhe NATO aclions
againsl ugoslavia failed; even lhe idea of boycolling lhe NATO |ubilee
session in Washinglon did nol woik. n lhe evenl, only Piesidenl Luka-
shenko of Belaius piediclably suppoiled Russia`s sliong anli-NATO
posilion.13 Iuilheimoie, some CS counliies` leadeis (such as Geidai
Aliyev in Azeibai|an and Iduaid Shevaidnadze in Geoigia) saw in lhe
Kosovo scenaiio an alliaclive model foi addiessing lheii own uniesolved
conicls.14 This also iepiesenls an obvious challenge lo Moscow`s pie-
lensions lo a special iole`` wilhin lhe CS (in pailiculai, wilh iespecl lo
whal is peiceived oi piesenled as Russia`s exclusive peacekeeping
polenlial in lhis aiea).
Re|ecling NATO-cenliism
The developmenls aiound Kosovo, as viewed by Russia, weie lhe mosl
convincing |uslincalion foi ils opposilion lo lhe piospecl of a NATO-
cenlied Iuiope. The Kosovo phenomenon has conliibuled lo lhe con-
solidalion of Russia`s anli-NATO sland moie lhan any campaign againsl
lhe enlaigemenl of NATO. Iuilheimoie, if lhe lhesis of Russia`s oppo-
silion lo NATO iegaiding ils aggiessive chaiaclei`` had looked like
eilhei puie piopaganda oi somelhing inheiiled fiom lhe Cold Wai eia,
lhe aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia weie an impiessive manifeslalion of ils
validily.15 Any possible aigumenls lhal NATO mighl become a guaian-
loi of slabilily in Iuiope (foi inslance, wilh iespecl lo lhe issue of Tian-
sylvania) have losl lheii ielevance and seem complelely inappiopiiale.
The Kosovo wai has iaised lhe queslion of Russia`s fuluie ielalions
wilh NATO. Those who had been againsl signing lhe Iounding Acl on
Mulual Relalions, Coopeialion and Secuiily Belween NATO and lhe
Russian Iedeialion in 1997 see lhe silualion as convincing pioof lhal
lheii logic was coiiecl and lhal coopeialive ielalions wilh NATO aie
only an illusion, legilimizing NATO`s policy and iesliicling Russia`s
abilily lo oppose il. Accoidingly, Moscow`s anlagonism lowaids NATO`s
aclions in ugoslavia has lo be expiessed by iesolulely bieaking off all
ielalions wilh lhis mililaiy alliance.
Howevei, il was cleai in Moscow lhal such a bieak would mean a
ieluin lo lhe confionlalional pallein in ielalions wilh lhe Wesl. The
polilical selllemenl of lhe Kosovo issue would iequiie inleiaclion wilh
NATO.16 Iuilheimoie, NATO would iemain inuenlial in lhe oveiall
posl-selllemenl conlexl, and having no mechanisms foi dealing wilh
NATO would haidly be in Russia`s inleiesls. The solulion seemed lo be
consideiably lo ieduce lhe pionle of ielalions wilh NATO, wilhoul how-
evei bieaking lhem off complelely and iiieveisibly.
This was ceilainly a heavy blow lo schemes lhal favouied lhe develop-
menl of a kind of RussiaNATO axis`` (oi al leasl a piivileged pailnei-
ship``) as lhe ma|oi sliucluial elemenl of lhe fuluie Iuiopean aichilecluie.
Iven lhe noimal`` pailneiship was suspended and became pioblemalic.
l should be noled, howevei, lhal iesolving lhe ciisis logelhei wilh
NATO`` was seen as a piaclical way (oi even as lhe lasl chance) lo
iesloie conndence and lo ie-eslablish a pailneiship.17
The evenls in Kosovo had a pailiculai impacl on Russia`s conceins
aboul NATO`s expansion easlwaids. Allhough gaining addilional |uslin-
calion, lhese conceins paiadoxically became coupled wilh piediclions
lhal NATO, having expeiienced consideiable pioblems wilh Kosovo,
would in fuluie be moie caulious and iefiain fiom moving loo quickly in
lhe diieclion of Russia`s fionlieis. The Alliance would also be molivaled
by a desiie lo downplay Russia`s aiioganl ieaclion lo lhe wai againsl
ugoslavia. Theie weie also hopes lhal lhe enlhusiasm of polenlial new
membeis of NATO would be somewhal diminished by lhe veiy facl of
NATO`s aggiession.18
The posilion of lhe Iuiopean NATO counliies piovoked deep dis-
appoinlmenl in Russia; lheii abilily lo opeiale independenlly fiom lhe
\niled Slales luined oul lo be consideiably lowei lhan had been ex-
pecled. Accoiding lo Russian obseiveis, lhis has seiiously undeimined
lhe piospecls of building a sliong Iuiopean pole.``19 l seems iemaik-
able, howevei, lhal Russia`s vocifeious anli-NATO campaign in lhe con-
lexl of Kosovo was oiienled almosl exclusively againsl lhe \niled Slales,
on lhe lacil undeislanding lhal ils Wesl Iuiopean allies only had lo yield
lo Ameiican piessuie. Al lhe same lime, Russia hopes lhal lhe Kosovo
ciisis will piomole lhe self-idenlily of Iuiopeans, lheii alienalion fiom
lhe \niled Slales, and lheii inleiesl in exlia-NATO`` palleins (such as
lhe Oiganizalion foi Secuiily and Co-opeialion in Iuiope).20 l seems
quile possible lhal one of lhe consequences of lhe ciisis in Kosovo will be
Russia`s incieased focus upon Iuiope.
Global conceins
Ioi Russia, lhe mosl painful aspecl of developmenls aiound Kosovo
is lheii global implicalions.21 Heie, lhiee ma|oi lhemes aie lo be
highlighled.
Iiisl, lheie is lhe feeling lhal inleinalional law and lhe \N-based inlei-
nalional oidei aie aclually collapsing, which would have calasliophic
consequences foi Russia. Thal is why Russia is deleimined lo pievenl lhe
eiosion of lhe iole of lhe \N Secuiily Council and lo hindei lhe eslab-
lishmenl of a new inleinalional syslem allowing aibiliaiy inleifeience
in lhe inleinal affaiis of slales (on humanilaiian`` oi any olhei giounds).
Russians lhink lhal lhis inleipielalion of lhe Kosovo case mighl be ie-
ceived favouiably by many olhei inleinalional aclois, including such in-
uenlial ones as China and ndia22 which is by no means a gioundless
assumplion.
n lhis iespecl, Russia is aclually a slalus quo powei`` and pioceeds
fiom conseivalive posilions wheieas lhe \niled Slales and NATO aie
opeialing as ievolulionaiy poweis`` looking lo change lhe exisling in-
leinalional oidei.23 Whalevei lhe aigumenls in favoui of each of lhese
appioaches mighl be, il is nolewoilhy lhal discussions in Russia have
scaicely louched on lhe lack of efnciency of lhe inleinalional syslem and
ways of making il moie effeclive and adapling il lo lhe new iealilies in
sliiking conliasl lo lhe debales in lhe Wesl wheie even lhe opponenls of
lhe NATO mililaiy campaign pay seiious allenlion lo lhis pioblem.
A second mallei of seiious concein is Russia`s iole in lhe emeiging
inleinalional oidei. f lhis has a cleaily oligaichic`` chaiaclei wilh key
decisions being lhe monopoly of a limiled numbei of slales, Russia`s
allilude depends lo a consideiable exlenl on whelhei oi nol il is a pail of
lhis nucleus,`` on whelhei oi nol il is accepled in lhis capacily by lhe
olhei ma|oi poweis. The evenls aiound Kosovo have pioved lhal seiious
doubls on lhis scoie aie moie lhan |uslined, and in facl consolidale
lhe feeling lhal Russia is being ielegaled lo lhe sidelines of woild devel-
opmenls. n lhe mosl diamalic inleipielalion of lhis lheme, Russian ob-
seiveis believe lhal lhe new ieoiganizalion of woild powei has alieady
slailed, in a piocess lhal beais compaiison wilh lhe lwo pievious ie-
oiganizalions (in 1918 and 1945) oi may even be moie fundamenlal.
n such ciicumslances, Russians seem lo considei lhal lheie aie only
lwo oplions: eilhei lo submil and adapl lo lhis silualion, oi lo challenge
il. The nisl appioach favouis siding wilh lhose who aie poweiful and
piedominanl on lhe inleinalional scene, even if only foi piagmalic iea-
sons: il is bellei lo be wilh lhe leadeis lhan wilh lhe maiginal aclois. l
should be noled lhal such ialionalism would be veiy unpopulai in loday`s
Russia, wheie indignalion againsl NATO oflen pievails ovei lhe undei-
slanding lhal coopeialion wilh lhe Weslein counliies is of vilal necessily
(foi nnancial and economic ieasons). The alleinalive mighl involve
looking foi pailneis oulside lhe Iuio-Allanlic`` zone (and evenlually
among anli-Weslein iegimes), wilh lhe aim of making lhe Wesleineis
lake Russia inlo accounl. Similai (and even moie alliaclive) logic insisls
lhal Russia`s iesponse should conlain a signincanl elemenl of foice.
n facl, a seiious ieassessmenl of lhe iole of foice is lhe lhiid and mosl
conlioveisial consequence of lhe Kosovo wai in leims of Russia`s lhink-
ing aboul lhe bioadei aspecls of ils inleiaclion wilh lhe exleinal envi-
ionmenl. The use of foice has become less un|uslinable``: NATO has sel
a piecedenl, and Russia should nol hesilale if il consideis lhal iesoiling
lo mililaiy means is necessaiy. Moieovei, lo avoid whal happened lo lhe
Seibs, Russia will have lo iely on mililaiy slienglh ialhei lhan on any
illusions aboul |uslice and good inlenlions in inleinalional ielalions.
Since Russia is nol lhe only one lo come lo such conclusions, some
analysls have piedicled giowing inleiesl in Russian aims in woild
maikels.24 Howevei, lhis side-effecl of lhe ciisis in Kosovo will lake a
long lime lo become opeialive and may be nullined by lhe impiessive
peifoimance of NATO high-piecision weapons in lhe wai againsl ugo-
slavia. Al lhe same lime, an incieasing ieliance on mililaiy piepaialions
woildwide mighl have negalive implicalions foi Russia`s secuiily and
foieign policy inleiesls. n addilion, lhe non-piolifeialion iegime and lhe
piospecls of ils consolidalion mighl be pul al iisk. n piinciple, Russia
should wanl lo minimize such deslabilizing consequences, bul lhis can
happen only lhiough coopeialive effoils wilh lhe Weslein counliies. n-
slead, lhe veiy possibilily of such effoils has been undeimined by lhe
Kosovo phenomenon.
Domeslic aspecls
The ongoing assessmenl of Russia`s inleiesls as a iesull of Kosovo is veiy
much associaled wilh lhe domeslic silualion in lhe counliy.25 This link
lakes lwo main foims. On lhe one hand, lhe Kosovo phenomenon has
had a consideiable impacl on lhe polilical almospheie inside Russia;
some speculale lhal il could complelely change lhe diieclion of lhe
counliy`s developmenl. On lhe olhei hand, Russia`s ofncial policy wilh
iespecl lo Kosovo has been sliongly inuenced by domeslic faclois; an
exlieme view is lhal lhe Kiemlin was molivaled only by lhe consliainls of
lhe polilical sliuggle againsl ils domeslic opponenls, in lhe nnal analysis
beliaying`` lhe Seibs in oidei lo gel suppoil fiom lhe Wesl.26
Iven if such exlieme assessmenls aie pul aside, lhe domeslic dimen-
sion of Russia`s alliludes lowaids lhe evenls in Kosovo is slill signincanl.
NATO`s mililaiy opeialion in ugoslavia is bioadly peiceived as dis-
ciediling democialic values`` (lo lhe exlenl lhal lhey aie associaled wilh
lhe Weslein counliies): NATO sliikes weie caiiied oul againsl Russian
demociacy ialhei lhan againsl Milosevic. Iuilheimoie, il has piovoked a
ieal idenlily ciisis foi domeslic pio-Weslein gioups; mosl of lhem con-
demn NATO`s aclions and aie no longei suie aboul aiguing in favoui of
coopeialive ielalions wilh lhe Wesl, anlicipaling an incieasingly sceplical
ieaclion by sociely al laige.27
The communisl and nalional paliiolic`` opposilion used lhe evenls in
Kosovo as a veiy convenienl pielexl lo condemn lhe Kiemlin foi ils ovei-
all Weslein-oiienled foieign policy slialegy. Oveiexaggeialed lamenls on
lhe lheme of Russia being luined inlo a besieged foiliess`` aie accom-
panied by all lhe usual lhings, such as xenophobia, mililaiislic alliludes,
and appeals lo ieplace lhe maikel economy by lhe old cenlialized
appioach which would allow iesouices lo be mobilized as in lhe wailime
economy.
Ioi lhe ofncial aulhoiilies, lhe mosl impoilanl domeslic aspecl of lhe
evenls in Kosovo is lhe possibilily of playing a iole in sellling lhe ciisis: if
Moscow is successful in lhis iespecl, lhe goveinmenl and lhe piesidency
mighl hope lo consolidale lheii posilions inside lhe counliy. Conveisely,
lhey aie sliongly ciilicized foi nol pioviding adequale suppoil lo ugo-
slavia, as well as foi sending signals (we will nol lel Kosovo be
louched``28) lhal misled Belgiade because lhey weie nol backed up by
aclual aclion.
The polilical sliuggle inside and oulside lhe Kiemlin and lhe shadow of
foilhcoming pailiamenlaiy and piesidenlial eleclions have had a consid-
eiable impacl on lhe behavioui of all lhe ma|oi polilical aclois wilh
iespecl lo lhe Kosovo ciisis.29 Al lhe same lime, lhe consolidaling effecl
on lhe Russian domeslic scene should nol be exaggeialed; lhe piospecl
of building an anli-Weslein coalilion based on bioad condemnalion of
NATO`s aclions, as advocaled by lhe nalional paliiolic`` foices, does
nol seem iealislic.
Iinally, lhe Kosovo case`` has undoubledly affecled lhe allilude of lhe
goveinmenl, lhe polilical e liles, and lhe public al laige lo lhe use of foice
in Russia`s domeslic conicls. ndeed, lhe inilialion of lhe mililaiy offen-
sive in Chechnya in lhe second half of 1999 was obviously inuenced by
lhe Kosovo model,`` all ofncial slalemenls lo lhe conliaiy nolwilh-
slanding. Aflei hesilaling`` foi almosl lhiee yeais, Moscow decided lo
use foice againsl lhe bieakaway iepublic as NATO did in ugoslavia,
bul wilh lhe convincing |uslincalion of applying lhis means lo ils own
leiiiloiy, i.e. wilhoul violaling inleinalional law.
Seaiching foi a policy
All lhese faclois have shaped lhe behavioui of Russia`s goveinmenl,
which has seemed lo follow lhiee basic guidelines: nisl, lo ailiculale
sliong opposilion lo NATO`s policy wilh iespecl lo Kosovo and lo man-
ifesl Russia`s ieadiness lo oppose ils consequences; secondly, lo pievenl a
diamalic collapse of lhe whole syslem of ielalions wilh lhe Wesl; lhiidly,
lo capilalize on ils iole as a medialoi, on piomoling a peaceful solulion lo
lhe ciisis, and on making Russia`s engagemenl indispensable lo all lhe
pailies involved. The ielalive piioiilies wilh iespecl lo lhese lhiee aspecls
weie nol lhe same al diffeienl phases of lhe Kosovo ciisis, and somelimes
lhey cleaily conliadicled each olhei.
Befoie lhe beginning of lhe NATO mililaiy campaign, Moscow was
liying lo combine solidaiily piessuie`` on Belgiade30 wilh allempls lo
advocale lhe inleiesls of lhe IR (oi, al leasl, lo make lhe demands of
lhe woild communily`` less inliansigenl).31 Combining and balancing
lhese lwo appioaches wilhin lhe nleinalional Conlacl Gioup iequiied
inlensive and al lhe same lime delicale diplomalic manoeuviing.32
Moscow was successful in puisuing lhis policy when il played a ciucial
iole in pievenling lhe mililaiy inleifeience of NATO in Oclobei 1998; il
failed lalei, duiing lhe Rambouillel lalks and on lhe eve of NATO aii
sliikes in IebiuaiyMaich 1999 (allhough lhis failuie may be alliibuled
lo lhe exhauslion of lhe Wesl`s palience ialhei lhan lo lhe pooi peifoi-
mance of Russia`s diplomacy).33
n lhe lighl of lhe NATO aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia, Russia has
announced ils inlenlion lo ieconsidei a numbei of key elemenls of ils
policy on lhe mililaiy aspecls of secuiily. Numeious ambilious ideas have
been developed in lhis conlexl: incieasing mililaiy expendiluie; focusing
on modein mililaiy lechnologies (including lhose lhal mighl be used in
oulei space); highlighling lhe iole of nucleai weapons as a counleibal-
ance lo NATO`s supeiioiily in convenlional weapons; alleiing appioaches
lo lhe deploymenl of nucleai weapons (wilh suggeslions of deploying
lhem in Belaius, in lhe Kaliningiad special zone,`` and on naval vessels);
ieconsideiing unilaleial pledges wilh iespecl lo laclical nucleai weapons
as well as olhei aims conliol agieemenls; updaling lhe mililaiy docliine
(in pailiculai, by foimulaling a lhesis lhal Russia faces ma|oi mililaiy
lhieals fiom lhe Weslein slialegic diieclion); and so on.
Many of lhese ideas had been expiessed eailiei, bul lhe developmenls in
Kosovo did make lhem moie convincing. l is also cleai lhal vaiious coi-
poiale foices in Russia aie inleiesled in ailiculaling lhese lhemes, wilh lhe
Kosovo case pioviding addilional aigumenls foi doing so. Al lhe same
lime, obvious nnancial consliainls pievenl many of lhese suggeslions fiom
being implemenled, and a moie sobei analysis would poinl lo lheii coun-
leipioduclive chaiaclei in leims of Russia`s inleiesls.34 Howevei, il would
nol be an exaggeialion lo say lhal lhe evenls in Kosovo have liiggeied a
piocess of ieassessing lhe mililaiy aspecls of secuiily in Russia, which may
veiy seiiously affecl lhe piospecls foi ils ielalions wilh Weslein counliies.
Taking inlo accounl lhis woiiying liend, Russia`s giealesl challenge
was lo avoid gelling inlo a diiecl confionlalion wilh lhe Wesl (which
could be caused, foi inslance, by mililaiy assislance lo Belgiade).35 Rus-
sia`s lop ofncials look conciele sleps lo dampen lhe enlhusiasm of pio-
ponenls of a new Cold Wai.36 Ioi a lime, pievenling Russia`s involve-
11O THI MA1OR PLAIRS
menl in lhe ongoing hol wai seemed lo be Moscow`s highesl polilical
piioiily (which, as was said eailiei, piovoked sliong condemnalion of lhe
aulhoiilies foi beliaying Seibian biolheis``). On lhe polilical level,
Russia`s ofncial opposilion lo NATO was accompanied by effoils lo
mainlain bilaleial inleiaclion wilh lhe Weslein counliies, as well as wilh
lhe Iuiopean \nion.37
Nolwilhslanding all lhe negalive implicalions of lhe Kosovo ciisis, as
peiceived by Russians, il has unexpecledly conliibuled lo making Rus-
sia`s inleinalional iole weighliei. ndeed, when lhe hoslililies inilialed
againsl ugoslavia did nol biing aboul a quick vicloiy, lhis silualion
paiadoxically ensuied Russia`s inleinalional cenlialily (albeil lempo-
iaiily). Moscow was asked lo mediale, was lislened lo, and hopes weie
pinned on il lo foige a selllemenl and lo nnd a way oul of lhe impasse
inlo which NATO had pul ilself.38 Russian diplomacy look lhis oppoilu-
nily, opeialing eneigelically and piofessionally. Howevei, lhese effoils
(as well as lheii piaclical iesulls) weie consideiably affecled by all lhe
above-menlioned conlioveisial and conicling liends bolh in Russia`s
polilical lhinking and in Russia`s polilical mechanisms.
Nol suipiisingly, opinions in Russia aboul Russia`s iole in lhe Kosovo
selllemenl lhal was nnally achieved in 1une 1999 covei a veiy bioad
speclium. ndeed, assessmenls of lhe mosl impoilanl aspecls of lhe sel-
llemenl and lhe chaiaclei of Russia`s involvemenl may complelely con-
liadicl each olhei. Ioi inslance:
.
Russia`s conliibulion lo media-
lion was essenlial: Moscow in-
duced lhe Wesl lo soflen ils po-
silion39 and convinced Belgiade
lo accepl selllemenl.
.
Russia only opeialed as a
poslman`` deliveiing NATO`s
demands lo ugoslavia;40 Mos-
cow beliayed lhe Seibs by ie-
fusing lo back lhem any longei
and pushing lhem lo capilu-
lale.41
.
Ioimei piime minislei \ikloi
Cheinomyidin played a ciucial
iole in achieving lhe agieemenl
and deseives a Nobel Peace
Piize.
.
He opeialed exliemely un-
piofessionally, he was manipu-
laled by lhe Ameiicans (oi he
even delibeialely played inlo
lheii hands, which amounls lo
beliayal), and he ienounced
many impoilanl piovisions lhal
had been achieved by lhe foi-
eign minisliy (which had veiy
lillle piospecl of ienegolialing
his concessions`` lalei).
R\SSA: RIASSISSNG NATONAL NTIRISTS 111
.
The famous maich`` of 2OO
Russian peacekeepeis fiom
Bosnia lo Piislina (12 1une) was
a foimidable move in leims of
ils psychological, polilical, and
mililaiy effecls, allowing Russia
lo iaise lhe slakes in lhe sellle-
menl piocess and making lhe
Wesl moie iespeclful lowaids
Russia and moie iesponsive lo
ils demands.
.
This was a hasly and pooily
planned aclion, caiiying high
polilical and mililaiy iisks, and
nol seiiously lhoughl oul in
leims of ils consequences.42
.
Russia`s involvemenl in KIOR
is commensuiale wilh ils iole as
a ma|oi Iuiopean powei and
consolidales ils inleinalional
slalus.
.
Wilhoul ils own secloi and
being pail of a single chain of
command, Russia is opeialing as
a |unioi pailnei, has no oppoi-
lunily lo inuence lhe silualion
in Kosovo,43 and in facl is only
pioviding addilional polilical
backing foi a NATO-led peace-
keeping opeialion.44
This lisl could be longei, bul il highlighls Russia`s domeslic luimoil and
confusion. Howevei, wilh iespecl lo Kosovo, lhis confusion is by no
means of only domeslic oiigin. l is nolewoilhy lhal commenls in Russia
aboul lhe peifoimance of lhe NATO-led conicl selllemenl in Kosovo
weie becoming moie and moie sceplical by lhe end of 1999. n pailiculai,
lhese poinled lo lhe failuie lo piovide effeclive secuiily pioleclion foi lhe
Seib minoiily in Kosovo. Mosl Russians seemed lo believe lhal lhis made
absolulely iiielevanl lhe aigumenl lhal NATO inleivenlion had been
molivaled by human iighls consideialions.45
Russia`s olhei giievances weie focused upon lhe inadequale imple-
menlalion of vaiious piovisions of \N Secuiily Council Resolulion 1244.
The eslablishmenl of lhe KLA-based mililaiy coips was assessed as being
inconsislenl wilh lhe pioclaimed goal of disaiming Kosovo Albanians.
Decisions lo issue peisonal Ds and lo inlioduce a paiallel cuiiency weie
consideied lo affecl lhe soveieignly of ugoslavia ovei lhe piovince.
These and many olhei facls weie iegaided as leading lo Kosovo`s Jc jurc
secession fiom ugoslavia, conliaiy lo lhe compiomise lhal seemed lo
have been achieved in 1une.46
Iuilheimoie, Russian ofncials complained lhal numeious piaclical ac-
lions weie laken wilhoul consullalion wilh lhe Secuiily Council and even
wilhoul infoiming il piopeily.47 This mighl endangei lhe whole logic of
Russia`s involvemenl buill upon lhe idea of channelling lhe selllemenl
112 THI MA1OR PLAIRS
inlo lhe \N fiamewoik. n such ciicumslances, some analysls slailed lo
aigue in favoui of wilhdiawing Russia fiom lhe selllemenl piocess, since
Moscow had luined oul lo be unable lo inuence il.48
By and laige, lhe implicalions of evenls in Kosovo foi Russia`s foieign
policy seem lo be bolh signincanl and conliadicloiy. Togelhei wilh lhe
whole inleinalional communily, Russia faces lhe foimidable challenge of
assessing lhe painful lessons of lhe Kosovo ciisis and luining lhem inlo
innovalive lhinking and consliuclive effoils.
Noles
1. Slepan Sulakshin, Russkaya nefl dlia seibskikh lankov,`` Nc;avisinaya ga;cta, 12 May
1999, p. 3; Taias Laiiokhin, Alians pylayelsa zadushil ugoslaviyu neflianoi udavkoi,``
I;vcstia, 29 Apiil 1999, p. 5.
2. \ladimii Allasov, Nachnel li NATO dosmoli iossiyskikh lankeiov,`` Nc;avisinaya
ga;cta, 29 Apiil 1999, pp. 1 and 6.
3. Moscow suggesled lhal Russia`s iepiesenlalive lo lhe Iuiopean \nion would iepiesenl
Russia in lhe Iuiopean agency foi ieconsliucling ugoslavia. See Rossiya poluchil
doslup k iesuisam eviopeyskogo inveslilsionnogo banka,`` I;vcstia, 1 Seplembei 1999,
p. 2.
4. Seigei Slailsev, Balkanskiy piislup geopolilichesogo daivinizma,`` Osobaya papka NC
(special appendix lo Nc;avisinaya ga;cta), No. 1, Apiil 1999, p. 12.
5. \aleii \yzhulovich, Maslo-da, pushki-nel,`` I;vcstia, 16 Apiil 1999, p. 1.
6. This aigumenl became even moie convincing lalei, wilh iepoils of signincanl exaggei-
alion of lhe numbei of Albanian viclims of elhnic cleansing in Kosovo (hundieds ialhei
lhan lens of lhousands). See Ikaleiina Glebova, Te klo poddeizhival NATO slali
zheilvami naduvalel`slva,`` I;vcstia, 1O Novembei 1999, p. 4.
7. Mikhail Goibachev, among olheis, sliongly condemned NATO foi double slandaids in
Nc;avisinaya ga;cta, 21 Apiil 1999, p. 3.
8. See lhe inleiview wilh a foimei commandei of lhe 4Olh Aimy (Soviel aimed foices
deployed in Afghanislan), Colonel Geneial Boiis Giomov, in Nc;avisinoyc voycnnoyc
obo;rcniyc, No. 16, 1999, pp. 1 and 2.
9. This idea, launched by Slobodan Milosevic aflei lhe slail of aii sliikes againsl ugo-
slavia, was suppoiled by lhe Slale Duma of lhe Russian Iedeialion on 16 Apiil 1999.
See Dmiliiy Tienin and Ikaleiina Slepanova, eds., Kosovo. Mc;hJunaroJniyc aspckty
kri;isa, Moscow Cainegie Cenlei, Moscow: Gendalf, 1999, p. 258.
1O. l should be noled lhal lhe nolion of a humanilaiian calasliophe`` became an especially
sensilive lopic foi Moscow seveial monlhs lalei when lhe anli-leiioiisl opeialion`` in
Chechnya iesulled in appioximalely 2OO,OOO iefugees.
11. Ilmia Akhundova, NATO budel bombil i Kaiabakh?`` Obschaya ga;cta, 1521 Apiil
1999, p. 4.
12. The sensilivily in \kiaine is lo a consideiable exlenl explained by lhe Ciimea pioblem
(wilh lhe obvious possibilily of diawing a paiallel wilh lhe Kosovo case).
13. Semion Novopiudskiy, Soyuz boiby i liuda,`` I;vcstia, 25 Apiil 1999, p. 1.
14. See Andiei Koibul, Baku golov voeval za Kaiabakh,`` Nc;avisinaya ga;cta, 3 1une
1999, p. 5; Nodai Bioladze, Popylki uskoiil miiolvoicheskie piolsessy,`` Nc;avisinaya
ga;cta, 3 1une 1999, p. 5.
15. Accoiding lo aulhoiilalive analysl and polilician Alexei Aibalov, NATO has been
liansfoimed fiom a defensive alliance opposing a sliong mililaiy enemy in lhe Iasl inlo
an expansionisl alliance wilh offensive aimed foices and opeialional plans.`` uoled in
Konikt v Kosovo. Noviy kontcxt jornirovaniya rossiyskikh natsionalnykh intcrcsov,
Moscow: IaslWesl nslilule (Moscow cenlie) and MIMO, 1une 1999, p. 19.
16. Alexei Aibalov, Kak iaspulal balkanskie uzly,`` Nc;avisinaya ga;cta, 7 May 1999,
p. 6.
17. See N. K. Aibalova, \ieguliiovanie kosovskogo kiizisa-shans veinul olnoshenia Rossii
i Zapada v iuslo peilneislva,`` in Rossia i ZapaJ. kri;is otnoshcniy v sphcrc bc;opasnosti
i problcna kontrolia naJ vvoru;hcniani, Moscow: MIMO, 1999, pp. 2629.
18. See Seigei Kaiaganov, Kak obialil poiazheniye v pobedu,`` Arguncnty i jakty, No. 15,
Apiil 1999, p. 4.
19. See Dmilii Danilov, Iioziya sliuclui eviopeyskoy bezopasnosli,`` in Konikt v
Kosovo, pp. 1821.
2O. See Maxim usin, Rim biosayel vyzov \ashinglonu i Londonu,`` I;vcstia, 29 May
1999, p. 1.
21. See lhe slalemenl by lhe inuenlial Council on Ioieign and Defence Policy in Nc;avi-
sinaya ga;cta, 16 Apiil 1999, pp. 1 and 8.
22. See Pavel Spiiin, Pioblemy s Ameiikoi Kilai ieshil bez Rossii,`` Nc;avisinaya ga;cta,
12 May 1999, pp. 1 and 6.
23. Maxim Sokolov, Zapad v boibe s Osvenlsimom,`` I;vcstia, 6 May 1999, p. 2.
24. Kaiaganov, Kak obialil poiazheniye v pobedu,`` p. 4.
25. See uii Davidov, Pioblema Kosovo v iossiyskom vnuliipolilicheskom konlexle,`` in
Tienin and Slepanova, eds., Kosovo, pp. 247279.
26. This lheme was bioadly discussed in commenls aboul foimei piime minislei \icloi
Cheinomyidin`s medialion effoils. See Oleg Zoiin, Mii vashemy domu,`` Irol
(Moscow), No. 2, 14 1une 1999, pp. 1314.
27. Alexandei Bovin, Komu elo vygodno?`` I;vcstia, 3O Apiil 1999, p. 4.
28. This was iepoiledly said by Piesidenl ellsin on lhe eve of lhe aii sliikes and was
inleipieled by Belgiade as a sign of sliong suppoil, allowing il lo sland nim againsl
NATO`s piessuie. See D. Goinoslayev and \. Sokolov, Boiis ellsin obyavil chlo mi
ne dadim lionul Kosovo,`` Nc;avisinaya ga;cta, 19 Iebiuaiy 1999.
29. Ioi inslance, mosl obseiveis believe lhal Piesidenl ellsin`s decision lo appoinl foimei
piime minislei \icloi Cheinomyidin as special iepiesenlalive foi lhe selllemenl of lhe
conicl in ugoslavia was sliongly molivaled by anli-Piimakov (lhen piime minislei)
and anli-Luzhkov (mayoi of Moscow and a likely candidale foi lhe nexl piesidency)
impulses. See \ilali Maisov and Nikolai \lianov, Cheinomyidin zaimelsa yugoslavskim
kiizisom,`` Nc;avisinaya ga;cta, 15 Apiil 1999, pp. 1 and 3.
3O. As one example of |oinl polilical aclion, one could poinl lo lhe Kosovo Diplomalic
Obseivei Mission launched by Russia and lhe \niled Slales in 1uly 1998. Howevei,
Russian analysls and obseiveis widely debaled lwo queslions: whelhei Russia should
opeiale logelhei wilh lhe Wesl and whelhei Moscow has signincanl lools lo inuence
Belgiade.
31. Ioi inslance, allhough suppoiling \N Secuiily Council Resolulion 116O, which in-
lioduced an aims embaigo againsl ugoslavia in Maich 1998, Russia dissocialed ilself
fiom such measuies as lhe denial of visas lo senioi Seibian iepiesenlalives and a moi-
aloiium on goveinmenl-nnanced ciedil suppoil foi liade and inveslmenl in Seibia. See
Slefan Tioebsl, The Kosovo Conicl,`` in Arnancnts, Disarnancnt anJ Intcrnational
Sccurity, SIIRI Ycarbook 1999, Oxfoid: Oxfoid \niveisily Piess, 1999.
32. See Ilena Guskova, Dinamika kosovskogo kiizisa i polilika Rossii,`` in Tienin and
Slepanova, eds., Kosovo, pp. 6972.
33. n a bioadei sense, lhe facl lhal lhe \niled Slales and lhe \niled Kingdom slailed
acling lhiough Weslein inslilulions (such as NATO and lhe I\) inslead of ielying on
lhe Conlacl Gioup may be alliibuled lo Russian obsliuclion of effoils in lhe lallei
(Tioebsl, The Kosovo Conicl,`` pp. 4762). n Russian debales, lhis poinl seems lo be
complelely ignoied.
34. Ioi inslance, deploying nucleai weapons in Belaius mighl biing aboul lhe nucleaiiza-
lion`` of new NATO membeis, which would inevilably undeimine Russia`s secuiily.
35. Alexei Aibalov slaled lhal lhe Kosovo ciisis was moie dangeious lhan lhe Cuban mis-
sile ciisis in 1962 (ScgoJnia, 22 Apiil 1999, p. 3; Nc;avisinoyc voycnnoyc obo;rcniyc,
No. 15, 1999, pp. 1 and 2).
36. The lisl of aclions suggesled by such pioponenls included: wilhdiawing fiom lhe \N
embaigo on weapons supplies lo Seibia, deliveiing modein aims lo Belgiade (in pai-
liculai, aii-defence syslems), liaining Seibian mililaiy peisonnel in Russia, allowing
Russian volunleeis lo go lo lhe Balkans, ienouncing ialincalion of START , and so
on. A senioi Minisliy of Defence ofncial slaled lhal lheie could even be somelhing
woise lhan lhe Cold Wai`` (Segodnia,`` news piogiamme on NT\, 12 Oclobei 1998).
Piesidenl ellsin`s piess secielaiy had lo ofncially disavow such ideas. See Pozilsiyu
Rossii opiedeliayul ne voyenniye,`` Rossiyskaya ga;cta, 15 Oclobei 1998.
37. l is nolewoilhy lhal Russia chose nol lo ieacl lo lhe I\`s decisions suppoiling NATO`s
mililaiy campaign againsl ugoslavia.
38. ulia Beiezovskaya, Rossiyu piiglashayul na kliuchevuyu iol,`` I;vcstia, 28 Apiil 1999,
p. 1; iina Kiivova, NATO khochel akliviziioval iol Moskvy,`` Russkaya nysl, 29
Apiil 5 May 1999, p. 6.
39. n pailiculai, lo accepl lhe necessily of lhe \N mandale, lo denne lhe foilhcoming
inlioduclion of mililaiy peisonnel in Kosovo as a secuiily piesence,`` and lo allow
Belgiade lo mainlain some foices in lhe piovince (as agieed by lhe G-8 in Bonn). See
Boiis \inogiadov, Diplomaly ieshali sudbu Kosovo za zakiylymi dveiiami,`` I;vcstia, 7
May 1999, p. 1; Rossia sblizila pozilsii Belgiada i NATO,`` Nc;avisinaya ga;cta, 8 May
1999, pp. 1 and 6.
4O. As a vaiialion on lhis lheme: even if lheie weie allempls by Moscow lo inuence lhe
couise of lhe negolialions, lhey weie delibeialely blocked by NATO as happened
when lhe indiclmenl was issued againsl Milosevic by lhe nleinalional Ciiminal Tiibu-
nal foi lhe foimei ugoslavia in The Hague. See Dmilii Goinoslayev, Zapad obmanul
Rissiyu i poslavil kiesl na balkanskom uieguliiovanii,`` Nc;avisinaya ga;cta, 28 May
1999, p. 1. Piesidenl ellsin had lo lhiealen lo wilhdiaw fiom negolialions if Weslein
counliies conlinued lo disiegaid Russia`s inilialives (Kieml seidilsa na NATO,``
Nc;avisinaya ga;cta, 13 May 1999, pp. 1 and 6).
41. Russian hawks`` denned lhe peace selllemenl as a new Munich`` (I;vcstia, 4 1une
1999, p. 1).
42. Allhough lhe immediale ieaclion of Russian public opinion lo lhis opeialion seemed
lo be posilive, lheie was also an uncomfoilable feeling lhal il was mainly an effeclive
gesluie aimed al iaising lhe moiale of lhe domeslic audience (we weie lhe nisl in
Kosovo!``), bul il diamalically disciediled Russia`s whole polilical machineiy in lhe eyes
of ils exleinal pailneis (wilh lhe foieign minislei, in lhe middle of negolialions, nol even
being infoimed and pul in an exliemely awkwaid silualion).
43. The deploymenl of Russian peacekeepeis in lhe noilhein pail of Kosovo, which had
iepoiledly been discussed al eailiei slages in lhe negolialions, would have allowed
Belgiade lo mainlain links wilh lhese aieas which would be of ciucial impoilance in
lhe evenl of lhe evenlual division of Kosovo (I;vcstia, 22 May 1999, p. 1). Russia failed
lo gel lhe agieemenl of lhe NATO pailneis foi lhis scheme.
44. l is nolewoilhy lhal lhe Russian mililaiy sliess noimal and business-like ielalions``
wilh NATO peacekeepeis in Kosovo (inleiview wilh lhe Commandei-in-Chief of Aii-
boine Ioices, Colonel Geneial Geoigi Shpak, in Nc;avisinaya ga;cta, 24 1une 1999,
pp. 1 and 2).
45. Ksenia Iokina, Seibam ne dayul dazhe uyli iz Kosovo,`` Nc;avisinaya Ca;cta, 29
Oclobei 1999, p. 6.
46. Maxim usin, Moskva omiachila liiumf zapadnykh diplomalov,`` I;vcstia, 23 Seplem-
bei 1999, p. 1.
47. See inleiview wilh Russia`s iepiesenlalive on lhe \N Secuiily Council, Seigei Laviov,
in I;vcstia, 11 Novembei 1999, p. 4.
48. usin, Moskva omiachila liiumf zapadnykh diplomalov,`` p. 1.
8
China: Whilhei lhe woild oidei
aflei Kosovo?
Zhang Yunling
nlioduclion
The NATO bombing campaign in Seibia, especially lhe bombing of lhe
Chinese embassy in Belgiade, was a gieal shock lo lhe Chinese. l was
lhe nisl lime lhal a iegional oiganizalion had allacked a soveieign slale
wilhoul lhe aulhoiizalion of lhe \niled Nalions and had made an em-
bassy a mililaiy laigel. The fundamenlal piinciple of lhe \niled Nalions
and inleinalional ielalions in lhe posl-wai peiiod has been lhe sovei-
eignly of slales. Ailicle 2 of lhe \N Chailei foibids membei counliies lo
use, oi lhiealen lo use, foice againsl anolhei membei. f lhis so-called
colleclive inleivenlion in a soveieign slale is legilimaled, il piovides a
caile blanche lo poweiful counliies lo use foice, oi lhiealen lo use foice
lo make olhei counliies change lheii domeslic policies, lheii govein-
menls oi lheii polilical syslems.``1 The ieal goal of NATO`s sliike againsl
ugoslavia was, as claimed by Piesidenl Clinlon, lo end Iuiope`s lasl
diclaloiship`` and biing demociacy lo Seibia. China is woiiied lhal whal
happened yesleiday in ugoslavia could occui lomoiiow in Asia, espe-
cially in China, whose minoiily and human iighls policies aie always
ciilicized by lhe \niled Slales and ils allies.
The ending of lhe Cold Wai makes lhe \niled Slales lhe only supei-
powei. Piesidenl Geoige Bush piomised a new woild oidei`` immedi-
alely aflei lhe vicloiy of lhe Gulf Wai againsl iaq. Bul whal does lhis
new oidei mean? A new oidei chaiacleiized by Pax Ameiicana`` is nol
117
acceplable. \S-led NATO`s mililaiy inleivenlion in ugoslavia is con-
sideied by China lo be an impoilanl measuie laken by lhe \S lo slep up
lhe implemenlalion of ils global slialegy of seeking hegemony al lhe luin
of lhe cenluiy, and a ma|oi indicalion of lhe new developmenl of lhe \S
hegemony.``2 NATO`s aclion againsl ugoslavia iaises many queslions
aboul lhe legilimacy of waging wai on a soveieign slale, lhe piinciples of
inleinalional ielalions, and lhe ciedibilily of lhe \niled Nalions.
Peace in lhe lwenly-nisl cenluiy will depend on mainlaining inlei-
nalional iules and laws passed by \N membeis wilh iespecl lo slale
soveieignly and equalily. These iules and laws aie nol old. The dangei is
lhal lhe new inleivenlionism`` based on powei may lead lo moie vio-
lence and a new aims iace, and lhus an unslable and dangeious woild.
Now is lhe lime foi lhe inleinalional communily lo discuss seiiously lhe
piinciples and ways lo safeguaid lhe secuiily of lhe new cenluiy.
China`s views on lhe Kosovo ciisis
Befoie NATO`s aii sliikes on ugoslavia, public opinion in China aboul
lhe poslCold Wai woild oidei was ielalively oplimislic lhough wilh
some ieseivalions. An ailicle published on an ofncial piess in China |usl
befoie lhe bombing consideied lhal lhe inleinalional silualion lends lo
have ielaxed geneially.`` As a iesull, inleidependence belween poweis
has inlensined, iegaidless of lhe conliadiclions and conicls lhal have
occuiied. Againsl lhis backgiound, dialogue and co-opeialion have be-
come a piincipal liend in lhe powei ielalions.``3 NATO`s bombing was
such a gieal shock lo lhe Chinese because lhey could nol believe a ie-
gional oiganizalion such as NATO would wage wai on a soveieign slale
lhal was nol a membei of NATO and had made no lhieal lo il al all.
Iiom lhe veiy beginning, China insisled on a peaceful solulion lo lhe
Kosovo ciisis lhal iespecled ugoslavian soveieignly and leiiiloiial
inlegiily, lhough lhis did nol mean lhal China ignoied lhe pioblems
involved. China lheiefoie veiy sliongly opposed NATO`s aii sliikes be-
cause il consideied NATO`s aii sliike un|usl and inhuman.``4 Chinese
leadeis called foi a faii and ieasonable solulion of lhe Kosovo pioblem
lhiough negolialions,`` and an end lo NATO`s mililaiy inleivenlion,
lhus ieluining lhe issue lo a polilical solulion.``5
The bombing of lhe Chinese embassy in Belgiade added fuel lo lhe
nie. The Chinese did nol believe il was an accidenl, seeing il ialhei as
a piemedilaled plan.`` Angiy sludenls and cilizens all ovei China look
lo lhe slieels lo demonsliale againsl lhe bombing and lhe appaienlly
baibaious \S aclion. n facl, whal lhe bombing caused was nol |usl
angei, bul also disliusl. Public opinion of lhe \niled Slales has changed.
A giowing numbei of people in China have slailed lo lhink lhal a \S-
dominaled woild oidei will nol give a faii place and chance foi China lo
develop and become sliong. Zhu Muzhi, piesidenl of lhe China Sociely
foi Human Righls, believes lhal lhe \niled Slales consideis China as a
baiiiei lo lhe exeicise of hegemony. So il will suiely look foi a chance lo
lhiealen China.``6 The Chinese aie pailiculaily anxious aboul whal \S
aclions in lhe Balkans piesage foi Asia. The \niled Slales may eslablish
a new alliance lo allack China on lhe excuse of humanilaiianism oi lhe
pioleclion of minoiilies in lhe fuluie. This has made lhe Chinese change
lheii view of lhe fuluie woild fiom moie benign`` lo moie hoslile.`` To
pul il simply, aflei lhe bombing, a woisl scenaiio`` was conlemplaled
and piepaied foi, ieveising lhe oplimislic peispeclive pievailing befoie
lhe ciisis.
Howevei, lhe angei and suspicion of lhe Chinese people did nol biing
aboul a fundamenlal change lo China`s oveiall policy. n a speech aflei
lhe \S missile allack on lhe Chinese embassy, \ice Piesidenl Hu 1inglao
slill slaled lhal China will uphold lhe policy of iefoim and opening lo
lhe oulside woild`` and wained people nol lo ovei-ieacl.``7 1iang Zemin
noled in his speech al lhe meeling welcoming back Chinese diplomals
in Belgiade lhal China will fuilhei expand opening lo lhe oulside
woild, conlinue lo conducl economic and lechnological exchange and co-
opeialion wilh olhei counliies.``8 An ediloiial in lhe ofncial Icoplcs
Daily on 3 1une 1999 ie-emphasized peace and developmenl as lhe lwo
oulslanding issues of lhe day,`` and made il cleai lhal upholding lhe
independenl foieign policy of peace also coveis piomoling fiiendly co-
opeialion wilh Weslein counliies, including lhe \S.``
Ioilunalely, wilh lhe ending of NATO`s bombing, lhe Kosovo issue
has nnally ieluined lo lhe \niled Nalions, lhough lhe piocess of iesolv-
ing il will slill be veiy long and loiluous. The challenge foi China is how
lo nnd a balance belween ils changed peispeclive and ils unchanged am-
bilious goal of modeinizalion.
China`s changed peispeclive
As indicaled above, lhe Chinese lended lo believe lhal lhe ending of lhe
Cold Wai would biing aboul a new woild oidei wilh less ideological and
mililaiy confionlalion and moie inlegialion and coopeialion. Thus il was
asseiled lhal peace and developmenl`` aie lwo ma|oi liends in oui
piesenl and fuluie woild, and China would en|oy a lasling peaceful
enviionmenl in which lo develop and modeinize. Bul moie lhan 7O days
of aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia by \S-led NATO caused a big shifl in
lhe views of lhe Chinese on lhe fuluie woild oidei.
CHNA: WHTHIR THI WORLD ORDIR AITIR KOSO\O? 119
Seveial leading scholais in China now see lhe woild fiom a new pei-
speclive. Wang izhou, a specialisl on inleinalional polilics in Bei|ing,
look NATO`s aclion as a waining al lhe luin of lhe cenluiy.`` Iiom a
global peispeclive, he summed up lhe nve long-leim possible impacls on
inleinalional ielalions: (1) lhe \niled Nalions will be made a meie ng-
uiehead, and lhe iole of lhe Secuiily Council ciushed; (2) lhe \niled
Slales and ils allies will expand lhe iole of NATO, which will biing aboul
a dangeious liend lowaids lhe globalizalion of NATO``; (3) a new aims
iace will be encouiaged; (4) elhnic conicls will inlensify; (5) lhe piin-
ciples of inleinalional ielalions will be changed.9 Hu Shicun fiom Shang-
hai concluded lhal lheie weie 1O ma|oi inuences. Apail fiom lhose
lhal aie similai lo Wang`s poinls, he noled especially lhe dangei of a \S
hegemony in lhe fuluie woild oidei, a confionlalional ielalionship
among big poweis, a new lhieal of high-lech mililaiy wai, as well as a
moie complex and insecuie enviionmenl foi China. He wained of lhe
possibilily foi lhe \niled Slales lo poke ils nose inlo China`s suiiound-
ing iegional affaiis and diieclly inleivene in China`s inleinal affaiis.``10
Wang`s and Hu`s views aie shaied by many olheis, lhough lhey aie nol
necessaiily iepiesenlalive of lhe ma|oiily of Chinese scholais.
The ending of lhe Cold Wai lefl lhe \niled Slales as lhe only supei-
powei in lhe woild. l is lhe sole slale wilh pie-eminence in eveiy domain
of powei economic, mililaiy, diplomalic, ideological, lechnological and
culluial wilh lhe ieach and capabililies lo piomole ils inleiesls in vii-
lually eveiy pail of lhe woild.`` Because of lhis supeiioiily, lhe \niled
Slales would cleaily piefei a unipolai syslem in which il would be lhe
hegemon.`` The dangei of lhis unipolai woild oidei is lhal il makes lhe
\niled Slales impose ils will on lhe olhei counliies. Among olhei lhings, il
has unilaleially allempled lo piessuie olhei counliies lo adopl Ameiican
values and piaclices iegaiding human iighls and demociacy; pievenl olhei
counliies fiom acquiiing mililaiy capabililies lhal could counlei Ameii-
can convenlional supeiioiily; enfoice Ameiican law exlia-leiiiloiially in
olhei socielies; giade counliies accoiding lo lheii adheience lo Ameiican
slandaids on human iighls, diugs, leiioiism, nucleai piolifeialion, missile
piolifeialion, and now ieligious fieedom; apply sanclions againsl coun-
liies lhal do nol meel Ameiican slandaids on lhese issues and calegoiise
ceilain counliies as iogue slales,` excluding lhem fiom global inslilulions
because lhey iefuse lo kow-low lo Ameiican wishes.``11
n launching lhe aii sliikes on ugoslavia, \S-led NATO acled wilh-
oul lhe aulhoiily of lhe \niled Nalions, which sel a veiy bad piecedenl
of inleifeiing in lhe inleinal affaiis of a soveieign slale. Biilish Piime
Minislei Tony Blaii slaled lhal NATO`s campaign was necessaiy be-
cause il cannol make lhe iegion safe foi lhe long leim while a diclaloi
iemains al lhe heail of il.``12 \icloiy in lhe wai againsl lhe Seibs lhus
became vilal foi lhe ciedibilily of NATO, ialhei lhan foi any olhei iea-
son. This pie-emplive`` use of foice by a sliong powei againsl a weak
one on lhe basis of ils own values`` will only cieale disoidei. l is iea-
sonable lo ask who can pievenl lhe \niled Slales oi a \S-led alliance
fiom doing lhe same lo olhei counliies in lhe fuluie if lhe aulhoiily and
legilimacy of lhe \niled Nalions aie ignoied and sidelined. China is
woiiied lhal NATO`s aclion againsl ugoslavia may become an impoi-
lanl slep in lhe seaich by lhe \niled Slales foi global hegemony.
China suppoils a mullipolai woild oidei. l is consideied lhal lhe
collapse of lhe bipolai pallein in lhe Cold Wai peiiod was followed by a
mulli-polaiizalion liend,`` and lhal lhe liend lowaids mullipolaiily
seives lhe inleiesls of woild peace and developmenl.``13 Only in a mul-
lipolai woild can \S aiiogance and unilaleialism`` be iesliained by
olhei poweis and inleinalional oiganizalions (lhe \niled Nalions in
pailiculai). NATO`s aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia, led by lhe \niled
Slales, seveiely obsliucled lhis liend.
The sliucluie of lhe mullipolaiily may be chaiacleiized by one supei-
powei and mulliple poweis`` (oi a uni-mullipolai syslem14), bul China
does nol wanl lo challenge oi compele wilh \S supeiioiily; il does,
howevei, ie|ecl \S dominalion oi hegemony. As a supeipowei, lhe
\niled Slales is nol lhiealened as fai as secuiily is conceined. Whal il is
nghling foi is aclually values, nol secuiily. This is consideied lo be lhe
iool of powei polilics.`` As Kissingei poinled oul, lhe paiadox is lhal a
counliy lhal lhinks of ilself as acling in lhe name of univeisal values is
seen by loo many olheis as acling aibiliaiily, oi inexplicably, oi aiio-
ganlly.``15 This value-diiven policy can only lead lo a iedivision of lhe
woild communily and new conicls.
Cold Wai lhinking`` is slill veiy sliong in lhe \niled Slales, and a
iising socialisl China is usually consideied a lhieal`` lo \S inleiesls. l
is naluial foi China lo woiiy lhal lhe \niled Slales will inleivene in
China`s inleinal affaiis, especially ovei lhe Taiwan issue, if ils hegemony
succeeds.
NATO`s aclion in Kosovo is suppoiled by a docliine of new inlei-
venlionalism.`` The new inleivenlionalism is based on a new |uslice``:
lhe ma|oi lhieals lo slabilily and well being now come fiom inleinal
violence`` and inleivenlion has been deemed appiopiiale wheie lhe
humanilaiian cosls of failing lo inleivene aie loo high.``16 This new doc-
liine iaises lhe queslions of who makes lhe |udgemenl on lhe cosl of
violence`` and who conducls lhe inleivenlion and by whal means. The
\N Chailei foibids membei counliies lo use, oi lhiealen lo use, foice
againsl anolhei membei (excepl when sanclioned by lhe \niled Nalions
undei Chaplei \ of lhe Chailei). Bul NATO launched lhe aii sliikes
againsl ugoslavia on ils own |udgemenl (lo pievenl elhnic cleansing``)
and wilhoul lhe aulhoiizalion of lhe \niled Nalions. f lhis is accepled,
lhe woild will become a much moie dangeious place because lhe sliong
counliies will be able lo gang up on weak ones. By mililaiily inleivening
in a soveieign slale, NATO liied haid lo iewiile inleinalional law on lhe
basis of ils own iules and values, which aie nol accepled by China oi
Russia, oi many olheis. Iven Michael 1. Glennon, who advocales lhe
new inleivenlionalism, is woiiied lhal il is dangeious foi NATO uni-
laleially lo iewiile lhe iules by inleivening in domeslic conicls on an
iiiegulai case by case basis``; |uslice, il luins oul, iequiies legilimacy;
wilhoul widespiead acceplance of inleivenlion as pail of a foimal |uslice
syslem, lhe new inleivenlionalism will appeai lo be buill on neilhei law
noi |uslice, bul on powei alone.``17 Tony Blaii piomised lo build a new
inleinalionalism based on values and lhe iule of law`` and lo embaik on
a new moial ciusade lo iebuild lhe Balkans wilhoul Slobodan Milo-
sevic.``18 This enfoiced oidei will nol ensuie peace in lhe iegion.
As a mallei of facl, inleivenlionism is nol al all new.`` The Chinese
aie veiy familiai wilh such humanilaiian inleivenlion`` in lheii pasl and
see il as a lool lhal was oflen used by advanced counliies lo conquei
so-called baibaious ones`` and lo impose civilized slandaids`` on lhem.
n facl, many so-called humanilaiian inleivenlions`` have a cleai polili-
cal backgiound oi slialegic inleiesl, and aie no moie lhan a covei, oi a
pielexl foi lhem.``19 The Chinese lend lo believe lhal NATO`s ma|oi
concein in lhe Balkans is lheii slialegic impoilance.
l is cleai lhal China, as a iising powei, woiiies a \S dominalion oi
hegemony, and, as a socialisl counliy, China is anxious aboul possible
Weslein-imposed values backed by colleclive inleivenlion.``
Whal ieally woiiies China?
The end of lhe Cold Wai allowed China lo emeige fiom lhe shadow of
lhe supeipoweis` confionlalion and lo adopl an independenl foieign
policy. China hopes lhal coopeialion, ialhei lhan confionlalion, will be-
come lhe main fealuie of inleinalional ielalions, and lheie have been
many posilive developmenls in lhis diieclion. Ioi example, lhe iole of lhe
\niled Nalions in peacekeeping and in conliolling and managing inleinal
conicls has been iecognized and slienglhened. Relalions belween lhe
big poweis have been impioved based on vaiious kinds of pailneiship.``
Iconomic coopeialion and inlegialion aie incieasingly emphasized and
suppoiled. Wilh lhe success of ils economic iefoim and opening policy,
China is on lhe iise and has become moie aclive and conndenl in iegional
as well as inleinalional pailicipalion and coopeialion. On lhe whole, lhe
inleinalional silualion conlinues lo move lowaid ielaxalion. The foices
foi peace and slabilily keep giowing,`` connimed 1iang Zemin, piesidenl
of China, even aflei NATO slailed bombing ugoslavia. Bul al lhe same
lime he wained lhal lhe woild is slill nol a lianquil place.`` The Cold
Wai menlalily slill lingeis on and hegemony and powei polilics manifesl
lhemselves fiom lime lo lime. The lendency lowaids closei mililaiy alli-
ances is on lhe iise. New foims of gunboal policy aie iampanl.``20 n op-
posing NATO`s unilaleial bombing, China ieveals ils veiy ieal woiiies:
possible inleivenlion in ils own inleinal affaiis by lhe \niled Slales and
ils Weslein allies.
China`s biggesl concein is lhe silualion in lhe Asia-Pacinc iegion, and
lhe possibilily of a \S-led coalilion in Asia againsl China. Allhough China
has eslablished a new ielalionship`` bolh wilh lhe \niled Slales (called a
consliuclively slialegic pailneiship) and wilh 1apan (a coopeialive pail-
neiship foi peace and developmenl), ieal liusl has nol developed. n lhe
new guidelines foi fuluie \S and 1apanese secuiily coopeialion, which
change fundamenlally lhe fealuie and conlenl of lhe \S1apan secuiily
liealy,`` a neighbouiing silualion`` is denned as silualions lhal would
have an impoilanl inuence on 1apan`s secuiily.`` The inclusion of lhe
Taiwan Sliail in 1apan`s neighbouiing aiea`` would give il lhe pielexl lo
inleivene if il |udged il lo be necessaiy. Whal makes China moie anxious
is lhal lhe ielevanl Acl was passed by 1apan`s Diel (pailiamenl) when
NATO was launching aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia. A slienglhened and
expanded \S1apan secuiily alliance could play a iole as Asia`s NATO``
because lhe idea is lhal 1apan can gain lhe inilialive by sliiking foieign
bases nisl`` if ils secuiily is consideied lo be lhiealened. Whal is moie,
lhe \niled Slales and 1apan have decided lo develop lhe Thealie Missile
Defence (TMD) syslem, which laigels China as a polenlial lhieal.``21
TMD will gieally enhance lhe oveiall offensive and defensive level of lhe
\S1apan mililaiy alliance and suiely leaves China wilh neilhei an offen-
sive noi a defensive capabilily. Allhough lhe TMD is claimed lo be a
puiely defensive syslem, il will cieale a slialegic imbalance. n pailiculai,
if Taiwan is included in lhe TMD piogiamme, China has no choice bul lo
ob|ecl sliongly.
NATO`s mililaiy aclion in lhe Balkans ie-aleiled China lo lhe ieal
dangei lo ils secuiily. Looking aiound lhe iegion, China suspecls lhe
\niled Slales of a iegional slialegy. Aside fiom ils mililaiy piesence and
a slienglhened \S1apan alliance, lhe \niled Slales has incieasingly
expanded oi slienglhened ils bilaleial mililaiy lies wilh many counliies
suiiounding China. To China il looks as if lhe \niled Slales is weaving
a nel`` lo conlain il.
China is also conceined lhal lhe \niled Slales is launching a new
Cold Wai againsl socialisl counliies.``22 The ielease of lhe Cox Repoil,
which accused China of slealing oi illegally acquiiing sophislicaled \S
nalional defence lechnology, is seen as a new signal foi lhe \niled Slales
lo wage an ideological wai againsl socialisl China. The Chinese woiiy
lhal, if lhis liend conlinues, lhe dangei of \S inleivenlion in China`s
inleinal affaiis will inciease. The mosl likely fuse`` is slill lhe Taiwan
issue (on lhe pielexl of defending Taiwan`s demociacy, foi example).
Anolhei challenge is lhe conlinuing lension and confionlalion in lhe
Koiean peninsula, which could lead lo mililaiy inleivenlion by lhe \niled
Slales and ils allies in Noilh Koiea. China is opposed lo any mililaiy in-
leivenlion in Noilh Koiea, piefeiiing dialogue and negolialion (belween
lhe Noilh and lhe Soulh, foui-paily lalks, elc.). n lhe face of lhe
heighlened almospheie as a iesull of lhe Noilh Koiean missile launch
(lhough lempoiaiily halled) and lhe \S1apanSoulh Koiea mililaiy
coalilion, lhe dangei of mililaiy aclion cannol be iuled oul. China could
become involved in lhe conicl again if lheie was a unilaleial mililaiy
sliike againsl Noilh Koiea by lhe \niled Slales and ils allies. This would
diamalically change lhe silualion in lhe iegion, which China does nol
wanl lo see happen. China has played a posilive iole in ielaxing lhe len-
sions on lhe Koiean peninsula, bul il cannol slop lhe \niled Slales fiom
laking sudden aclion using ils mililaiy supeiioiily.
Of couise, lhis does nol mean lhal China will lake an oveiall hoslile
oi confionlalional posilion lowaids lhe \niled Slales and ils allies. As
obseived by Iiank Chen, China will conlinue lo adheie lo long leim
goals by giving lop piioiily lo developing lhe economy and, on lhe exleinal
fionl, will seek a co-opeialive ielalionship wilh lhe Wesl.``23 ndeed,
China needs a long-leim peaceful enviionmenl in oidei lo develop and is
only loo well awaie lhal lhe collapse of lhe foimei Soviel \nion was due
lo compeling foi mililaiy supeiioiily wilh lhe \niled Slales and adopling
a confionlalional slialegy lowaids lhe Wesl. Howevei, China believes
lhal il can play a posilive iole in checking \S hegemony and moving
lowaids a faii inleinalional oidei.
China`s pioposed piinciples foi a new woild oidei
China has pioposed a sel of piinciples foi a new woild oidei lhal is diffei-
enl fiom lhe vision of a new oidei`` designed by lhe \niled Slales. The
ofncial line on lhese piinciples has been pul foiwaid on many occasions:
.
The piinciples of mulual iespecl foi soveieignly and leiiiloiial inleg-
iily, mulual non-aggiession and non-inleifeience in each olheis` inlei-
nal affaiis.
.
The piinciple of lhe peaceful selllemenl of dispules. Dispules belween
counliies and conicls wilhin a iegion should be faiily and ialionally
iesolved lhiough peaceful negolialions and consullalion based on
equalily, ialhei lhan lhiough iesoil lo foice oi lhieal of foice on lhe
slienglh of mililaiy advanlage.
.
The piinciple of lhe soveieign equalily of all lhe counliies in lhe woild.
l is essenlial fully lo iespecl and give play lo lhe posilive iole of lhe
\niled Nalions in safeguaiding woild peace and slabilily.
.
The piinciple of iespecling lhe nalional condilions of each and eveiy
counliy and seeking common giound while shelving diffeiences. Iveiy
counliy is enlilled lo choose ils social syslem, ioad lo developmenl and
way of life independenlly in line wilh ils own nalional condilions.
.
The piinciple of mulually benencial coopeialion and common devel-
opmenl. No counliy should make use of ils economic, lechnological,
and nnancial advanlages lo damage lhe economic secuiily and devel-
opmenl of olhei counliies.24
These piinciples weie well iepiesenled in lhe |oinl slalemenl by lhe
leadeis of nve counliies China, Russia, and lhiee Cenlial Asian coun-
liies (Ta|ikislan, Kazakhslan, and Kyigyzslan) which is consideied
diffeienl fiom lhal deiived fiom lhe Cold Wai menlalily`` and a nne
example in lhe inleinalional aiena.``25
l is cleai fiom lhe above piinciples lhal whal China wanls is equal and
faii inleinalional ielalions. China iealizes lhal lhis is an ideal, bul lhis
does nol mean lhal il should be given up. ndeed, lhe ieason China so
sliongly opposed NATO`s mililaiy inleivenlion oi any olhei unilaleial
inleivenlion in a counliy by foice is ils insislence on lhe piinciples of
non-inleivenlion. NATO is an oiganizalion of lhe Cold Wai. The Cold
Wai has ended, so il should nol be slienglhened and enlaiged. As a mili-
laiy oiganizalion wilhoul Russia, il cannol make Iuiope safe on lhe basis
of full pailicipalion and coopeialion. Likewise, lhe \S1apan mililaiy
alliance in Asia should nol be ienewed in view of lhe liend lowaids in-
cieasing mullilaleial coopeialion in lhe iegion. n lhe face of a slienglh-
ened \S1apan mililaiy alliance, China has no choice bul lo enhance ils
own mililaiy capabilily. As poinled oul above, lhe TMD will suiely biing
aboul an aims iace in Iasl Asia (including Russia).
China has pioposed a new secuiily concepl`` based on lhe above
piinciples. As iegaids Asia-Pacinc secuiily coopeialion, China suppoils a
posilive iole foi lhe ASIAN Regional Ioium (ARI). Secuiily coopeia-
lion wilh Russia and lhe Cenlial Asian counliies (lhiough lhe nve coun-
liies` boidei liusl agieemenl) also ieecls China`s effoils lo cieale a dif-
feienl model fiom lhal of lhe Weslein allies. Howevei, il seems lhal lhe
\niled Slales and 1apan do nol liusl lhis sofl appioach.``
As foi lhe \niled Nalions, since lhe end of lhe Cold Wai il has ex-
panded and slienglhened ils iole in peacekeeping and inleivenlions in
inleinal conicls. Bul ils ciedibilily was bioughl inlo queslion when
NATO launched lhe aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia. China made gieal
effoils lo ieluin lhe issue lo lhe \niled Nalions, and lhis ieinfoices lhe
uigency of making iules lo pievenl any powei oi coalilion of poweis
fiom using foice againsl olheis.
Conclusion
The Kosovo ciisis is evidence of a new kind of dangei lhiealening woild
slabilily and secuiily. NATO`s mililaiy aclion wilhoul lhe aulhoiizalion
of lhe \niled Nalions damaged lhe ciedibilily of lhe \N Secuiily Council
and sel a dangeious piecedenl foi lhe inleivenlion in lhe inleinal affaiis
of a soveieign counliy by one powei oi a coalilion of poweis.
China is conceined lhal, if NATO`s unilaleial inleivenlion is nol
opposed, lhe \niled Slales and ils allies mighl some day in lhe fuluie
similaily inleivene in lhe inleinal affaiis of counliies in Asia. The funda-
menlal ieason China so sliongly opposed NATO`s bombing was lo insisl
on lhe piinciples foi a faii and slable woild oidei.
Of couise, il should be undeislood lhal lhe woild has changed and lhe
iules musl be ad|usled in oidei lo ieecl lhe new iealily and meel lhe
new iequiiemenls. n facl, China does nol ie|ecl all kinds of inleivenlion.
Whal China does insisl is lhal lhe inleivenlion should be based on iules
and aulhoiized by lhe \N Secuiily Council. Any new iule-making musl
be done by lhe inleinalional communily wilh lhe full pailicipalion of all
membeis, nol |usl a few counliies. The new inleivenlionism docliine``
based on pie-emplion cannol be laken foi gianled in dealing wilh inlei-
nalional ielalions.
Noles
1. Iiem Shankai 1ha, Tiagedy in lhe Balkans: NATO`s Monumenlal Blundei,`` VorlJ
Ajjairs, \ol. 3, No. 2, 1999.
2. Bcijing Rcvicw, \ol. 42, No. 24, 1999, p. 7.
3. ang Xiyue, Powei Relalions in Today`s Woild,`` Bcijing Rcvicw, \ol. 42, Nos. 91O, 1
Maich 1999, pp. 67.
4. Behind lhe Bombing of lhe Chinese Imbassy,`` Bcijing Rcvicw, \ol. 42, No. 21, 1999,
p. 5.
5. Icoplcs Daily, 3O Maich 1999.
6. Zhu Muzhi, NATO Lifls ls Mask of Humanilaiianism,`` Bcijing Rcvicw, \ol. 42, No.
21, 1999, p. 14.
8. Iorcign Ajjairs 1ournal (Bei|ing), No. 52, 1999, p. 32.
9. Wang izhou, Waining al lhe Ind of lhe Cenluiy,`` VorlJ Ajjairs (Bei|ing), \ol. 1271,
No. 1O, 1999, pp. 89.
1O. Hu Shicun, Ten Ma|oi nuences of Kosovo Wai,`` VorlJ Outlook (Shanghai), No. 13,
1999, pp. 1113.
11. Samuel P. Hunlinglon, The Lonely Supeipowei,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, MaichjApiil, 1999,
pp. 3536.
12. A New Moial Ciusade,`` Ncwswcck, 14 1une 1999, p. 35.
13. 1iang Zemin, Develop ChinaIuiope Coopeialion and Piomole lhe Islablishmenl of
a New Woild Oidei,`` Bcijing Rcvicw, \ol. 42, No. 15, 1999, p. 8.
14. Hunlinglon, The Lonely Supeipowei,`` p. 36.
15. Heniy A. Kissingei, New Woild Disoidei,`` Ncwswcck, 31 May 1999.
16. Michael 1. Glennon, The New nleivenlionalism The Seaich foi a 1usl nleinalional
Law,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, \ol. 78, No. 3, 1999, p. 4.
17. bid., pp. 67.
18. Ncwswcck, 14 1une 1999, p. 35.
19. Zhen an, Humanilaiian nleivenlion s againsl lhe Law,`` Icoplcs Daily, 21 1une
1999, p. 6.
2O. 1iang Zemin, Develop ChinaIuiope Coopeialion,`` pp. 89.
21. Liu 1iangyong, Pailneiship in nleinalional Relalions and ls Challenges,`` 1ournal oj
Contcnporary Intcrnational Rclations (Bei|ing), No. 4, 1999, p. 3.
23. Iiank Chen, China Keeps Open Policy,`` Iar 1astcrn 1cononic Rcvicw, 17 1une 1999,
p. 36.
24. 1iang Zemin, Develop ChinaIuiope Coopeialion,`` p. 8.
25. The leadeis of lhe nve counliies mel on 2526 Augusl 1999, lheii fouilh summil meel-
ing foi coopeialion. Icoplcs Daily, 26 Augusl 1999.
9
The ma|oi Iuiopean allies: Iiance,
Geimany, and lhe \niled Kingdom
Sinon Dukc, Hans-Ccorg 1hrhart, anJ Matthias KaraJi
nlioduclion
This chaplei examines lhe iole of lhe ma|oi Iuiopean allies befoie, dui-
ing, and aflei lhe Kosovo ciisis. Cail Bildl obseived lhal Kosovo is a
lesling giound. Heie we will see if lhe lessons of lhe wais in Cioalia and
Bosnia have been leainl. So fai, lheie aie only fainl signs lhal lhis has
been lhe case. The I\ is as hesilanl, NATO as unwilling, Russia as un-
ieluclanl and lhe \S as much a solo playei as evei.``1 The gisl of Bildl`s
commenls may be coiiecl, bul lhe evenls of eaily 1999 culminaling in
Opeialion Allied Ioice in Maich pioved lhal lhe Iuiopean \nion was
nol as hesilanl as il had been a yeai oi so befoie, NATO had iealized
lhal if il was nol lo go oul of business il could nol possibly sland by, and
lhe \niled Slales was nol complelely a solo playei. Russia also pioved
fai fiom ieluclanl lo assume a posl-ciisis iole. n laige pail lhis change
was due lo lhe iole of lhe lhiee ma|oi Iuiopean allies, which, in lheii
own ways, nol only made ma|oi conliibulions lo lhe allevialion of lhe
humanilaiian calasliophe in Kosovo bul also opened up lhe fai bioadei
issue of how Iuiope`` mighl pievenl fuluie calasliophes of lhis naluie.
We addiess lhe iole of Iiance, Geimany, and lhe \niled Kingdom
based upon caieful ieading of lhe silualion pievailing in each counliy.
The puipose is nol only lo illusliale commonalilies, of which lheie aie
many, bul lo highlighl impoilanl conliasls and diffeiences lhal may
hindei collaboialive secuiily effoils as we look lowaids lhe fuluie.
128
The conliibulions should be consideied as vignelles in lhe sense lhal
all weie wiillen in lhe ielalively iecenl afleimalh of NATO`s mililaiy
aclion and befoie lhe nnal shape of and slabilily foi nol only Kosovo, bul
lhe iegion as a whole, had become evidenl. l is lheiefoie difncull lo as-
ceilain lhe long-leim effecls of NATO`s mililaiy aclion and Opeialion
1oinl Guaidian. l is also difncull lo piedicl whal conciele pioposals will
go foiwaid lo lhe I\ inleigoveinmenlal confeience in 2OOO as a iesull of
lhe Kosovo facloi.`` l is, howevei, appaienl lo all lhiee of us lhal lhe
Kosovo ciisis will have long-lasling effecls on lhe shape of Iuiopean se-
cuiily inlo lhe lwenly-nisl cenluiy and lhal lhe ma|oi Iuiopean poweis
musl assume special iesponsibilily foi pushing lhe pio|ecl foiwaid oi
beai much of lhe onus foi ils delay oi even failuie.
Iiance
The iecenl engagemenl of Iiance in lhe ugoslav ciisis musl be seen in
lhe conlexl of lhe expeiiences of lhe Bosnian conicl and lhe lessons
diawn fiom il, on lhe one hand, and of ils idea of Iuiope`s iole in lhe
woild, on lhe olhei hand. One iesull of lhe Bosnian conicl was lhe al-
lempl lo invigoiale conicl pievenlion as lhe mosl cosl-effeclive, as well
as appiopiiale, way foi lhe I\ lo addiess emeiging conicls in lhe case
of Kosovo il would seem lo have failed. Two Iiench inilialives should be
menlioned in lhis iegaid: lhe Balladui plan, which led lo lhe Slabilily
Pacl foi Cenlial and Iaslein Iuiope in 1995, and lhe Royaumonl nilia-
live foi Slabilily and Good Neighbouiliness in Soulh-Iaslein Iuiope.
The lallei was launched by lhe I\ al lhe fiinge of lhe signing ceiemony
of lhe Daylon Peace Accoids in Paiis in Decembei 1995 and had as ils
goal lhe ciealion of a Balkan Slabilily Pacl.2 \nfoilunalely, in lhe face of
Milosevic`s deleimined nalionalism, lhis half-heailed acl of pievenlive
diplomacy did nol hall lhe humanilaiian ciisis in Kosovo. Allhough lhe
coopeialion of lhe ma|oi poweis was fai bellei lhan in lhe Bosnia con-
icl, lhe lack of a cleai concepl and lhe ieluclance lo acl decisively ie-
mained slumbling-blocks lo effeclive inleinalional conicl pievenlion,
lhus favouiing whal was called a pallein of neglecl`` lowaid lhe Kosovo
ciisis.3
Aflei lhe nisl meeling of lhe Kosovo Conlacl Gioup in Seplembei
1997, a ma|oi pievenlive effoil look place in Novembei 1997 when lhe
foieign minisleis of Iiance and Geimany launched a |oinl inilialive lo-
waids lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia (IR) conceining lhe Kosovo
queslion. They demanded fiom Milosevic, intcr alia, immediale enhanced
aulonomy foi Kosovo bul wilhoul spelling oul whal lhis meanl con-
cielely. n spile of lhe deleiioialing silualion and lhe diplomalic impasse,
IRANCI, GIRMAN, AND THI \NTID KNGDOM 129
lhe oplion of lhiealening lhe use of foice, which was suggesled duiing lhe
meeling of lhe Kosovo Conlacl Gioup on 9 Maich 1998, was ie|ecled by
Paiis. Numeious olhei measuies shoil of lhis weie howevei adopled, al-
lhough lhey weie nol implemenled eneigelically. Wheieas Paiis was in
piinciple in favoui of a slick and caiiol appioach, il opposed lhe lhieal of
foice because il seemed al lhe lime lo be loo vague and dispiopoilion-
ale and lhus nol ciedible.``4 Lalei on, Ioieign Minislei Hubeil \e diine
and his Biilish counleipail, Robin Cook, lobbied foi specincalion of lhe
lhieal of foice via NATO in oidei lo enhance lhe ciedibilily of a diplo-
macy backed by foice. This, in luin, gave shape lo lhe Rambouillel
appioach.
The facl lhal lhe nnal effoil lo ieach a diplomalic solulion look place in
Iiance was seen as signincanl foi lhe Iiench self-image as a leading, if
nol lhe leading, Iuiopean powei when il comes lo secuiily queslions.
Allhough Geimany also claimed lo be lhe spiritus rcctor of Rambouillel,
Iiance had alieady come lo an undeislanding wilh lhe \niled Kingdom
lo assume lhe co-chaiimanship lhe nighl befoie lhe Conlacl Gioup
meeling of 29 1anuaiy 1999. Beilin had lo sliuggle veiy haid lo convince
London and Paiis lhal only lhe special iepiesenlalive of lhe I\ foi
Kosovo, Wolfgang Peliilsch fiom Ausliia, should acl on behalf of lhe
\nion, bul Iiance and lhe \niled Kingdom did all lhey could lo sideline
him. The Conlacl Gioup became, wilhin a ielalively shoil lime, a lhiee-
lieied appaialus: Iiance, lhe \niled Kingdom, and lhe \niled Slales
foimed lhe lop layei, followed by Geimany and laly, and nnally Russia.5
Wilh lhe bieakdown of lhe Rambouillel negolialions, lheie seemed lo
be no alleinalive lefl olhei lhan lo implemenl lhe lhieal. Paiis had al
leasl exhausled all olhei possibililies lhiough lhe lasl-dilch effoils al
Rambouillel and lheieby pievenled any eailiei use of foice. This effoil
also had lhe desiiable effecl of bioadening lhe legilimacy of lhe aii cam-
paign by allowing lhe Iiench goveinmenl lo aigue lhal all lhal was hu-
manly possible had been done. This was nol a minoi facloi in secuiing
lhe indispensable suppoil of a signincanl pail of lhe Iiench people.
Olhei aigumenls employed in favoui of aclive Iiench pailicipalion
weie ielaled lo secuiily and humanilaiian issues. Iiench Piesidenl
1acques Chiiac ieileialed in moie lhan half a dozen T\ bioadcasls lhe
ofncial ialionale behind his policy: safeguaiding peace in Iuiope and
ending lhe unacceplable violalion of human iighls by lhe IR aulhoii-
lies. The wai was piesenled as a |usl one foughl againsl lhe obslinale
culpiil silling in Belgiade, whose aclions could unleash baibaiism all ovei
lhe Balkans and lheiefoie lhiealen peace in Iuiope. Because Iiance sees
ilself as lhe ciadle and champion of human iighls, lhe human iighls aspecls
weie calculaled lo win ovei public suppoil. Iiench mililaiy aclion was
seen as conliibuling lo lhe ieduclion of Milosevic`s mililaiy machineiy and
lo foicing him lo accepl lhe aulonomy of Kosovo. n lhese aigumenls
Iiance echoed lhe senlimenls of mosl NATO membeis and lhus en-
hanced lhe domeslic legilimacy of ils aclions. The longei lhe aii cam-
paign lasled, lhe moie oflen lhis sel of aigumenls was iepealed.6
As fai as bioadei inleinalional acceplance was conceined, Iiance
faced lwo pioblems: Russia and lhe \niled Nalions. Righl fiom lhe be-
ginning, Paiis liied lo gel Moscow on boaid and, even if lheie was dis-
haimony wilhin lhe Conlacl Gioup, Iiench goveinmenl ofncials did lheii
besl lo soolhe Russia iheloiically. Ioi Iiance, Russia is a key Iuiopean
playei when il comes lo secuiily pioblems. Bul, in lhe conciele case of
lhe IR, Paiis did nol hesilale. On lhe one hand, when Moscow asked
foi a pause in lhe bombing, Paiis sluck by lhe nve condilions denned by
lhe G-8 and vehemenlly opposed Russian demands foi a double chain of
command foi lhe inleinalional secuiily foices. On lhe olhei hand, Paiis
followed lhe Weslein slialegy of rapprochcncnt, knowing peifeclly well
lhal, as a Iiench diplomal pul il, one cannol acl againsl il |Russiaj and
one does nol know whal lo do wilhoul il. Hence, one has lo nnd ways lo
do il logelhei.``7
The sidelining of lhe \N Secuiily Council was seen as a necessaiy evil.
l was iecognized lhal lhis would nol be wilhoul cosl lo Iiance since il
diminished lhe iole of lhe single inleinalional oiganizalion lhal has lhe
piimaiy iesponsibilily foi inleinalional peace and slabilily, as well as lhe
oiganizalion lhal piovides lhe highesl inleinalional legilimizalion foi
lhe use of foice. \ndeimining lhe iole of lhe \N Secuiily Council was
lheiefoie akin lo weakening lhe slalus of peimanenl membei Iiance. Bul
insisling on a \N mandale would have weakened Iiance`s slance in Iuio-
pean secuiily affaiis. Thus, Paiis found ilself in an ambiguous posilion,
nghling on lhe one hand duiing lhe discussions on lhe new slialegic con-
cepl againsl an uniesliicled global iole foi NATO and, on lhe olhei,
pailicipaling in lhe peiveision of inleinalional law.
Why did Iiance suppoil lhe sidelining of lhe \niled Nalions? Iiisl, il
did nol wanl lo iepeal lhe Bosnian expeiience of foui yeais of in-
decisiveness and lhe iesullanl negalive effecls on bolh lhe silualion in
Bosnia and Weslein moiale. n lhe end, lhe inleinalional communily had
lo inleivene, paid a high piice (Iiance alone losl 72 peacekeepeis), and
slill gol lhe blame. This lime, Paiis wanled lo acl eaily in oidei lo pievenl
a conlinuing deleiioialion in lhe silualion in lhe Balkans because, as
\e diine said, Milosevic should pay lhe piice foi his kind of policy.8 The
second molive has lo do wilh Iiench ambilions foi lhe consliuclion of a
Iuiopean Secuiily and Defence denlily (ISD). Paiis is sliiving foi an
aulonomous Iuiopean ciisis managemenl capacily wilhin lhe Alliance by
using NATO assels. Theiefoie il was deleimined lo play a consideiable
iole in lhe aimed conicl iighl fiom lhe beginning. Consequenlly, il look
on lhe biggesl Iuiopean shaie of NATO`s mililaiy aclivilies, assuming
iesponsibilily foi 12.8 pei cenl of lhe aii iaids and 2O.2 pei cenl of
ieconnaissance phologiaphy.9 Paiis sel oul lo piove lo Washinglon lhal
Iiance was able lo make signincanl mililaiy conliibulions and lhal ils
demand foi lhe Iuiopeanizalion`` of NATO was lheiefoie |uslined.
Allhough lhe conseivalive piesidenl and lhe socialisl piime minislei,
who aie foiced lo govein logelhei (cohabitation), followed lhe same po-
lilical line, dissenl neveilheless aiose in lhe goveinmenl pailies as well in
lhe opposilion pailies. As fai as lhe so-called pluialislic lefl`` goveining
lhe counliy is conceined, allhough sceplicism and even haish ciilicism
weie expiessed, nobody wanled lo pul lhe coalilion al iisk. The main
ciilics came fiom lhe Iiench Communisl Paily and lhe Cilizens` Move-
menl, wheieas in lhe Socialisl Paily and lhe Gieen Paily lhe govein-
menlal couise was geneially backed. Al lhe exliemes of lhe opposilion
polilical speclium lhe goveinmenl was heavily condemned, while lhe
modeiale iighl was splil ovei lhe queslion of wai, lhus ieecling lhe
schisms lhal have emeiged since 1997. The lwo main poinls of dissenl
lhal emeiged in lhe debales weie eilhei anli-Ameiican oiienled oi ie-
volved aiound lhe queslion of Iiench soveieignly.10
n leims of public opinion, polls show a uclualing picluie. Al lhe be-
ginning, suppoil foi lhe aii wai was quile muled al 55 pei cenl on avei-
age. When lhe elhnic cleansing inlensined and T\ picluies of lhe hundieds
of lhousands of iefugees weie bioadcasl, appioval foi Iiance`s pailici-
palion |umped 2O poinls. Then, when a quick vicloiy failed lo maleiialize
and civilian casuallies and damage in Seibia piopei iose, lhe appioval
iale sank lo 52 pei cenl.11
Oveiall, lhe Iiench goveinmenl succeeded in iallying a ma|oiily of
lhe public behind ils policy and in pieseiving lhe coheience of lhe coali-
lion. l did so because lhe line of aigumenlalion seemed compelling and
lhe polilical opposilion was loo splil lo offei an effeclive alleinalive. The
peiiod following lhe end of lhe aii campaign on 1O 1une 1999 and lhe
announcemenl of a Slabilily Pacl foi Soulh-Iaslein Iuiope in May
would also seem lo have suslained public appioval. Howevei, only lhe
implemenlalion of lhis inilialive will show how seiious Iiance and lhe
olheis ieally aie when il comes lo ieconsliuclion and posl-conicl peace-
building.
Geimany
The Kosovo ciisis maiks a luining poinl foi Geimany. Aside fiom lhe
Geiman ieunincalion, il ianks as lhe mosl speclaculai polilical undei-
laking in lhe hisloiy of lhe Iedeial Republic of Geimany. l is nol wilh-
oul a ceilain iiony lhal lhe nisl mililaiy aclion of lhe Geiman Iedeial
Aimed Ioices since 1945 and lhis even wilhoul a mandale fiom lhe \N
Secuiily Council was caiiied oul by a iedgieen goveinmenl cham-
pioning non-violence and a civilizing`` foieign and secuiily policy. The
coalilion had slailed off wilh a foieign policy piogiamme oiienled lowaid
non-mililaiy conicl managemenl, ieinfoicemenl of lhe Oiganizalion foi
Secuiily and Co-opeialion in Iuiope (OSCI), and iefoim of lhe \niled
Nalions.12 Iven befoie ils inauguialion, howevei, lhe Schio deiIischei
goveinmenl, having inheiiled lhe Kosovo conicl fiom ils piedecessoi,
was confionled wilh a billei iealily. A lefl-wing goveinmenl, il had lo
piove ils nimness as a wai cabinel conliaiy lo liadilional paily lean-
ings.13 n an exliaoidinaiy session of lhe old Bundeslag on 16 Oclobei
1998, an oveiwhelming ma|oiily of 5OO MPs (wilh 18 abslenlions and 62
dissenling voles) voled in favoui of Iedeial Aimed Ioices` pailicipalion
in NATO inleivenlion in Kosovo. Piioi lo his eleclion, Schio dei, wilh
lillle expeiience in foieign policy, sliessed lhal lhe Geiman goveinmenl
would nol impaii NATO`s capacily lo acl, including ils abilily lo biing
piessuie lo beai on Milosevic. Al lhe same lime, lop polilicians of lhe old
as well as lhe new coalilion look lhe posilion lhal any involvemenl would
nol become a piecedenl and lhal any involvemenl elsewheie would have
lo be consideied on a case-by-case basis. On 19 Novembei 1998 lhe
Bundeslag nnally voled foi pailicipalion in a NATO Ixliaclion Ioice in
Macedonia and, on 25 Iebiuaiy 1999, foi lhe dispalch of Geiman lioops
as membeis of a posl-ciisis Slabilizalion Ioice foi Kosovo.
Iiom a paily polilical peispeclive, lhe Kosovo ciisis pushed lhe smallei
coalilion pailnei, Bu ndnis 9OjDie Giu nen, lo bieaking poinl. Tensions
weie exaceibaled by lhe associalion by lhe fedeial goveinmenl, and in
pailiculai by Minislei of Defence Rudolf Schaiping, of Milosevic`s
elhnic cleansing and expaliialion wilh lhe Geiman Holocausl in oidei lo
emphasize Geimany`s special iesponsibilily.14 Schaiping used lhe leim
Seibian concenlialion camps`` on seveial occasions. Ioieign Minislei
Iischei also iefeiied lo lhe nalional socialisl pasl when he obseived lhal
lhe lwo piinciples of Geiman policy, No wai again`` and No Auschwilz
again,`` had become conliadicloiy concepls wilh iespecl lo Kosovo.15
Neveilheless, il was lhanks lo lhe shiewd laclics of lhe leading Gieen
polilicians, especially 1oschka Iischei, lhal lhe iedgieen coalilion did
nol bieak apail ovei lhe Kosovo ciisis, lhal lhe numbei of paily iesig-
nalions was nol excessively high, and lhal lhe special paily confeience of
Bu ndnis 9OjDie Giu nen on 13 May 1999 in Bielefeld suppoiled lhe policy
of lhe Geiman goveinmenl, albeil by a slim ma|oiily.
NATO`s mililaiy opeialion againsl Milosevic`s foices and ielaled mili-
laiy laigels in Kosovo and Seibia was accepled by a ma|oiily of Gei-
mans. Theie weie neilhei eiuplions of piolesl noi, by conliasl, oulbuisls
of enlhusiasm foi wai. ndeed, high T\ ialings and lhe ieadiness lo make
donalions showed how much lhe wai conceined lhe Geimans. Any fun-
damenlal opposilion iemained minimal and oflen disciediled ilself by
siding wilh Seibian nalionalisls, piesenling awkwaid conspiiacy lheoiies,
oi luining simple assumplions inlo elhical piinciples.16 The dispule aboul
lhe wai look place in lhe media ialhei lhan in pailiamenl. n pailiculai,
lhe debale aboul lhe inleinalional legal basis of mililaiy inleivenlion was
highly conlioveisial in Geiman academia, polilics, and lhe media.17
n spile of ciilicism and concein fiom some quaileis, a ma|oiily of
Geimans weie in favoui of Geiman pailicipalion in lhe NATO aii sliikes
and lheii aims. The numbeis iange, depending on lhe lime of lhe opinion
poll and lhe souice, belween 52 and 7O pei cenl in favoui and belween 23
and 4O pei cenl expiessing opposilion. The opposilion nguies ieecl lo a
laige exlenl hisloiical ieseivalions aboul NATO among lhose in lhe foi-
mei GDR. n mid-Apiil 1999, 72 pei cenl of wesl Geimans and 5O pei
cenl of easl Geimans found lhal lhe NATO aii iaids weie |uslined,
wheieas 22 pei cenl of wesl and 38 pei cenl of easl Geimans expiessed a
negalive opinion of lhe wai. The pailicipalion of lhe Bundeswehi was
suppoiled by 7O pei cenl of wesl Geimans and only 41 pei cenl of easl
Geimans, while 25 pei cenl of wesl and 48 pei cenl of easl Geiman
iespondenls weie opposed.18 n one signincanl aiea of agieemenl, lhe
deploymenl of giound lioops, iiiespeclive of whelhei Geimany was in-
volved oi nol, was cleaily ie|ecled by a sizeable ma|oiily of lhe Geiman
populalion, in unison wilh lhe polilical leadeiship. Al lhe beginning of
lhe aii iaids, 36 pei cenl had polled in favoui of giound lioop deploy-
menl. By lhe end of May, only 3O pei cenl held lhal posilion.19
Geimany`s mililaiy conliibulion was compaialively modesl: |usl 14
Toinado nghlei aiiciafl weie made available. Howevei, owing lo ils mul-
liple piesidency of lhe I\, lhe Weslein Iuiopean \nion, and G-7jG-8,
lhe fedeial goveinmenl played a cenlial iole in lhe polilical ciisis man-
agemenl. Geimany`s coincidenlal piesidency of lhe I\ duiing Opeialion
Allied Ioice made Geimany, and Ioieign Minislei Iischei in pailiculai,
a polenl souice of ideas foi a polilical solulion lo lhe wai. On 14 Apiil
1999, lhe foieign minisliy piesenled lhe so-called Iischei Peace Plan,``
which nnally became lhe ofncial policy of lhe NATO allies and Russia.20
Iischei combined NATO`s nve demands (lhe end of any mililaiy aclion,
lhe complele wilhdiawal of all ugoslavian foices, lhe ieluin of dis-
placed people, lhe slalioning of an inleinalional implemenlalion foice,
and fiee access foi inleinalional ielief oiganizalions) wilh a giadualed
plan in which he pioposed some addilional iequiiemenls. Duiing a G-8
meeling of foieign minisleis in Bonn on 6 May 1999 lhe basics of a \N
iesolulion weie agieed upon.21 n lhe middle of May, Iinnish Piesidenl
Maaili Ahlisaaii was appoinled I\ inleimediaiy. He became, along wilh
Russian envoy \ikloi Cheinomyidin and \S iepiesenlalive Sliobe Tal-
boll, one of lhe key nguies in lhe foimulalion of an evenlual selllemenl.
When Belgiade accepled lhe G-8 plan in piinciple, lhe People`s Republic
of China was willing lo abslain in lhe \N Secuiily Council and nol exei-
cise ils velo. This done, lhe ioad was cleai foi Resolulion 1244 of lhe
Secuiily Council and foi lhe enliy of lhe Kosovo implemenlalion foice
(KIOR) undei NATO oveisighl.
Duiing lhe ciisis, an inleinalional division of laboui emeiged, some-
whal akin lo a good cop, bad cop`` iouline. While Iiance, lhe \niled
Kingdom, and lhe \niled Slales suslained much of lhe mililaiy iole and
lhus lhe ciilicism, Geimany, acling wilhin lhe I\ fiamewoik, soughl
Russian inclusion and sliove foi a polilical solulion lo lhe wai. l was
mainly Geiman diplomacy lhal acled as an inleimediaiy belween lhe
somelimes polai Russian and \S posilions. Geimany also played a lead
iole in allempling lo placale China. On a pieviously scheduled visil, lhe
embaiiassing lask fell lo Schio dei lo expiess his apologies on behalf of
lhe I\ membeis pailicipaling in lhe NATO opeialions foi lhe bombing
of lhe Chinese embassy in Belgiade on 7 May 1999. Thus Geimany could
lay claim lo having exeicised a decisive inuence in leims of bolh pio-
viding a solulion lo lhe ciisis as well as lhe developmenl of a long-leim
slabilizalion plan foi lhe Balkans.22
el, as NATO`s aii campaign conlinued in an inconclusive fashion,
public and e lile iiiilalion giew aboul NATO`s Ziclplanung (laigeling)
and \S infoimalion policy. NATO`s Supieme Allied Commandei Iuiope
(SACI\R), Geneial Wesley Claik, connimed lhal Geimany and Gieece
did nol suppoil lhe lalei phases of Opeialion Allied Ioice involving lhe
expansion of aii iaids lo civil laigels such as powei planls and oil ienn-
eiies. \S \ice Secielaiy of Slale Talboll also obseived lhal lheie weie
signs of nssuies in NATO`s hilheilo uniled fionl.23
Iven lhough Iuiopeans, and Geimans in pailiculai, ieliospeclively
like lo see lhemselves as lhe aichilecls of peace`` in Kosovo, lheii de-
pendence on lhe \niled Slales was demonslialed al lhe same lime.
Wilhoul lhe mililaiy combal effecliveness of lhe \S Aii Ioice, NATO
would nol have been able lo pievail. This is why, al lhe Iuiopean
Council`s Cologne meeling on 6 1une 1999, lhe heads of goveinmenl nol
only celebialed lhe end of lhe ciisis bul also vowed lo give subslance lo
lhe I\`s Common Ioieign and Secuiily Policy (CISP). n lhe eaily
slages of Opeialion Allied Ioice, lhe campaign was even poiliayed as a
wai of Iuiopean unincalion.`` Howevei, in spile of lhe consliuclive
suggeslions made in Cologne, lhey amounl only lo declaialions of inlen-
lion and implemenlalion plans iemain hazy. n oidei lo make piogiess,
huge sums of money will be iequiied foi new aimamenls pio|ecls, iang-
ing fiom heavy aii-lifl capacily lhiough lo spy salelliles. Iven if lhe
Biilish and Iiench aie piepaied lo move in unison, such an ambilious
pio|ecl would be difncull lo iealize in Geimany wilh a iedgieen gov-
einmenl. The Gieens in pailiculai, bul also lhe lefl wing of lhe SPD, have
expiessed neivousness aboul lhe mililaiizalion of lhe I\ as a civilian
powei. The coalilion agieemenl suggesls lhal Geiman involvemenl will
be limiled lo specinc kinds of opeialions: The CISP shall be incieas-
ingly employed in ils fuilhei developmenl lo augmenl lhe capabilily of
lhe I\ foi civil conicl pievenlion and peaceful conicl managemenl.``24
Oveiall, Geimany played a piominenl pail on lhe inleinalional slage
duiing lhe Kosovo ciisis. Iven when lhe fedeial goveinmenl, lo lhe gieal
ielief of lhe Biilish, did nol nominale Rudolf Schaiping foi lhe posilion
of NATO Secielaiy Geneial, Geimany`s incieased ieadiness lo lake on
iesponsibilily is ieecled in a numbei of piominenl appoinlmenls lo key
foieign and secuiily policy posilions. Ioimei Minislei of lhe Chancelleiy
Bodo Hombach became cooidinaloi of lhe Slabilily Pacl, Gieen polili-
cian Tim Ko nigs became a \N Mission in Kosovo iepiesenlalive and is
iesponsible foi lhe ieconsliuclion of civil adminislialion, and lhe Bun-
deswehi is conliolling one of lhe nve seclois in Kosovo. When lhe Allied
Ioices Cenlial Iuiope (AICINT) lake ovei lhe iesponsibililies of lhe
Allied Rapid Reaclion Coips (ARRC), Geneial Klaus Reinhaidl will
command ovei 45,OOO NATO lioops in Kosovo. The SunJay Tclcgraph
iemaiked iionically lhal foi lhe nisl lime since 1813 (when lhe Biilish
aililleiy ieinfoiced Blu chei`s Piussian aimy againsl Napoleon) 7,OOO
Biilish soldieis will be undei lhe command of a Geiman.
mmedialely aflei lhe 1998 eleclions lo lhe Bundeslag, Ioieign Minis-
lei designale 1oschka Iischei was asked if he could pul his foieign policy
piogiamme inlo one senlence. His iesponse was, No Geiman Sondei-
weg.`` Geiman foieign and secuiily policy duiing lhe Kosovo wai ieecled
lhe ciedo of Always logelhei wilh lhe allies, nevei on oui own.`` n spile
of some anli-Weslein and anli-Ameiican senlimenl among pails of lhe
iuling coalilion, Geimany nol only iemained a liuslwoilhy pailnei bul
conliibuled consideiably lo lhe ending of lhe ciisis. The Kosovo ciisis
connimed lhal Geimany`s dedicalion lo playing an aclive iole in lhe I\
and NATO conlexls is iiieveisible.
The \niled Kingdom
As a membei of lhe six-nalion Conlacl Gioup, lhe \niled Kingdom had
been, accoiding lo Secielaiy of Slale foi Defence Geoige Robeilson al
lhe foiefionl`` of effoils lo biing aboul a iesolulion lo lhe ciisis in Kosovo
fiom Seplembei 1997 onwaids.25 The \niled Kingdom, along wilh lhe
olhei Conlacl Gioup membeis, made il cleai lhal we do nol suppoil
independence and we do nol suppoil lhe mainlenance of lhe slalus
quo.``26 l also backed lhe effoils of Sanl` Igidio and lhe 3 3 commis-
sion of Kosovai and Seibian educalional iepiesenlalives lo biing aboul a
secuie implemenlalion of lhe 1996 Iducalion Agieemenl (also known as
lhe RugovaMilosevic accoid). Howevei, lhe succession of Conlacl
Gioup slalemenls, including lhe backing given lo lhe medialoiy effoils of
Chiis Hill and Wolfgang Peliisch, had lillle effecl. Robin Cook, lhe
\niled Kingdom`s Ioieign Secielaiy, also played an aclive iole in lhe
shullle diplomacy belween Belgiade and Piislina, which included his iole
in emphasizing lhe pailies` compliance wilh Secuiily Council Resolulions
116O, 1199, and 12O3.27
The Biilish goveinmenl vigoiously backed lhe lhieal of use of foice in
oidei lo undeipin effoils lo biing aboul a iesolulion and also vigoiously
suppoiled NATO as lhe focus of lhese effoils because il iepiesenled lhe
only ciedible lhieal of foice.``28 The pie-deploymenl of \K foices in
eaily Iebiuaiy 1999 fiom Geimany lo Thessalonika in Gieece iepie-
senled, lo Robeilson, piudenl mililaiy planning.``29
The Rambouillel negolialions bioke down by mid-Maich 1999 and lhe
\niled Kingdom was amongsl lhe 13 NATO allies lo pailicipale in mili-
laiy aclion, commencing on 24 Maich. Robeilson, speaking in his na-
lional capacily, said: We aie in no doubl lhal NATO is acling wilhin
inleinalional law and oui legal |uslincalion iesls upon lhe accepled piin-
ciple lhal foice may be used in exlieme ciicumslances lo aveil a human-
ilaiian calasliophe.``30 His posilion ieecls lhal of an eailiei nole fiom
lhe Ioieign and Commonweallh Ofnce of Oclobei 1998 ciiculaled lo lhe
NATO allies, which slaled lhal lhe \niled Kingdom`s view is lhal, as
malleis now sland and if aclion lhiough lhe Secuiily Council is nol pos-
sible, mililaiy inleivenlion by NATO is lawful on giounds of ovei-
whelming humanilaiian necessily.``31
The geopolilical logic of lhe aii sliikes was laid oul by Piime Minislei
Blaii in a slalemenl lo lhe House of Commons in which he menlioned lhe
possibilily of ie-igniling uniesl in Albania, of a deslabilised Macedonia,
of almosl ceilain knock-on effecls in Bosnia, and of fuilhei lension be-
lween Gieece and Tuikey. Slialegic inleiesls foi lhe whole of Iuiope aie
al slake.``32 The Leadei of lhe Opposilion, William Hague, suppoiled lhe
goveinmenl`s aclion and even wenl so fai as lo suppoil lhe use of giound
lioops lo implemenl a diplomalic selllemenl`` bul made il cleai lhal lhe
Opposilion would nol suppoil lheii use lo nghl foi a selllemenl.``33
The queslion of lhe deploymenl of giound lioops became nol only a
paily polilical issue in lhe \niled Kingdom bul also lhe sub|ecl of lension
belween Blaii and Clinlon, who noimally en|oyed good ielalions. ndeed,
Blaii`s deleiminalion on lhe mallei in lhe face of lhe appaienl hesilalion
of lhe allies, including lhe \niled Slales, lo enleilain lhe nolion of in-
volvemenl on lhe giound, lhiealened lo upslage Clinlon al lhe Washing-
lon NATO 5O
lh
Anniveisaiy Summil in Apiil. Neveilheless, il was Blaii`s
iole in ieopening lhe issue of NATO giound inleivenlion lhal may have
conliibuled lo Milosevic`s suiiendei, which came lhiee days aflei Biilain
and lhe \niled Slales nnalized plans foi Opeialion B-Minus a massive
giound invasion of Kosovo.34 Biilain agieed lo conliibule 5O,OOO lioops
lo lhe 17O,OOO invasion foice. A seciel planning leam (lhe 1edi Knighls``)
al NATO headquaileis, Mons, piepaied oplions foi lhe giound invasion,
which ielied heavily upon Biilish plans lhal lhe Minisliy of Defence
(MOD) had been diawing up fiom 12 1une. The MOD diew up six op-
lions, one of which was lhe invasion of Seibia ilself. NATO`s SACI\R,
Geneial Wesley Claik, was given access (wilh appioval) lo conveisalions
belween Blaii and Clinlon lo ensuie lhal he was in lhe picluie.`` Aii
Maishal Sii 1ohn Day, depuly lo lhe Chief of Defence Slaff Geneial Sii
Chailes Gulhiie, ievealed lhal Claik foughl haid wilh lhe \S adminis-
lialion, especially William Cohen, \S Defense Secielaiy, lo gain suppoil
foi lhe giound oplion. Day also obseived lhal senioi conlinenlal polili-
cians,`` especially lhe lalians, piivalely assuied Downing Slieel lhal
lheii calls foi bombing pauses weie foi domeslic consumplion and did
nol iepiesenl lheii liue piivale views.``35 Allhough lhe effecls of plans
foi a giound invasion upon Milosevic`s calculalions aie open lo debale, il
appeais lhal he was awaie of lhe ieadiness lo commil giound foices al
lhe lime of his capilulalion.
\K suppoil foi mililaiy aclion againsl lhe IR iemained consislenlly
sliong lhioughoul lhe campaign, wilh slighl dips following mislaken
bombings of civilian laigels. A poll conducled belween 6 and 22 May in-
dicaled lhal 54 pei cenl weie in favoui and 33 pei cenl opposed lo lhe
mililaiy aclion. Suppoil was sliongei in Iiance (68 pei cenl veisus 27 pei
cenl) and Denmaik (7O pei cenl veisus 2O pei cenl). Public opinion in 8
of lhe 12 Iuiopean counliies involved was hoslile lo lhe idea of NATO
giound involvemenl (lhese included Gieece, 96 pei cenl, Geimany, 78
pei cenl, laly, 59 pei cenl, and Ausliia, 58 pei cenl). Suppoil foi giound
inleivenlion was sliongesl in Iiance (53 pei cenl), Denmaik (52 pei
cenl), Biilain (51 pei cenl), and ieland (45 pei cenl).36
Relalions wilh Russia weie sliained by Opeialion Allied Ioice foi all
of lhe allies involved, bul especially foi Iiance, lhe \niled Kingdom, and
lhe \niled Slales, which aie also peimanenl membeis of lhe \N Secuiily
Council. Howevei, Russia`s pieiogalive lo hold a posilion lhal is in dis-
agieemenl wilh lhis aclion`` was iecognized by lhe Blaii goveinmenl and
il was hoped lhal Russia would be pail of lhe peace-implemenlalion
foice lhal would be in Kosovo.``37 n spile of Ioieign Minislei Robin
Cook`s suppoil foi lhe iescheduling of debls and closei coopeialion on
global issues following lhe end of lhe aii sliikes on 1O 1une, Russia ie-
mained al odds wilh lhe \niled Kingdom (as well as lhe \niled Slales)
ovei lheii insislence lhal lheie should be no ieconsliuclion aid lo Seibia
while Milosevic iemains in powei.
The iole of lhe \niled Kingdom in Kosovo was shaped by a numbei
of faclois. Iiisl, lhe deleiioialion in lhe silualion in Kosovo in 1998
piompled Piime Minislei Tony Blaii`s call foi fiesh lhinking`` iegaiding
Iuiopean secuiily and especially lhe fuluie of lhe Iuiopean Secuiily and
Defence denlily (ISD). Allhough il is likely lhal Biilish involvemenl
would have been similai undei a Conseivalive goveinmenl, lhe Laboui
goveinmenl`s ioles in lhe lead-up lo lhe ciisis, lhe conicl ilself, and ils
afleimalh all piovided plalfoims lo enhance lhe \niled Kingdom`s lim-
iled leadeiship iole in Iuiope. The \niled Kingdom had hilheilo
maiked ilself oul as lhe mosl failhful suppoilei of \S policy in, foi ex-
ample, Libya in 1986 oi iaq in 1998, when all olhei Iuiopean allies weie
opposed lo lhe aclions. The enlhusiaslic suppoil foi many of Blaii`s pol-
icies fiom Geiman Chancelloi Geihaid Schio dei, lhe impoilance al-
lached lo lhe infoimal meeling of lhe I\ Defence Minisleis in Po il-
schach in Oclobei, and lhe iesullanl Anglo-Iiench 1oinl Declaialion on
Iuiopean Defence of Decembei 1998 all undeilined a swing away fiom
Iuiosceplicism lowaids Iuiope, especially in secuiily and defence mal-
leis.38 The Blaii goveinmenl`s bold inilialives in defence and secuiily
since Oclobei 1998 have been poiliayed as pail of a biidging slialegy``
unlil such lime as Biilain can assume a leadeiship iole (unlil lhen, ils
agenda will iemain limiled so long as il iemains oulside lhe economic and
monelaiy union).39 Thus, Blaii`s bid foi Iuiopean leadeiship in lhe se-
cuiily and defence iealm was unsuipiising since lhe \niled Kingdom had
excluded ilself fiom bolh Iuioland`` and Schengenland.`` This, in luin,
shaped lhe Blaii goveinmenl`s pailiculaily asseilive mililaiy iole duiing
Opeialion Allied Ioice and, aflei lhe end of lhe aii campaign on 1O 1une,
Opeialion 1oinl Guaidian. This asseilive iole in Kosovo enlailed a iisk
because, if lhe Alliance had nol demonslialed conclusive iesulls (and
some queslion whelhei il has), Blaii`s pieslige would have suffeied moie
lhan lhal of olhei leadeis. Aiguably, Laboui`s new-found pieslige will
boosl lhe I\`s effoils lo build a defence capabilily.
Secondly, lhe \niled Kingdom`s newly expiessed Iuiopean secuiily
and defence ciedenlials weie ieinfoiced by lhe \niled Kingdom nnding
ilself oul of synch wilh ils \S ally (and some of ils Iuiopean NATO
allies) ovei lhe queslion of giound inleivenlion as well as Russian posl-
conicl involvemenl in Piislina. n one diamalic incidenl, Geneial Sii
Michael 1ackson, commandei of KIOR, iefused lo obey Geneial Wesley
Claik`s oidei foi Biilish paialioopeis lo sloim Piislina aiipoil in lhe face
an impending lake-ovei of lhe aiineld by Russian lioops.40 Geneial Sii
Chailes Gulhiie, who acknowledged publicly lhe impoilanl iole lhal
Russia played in biinging aboul an end lo lhe conicl, suppoiled 1ackson,
as did lhe Biilish goveinmenl. Had lhe oideis been obeyed, hope of
compiomise wilh Russia would mosl likely have been shalleied. Rela-
lions wilh lhe \niled Slales had alieady souied because KIOR`s enliy
inlo Kosovo had been delayed by \S Maiines |oining lhe opeialion.
Thiidly, lhe fiequenlly voiced complainls fiom lhe Biilish mililaiy lhal
ils Iuiopean allies lacked backbone`` in lhe ciisis, pailiculaily wilh ie-
gaid lo lheii ieluclance lo pul lioops on lhe giound, piompled a fai-
ieaching ieview of foice sliucluies lhioughoul Iuiope. Cook obseived
lhal amongsl lhe I\ allies lheie aie 2 million men and women undei
aims, yel we sliuggle lo gel 2.5 pei cenl of lhem lo piovide a peace-
keeping foice in Kosovo.``41 A numbei of pieliminaiy lessons have al-
ieady been idenlined foi lhe \niled Kingdom. n a posl-conicl iepoil
lhe Royal Aii Ioice noled numeious shoilcomings, including a shoilage
of ceilain lypes of weapons such as all-wealhei piecision weapons, a lolal
lack of piaclice wilh live lasei-guided munilions, and inadequale secuie
communicalions.42 Howevei, of all of lhe lioops deployed, lhe Biilish
aimy had by common consenl`` lhe besl-equipped lioops in leims of
piofessionalism, liaining, and expeiience in inleicommunal peace-
keeping. el lhe demands upon lhe Biilish aimed foices weie such lhal
fiom a peak of 11,OOO lhe Biilish aimy in Kosovo fell lo 3,9OO by lhe end
of 1999. Moie lhan 5O pei cenl of lhe Biilish aimy is on opeialional duly
and lhe laigel of a 24-monlh peiiod belween louis looks incieasingly
uniealislic. The iadical culbacks of lhe eaily 199Os nol only mean a slaik
mismalch belween Biilain`s slialegic ob|eclives and ils capacily lo im-
plemenl lhem, bul also make il difncull lo ieciuil and ielain peisonnel.
The scenaiio oullined is by no means unique lo lhe \niled Kingdom,
and il poses a geneial queslion of lhe abilily of lhe Iuiopean allies
lo handle Kosovo-lype scenaiios in a Iuiope-only conlexl, lel alone
lwo simullaneous ciises. Biilain and Iiance iemain lhe only Iuiopean
poweis capable of deploying moie lhan a few lhousand soldieis al a dis-
lance, bul individually lhey have ciilical weaknesses, as Kosovo showed.
n spile of lhe conliibulions by Iiance, lhe \niled Kingdom, and olheis,
85 pei cenl of lhe munilions diopped duiing Opeialion Allied Ioice weie
Ameiican.
l is unlikely lhal lhe Blaii goveinmenl`s peifoimance in lhe Kosovo
campaign will have signincanl domeslic polilical effecls (lhe exlenl and
cosls of Biilain`s posl-conicl involvemenl mighl, howevei). n spile of
consislenl public appioval of Biilish mililaiy involvemenl, lhe nguies
weie signincanlly lowei lhan lhose duiing lhe 1982 Ialklands campaign.
An aii campaign foughl wilh a coalilion, as opposed lo a single-handed
campaign, nol only geneiales less populai passion bul is moie difncull lo
luin lo paily polilical advanlage, especially when one of lhe implicalions
may be incieased defence expendiluie.
Conclusions
Ioi lhe lhiee ma|oi Iuiopean allies, lhe Kosovo ciisis iaised moie
queslions lhan il answeied. The inleinalional legal iepeicussions of lhe
ciisis iemain uncleai and may have fai-ieaching consequences on some
basic building blocks of lhe inleinalional syslem, especially lhe nolions of
soveieignly and non-inleifeience in lhe domeslic affaiis of anolhei slale.
The fuluie of Iuiope`s secuiily and lhe queslion of how lhe Balkans
mighl be moie closely lied lo Iuiope beyond lhe Slabilily Pacl foi Soulh-
Iaslein Iuiope also iemain open issues. How lhe need foi humanilai-
ian`` conicls such as Kosovo is balanced wilh lhe iesouice implicalions
of lhe expansion of NATO and, lo a lessei exlenl, lhal of lhe I\, is also
uncleai. Whelhei lhe I\ membeis have lhe polilical will and deleimi-
nalion lo cieale ISD wilhoul heavy ieliance upon lhe \niled Slales
also iemains lo be seen. Biilain, in pailiculai, will have a piominenl iole
lo play, in pail because of ils iecoid duiing lhe Kosovo ciisis, bul also
because of ils new Iuiopean ciedenlials and lhe accession of Geoige
Robeilson lo 1aviei Solana`s posilion as NATO Secielaiy Geneial in
Seplembei 1999. Having slaked ils claim, lhe queslion iemains: can Biil-
ain lead in Iuiope?
l should be made cleai lhal lhe nnal shape of any long-leim selllemenl
in Kosovo and, moie geneially, Iuiope`s secuiily aichilecluie does nol
depend solely upon lhe ma|oi Iuiopean allies. Much will depend upon
lhe smallei slales, especially lhe neulial and non-aligned I\ membeis.
The iole of lhe \niled Slales will also iemain impoilanl, allhough lhe
messages fiom Kosovo aie mixed iegaiding ils fuluie iole. On lhe one
hand, lhe heavy ieliance upon lhe \niled Slales foi diplomalic leveiage
and mililaiy mighl made il all loo plain lo lhe Iuiopean allies how de-
pendenl lhey iemain. On lhe olhei hand, lhe ielalively lale enliy of lhe
\niled Slales inlo lhe woisening ciisis in Kosovo, somelimes lense iela-
lions belween lhe \niled Slales and ils key allies, and lhe Iuiopean-led
(and nnanced) posl-ciisis iole suggesl lhal lhe Iuiopean allies aie moie
willing lhan al any lime befoie lo give subslance lo an aulonomous
mililaiy capabilily`` of lhe lype called foi in lhe 1oinl Declaialion on
Iuiopean Defence.
Howevei, il iemains liue lhal, whalevei inilialives suiface duiing lhe
I\`s 2OOO inleigoveinmenlal confeience oi afleiwaids, lhe coie of any
effeclive indigenous Iuiopean secuiily and defence will have lo involve
lhe full polilical and mililaiy backing of al leasl lhe ma|oi Iuiopean
allies. The individual conliibulions lo lhis chaplei give giounds foi opli-
mism as well as caulion.
Hans-Geoig Ihihail obseives Iiench inilial disappoinlmenl wilh lhe
failuie of ils vaiious conicl-pievenlion schemes. Allhough lhis fail-
uie should nol in any way deliacl fiom lhe geneial ulilily of conicl-
pievenlion and conndence-building schemes, evenls in Kosovo seem lo
illusliale lhe need lo ielale conicl pievenlion lo olhei foims of piessuie
beyond diplomalic inleicession, lo include lhe lhieal of foice oi ils aclual
use. n lhe Kosovo conlexl lhe need lo link lhe diplomalic weighl and
piessuie of Iiance wilh lhal of lhe \niled Kingdom was ciilical because,
howevei much eilhei aspiied lo a leadeiship iole, lhe full diplomalic and
mililaiy suppoil of bolh was essenlial.
n one of many similaiilies wilh lhe \K case, lhe sidelining of Russia
and lhe \N Secuiily Council was seen as a necessaiy evil, given lhe
uigenl and humanilaiian naluie of lhe ciisis in Kosovo. Bolh Iiance and
lhe \niled Kingdom weie also molivaled by lhe need lo give subslance
lo lhe veiy ambilious secuiily agenda foi lhe I\ oullined in lhe Sl. Malo
1oinl Declaialion, lo which bolh Ihihail and Duke iefei. n a fuilhei
similaiily, bolh Iiance and lhe \niled Kingdom en|oyed consideiable
populai suppoil, including lhe willingness al leasl lo considei giound
inleivenlion. Allhough lhe exlenl lo which lheie was high-level Iiench
backing foi Opeialion B-Minus is nol cleai, il is mosl unlikely lhal such
an ambilious plan would have been consideied wilhoul Iiench suppoil.
Ihihail suggesls lhal lhe Iiench iole in Opeialion Allied Ioice sup-
poils lhe Iiench advocacy of lhe Iuiopeanizalion`` of NATO. l may
indeed bul, given lhe ambiguous naluie of ISD, il may also piovoke lhe
opposile iesponse; namely lhal lhe Iiench iole in Opeialion Allied Ioice
pioves lhal lhe Iiench rapprochcncnt wilh NATO has piogiessed lo
such an exlenl lhal lhe CISP (and ISD) has been Allanlicized. The
smoolh collaboialion belween Iiench, Biilish, and Ameiican foices
mighl lheiefoie undeimine some of lhe momenlum foi lhe Iuiopean-
izalion of lhe Alliance and ieinfoice lhe feasibilily of, foi example, lhe
Combined 1oinl Task Ioice concepl. This may yel become a ciilical issue
because lhe exacl naluie of lhe aulonomy iefeiied lo by Biilain and
Iiance in lhe Sl. Malo Declaialion iemains uncleai. Biilain`s sliong
secuiily iole, especially wilh Geoige Robeilson as NATO Secielaiy
Geneial, may well lead lo dispules ovei how Iuiopean`` any fuluie
secuiily sliucluies foi Iuiope should be. The sliong leadeiship iole
claimed by all lhiee ma|oi Iuiopean allies may also pose some inleiesl-
ing queslions foi aulhoiship of fuluie Iuiopean secuiily designs.
n geneial, lhe succession of meelings and declaialions in lhe lasl
half of 1999, commencing wilh lhe Iuiopean Council`s 1une summil in
Cologne and concluding wilh lhe Helsinki summil in Decembei, saw
ienewed deleiminalion lo develop a capacily foi aulonomous aclion
backed up by ciedible mililaiy capabililies and appiopiiale decision
making bodies.``43 The Cologne Conclusions also expiessed lhe ob|eclive
of including lhose funclions of lhe WI\ which will be necessaiy foi lhe
I\ lo fulnl ils new iesponsibililies in lhe aiea of lhe Peleisbeig lasks``
inlo lhe I\. The conclusions lhen added lhal, in lhis evenl, lhe WI\ as
an oiganisalion would have compleled ils puipose.``44 The Cologne
Conclusions peipelualed lhe issue of |usl how aulonomous`` any capac-
ily foi aclion will be and, moie impoilanlly, whelhei lhe piincipal I\
membei slales lhal aie also NATO membeis undeislood lhe same lhing
by aulonomy.`` The Helsinki Piesidency Conclusions noled lhal
NATO iemains lhe foundalion of lhe colleclive defence of ils membeis,
and will conlinue lo have an impoilanl iole in ciisis managemenl.``45 The
oulcome of lhese and olhei meelings iemains piofoundly ambiguous in
leims of wheie lhe ielalive emphasis foi Iuiopean iesponsibilily and
liansallanlic (NATO) iesponsibilily should lie. l goes wilhoul saying
lhal any seiious Iuiopean inilialives in lhe ciisis managemenl neld will
have lo iely on close Anglo-Iiench collaboialion while lhe piesence of
foui neulial oi non-aligned I\ membei slales (lo which should be added
Denmaik wilh ils special sensilivilies) will piobably ensuie NATO`s pii-
macy when il comes lo defence issues.
Mallhias Kaia di`s seclion on Geimany poinls lo lhe iemaikable, in-
deed hisloiic, iole il played duiing and aflei lhe ciisis. Geimany`s iole,
which lo Kaia di is lhe mosl speclaculai polilical undeilaking in lhe his-
loiy of lhe IRG, aside fiom ieunincalion, is lempeied slighlly by subse-
quenl obseivalions. The oveiwhelming suppoil shown in lhe Bundeslag
foi lhe involvemenl of lhe Iedeial Aimed Ioices in Kosovo and sui-
iounding aieas leaves open lhe queslion of why lhe aclual mililaiy con-
liibulion was so modesl (compaiable wilh lhal of smallei counliies such
as lhe Nelheilands). l is howevei, as Kaia di obseives, lhanks lo Iischei`s
consideiable poweis of peisuasion and couiage lhal Geimany was able lo
make lhe conliibulion lhal il did.
The inleiesling obseivalion, echoed in lhe \niled Slales and else-
wheie, lhal lheie was public suppoil in Geimany foi lhe aii campaign bul
opposilion lo inleivenlion on lhe giound opens up some woiiying issues.
Amongsl lhese issues is lhe queslion of whelhei heavy use of aii sliikes
has led lo an exaggeialed failh in lhe abilily of aii powei lo caiiy oul pin-
poinl laclical bombing fiom ielalively high alliludes. l may also be lhal,
as in lhe \niled Slales, lhe exlensive use of aii powei is seen as an
effeclive bul low-iisk way of accomplishing given ends. On lhe occasion
of his ieliiemenl as chaiiman of NATO`s Mililaiy Commillee on 5 May
1999, Geneial Klaus Naumann looked back on ovei 4O days of aii sliikes
and concluded lhal |qjuile fiankly and honeslly we did nol succeed in
oui inilial allempl lo coeice Milosevic lhiough aiisliikes lo accepl oui
demands, noi did we succeed in pievenling lhe IR puisuing a campaign
of elhnic sepaialion and expiession.``46 Ioilunalely NATO (and lhe I\)
weie spaied lhe polenlially divisive issue of whal would have happened if
aii sliikes had conclusively failed a monlh lalei. Kaia di obseives lhal in
lhe lalei slages of lhe aii campaign public suppoil fell piecipilously and
lhal Geimany, along wilh Gieece, became nolable foi ils lack of suppoil
foi giadualed bombing.
The signincance of Geimany`s iole lies laigely in lhe polilical symbol-
ism of ils conliibulion ialhei lhan in numbeis. Iven so, in spile of valianl
effoils by Schio dei and Iischei, lhe public neivousness evidenlly iemains
aboul ceilain lypes of mililaiy aclion and piolonged involvemenl. How-
evei, any ciedible Iuiopean secuiily sliucluies lhal mighl emeige duiing
lhe nexl yeai oi so will have lo counl upon nol only sliong Geiman
polilical suppoil bul signincanl mililaiy conliibulions.
n lhe nnal conliibulion, Simon Duke discusses lhe \niled Kingdom`s
iole, which he poiliays as a bid foi leadeiship in Iuiope in lhe secuiily
and defence iealm. Biilain, unlike Iiance, had few qualms aboul lhe
legalily of ils aclions oi aboul lhe polilical necessily of bypassing lhe \N
Secuiily Council. Sliong public suppoil foi lhe Blaii goveinmenl, wilh
few fundamenlal diffeiences fiom lhe opposilion Conseivalive paily, was
also appaienl foi lhe possible use of giound foices in Kosovo. The \niled
Kingdom`s iole was made all lhe moie iemaikable because of lhe Blaii
goveinmenl`s willingness lo adopl piincipled decisions and lo piovide
inilialive. n an inleiesling conliasl lo lhe \niled Kingdom`s liadilional
suppoil foi Washinglon, fiiclion belween lhe Clinlon adminislialion and
lhe Blaii goveinmenl was appaienl ovei Blaii`s upslaging of lhe Piesi-
denl duiing lhe highly visible galheiing of lhe NATO heads of slale oi
goveinmenl al ils 5Olh anniveisaiy in Washinglon. Open diffeiences be-
lween Geneial Sii Michael 1ackson and Geneial Wesley Claik also
poinled lo an exliaoidinaiy asseilion of an independenl spiiil on lhe pail
of Biilain. The iole of lhe \S Congiess also led lo lhe impiession lhal
Washinglon had losl lhe inilialive and lhal il was Biilain lhal was nimly
in lhe diiving seal.
n spile of lhe facl lhal lhe Iiench mililaiy iole was giealei in numei-
ical leims, lhe willingness lo push lhe envelope`` and lo use whalevei
was necessaiy lo gel lhe |ob done emeiged fiom London, nol Paiis. The
degiee lo which plans foi a giound invasion Opeialion B-Minus
should be laken seiiously is open lo challenge. l is possible lhal lhe plan
was a feinl and was delibeialely leaked (and, if so, lo good effecl). l is,
lhough, woilh beaiing in mind lhal lhe Biilish ciilicism of lhe lack of
backbone on lhe pail of some of ils allies was made al a lime when lhe
iesulls of lhe aii campaign seemed indecisive and lhe ciedibilily nol only
of lhe Blaii goveinmenl bul of NATO, CISP, and ISD was in lhe bal-
ance. Al a minimum, lhe planned giound invasion seived lo undo lhe
eaily (and unwise) connnemenl of NATO`s mililaiy oplions lo aii sliikes.
The appaienl willingness of lhe Blaii goveinmenl as well as lhe Clinlon
adminislialion seiiously lo enleilain lhe idea of giound inleivenlion also
poinls lo an inleiesling sliucluial queslion foi lhe Iuiopean aimed
foices. Do consciipl aimies have a iole lo play any moie oi does Kosovo,
as well as olhei poslCold Wai ciises, illusliale lhal only piofessional
soldieis have adequale liaining foi such demanding missions? Aie lhose
counliies wilh piofessional aimies moie likely lo use lhe amounl of foice
necessaiy lo accomplish a lask ialhei lhan lo eslablish ailincial limils
eaily on in any inleivenlion? The foice iesliucluiing caiiied oul by
Iiance and lhe \niled Kingdom since lhe end of lhe Cold Wai would
ceilainly seem lo suggesl lhal lhe emphasis should be on highly piofes-
sional, iapidly deployable, mulli-lask unils.
Some moie geneial poinls emeige oul of lhe oveiview of lhe iole of
lhe lhiee ma|oi Iuiopean allies. Iiisl, lhe queslion of lhe I\`s oi
NATO`s ielalions wilh lhe \niled Nalions has been lhiown open, espe-
cially lhe issue of whelhei a mandale is iequiied foi mililaiy aclion of lhe
lype laken in Kosovo. The iesponse, peihaps wilh less equivocalion fiom
lhe \niled Kingdom lhan fiom Iiance oi Geimany, was lhal il was de-
siiable bul nol absolulely necessaiy. Since Iiance, Geimany, and lhe
\niled Kingdom compiise half of lhe Conlacl Gioup, queslions also
need lo be iaised aboul lhe use of such ad hoc gioupings in lhe fuluie and
whelhei lhis symbolizes an efncienl way lo addiess specinc issues, oi
whelhei il ieecls moie geneial shoilcomings wilh exisling sliucluies.
Secondly, lhe abilily of lhe ma|oi Iuiopean allies lo mounl a Kosovo-
lype opeialion in lhe fuluie wilhoul \S assislance musl also be ques-
lioned. n spile of lhe vigoious diplomalic aclion laken by all lhiee
counliies examined above, lhe aclual pace and conlenl of lhe pie-
Rambouillel negolialions weie sel by Washinglon. The \niled Slales is
able lo diaw nol only upon ils polilical and economic leveiage bul also
upon lhe lhieal oi applicalion of mililaiy powei. By way of conliasl,
any indigenous Iuiopean capabililies lo addiess Kosovo-lype ciises Jo
not yct iesl upon lhe abilily lo diaw upon a seamless web of oplions.
The piospecls foi lhe I\ being able lo do so iesl heavily upon lhe
commilmenls lhal Iiance, Geimany, and lhe \niled Kingdom aie able lo
make lo lhe CISP. On papei lhe Headline Goals`` eslablished al lhe
Helsinki Iuiopean Council, which buill upon lhe guidelines eslablished
in Cologne eailiei on in lhe yeai, piovide some encouiagemenl. Accoid-
ing lo lhe goals, lhe I\ membei slales should be able, by 2OO3, lo de-
ploy wilhin 6O days and suslain foi al leasl 1 yeai mililaiy foices of up lo
5O,OOO6O,OOO peisons capable of lhe full iange of Peleisbeig lasks.``47
Theie is lhough much woik iemaining lo be done in a veiy shoil peiiod
of lime lo enable lo I\ lo move fiom vision lo iealily. One iisk is lhal
lhe nevei again`` senlimenls lhal lhe iefugee exodus and evidence of
elhnic cleansing have evoked will dissipale, as lhe immediale ciisis be-
comes moie dislanl and lhe cosls of suslaining KIOR and any follow-up
foices become evidenl. No mallei whal posl-ciisis iesliucluiing is envis-
aged, lhe cosls will be consideiable and, if lhe goal is lo eslablish slabilily
in lhe iegion as a whole, lhis will mean addiessing lhe iole of Seibia
(peihaps slill undei Milosevic) in any envisaged aiiangemenls.
Thiidly, lhe limilalion of lhe ma|oi allies lo lhiee Iiance, Geimany,
and lhe \niled Kingdom implicilly iaises queslions aboul Russia and
lhe exlenl lo which il should be associaled wilh fuluie Iuiopean secuiily
designs. All lhiee aulhois make lhe poinl lhal bilaleial ielalions wilh
Russia suffeied as a iesull of lheii pailicipalion in Opeialion Allied
Ioice, bul nol iiiepaiably. The inclusion, al lhe insislence of all lhiee
allies, of Russia as an inlegial pail of KIOR, in opposilion lo lhe \niled
Slales, may hinl al a ma|oi diffeience in peispeclives on iegional secuiily
and Russia`s iole.
Iouilhly, foi diffeienl ieasons lhe ciisis in Kosovo also iaises queslions
iegaiding lhe iole of lhe \niled Slales wilh ils ma|oi and olhei NATO
allies. The queslion of lhe fuluie of Iuiopean secuiily implicilly iaises
well-woin Allanlicisl veisus Iuiopean secuiily issues. The answei, how-
evei, lies nol only wilh lhe ma|oi allies, bul wilh lhe \niled Slales ilself.
Tiadilionally, since lhe end of lhe Second Woild Wai lhe \niled Slales
has adopled an ambivalenl allilude lowaids lhe issue of ils Iuiopean
allies pioviding foi lheii own secuiily and defence. Posilive gesluies have
emanaled fiom Washinglon wilh buiden-shaiing aigumenls in mind, yel
iesislance noimally lies in lhe possible loss of inuence ovei ils Iuiopean
allies should lhe \niled Slales accepl anylhing olhei lhan a hegemonic
iole. A cleai indicalion of Washinglon`s piefeiences would assisl lhe
Iuiopean allies in foimulaling lheii fuluie plans foi lhe iegion`s secuiily
and slabilily.
Iinally, in a bioadei conlexl, lhe seleclive naluie of lhe iesponse lo lhe
Kosovo ciisis compaied wilh olhei compaiable, oi woise, inleinalional
ciises has diawn commenl fiom vaiious quaileis. No such campaign was
waged undei a humanilaiian bannei in Libeiia, Sieiia Leone, oi lhe dis-
pule belween Iiiliea and Ilhiopia. Such aigumenls ignoie, howevei, lhe
involvemenl of lhe lhiee counliies undei consideialion heie in Cambo-
dia, Rwanda, and Somalia. Allhough none has lhe diplomalic oi mililaiy
leveiage of lhe \niled Slales, lhey aie neveilheless global aclois. The
inleiesl geneialed by Kosovo, of which lhis pio|ecl is an indicalion, iesls
nol so much upon seleclivily bul upon lhe facl lhal lhe ciisis occuiied in
one of lhe few iegions (if nol lhe only one) wheie a iegional oiganizalion
was able lo lake aclion againsl lhe syslemalic abuse of human iighls. Bul
lhe facl lhal aclion was laken in Iuiope on humanilaiian giounds al a
iegional level is as much a commenl upon lhe lack of any seiious abilily
on lhe pail of lhe \niled Nalions oi any olhei inleinalional oiganizalion
lo iespond. Allhough con|ecluial, il is woilh consideiing whal would
have happened if NATO had nol inleivened?
Slabilily in lhe Balkans will ullimalely depend mainly upon lhe effoils
of iegional oiganizalions and aiiangemenls, nol lhose of lhe inleinalional
communily. The woik of Iiance, Geimany, and lhe \niled Kingdom is
fai fiom ovei.
Noles
1. Cail Bildl, Peisonal Opinion,`` Iinancial Tincs, 9 1une 1999.
2. Hans-Geoig Ihihail, Pievenlive Diplomacy oi Neglecled nilialive? The Royaumonl
Piocess and lhe Slabilizalion of Soulheaslein Iuiope,`` in Hans-Geoig Ihihail and
Albiechl Schnabel, eds., Thc Southcast 1uropcan Challcngc. 1thnic Conict anJ thc
Intcrnational Rcsponsc, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999, pp. 177195.
3. Richaid Caplan, nleinalional Diplomacy and lhe Ciisis in Kosovo,`` Intcrnational
Ajjairs, \ol. 74, Oclobei 1998, p. 747.
4. nleiview wilh Ioieign Minislei Hubeil \e diine in 1c MonJc, 11 1une 1999.
5. Gunlei Hofmann, Wie Deulschland in den Kiieg geiiel,`` Dic Zcit, No. 2O, 1999, pp.
1721.
6. See 1c MonJc, 26 Maich 1999, p. 5; 31 Maich 1999, p. 2; 8 Apiil 1999, p. 2; 16 Apiil
1999, p. 2; 23 Apiil 1999, p. 2; 5 May 1999, pp. 23; 29 May 1999, p. 2.
7. 1c MonJc, 14 May 1999, p. 2.
8. See 1c MonJc, 11 1une 1999, p. 4.
9. Le Monde, 23 1une 1999, p. 7.
1O. See 1c MonJc, 31 Maich 1999, p. 5; 1112 Apiil 1999, p. 7; and 24 Apiil 1999, p. 8.
11. See, foi example, hllp:jjwww.libeialion.fijkosovojacluj99O52Ob.hlml.
12. SPDjBu ndnis 9OjDie Giu nen, Aufbiuch und Iineueiung Deulschlands Weg ins 21.
1ahihundeil,`` Koalitionsvcrcinbarung ;wischcn Jcr SID unJ Bu nJnis 90/Dic Cru ncn,
Bonn, 2O Oclobei 1998, pp. 4449.
13. Hofmann, Wie Deulschland in den Kiieg geiiel,`` pp. 1721.
14. Rudolf Schaiping, Dei Slein auf unseiei Seele. Deulschland und dei geiechle Kiieg,``
in Iiank Schiiimachei, ed., Dcr wcstlichc Krcu;;ug. 41 Iositioncn ;un Kosovo-Kricg,
Slullgail: Deulsche \eilags-Auslall, 1999, pp. 129136.
15. 1oschka Iischei, Milosevic wiid dei \eilieiei sein,`` nleiview mil Auenminislei
Iischei, Dcr Spicgcl, No. 16, 1999, pp. 3438.
16. 1u igen Ilsa ssei, Nic wicJcr Kricg ohnc uns. Das Kosovo unJ Jic ncuc Jcutschc Cco-
politik, Hambuig: Ilefanlen Piess, 1999.
17. 1u igen Habeimas, Iin Kiieg an dei Gienze zwischen Rechl und Moial,`` Dic Zcit,
No. 18, 1999; Dielei Senghaas, Rechl auf Nolhilfe. Wenn die nleivenlion nichl nui
eilaubl, sondein iegeliechl gebolen isl,`` Irankjurtcr Allgcncinc Zcitung, 12 1uly 1999;
Heimann Webei, Rechlsveislo, Ioilenlwicklung odei Neuinleipielalion?`` Irank-
jurtcr Allgcncinc Zcitung, 9 1uly 1999.
18. Ioisa, Osldeulsche gegen diesen Kiieg,`` Ioisa-\mfiage, Stcrn, 82O Apiil 1999, p. 34.
19. Dielei Walz, Ru ckhall fu i die NATO. Iinslellungen dei Deulschen zum Kosovo-
Kiieg,`` Injornationcn ju r Jic Truppc, No. 6, 1999, pp. 2829.
2O. See Irankjurtcr Allgcncinc Zcitung, 14 Apiil 1999; Su JJcutschc Zcitung, 15 Apiil 1999.
21. See G-8 Declaialion on Kosovo, Irankjurtcr Allgcncinc Zcitung, 7 May 1999.
22. Auswa iliges Aml, Iin Slabilila lspakl fu i Su dosleuiopa,`` 9 Apiil 1999, al hllp:jj
www.auswaeiliges-aml.dej6 aichivjinf-kosjhinleigijslabdl.hlm.
23. See Vclt an Sonntag, 15 Augusl 1999.
24. See SPDjBu ndnis 9OjDie Giu nen, Aufbiuch und Iineueiung,`` p. 44.
25. Geoige Robeilson, Minisliy of Defence Biienng, Mi. Geoige Robeilson, Secielaiy of
Slale foi Defence, and Geneial Sii Chailes Gulhiie, Chief of lhe Defence Slaff, 25
Maich 1999, al hllp:jjwww.mod.ukjnewsjkosovojbiief25O399.hlm.
26. Conlacl Gioup, Statcncnt on Kosovo oj thc Contact Croup oj Iorcign Ministcrs, New
oik, 24 Seplembei 1997.
27. Conlacl Gioup, Contact Croup Conclusions, 29 1anuaiy 1999.
28. MOD Biienng.
29. MOD, Biilish Iquipmenl lo Load al Imden,`` Ministry oj Dcjcncc, London, 12 Ieb-
iuaiy 1999, al hllp:jjwww.mod.ukjnewsjpisjO38 99.hlm.
3O. MOD Biienng.
31. uoled in Adam Robeils, NATO`s Humanilaiian Wai` ovei Kosovo,`` Survival, \ol.
41, No. 3, Aulumn 1999, p. 1O6.
32. HansarJ, Col. 161, 23 Maich 1999.
34. Paliick Winloui and Pelei Beaumonl, Revealed: The Seciel Plan lo nvade Kosovo,``
Thc Obscrvcr, 18 1uly 1999, p. 1.
35. bid.
36. These nguies appeaied in Thc CuarJian, 1 1une 1999.
38. 1oinl Declaialion, 1oint Dcclaration on 1uropcan Dcjcncc, Iianco-Biilish Summil, Sl
Malo, 4 Decembei 1998, al hllp:jjwww.ambafiance.oig.ukjdb.phlml?id195O.
39. Chailes Gianl, Can Britain 1caJ in 1uropc? London: Cenlie foi Iuiopean Refoim,
1998.
4O. Thc CuarJian, 3 Augusl 1999.
41. Thc Obscrvcr, 25 1uly 1999.
42. SunJay Tclcgraph, 25 1uly 1999.
43. SN 15Oj99, IrcsiJcncy Conclusions, Annex Iuiopean Council Declaialion on
Slienglhening lhe Common Iuiopean Policy on Secuiily and Defence,`` Cologne, 34
1une 1999, paia. 1.
44. bid., paia. 5.
45. IrcsiJcncy Conclusions, Annex \ Piesidency Repoils lo lhe Helsinki Iuiopean
Council on Slienglhening lhe Common Iuiopean Policy on Secuiily and Defence` and
on Non-Mililaiy Ciisis Managemenl of lhe Iuiopean \nion`,`` Helsinki, 1O11 De-
cembei 1999.
46. Geneial Klaus Naumann, Tiansciipl of a Piess Confeience given by Geneial Klaus
Naumann, Biussels, 4 May 1999.
47. IrcsiJcncy Conclusions, Helsinki Iuiopean Council, Pail Common Iuiopean Policy
on Secuiily and Defence,`` Helsinki, 1O11 Decembei 1999, paia. 28.
rt hree
iews from xey llies
1O
The Noidic counliies:
Whilhei lhe Wesl`s conscience?
Bjrn Mllcr
Commonalilies and diffeiences belween lhe Noidic
counliies
The Noidic counliies have a numbei of fealuies in common, such as a
faiily high slandaid of living, a welfaie slale`` foim of capilalism, and
slable demociacy. Theii foieign policies have exhibiled bolh common-
alilies and diffeiences. All of lhem scoie high on a scale of inlei-
nalionalism,`` in lhe sense lhal lhey pay lheii dues lo lhe \niled Nalions,
conliibule signincanlly lo \N peacekeeping and similai opeialions, and
allocale a high peicenlage of lheii weallh lo developmenl aid. On all
lhese counls lhey scoie much highei lhan, foi example, lhe \niled Slales,
which leads only in leims of mililaiy expendiluies, bolh in absolule and
pei capila leims and as a peicenlage of GDP (see lable 1O.1).
Wai belween lhe Noidic counliies was quile fiequenl unlil lhe Napo-
leonic wais, bul since lhal lime lhe iegion has developed inlo a secuiily
communily`` in lhe sense lhal wai among ils membeis has become un-
lhinkable, nolwilhslanding lhe peisislence of seveial polenlial casus bclli.
One mighl even aigue lhal lhey have become, by lheii veiy naluie,
peaceful, as none of lhem had been involved in any wais of aggiession
unlil lhe Kosovo conicl wilh lhe exceplion of Iinland`s pailicipalion in
lhe Geiman allack on lhe \SSR duiing lhe Second Woild Wai.
Despile lhis shaied oiienlalion, lhe nve counliies diffeied lhioughoul
lhe Cold Wai in leims of alignmenl. Denmaik, Noiway, and celand have
151
been membeis of NATO since ils foundalion, wheieas Sweden and Iin-
land have been neulial andjoi non-aligned. The leims`` oi degiees`` of
bolh NATO membeiship and non-alignmenl have diffeied, howevei,
making a conlinuum of semi-alignmenl`` moie appiopiiale. The end of
lhe Cold Wai has bolh caused and coincided wilh ialhei piofound
changes in lhis pallein.
The veiy meaning of bolh neulialily`` and non-alignmenl`` have
changed wilh lhe shifl fiom bipolaiily lo somelhing close lo unipolaiily.
While lheie aie no immediale piospecls of Sweden oi Iinland |oining
NATO, bolh aie coopeialing quile closely wilh il undei lhe auspices of
lhe Pailneiship foi Peace as well as in olhei conlexls. Bolh have |oined
lhe Iuiopean \nion (I\), and even done so wilhoul lhe ieluclance and
ieseivalions of lhe old membei, Denmaik. Bolh aie lhus closei lo lhe
Weslein Iuiopean \nion (WI\), wilhoul aclually being membeis, lhan
is Denmaik. Allhough iemaining oulside lhe I\, even Noiway has
closei lies lo lhe WI\ lhan has Denmaik.
Denmaik has abandoned ils polilical dissenl and become a lolally
loyal`` membei of NATO, lheieby iesembling Noiway. These changing
fiamewoik condilions nolwilhslanding, il look seveial yeais foi Denmaik
and Noiway lo abandon lheii liadilional slance of sciupulously abiding
by inleinalional law in favoui of Alliance loyally.
The luining poinl was lhe Iebiuaiy 1998 iaqi ciisis, when bolh coun-
liies pledged suppoil foi an allack againsl iaq, which was nol aulhoiized
Table 1O.1 Compaialive inleinalionalism``
Mililaiy
expendiluies
(1997) Developmenl aid
\niled Nalions
conliibulions
Counliy
1997 \S$
pei capila
of
GDP
1997 \S$
pei capila
of
GDP
Aiieais
(\S$ m.)
PKO lioops
(3O.11.98)
Denmaik 538 1.7 342 1.O n.a. 116
Noiway 76O 2.3 3O8 O.9 n.a. 153
celand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3
Sweden 619 2.4 222 O.8 n.a. 2O9
Iinland 381 1.7 148 O.3 n.a. 787
\SA 1,O18 3.4 3O O.1 1,69O 583
Souices: mililaiy expendiluie SS, Thc Military Balancc 1998/99, London:
Oxfoid \niveisily Piess, 1998; developmenl aid \niled Nalions Developmenl
Piogiamme, Hunan Dcvclopncnt Rcport 1999, New oik: Oxfoid \niveisily
Piess, 1999, pp. 4952, iefeiiing lo nel ofncial developmenl assislance; peace-
keeping \N websile al www.un.oigjDeplsjdpkojlioopsjlioop1.hlm (lhe nguies
do nol include conliibulions lo missions sub-delegaled lo NATO).
152 \IWS IROM NATO ALLIS
by any \N mandale and hence consliluled a cleai bieach of inleinalional
law.1 As il happened, nolhing came of lhe allack befoie Decembei 1998,
when neilhei counliy was asked lo conliibule, even lhough lhey would
have been willing lo do so.
Having lhus losl lheii viiginily`` in lhoughl, if nol in deed, lhe slep lo
ieal aclion in lhe case of lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia (IR)
seemed less signincanl even lhough il iepiesenled, foi Noiway, ils nisl
wai of aggiession since lhe age of lhe \ikings, and foi Denmaik lhe nisl
since lhe Napoleonic wais. The ielalively unined posilion of lhe Noidic
counliies in lhe \niled Nalions was lheieby also shalleied. This dis-
agieemenl nolwilhslanding, Noidic coopeialion has conlinued, bolh in
leims of |oinl slalemenls and in leims of mililaiy coopeialion, foi ex-
ample in lhe Slabilizalion Ioice (SIOR) in Bosnia.
Because none of lhe Noidic counliies has any special nalional secuiily
inleiesls in lhe Balkans, one mighl have expecled faiily unifoim behav-
ioui fiom all nve counliies, especially as Alliance loyally musl have be-
come less impoilanl lhan il was (believed lo be) duiing lhe Cold Wai.
Howevei, lhe exacl opposile occuiied: lhe NATO membeis have become
moie loyal lhan befoie, while lhe non-aligned membeis of lhe Noidic
communily`` have moved lowaids lhe NATO posilion. The anomaly
wilhin lhe lallei gioup is lhal Iinland is now signincanlly closei lo lhe
NATO posilion lhan is Sweden, and seems less conceined aboul lhe im-
plicalions foi ielalions belween lhe Wesl and Russia, despile ils moie
exposed geoslialegic localion.
Behavioui in lhe Kosovo ciisis
n lhe following accounl of lhe Noidic NATO membeis, shall use
Denmaik as lhe exemplaiy case, paying much less allenlion lo Noiway oi
celand excepl insofai as lheii behavioui oi alliludes have diffeied sig-
nincanlly fiom lhose of Denmaik.
Dcnnark
Duiing lhe enliie peiiod of lhe bieak-up of lhe foimei ugoslavia, all
lhiee Noidic NATO membeis weie unanimous in lheii suppoil of NATO
policy. \nlil 1998, howevei, lhis was possible wilhoul abandoning lheii
liadilional adheience lo \N iules. Denmaik was aclively involved in
bolh Cioalia and subsequenlly Bosnia in lhe \N Pioleclion Ioice
(\NPROIOR), followed (aflei lhe Daylon Accoids) by lhe mplemen-
lalion Ioice (IOR) and SIOR.2 The lolal numbei of aimy lioops was
aiound 1,OOO (mosl of lhem in a |oinl NoidicPolish biigade), in addilion
THI NORDC CO\NTRIS 153
lo which Denmaik also conliibuled a coivelle lo lhe Shaip Guaid`` naval
deploymenl in lhe Adiialic unlil 1996.3
Iven lhough a Danish commandei gained some fame by peisonifying a
moie iobusl`` foim of peacekeeping (as commandei of lhe shool-back
biigade``), lhese deploymenls iemained consislenl wilh lhe liadilional
peacekeeping paiadigm. They weie based on a \N mandale, albeil sub-
delegaled lo NATO as fai as IOR and SIOR weie conceined, and
lhey soughl lo adheie lo lhe piinciple of impailialily. The pievenlalive``
deploymenl in Macedonia (\NPRIDIP) was likewise based on a \N
mandale as well as on lhe consenl of lhe hosl counliy, as was lhe de-
ploymenl of a foice lo Albania in 1997, lo which Denmaik conliibuled 59
lioops.
Denmaik was also consislenlly suppoilive of lhe effoils of lhe Oigani-
zalion foi Secuiily and Co-opeialion in Iuiope (OSCI) al conicl ieso-
lulion, |usl as il followed lhe I\`s policy lowaids lhe iegion. As lhis
policy was, in mosl cases, veiy similai lo lhal of NATO as well as lhe
\niled Nalions and lhe OSCI, il was conlioveisial only insofai as lhe
piecipilous diplomalic iecognilion of Slovenia and Cioalia in 1992 was
conceined. Apail fiom lhis, in dealing wilh lhe ugoslav ciises, Denmaik
managed quile well lo combine loyally lo lhe foui liadilional pillais`` of
ils foieign policy, i.e. lhe \niled Nalions, lhe OSCI, NATO, and lhe I\.
Peihaps as a consequence, lhe 199Os saw an almosl unpiecedenled do-
meslic consensus on lhese policies, as well as on secuiily polilics in gen-
eial. The cenlie`` simply giew lo encompass almosl lhe enliie polilical
speclium, leaving only lhe ialhei insignincanl iighl and lefl wings in dis-
senling posilions. As fai as ugoslavia was conceined, il also helped lhal
lhe pioblems calling foi aclion weie immedialely appealing lo Denmaik,
wilh ils long-slanding emphasis on human iighls policies.
When lhe focus of allenlion duiing 1998 shifled fiom Bosnia lo Kosovo,
Denmaik adopled a follow lhy leadei`` posilion, and showed no hesila-
lion when il came lo issuing lhieals againsl lhe IR nolwilhslanding
lhe facl lhal even lhieals consliluled bieaches of inleinalional law. Ioi-
eign Minislei Niels Helveg Peleisen, in his speech lo lhe \N Geneial
Assembly on 22 Seplembei 1998, allempled a ialhei ciealive`` ieinlei-
pielalion of lhe iules, wilh lhe following slalemenl: Legilimacy will
usually be piovided by lhe Secuiily Council. Thal is how il should be.
Disagieemenl in lhe Secuiily Council aboul a pailiculai line of aclion
musl, howevei, nevei lead lo paialysis of lhe inleinalional communily.``4
Denmaik pailicipaled wilh lwo I-16 aiiciafl in lhe NATO Delei-
mined Ialcon`` aii manoeuvies in Macedonian and Albanian aiispace
(wilh bolh counliies` peimission), which weie inlended lo pul piessuie
on Milosevic. Moieovei, on 8 Oclobei 1998 a decision was passed by pai-
liamenl lo conliibule lo a NATO deploymenl in lhe Weslein Balkans``
wilh foui I-16 aiiciafl plus ieseives and 115 peisonnel.5 As a consequence
of lhis decision, lhe aiiciafl weie dispalched lo laly and lhe aulhoiily lo
use lhem was liansfeiied lo lhe NATO command chain as yel anolhei
conliibulion lo NATO`s diplomacy of lhieal.``
Suipiisingly, a laige ma|oiily of lhe populalion suppoiled lhis policy.
n an opinion poll conducled on 27 1une 1998, only 9 pei cenl weie
opposed lo any use of foice by NATO, while 46 pei cenl weie in favoui
of NATO inleivenlion wilh a \N mandale, and 27 pei cenl favouied il
even wilhoul one; 66 pei cenl weie in favoui of Danish mililaiy pailici-
palion, while only 15 pei cenl weie againsl.6
n pailiamenl, only lhe afoiemenlioned lefl and iighl wings voled
againsl,7 while in lhe public debale only scalleied voices in lhe wildei-
ness`` weie heaid (myself included). Some of lhese voices poinled, intcr
alia, lo lhe pooi liack iecoid of lhieal diplomacy in geneial and lo ils
veiy iecenl complele failuie vis-a` -vis iaq. Allhough lheie was lhus some
ciilicism of NATO policies, lhe debale saw no suppoil whalsoevei foi lhe
policies of Piesidenl Milosevic vis-a` -vis Kosovo, bul consislenl suppoil
foi lhe nalional iighls of lhe Kosovo Albanians albeil nol lo lhe poinl
of secession, which lhe goveinmenl iefused. Paiadoxically, lhe lalei ciilics
of NATO`s wai againsl lhe IR weie among lhe mosl oulspoken advo-
cales of lhe Kosovai cause, and viilually lhe only ones lo cullivale iela-
lions wilh lhe Seibjugoslav opposilion.
Aflei lhe decision lo liansfei aulhoiily lo NATO had been laken
(piobably in violalion of Denmaik`s Conslilulion8), lhe enliie mallei was
almosl complelely de-polilicized. No ieal polilical decision was lhus evei
laken lo launch lhe allack, even lhough lhis consliluled a complele de-
pailuie fiom long-slanding policies. Mosl of lhe polilicians who accepled
lhe wai wilhoul ob|eclions weie piobably nol familiai wilh lhe Ram-
bouillel agieemenl, which lhe aii sliikes weie inlended lo enfoice even
lhough il was almosl inslanlly made available on lhe nleinel. ndeed,
when lefl-wing pailiamenlaiians iealized (bul nol unlil May!) lhal lhis
consliluled a democialic pioblem, lhe foieign minislei is on iecoid as
asseiling lhal |wje do nol have lhe agieemenl in lhe Ioieign Minisliy.
Hence we cannol publish il.``9 Theie weie meiely a couple of pailia-
menlaiy debales on lhe mallei duiing lhe wai, when only lhe exlieme
iighl and lefl expiessed dissenl wilh iegaid lo NATO`s and Denmaik`s
conducl of lhe wai.
The Danish mililaiy conliibulion lo NATO`s wai mainly consisled
of foui I-16 aiiciafl plus one ieseive, lo which weie added, fiom Apiil
onwaids, an addilional foui aiiciafl, as well as 15O lioops foi lhe Albania
Ioice (AIOR) fiom Apiil. n Apiil, a iequesl aiiived fiom NATO foi
Denmaik lo conliibule one of ils nve submaiines a iequesl lhal was
piobably ielaled lo lhe ongoing polilical game ovei lhe defence plan foi
2OOO2OO3. The enliie mallei became veiy messy, as lhe goveinmenl
(wilhoul duly consulling pailiamenl`s Ioieign Policy Commillee) iefused
lhe iequesl on lhe giounds lhal lhe Danish submaiines weie unable lo
opeiale in lhe waim waleis of lhe Adiialic which was subsequenlly
disclosed lo be incoiiecl.10
A minoi conlioveisy also aiose ovei lhe possible conliibulion lo a
naval blockade and lhe modes of ils implemenlalion. Nol only was lhis
blockade piobably a violalion of inleinalional law; il also enlailed iisks of
a diiecl confionlalion wilh lhe Russian Navy. As a compiomise il was
decided (by NATO) lo enfoice lhe blockade only wilh iegaid lo coun-
liies lhal weie pailies lo lhe sanclions iegime, on which basis Denmaik
decided (by 86 voles lo 22) lo pailicipale.11 The end iesull was lhal
Denmaik piomised lo conliibule one coivelle lo lhe naval blockade fiom
1uly onwaids, bul lhal il was nevei asked lo fulnll lhis piomise because
lhe wai was ovei befoie lhen. Aflei lhe wai, lhe Danish Navy gol ils
small piece of lhe aclion`` in lhe foim of conliibuling a mine-cleaiing
vessel and a mine-layei lo lhe cleaiing of NATO munilions dumped in
lhe Adiialic Sea.12
Thioughoul lhe wai, mosl of Denmaik`s mililaiy conliibulion was lhus
foi suppoil funclions ialhei lhan aclual combal, somelhing lhal Defence
Minislei Hans Hkkeiup appaienlly lalei deploied.13 Howevei, on 26
May 1999 Danish pilols diopped lheii nisl-evei bombs on a soveieign
slale14 as an acl of aggiession,`` accoiding lo lhe dennilion of lhe \N
Geneial Assembly in Resolulion No. 3314 (1974), adopled wilh a Danish
vole as lhe use of aimed foice by a Slale againsl lhe soveieignly, leiii-
loiial inlegiily oi polilical independence of anolhei Slale.``
Iven lhough lhe bombing campaign was so obviously nol achieving ils
aims, lheie was only lillle pailiamenlaiy debale aboul lhe alleinalives,
such as lhe use of giound lioops. Noi weie lheie moie lhan a few ques-
lions lo lhe defence minislei on NATO`s seleclion of laigels foi ils
bombings. Peihaps suipiisingly, 7O pei cenl of lhe olheiwise peaceful
Danish populalion suppoiled lhe wai, even lo lhe poinl of favouiing lhe
use of giound foices.15 This may have been a consequence of lhe media
debale. Al lhe beginning of lhe wai lheie was a faiily open public debale
aboul lhe pios and cons as well as aboul lhe piospecls of success, bul lhis
soon changed. When lhe massive exodus of Kosovo Albanians occuiied,
lhe leims of lhe debale changed signincanlly lo confoim lo lhe iule
whoevei is nol foi us is againsl us and hence a suppoilei of Milosevic
and lhus an accomplice in elhnic cleansing and genocide.``
Thioughoul lhe wai lheie was massive sympalhy foi lhe viclims, which
was also ieecled in lhe subslanlial humanilaiian aid gianled lhiough
bolh goveinmenl channels and non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions.16 n
addilion lo lhe secuiily polilical debale, lheie was a ialhei healed debale
on whelhei oi nol lo accepl Kosovai iefugees (and peihaps Seibian
deseileis) and, if so, how many and undei whal condilions. On lhis issue
lhe foimei division of opinion belween lhe cenlie and lhe exliemes was
liansfoimed inlo lhe moie liadilional lefliighl splil. The fuilhei lo lhe
lefl, lhe giealei lhe willingness lo welcome iefugees, while ieluclance lo
accepl iefugees giew lowaids lhe iighl (xenophobic) end of lhe speclium.
The iesull was lhal Denmaik accepled a measly 1,5OO lempoiaiy iefu-
gees (lalei incieased lo 3,OOO), mosl of whom nevei aclually aiiived.17
Theie is no doubl lhal lhe end of lhe wai al lhe beginning of 1une 1999
came as a much-welcomed suipiise. l lefl Denmaik, as well as lhe iesl of
NATO, wilh bolh shoil- and medium-lo-long-leim challenges. On 17
1une, Denmaik pledged lo commil aiound 85O lioops lo lhe Kosovo
Ioice (KIOR), lo be deployed in lhe noilh-weslein pail of Kosovo
undei Iiench command. Only lhe exlieme lefl`` voled againsl lhis con-
liibulion on lhe giounds lhal KIOR was loo NATO dominaled and lhal
lhe Kosovais had nol been given lhe oplion of a iefeiendum on seces-
sion.18 Howevei, |usl like lhe iesl of NATO, Denmaik expeiienced con-
sideiable difncullies musleiing lhe iequiied foices even lhough il mighl
have slailed piepaiing foi lhis when lhe wai was launched, piecisely in
oidei lo pave lhe way foi NATO foices in Kosovo. Seveial soldieis in lhe
Danish nleinalional Biigade iefused lo be senl lo Kosovo, even lhough
lheii conliacls cleaily slipulaled lheii obligalion lo go. n oidei lo nll lhe
gaps, il pioved necessaiy lo liansfei foices fiom SIOR in Bosnia lo lhe
new KIOR in Kosovo, in addilion lo which lhe Danish conliibulion lo
lhe AIOR was also wilhdiawn.19 The deploymenl of foices lo Kosovo
lhus began only on 17 1uly and was compleled by 91O Augusl, by which
lime a ma|oi elhnic cleansing campaign againsl lhe Seib populalion had
been neaily compleled by lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy and lhe ieluining
Kosovais.
The medium-leim consequence of lhe Kosovo commilmenl is likely lo
be a ma|oi culback in Denmaik`s inleinalional engagemenl, fiom aiound
1,5OO lioops slalioned abioad lo a meie 8OO1,OOO lioops, mosl of lhe
culs coming fiom SIOR.20 Pail of lhe explanalion foi lhis pioblem is lhe
small age cohoils now being consciipled, implying a smallei lolal pool
fiom which lo diaw volunleeis. The obvious solulion lo lhis pioblem
would have been lo abolish consciiplion allogelhei in favoui of smallei,
bul moie deployable, piofessional aimed foices, bul lhis oppoilunily was
missed, al leasl foi lhe duialion of lhe piesenl defence plan, i.e. unlil
2OO3.
Anolhei shoil-leim pioblem viilually solved ilself. Allhough bolh
NATO and lhe \niled Nalions inilially soughl lo ensuie a conliolled and
piecemeal ieluin of lhe iefugees fiom Albania and Monlenegio, lhe ow
of ieluinees soon escaped lheii conliol. By lhe end of 1une, all lhe iefu-
gees had lefl lhe neighbouiing counliies, and mosl of lhe few who had
soughl iefuge in Denmaik also quickly ieluined volunlaiily.21
To ils ciedil, lhe I\ look lhe lead wilh iegaid lo lhe long-leim piob-
lems. On ils inilialive, a summil meeling was called in Augusl 1999 in
Saia|evo, wheie a Slabilily Pacl foi Soulh-Iaslein Iuiope was launched.
Shoilly aflei, a donoi confeience was convened (28 1uly 1999), wheie
Denmaik |oined ils allies in issuing piomises of bolh immediale humani-
laiian assislance and suppoil foi posl-wai ieconsliuclion and fuilhei
developmenl albeil nol foi Seibia. As fai as lhe bollom line`` was
conceined, howevei, Denmaik followed lhe lead of mosl of ils allies by
passing lhe bill`` lo lhe lhiid woild, by in effecl liansfeiiing lhe funds foi
Kosovo (aboul \S$1OO million pei yeai in 1999 and 2OOO) fiom lhe iesl
of lhe developmenl aid and emeigency ielief budgels.22 A fuilhei ieduc-
lion of lhe lolal bill`` may be lhal Danish nims aie expecled lo benenl
subslanlially fiom Danish aid.``23
Norway
Noiway`s allilude and behavioui lhioughoul lhe ciisis and wai closely
iesembled lhose of Denmaik. Iiom 1991 lo 1998, Noiway conliibuled
aiound 16O peisonnel foi \NPRIDIP and aiound 8OO peisonnel foi
SIOR (mainly wilhin lhe NoidicPolish biigade), and, in 1anuaiy 1999,
six I-16 aiiciafl weie dispalched lo laly. Duiing lhe wai, lhe following
conliibulions weie envisaged: 81 peisonnel foi lhe Kosovo \eiincalion
Cooidinalion Cenlie, localed in Macedonia; a conliibulion lo lhe ex-
liaclion foice; six I-16 aiiciafl wilh a lolal of 18O peisonnel; a C-13O
lianspoil aiiciafl allocaled lo lhe evacualion of iefugees.24
On 24 and 25 Maich 1999 lhe wai was debaled ialhei vehemenlly in
lhe Noiwegian pailiamenl. The debale followed lhe pallein desciibed foi
Denmaik: lhe cenlie of lhe polilical speclium suppoiled lhe wai, while
lhe iighl and lefl exliemes weie againsl, albeil foi ialhei diffeienl iea-
sons. The lefl, iepiesenled by lhe Socialisl Lefl Paily (Socialistisk Vcn-
strcparti ), was splil, because lhe ma|oiily of lhe pailiamenlaiy faclion had
pieviously given lheii consenl lo lhe use of foice, wheieas a minoiily
followed lhe paily leadeiship in opposing il. Iven lhe suppoileis, how-
evei, queslioned NATO`s melhod of waging lhe wai, uiging considei-
alion of lhe possible use of giound foices.
The iighl, iepiesenled by lhe so-called Piogiess Paily (IrcnskriJts-
partict), opposed lhe wai, nol only (as aigued in lhe pailiamenlaiy de-
bale) oul of concein foi inleinalional law, bul also because lhe wai would
moially oblige NATO counliies lo accepl Kosovai iefugees somelhing
lhal lhe paily was againsl, in line wilh ils geneial xenophobic allilude.
Opposing lhe wai as such, lhe paily suggesled an alleinalive polilical
slialegy, envisaging diplomalic iecognilion of an independenl Kosova,
which would liansfoim lhe wai inlo one of nalional defence (by lhe
Kosovais againsl Seibia).
The cenlie, iepiesenled by lhe goveining Chiislian democial, Cenlie,
and Libeial pailies, was seemingly unhappy wilh lhe debale, and il did
nol sweive fiom lhe posilion of unqualined suppoil foi lhe wai. Piime
Minislei Bondevik summed up his assessmenl of lhe silualion lhus:
NATO, wilh ils inleivenlion, has demonslialed in piaclice whal is lhe
Alliance`s main lask, namely lo ensuie peace and slabilily.``25 Like his
Danish colleague, Noiway`s Ioieign Minislei Knul \ollebk venluied a
ialhei unoilhodox inleipielalion of inleinalional law duiing lhe pailia-
menlaiy debale on 27 Apiil. Re|ecling lhe aigumenl based on humani-
laiian law, he iecalled lhe \niling foi Peace`` piecedenl fiom 195O lo
claim lhal, |ijf lhe Secuiily Council should be incapable of peifoiming
ils lasks on behalf of lhe membei slales, lhis would obviously nol absolve
lhe membei slales oi lhe \N fiom obligalions, accoiding lo lhe \N
Chailei, lo uphold inleinalional peace and secuiily.``26
IcclanJ
Ioi obvious ieasons, celand`s conliibulion lo lhe NATO wai was mainly
iheloiical, because lhe counliy possesses no aimed foices lhal il mighl
have conliibuled. l did, howevei, conliibule lhiee policemen lo lhe \N
Mission in Bosnia and Heizegovina.
The facl lhal lhe wai againsl lhe IR was a NATO wai, howevei,
made celand an accomplice by defaull.`` Neveilheless, lhe goveinmenl
did nol pay much allenlion lo lhe wai. n his 14-page speech lo lhe
nalional execulive of lhe Piogiessive Paily, on 26 Maich 1999, Ioieign
Minislei Halldo i A
sgiimson (albeil in his capacily as paily leadei) man-

aged nol lo make a single menlion of lhe wai lhal had |usl begun. Thal
lhis omission was nol due lo embaiiassmenl became cleai when, in an
addiess lo lhe Nalional Piess Club in Washinglon, on 22 Apiil 1999, he
explained celand`s posilion:
s NATO`s decision lo inleivene coiiecl? The answei is yes. ndiffeience in lhe
face of aliocilies would make us accessoiies lo Milosevic`s ciimes of allempled
genocide . . . Hencefoilh we have bul one choice: To pievail, eilhei by enfoicing
uncondilional suiiendei of lhe aggiessoi oi by a negolialed selllemenl, enfoiced
by an inleinalional peacekeeping foice.27
IinlanJ
Thioughoul lhe ciises, lhe lwo (no longei quile so) neulial Noidic slales
weie aclively involved, albeil nol in lhe same way as lhe NATO membeis
if only because lhey weie nevei asked lo pailicipale in lhe wai againsl
lhe IR.
Iinland`s aclivilies weie fuilhei consliained by a law on peacekeeping
opeialions, accoiding lo which such missions iequiie a \N oi OSCI
mandale. Iuilheimoie, Iinnish lioops aie nol allowed lo engage in peace
enfoicemenl, and lheii lolal numbei musl nol exceed 2,OOO.28 The gov-
einmenl has expiessed inleiesl in slienglhening lhe I\`s capabililies foi
ciisis managemenl (including so-called Peleisbeig lasks``), which mighl
give Iinland a piece of lhe aclion.``29 Iinland`s conliibulion lo lhe con-
icl consisled of a foiensics leam lo invesligale lhe Racak massacie (il
found il lo be a ciime againsl humanily,`` bul iefused lo label il a
massacie`` oi lo place lhe blame on lhe Seibs), and 3O35 peisons foi
lhe OSCI`s Kosovo \eiincalion Mission.
Iinland`s ieaclion lo NATO`s aii sliikes was muled, bul suppoilive,
expiessing hope foi a diplomalic solulion on lhe basis of lhe Rambouillel
fiamewoik`` while placing lhe blame exclusively on lhe IR. Pail of lhe
ieason given foi lhis was lhal Iinland, as lhe incoming I\ piesidenl,
could nol veiy well lake a diffeienl sland. Wheieas lheie had pieviously
been some inleiesl in exploiing lhe oplion of |oining NATO, suppoil foi
lhe Alliance among lhe public declined signincanlly lo a quailei oi even
a nflh of lhe populalion duiing lhe wai.30 Some of lhe opposilion pailies,
including lhe Cenlie Paily, also expiessed ieseivalions aboul pailiculai
fealuies of lhe wai.31
Duiing lhe wai, Iinland piovided humanilaiian aid as well as lempo-
iaiy iefuge foi a small numbei of iefugees. n facl, Piime Minislei Lip-
ponen ciealed a minoi scandal when he menlioned 5O as lhe numbei of
Kosovais his counliy was likely lo accepl.32 Shoilly aflei, howevei, lhe
minisliy of laboui declaied lhal Iinland could ieceive 1,OOO iefugees,
if iequiied lo do so.33 Addilionally, Piesidenl Ahlisaaii seived as I\
envoy lo woik oul lhe peace agieemenl wilh Piesidenl Milosevic, and lhe
counliy offeied lo conliibule lioops foi whal became KIOR, aflei a \N
mandale had been secuied.
As fai as lioop conliibulions weie conceined, Iinland was inleiesled in
collaboialion wilh Sweden in lhe foim of a ballalion lo which Iinland
would conliibule lwo companies. Sweden, howevei, declined lhe offei
aflei lhe inilial lalks.34 The end iesull was lhal Iinland decided lo send a
ieinfoiced ballalion (76O lioops), which lefl foi Kosovo by lhe end of
Augusl. As compensalion`` foi lhis, Iinland announced ils inlenlion lo
ieduce ils conliibulion lo SIOR fiom 47O lo aiound 1OO lioops.35
SwcJcn
Sweden was signincanlly less suppoilive of lhe NATO wai lhan Iinland.
This was nol so much because of a diffeienl assessmenl of lhe silualion in
Kosovo oi of lhe desiiabilily of a solulion along lhe lines of lhe Ram-
16O \IWS IROM NATO ALLIS
bouillel diafl, as due lo conceins foi inleinalional law. n hei slalemenl
lwo days befoie lhe wai, Ioieign Minislei Anna Lind lhus placed lhe
blame exclusively on lhe Seib mililaiy and police, and iefeiied lo lhe
Rambouillel agieemenl as lhe besl available oplion.``36 Howevei, in a
slalemenl on 24 Maich 1999, Piime Minislei Go ian Peisson was aboul as
ciilical as il was possible lo be foi lhe leadei of a slale aligned wilh mosl
of lhe aggiessois,`` albeil in lhe fiamewoik of lhe I\: Iiom lhe poinl
of view of inleinalional law il is difncull lo nnd a cleai and unequivocal
basis foi lhe mililaiy opeialions which aie now laking place. iegiel lhal
il hasn`l been possible lo achieve unily wilhin lhe inleinalional commu-
nily lo suppoil lhis aclion lhiough a \N Secuiily Council mandale. . . .
|Tjhe bombing ilself cannol solve lhe Kosovo conicl.``37
n a speech on 13 Apiil, lhe foieign minislei included foimulalions lhal
diffeied signincanlly fiom lhe NATO discouise:
l was a selback foi lhe \N and lhe Secuiily Council`s aulhoiily lhal lhe Council
could nol agiee on measuies lo follow up lhe iesolulions on lhe conicl in Kosovo
lhal lhe Council adopled lasl fall. As a membei of lhe Secuiily Council, Sweden
woiked deleiminedly foi such piepaiedness wilhin lhe Council. We inlensely
soughl lo avoid bolh unilaleial use of foice and blocking veloes. . . . l is necessaiy
now lo iesloie lhe Secuiily Council`s aulhoiily. . . . The giealesl possible consen-
sus and unily in aclion belween Russia and lhe NATO counliies is appiopiiale. l
is also impoilanl lhal lhe gap lhal has emeiged is nol allowed lo damage lhe long-
leim all-Iuiopean secuiily polilical coopeialion.38
Slale Secielaiy foi Ioieign Affaiis Pieiie Schoii was even moie openly
ciilical of lhe wai on seveial occasions. n a speech on 6 May, he aigued
lhal |wjai always conslilules a polilical failuie. Mililaiy aclion musl
cease. The NATO bombings, which also affecl a gieal many innocenl
people, can iapidly be bioughl lo a hall. . . . l is only lhe \N lhal has lhe
moial aulhoiily lo cieale a lasling solulion lo lhe conicl.``39 A week lalei,
he explicilly ciilicized NATO`s bombings of civilian laigels, aiguing lhal
NATO`s allacks againsl civilian laigels musl cease. The bombaidmenl
of non-mililaiy laigels in Seibian cilies wilh gieal iisks of civilian casu-
allies cannol be necessaiy foi slopping lhe elhnic cleansing in Kosovo.``40
n Sweden, as in lhe olhei Noidic counliies, alliludes lo lhe wai did
nol follow liadilional lefliighl divisions. Nol only was lhe exlieme``
lefl (Vanstcrpartict) againsl lhe wai, bul lhe Modeiale Paily (MoJcrat-
crna) loo was quile ciilical. l was led, unlil Augusl 1999, by lhe foimei
piime minislei, Cail Bildl, who had pieviously seived as \N envoy lo
Bosnia, and who is cuiienlly lhe \niled Nalions` iepiesenlalive in
Kosovo. He has been veiy oulspokenly ciilical of lhe bombing campaign.
n his weekly lellei`` (Vcckobrcv) of 22 Maich, he lhus wiole: Ioi
NATO lo iniliale acls of wai againsl Seibia is only |uslinable if lhe inilial
aii opeialions can be followed diieclly by compiehensive giound opei-
alions. Olheiwise lheie is a iisk lhal lhe effecl will be lhal we leave mil-
lions of people defenceless on lhe giound in lhe conicl lhal will iapidly
escalale. And lo believe lhal a wai foughl wilh Kalashnikovs belween
iuins can be slopped by means of ciuise missiles and B-52s is naive and
dangeious.``41
Bildl was nol lhe only foimei piime minislei lo condemn NATO`s wai.
So did ngvai Cailsson of lhe Social Democials, who is cuiienlly co-
chaiiman of lhe Commission on Global Goveinance. n an ailicle in lhe
CuarJian on 2 Apiil, |oinlly wiillen wilh his fellow co-chaiiman, Shiidalh
Ramphal, he wiole lhal NATO`s aii allacks againsl ugoslavia have
nol been aulhoiized by lhe \niled Nalions. l was nol even allempled
lo achieve such aulhoiizalion. They aie consequenlly acls of aggiession
againsl a soveieign counliy, and as such go againsl lhe veiy heail of lhe
inleinalional legal oidei and lhe \N`s aulhoiily.``42
The Swedish conliibulion lo lhe ciisis included humanilaiian assis-
lance, in lhe foim of a piomise lo accepl up lo 5,OOO iefugees lempoiaiily
in addilion lo lhose alieady in Sweden.43 As il happened, howevei, only
3,7OO aclually aiiived. Iuilhei, lhe counliy piomised lo conliibule lo
KIOR aflei lhe end of lhe wai.44 n lhe pioposal foi lhe lallei, il was
aigued lhal lhe pailicipalion of non-aligned counliies was impoilanl. n
lhe pailiamenlaiy debale (14 1une) on lhe pioposal, ciilicism of NATO`s
wai was voiced by lhe Lefl Paily, lhe Libeial Paily (Iolkpartict 1ib-
cralcrna), and lhe Icology Paily (Miljo partict Dc Cro na).45 n lhe end
Sweden senl a mechanized ballalion (aiound 8OO lioops) lo KIOR bul
ieduced ils piesence in SIOR coiiespondingly and piomised lo send 5O
policemen lo assisl in lhe eslablishmenl of a local police foice and 4O
obseiveis lo lhe OSCI mission.46
As a ieeclion of ils (al besl) lukewaim suppoil foi NATO`s handling
of lhe Kosovo ciisis, Sweden has subsequenlly pioposed lhe eslablish-
menl of an independenl commission undei lhe auspices of lhe \niled
Nalions lo invesligale whal happened befoie, duiing, and aflei lhe wai.47
Conclusion
We have lhus seen lhal lhe Noidic counliies have adopled diffeienl
policies wilh iegaid lo lhe Kosovo ciisis. Bolh Noiway and Denmaik
pailicipaled, wilhoul any signincanl hesilalion, in lhe allack againsl
ugoslavia, lheieby abandoning lheii liadilional sciupulous adheience
lo inleinalional law and |oining in lhe undeimining of lhe aulhoiily of
lhe \niled Nalions. celand played a suppoilive bul passive iole, as did
Iinland, which consislenlly suppoiled lhe NATO line polilically, albeil
fiom a posilion of neulialily. Only Sweden voiced conceins aboul lhe
wai, and even ils possible dissenl was consideiably muled, mosl likely oul
of loyally lo ils pailneis in lhe Iuiopean \nion, mosl of which pailici-
paled in NATO`s allack.
By in effecl passing lhe bill foi lhe ieconsliuclion of whal lhey lhem-
selves deslioyed lo lhe lhiid woild, lhe Noidic NATO membeis have
also abandoned lheii liadilional slance of global solidaiily in favoui of a
Iuiocenliic posilion lhal does nol bode well foi lhe fuluie.
Noles
1. The Danish pailiamenlaiy debale, 1718 Iebiuaiy 1998, on Ioislag lil folkelingsbe-
slulning om el dansk mililil bidiag lil en mullinalional indsals i Mellemoslen`` is
documenled in Sven Aage Chiislensen and Ole Wvei, eds., DUIIDOK 1998. Dansk
uJcnrigspolitisk Jokuncntation, Copenhagen: Danish nslilule of nleinalional Affaiis,
1999, pp. 43O449. The debale concluded wilh a 11O13 vole in favoui of Danish pai-
licipalion. Only lhe lwo lefl-of-cenlie pailies, lhe Socialisl People`s Paily (Socialistisk
Iolkcparti ) and lhe Danish RedGieen Alliance (1nhcJslistcn), voled againsl.
2. The pailiamenlaiy debale on lhe Danish conliibulion lo SIOR look place in Novembei
Decembei 1996. l was ialhei unconlioveisial, and only lhe exlieme iighl and lefl ended
up voling againsl. See exliacls in Svend Aage Chiislensen and Ole Wvei, eds., DUII-
DOK 1996. Dansk uJcnrigspolitisk Jokuncntation, Copenhagen: D\P, 1997, pp. 432
446.
3. Defence Minisliy, Danske soldalei i ex-1ugoslavien,`` 1999, al www.fmn.dkjudlandelj
ex|ugo.hlm.
4. DUIIDOK 1998, p. 413.
5. Defence Minislei, A
rlig RcJcgrclsc 1998, al www.fmn.dkj1998jkapO4.hlm.

6. Obseiva opinion poll conducled by GfK, iepiinled in DUIIDOK 1998, pp. 764765; also
included in Beilel Heuilin and Hans Mouiilzen, eds., Danish Iorcign Iolicy Ycarbook
1999, Copenhagen: D\P, 1999, p. 223. Theie was a disciepancy belween lhe woiding
of lhe queslion and lhe possible iesponses, lhe queslion iefeiiing lo lhe inleinalional
communily`` bul lhe answeis lo NATO.``
7. The molion and lhe debale aie documenled in DUIIDOK 1998, pp. 483513.
8. Ail. 19.2 of lhe 1953 Conslilulion ieads: Ixcepl foi defence againsl an aimed allack
againsl lhe iealm oi againsl Danish foices, lhe King cannol wilhoul lhe appioval of
pailiamenl use mililaiy means of powei againsl any slale`` (my unofncial lianslalion).
The King`` is, of couise, an anachionism foi his oi hei ma|esly`s goveinmenl.
9. Soien Iunch, Den hemmelige fiedsaflale,`` 1yllanJspostcn, 23 May 1999.
1O. 1elle Ilbk Maiessa, Helle b, and David Tiads, Danmaik anmodel om a deassis-
lance,`` 1yllanJspostcn, 21 Apiil 1999; Mads Tiads, 1P-analyse: \ba d biydei boig-
fieden,`` 1yllanJspostcn, 23 Apiil 1999.
11. Beslulningsfoislag ni. 146,`` al www.um.dkjkosovojbeslulningsfoislagjfoislag b146j.
12. Mads Slensliup, Paliul|eskib ei alleiede afse|lel,`` 1yllanJspostcn, 26 May 1999.
13. See lhe inleiview wilh Hkkeiup in Chiislian Biondum and 1espei Laisen, nlel al
foiliyde,`` Bcrlingskc TiJcnJc, 23 Augusl 1999.
14. Toiben Bennei and 1ens Giund, To danske y angieb seibiske ma l i Kosovo,``
1yllanJspostcn, 28 May 1999.
15. Lone Ryg Olsen, Meningsma ling: Danskeie ei klai lil landkiig,`` 1yllanJspostcn, 1 1une
1999.
16. Ioi an oveiview, see Ioieign Minisliy, Humanili bisland lil ofiene foi Kosovo-
koniklen,`` al www.um.dkjkosovojp|ecej; and Regeiingens slolle lil ofiene foi
Kosovo-kiisen i 1999,`` al www.um.dkjkosovojiegslollej.
17. Having been ieminded by lhe \N High Commissionei foi Refugees lhal lhe legislalion
inilially adopled foi lhe iefugees violaled inleinalional convenlions, in Apiil 1999 il was
amended lo comply, implying lhal some of lhe iefugees mighl slay on longei. On lhe legal
pioblems, see Helle b and Rasmus Helveg Peleisen, Silov ndiel eflei IN-kiilik,``
1yllanJspostcn, 23 Apiil 1999; Rasmus Helveg Peleisen, Ilyglningekvole foidobles,``
1yllanJspostcn, 6 May 1999.
18. Mads Slensliup, Danske lioppei ylles fia Bosnien lil Kosovo,`` 1yllanJspostcn, 22
1une 1999; Dansk slyike klai lil huilig udiykning,`` 1yllanJspostcn, 23 1une 1999;
Biigade i Bosnien nedlgges,`` 1yllanJspostcn, 23 1une 1999; 1an B|eiie Lauiidsen,
Danske soldalei klai lil Kosovo,`` 1yllanJspostcn, 6 1uly 1999.
19. Mads Slensliup, Albanien-slyike h|em,`` 1yllanJspostcn, 15 1uly 1999.
2O. The nisl slep in lhis diieclion is a planned liansfei of 14O lioops fiom lhe lolal of 8OO in
SIOR lo a new lolal of 85O in KIOR. Wilhin a couple of yeais, lhe lolal numbei of
Danish lioops abioad is envisaged lo be ieduced lo aiound 1,OOO. See Injornation, 28
29 Augusl 1999.
21. Rasmus Helveg Peleisen and Heniik Simaik-Thomsen, Kosovoalbaneine ei pa ve|
h|em,`` 1yllanJspostcn, 22 1uly 1999.
22. The amounls aie DKi 58O67O million in 1999 and DKi 68O85O million in lhe yeai
2OOO, foi lhe iegion as a whole. The plan foi lhe Danish assislance is desciibed in
Ioieign Minisliy, Rcgcringcns hanJlingsplan jor Jansk bistanJ til Jct vcstligc Balkan, al
www.um.dkjkosovojbalkanjindex.hlm.
23. Moilen B|oin Hansen, Konliaklkaplob i Kosovo,`` Bcrlingskc TiJcnJc, 21 Augusl
1999.
24. Defence Depailmenl, Ioisvaiels bidiag i foibindelse med kiisen i Kosovo,`` Sl Pip
62, 23 Apiil 1999, al hllp:jjodin.dep.nojiepubj98-99jslpipj62j, and Ioisvaiels innsals
i foibindelse med kiisen i Kosovo lilleggsbevillingei,`` available al hllp:jj
odin.dep.nojfdjpimj1999jk2j99O423.hlml.
25. ueslion lime`` (Spoiielime), Dokuncntcr jra Stortingct, 24 Maich 1999; Deball
om slalsminisleiens iedegoielse om spoigsma l i lilknylning lil NATOs loppmole i
Washinglon 2325 Apiil,`` Dokuncntcr jra Stortingct, 25 Maich 1999.
26. Reponse lo queslion by MP Dag Danielsen, Dokuncntcr jra Stortingct, Meeling, 27
Apiil 1999.
27. Available al hllp:jjbiunnui.sl|i.isjinleipiojulanijuln-eng.ns.
28. Diplonatic Diary, 8 Iebiuaiy 1999, al hllp:jjviilual.nnland.njnewsj.
29. HuvuJstaJsblaJct, 7 Decembei 1998, al hllp:jjviilual.nnland.njnewsj.
3O. Only One Iinn in Ioui Wanls Counliy lo 1oin NATO,`` 6 Apiil 1999, and Iinland-
NATO,`` 7 May 1999, bolh al hllp:jjviilual.nnland.njnewsj.
31. Cenliisls Ciilicise Nalo Aclion,`` Daily Ncws, 26 Apiil 1999, al hllp:jviilual.nnland.nj
newsj.
32. Iinland Can Receive Some Refugees, Says Lipponen,`` Daily Ncws, 6 Apiil 1999, al
hllp:jjviilual.nnland.njnews.
33. Iinnish goveinmenl, piess ielease, 9 Apiil 1999, al hllp:jjviilual.nnland.njnewsj.
34. Diplonatic Diary, 9 Maich 1999, and Daily Ncws, 19 Maich 1999, bolh al hllp:jj
viilual.nnland.njnewsj.
35. Slalsia dels iedogo ielse lill Riksdagen,`` 15 1une 1999, al www.vn.njvnjsvenskaj
iedogoij99O615kosovo.hlm.
36. Ioieign Minisliy, Piess Release, 22 Maich 1999.
37. Ioieign Minisliy, Piess Release, 24 Maich 1999.
38. Available al www.ud.sejpiessinfjlaluliminj99O413 O.hlm.
39. Ioieign Minisliy, Piess Release, 7 May 1999.
4O. Ioieign Minisliy, Piess Release, 16 May 1999.
41. \eckobiev@lislseiv.modeial.se.
42. uoled (and lianslaled back inlo Inglish) fiom IrcJsbonbcr o vcr Balkan. Koniktcn
on Kosovo, Slockholm: Manifesl, 1999, pp. 114116.
43. Ioieign Minisliy, Piess Release, 6 Apiil 1999.
44. Ioieign Minisliy, Piess Release, 6 May 1999.
45. See www.iiksdagen.sejdeballj9899jpiolj1O9j.
46. Defence Minisliy, Piess Release, 23 1une 1999 and 16 Augusl 1999.
47. Slalsia dsbeiedningen, Piess Release, 9 Augusl 1999.
11
The Soulhein Ilank:
laly, Gieece, Tuikey
Ccorgios Kostakos
nlioduclion
This chaplei focuses on laly, Gieece and Tuikey, all lhiee of lhem slales
belonging lo NATO`s Soulhein Ilank.1 liy lo summaiize ofncial as well
as unofncial alliludes as lhey evolved ovei lhe span of lhe Kosovo ciisis
(Maich1une 1999), lo idenlify lhe iool causes lhal shaped lhese alli-
ludes, and lo skelch oul some of lheii possible bioadei iepeicussions.
Owing lo lhe lempoial pioximily of lhis exeicise lo lhe aclual evenls
undei consideialion, a lol is lefl lo my impeifecl news inlake and my
ieading of lhe almospheie in each counliy, on lhe basis of pievious
sludies of lhe counliy in queslion, ils polilical hisloiy, goveinmenlal
piaclice, and public opinion palleins.
An oveiview of ofncial and unofncial alliludes lo lhe
Kosovo ciisis
When, on 24 Maich 1999, lhe bombing iaids againsl ugoslavia ovei
Kosovo slailed, many weie caughl by suipiise. The collapse of lhe Ram-
bouillel lalks and lhe subsequenl failuie of Richaid Holbiooke`s lasl-
dilch negolialing effoil weie unavoidably leading lo escalalion, bul lhe
lhieshold foi lhe use of foice was nol cleaily maiked. Moieovei, lheie
had been similai lension build-ups in lhe pasl, which had nol led lo oul-
166
iighl confionlalion.2 Of couise, ieaclions diffeied fiom counliy lo coun-
liy, accoiding lo lhe pailiculai peiceplions, pieoccupalions, and inleiesls
in play in each case.
Italy
laly assumed a ciucial iole in lhe bombing campaign fiom lhe slail, by
pioviding lhe aiinelds foi NATO`s iaids and by conliibuling planes and
ciews. Public opinion in lhe counliy soon appeaied divided belween lhose
favouiing and lhose disappioving of lhe allacks. The cenlielefl coalilion
goveinmenl appaienlly iemained nim in ils suppoil foi NATO`s aclions.
Howevei, in mid-May, a few weeks befoie lhe Iuiopean Pailiamenl
eleclions (13 1une 1999), Piime Minislei Massimo DÀlema came oul
wilh pioposals foi a hall lo lhe bombing in view of lhe ongoing negolial-
ing effoils. The move was polilely bul unequivocally ie|ecled by NATO,
aiousing iesenlmenl in lhis ma|oi membei of lhe Iuiopean \nion,
NATO, and G-7, and widening lhe ciacks in lhe cohesion of laly`s iuling
alliance. The agieemenl ovei Kosovo ieached |usl a few days befoie lhe
Iuiopean eleclions did nol pievenl lhe goveinmenl`s defeal in lhe polls,
bul Mi. DÀlema`s posilion was nol challenged.
Iiom lhe slail of lhe ciisis, lhe feai of iefugees pouiing oul of Kosovo
and inlo laly had been a poweiful incenlive foi lhis counliy lo acl.
Moieovei, lhe slabilily of Albania was al slake. laly has a lasling special
inleiesl in Albania (see also ils leading iole in lhe 1997 \N-aulhoiized
Opeialion Alba``), which il consideis as a piole ge slale, a pail of ils
immediale spheie of inuence. These consideialions weie in slep wilh
laly`s ambilions foi a moie signincanl iole in Soulh-easlein Iuiope, lhe
Iuiopean \nion, NATO, and beyond.
Crcccc
n Gieece, a smallei counliy physically localed in lhe Balkans and iso-
laled fiom lhe iesl of ils Iuiopean \nion pailneis, ieaclions weie moie
foiceful. The public oveiwhelmingly opposed lhe NATO bombing and
sympalhized wilh lheii fellow-Oilhodox Seibs. Neveilheless, Coslas
Similis`s goveinmenl acquiesced in lhe bombing campaign and subse-
quenl coeicive measuies such as lhe oil embaigo. The counliy`s foiemosl
goal of |oining lhe Iuiopean Iconomic and Monelaiy \nion (IM\) and
of iemaining pail of lhe piospeious and slable Wesl led lo lhe modeia-
lion of any piolesls ofncial ones al leasl againsl lhe NATO acls. The
goveinmenl liied lo keep a ielalively low pionle on conlioveisial issues,
allhough il had made cleai fiom lhe slail lhal il would nol conliibule
lioops lo any enfoicemenl opeialion. This nne balancing acl belween
THI SO\THIRN ILANK: TAL, GRIICI, T\RKI 167
NATO commilmenls and incompalible sympalhies conlinued lhioughoul
lhe hoslililies. Gieece concenlialed on lhe piovision of humanilaiian
assislance lo bolh lhe Kosovo iefugees foiced oul of lheii homes and lhe
Seibs suffeiing undei lhe NATO allacks. l also offeied ils good ofnces in
lhe seivice of ieaching a peaceful selllemenl lo lhe conicl.
The Kosovo ciisis ullimalely piesenled Gieece wilh an oppoilunily lo
pio|ecl ilself as a slalus quo powei, a souice of slabilily and developmenl
in lhe Balkans, and a well-inlenlioned biidge foi lhe olhei counliies of
lhe iegion lo |oin NATO and lhe piospeious Iuiopean \nion, despile
seveial aclual oi polenlial poinls of fiiclion belween Gieece and ils
neighbouis. The slabilily of Albania and moie so of lhe Ioimei ugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (IROM) emeiged in lhe piocess as a ma|oi
pieoccupalion of Gieek foieign policy. Iffoils weie made lo slienglhen
lhese counliies and lo suppoil lhem in caiing foi lhe lhousands of iefu-
gees who mighl olheiwise have slieamed inlo Gieece and |oined lhe
seveial hundied lhousand piimaiily Albanian economic immigianls of
iecenl yeais.
Turkcy
Iuilhei lo lhe easl, Tuikey had lo face lhe Kosovo ciisis while in lhe
midsl of a similai one of ils own. The counliy`s unqueslioning suppoil foi
NATO`s aclions in favoui of a fellow Muslim people and iemnanl of lhe
Olloman Impiie was manifesled in woid and deed (including lhe pailic-
ipalion of nghlei planes in defensive ioles). Moieovei, lhis was anolhei
oppoilunily foi Tuikey lo demonsliale ils sliong commilmenl lo lhe
Alliance and lo lhe values of lhe Wesl, inlo lhe haid coie of which il
wanls lo be fully inlegialed. Howevei, suppoil was somewhal dampened
by lhe iealizalion of lhe analogy belween lhe Kosovo and lhe Kuidish
queslions. The counliy was piepaiing foi a ma|oi liial againsl lhe lhen
iecenlly capluied leadei of lhe Kuidislan Woikeis` Paily (PKK), Ocalan,
a leiioiisl and liailoi lo lhe slale accoiding lo ofncial pioclamalions.
Thus, any indicalion lhal lhe inleinalional communily,`` lhiough lhe
Kosovo piecedenl, would be given a fiee hand lo inleivene foicefully
wilhin eslablished boideis in favoui of ieslless minoiilies was enough lo
keep a lid on pio-bombing enlhusiasm. The lone was also iesliained be-
cause of a ciucial geneial eleclion due in Apiil, which was seen as a lesl
foi lhe populaiily of lhe slamisls allegedly lhiealening lhe seculai chai-
aclei of lhe Tuikish slale.
The slamic lhieal nol having maleiialized in lhe eleclions and no
conneclion having been made belween lhe Kosovo inleivenlion pallein
and olhei similai pioblems aiound lhe woild, lhe Tuikish ofncial allilude
slailed lo become boldei. n mid-May NATO was given peimission lo
use aiipoils in lhe Iuiopean pail of Tuikey. n lhe humanilaiian neld,
Tuikey was among lhe nisl counliies lhal volunleeied lo lake in iefugees
fiom Kosovo and lo piovide humanilaiian assislance. Many of lhe 2O,OOO
oi so iefugees absoibed weie evenlually uniled wilh ielalives in Tuikey.
Lel us now liy lo analyse a bil fuilhei whal has been piesenled above in
condensed foim.
nleiesls and consideialions lhal shaped ofncial posilions
and populai ieaclions
1oyalty to thc Alliancc anJ broaJ gcopolitical anJ ccononic
consiJcrations
One lhing lhal Tuikey, laly, and Gieece can be said lo shaie beyond any
doubl is lhe iealizalion lhal lhe \niled Slales of Ameiica is lhe foiemosl
powei in lhe woild loday. All lhiee weie membeis of lhe \S-led alliance,
NATO, duiing lhe Cold Wai yeais and naluially conlinue lheii mem-
beiship in lhis club of viclois in lhe poslCold Wai peiiod. Of couise,
beyond secuiing ils place in lhe piivileged enlouiage of lhe only iemain-
ing supeipowei, each counliy has ils own piioiilies, pieoccupalions, and
inleiesls lhal il wanls lo fuilhei lhiough lhis engagemenl.
laly seems like moie of an equal pailnei, pailicipaling as il does in all
polilical and mililaiy aclivilies as pail of lhe second liei of ma|oi poweis
aiound lhe hegemon. The piimaiy use of aii bases in noilhein laly foi
lhe allied bombing of ugoslavia and lhe pailicipalion of lalian planes
and ciews weie a demonslialion of lhal. The counliy aspiies lo enhance
ils inleinalional slaluie and play a biggei iole in Iuiope and beyond
lhiough ils aclive involvemenl in Soulh-easlein Iuiope and lhe Medi-
leiianean.3 This is wheie laly has a compaialive advanlage, geogiaphi-
cally al leasl, unlike Cenlial Iuiope, which is dominaled by Geimany,
and Weslein Iuiope led by lhe Iianco-Geiman axis. A demonslialion of
iesolve malched wilh lhe necessaiy means in lhis pail of lhe woild would
have a favouiable impacl on laly`s inleinalional image, possibly secuiing
foi il a semi-peimanenl seal on lhe Secuiily Council, if lhe global peace
and secuiily body evei gels enlaiged.4 ndicalive of lhis aie laly`s mem-
beiship of lhe Conlacl Gioup on Kosovo (unlike lhe one on Bosnia)
duiing lhe negolialing effoils; ils cenlial iole in secuiing lhe depailuie
fiom ugoslavia of lhe modeiale Kosovai leadei biahim Rugova;5 and
lhe assignmenl lo ils foices of a sepaiale secloi in KIORjNATO-
conliolled Kosovo (along wilh lhe \niled Slales, lhe \niled Kingdom,
Iiance, and Geimany).
Tuikey sees ilself similaily lo laly, making allowances foi ils diffeienl
geogiaphical localion. This counliy is slialegically placed among aieas
of inslabilily and signincanl naluial iesouices, especially oil, lhal aie im-
poilanl lo lhe Wesl. l is wheie Iuiope meels lhe Caucasus and Cenlial
Asia, lhe Middle Iasl, and lhe Gulf. Being lhe laigesl counliy in lhe ie-
gion (apail fiom Russia, of couise) and lhe besl connecled, il bids foi
lhe iole of a iegional chief, a ieliable ally, and iepiesenlalive of lhe
hegemon. The benenls lo be ieaped include fullei inlegialion inlo lhe
piospeious Wesl (including I\ membeiship), economic developmenl,
iegional inuence, and domeslic slabilily lhe lasl by slienglhening lhe
seculai iegime againsl slamic, leflisl, oi sepaialisl lhieals.
Gieece`s claims aie nol as ambilious as lhose of lhe olhei lwo, al leasl
in geoslialegic leims. Beaiing in mind ils own compelilive advanlages,
lhe counliy has adopled lhe model of a slalus quo powei, pieaching
iespecl foi eslablished boideis, slale soveieignly, and inleinalional law.
Al lhe same lime il is allempling lo acl as a calalysl in leims of economic
developmenl (including signincanl inveslmenl in lhe iegion), democialic
inslilulion-building, and human iighls. Thus, il aims lo gel eslablished as
lhe prinus intcr parcs among lhe neighbouiing counliies, which il piom-
ises lo assisl in lheii piocess of inlegialion inlo lhe Wesl. Moieovei,
Gieece is mindful of ils own economic inleiesls, which may have been
pailly haimed by lhe wai in ugoslavia (a deciease in louiism, lhe closing
of liade ioules, elc.) bul weie geneiously compensaled by lhe use of
Thessaloniki as lhe main poil foi lhe landing of NATO lioops and foi
associaled caleiing and iesl and ielaxalion`` seivices lo soldieis.6 Iui-
lhei lhan lhal, Gieece hopes lo place ilself in a piivileged posilion wilh
iegaid lo lhe posl-wai Balkan ieconsliuclion conliacls.
Kosovo-likc situations ajjccting cach country
The alliludes of laly, Gieece, and Tuikey vis-a` -vis lhe Kosovo ciisis
could nol bul have been colouied by pioblems of a similai kind faced by
lhese counliies. Iiisl of all, Tuikey had lo deleimine ils slance aflei
caieful consideialion of ils own Kuidish pioblem. By puie coincidence,
lhis pioblem had come inlo lhe limelighl lhanks lo lhe capluie in Iebiuaiy
1999 of Abdullah Ocalan, lhe leadei of lhe mililanl Kuidislan Woikeis`
Paily (PKK), who was lo be pul on liial foi high lieason. l was only
naluial lhal lhe Tuikish aulhoiilies would ieacl veiy cauliously lowaids
any piecedenl lhal mighl legilimize foiceful inleinalional inleivenlion in
lhe domeslic affaiis of a slale foi lhe selllemenl of elhnic dispules and
sepaialisl claims. The feai was lhal lhe PKK mighl al some poinl gain
acceplance as a legilimale nalional libeialion foice and alliacl inleina-
lional suppoil. This is whal happened wilh lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy
(KLA), which inilially had been chaiacleiized as a leiioiisl oiganizalion
bul lalei became a piivileged inleiloculoi of lhe inleinalional commu-
nily.`` These feais subsided as assuiances aiiived lhal lhe Kosovo inlei-
venlion was nol a model lo be bioadly applied, ceilainly nol in lhe case of
Tuikey.7
Anolhei Kosovo-lype silualion affecling bolh Tuikey and Gieece is, of
couise, Cypius. n lhis case il is lhe Tuikish-Cypiiol populalion lhal
conslilules lhe minoiily whose alleged peiseculion by lhe Gieek-Cypiiol
ma|oiily led Tuikey lo inleivene mililaiily and lo occupy a laige pail of
lhe island slale since 1974. Tuikey has always claimed and since Kosovo
moie eloquenlly so lhal il was ils inleivenlion in suppoil of peace in
1974 lhal secuied lhe iighls of lhe Tuikish-Cypiiols, and lhus il was a
fully waiianled and legilimale acl. Gieece sees il lhe olhei way iound,
as an unlawful foieign invasion lhal caused dealh and desliuclion and
divided lhe island along elhnic lines. Tuikish-Cypiiol claims lo lheii own
independenl slale of Noilhein Cypius aie mel wilh Gieek-Cypiiol insis-
lence on a unined island and on lhe leiiiloiial inlegiily of lhe slale.
Similai consideialions apply lo lhe Muslim minoiily in Gieek Thiace
(boideiing Tuikey), a laige pail of which is of Tuikish oiigin. Allhough
fai fiom being openly confionlalional, elhnic-ieligious ielalions may soui
if lhe peicenlage of lhe Muslim populalion conlinues lo inciease in lhis
pailiculai aiea, signincanlly suipassing lhal of lhe Oilhodox Gieeks. l is a
Gieek nighlmaie, lheiefoie, lhal one day lhis minoiily luined cleai local
ma|oiily oi ialhei ils ambilious palion acioss lhe boidei could invile
lhe inleinalional communily lo assuie ils iighl lo self-deleiminalion by
somehow piovoking a confionlalion. f lhis is a woisl-case scenaiio foi
Gieece, il would nol be lhe same if inleinalional inleivenlion came aboul
in favoui of lhe Gieek minoiily in soulhein Albania. Neveilheless, no
such issue has been iaised in iecenl yeais by lhe Gieek aulhoiilies and
lhe liulh is lhal lhe minoiily`s numbeis have been depleled lhiough
migialion soulhwaids, along wilh laige pails of lhe Albanian populalion,
in seaich of a bellei fuluie in ielalively piospeious Gieece.
laly looks less lhiealened by such scenaiios, being moie closely in-
legialed nol leasl geogiaphically lo lhe haid-coie Weslein woild and
Weslein Iuiope. Thus, exisling sepaialisl claims, mainly in lhe noilh of
lhe counliy, aie deall wilh peacefully and wilh an appaienl undeisland-
ing on all sides lhal boideis do nol change excepl by consensus, and in
any case boideis do nol mallei lhal much nowadays in an inlegialed
Iuiope.
Historical, cultural, cthnic, anJ/or rcligious ajnitics
Tuikey and Gieece, being pail of lhe Balkans and of lhe foimei Olloman
Impiie (which shaped lhe special chaiaclei of lhis aiea, along wilh ils
piedecessoi, lhe Byzanline Impiie), cannol be disassocialed fiom lhe
peoples of lhe iegion, including lhose diieclly involved in lhe Kosovo
conicl lhe Kosovo Albanians and lhe Seibs. Ioi mosl of lhe posl-
Olloman peiiod, in lhe lale nineleenlh and lhe eaily lwenlielh cenluiies,
when lhe boideis of lhe new elhnic slales weie diawn, Gieece and Seibiaj
ugoslavia weie on lhe same side againsl lhe Tuiks and olhei Olloman
successoi slales in lhe iegion. Thus, lhe lwo Oilhodox Chiislian peoples
foiged sliong polilical and slialegic lies. Nol always on good leims wilh
lheii Slav neighbouis, Gieeks found lhal lhey could iely on lhe Seibs on
seveial issues wheie lheii inleiesls coincided. So a kind of piefeienlial
ielalionship was eslablished belween lhe lwo. This ielalionship ievived in
lhe poslCold Wai peiiod, when lhe Tiloisl claims ovei Macedonia and
lhe long-simmeiing dispule weie no longei sliiied up by Belgiade bul by
lhe newly independenl Skop|e.
Talk aboul ieligious aics,`` axes,`` oi bells`` in lhe Balkan iegion is
quile common. Thus Seibs, Gieeks, and olhei Oilhodox in vaiious com-
binalions have been accused of building an Oilhodox axis inlended lo
slie lhe iemaining Muslim populalions, such as lhe Bosnian Muslims
and lhe Albanians. Ioi lhe Oilhodox, lhe lhieal comes fiom Tuikey and
ils lingeiing impeiial ambilions. Thal counliy is accused of allempling lo
ievive lhe Olloman Impiie indiieclly, by using lhe iemaining Muslim
populalions (plus some Tuikish minoiilies) in lhe Balkans as a leveiage
foi inuence and by fosleiing division and inslabilily lo seive ils slialegic
aims. Whichevei came nisl, if eilhei, lhese mulually exclusive bul also
mulually ieinfoicing peiceplions seem lo shape lhe public mood and lo
diclale, lo some exlenl al leasl, lhe moves by goveinmenls in lhe iegion.
The oveiall iesull is inslabilily and mulual suspicion, boideiing on hos-
lilily. Despile lhe facl lhal Gieece and Tuikey belong lo lhe same mili-
laiy alliance, i.e. NATO, if lhe woisl comes lo lhe woisl and nalional
suivival is consideied lo be al slake, ieexes lead lo liadilional alliances
wilh ieliable,`` like-minded, and like-confessing foices and peoples.8
laly slands on lhe iim of lhe Balkan hisloiical cauldion. l has ils own
enduiing ielalionship wilh lhe iegion, especially wilh Albania, which il
has oflen liealed as a piolecloiale, even befoie lhe Second Woild Wai.
Suiiounded by moie poweiful neighbouis, Albania has been an easy
clienl lo be enlisled by an laly slied in all olhei diieclions by ma|oi
Wesl Iuiopean counliies, nolably Geimany and Iiance. The liadilion of
lalian inuence ovei Albania was ieasseiled aflei lhe end of lhe Cold
Wai wilh opeialions Pelican`` (lhe piovision of humanilaiian assislance
in 1991) and Alba`` (lhe lalian-led Mullinalional Pioleclion Ioice in
1997).9 This is giounds foi laly lo |uslify ils claims lo ma|oi powei slalus
in Iuiope and lhe woild, as pieviously explained.
Thc rcjugcc jactor
A feai common lo all lhiee counliies undei consideialion, caused by
lheii geogiaphical pioximily lo lhe lhealie of lhe confionlalion, was lhal
lhey mighl be ooded wilh iefugees fiom Kosovo. The moie piospeious
laly and Gieece, in pailiculai, had alieady wilnessed an inux of eco-
nomic migianls fiom Albania in lhe poslCold Wai yeais. To avoid new
human slieams would ullimalely mean conlaining lhe Kosovo conicl.
nilially, lhal was given by NATO as one of lhe main ieasons foi
mounling ils offensive againsl ugoslavia. How upselling, lheiefoie, lhal
soon aflei lhe iaids had begun lhe numbeis of iefugees incieased sig-
nincanlly, ceilainly undei lhe piessuie of ievengeful Seibs and aiguably
also because of feai of lhe NATO sliikes.
Of couise, once lhe humanilaiian emeigency had cleaily manifesled
ilself, all lhiee counliies volunleeied lo ieceive some iefugees, especially
in lhe lighl of lhe excessive sliain pul on IROM and Albania. Tuikey
agieed lo accepl as many as 2O,OOO, seveial of whom had ielalives who had
migialed lo lhal counliy aflei bolh lhe Iiisl Woild Wai and lhe Second.
ndeed, seveial lhousand weie liansfeiied fiom IROM, allhough some
of lhem in a hasly and messy way (foiced family sepaialions, elc.).10 laly
sel al 1O,OOO lhe numbei of iefugees il would hosl.11 As was lhe case wilh
Tuikey, lhis aiiangemenl was seen as an inleiim solulion, wilh lhe even-
lual ieluin of iefugees lo lheii homes in mind.12 Gieece`s inilial offei lo
accepl as many as 5,OOO iefugees inlo oiganized camps was nol laken up,
following lhe inabilily of lhe Iuiopean \nion lo agiee on iefugee quolas
foi all of ils membei slales. Howevei, Gieece offeied Thessaloniki aii-
poil foi lhe aiilifling of seveial hundied iefugees lo deslinalions such as
Auslialia, lhe \niled Slales, and Canada.13
Ralhei lhan accepling huge numbeis of iefugees on lheii soil, lhe lhiee
counliies iushed lo piovide humanilaiian assislance lo lhe hundieds of
lhousands ciossing lhe boidei inlo Albania and IROM. Tons of sup-
plies weie lianspoiled, money was donaled, and even lenl camps wilh
decenl facililies weie consliucled by lhe lhiee counliies in a shoil lime.
laly sel up a special Opeiazione Aicobaleno`` (Opeialion Rainbow) lo
help iefugees in Albania.14 Ioi ils pail, Gieece conliibuled lo effoils al
keeping lhe iemaining Kosovo Albanian populalion in lheii piovince,
lhiough lhe piovision of humanilaiian assislance on lhe spol, despile lhe
conlinuing aii iaids. \sing ils piefeienlial access lo lhe Seib aulhoiilies
slill in conliol on lhe giound, Gieece assumed a cenlial iole wilhin lhe
fiamewoik of lhe IOC\S humanilaiian inilialive, in associalion wilh
Russia, Swilzeiland, and Ausliia.15
Thc stability oj thc rcgion
l became obvious quile eaily in lhe bombing campaign lhal lhe slieams
of people owing oul of Kosovo could cause seiious luimoil in neigh-
bouiing Albania and IROM, wheie lhey asked foi iefuge foi lhe main
pail.
Albania, lhe molhei counliy`` of lhe Kosovo Albanians, had ils own
seiious domeslic pioblems and divisions lo deal wilh. Kepl in a soil of
Daik Ages by lhe Hoxha iegime duiing lhe Cold Wai, Albania lalei
embaiked on a long and difncull liansilion. This included economic,
humanilaiian, and polilical ciises such as lhe one in 1997, which had
made Albania ilself lhe iecipienl of inleinalional inleivenlion and assis-
lance foi lhe iesloialion of law and oidei (see Opeialion Alba`` above).
The hundieds of lhousands of Kosovai iefugees could nol easily be ac-
commodaled, piaclically as well as polilically. The KLA`s sliong pies-
ence in lhe iefugee camps lhiealened lo side-slep lhe counliy`s elecled
aulhoiilies, as lhe KLA allempled lo enlisl lhe suppoil of all Albanians
lo lhe cause of Kosovo libeialion as lhe piimaiy ob|eclive of lhe nalion.
The Albanian leadeiship was aslule enough lo iealize lhal and lo liy lo
placale lhe mililanls by backing lhe KLA cause publicly.
IROM was an even moie difncull case, because of lhe special com-
posilion of lhe counliy. Wilh a Slav-Macedonian ma|oiily of aboul 66 pei
cenl and a laige Albanian minoiily of 2333 pei cenl, lhe counliy cleaily
depends foi ils suivival on lhe piecaiious balance belween lhese lwo
main elhnic gioups.16 The inux of lhousands of Kosovais lhiealened lo
upsel lhis balance by subslanlially incieasing lhe numbeis of lhe Alba-
nians and by slienglhening lhe sepaialisl foices alieady evidenl among
lhe local Albanian populalion. The pio|ecl of a Giealei Albania com-
piising Albania piopei as well as Kosovo and lhe noilh-weslein pail of
IROM was nevei so close lo fiuilion foi many an Albanian nalionalisl.
Such an evenlualily would foice lhe Slav-Macedonians eilhei lo suslain
a wai in lheii counliy, oi lo compiomise on a mini-slale wilh a cleai
ma|oiily of lheii own, oi lo ask foi lhe pioleclion of Bulgaiia (which
always claimed lo be lheii molhei counliy) oi Seibia.
Any of lhese evenlualilies would also be bad foi Gieece, which would
nol wanl lo face eilhei a Giealei Albania, oi a Giealei Bulgaiia, oi even
whalevei ils sympalhies a Giealei Seibia on ils noilhein boideis.
Opening a Pandoia`s box of boidei changes in lhe Balkans was nol a
welcome piospecl foi lhe olhei lwo counliies undei consideialion eilhei,
oi foi lhe inleinalional communily al laige. The need lo pieseive slabil-
ily in IROM was undeiscoied by visils lo lhe counliy and slalemenls lo
lhis effecl made by Gieek, lalian, and Tuikish ofncials. Assislance lo
Skop|e fiom lhe inleinalional communily bolh in kind and in leims of
secuiily guaianlees (see lhe signincanl numbei of NATO lioops slalioned
lheie), polilical suppoil, and humanilaiian aid was of gieal impoilance.
Among olhei lhings, il was lacilly accepled lhal, above a ceilain numbei,
Kosovo iefugees in IROM would be moved lo Albania oi olhei coun-
liies willing lo ieceive lhem.
The need lo conlain inslabilily in lhe iegion, especially as iegaids
Albania and IROM, was iepealedly iaised by lalian, Tuikish, and
Gieek ofncials.17 The possibilily of geneialized conicl encompassing
also Tuikey and Gieece, which mighl nnd lhemselves on opposile sides,
had been suggesled by Piesidenl Clinlon as a ieason foi NATO`s use of
foice ovei Kosovo, bul was vehemenlly iefuled by bolh goveinmenls
conceined.18
Doncstic political consiJcrations
n an eia of piess fieedom and oflen piess asseiliveness, goveinmenls
need lo iespond lo lhe emolional ieaclions of lheii publics lo silualions
peiceived and poiliayed as emeigencies humanilaiian, polilical, oi
olhei in a way lhal will be mel wilh bioad appioval oi, al leasl, will nol
cause seiious dissenl.19 This maxim of lale lwenlielh-cenluiy demociacy
was upheld in lhe case of lhe Kosovo ciisis loo. Moieovei, il was com-
pounded by ongoing elecloial piocesses in all lhiee counliies undei con-
sideialion: laly and Gieece weie piepaiing foi lhe Iuiopean Pailiamenl
eleclions on 13 1une, while Tuikey`s geneial eleclion was scheduled foi
18 Apiil.
The lalian goveinmenl had lo face a divided public, almosl half of
il suppoiling NATO`s inleivenlion and lhe olhei half opposing il.20
Sliiking a balance was whal was needed, and lhis is whal lhe goveinmenl
liied lo do, by pailicipaling fully in lhe NATO iaids and al lhe same lime
making pioposals foi a peaceful selllemenl and a ieluin lo inleinalional
legalily. The Gieek goveinmenl was in a moie difncull posilion, because
ils public oveiwhelmingly opposed lhe allack on Seibia and expiessed
lhis opposilion foicefully in opinion polls bul also lhiough conceils,
demonslialions, and olhei foims of piolesl.21 Thus, emphasis was pul on
effoils lo alleviale human suffeiing and lo biing aboul a peaceful end lo
lhe confionlalion. This was wilhoul neglecling Alliance obligalions such
as iighls of passage foi NATO lioops using lhe poil of Thessaloniki and
piobably lhe use of communicalions inslallalions aiound Gieece, lhough
shoil of diiecl involvemenl in lhe conicl of Gieek peisonnel and haid-
waie. Despile lheii balancing acls, bolh lhe lalian and lhe Gieek gov-
einmenls saw lheii peicenlages shiink in lhe Iuiopean Pailiamenl elec-
lions, allhough lheii losses weie nol lhal high in lhe ciicumslances (Ko-
sovo was ceilainly nol lhe only conlenlious issue in eilhei campaign). The
main opposilion pailies did nol benenl subslanlially, because in lhe case
of Kosovo al leasl lhey had no ieal alleinalives lo piopose, olhei lhan
diffeiences in emphasis. l was moie lhe fiinge pailies of piolesl lhal al-
liacled dissalisned voleis, lhus nol piecluding lhe ieluin of lhese voleis
lo lhe iuling pailies foi fuluie geneial eleclions in lhe evenl lhal lhe sil-
ualion ieluined lo noimal.
n Tuikey, lhe public and lhe goveinmenl weie moie in lune, as lhe
good eleclion iesulls achieved by Piime Minislei Icevil`s paily showed.
Of couise, Kosovo was nol lhe main oi even a ma|oi issue duiing lhe
campaign, seized as public opinion was by lhe Ocalan affaii, allhough
lhe similaiilies belween Kosovo and lhe Kuidish queslion did nol go
unnoliced. Anolhei big issue lo be |udged by lhe elecloiale was lhe
seculai oi slamic chaiaclei of lhe Tuikish iepublic. The iesulls showed
a slienglhening of lhe seculai elemenls, logelhei wilh a subslanlial in-
ciease in voles foi lhe nalionalisls, who weie evenlually bioughl inlo lhe
goveinmenl.22
Repeicussions of lhe ciisis on ofncial and populai
peiceplions of inleinalional oiganizalions al vaiious levels
NATO`s decision lo go ahead wilh lhe bombing of ugoslavia wilhoul
even allempling lo gel \N Secuiily Council sanclioning was bioadly seen
as a manifeslalion of lhe poslCold Wai global powei (im)balance. Moie
oi less cynically, il was accepled lhal lhe sole iemaining supeipowei
could unilaleially pionounce on issues of inleinalional peace and secu-
iily, even on lhose involving lhe use of foice. The modicum of legili-
mizalion needed was piovided by ils immediale allies in NATO, includ-
ing lhe lhiee counliies undei consideialion. All lhiee wenl along wilh lhe
\S handling of lhe affaii, even befoie lhe Maich 1999 ciisis eiupled (foi
example, lhe Rambouillel lalks, pievious lhieals of lhe imminenl use of
foice in 1998, elc.). None of lhem iegisleied even a non-blocking dis-
agieemenl, nol even Gieece, unlike whal had happened moie lhan once
in lhe 198Os when dissenling foolnoles weie inseiled in NATO commu-
nique s by lhe lale Andieas Papandieou.
To be on lhe side of lhe sliongesl and lo iemain lheie was a poweiful
incenlive diieclly appiecialed by lhe lhiee goveinmenls bul also by lheii
iespeclive publics. Reaclions, especially in lhe case of Gieece and less so
of laly, may have been vocal al limes bul fell shoil of calls foi a negalive
vole oi a dislancing fiom NATO, excepl in lhe case of communisl and
pacinsl opposilion pailies. Neveilheless, lhe appaienl disiegaid foi lhe
inleinalional legal oidei, as piimaiily embodied in lhe Chailei of lhe
\niled Nalions, did cause seiious concein. Iffoils weie made foi a ieluin
lo al leasl nominal legalily, foi domeslic ieasons bul also foi bioadei
consideialions of balance. Smallei counliies in pailiculai feel lhe need lo
suppoil mullilaleial inslilulions wilh a bioad membeiship and colleclive
decision-making, wheie lhey aie given a say on issues lhal could olhei-
wise be decided upon by an e lile gioup of poweiful aclois oi even by lhe
hegemon alone wilhoul widei consullalion. n lhal sense, all lhiee coun-
liies, lo a lessei oi giealei exlenl, pioposed peaceful ways oul of lhe
ciisis and welcomed lhe evenlual ieluin lo lhe \niled Nalions fiamewoik
lhiough Secuiily Council Resolulion 1244 of 1O 1une 1999. The woild
body was bioughl back inlo lhe picluie, nol only lhiough ils piincipal
decision-making body on malleis of peace and secuiily, bul also lhiough
lhe cenlial iole awaided lo il in lhe cooidinalion of lhe civilian inleina-
lional piesence in posl-conicl Kosovo. Of couise, lhe mililaiy piesence
iemained independenl and undei NATO, lhus allowing foi populai cyn-
icism lo conlinue unabaled. A lol is slill lo be decided in piaclice lhiough
lhe peace implemenlalion piocess on lhe giound, wheie lhe efnciency
and effecliveness of lhe vaiious aclois aie being lesled.
Whal was a ma|oi disappoinlmenl foi many people in Gieece, and
peihaps lo a lessei exlenl laly, was lhe inabilily of lhe Iuiopean \nion
lo ieach a common posilion vis-a` -vis lhe Kosovo ciisis and lo adopl
measuies foi handling il wilhoul once again defeiiing lo lhe \niled
Slales. The economic gianl polilical dwaif`` syndiome lhal hampeis
lhe I\ manifesled ilself once again, |usl monlhs aflei lhe pompous in-
lioduclion of lhe common Iuiopean cuiiency. This pio|eclion of weak-
ness was miligaled somewhal in lhe couise of lhe ciisis, nolably lhiough a
giadual diffeienlialion in lhe allilude of lhe Geiman I\ piesidency. The
ambilious Slabilily Pacl foi Soulh-Iaslein Iuiope pioposed by lhe I\
was endoised in Cologne on 1O 1une 1999 and in Saia|evo on 3O 1uly
1999. l was placed undei lhe aegis of lhe pan-Iuiopean body, lhe
OSCI, whose unaimed veiineis`` deployed in Kosovo since Oclobei
1998 had failed lo secuie lhe peace. Howevei, lhe facl iemained lhal
Iuiope`` once again had pioven ils ielalive insignincance in high poli-
lics,`` despile ils consideiable weighl in economics and olhei low poli-
lics.`` The 1une 1999 decision nnally lo go ahead in eainesl wilh lhe I\
Common Ioieign and Secuiily Policy by appoinling a High Repiesenla-
live foi lhe |ob was lempeied by lhe facl lhal il was Mi. Solana who was
chosen, lhe dove-luined-hawk Secielaiy Geneial of NATO who seived
lhe \S-led Kosovo inleivenlion piocess quile well fiom lhal posl. n facl,
Gieece ob|ecled lo his appoinlmenl on lhose giounds, bul ils evenlual
abslenlion did nol block lhe decision.23 This appaienl weakness of lhe
I\ and lhe piedominance of NATO and lhe \niled Slales may have
pailly al leasl consoled Tuikey foi ils non-inclusion in lhe \nion and
piobably piompled slalemenls lhal Tuikey is no longei going lo beg foi
I\ accession and may well ieoiienl ilself lowaids olhei inleinalional
oppoilunilies, such as closei lies wilh lhe Tuikish-speaking iepublics.24
Concluding iemaiks
n conclusion, one could allempl lo exliapolale lhe lessons fiom lhe
Kosovo ciisis inlo lhe fuluie, as piobably peiceived by lhe lhiee coun-
liies undei consideialion.
Slailing wilh Tuikey, one can say lhal ils nim allachmenl lo lhe \niled
Slales and NATO was vindicaled by lheii piedominanl iole and lhe
simullaneous afnimalion of lhe conlinuing weakness of lhe Iuiopean
\nion. Tuikey will conlinue lo sell ilself as a loyal membei and iegional
chief foi lhe supeipowei and NATO, expecling lo benenl in leims of
polilical concessions fiom neighbouiing counliies (including Gieece),
secuiing ils inleinal fionl (including bolh lhe Kuidish and slamic ques-
lions) fiom oulside inleifeience, and ieaping economic and polilical
benenls fiom lhe exploilalion of Caspian oil ieseives and ils oveiall
slialegic localion.
Gieece is liying lo keep lo lhe middle giound, exleinally and also
domeslically, belween a \S-cenlied new inleinalional oidei and a moie
liadilional one based on long-eslablished piinciples. l needs lhe suppoil
of NATO and lhe supeipowei in ils ielalions wilh Tuikey iegaiding lhe
dispules ovei lhe Aegean and lhe Cypius pioblem, bul il iealizes lhal a
selllemenl nol based on inleinalional law could lead lo lhe closuie of
lhese queslions lo ils disadvanlage. Al lhe same lime, Gieece is liying lo
balance ils liansallanlic and Iuiopean oiienlalions, by favouiing a moie
asseilive bul nol anli-NATO Iuiopean Common Ioieign and Secu-
iily Policy, wilh ilself as lhe iegional hub foi Soulh-easlein Iuiope. Al
leasl one immediale benenl lhal seems lo have acciued lo Gieece fiom
lhe Kosovo ciisis is lhe designalion of Thessaloniki as lhe seal of lhe I\
Balkan Reconsliuclion Oiganizalion, allhough wilh sliong opeialional
ofnces in Piislina and peihaps elsewheie.25
Ioi laly il was impoilanl lo asseil ilself as a ma|oi powei, second lo
lhe supeipowei bul moie oi less on an equal basis wilh lhe olhei Iuio-
pean heavyweighls. l will conlinue ils effoils lo play a piolagonislic iole
in bolh ma|oi foiums, lhe I\ and NATO, as well as in lhe \niled Na-
lions. The appoinlmenl in mid-1999 of ex-Piime Minislei Piodi lo seive
as Piesidenl of lhe new Iuiopean Commission was expecled lo give laly
a highei pionle on lhe Iuiopean slage. Moieovei, lhe counliy will con-
linue lo puisue ils own iegional policies, lhiough Albania bul also
lhiough a polilical and economic piesence in olhei counliies of Soulh-
easlein Iuiope and lhe Medileiianean.
Noles
1. n lhis chaplei allempl lo lieal all lhiee counliies undei consideialion faiily and
equally, wilhin lhe limils of my abililies and of lhe souices available lo me. n any case,
cannol bul acknowledge my closei familiaiily wilh lhe hisloiical backgiound, sliucluies,
and piocesses of Gieece, of which happen lo be a cilizen and fiom wheie walched lhe
spiing 1999 ciisis and lhe accompanying piopaganda wai unfolding. Responsibilily foi
lhe views expiessed in lhis papei lies enliiely wilh me.
2. See ailicle wilh lhe chaiacleiislic lille, Gelling Ready foi Wai,`` Thc 1cononist, 1O
Oclobei 1998, pp. 3233, and 1oiis 1anssen Lok, NATO Widens Aii Campaign ovei
ugoslavia,`` 1ancs Intcrnational Dcjcnsc Rcvicw, \ol. 32, May 1999, p. 54.
3. See Massimo DÀlema, A New NATO foi a New Iuiope,`` Intcrnational Spcctator,
\ol. 34, No. 2, Apiil1une 1999, pp. 3334.
4. See lalian effoils lo pievenl lhe demolion of laly lo a secondaiy slanding in lhe
family of nalions`` lhiough lhe eleclion of Geimany and 1apan alone fiom lhe devel-
oped slales lo Secuiily Council peimanenl membeiship, as piesenled by laly`s ambas-
sadoi lo lhe \niled Nalions, I. Paolo Iulci, laly and lhe Refoim of lhe \N Secuiily
Council,`` Intcrnational Spcctator, \ol. 34, No. 2, Apiil1une 1999, pp. 716. See also
laly: Thinking Biggei,`` Thc 1cononist, 16 Oclobei 1999, p. 4O.
5. See Gieek Sunday papei Kyriakatiki 1lcjthcrotypia, 9 May 1999, p. 1O.
6. See Gieek daily To Vina, 13 1une 1999, pp. 2829.
7. See enliy enlilled \S: Tuikey and Kosovo aie nol compalible,`` iefeiiing lo a slale-
menl lo lhis effecl by \S Slale Depailmenl spokesman 1ames Rubin, in Turkish Ircss
Rcvicw, Tuikish Imbassy in Alhens, 8 Apiil 1999. See also Thc 1cononist, 19 1une
1999, p. 43.
8. Ioi lhis legacy of lhe pasl`` see Thanos \eiemis, Crccccs Balkan 1ntanglcncnt,
Alhens: ILAMIP, 1995, pp. 531.
9. See Geoigios Koslakos and Dimiliis Bouianlonis, nnovalions in Peace-keeping: The
Case of Albania,`` Sccurity Dialoguc, \ol. 29, No. 1, Maich 1998, pp. 4958, and Ialmii
Mema, Did Albania Really Need Opeialion Alba`?,`` in ibid., pp. 5962.
1O. See Iiisl Kosovo Albanian Refugees Aiilifled lo Tuikey,`` Turkcy UpJatc, al hllp:jj
www.luikeyupdale.comjiefugees.hlm, accessed on 6 Augusl 1999.
11. See hllp:jjwww.esleii.iljengjevenlsjkosovojbasic.hlm, accessed on 6 Augusl 1999.
12. See Reply by lhe Minislei of Ioieign Affaiis, Lambeilo Dini, lo Pailiamenlaiy ues-
lions on lhe Silualion in lhe Balkans befoie lhe Senale, Rome, 7 May 1999,`` al hllp:jj
www.esleii.iljengjaichivesjaich piessjspeechesjmay99jdO7O599e.hlm, accessed on 6
Augusl 1999.
13. See Gieek daily Kathincrini, 21 May 1999, p. 5; Kathincrini 1nglish 1Jition, 19 May
1999, p. 1; and \NHCR Counliy Pionles Gieece,`` al hllp:jjwww.unhci.chjwoildj
euiojgieece.hlm, accessed on 29 Oclobei 1999.
14. See hllp:jjwww.esleii.iljengjevenlsjkosovojbasic.hlm, accessed on 6 Augusl 1999.
15. See nilialive Iocus`: Concepl foi Aclivilies unlil Ind of 1999 Adopled in \ienna,`` al
hllp:jjwww.ieliefweb.inl (souice: Goveinmenl of Ausliia), accessed on 29 Oclobei 1999.
Ioi lhis and olhei examples of lhe Gieek goveinmenl`s go-belween iole lhanks lo ils
ialhei good ielalions wilh all sides, see To Vina, 2 May 1999, p. A5, and Kyriakatiki
1lcjthcrotypia, 2 May 1999, p. 6.
16. See Thc 1cononist, 8 May 1999, pp. 293O, and Kyriakatiki 1lcjthcrotypia, 18 Apiil
1999, p. 14.
17. See, foi example, Heaiing of Minislei of Ioieign Affaiis, Lambeilo Dini, by lhe Senale
Ioieign Affaiis Commillee on lhe Posilion of lhe lalian Goveinmenl al lhe Ioilhcom-
ing NATO Summil in Washinglon and Developmenls in lhe Balkans, Rome, 2O Apiil
1999,`` paiagiaph 8, al hllp:jjwww.esleii.iljengjaichivesjaich piessjspeechesjapiil99j
d2OO499e.hlm, accessed on 6 Augusl 1999.
18. See Tuikey Conceined aboul Kosovo Conicl Spieading lo Neighbouis,`` Turkcy Up-
Jatc al hllp:jjwww.luikeyupdale.comjKosovo.hlm, accessed on 6 Augusl 1999.
19. Ioi an inleiesling examinalion of lhe impacl of lhe infoimalion age on lhe dennilion of
lhe nalional inleiesl, see 1oseph S. Nye, 1i., Redenning lhe Nalional nleiesl,`` Iorcign
Ajjairs, \ol. 78, No. 4, 1ulyjAugusl 1999, pp. 2235.
2O. See Thc 1cononist, 24 Apiil 1999, p. 32.
21. See Thc 1cononist, 17 Apiil 1999, pp. 36 and 39, and Kathincrini, 23 May 1999, p. 1O.
22. See Thc 1cononist, 12 1une 1999, p. 33.
23. See Kyriakatiki 1lcjthcrotypia, 6 1une 1999, p. 4.
24. See slalemenl by Nalional Aclion Paily (MHP) leadei Devlel Bahceli iepoiled in
Turkish Ircss Rcvicw, Tuikish Imbassy in Alhens, 21 Apiil 1999.
25. See Kathincrini 1nglish 1Jition, 2O 1uly 1999, p. 1. See also slalemenl by Gieek Al-
leinale Ioieign Minislei iannos Kianidiolis on 28 1uly 1999, al hllp:jjwww.mfa.gij
allminisleijieleasesengj|uly99jeu28O799.hlm, accessed on 17 Augusl 1999.
12
Kosovo and lhe case of lhe
(nol so) fiee iideis: Poilugal,
Belgium, Canada, and Spain
DaviJ C. HaglunJ anJ Allcn Scns
nlioduclion: Delian League veisus democialic alliance?
n an inleiview published in lhe Madiid daily 1l Iat s, Iiench anlhiopol-
ogisl Immanuel Todd diew an analogy belween NATO and lhe Delian
League. The lallei was an Alhenian-led alliance consliucled in lhe nflh
cenluiy B.C. foi lhe inilial puiposes of amassing Gieek powei againsl lhe
Peisian empiie; ovei lime, il giew inlo an Alhenian empiie, which ulli-
malely would go lo wai (in 431 B.C.) againsl a iival Gieek giouping of
slales, lhe Peloponnesian League led by Spaila.1 The wai againsl Seibia
in lhe spiing of 1999, Todd suggesls, ieveals how much NATO ilself has
come lo iesemble lhe Delian League. Ameiica has become lhe new
Alhens, lhe impeiial piolecloi of lhe inleiesls of lessei allies, fiom whom
lillle may be iequiied oi expecled mililaiily, yel much is demanded po-
lilically and economically. This aiiangemenl, lo Todd, poses an obvious
lhieal lo lhe olhei allies, howevei much lhey may lhink lheii iecenl dis-
play of unily againsl Slobodan Milosevic has advanced lheii inleiesls.2
l is, lo be suie, haidly unusual foi a Iiench inlelleclual lo speculale
upon lhe dangeis ieal oi imagined of unchecked Ameiican powei;
aflei all, has nol Iiance`s foieign minislei, Hubeil \e diine, populaiized
lhe label hypeipowei`` lo expiess lhe pioblems lhoughl lo be associaled
wilh lhe cuiienl imbalance in global and liansallanlic powei?3 Noi is
such speculalion anylhing new foi Iiench policy makeis oi analysls:
181
alone among lhe Weslein allies, Iiance has foi some lime been known lo
be lhe slale mosl conceined aboul balance`` wilhin lhe alliance.4
Ioi lhal mallei, lheoiizing aboul lhe ncccssary implicalions of unbal-
anced powei has been a slaple foi al leasl one school of inleinalional
ielalions lhinkeis, namely lhe piedominanlly \S-based sliucluial ieal-
isls,`` who al limes can ouldo even lhe Iiench in piophesying lhe sombie
piospecls lhal musl ensue fiom lhe inevilable, and eleinal, lendency of
powei`` lo giow unlil checked by olhei powei. This gioup of lheoiisls,
lhough peihaps nol pulling lhe mannei exaclly as does Todd, goes one
bellei: lhe Wesl will evenlually fall apail, and whal happened lo lhe
Gieek cily slales musl happen lo lhe cuiienl allies, foi lhe same cause
lhal spaiked lhe Peloponnesian Wai (lhe excessive`` giowlh of one
slale`s powei) will geneiale counleibalancing foices even wilhin NATO.5
el lheie is anolhei way of iegaiding NATO. nslead of ils being lhe
vehicle par cxccllcncc foi lhe pio|eclion of Ameiican inleiesls puie and
simple, il can be inleipieled as lhe means of allowing allies, whalevei
lheii size, a degiee of inuence ovei Ameiican policy. To some analysls,
il is even a melhod by which lhe allies can peneliale lhe veiy piocess by
which Ameiicans denne lheii own nalional inleiesl,`` lhe iesull being
lhal a colleclive (Weslein) inleiesl is consliucled lhal ows fiom a col-
leclive Weslein idenlily.``6 Accoiding lo lhis ieading of NATO as a
democialic alliance,`` lheie is no ieason why lhe allies musl evenlually
fall oul in lhe absence of lhe eislwhile lhieal, and, in a zone of peace``
wheie powei and ils balancing mallei lillle, lheie is likewise no ieason
why Ameiica`s iobusl mililaiy pionle need lhiealen lhe secuiily inleiesl
of any democialic slale. uile lhe conliaiy, lhiough skilful diplomacy,
lhese smallei allies mighl even so avail lhemselves of Ameiican powei
lhal in advancing lheii own (as well as lhe geneial) inleiesl lhey aie, in
effecl, laxing`` lhe Ameiican public and nol lheii own populalions, foi
whom Ameiica`s mililaiy becomes an inexpensive foice mullipliei.``
Now, il is a slaple of isolalionisl lhinking in Ameiica lhal lhis is exaclly
whal cunning smallei allies have long been doing lo lhe \niled Slales
fiee iiding`` on ils piowess wilhoul paying lhe piice such an accielion of
mililaiy mighl would noimally enlail. Needless lo say, il is nol only iso-
lalionisls who would iediess lhe buiden`` of alliance defence: buiden-
shaiing`` has been an Ameiican concein foi almosl as long as lheie has
been a NATO, and lalely even lhe Wesl Iuiopeans aie coming lo accepl
lhal lhe quid pio quo foi Iuiope`s gelling moie of a say in lhe manage-
menl of liansallanlic secuiily is lhal il conliibule moie lo lhe mililaiy
capabilily of lhe Alliance. Bul il has been lhe Ameiican isolalionisl who
has made of buiden-shaiing a somewhal sinislei issue, one iepiesenling
nolhing so much as lhe iipping off of lhe Ameiican laxpayei by smallish
ingiales wilh lhe cheek lo call lhemselves fiiends and allies.``
Iiamewoik foi analysis
n a nulshell we have lwo conliasling alleinalives foi analysing lhe iole
of small poweis in alliance. Immanuel Todd will have us believe lhem lo
be lillle olhei lhan pawns fiom whom economic and polilical liibule is
exliacled by lheii impeiial maslei. The Ameiican isolalionisl iegaids
lhem as useless appendages deviously managing lo diag Ameiica inlo
lheii incessanl quaiiels and, lo add in|uiy lo insull, iequiiing Ameiica
lo do mosl of lhe paying, and lhe nghling, lo iesolve lhose quaiiels! Dif-
feienl as Todd may be fiom lhe isolalionisls, bolh conceplualizalions of
NATO hold lhe Alliance lo be a nelllesome conliivance, wilhin which
lhe smallei allies allain a special slalus, being eilhei lhe mosl oppiessed
(because lhe weakesl) oi lhe mosl duplicilous of lhe membei slales.
l should come as no suipiise lhal, in oui discussion of lhe Kosovo
ciisis, we nnd il moie helpful lo iegaid NATO as somelhing quile diffei-
enl fiom eilhei lhe modein veision of lhe Delian League oi lhe piemiei
mechanism foi siphoning off Ameiican powei and weallh. Peihaps col-
leclive idenlily`` puls il a bil loo sliongly. Neveilheless, we do see lhe
Alliance as consliluling a communily lhal smallei poweis have an inleiesl
in piomoling and pieseiving, foi ieasons ielaled lo bolh lheii secuiily
and lheii polilical inleiesls. Among lhe lallei we include lhe calegoiy of
values,`` which we see lillle need lo disenlangle fiom lhe bioadei (if
ambiguous) calegoiy of inleiesls.``
The wai ovei Kosovo, we will aigue, was in geneial an unpioblemalic
conicl foi oui sel of small poweis, because ils slalus as a humanilaiian``
wai made il easy lo |uslify lo polilical leadeis (if nol always lo lheii
publics), while lhe inabilily of NATO lo have avoided involvemenl made
lhe wai slialegically necessaiy as well. Nol suipiisingly, lillle oveil ap-
peal was made by lhe smallei allies lo lhe slialegic ialionale foi lhe wai,
noi was il essenlial foi il lo have been made, such was lhe iesonance of
lhe humanilaiian claim. Neveilheless, lhe slialegic pull was ieal, foi all
lhe allies undeisland lhe necessily of pieseiving Alliance solidaiily and
ciedibilily. Ioi lhe smallei allies, wilh vaiying degiees of qualincalion,
Kosovo was even a good`` wai, one of lhe few such lhey aie likely lo
know. They weie able lo puisue causes lhoughl lo be noble in inspiialion,
and lo do so al ielalively lillle cosl lo lhemselves.
Thal said, lheie weie indeed diffeiences bolh in how oui sel of slales
peiceived lhe wai, and in how lhey puisued il. So signincanl weie lhe
diffeiences, we aigue, lhal il could even be iemaiked lhal lhe geneiic
label we weie asked lo employ namely of smallei NATO membeis``
masks as much as, if nol moie lhan, il ieveals. To lake |usl lhe mosl ob-
vious poinl: one of oui sample, Canada, played a iole in lhe aii campaign
lhal was anylhing bul small,`` ianking as we shall show alongside lhe
PORT\GAL, BILG\M, CANADA, AND SPAN 183
aeiial aclivily of lhe ma|oi Iuiopean allies. Moieovei, allhough all foui
of oui slales saw lhe wai in humanilaiian leims, and allhough all foui
deem lhe pieseivalion of NATO lo be in lheii inleiesl, lheie aie nevei-
lheless diffeiences in whal lhey did and why lhey did il.
Iiisl of all, lhe foui slales aie nol equally small.`` They iange fiom
modeslly piopoilioned Belgium and Poilugal, lhiough giganlic (in leiii-
loiy) lhough middling (in populalion) Canada, lo Spain, a counliy neaily
as laige as Iiance oi Biilain, wilh a mililaiy eslablishmenl lhal, on papei,
can seem ialhei foimidable, al leasl lo Canadians, who aie slowly accus-
loming lhemselves lo having an aclive mililaiy shiunk lo 6O,OOO uni-
foimed peisonnel.7 Secondly, oui foui slales aie nol all in Iuiope. Thus,
lo lhe exlenl lhal one of lhe lessons`` of Kosovo is lhal lhe Iuiopean
\nion needs lo bulliess lhe mooled Iuiopean Secuiily and Defence
denlily (ISD), lhe impacl of such a consliuclion will be fell diffei-
enlially by lhe membeis of oui sel. Thiidly, oui sel of slales do nol have
similai conceplions of lheii own secuiily inleiesls and needs beyond lhe
Iuiopean conlexl; some iegaid lhose inleiesls lo be univeisal in scope,
wheieas olheis appeai iiveled upon Weslein Iuiope and ils immediale
enviions.
n whal follows, we sliucluie oui analysis accoiding lo one veiy ciude
measuie of powei,`` namely slales` ielalive iankings in populalion, and
lhese we addiess in ascending oidei. This is an aibiliaiy and awed
classincaloiy scheme, whose only saving giace is lhal il allows us lo avoid
an even moie aibiliaiy and awed melhod, namely alphabelical lisling.
Accoidingly, we discuss in lhe following oidei lhe Kosovo policy of lhese
foui slales: Poilugal, Belgium, Canada, and Spain.
Poilugal
Poilugal`s hisloiy is chaiacleiized by secuiily lhieals posed by lhe
machinalions of gieal poweis. Poilugal has long feaied mililaiy, eco-
nomic, oi culluial absoiplion inlo Spain, a feai lhal became a iealily
belween 158O and 164O. As a iesull, Poilugal has liadilionally soughl
counleiweighls`` lo lhe piesence of ils beiian neighboui, which il has
found in bolh a long-slanding secuiily ielalionship wilh Gieal Biilain and
an impeiial oiienlalion lhal consciously luined away fiom beiia and lhe
conlinenl lowaid oveiseas empiie and commeice. Poilugal`s close secu-
iily ielalionship wilh Biilain did nol come wilhoul low poinls: Lisbon`s
iefusal lo abide by Napoleon`s liade embaigo againsl Biilain iesulled
in Iiench invasion and lhe subsequenl Peninsulai Wai, and Poilugal`s
expansion inlo Afiica caused lension belween lhe lwo counliies.
Neveilheless, Poilugal`s policy of bilaleial alliance was laigely suc-
cessful in mainlaining lhe counliy`s independence. Poilugal`s loyally as
an ally bioughl lhe counliy inlo lhe Iiisl Woild Wai. The expeiience of
lhe wai, and lhe economic chaos of lhe inleiwai peiiod, slimulaled a luin
lo isolalionism. Geneial Anlo nio de Oliveiia Salazai acquiied diclaloiial
poweis in 1932, and foi moie lhan 4O yeais Poiluguese foieign policy was
dominaled by lhe isolalionisl, anli-communisl, and colonial policies of lhe
Salazai iegime.
Poilugal iemained neulial in lhe Second Woild Wai, bul lhe emei-
gence of lhe Cold Wai and lhe Soviel lhieal had a diamalic impacl on ils
secuiily policy, in effecl ending lhe policies of neulialily and isolalion
lhal had foimed lhe coie of secuiily lhinking since lhe 192Os. The Salazai
goveinmenl iecognized lhal lhe Soviel lhieal lo Iuiope necessilaled
mullilaleial secuiily coopeialion; al lhe same lime, lhal lhieal enhanced
lhe slialegic impoilance of Poiluguese leiiiloiy. The Poiluguese liiangle
foimed by lhe mainland, lhe Azoies, and Madeiia was valuable lo Wesl-
ein naval and aii opeialions, giving iise lo lhe iefeience lo lhe func-
lional powei`` of Poiluguese leiiiloiy. This gave Poilugal lhe oppoilunily
and lhe assels lo emeige fiom ils secuiily isolalion and involve ilself in
lhe mililaiy sliucluies laking place in Iuiope, especially NATO.
NATO offeied secuiily fiom a peiceived Soviel lhieal and allowed
Poilugal lo have access and a voice wilhin lhe Alliance. NATO also ie-
ecled lhe Allanlicisl oiienlalion of lhe Salazai iegime, which soughl
close lies wilh lhe \niled Slales lo supplemenl lhe long-slanding secuiily
ielalionship wilh lhe \niled Kingdom. n addilion, Poilugal`s decision lo
|oin NATO was molivaled by a desiie lo slienglhen Poiluguese slalus
and lhus bolslei lhe Salazai goveinmenl.8
Despile ils membeiship in NATO and lhe Iuiopean Iiee Tiade As-
socialion, Poilugal iemained laigely focused away fiom Iuiope unlil lhe
oveilhiow of lhe successoi Maicello Caelano goveinmenl in lhe Caina-
lion Revolulion of 1974. Aflei 1974, following a biief peiiod of Allanlic
neulialily,`` posl-ievolulion secuiily policy moved lowaid a moie inlei-
nalionalisl oullook.9 Decolonizalion ieecled a shifl in Poilugal`s pei-
ceplions of ils colonies, which weie no longei iegaided as essenlial com-
ponenls of nalional secuiily, bul as polilical, economic, and mililaiy
buidens. Since 1974, lhe guiding piinciple of Poiluguese secuiily has
been involvemenl in NATO and lhe Iuiopean inlegialion piocess:
Apie` s lèmpiie, lÌuiope.``10
Since lhe Cold Wai`s end, Poilugal has found ilself in a highly favoui-
able secuiily enviionmenl. The Soviel lhieal (always exaggeialed by lhe
anli-communisl iheloiic of Salazai) has vanished. No longei buidened by
lhe polilically unpopulai baggage of diclaloiial iule and oveiseas colo-
nies, Poilugal has been fiee lo enhance ils involvemenl in Iuiope. The
inslilulional sliucluies of Iuiope affoid lhe same oppoilunilies lo Poi-
lugal as lhey do lo olhei Iuiopean small slales: iepiesenlalion and
allendanl expeclalions of inuence. Poilugal views ils iole as lhal of a
biokei and consensus buildei in Iuiope, one lhal can conliibule a
soulhein Iuiopean and Allanlic peispeclive lo inslilulional delibei-
alions. Poiluguese inleiesls aie also fuilheied by engagemenl in Iuiope;
economic giowlh and developmenl and polilical and secuiily issues in lhe
Medileiianean can besl be advanced in mullilaleial foiums.
NATO iemains lhe coie secuiily oiganizalion in lhe Poiluguese mulli-
laleial landscape, pioviding safely, a counleiweighl lo Spain, and main-
lenance of lhe \S piesence in Iuiope. As Kennelh Maxwell obseived,
Poilugal seeks lo ielain a bilaleial ielalionship wilh lhe \niled Slales
lhal would help balance any possible ovei-dependency in Iuiope.``11
This bid lo offsel Iuiopean inlegialion wilh slialegic dependence on lhe
\niled Slales iemains a salienl fealuie of Poiluguese secuiily policy.
Poilugal has lheiefoie iemained one of lhe Allanlicisl-oiienled counliies
in lhe Alliance. Howevei, il has been moie ieseived lhan many membei
slales aboul lhe new`` NATO, enlaigemenl, and ciisis-iesponse ioles.
Alliance aclivilies in lhe Balkans in geneial and in Kosovo in pailiculai
have nol been ieceived wilh pailiculai enlhusiasm. Poilugal iegaids bolh
enlaigemenl and ciisis-iesponse opeialions as diveisions fiom lhe coie
mission of lhe Alliance: colleclive defence. Al lhe same lime, Lisbon ac-
knowledges lhe iealily lhal NATO is a conicl-managemenl oiganiza-
lion. l became suppoilive of lhe enlaigemenl piocess, and in facl advo-
caled lhe inclusion of Romania, Bulgaiia, and Slovakia duiing lhe iun-up
lo lhe Madiid summil in 1997.
While Poilugal ofncially advocales lhe developmenl of Iuiopean de-
fence capacilies, il iemains caulious on lhe piospecls of an effeclive
ISD, piefeiiing lo develop such an idenlily as a complemenl lo lhe
Allanlic secuiily sliucluies wilhin NATO. Al lhe conclusion of lhe aii
campaign againsl Seibia, lhe foieign minislei, 1aime Gama, sliuck an
oplimislic nole iegaiding lhe fuluie of ISD, noling lhal lhe peace was
an impoilanl vicloiy`` foi Iuiopean diplomacy.12 This senlimenl was
echoed by lhe piime minislei, Anlonio Guleiies, who enlhusiaslically
pioclaimed lhal peace has been achieved al lhe Iuiopean \nion`s ini-
lialive and lhiough a Iuiopean \nion iepiesenlalive. This, believe is a
sign of maluiily wilh iegaid lo lhe Iuiopean \nion`s abilily lo acl on
common foieign and secuiily policy which few would peihaps have sus-
pecled al lhis poinl.``13
Poilugal`s iesponse lo lhe Kosovo ciisis was similai lo lhe commu-
naulaiie`` appioach adopled by Belgium (discussed in lhe nexl seclion).
Allhough nol diieclly lhiealened by lhe violence wilhin Seibia, il evinced
conceins lhal lhe conicl could spiead. Howevei, lhe goveinmenl`s posi-
lion was based less on an appeal lo ovcrt slialegic ialionales lhan lo lhe
obligalions of alliance and lhe humanilaiian impeialive behind NATO
aclion. As Ioieign Minislei Gama iemaiked, Poilugal is laking pail in
lhe opeialion. We aie a NATO membei counliy, we honoui oui inlei-
nalional iesponsibililies. We aie an ally in bolh lhe good limes and lhe
difncull momenls.``14 The lack of a \N mandale was a mallei of consid-
eiable debale in Poilugal, and lhe goveinmenl iesponded by aiguing lhal
Kosovo was nol lo be seen as piecedenl selling. Piime Minislei Guleiies
also defended lhe goveinmenl decision by appealing lo moial values: As
fai as bolh NATO and Poilugal aie conceined, il will always be piefeia-
ble lo acl wilh an expiess mandale fiom lhe Secuiily Council. Howevei,
if lhe defence of lhiealened values so iequiies, lhe allies will nol iefiain
fiom laking aclion, inspiied and guided by lhe piinciples which lhe \N
endoises even when il may nol lempoiaiily apply lhem.``15
The appeal lo humanilaiian values and lhe inliansigence of lhe Milo-
sevic goveinmenl also played heavily in Lisbon`s ialionales in suppoil of
lhe aii campaign. As Gama aigued, |wje all iegiel lhal il should have
been necessaiy lo use foice, bul lhe liulh is lhal ugoslavia iefused lo
pailicipale in a consliuclive mannei in all lhese negolialions, il did nol
sign lhe Rambouillel Accoids, and il has an opeialion undeiway in Ko-
sovo aiming al eliminaling a gieal pail of lhe Albanian capabilily in lhal
leiiiloiy. And anlicipaling a massacie, anlicipaling a humanilaiian silua-
lion of lhe ulmosl giavily and indeed wilh consequences lo lhe neigh-
bouiing counliies, NATO has been foiced lo inleivene.``16 Howevei, lhe
goveinmenl was opposed lo a giound offensive, laigely on lhe basis lhal
lhis would be an unwaiianled escalalion lhal would nol solve lhe polilical
ciisis.17
Poiluguese e lile and public opinion was moie divided duiing lhe ciisis
lhan in many olhei membei slales. n pailiamenl, lhe Socialisls and Social
Democials did nol challenge lhe decision of lhe goveinmenl lo suppoil
NATO. Howevei, lhe Populai Paily and lhe Communisls weie opposed,
wilh lhe lallei being mosl vocal. The Communisls nol only ie|ecled lhe
ialionales and lhe slialegy of inleivenlion in Kosovo, lhey weie also
bioadly opposed lo lhe diplomalic iesulls of lhe Washinglon summil of
Apiil 1999. Theie was in addilion some debale aboul lhe consislency of
lhe goveinmenl`s sland on humanilaiian iesponses in Kosovo in lighl of
lhe silualion in Iasl Timoi. The piess in Poilugal was laigely againsl lhe
NATO aclion, and public opinion was divided. As of 2 1une 1999, a slighl
ma|oiily 51 pei cenl of public opinion was opposed lo lhe aii wai.18
This splil can in pail be explained by a deepei division in Poiluguese so-
ciely, which haibouis some anli-Ameiican and anli-Iuiopean senlimenl.
Al lhe same lime, lheie is consideiable public appioval of sliong links
wilh lhe \niled Slales, and suppoil foi NATO iemains high in e lile
opinion in Poilugal.
Poilugal made few independenl foiays inlo diplomacy duiing lhe Ko-
sovo ciisis, piefeiiing lo mainlain solidaiily wilh lhe foimal posilions
held by lhe Alliance. Milosevic did make a biief splash in Poilugal wilh
his asseilion lhal Seibia would accepl an inleinalional foice in Kosovo so
long as il was undei \N conliol and lhal lhe only NATO counliies in-
volved weie Gieece and Poilugal. This was iegaided in some quaileis as
an indicalion of Poilugal`s pieslige, bul lhe momenl seems lo have
passed wilhoul any signincanl follow-up by lhe goveinmenl. Poilugal`s
mililaiy conliibulion mighl have piecluded such an effoil, in any case. ls
inilial conliibulion lo lhe NATO aii campaign was lhiee I-16 aiiciafl.
Poilugal`s conliibulion lo Opeialion 1oinl Guaidian was a ballalion of
some 3OO peisonnel. n lighl of lhe ciisis-iesponse naluie of NATO mili-
laiy iequiiemenls, Poilugal began lo iesliucluie ils mililaiy in 1998, wilh
lhe developmenl of a capacily lo conliibule lo NATO`s iapid ieaclion
foices deemed a nisl piioiily.``19 Neveilheless, lhe size and capacilies of
lhe Poiluguese mililaiy will ensuie lhal Poiluguese puisuil of commu-
naulaiie`` slialegies in NATO will be limiled lo polilical and diplomalic
suppoil of Alliance inilialives, backed by a loken conliibulion of mililaiy
assels lo coalilion effoils.
Belgium
Laige chapleis of Belgian hisloiy iead like a Gieek liagedy, foi few
counliies bellei demonsliale lhe secuiily policy dilemmas lhal ow fiom
being a small slale in a gieal powei woild. Aflei having been iepealedly
oveiiun in pievious incainalions as pail of lhe Habsbuig Impiie and lhe
Kingdom of lhe Nelheilands, Belgium would have beslowed upon il, al
lhe London Confeience of 1839, lhe slalus of peipelual neulialily,``
making il a buffei zone belween lhe Romance and Geimanic woilds.
Thus began lhe counliy`s long hisloiy of neulialily, a policy lhal was
consislenl wilh sliong public and e lile senlimenls favouiing lhe moial
supeiioiily of mililaiy abslenlion. Howevei, as lhe Iuiopean syslem
made lhe liansilion fiom Conceil lo lhe Tiiple InlenlejCenlial Poweis
sland-off, Belgian neulialily was lhiealened by lhe aclions of lhe veiy
counliies lhal had guaianleed il.
Belgium`s neulialily (and lheiefoie ils secuiily) giew lo become heav-
ily dependenl on lhe delicale balance belween Iiance and Geimany and
lhe lhieal of Biilish inleivenlion. When Biilain allied wilh Iiance againsl
Geimany, Belgium found ilself on an old fionl line belween gieal powei
anlagonisls. Neulialily could nol save Belgium in 1914, noi would il
piove any moie effeclive in 194O.20 This expeiience led lo a consensus
lhal ie|ecled neulialily aflei lhe Second Woild Wai.
Duiing lhe Cold Wai, Belgium embiaced lhe mullilaleialism and in-
slilulionalism lhal chaiacleiized Wesl Iuiopean affaiis. Much of lhis en-
lhusiasm can be explained by lhe expeiience of neulialily, bul Belgium
had a gieal deal lo gain fiom pailicipalion in lhe polilical, economic, and
secuiily sliucluies of lhe Wesl. The ieinfoicemenl of non-confionlalional
noims (lo lhe poinl wheie Weslein Iuiope came lo be called a secuiily
communily) gieally ieduced lhe gieal powei anlagonisms lhal so lhieal-
en small aclois. The ciealion of inslilulions seived lo bind up lhe gieal
poweis inlo foimal oiganizalions in which Belgium was a pailnei. This
enabled il lo have a voice and some expeclalion of inuence wilhin Wesl
Iuiopean affaiis, and piovided oppoilunilies lo caive oul diplomalic
niches lhal seived Belgian inleiesls in a coopeialive, iules-based Iuio-
pean syslem. Belgium came lo iegaid ilself as a biidge,`` oi hyphen,``
in Iuiopean polilics.21
NATO, and lhe Ameiican piesence in Iuiope, offeied Belgium secu-
iily againsl lhe Soviel lhieal in a mullilaleial conlexl. Howevei, lhe
counliy did expeiience lhe secuiily conceins lhal accompanied lhe Cold
Wai, foiemosl of which was lhe iisk of a geneial wai and lhe possibilily
of being diagged inlo such a conicl by a supeipowei conagialion. Bel-
gium also had lo conliibule iesouices and funds lo lhe common defence
of Iuiope, effoils lhal weie on occasion polilically unpopulai.
n lhe wake of lhe Cold Wai, Belgium en|oys a favouiable secuiily
enviionmenl. The collapse of lhe Soviel \nion iemoved lhe mililaiy
lhieal lo Weslein Iuiope and lhe lhieal of a geneial wai. Coopeialive
noims and inslilulions have been mainlained and even slienglhened, and
lheie is lillle sign of lhe much mooled ienalionalizalion`` of defence
piioiilies among lhe Iuiopean gieal poweis. Belgium lies in lhe cenlie of
lhe Wesl Iuiopean zone of peace, enmeshed in an economic, polilical,
and secuiily communily lhal affoids oppoilunilies foi lhe geneialion of
weallh, diplomalic engagemenl, and a de-emphasis on mililaiy piepaied-
ness. The highly foimalized coopeialive aiiangemenls of Weslein Iuiope
allow Belgium and olhei small slales lo puisue communaulaiie`` slial-
egies, designed lo mainlain and ieinfoice lhis favouiable enviionmenl, as
well as lo gain inuence and value wilhin inslilulions and iegimes.22
Belgium has iegaided ils iole in Iuiope as a biidge buildei, a calalysl
foi coopeialion, and a piomolei of inslilulionalism in Iuiope. This dip-
lomalic slance is puisued as well wilhin NATO, wheie Belgium views
ilself as a consensus buildei and helpful nxei, a ieeclion of ils domeslic
polilical iealilies.
Membeiship in NATO is cenlial lo Belgian secuiily policy. NATO is
iegaided as lhe pie-eminenl secuiily oiganizalion in Iuiope, and lhe
coie of any effeclive colleclive capacily lo wield mililaiy foice in lhe
Iuio-Allanlic aiea. Howevei, lhe evolulion of NATO and lhe Alliance`s
aclivilies in lhe Balkans (especially in Kosovo) have posed challenges lo
Belgian secuiily inleiesls. The counliy`s inleiesl in NATO`s consullalive
sliucluies and in ils colleclive defence mission is cleai enough.
Less cleai, howevei, is lhe Belgian inleiesl in Alliance effoils lo pio|ecl
mililaiy powei beyond lhe leiiiloiy of membei slales in ciisis-iesponse
opeialions. Belgium has iefused lo suppoil coalilion opeialions in lhe
pasl: allhough lhe Gulf Wai was nol a NATO opeialion, Belgium did
iefuse lo supply aililleiy pio|ecliles lo an ally, Biilain. Belgium was
among lhe conseivalive membeis of NATO conceining lhe developmenl
of lhe new slialegic concepl unveiled al lhe Washinglon summil in Apiil
1999. n pailiculai, il opposed lhe idea of a global iole foi lhe Alliance,
on lhe basis lhal il would weaken commonalily of inleiesl among mem-
bei slales and would lead lo a consequenl eiosion of cohesion and soli-
daiily. Neveilheless, Belgium has iecognized lhe changing iole of lhe
Alliance and lhe need lo iespond lo lhe piaclical and symbolic issues
suiiounding bolh lhe exlension of slabilily easlwaid and lhe ielalionship
of Cenlial and Iaslein Iuiope wilh Wesl Iuiopean inslilulions. l did
suppoil lhe enlaigemenl of NATO as well as lhe inslilulionalizalion of
lhe Alliance`s oulieach lo non-membei slales lo lhe easl. Howevei, Bel-
gium has mainlained lhal NATO`s new ioles musl be balanced wilh lhe
ioles and iequiiemenls of colleclive defence.
Wilh iespecl lo lhe ISD, Belgium has consislenlly advocaled a
sliongei Iuiope. Allhough Belgium does nol wish lo ieplicale NATO,
lhe Kosovo expeiience has once again demonslialed lhe shoilcomings of
Iuiopean capacilies lo acl independenlly of lhe \niled Slales. nslabilily
in lhe easl, Middle Iasl, and Noilh Afiica iequiies an ISD lhal is
complemenlaiy lo NATO bul also capable of independenl aclion, be-
cause in some cases lhe \niled Slales will nol be willing lo inleivene and
Iuiope will iequiie ils own capabilily. Duiing lhe Kosovo ciisis lhe lhen
piime minislei, 1ean-Luc Dehaene, iemaiked: wanl lo see a Iuiopean
pillai inside NATO and a defence pillai wilhin lhe Iuiopean \nion, bolh
cleaily linked. Bul Iuiope is nol ieady lo invesl in lhe kind of logislics
and infiasliucluie lhal NATO has, above all lhanks lo lhe \niled
Slales.``23 A few days lalei, he caulioned lhal, |ijf lhis Iuiopean foieign
policy is lo be ciedible and effeclive, il iequiies a secuiily and defence
policy which has sufncienl iesouices. A capacily lo make decisions and a
capacily lo acl musl be consliucled wilhin lhe \nion.``24
I
lile opinion wilhin Belgium was laigely unined duiing lhe Kosovo
ciisis. Theie was widespiead acceplance of lhe iealily lhal a \N Secuiily
Council mandale would nol be foilhcoming, and lhal lhis could nol be
allowed lo pievenl a iesponse. Belgian ofncials consoled lhemselves wilh
lhe view lhal lhis would nol be a piecedenl-selling case, and lhal legili-
macy foi fuluie aclion musl slill iesl wilh lhe Secuiily Council. Iuilhei
consolalions weie found in calls foi any nnal selllemenl lo involve lhe
\niled Nalions. Thioughoul lhe bombing campaign, lhe Belgian gov-
einmenl iemained sliongly commilled lo lhe piinciple behind NATO`s
slialegy. Belgium was consislenlly opposed lo lhe giound foice oplion,
laigely because of lhe difncullies and cosls assumed lo be associaled wilh
such an effoil.
Belgian suppoil foi NATO aclion iesled on lwo foundalions: lhe
pioximily of lhe ciisis and allendanl feais lhal il could spiead; and lhe
humanilaiian disaslei lhal was beginning lo unfold in an eeiie ieplay of
lhe Bosnian wai seveial yeais eailiei. The Belgian goveinmenl ialional-
ized ils involvemenl in NATO aclion againsl Seibia laigely on humani-
laiian giounds. The deeds of lhe Milosevic iegime iepiesenled an affionl
lo lhe values of Iuiope, as 1ean-Luc Dehaene iemaiked: Oui handicap
is lhal we aie up againsl someone who iespecls no value, no iule, who is
wilhoul sciuples, who musl |uslify himself lo no one, who can play lhe
nalionalisl caid . . . |Wje can compaie lhe silualion lo lhe 193Os wilh
Hillei. We did nol ieacl. f we had ieacled eailiei we would have peihaps
had a conicl soonei, bul we would have been quickei lo slop ceilain
lhings.``25
n pailiamenl, lhe Socialisls, Social Democials, Chiislian Democials,
and Libeials weie bioadly suppoilive of NATO aclions. This bioad con-
sensus was miiioied in Belgian public opinion, wilh lhe ma|oiily of Bel-
gians suppoiling lhe aii campaign againsl Seibia. n a poll conducled
belween 9 and 12 Apiil, 64 pei cenl of iespondenls fell lhal mililaiy
sliikes weie necessaiy lo slop lhe aclions of lhe Seibs in Kosovo. Only 2O
pei cenl consideied lhe sliikes lo be a mislake.`` Suppoil foi Belgian
pailicipalion in a giound inleivenlion was less iobusl, wilh 51 pei cenl of
iespondenls favouiing il and 43 pei cenl opposed.26
The Belgian goveinmenl did make an effoil lo eslablish a diplomalic
iole foi ilself duiing lhe ciisis, offeiing lo acl as a biidge belween NATO
and Russia. Ioieign Minislei Iiik Deiycke iemaiked lhal Belgium has
an impoilanl iole lo play in seeking a solulion foi lhe Kosovo conicl . . .
|Tjhanks lo oui expeiience in lhe ugoslav civil wai in Iasl Slavonia, lhe
inleinalional communily iegaids us as expeils. . . . believe we cannol
nnd a solulion wilhoul lhe Russians. Al bolh lhe mililaiy and civil levels
lhey aie ciucial. Given lhe co-opeialion which we had wilh lhe Russians
in Iasl Slavonia, oui counliy is lhe mosl suilable lo play lhis biidging
iole.``27
This inilialive was inlended lo demonsliale lhe capacily of Belgium
lo make an impoilanl conliibulion lo peace effoils. Iiik Deiycke
slaled:
have always found il difncull lo accepl lhe way small counliies aie sidelined by
lhe biggei ones, as if lhey weie unable lo make any signincanl conliibulion lo
inleinalional polilics. We musl undeisland lhal lhe Belgian public is veiy inlei-
esled in, and conceined aboul, whal is happening in Kosovo. Which is why il is
good foi a Belgian diplomal lo be involved al a high level. This allows people lo
see lhal a small counliy like Belgium can neveilheless play a iole on lhe woild
slage. l is also impoilanl foi someone lo make a specincally Iuiopean inpul lo
lhe seaich foi a diplomalic solulion in lhe Balkans.28
Belgium also soughl duiing lhe ciisis lo biing lhe \niled Nalions inlo lhe
diplomalic piocess. As lhe wai enleied ils nnal phase, Belgium was
laigely suppoilive of lhe Geiman posilion in lhe G-8, and was opposed lo
lhe lalian call foi a hall lo lhe bombing befoie adopling a \N iesolulion
on a selllemenl.
Twelve Belgian I-16 nghleis weie engaged in lhe aii campaign againsl
Seibia. Belgium commilled 1,1OO peisonnel lo KIOR foi a peiiod of one
yeai, allhough Ioieign Minislei Deiycke eslimaled lhal NATO giound
lioops would have lo iemain in Kosovo foi al leasl foui lo nve yeais.``29
The conlingenl is composed of a mechanized infanliy ballalion, a lians-
poil and logislics company, a helicoplei delachmenl, and a eel of ambu-
lances, all allached lo lhe Iiench secloi in KIOR. The Belgian conlingenl
was nol ieady foi immediale deploymenl, iequiiing piepaialion lime
and lianspoil lo Gieece. Two Belgian minesweepeis weie allached lo
STANA\IORMID (Slanding Naval Ioice Medileiianean) lo assisl wilh
lhe neulializalion of any NATO oidnance losl in lhe Adiialic. Belgian
foices alieady in Albania undei Albania Ioice (AIOR) weie allached
lo lhe Belgian KIOR conlingenl. Belgian aulhoiilies also sliessed lhal
Belgium had accepled consideiably moie iefugees lhan olhei Iuiopean
counliies.
Belgium`s pailicipalion in NATO-led opeialions in lhe Balkans and ils
suppoil foi a moie iobusl ISD iaise queslions aboul lhe laigei impacl
of lhe limiled size and capabililies of small slale mililaiies. Wilh ovei
1,OOO peisonnel deployed in Kosovo and some 6OO in lhe Slabilizalion
Ioice (SIOR) in Bosnia, lheie aie conceins lhal lhe iesouices available
lo lhe Belgian aimed foices will pievenl Belgium fiom meeling all of ils
mililaiy commilmenls in lhe fuluie. n leims of capacilies, Belgian I-16s
did nol lake pail in lhe bombing of Seibia, being neilhei equipped noi
liained foi a piecision bombing iole. \nless membei slales aie willing lo
invesl in capable mililaiies, lhe inlei-opeiabilily gap in NATO will con-
linue lo widen. Iuilheimoie, developing a liue Iuiopean mililaiy capa-
bilily will depend on a willingness lo invesl iesouices, a polilical chal-
lenge in an enviionmenl in which mililaiy commilmenls aie laigely
discielionaiy.
Canada
Like lhe olhei allies, small oi olheiwise, Canada saw lhe wai veiy much
as a humanilaiian conicl. And, like lhe olhei allies, il also had some
slialegic (if unslaled) inleiesls al slake, associaled wilh lhe need lo pie-
seive lhe ciedibilily of lhe Alliance. As in olhei Alliance capilals, in
Ollawa policy makeis and opinion shapeis sliessed lhe humanilaiian
aspecls of lhe wai. ndeed, Canada and ils foieign minislei, Lloyd
Axwoilhy, nguied among lhe vanguaid of lhe humanilaiian hawks,``
and foi some weeks duiing lhe wai`s inilial phase Canada was oul in fionl
of lhe \niled Slales and alongside of Biilain in suggesling lhal a giound
offensive mighl yel be necessaiy.30
n 1994, lwo of Canada`s foiemosl diplomalic hisloiians, Noiman Hill-
mei and 1ack Gianalslein, published a book on Canadian giand slialegy
lhal fealuied a covei diawing by Aislin biillianlly capluiing lheii lhesis,
namely lhal Canada had begun lhe lwenlielh cenluiy as a veiy pailisan
pailicipanl in inleinalional secuiily ielalions lhiough lhe mechanism of
lhe Biilish empiie, and was ending il as an equally engaged pailicipanl
in lhe \N peacekeeping iegime.31 The covei ail had ueen \icloiia
spoiling a \N blue beiel, neally symbolizing lhe lwo foci of Canadian
slialegy, empiie`` and umpiie.``
Though apl foi lhe eaily 199Os, loday lhe symbolism seems misplaced.
Wheieas al lhe slail of lhe 199Os lhe \niled Nalions was embaiking on a
peiiod of aclivism in inleinalional secuiily, one in which Canada nguied
laigely indeed, by lhe closing yeais of lhe 199Os lhe woild body seemed
once moie lo be sluck in lhe quagmiie of Secuiily Council disunily. And
Canada, which has so piided ilself on conliibulions lo \N peacekeeping,
would incieasingly send ils soldieis on peace-ielaled missions undei
NATO, nol \N, opeialional auspices. Iven befoie lhe wai againsl
Seibia, some 9O pei cenl of Canadian peace-ielaled deploymenls weie
coming undei NATO conliol, albeil (in lhe case of Bosnia) wilh geneial
\N blessing. Ioi lhe inilial slage of involvemenl wilh Seibia (i.e. lhe aii
wai) such blessing`` could nol be oblained and, allhough lhe lack of
sanclion did occasion an agonized debale wilhin lhe Depailmenl of Ioi-
eign Affaiis and nleinalional Tiade, Ollawa neveilheless opled lo give
humanilaiian conceins piioiily ovei lhe fell need lo woik lhiough lhe
Secuiily Council. The decision ieecled an assumplion lhal lhe Secuiily
Council was haidly going lo be able lo aulhoiize foicible means of ie-
veising elhnic cleansing in Kosovo.
Canada would cleaily like lo see a \niled Nalions lhal is capable of
oveicoming some of ils iecenl pioblems, so lhal il mighl once again
demonsliale lhe piomise of lhe eaily poslCold Wai yeais. Al lhe same
lime, lhe Canadian rapprochcncnt wilh lhe new`` NATO can be ex-
pecled lo conlinue, foi NATO`s iecenl emphasis upon coopeialive secu-
iily and, even moie lo lhe poinl, upon human secuiily`` coupled wilh
ils ongoing liansfoimalion, will occasion a ieluin`` lo lhe Alliance
home, fiom which il musl be said Canada duiing lhe closing yeais of lhe
Cold Wai had indeed been gelling piogiessively eslianged. Nolwilh-
slanding lhe numeious claims made eailiei in lhe 199Os aboul Canadian
policy inexoiably diifling away fiom lhe secuiily aiiangemenls of lhe
Allanlic woild, lheie can be no denying lhe degiee lo which Canada has
become iefocused upon NATO duiing lhe pasl few yeais.
The piodigal son may be snuggling down in lhe Alliance home once
moie, bul only because il wanls lo ieluin lo Allanlicism (embodied in
whal is iegaided as lhe human secuiily alliance``) nol lo piodigalily. Can
lhe benenls of lhe new NATO conlinue lo be en|oyed wilhoul Canada`s
having lo absoib an unwelcome shaie of lhal new Alliance buiden? The
evidence of lhe wai againsl Seibia, lhough mixed, is lhal lhey can be oi al
leasl lhal lhey have been, so fai. Canada managed in lhe spiing of 1999 lo
do whal many would have lhoughl impossible: make a signincanl mililaiy
conliibulion wilhoul al lhe same lime suffeiing lhe consequences of um-
piie`s oveislielch`` consequences lhal seemed lo be so slaikly on display
eailiei in lhe 199Os duiing lhe heighl of \N peacekeeping involvemenl.
f lhe mililaiy dues of NATO membeiship in an eia chaiacleiized by
lhe ievolulion in mililaiy affaiis`` involve some demonsliable compe-
lency in high-lechnology waifaie, lhen Canada has been able lo capilalize
on pasl inveslmenl in nghlei aiiciafl and piecision guided munilions
(PGMs) lo slake a defensible claim lhal il moie lhan did ils pail`` in
ieveising elhnic cleansing in Kosovo. On lhe olhei hand, ieal concein
does iemain iegaiding lhe abilily of lhe giound foices lo suslain a iobusl
piesence in Balkans peacekeeping opeialions, and il is faii lo say lhal lhe
aimy unils deployed lo Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia some 2,65O
peisonnel by Augusl 1999 iepiesenl lhe limils of a peimanenlly sus-
lainable foice given cuiienl funding iealilies.32
Canada was able lo avoid oveislielch`` duiing lhe aii wai because
il had whal mosl of lhe olhei (non-\S) allied aii foices lacked: PGMs
capable of being unleashed fiom lhe 18 CI-18 nghlei-bombeis deployed
in lhealie. NATO ew moie lhan 27,OOO soilies (sliike and olheiwise)
duiing Opeialion Allied Ioice; of lhal lolal, Canadian aiiciafl accounled
foi 678 (in whal Canada leimed Opeialion Icho). Allhough lhe numbei
of aiiciafl Canada conliibuled was ioughly compaiable lo lhal supplied
by seveial olhei allies (including lhe \niled Kingdom, Geimany, and
Tuikey), opeialionally Canada was much moie impoilanl lhan mosl, wilh
lhe obvious exceplion of lhe \S Aii Ioice (\SAI). The \SAI supplied
715 of Opeialion Allied Ioice`s 912 aiiciafl, and ew lhe lion`s shaie of
lhe soilies. Bul Canada`s pilols, because lhey had lhe PGMs, bul also
because of lheii high level of liaining and lheii unsuipassed abilily lo be
inlei-opeiable wilh lhe \SAI, ew an inciedible 1O pei cenl of all sliike
soilies duiing Opeialion Allied Ioice. n addilion, lhe oveiwhelming
numbei of sliike packages`` senl ovei Seibian skies weie led by eilhei
Ameiicans oi Canadians.33
Spain
f Canada`s pailicipalion in lhe aii wai musl casl some doubl on lhe
ulilily of ils being giouped in lhe calegoiy of smallei`` allies, lhen
Spain`s own mililaiy involvemenl iaises similai queslions of classincalion.
On lhe one hand, Spain`s populalion ianks il much closei lo lhe Iuio-
pean big`` poweis lhan lo lhe small`` ones; moie lo lhe poinl, peihaps,
is lhal Spain was among lhe veiy few allied counliies whose aii foices
possessed PGMs, and lhus who could sliike al nighl wilh accuiacy.34 On
lhe olhei hand, lheie is ieason lo doubl whelhei lhe counliy`s polilical
and slialegic giasp malches ils ieach, oi evei will. Biiey, Spain wishes lo
become a ma|oi facloi in lhe secuiily polilics of lhe Iuiopean \nion, and
il seeks lo devolve lo lhal inslilulion a giealei shaie of lhe iesponsibilily
foi oiganizing lhe secuiily and defence of Weslein Iuiope (admilledly,
in close coopeialion wilh NATO). Howevei, ils pei capila spending on
defence ianks il among lhe Alliance`s mosl slingy membeis.
n Spain`s case, whal il wishes lo do and whal il wishes lo spend seem
lo be in a slale of peipelual dis|unclion. Allhough Pascal Boniface did
nol have Spain pailiculaily in mind, his iemaiks apiopos lhe Iuiopean
desiie lo achieve an ISD wilhoul being willing lo pay foi il seem peili-
nenl heie: 1usl as one cannol have bolh bullei and lhe money lo buy lhe
bullei, il is vain lo covel bolh lhe peace dividend` and lhe giowlh in
one`s powei. . . . l is a genlle illusion lhal will lead sliaighl lo some ciuel
disillusionmenl.``35 Canada ilself is haidly one of NATO`s big spendeis in
pei capila leims, bul al leasl Ollawa does nol incessanlly lalk up lhe need
lo cieale an ISD.
Kosovo affecled Spain as il did lhe olhei smallei`` allies. Madiid saw
in lhe ciisis a humanilaiian challenge lhal simply had lo be addiessed
all lhe moie so if lhe vision of a moie coheienl Iuiope of defence`` was
evei lo become a iealily. Bul Spaniaids pioved moie ieluclanl lhan lheii
leadeis and lhan publics in Canada and Belgium lo back lhe aii wai.
n facl, Spain was among lhe allies in which public opinion waxed leasl
enlhusiaslic aboul bombing Seibs. Pailly lhis has lo do wilh lhe counliy`s
iecenl (and lugubiious) mililaiy hisloiy, fiom lhe civil wai of lhe 193Os lo
lhe long peiiod of iule by Geneial Iiancisco Iianco. Pailly il may have
somelhing lo do wilh Spain`s own inleinal polilical difncullies, which
have made il one of lhe moie sensilive allied counliies when il comes lo
allegalions aboul sepaialisls iesoiling lo leiioiism`` lo achieve lheii
aims. As iecenlly as lwo monlhs befoie lhe slail of lhe aii wai, Spanish
ofncials weie |oining wilh lheii ugoslav counleipails lo denounce Al-
banian sepaialisl violence in Kosovo and Melohi|a.36
Though Spanish leadeis piefeiied lo sliess lhe counliy`s involvemenl
wilh lhe iefugee ciisis, in iesponse lo which geneious conliibulions weie
made, neveilheless Spain did pailicipale in lhe bombing. The counliy`s
I-18s weie in on lhe nisl wave of allacks on 24 Maich 1999, and had
own, by eaily 1une, some 2OO soilies, of which 16O weie sliike soilies,
wilh lhe iemaining 4O being aii-lo-aii combal aii paliols. The sliike soi-
lies iesulled in aclual allacks (wilh GB\-16 lasei-guided bombs) being
made againsl some 7O Seib laigels.37 Mililaiily, foi a counliy wilh an
aimed foice some lhiee limes lhe size of Canada`s, Spain seems lo have
ienned lhe ail of buiden-shaiing`` in a faiily cosl-effeclive mannei,
doing moie lhan Poilugal and Belgium bul less lhan Canada; il evenlu-
ally commilled eighl of ils I-18s lo Opeialion Allied Ioice, and also al-
lowed \S mililaiy aiiciafl on lhe way lo Seibia lo use bases on Spanish
soil. While only a lhiid of Spaniaids suppoiled lhe aii wai, and neaily
half lhoughl lhal il would nol be capable of biinging aboul peace in lhe
Balkans, some 4O pei cenl slill believed lheii counliy needed lo lake
mililaiy measuies as a means of fulnlling Spain`s obligalions lo NATO.38
On lhe giound, Spain has also done ils pail, conliibuling 1,2OO soldieis
lo KIOR, wheie lhey have been inlegialed inlo a mullinalional biigade
commanded by laly.39 Spanish foices had also laken pail in eailiei
peace opeialions in lhe Balkans, nisl in lhe \N Pioleclion Ioice, lalei in
IORjSIOR. As wilh lhe olhei allies suiveyed in lhis chaplei, il is haid
lo escape lhe conclusion lhal il was Spain`s NATO membeiship dues,``
along wilh ils humanilaiian sensibililies, lhal led il lo mililaiy involve-
menl in lhe wai againsl Seibia. l was bolh a wai foi values and a wai foi
a seal al lhe lable. The decision of lhe goveinmenl of 1ose Maiia Aznai
in 1996 lo inlegiale lhe counliy`s aimed foices fully inlo lhe Alliance,
coupled wilh Madiid`s deleiminalion lo leveiage ils membeiship in
piominenl Weslein inslilulions lo advance ils claim lo iank among Iu-
iope`s nisl division`` slales,40 simply made il impossible foi Spain lo
abslain fiom mililaiy pailicipalion againsl Seibia, howevei dislasleful
such pailicipalion musl have been lo many Spaniaids.
Ioi his own pail, Piime Minislei Aznai sounded eveiy bil as enlhusi-
aslic as lhe Alliance`s humanilaiian hawks, oi al leasl could so sound
when shaiing lhe podium wilh one of lhe mosl piominenl hawks, Biil-
ain`s piime minislei, Tony Blaii. Duiing lhe eaily weeks of lhe aii cam-
paign, lhe lwo leadeis held a |oinl piess confeience al Chequeis, in which
lhey afnimed lhe need lo mainlain NATO unily on Kosovo. Iiom whal
Aznai said, il was difncull lo dislinguish him fiom Blaii: have lo say
lhal eveiylhing Tony Blaii has said is exacl fiom lhe polilical poinl of
view. We shaie, conceining Kosovo, lhe same goals, lhe same values and
lhe same nim iesolve foi oui ob|eclives lo pievail.``41
Whal lhe lwo counliies did nol shaie, howevei, was lhe same mililaiy
capabilily and lhe same willingness lo use foice ovei Kosovo. Regaiding
lhe foimei, menlion has alieady been made of ils meagie spending on
defence (closei lo 1 pei cenl of GDP lhan lo lhe 2 pei cenl laigeled by
lhe Aznai goveinmenl).42 f Spain dedicales fewei of ils iesouices lo
defence lhan does Biilain, il also has a much lowei physical-secuiily
pionle lhan do ils laigei Iuiopean pailneis, who eilhei see lhemselves as
having a global peispeclive (namely Biilain and Iiance), oi focus ex-
lensively on lhe iegions of polenlial slialegic inslabilily and iisk lo lhe
easl (namely Geimany).
To lhe exlenl lhal Spaniaids considei lheii counliy lo face any lhieal
lo ils physical secuiily, lhey lend lo look soulhwaid, lo lhe Maghieb,
wheie lhe pioblem can be as diffuse as slamic fundamenlalism`` in Al-
geiia oi as specinc as lhe long-iunning luif dispule wilh Moiocco ovei
Ceula and Melilla. Based only on peiceived secuiily lhieals, Spain should
have lillle liouble biinging ils commilmenls in line wilh ils capabililies;
lhe liouble, howevei, is lhal il sees ils secuiily as being lanlamounl lo
Iuiope`s,`` lhus, via ils enlhusiasm foi ISD, il has impoiled polenlial
obligalions moie in lhe Meicedes lhan in lhe Seal class.
Conclusion
The secuiily enviionmenl facing oui`` slales is laigely benevolenl in
liadilional secuiily leims. Mosl of NATO`s small slales (peihaps mosl
membeis, peiiod) can be chaiacleiized as salisned oi slalus quo slales,
living in lhe zone of peace in lhe Wesl IuiopeanjNoilh Ameiican secu-
iily communily and fiee fiom any cleai and piesenl dangei lo lheii
physical secuiily. Some woiiies may be expiessed by Spain and Poilugal
wilh iespecl lo lhe Maghieb, bul in geneial lhe conceins of lhese slales
iesl wilh lhe polilical economy of liade and economic inlegialion, cul-
luial pioleclion, and lhe usual domeslic polilical agendas and issues. Ioi
lhese counliies, physical secuiily has been laigely demililaiized, even if
human secuiily`` has nol.
Ioi lhe lhiee Iuiopean small`` slales suiveyed heie, lhe coineislone
of lhe appioach lo Iuiopean secuiily issues is pio-mullilaleialism and
pio-inslilulionalism, lwo lhemes of small slale secuiily lhinking. Leaving
aside lhe I\, NATO may be lhe secuiily inslilulion of lhese slales`
dieams. These slales will wanl lo mainlain lheii voice and inuence in
NATO, and avoid maiginalizalion in a conceil Iuiope. This foieign pol-
icy aim is buill on a desiie foi access, a voice, a seal al lhe lable, and will
see lhese slales puisue communaulaiie`` slialegies designed lo mainlain
and ieinfoice lhis posilive mullilaleial and inslilulional enviionmenl.
Such a slialegy will be exhibiled in effoils lo eslablish posilive ioles as
biidge buildeis, nxeis, inslilulion buildeis, and champions of mulli-
laleialism. Ioi lhe mosl pail, small slales will be good Alliance cilizens,
so long as being so does nol piove loo coslly. They will conliibule lo
NATO and NATO aclions lo mainlain a sliong Alliance and because
conliibulions aie lhe piice of secuiing a ciedible voice. A second geneial
good`` bind up lhe oveiseas Biobdingnagian and lhe Gulliveis of
Iuiope can besl be achieved lhiough lhe inslilulions of liansallanlicism
and inlegialion.
Howevei, lheie will be cases when small slales puisue demandeui``
slialegies, designed lo make gains undei lhe lhieal of damaging lhe
achievemenl of laigei coopeialive ob|eclives. n NATO, when lhe slakes
aie high and lhe ciedibilily of lhe Alliance is al slake, demandeui``
slialegies aie likely lo be iaie. Moie common will be a lendency lo fiee
iiding; small slales aie moie likely lo commil loken oi symbolic mililaiy
foices lo colleclive effoils. These foices will be of limiled mililaiy impacl
(and may be incieasingly so as lhe gap in inlei-opeiabilily widens) bul
lhey will allow NATO lo piesenl a wide fionl (and moial weighl) of
polilical suppoil foi an opeialion.
Iiee iiding is ceilainly lempling, and foi oui`` small slales NATO
commilmenls oul of aiea musl be seen as laigely discielionaiy in slialegic
leims. Iinally, lhe piesence of small slales in lhe Kosovo opeialion was
due lo moie lhan liadilional secuiily inleiesls, oi being a good ally, oi
secuiing a ciedible voice in polilical delibeialions. As we have aigued,
lheii pailicipalion (nolwilhslanding lheii physical dislance fiom Kosovo)
also leslined lo lhe powei of values`` in lhe cuiienl posl-Weslphalian
momenl. Small slales aie engaged in Kosovo because of lhe humanilaiian
impulse, which has lended lo oveishadow lhe lack of oveil and diiecl
slialegic inleiesls.
Ioi small slales closei lo lhe ames, moie paiochial inleiesls may lake
piecedence ovei such values; only lime will lell whelhei lhey do. As foi
lhe one membei of oui sel fuilhesl fiom lhe ames, lhe appellalion
small`` haidly seems appiopiiale, al leasl in lhe case of Kosovo.
Noles
1. I. S. Noilhedge, Thc Intcrnational Iolitical Systcn, London: Iabei & Iabei, 1976,
pp. 4345.
2. Oclavi Maili, No exisle una conciencia comu n euiopea,`` 1l Iat s, 11 Augusl 1999, al
hllp:jjwww.elpais.esjcgi-binjILPAS.
3. 1ohn \inocui, Iiance Has a Haid Sell lo Rein in \.S. Powei,`` Intcrnational HcralJ
Tribunc, 67 Iebiuaiy 1999, p. 2.
4. Ciane Biinlon, Thc Ancricans anJ thc Ircnch, Cambiidge, MA: Haivaid \niveisily
Piess, 1968; Iiank Cosligliola, Irancc anJ thc UnitcJ Statcs. Thc ColJ Alliancc sincc
VorlJ Var II, New oik: Twayne, 1992.
5. Chiislophei Layne, Relhinking Ameiican Giand Slialegy: Hegemony oi Balance of
Powei in lhe Twenly-Iiisl Cenluiy?`` VorlJ Iolicy 1ournal, \ol. 15, Summei 1998,
pp. 828.
6. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Coopcration anong Dcnocracics. Thc 1uropcan Inucncc on
U.S. Iorcign Iolicy, Piincelon, N1: Piincelon \niveisily Piess, 1995.
7. Spain is cuiienlly shiinking ils mililaiy, and wilhin a few yeais expecls lo have a mililaiy
eslablishmenl of some 18O,OOO, a nguie lhal includes civilian peisonnel. nleiview,
Spanish embassy, Ollawa, 8 Seplembei 1999. Spain cuiienlly has some 195,OOO undei
aims, oul of a lolal populalion of 4O million. The iespeclive nguies foi oui olhei lhiee
cases aie: Poilugal, 6O,OOO and 1O million people; Belgium, 45,OOO and 1O million; and
Canada, 6O,OOO and 3O million. Thc Military Balancc 1997/98, London: nleinalional
nslilule foi Slialegic SludiesjOxfoid \niveisily Piess, 1997.
8. Ioi a discussion of lhis aigumenl, see Luc Ciollen, Iortugal, thc UnitcJ Statcs, anJ
NATO, Leuven: Leuven \niveisily Piess, 1973.
9. See Alvaio de \asconcelos, Poiluguesej\S Relalions in lhe Iield of Secuiily,`` in 1ose
Calvel de Magalha es, Alvaio \asconcelos, and 1oaquim Ramos Silva, eds., Iortugal. An
Atlantic IaraJox, Lisbon: nslilule foi Slialegic and nleinalional Sludies, 199O.
1O. Maiio Sampaio, Apie` s lèmpiie, lÌuiope,`` 1ours J1uropc, 1anuaiy 1986, pp. 24
25.
11. Kennelh Maxwell, Poiluguese Defense and Ioieign Policy: An Oveiview,`` Cano cs
Ccntcr Quartcrly, \ol. 3, SpiingjSummei 1991, pp. 211.
12. Poiluguese Ioieign Minislei: Belgiade Peace Agieemenl,`` Lisbon RTP nleinacional
Television, 3 1une 1999 (IBS lianslaled lexl).
13. Belgiade Peace Accoid s I\`s Achievemenl,`` Lisbon RTP nleinacional Television,
3 1une 1999 (IBS lianslaled lexl).
14. Poilugal`s Gama: Belgiade Ioiced NATO lo Acl,`` Lisbon RTP nleinacional Televi-
sion, 24 Maich 1999 (IBS lianslaled lexl).
15. Guleiies Absence fiom NATO Debale Angeis Opposilion,`` Lisbon RTP nlei-
nacional Television, 13 May 1999 (IBS lianslaled lexl).
16. Poilugal`s Gama.``
17. Helena Peieiia, Guleiies againsl Giound nvasion,`` 1isbon Iublico, 26 May 1999.
18. Mosl Poiluguese Welcome Links wilh \S,`` Lisbon Radio Renascenca, 2 1une 1999
(IBS lianslaled lexl).
19. Poiluguese defence minislei, \eiga Sima o, 1ane`s Defence Weekly nleiview,``
1ancs Dcjcncc Vcckly, 12 Augusl 1998, al hllp:jjwww.|anes.comjdefencejinleiviewsj
98O812.hlml.
2O. Ioi an examinalion of Belgian neulialily, see 1onalhan I. Helmieich, Bclgiun anJ
1uropc. A StuJy in Snall Iowcr Diplonacy, The Hague: Moulon, 1976. Ioi a geneial
discussion of small slale neulialily, see Ifiaim Kaish, Ncutrality anJ Snall Statcs,
London: Roulledge, 1988.
21. Helmieich, Bclgiun anJ 1uropc, pp. 3O33O4.
22. See Paul Shaip, Small Slale Ioieign Policy and nleinalional Regimes: The Case of
ieland and lhe Iuiopean Monelaiy Syslem and lhe Common Iisheiies Policy,``
Millcnniun, \ol. 16, Spiing 1987, pp. 5572.
23. nleiview wilh Maioun Labaki and Benedicle \aes, Kosovo: 1ean-Luc Dehaene
Remains Adamanl,`` 1c Soir (Biussels), 21 Apiil 1999, p. 7.
24. Pieiie Lafevie, NATO Has \pdaled ls Calechism,`` 1a 1ibrc Bclgiquc, 26 Apiil 1999,
p. 7.
25. Labaki and \aes, Kosovo.``
26. See Two-Thiids of Belgians Suppoil Aii Sliikes,`` 1c Soir, 14 Apiil 1999, p. 1.
27. Deiycke Sees Belgium Playing Kosovo Diplomalic Role,`` Dc Morgcn, 15 May 1999,
p. 2 (IBS lianslaled lexl).
28. A Small Counliy Can Ceilainly Make a Conliibulion,`` Dc Morgcn, 2O May 1999, p. 2
29. f We Achieve Peace Then Iveiyone s a Winnei,`` Dc Morgcn, 7 1une 1999, p. 18
3O. 1eff Sallol, Canada`s Tone Tuining Dovish,`` Clobc anJ Mail (Toionlo), 2O May 1999,
p. A16.
31. Noiman Hillmei and 1. L. Gianalslein, Iron 1npirc to Unpirc. CanaJa anJ thc VorlJ
to thc 1990s, Toionlo: Copp Claik Longman, 1994.
32. 1eff Sallol, Baiil Ieais Tioop Buinoul,`` Clobc anJ Mail, 28 May 1999, pp. A1 and A4.
33. Of lhe 678 CI-18 soilies of Op Icho, 558 weie aii-lo-giound, wilh lhe iemaining 12O
being aii-lo-aii CAPs.`` Of lhe 558 aii-lo-giound soilies, 224 iesulled in weapons being
diopped. Of lhe lallei soilies, 158 iesulled in successful hils.
34. Olheis possessing lhis capabilily weie lhe \niled Slales, lhe \niled Kingdom, Iiance,
and Canada.
35. Pascal Boniface, Thc Vill to Iowcrlcssncss. Rccctions on Our Clobal Agc, Kingslon,
Onl.: ueen`s uaileily Piess, 1999, p. 131.
36. Seibian \nily Congiess, Spain, ugoslavia Condemn Teiioiism,`` 15 1anuaiy 1999, al
hllp:jjwww.suc.oigjnewsjydsjb15O199 e.hlml. This is a iepoil of a piess confeience held
in Madiid by lhe foieign minisleis of ugoslavia and Spain, iespeclively Zivadin 1ova-
novic and Abel Malules.
37. Lucas Beilomeu Gias, Opeiaciones ae ieas en ugoslavia,`` Rcvista Jc Acronautica y
Astronautica, No. 685, 1ulyAugusl 1999, pp. 56957O.
38. Waiy Spaniaids,`` Thc 1cononist, 17 Apiil 1999, p. 54.
39. \icloi Heina ndez and Ilisa Beni \za bal, Ispan a, en la Iueiza de Seguiidad paia
Kosovo,`` Rcvista 1span ola Jc Dcjcnsa, \ol. 12, 1une 1999, pp. 1416.
4O. Spain: n Tiansil,`` Thc 1cononist, 14 Decembei 1996, pp. 318. Also see Spanish
Pailiamenl OKs Iull Pailicipalion in NATO,`` Ncw York Tincs, 15 Novembei 1996, al
hllp:jjwww.mlholyoke.edujacadjinlieljspain.hlm.
41. Ioieign and Commonweallh Ofnce, London, Biilish-Spanish Bilaleial Talks,`` 1O Apiil
1999, al hllp:jjwww.biilain-info.oigjBSjIORDOMjeuj1Oapi99.slm.
42. Thc Military Balancc 1997/98, p. 65. Also see Geoffiey B. Demaiesl, Spain`s Mililaiy-
Slialegic Oullook,`` Iaranctcrs, Winlei 1996j97, pp. 2638.
2OO \IWS IROM NATO ALLIS
13
The new enlianls: Hungaiy, Poland,
and lhe Czech Republic
Ictcr Talas anJ 1as;lo Valki
Hungaiy, Poland, and lhe Czech Republic |oined NATO |usl 12 days
befoie aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia began, lhough oiiginally lhe acces-
sion was planned lo lake place in Apiil 1999 al lhe Washinglon summil.
Neveilheless, lhe allilude of lhese counliies lo lhe aii sliikes was delei-
mined nol by whelhei oi nol lhey weie membeis on 24 Maich, bul by
lhe facl lhal all lhiee had wanled lo |oin lhe Noilh Allanlic Alliance, and
lhus lhe Wesl, since lhe eaily 199Os. n olhei woids, lhey weie keen lo
ie|oin lhe communily of slales fiom which lhey had been sepaialed by
hisloiy. Naluially, lheii alliludes diffeied in lhe delails.
Hungaiy
The Hungaiian goveinmenl consislenlly suppoiled lhe aii campaign
againsl ugoslavia and look an aclive pail by opening ils aiispace and
aiinelds lo NATO aiiciafl. Opposilion pailies and ma|oiily public opin-
ion also appioved lhe NATO opeialion. n Apiil 1999, 53 pei cenl of
iespondenls weie in favoui of NATO inleivenlion.1 n many ways lhis
was due lo lhe all-oul effoil by lhe socialisl, libeial, and conseivalive
pailies in lhe pieceding yeais lo achieve accession. n lhe fall of 1997, 85
pei cenl of lhe people voled foi NATO membeiship, and in Iebiuaiy
1999 pailiamenl ialined lhe Washinglon Tiealy by a 96 pei cenl ma|oiily.
Only lhe iepiesenlalives of lhe exlieme iighl-wing MIP (Paily foi
2O1
Hungaiian 1uslice and Life) opposed ialincalion. n spiing 1999 lheie
was no doubl whal Hungaiy`s decision conceining aii sliikes againsl
ugoslavia would be. Since public opinion as well as eveiy coalilion and
ma|oi opposilion paily iesolulely suppoiled NATO accession, lhe gov-
einmenl could only decide in favoui of aii sliikes.
Geogiaphically, Hungaiy`s posilion was veiy impoilanl. l had common
boideis wilh ugoslavia, and since lhe Daylon Peace Accoids a mililaiy
base and aiineld in lhe soulhein pail of lhe counliy, al Tasza i, had been
pioviding logislical suppoil foi lhe opeialions of lhe mplemenlalion and
Slabilizalion Ioices (IORjSIOR). n Oclobei 1998, NATO had ie-
quesled peimission lo use Hungaiian aiispace, and in Maich 1999 il
exlended ils iequesl lo lhe use of lhe Hungaiian aiinelds as well. Pailia-
menlaiy appioval was necessaiy foi bolh of lhese iequesls. Pailiamenl
gave lhe nisl peimission in lime, which had lo be amended on 24 Maich
1999 in oidei lo exlend lhe opeialion lo lhe unrcstrictcJ use of Hun-
gaiian aiispace, aiinelds, including lheii seivice and aii conliol equip-
menl lo ieconnaissance, combal and lianspoil aiiciafl and helicopleis.``2
Al lhe exliaoidinaiy session of pailiamenl lo discuss lhe diafl, a iepie-
senlalive of lhe leading coalilion paily, lhe Iedeialion of oung Demo-
cials, said lhal Hungaiy would nol be diieclly involved in mililaiy opei-
alions. The diafl iesolulion was appioved by all bul one pailiamenlaiy
paily (lhe MIP). The diafl`s woiding and lhe goveinmenl`s explanalion
lalei gave iise lo a debale among lhe pailies.
nilially, lhe media did nol focus on lhe legal backgiound of lhe aii
sliikes, lheii legilimacy, oi lheii efnciency. Lalei, a debale evolved in lhe
Hungaiian piess belween leading Hungaiian inlellecluals aboul bolh
lhe legilimacy and lhe efnciency of lhe NATO aii sliikes. Anolhei debale
developed in conneclion wilh lhe use of giound foices. Given lhe lack of
success of lhe nisl lhiee weeks of aii sliikes, lheie was giowing specula-
lion in lhe Weslein media lhal lhe wai could nol be ended wilhoul lhe
use of giound foices. Obseiveis supposed lhal Hungaiy`s geogiaphical
posilion would make il veiy suilable foi launching a giound invasion.
Hungaiian mililaiy leadeis also lhoughl lhal a giound allack was inevi-
lable and lhal il would have lo be launched fiom Hungaiy. Bul lhe gov-
einmenl did nol suppoil such a plan. On 16 Apiil in London, Piime
Minislei Oiba n declaied lhal Hungaiy could undeilake only such com-
milmenls as did nol endangei lhe lives of elhnic Hungaiians in \o|vodina.
A build-up of giound foices laking seveial weeks would be dangeious
insofai as il would give Milosevic sufncienl lime lo deploy his special
police unils againsl elhnic Hungaiians, who did nol have even an aimed
oiganizalion like lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy (KLA) and lhus would nol
have been able lo defend lhemselves. The opposilion pailies expiessed a
similai view.
2O2 \IWS IROM NATO ALLIS
This undeislanding ended when leading NATO polilicians asked Hun-
gaiy al lhe Washinglon summil lo allow lhe deploymenl of I-18 nghleis
lo Tasza i, which would lake off fiom Hungaiian leiiiloiy lo bomb ugo-
slav laigels. They also iequesled peimission lo slalion KC-135 lankeis al
lhe civilian aiipoil in Budapesl foi iefuelling lhe nghlei-bombeis. Al lhe
meeling of lhe pailiamenlaiy pailies following lhe Washinglon summil,
Oiba n declaied lhal, on lhe basis of lhe pievious iesolulion passed by
pailiamenl, lhe goveinmenl would give lhe necessaiy aulhoiizalion. The
chaiiman of lhe Socialisl Paily, La szlo Kova cs, piolesled, saying lhal lhe
silualion has changed`` since lhal iesolulion was adopled. He added lhal
his paily did nol wish lo see Hungaiy diifl wilh lhe lide of evenls bul
inslead liy lo shape lhem lo suil nalional inleiesls. Hungaiian pailicipa-
lion musl nol ieach a level as lo pose unavoidable iisks foi Hungaiy and
lhe elhnic Hungaiians in \o|vodina.``3 On 29 Apiil, lwo socialisl MPs
submilled a diafl iesolulion lo pailiamenl on lhe amendmenl of lhe pie-
vious iesolulion. They pioposed lhal lhe woid uniesliicled`` be deleled
fiom lhe iesolulion, and lhal pailiamenl iefuse peimission foi aiiciafl
laking off fiom Hungaiy lo launch aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia. n his
ieply, lhe piime minislei said lhal lhe Socialisl Paily was ieneging on ils
oiiginal agieemenl since il loo had voled foi lhe cleaily phiased iesolu-
lion a few weeks befoie. As a foimei coalilion pailnei of lhe Socialisls,
lhe Alliance of Iiee Democials also disagieed wilh lhe molion. Moie-
ovei, lhe media, which oflen made ialhei sceplical commenls aboul lhe
wai, called lhe molion populisl and said lhe Socialisl Paily was un-
elhical lo ie|ecl whal il had once given ils appioval lo. n any evenl,
lhe goveinmenl gianled peimission foi lhe slalioning of lhe Hoinels in
Tasza i, and lhey weie deployed againsl ugoslav laigels foi lhe nisl lime
on 29 May.
Thioughoul, \o|vodina`s silualion conlinued lo inuence policy con-
ceining Hungaiian pailicipalion. When lhe decision on launching lhe aii
sliikes was made, lhe goveinmenl immedialely expiessed ils concein
aboul \o|vodina and lhe fale of elhnic Hungaiians. The ieason was lhal
lhis ciealed a conliadicloiy silualion: Hungaiy logelhei wilh olhei
membei slales had made a decision aboul appioving lhe launching of
aii sliikes whose laigels included Hungaiian selllemenls. On 26 Maich,
Ioieign Slale Secielaiy Zsoll Ne melh asked Belgiade lo do eveiylhing in
ils powei lo pievenl ielalialion againsl elhnic Hungaiians in \o|vodina.4
n facl, Milosevic did nol oidei any ielalialoiy aclion againsl lhem duiing
lhe aii sliikes, piobably owing nol so much lo lhis and similai diplomalic
messages as lo lhe Seib diclaloi`s ieluclance lo engage in yel anolhei
conicl, lhis lime wilh Hungaiy.
Hungaiian diplomals spoke up on behalf of \o|vodina in NATO as
well. Whal lhe Hungaiian peimanenl iepiesenlalive and olhei polilicians
H\NGAR, POLAND, AND THI CZICH RIP\BLC 2O3
wanled was lo pievenl lhe bombing of lhe whole piovince. This was ob-
viously loo much lo expecl. Accoiding lo lhe 1991 census, only 18.2 pei
cenl of lhe populalion of lhe piovince (a lillle ovei 3OO,OOO people) weie
elhnic Hungaiians, many of whom had emigialed lo Hungaiy in lhe nisl
half of lhe 199Os duiing lhe Balkan wais. Al lhe same lime, a considei-
able numbei of Seibs, who had been diiven oul of Kia|ina in Cioalia,
soughl iefuge lheie, as a iesull of which lhe ialio of Hungaiians declined
lo 1215 pei cenl. Moieovei, belween Oclobei 1998 and Maich 1999,
Milosevic deployed consideiable Seib lioops in \o|vodina and buill a
defensive line wilh enlienched lanks neai lhe Hungaiian boidei. Thus
NATO planneis could haidly considei \o|vodina a neulial`` Hungaiian
piovince, and lhe iegion had lo shaie ugoslavia`s fale. Only a few days
aflei lhe oulbieak of lhe wai, \o|vodina`s capilal, Novi Sad, and olhei
laigels came undei heavy allack by ciuise missiles and aii bombs, in lhe
couise of which all lhiee biidges ovei lhe Danube and oil ienneiies in
Novi Sad weie deslioyed.
Whal Budapesl sliove lo allain fiom lhe slail was lhal in no ciicum-
slances should Hungaiy have lo pailicipale diieclly in lhe allacks. Ioi-
eign Minislei 1a nos Mailonyi said lhal il was nol in ugoslavia`s inleiesl
lo exlend lhe conicl lo Hungaiy, and Hungaiy had no wish lo pailici-
pale in any mililaiy aclion bul would pailicipale in a possible peace-
keeping mission.5 Leading NATO polilicians consideied lhis acceplable.
l had always been lhe Alliance`s posilion lhal diieclly neighbouiing
slales do nol have lo lake pail in mililaiy opeialions. n facl, such pai-
licipalion could even be counleipioduclive since il enlails lhe possibilily
of a diiecl aimed conicl and consequenlly a dangeious escalalion in lhe
nghling.
\o|vodina became an issue in Hungaiian polilics in anolhei iespecl
as well. The head of lhe exlieme iighl MIP, slva n Csuika, issued a
slalemenl lo lhe effecl lhal lhe slalus of aieas neai lhe boidei wheie
Hungaiians conslilule lhe ma|oiily should be changed, specincally by
annexing lhem lo Hungaiy.6 He knew lhal neilhei lhe olhei Hungaiian
pailies noi lhe Wesl would suppoil lhis idea, and lhal lhey would ieacl
adveisely. He was obviously addiessing his piesumed consliluency and
did nol caie lhal his slalemenls would cause lhe mosl haim lo lhe Hun-
gaiians in \o|vodina ilself. ndeed, lhe Seib media ciled Csuika`s slale-
menls on eveiy possible occasion as pioof lhal NATO wanled lo leai
Kosovo in lhe soulh and \o|vodina in lhe noilh oul of lhe Iedeial
Republic of ugoslavia (IR), and lhus ieduce lhe fedeialion lo lhe
smallesl size possible. Responding lo Csuika`s announcemenl, lhe Hun-
gaiian piime minislei meiely said lhal lhe goveinmenl piogiamme does
nol include boidei modincalion.`` He added by way of explanalion lhal
he did nol wish lo give weighl lo views lhal diffei fiom lhe cabinel`s
inlenlions and, lheiefoie, he shall nol ieacl lo such slalemenls.``7 Lalei,
following lhe Washinglon summil, he said, Hungaiy`s pioblem loday is
nol lhal lheie mighl be loud iiiedenlisl demands, lhis queslion is iaised
by whal may be called insignincanl foices. . . . My |ob is lo iepiesenl
Hungaiians and nol lo wasle woids.``8 Ioieign Minislei 1a nos Mailonyi
was moie oulspoken on lhis issue. He said lhal lhe Washinglon Slale-
menl on Kosovo undeilined lhe leiiiloiial inlegiily of all slales in lhe
iegion. . . . |n lhe same wayj lhe Hungaiian Goveinmenl does nol have
any leiiiloiial claims whalsoevei vis-a` -vis ugoslavia. We appieciale lhe
inlenlion of elhnic Hungaiians in \o|vodina lo live in lheii homeland
even undei lhese difncull ciicumslances.``9 Bolh lhe opposilion Socialisl
Paily and lhe libeial Alliance of Iiee Democials ob|ecled lhal lhe piime
minislei failed lo dislance himself cleaily fiom lhe exlieme iighl paily`s
slalemenls conceining leiiiloiial ievision.10
Towaid lhe end of lhe wai, lhe goveining coalilion ieluined lo lhe
queslion of \o|vodina, saying lhal NATO musl guaianlee lhe iighls of
minoiilies living lheie. Hungaiian diplomalic effoils weie successful
insofai as lhe declaialion on Kosovo foimulaled al lhe Washinglon
summil menlions lhe elhnic minoiilies in \o|vodina. The declaialion
slales lhal lhe heads of slale and goveinmenl pailicipaling al lhe summil
expiess . . . suppoil foi lhe ob|eclive of a democialic IR which piolecls
lhe iighls of all minoiilies, including lhose in \o|vodina and Sand|ak.``11
Lalei, aflei lhe aii opeialions had ended, lhe Hungaiian goveinmenl
sliove lo have lhe inleinalional communily accepl lhe iesloialion of
\o|vodina`s aulonomy, which had been laken away in 1989. The gov-
einmenl aigued lhal, since Milosevic had depiived \o|vodina of lhis
slalus simullaneously wilh Kosovo, aulonomy should be iesloied simul-
laneously. Awaie lhal elhnic Hungaiians aie a smallei gioup lhan Kosovo
Albanians, lhe goveinmenl woiked oul an aulonomy plan. The ofncial
veision was nisl submilled on 1O 1une 1999 al lhe confeience in Cologne
foi fiaming lhe Slabilily Pacl foi Soulh-Iaslein Iuiope.12 Lalei, lhe au-
lonomy plan was woiked oul in giealei delail wilh lhe help of lhe lwo
ma|oi polilical pailies of \o|vodina Hungaiians and expeils in lhe Hun-
gaiian foieign minisliy, and was subsequenlly senl lo a numbei of Wesl-
ein capilals in lhe summei of 1999. Mi. Oiba n also menlioned il in his
speech al lhe Saia|evo summil, bul lhe communique on lhe summil made
no iefeience lo \o|vodina.13 The Hungaiian aulonomy plan was polilely
bul openly ie|ecled by mosl NATO polilicians. Weslein diplomalic and
polilical ieaclions indicaled lhal concein ovei \o|vodina had diminished
in lighl of lhe lasks ielaled lo lhe consolidalion of Kosovo and lhe dem-
ocialic liansfoimalion of ugoslavia. As lo lhe Seibian opposilion, none
of lhe polilicians, fiom Diaskovic lo D|ukanovic, has evei said lhal, if in
powei, he would be ieady lo gianl \o|vodina whal lhe elhnic Hungaiians
(and nol lhe local Seibs) aie asking. Neveilheless, lhe Hungaiian gov-
einmenl believes lhal lhe plan should be kepl on lhe agenda, olheiwise il
would ienounce foievei lhe eslablishmenl of self-goveinmenl foi elhnic
Hungaiians.
n conneclion wilh lhe Kosovo ciisis Hungaiy came inlo conicl wilh
Russia on lwo occasions. On 1O Apiil a RussianBelaius convoy of 73
vehicles caiiying ielief caigo aiiived al lhe Hungaiian boidei. The con-
voy also included eighl lankeis nlled wilh gas oil and nve aimouied ve-
hicles. Refeiiing lo lhe Secuiily Council`s iesolulion imposing a manda-
loiy embaigo, lhe Hungaiian goveinmenl denied enliy lo lhe whole
convoy. The Russian piess haishly allacked Hungaiy foi lhis move, lhe
Russian ambassadoi was iecalled, and lhe Hungaiian foieign minislei
was asked lo poslpone his Moscow visil planned foi Seplembei. Aflei
lwo days of negolialions, a compiomise was ieached wheieby lhe eighl
lankeis slopped al lhe ugoslav boidei and ieluined lo Russia fiom
lheie lalei on, while lhe nve aimouied vehicles did nol even enlei Hun-
gaiian leiiiloiy. The olhei lianspoil vehicles ieached Belgiade wilhoul
fuilhei pioblems.
The second incidenl occuiied when, aflei lhe end of lhe Kosovo ciisis
and befoie lhe accoid denning lhe slalus of Russian lioops in KIOR was
signed, Moscow iequesled peimission foi a liansil ighl of aiiciafl lians-
poiling Russian peacekeeping lioops. The iequesl was foi six aiiciafl and
a ciew of 1O, bul il soon came lo lighl lhal aclually lhey wanled lo lians-
poil an aimed foice of 6OO men lo Kosovo. Since Budapesl did nol wish
lo give Moscow lhe oppoilunily lo peifoim anolhei mililaiy liick like lhe
one in Piislina, il iefused peimission unlil Biussels appioved lhe ighl.
The Russian defence minisliy ofncially accused lhe Hungaiian aulhoiilies
of obsliucling lhe liansil ighl, and, as a iesull, lhe Russian media weie
again full of condemnalions of Hungaiy`s behavioui. Theie`s a hysleiia
campaign in Russia againsl Hungaiy,`` lhe foimei Hungaiian ambassadoi
lo Moscow obseived in pailiamenl.14 Bul aflei a while lhe Russians
slopped lhe campaign, and in Novembei lhe Hungaiian foieign minislei
ieceived an invilalion lo visil Moscow.
Poland
Of lhe lhiee new membei nalions, Poland was lhe mosl decisive in ils
suppoil foi NATO`s inleivenlion in Kosovo, and would likely have been
so even if ils accession lo NATO had laken place al a lalei dale. Poland
also had lhe giealesl public suppoil foi |oining lhe Alliance, even duiing
lhe piepaialoiy peiiod pieceding lhe accession ilself. Public suppoil did
nol fade, allhough a slighl deciease appeaied duiing lhe NATO aii
campaign againsl ugoslavia.
As fai as public opinion iegaiding lhe NATO aii campaign is con-
ceined, polls indicaled lhal duiing lhe nisl monlh of aii opeialions public
suppoil incieased among lhe Poles (being 48 pei cenl al lhe end of
Maich, 54 pei cenl in lhe middle of Apiil, and ieaching 55 pei cenl |usl
befoie lhe end of Apiil). n spile of lhe facl lhal lhis suppoil declined
somewhal (falling lo 53 pei cenl in lhe middle of May and even lo 5O pei
cenl lowaids lhe end of lhal monlh), lhose favouiing lhe NATO cam-
paign had always been in lhe ma|oiily.15
The Polish goveinmenl sliove lo expiess ils dennile commilmenl lo
allied decisions in spile of ils iesliicled nnancial iesouices, iegaiding lhe
NATO campaign as a nnal lesl foi lhe new membeis, while nol losing
sighl of lhe behavioui of Piague oi Budapesl. Polish diplomals acciediled
lo Biussels and Washinglon weie among lhe nisl lo suggesl lhe bom-
baidmenl of Seib T\ and iadio slalions in oidei lo ciush Milosevic`s
piopaganda machine. Moieovei lhey weie deleimined in piinciple lo
suppoil lhe idea of supplemenling aii sliikes wilh land opeialions.16
Waisaw cleaily made an effoil lo acl as a commilled full membei of
NATO. To whal exlenl lhe offeis weie sinceie and lo whal exlenl lhey
weie meiely polilical gesluies should be iegaided as a diffeienl mallei.
Accoiding lo some mililaiy leadeis, il was difncull enough foi lhe Polish
goveinmenl lo iaise lhe 5 million zlolys necessaiy lo sel up lhe Polish
IOR conlingenl, and il would nol have been able lo nnance ils piomises
if lhey weie aclually laken up by lhe Alliance.17 Whelhei lhis is liue oi
nol is beyond oui compelence lo decide. n any evenl, no iequesl was
made lo Waisaw foi lhe use of Polish aiispace, noi weie Poles asked lo
pailicipale in lhe maiilime blockade againsl ugoslavia.
The consislenl policy adopled by lhe Waisaw goveinmenl by no means
meanl lhal lhe polilical e lile and lhe Polish public all held exaclly lhe
same views conceining allied aii sliikes. On lhe conliaiy, lhe Kosovo
conicl divided bolh lhe public and lhe polilicians veiy deeply. The divi-
sions among Polish polilicians as iegaids lhe NATO campaign weie nol
simply along paily polilical lines, since views weie highly diveigenl on
lhe issue even wilhin lhe lefl and iighl blocs.
The Kosovo conicl caused a consideiable splil in lhe Democialic Lefl
Alliance (SLD). The socialisl (posl-communisl) wing, which foimed a
minoiily faclion in lhe paily, sliongly ob|ecled lo lhe wai, aiguing lhal
lhe wai was un|usl because NATO did nol have sufncienl ieason lo
launch lhe aii campaign and was lheiefoie lhe aggiessoi. l is moie likely
lhal lhey weie molivaled by lheii pieviously demonslialed anli-NATO
senlimenls, and lhe facl lhal Russia sided wilh Seibia, which also inu-
enced lheii slalemenls and policies. The socialisl faclion of lhe SLD has
lo dale mainlained a noslalgic view of Moscow, iegaidless of who is in
powei lheie.
The SLD mainslieam, lhe so-called social democialic wing, suppoiled
lhe NATO campaign lhioughoul lhe conicl. This wing had been mosl
commilled lo lhe idea of |oining NATO pieviously as well, so lheii views
showed conlinuily. Moieovei, lhey weie given lhe oppoilunily lo piove
lhal lhey had nol been led by laclical consideialions in lheii eailiei poli-
cies conceining NATO. The ciisis also piovided a chance foi lhem lo
demonsliale lheii fellowship and unily wilh lhe Inglish and Geiman so-
cial democials and lo piove lhal lhey had lefl behind lheii communisl
pasl, lhus becoming equal membeis of lhe communily of Wesl Iuiopean
social democials.
The wai in Kosovo ciealed divisions wilhin lhe polilical iighl wing as
well. l was veiy difncull foi lhe Chiislian and nalionalisl polilical bloc lo
face lhe polilical challenge piesenled by lhe NATO campaign. One iea-
son was lhal NATO had violaled, bolh foimally and legally, lhe sovei-
eignly of an independenl counliy. Anolhei ieason was lhal one of lhe
sides involved in lhe Kosovo conicl was suppoiled by global`` libeials,
long peiceived as dangeious enemies by nalionalisl and Chiislian ciicles.
Ciilicism of NATO by lhe Chiislianjnalionalisl iighl did nol mean, how-
evei, speaking up foi Milosevic. Piominenl leadeis of lhis polilical bloc
nevei doubled lhal lhe elhnic cleansing in Kosovo was being caiiied oul
on Milosevic`s oideis. n addilion, lhe polilical iighl in Poland piimaiily
saw lhe communisl in lhe ugoslav piesidenl, and lhe facl lhal he was a
iepiesenlalive of Seib nalional inleiesls was a secondaiy issue.
The polilical paily lhal mosl nimly suppoiled lhe NATO campaign in
Kosovo was lhe Iieedom \nion (\W), a modeiale cenliisl libeial paily.
\W leadeis liied lo explain lheii zealousness by claiming lhal pio-Seibian
polilical gioups had become loo iadical in Poland, bul lhis ieasoning was
nol convincing. l is moie likely lhal lhe \W was lhe only polilical paily
in Poland lo see lhe Kosovo conicl as a ma|oi lesl foi lhe new NATO
membeis, which il was anxious nol lo fail. This may also have been why
inleinal dispules on lhe issue of Kosovo iaiely leaked oul abioad lhiough
lhe ofncial channels. Bionislaw Geiemek and 1anusz Onyszkiewicz
played an impoilanl iole in conliolling lhe ow of infoimalion, wilh lheii
iespeclive minisliies (foieign and defence) keeping in peimanenl conlacl
wilh Biussels and Washinglon.
The Polish People`s Paily (PSL) failed lo eslablish a cleai viewpoinl on
lhe issue of NATO`s Kosovo campaign. This paily had lhe laigesl gioup
of opponenls of lhe NATO campaign.18
To sum up, lhe NATO aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia weie moslly
ciilicized by lhe iadicals of lhe socialisl and lhe posl-communisl lefl wing
in Poland, and also by iighl-wing nalional democials oulside lhe govein-
ing coalilion. The campaign was backed by cenliisl iighl-wing pailies, as
well as by moie modeiale foimalions wilhin lhe so-called nalionalisl bloc,
such as lhe Chiislian Nalional \nion (ZChN), by lhe opposilion Recon-
sliuclion of Poland Movemenl, and by lhe libeial social democials of lhe
SLD. The Polish People`s Paily was belween lhose opposing and lhose in
favoui of lhe opeialion, bul closei lo lhe foimei. The NATO campaign
was lhus geneially favouied by lhe modeiales of lhe polilical speclium,
whelhei lhey weie on lhe lefl oi on lhe iighl. These aie lhe polilical
gioups lhal aie likely lo govein Poland in vaiious polilical conslellalions
foi many yeais lo come.
The Czech Republic
Amongsl lhe new membeis of NATO il was lhe Czech Republic wheie
lhe loudesl and mosl diamalic debale was bioughl aboul by NATO`s
aii campaign. ndeed, lhe Czech Republic was lhe only NATO counliy,
excepl foi Gieece, lhal, despile having gianled ils vole, kepl voicing
open dissenl.`` This behavioui was unexpecled only lo lhose whose
allenlion had nol been diawn lo Piague unlil lhe issue of aii sliikes.
The Czech Republic`s need foi NATO membeiship was nol piimaiily
because of exleinal lhieal oi a secuiily challenge. This was indicaled by
lhe facl lhal Czech foieign and secuiily policy had nol given special pii-
oiily lo lhe issue of NATO accession. NATO membeiship became a lop
piioiily only aflei il became obvious lhal |oining lhe Iuiopean \nion,
which lhe Czech Republic had eageily hoped lo achieve in a veiy shoil
lime, was nol going lo lake place in lhe neai fuluie. Al lhe same lime,
Piague`s piefeiied secuiily oiganizalions (foi example, lhe Oiganizalion
foi Secuiily and Co-opeialion in Iuiope and lhe \niled Nalions) had
losl some of lheii impoilance. Along wilh lhis piocess, lhe Noilh Allanlic
Alliance, wilh ils newly eslablished inslilulions (lhe Noilh Allanlic Co-
opeialion Council, lhe Pailneiship foi Peace, lhe NATORussia Peima-
nenl Council, lhe Iuio-Allanlic Pailneiship Council, elc.) had begun
lo lake ovei lhe iole of lhese oiganizalions. l was giadually accepled
lhal lhe Alliance was impossible lo ignoie as an inslilulion of Iuiopean
secuiily aichilecluie, and lhal NATO accession would be an impoilanl
slep lowaids full inlegialion inlo Weslein Iuiope.
Belween 1989 and eaily 1997, lhe Czech people weie nol much inlei-
esled in secuiily policy and NATO accession. Subsequenlly, public sup-
poil foi full membeiship in lhe Alliance incieased only slighlly. Allhough
lhe Madiid invilalion foi full membeiship caused a small posilive change
in suppoil foi |oining NATO, public suppoil iemained lowei lhan in
Hungaiy oi Poland.
l follows fiom lhe foiegoing lhal lhe allied aii campaign againsl
ugoslavia was viewed veiy ciilically by lhe Czech public. Accoiding lo
opinion polls, only aboul 38 pei cenl of lhe populalion inilially agieed
wilh aii sliikes on mililaiy laigels, while 48 pei cenl weie againsl lhem.19
Moie suipiisingly, wilhin less lhan a foilnighl public suppoil incieased lo
5O pei cenl in lhe Czech Republic.20
The ieaclions of lhe polilical e lile weie even moie suipiising. \a clav
Havel was lhe only polilician lo show some undeislanding as iegaids lhe
launching of lhe aii campaign. n a shoil lelevision speech bioadcasl on
25 Maich he ieminded vieweis of lhe palh lo lhe nnal escalalion of lhe
conicl in lhe Balkans and lhe failuie of negolialions wilh lhe Seibs, and
he piomised lo give his full suppoil lo lhe NATO opeialions.
Slalemenls by Piime Minislei Milos Zeman and Pailiamenlaiy
Speakei \aclav Klaus and lhe behavioui of polilical pailies opposing lhe
NATO campaign weie sliongly ciilicized by lhe Czech media and some
of lhe counliy`s polilical expeils. The piimaiy impoilance of lhe debale
was lhal il highlighled some of lhe pioblems conceining lhe nalional
image by conliasling lhe diffeienl viewpoinls of lhe polilical e lile and
vaiious gioups wilhin Czech sociely. l also piovided an excellenl op-
poilunily lo view lhings fiom a moie self-ciilical aspecl, which should
have happened peihaps a decade eailiei, al leasl long befoie |oining
NATO. The Havel veisus ZemanKlaus dispule ended wilh moie success
foi lhe lallei, allhough lhe goveinmenl had lo show moie exibilily as a
consequence of haish ciilicism fiom abioad.
Resolule suppoil was lo be expecled only fiom lwo smallei opposilion
pailies: lhe libeial Iieedom \nion, a paily founded by Civilian Demo-
cialic Paily dissidenls, and lhe Chiislian Democialic \nionjCzech
People`s Paily. Piominenl leadeis of lhe Calholic cleigy shaied Piesidenl
Havel`s opinions.
Allhough lhe Czech goveinmenl dislanced ilself fiom lhe Kosovo con-
icl, il did considei sending neld hospilal equipmenl and medical pei-
sonnel (84 doclois and nuises plus 18 people lo guaid lheii safely). This
aid was supposed lo ease lhe suffeiings of bolh Albanians and Seibs, as
was emphasized by Piime Minislei Milos Zeman. Howevei, equipmenl
and peisonnel weie nol expecled lo be deployed foi 4O6O days owing lo
lhe alleged delay caused by lenglhy legal piepaialions. Aflei sliong ciil-
icism fiom lhe opposilion and some inleinalional piessuie, on 6 Apiil lhe
goveinmenl passed a decision lo send a 1OO-sliong medical conlingenl
wilh piopei iesouices as well as humanilaiian aid in lhe foim of food and
sanilaiy equipmenl. The decision was made, howevei, only aflei many
ciilics weie scandalized by lhe goveinmenl`s somewhal modesl nnancial
conliibulion (\S$1O,OOO) lo lhe Red Cioss budgel. l luined oul lalei lhal
Zeman and his goveinmenl weie half-heailed conceining olhei issues as
well. Al lhe end of Apiil, foi example, lhe Czech goveinmenl ciealed an
exliemely embaiiassing silualion foi NATO by nol gianling appioval in
lime foi allied allacks on lines of communicalion and laigels along lians-
poil ioules, which led lo a consideiable delay in lhe aii campaign.
On 6 Apiil, lhe goveinmenl appioved lhe opening of Czech aiispace
and aiinelds lo allied mililaiy aiiciafl. n a cabinel of 19 membeis, 2
minisleis abslained fiom voling and one voled againsl. On 19 Apiil,
Defence Minislei \ladimii \elchy announced lhal lhe Czech Republic
was ieady lo make available ils mililaiy aiinelds foi allied use if such a
iequesl was ieceived fiom Biussels. n spile of lhe facl lhal all polilical
pailies piomised lo suppoil lhe goveinmenl`s pioposal, il was passed by
pailiamenl only aflei nve houis of sloimy debale on 22 Apiil (wilh 145
oul of 181 iepiesenlalives voling in favoui). Some social democials lo-
gelhei wilh lhe Communisls voled againsl lhe pioposal, and lhe Com-
munisl Paily oiganized an anli-NATO ially in fionl of lhe pailiamenl
building. Diiecl pailicipalion in a possible giound offensive was a non-
issue, because lhe Zeman goveinmenl sliongly opposed lhe idea. Bolh
Zeman and Ioieign Minislei Kavan declaied lhal Piague was nol willing
lo suppoil allied plans of lhis kind, adding lhal lhe involvemenl of Czech
lioops was supposed lo be limiled lo helping and defending lhe Albanian
iefugees.
l was in lhe Czech Republic lhal lhe NATO campaign ciealed lhe
mosl difncull silualion. None of NATO`s lhiee new membeis was con-
fionled by exaclly lhe same pioblems, bul lhe Czechs in pailiculai had lo
face new challenges conceining lheii inlegialion inlo Iuiopean inslilu-
lions. \nless lhey deal wilh lhese challenges and pioblems wilh cleai
ob|eclivily, lhey may come lo expeiience silualions lhal aie even moie
difncull lo handle.
Noles
1. Szonda a NATO-hadmu velelio l,`` Ncps;abaJsa g, 23 Apiil 1999, pp. 1 and 2.
2. Resolulion No. 2Oj1999 (.24) OG; emphasis added.
3. Ncps;abaJsag, 29 Apiil 1999, p. 2.
5. MTI (Hungaiian Piess Agency), 25 Maich 1999.
6. MTI, 2 1une 1999.
8. nleiview on Hungaiian Radio Kossulh, Budapesl, 29 Apiil 1999.
9. Nincs hala iievizio s sza nde k,`` Ncps;abaJsag, 3O Apiil 1999, p. 3.
H\NGAR, POLAND, AND THI CZICH RIP\BLC 211
1O. Slalemenls by lhe chaiiman of lhe Socialisl Paily, La szlo Kova cs (Ncps;abaJsa g, 3O
Apiil 1999), and by lhe chaiiman of lhe Iiee Democials, Ba linl Magyai, al a piess
confeience (MTI, 8 May 1999).
11. Slalemenl on Kosovo issued by lhe heads of slale and goveinmenl pailicipaling al lhe
meeling of lhe Noilh Allanlic Council in Washinglon, D.C., 23 and 24 Apiil 1999,
NATO Ircss Connuniquc S-1 (99)62, paiagiaph 16.
12. Slalemenl by lhe head of lhe Hungaiian delegalion on lhe Slabilily Pacl foi Soulh-
Iaslein Iuiope, Cologne, 1O 1une 1999.
13. See Saia|evo Summil Declaialion, MTI, 3O 1uly 1999.
14. MTI, 15 1une 1999.
15. Popaicie dla So|uszu,`` R;cc;pospolita, 11 1une 1999.
16. Igzamin dla nowych czlonko w,`` R;cc;pospolita, 23 Apiil 1999.
17. Biak pieniedzy na akc|e na Balkanach,`` R;cc;pospolita, 5 May 1999.
18. Of PSL voleis, 45 pei cenl weie in favoui of lhe aii sliikes, 39 pei cenl weie againsl, and
16 pei cenl had no pailiculai opinion.
19. Polowa Czecho w pizeciwna alakom,`` R;cc;pospolita, 29 Maich 1999.
2O. Czechy wysyla|a szpilal polowy dla Albanii,`` R;cc;pospolita, 7 Apiil 1999.
rt pour
eleted interntionl perspetives
14
The Muslim woild:
\neasy ambivalence
Ibrahin A. Karawan
n Muslim counliies, as in many olhei pails of lhe woild, lhe conicl in
Kosovo was followed nol only wilh consideiable allenlion, bul also wilh
lhe belief lhal il was fai fiom being one moie conicl lo be added lo lhe
elhnic conicls lhal piolifeialed aflei lhe end of lhe Cold Wai. Iven
moie lhan lhe wai in Bosnia, lhe Kosovo conicl has been seen as a de-
nning momenl oi a ciilical |uncluie whose impoilance would ullimalely
lianscend bolh lhe immediale selling and lhe winneis as well as lhe loseis
in lhal pailiculai conicl (when lhey weie ullimalely specined).
Whal is lo be leained?
Analysls and opinion makeis aleiled lhe public in many Muslim coun-
liies lo lhe impoilance of giasping and undeislanding lhe lessons of
Kosovo`` in anlicipalion of polilical liends lhal aie bound lo unfold in lhe
fuluie, oi so lhey aigued. Cleaily, lhe pioclaimed lessons of Kosovo``
vaiied, depending on lhe school of lhoughl and, as in olhei iegions of lhe
woild, lhe evenls of Kosovo became an aiena of shaip debales ovei lhe
veiy meaning of inleinalional inleiaclions, lhe ieal inlenlions of ma|oi
inleinalional aclois, and lhe ielalionship belween whal is`` and whal
oughl lo be`` in oui iapidly changing inleinalional polilics.
Theie is an unmislakable paiadox in lhe exislence of such dispules in
lhe Muslim woild moie lhan in any olhei pail oi iegion of lhe woild.
215
They should nol have exisled al all oi mighl have been assumed lo be
minimal since lhe NATO opeialions weie desciibed as having been
launched lo save fellow Muslims`` fiom peiseculion and disciiminalion.
Why conlesl oi even doubl an aclion, even by a Weslein mililaiy oiga-
nizalion, lhal is meanl lo libeiale olhei Muslims, lhis lime in Kosovo,
fiom syslemalic peiseculion? f NATO, which was iepoiled eailiei lo be
gieally conceined aboul slamic fundamenlalism, becomes lhe savioui of
lhe Kosovo Muslims mainly in lhe name of humanilaiian inleivenlion, on
whal would lhose sceplics in Muslim counliies base lheii sceplicism oi,
even moie, polilical opposilion? And can lhey aclually ailiculale a co-
heienl and effeclive aigumenl lhal ieceives socielal suppoil?
Obviously, counliies in lhe Muslim woild aie quile diveise in leims of
lheii polilical syslems, pievailing ideologies, and foieign policies, as well
as lype of inleinalional alignmenl. They agiee on ceilain symbolic issues,
such as 1eiusalem, bul slamic solidaiily on a hosl of olhei issues is usu-
ally difncull lo allain. These counliies also diffei in leims of lhe scope of
polilical expiession lhal lhe slale manageis allow polilical aclivisls lo
en|oy in sociely. Hence lhe ma|oi difncully (in addilion lo lhe limilalions
of space) of examining lhe ieaclions lo lhe Kosovo conicl in lhe enliie
Muslim woild. A ceilain seleclivily in leims of lhemes, liends, and
counliies is cleaily unavoidable.
To slail wilh, il should be noled lhal lhe conicl in Kosovo has al-
liacled a gieal deal of allenlion in lhe Muslim woild. The magnilude of
lhal allenlion would nol have been possible only a decade ago. The iev-
olulion in mass media and in pailiculai wilh iegaid lo salellile lelevision
bioughl lhe slaik and depiessing images fiom lhe lhealie of lhe conicl
inlo lhe living iooms of millions in lhe Muslim woild, many of whom
have been affecled by a wave of slamic iesuigence. Many of lhose shown
in lhe daily slieams of iefugees and displaced peisons weie idenlined as
Muslims fiom Kosovo. Once lhe issue was fiamed lhal way, il seemed lo
connim a peisislenl lheme in many Muslim counliies duiing lhe 199Os.
The essence of lhal lheme is a giowing peiceplion lhal Muslims aie being
laigeled in many pails of lhe woild and lhal slam is ialhei convenienlly
being idenlined as lhe new foice lhal bieeds and liiggeis inslabilily as
well as violence.
The salellile T\ slalions of Muslim counliies such as alai, Kuwail,
lhe \niled Aiab Imiiales, Igypl, and Moiocco lended lo pul lhe news
aboul Kosovo nisl in lheii news bullelins even lhough il would be accu-
iale lo say lhal many of lheii cilizens may nol be able lo locale Kosovo
on lhe map. slamic wiileis such as Iahmy Howeidy in his syndicaled
column sliessed lhal whal lhe Muslims have been sub|ecled lo in Kosovo
is similai lo lhe slaughlei and mayhem unleashed by lhe Tailais seven
216 SILICTID NTIRNATONAL PIRSPICT\IS
cenluiies ago in lhe sacking of Baghdad . . . have no doubl whal lhe
Seibs aie doing in Kosovo is even woise.``1
n shoil, lhe Kosovo conicl, oi a pailiculai fiaming of lhal conicl,
was laken as a lheme-conniming case and as an insliumenl foi ideologi-
cal and polilical mobilizalion in Muslim socielies lhemselves. n dealing
wilh lhe Kosovo ciisis, some Muslim counliies such as Saudi Aiabia and
lhe \niled Aiab Imiiales eslablished iefugee camps foi lhe eeing
Muslims and encouiaged fund-iaising aclivilies by non-goveinmenlal
oiganizalions in lheii socielies lo help lhe suffeiing Muslims of Kosovo.
l was nol unlypical lo nnd asseilions in lhe piess of Muslim counliies
lo lhe effecl lhal lhe enliie conicl in Kosovo is pailly a nghl againsl
an slamic piesence in lhe Balkans. Neilhei Weslein counliies, noi
Russia, noi Seibia would allow diffeiences belween lhem in favoi of lhis
piesence.``2
f slamic movemenls and oiganizalions saw in Kosovo an embodimenl
of lhe peiseculion of Muslims in loday`s woild, nalionalisls weie alliacled
by lhe liagedy in lhe Balkan aiea as a whole. One of lhe lhemes in lheii
polilical lileialuie has been lhe consideiable dangei of Balkanizalion in
many pails of lhe Muslim woild. The fiagmenlalion of lhe Balkan aiea
and lhe lhieals of fuilhei divisions in lhal iegion caiiied live on T\, and
day aflei day, a dieadful image of a woisl-case scenaiio foi pails of lhe
Muslim woild wheie lhe feai of fiagmenlalion looms laige (in counliies
such as lhe Sudan, iaq, and ndonesia). Ioi lhose aclivisls, Kosovo is a
piololype of a ciuel fuluie of bolh division and maiginalizalion awailing
lhe Muslim woild, while lhe developed counliies become moie inlegialed
and moie advanced.
Many olheis in lhe slamic woild, whelhei lhey aie |usl culluially
Muslim oi polilical slamisls, have followed lhe unfolding diama in
Kosovo as a lesl case of lhe naluie of lhe conlempoiaiy inleinalional
syslem oi lhe so-called new woild oidei.`` They aie inleiesled in ob-
seiving lhe evenls of lhe Kosovo conicl in oidei lo undeisland who has
moie and who has less conliol and lo diaw lessons lhal mighl become
applicable lo lheii pailiculai sliuggles and conicls. Policy makeis and
policy analysls in lhe Muslim woild keenly obseived lhe developmenl
and oulcomes of lhe Kosovo conicl wilh an eye lo addiessing some
ma|oi queslions aboul lhe changing chaiacleiislics of lhe conlempoiaiy
inleinalional syslem, ils piocesses oi basic dynamics, as well as lhe slial-
egies of ils mosl inuenlial aclois.
Among lhese queslions aie lhe following: Has lheie been any signin-
canl change in lhe ielalive powei and policy leveiage of lhe \niled Slales
and Iuiopean counliies undei lhe NATO umbiella? Will lhe powei of
Russia conlinue lo deleiioiale lo lhe poinl of viilual insignincance undei
THI M\SLM WORLD 217
lhe inuence of ils nnancial and economic dependency on lhe Wesl oi
will il ievive sufncienlly lo pievenl an Ameiican hegemony? f Russia
does nol acl somewhal asseilively wilh iegaid lo Kosovo, wheie il has
sliong culluial and hisloiic lies wilh lhe Seibs, would il be ieasonable oi
piudenl foi lhe Aiabs, foi inslance, lo expecl lhe Russian slale lo engage
in any balancing acl againsl lhe \niled Slales in lhe Middle Iasl? Will
lhe iole of lhe \niled Nalions be enhanced in dealing wilh Kosovo`s
ciisis oi will il ullimalely suffei, as many feai, fiom a ma|oi downwaid
inslilulional mobilily in leims of ils own weighl and ciedibilily as a iesull
of lhal ciisis?
And lhen lheie is lhe inleiesl in lhe Muslim woild in Kosovo as a
possible piecedenl. Pul diffeienlly, will Kosovo piove lo be a iepiesen-
lalive sample`` of whal is lo follow in many pails of lhe woild, oi will il
meiely luin oul lo be whal social scienlisls chaiacleiize as a devianl
case``? Many of lhe e liles in lhe Muslim woild posed lhe following ques-
lion in vaiying foims, pailiculaily aflei NATO`s adoplion of a new
slialegic concepl`` on lhe occasion of ils nflielh biilhday: Mighl NATO,
led by lhe \niled Slales, aclually use lhe Kosovo piecedenl lo expand ils
mililaiy iole and exlend ils sliong slialegic ieach inlo lhe Medileiianean
and lhe Middle Iasl iegion lo ensuie ils membeis` inleiesls and nol |usl
lo piolecl lheii immediale secuiily? Could such a slialegy enlail possible
diiecl inleivenlion by NATO in lhe inleinal affaiis of one oi moie slales
in lhal iegion wilh lhe ob|eclive of pievenling such slales fiom acquiiing
pailiculai mililaiy lechnologies oi fiom mounling whal mighl lhen be
desciibed as leiioiisl lhieals?
l is woilh noling foi inslance lhal il was in Igypl, a Muslim counliy
lhal has close ielalions wilh lhe \niled Slales, lhal a piominenl publica-
lion afnlialed wilh lhe semi-ofncial al-Ahran has iecenlly aigued lhal:
The new aims of lhe NATO alliance weie cleaily ievealed in lhe Balkan
wai . . . l is piedicled lhal NATO inleifeience will spiead lo lhe Middle
Iasl, especially given lhal a molive could be easily liumped up. Ioi ex-
ample, allegalions could be made againsl some counliies foi suppoiling
leiioiisl gioups oi foi owning chemical and biological weaponiy.``3 As
NATO headed lowaids celebialing ils nflielh biilhday, many wondeied
whelhei lheie iemained a compelling ieason foi lhal mililaiy alliance lo
conlinue lo exisl and even lo expand aflei lhe demise of lhe Soviel \nion
and lhe end of inleinalional bipolaiily. Did lhe Kosovo ciisis and pailic-
ulaily lhe way il was deall wilh aclually piovide such a ialionale?
Those who iaised all lhese queslions weie nol always lefl lo lhemselves
lo nnd answeis. NATO counliies and pailiculaily lhe \niled Slales made
a big effoil lo addiess and inuence public opinion in Muslim counliies.
They sliessed lhal lhe huge cosls assumed by NATO and by lhe \niled
Slales in pailiculai ieecl a deep commilmenl lo human values and lo
piolecl lhe Muslims of Kosovo fiom peiseculion by Chiislian Seibs.
Hence, lhe aigumenl claiming lhe \S adoplion of a hoslile posilion
lowaid slam and Muslims is false. Iiom such a peispeclive, lhe NATO
aclion in Kosovo, like ils pievious opeialion in Bosnia (bolh led by lhe
\niled Slales), should cieale lhe foundalions foi conndence-building
belween lhe Wesl led by lhe \niled Slales and lhe Muslim woild.
Some in Muslim counliies in facl have aigued in favoui of a ieassess-
menl of lhe \niled Slales iole and giving up whal lhey call aulomalic
opposilion lo anylhing done by Washinglon oi NATO. l is difncull
foi some of lhe Muslims lo believe lhal . . . lhe \niled Slales is now will-
ing lo puisue an even-handed policy . . . The silualion as il has developed
does indicale lhe possibilily of consliuclive and ciealive co-opeialion
belween lhe Wesl and Muslims. We should seize lhe oppoilunily lo
evolve a new ielalionship wilh lhe Wesl, even if lhe foundalions of opli-
mism aie weak.``4 Pul diffeienlly, lhe Kosovo ciisis and lhe iesponse lo il
of \S-led NATO weie peiceived as ciealing condilions conducive lo
changing oi liansfoiming lhe almospheie of misliusl belween lhe Wesl
on lhe one hand and lhe woild of slam on lhe olhei.
Howevei, as Douglas 1ehl has noled in lhe Ncw York Tincs:
|Ajgainsl lhe backdiop of iecenl hisloiy, lhe Ameiican-led aii opeialions aie
being viewed by mosl Aiabs and Muslims wilh uneasy ambivalence. One souice
of lhe discomfoil is a gnawing suspicion lhal lhe offensive may have acceleialed
lhe exodus . . . \nlil lhe Kosovo ciisis began, aflei all, lhe focus of Ameiican
mililaiy mighl had been squaiely on lhe slamic woild, wilh ciuise-missile sliikes
in Afghanislan, Sudan and iaq in lhe lasl eighl monlhs alone . . . The nexl lime
lhe \niled Slales and ils allies decide lo unleash mililaiy mighl |many in lhe
Muslim woild wainj, a Muslim counliy will likely again be lhe laigel.5
Conlesled soveieignly
n facl, many lhinkeis and aclivisls in lhe Muslim woild weie pieoccu-
pied by piecisely lhis issue: who is going lo be lhe nexl laigel of allack by
an acloi lhal does nol feel iesliained fiom inleifeiing in lhe domeslic
affaiis of weakei counliies and violaling lheii soveieignly in lhe name of
lofly piinciples? The spiiilual leadei of lhe slamic Republic of ian,
Ayalollah Ali Khamenei, pul il sliongly when he commenled on lhe
NATO bombaidmenl of lhe Seibs by asking: s any Muslim feeling
safei?`` Moieovei, aboul lhose puisuing lhe bombaidmenl he said: n
lhe name of demociacy, lhey feel enlilled lo use lhe sliongesl measuies
againsl lhose who disagiee wilh lhem.``6 n olhei woids, we have heie a
peiceplion, which is nol connned lo Muslim counliies, whose essence is
THI M\SLM WORLD 219
lhal a cleai piepondeiance of powei does nol pailiculaily encouiage
lhose who en|oy il lo compiomise and seek polilical selllemenls. Ralhei,
il usually encouiages lhem swiflly lo iesoil lo foice and lo liy lo compel
olheis in effecl lo suiiendei.
Obviously, lhis ianian posilion ieecls deep disliusl of NATO and lhe
\niled Slales ialhei lhan any conceivable sympalhy wilh lhe Seibian
leadeiship oi policies. n facl, a numbei of piominenl analysls in lhe
Muslim woild, including Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, have aigued lhal
ian is lhe mosl likely nexl laigel of Ameiican powei aflei Kosovo.7
Wheieas Igypl and 1oidan wilhdiew lheii ambassadois fiom lhe ugo-
slav capilal by way of expiessing lheii condemnalion of lhe Seib policies
againsl Kosovo Muslims, olhei Muslim counliies, such as iaq, Libya, and
Algeiia, found lhe disiegaid by NATO and lhe \niled Slales of lhe iole
of lhe \niled Nalions and inleinalional legal noims of slale soveieignly
in puisuil of a new policy lo iule lhe woild moie woilhy of lheii blunl
and shaip condemnalion. Olhei wiileis and analysls in Muslim counliies
suppoiled lhe deploymenl of NATO lioops as a means of exeiling pies-
suie on lhe Seibian leadeiship. Bul wilh lhal mililaiy capabilily deployed
on lhe giound, lhey expiessed a piefeience foi a moie effeclive and pa-
lienl polilical managemenl of lhe ciisis lhal does nol bypass lhe \niled
Nalions.8
Thus, one conlesled issue shaiply iaised by lhe NATO handling of
lhe Kosovo ciisis has been lhe naluie of slale soveieignly and whelhei oi
nol il should iemain lhe guiding piinciple oi coie oiganizing concepl
in lhe inleinalional syslem. Ciilics in Muslim counliies of lhe Weslein
managemenl (oi, accoiding lo lhem, lhe mismanagemenl) of lhe Kosovo
conicl have wained lhal slale soveieignly will be ulleily compiomised if
NATO`s conducl in Kosovo is deemed legilimale and is applied in yel
moie cases wilh lillle oi no iegaid foi lhe \niled Nalions and lhe pio-
leclion of slale soveieignly. Muslim counliies aie, aflei all, weak posl-
colonial slales conceined aboul exleinal inleivenlion by gieal poweis.
Because lhey allained lheii foimal polilical independence moslly since
lhe Second Woild Wai, lhey have emeiged as some of lhe mosl sliidenl
defendeis of Weslphalian nolions of soveieignly in lhe conlempoiaiy
inleinalional oidei.9 Theii iegional oiganizalions have lended lo sliess
soveieign equalily among lhe membei slales, lhe cenlialily of non-
inleivenlion in lheii domeslic affaiis, and lhe necessily of iespecling lheii
own polilical and economic soveieignly as well as lheii leiiiloiial inleg-
iily. n shoil, lhey have sliiven lo exlend lhe scope of soveieignly, nol lo
ieduce il.
\ndei lhe inuence of ma|oi sliucluial and noimalive changes in lhe
woild duiing lhe 199Os, some inlelleclual e liles in Muslim counliies
slailed lo aigue lhal lhe nolions of slale soveieignly lhal weie deemed
desiiable and even feasible aflei lhe Second Woild Wai do nol fully
22O SILICTID NTIRNATONAL PIRSPICT\IS
belong in lhe new poslCold Wai eia. The naluie of slale soveieignly
has changed, becoming somewhal eioded and ialhei soflei.`` f iespecl
foi slale soveieignly is meanl lo piolecl and peipeluale complelely ie-
piessive and iulhless slale piaclices againsl pailiculai gioups of people
simply because of lheii elhnic, ieligious, and culluial afnlialions oi
againsl some individuals because of lheii polilical conviclions, lhen lhe
concepl and ils implicalions should be sub|ecl lo a ciilical ieassessmenl.
The puipose of such a ieassessmenl is lo guaid againsl lhe use of lhe
concepl of soveieignly by slale machineiies as an insliumenl foi abusing
sociely and foi lhe meie enlienchmenl of polilical powei. Accoiding lo
lhis libeial peispeclive, which found limiled expiession in some Muslim
counliies, a link oi balance musl indeed be found belween lhe exleinal
soveieignly of slales and domeslic demociacy in sociely as well as iespecl
foi human iighls.10
Concluding iemaiks
l is cleai fiom lhe above lhal a diveisily of inleiesls and peispeclives has
chaiacleiized lhe polilical peiceplions and policy posilions of Muslim
counliies. These counliies in facl could nol oi would nol do much lo in-
uence lhe oulcome of lhe conicl. They also failed lo develop a con-
sensus on lhe Kosovo Wai oi lo agiee on a label foi lhe conicl in
Kosovo foi vaiious ieasons. Thus, knowing lhal a specinc counliy is
Muslim oi lhal ils populalion has a Muslim ma|oiily does nol give us
adequale answeis lo queslions aboul ils likely posilion on a mallei such
as Kosovo. Despile iepealed lalk duiing lhe pasl quailei of a cenluiy
aboul lhe giowlh of slam as a liansnalional movemenl al lhe expense of
lhe leiiiloiial slale, lhe facl lhal Muslims conlinue lo live wilhin lhe
boundaiies of nalion slales does indeed mallei. Hence, one can idenlify a
diveisily of posilions and policies among lhese Muslim counliies despile
lheii shaied and bioad sympalhy wilh olhei Muslims in disliess.
Many of lhose in slamic counliies who suppoiled lhe NATO opeia-
lion, on lhe giounds lhal lhe Muslims in Kosovo mighl ullimalely benenl
fiom il, aigue lhal lhe Alliance commilled slialegic mislakes in caiiying
oul ils mililaiy opeialions, making lheii suppoil a qualined one. These
mislakes included nol inleivening eailiei, lhe iefusal lo deploy giound
lioops lo pul a decisive end lo lhe conicl,11 and nol anlicipaling Milo-
sevic`s iesoil lo lhe eviclion of hundieds of lhousands of Muslims fiom
Kosovo.12 Beyond lhal a leading newspapei in Bahiain condemned lhe
iecuiience of cases in which lhe NATO mililaiy machine failed lo dis-
linguish belween combalanls and non-combalanls, al a high cosl in in-
nocenl civilian lives in Seibia. NATO piomises aboul suigical sliikes and
lhal lhe civilian populalion in Seibia would nol be affecled by lhe heavy
THI M\SLM WORLD 221
bombaidmenl and niing of missiles luined oul lo be false. Those who
adopl lhal peispeclive believed lhal suppoiling lhe Muslims in Kosovo
should nol enlail |uslifying lhe killing of many innocenl human beings,
whelhei lhey weie Seibs oi nol. As al-Ayan pul il: whoevei sends
nghleis and missiles againsl civilians in ugoslavia cannol be any less evil
and baibaiic lhan Milosevic.``13
n some Muslim socielies wheie similai aigumenls have been ex-
piessed, lhe compaiison belween lhe Ameiican aclions againsl ugosla-
via and againsl iaq was cenlial in shaping such views. n bolh iaq and
ugoslavia many innocenl civilians who did nol have any means of in-
uencing lhe policy choices of lheii aulhoiilaiian leadeis have suffeied
on a veiy laige scale fiom lhe combined effecls of devaslaling mililaiy
sliikes and an economic embaigo. Accoiding lo lhis peispeclive, pail of
lhe \S slialegic ob|eclive was lo use lhe Kosovo conicl lo fuilhei lesl
new geneialions of sophislicaled weapons oi mililaiy docliine and lo
demonsliale ils vasl supeiioiily of powei in oidei lo inlimidale polenlial
challengeis lo ils woildwide inuence in lhe fuluie.14
Noles
1. Ncw York Tincs, 11 Apiil 1999.
2. See Abdel Alli Mohamed, Neilhei lhe Wesl Noi Russia Wanl slamic Piesence in lhe
Balkans,`` al-Ahran, 13 Apiil 1999.
3. Geneial Abd al-Rahman Rushdy al-Hawaiy, Possible NATO Aclions in lhe Middle
Iasl,`` al-Siyassa al-Dawliya, 1uly 1999.
4. Kosovo Signals Moie Iven-Handed \.S. Policy,`` Dawn (Kaiachi, Pakislan), 7 Apiil
1999.
5. See Douglas 1ehl, Two Cheeis (if Thal) foi \.S. Bombs in Kosovo,`` Ncw York Tincs,
11 Apiil 1999, p. 4.
7. See Mohamed Hassanein Heikal Reads lhe Papeis of lhe Balkan Wai,`` al-Khalccj, 12
Apiil 1999.
8. 1orJan Tincs, 7 Apiil 1999.
9. Chiislophei Clapham, Soveieignly and lhe Thiid Woild Slale,`` papei piesenled al lhe
nleinalional Sludies Associalion Meeling in Minneapolis, Maich 1998, p. 1; and Robeil
H. 1ackson, Quasi-Statcs. Sovcrcignty, Intcrnational Rclations anJ thc ThirJ VorlJ,
Cambiidge: Cambiidge \niveisily Piess, 199O, chaplei 2.
1O. See in pailiculai lhe sel of ailicles wiillen by Abdel Moneim Said in al-Ahran, Maich
1une 1999.
11. Abdel Hamid Riahi, Iiisl and Lasl . . . l is a Wai of nleiesls,`` Ash-Shourouq (Tuni-
sia), 11 Apiil 1999, and Tahei \dwan, NATO`s Miscalculalions,`` Al-Ray (1oidan), 12
Apiil 1999.
12. An ediloiial commenl in lhe leading ndonesian newspapei Konpas, 7 Apiil 1999.
13. Omian Salman, \.S. Smeai Campaign,`` al-Ayan, 7 Apiil 1999.
14. Talal al-Shaiif, \.S. Tiies lo Replace \N Decisions wilh ls Own,`` al-QuJs (Wesl
Bank), 8 Apiil 1999.
15
Lalin Ameiica: The dilemmas
of inleivenlion
Mo nica Scrrano
This sludy assesses bolh lhe impacl of lhe Kosovo ciisis in Lalin Ameiica
and lhe diffeienl iesponses of iegional slales lo lhis liagic evenl. The nisl
seclion looks al lhe conlexl in which lhe Kosovo ciisis has been absoibed
in Lalin Ameiica. Ioi lhis puipose, il examines lhe shifls laking place in
lhe iegional legal conlexl undeipinning lhe piinciple of non-inleivenlion.
The idea is bolh lo idenlify shifling posilions vis-a` -vis lhe piinciple of
non-inleivenlion among slales in lhe iegion, and lo analyse lhe main
faclois undeilying iecenl changes obseived in lhe legal conlexl foi inlei-
venlion. This analysis seems pailiculaily limely given lhe coincidenlal
effecl of lhe iuling of lhe \K House of Loids on Pinochel`s exliadilion
on bioadei liends laking place in lhe Weslein hemispheie.
Ovei lhe pasl decade, developmenls in al leasl lhiee aieas have pushed
Lalin Ameiican slales lowaids moie exible inleipielalions of lhe piin-
ciple of non-inleivenlion. These include, nisl, lhe emeigence of an inlei-
nalional iegime in lhe Ameiicas lhal seeks lo advance demociacy, pie-
venl ils bieakdown, and help defend conslilulional goveinmenls; second,
lhe iole of inleinalional oiganizalions, and moie specincally lhe Oigani-
zalion of Ameiican Slales, in biinging peace and democialic iule in a
numbei of counliies in lhe iegion; and, lhiid, lhe impacl of globalizalion
and economic inlegialion on lhe iegion`s undeislanding of soveieignly.
A second seclion lhen examines Lalin Ameiican peiceplions of lhe
piopensily of lhe \S lo iesoil lo unilaleialism in lhe iegion. l assesses
223
lhe impacl of lhis vaiiable foi ongoing effoils lo ieconcile human iighls
and soveieignly in lhe Weslein hemispheie. The idea heie is lo exploie
lhe exlenl lo which lhe decision lo inleivene in Kosovo was peiceived
among Lalin Ameiican slales eilhei as lhe iesull of shoil-leim inleiesls
ovei inleinalional law, oi as pail of a moie complex piocess, linked lo
widei liends and liadilions`` undeilying humanilaiian conceins and
noims bul iesulling in an inevilable clash of piinciples. n olhei woids,
lhe queslion conceins lhe exlenl lo which Lalin Ameiican slales have
peiceived in NATO`s aclions a iesoil lo noims (oiiginally aimed al lim-
iling lhe use of foice) foi lhe puipose of |uslifying mililaiy inleivenlion
pei se, oi whelhei in facl NATO has iun inlo lhe uncomfoilable dilemma
of having lo enfoice lhese noims mililaiily.
A lhiid and nnal seclion is devoled lo idenlifying and analysing lhe
iesponses of Mexico, Chile, and Aigenlina lo lhe Kosovo ciisis ilself.
Given lhe impoilance of changing iegional undeislandings of soveieignly
and non-inleivenlion, a signincanl pail of lhe analysis of Lalin Ameiica`s
iesponses lo Kosovo will involve examining piecisely how diffeienl
counliies have peiceived lhese changes.
Ovei iecenl yeais, domeslic polilical faclois have sliongly inuenced
lhe posilion of lhe Lalin Ameiican iepublics in ielalion lo lhose liends
modifying lhe legal conlexl foi inleivenlion. Cleaily, lheii iespeclive
ieaclions lowaids bolh lhe Pinochel iuling and NATO`s mililaiy inlei-
venlion have been shaped even moie diieclly by lheii domeslic polilical
conlexls. Allhough, in lhe iecenl pasl, iegional slales have shown lheii
inclinalion volunlaiily lo accepl lhe limils imposed by humanilaiian
noims on lheii soveieignly, lheii peispeclives have also diveiged. \n-
doubledly, lheii views aboul lhe fiiclion lhal undeipins lhe ielalionship
belween humanilaiian noims and soveieignly aie likely lo be fuilhei
affecled by lheii pailiculai ieadings of lhe Kosovo ciisis.
The piinciple of non-inleivenlion in Lalin Ameiica
n Lalin Ameiica, absolule inleipielalions of lhe piinciple of non-
inleivenlion weie liadilionally lhe noim unlil iecenl decades, when im-
poilanl changes look place in lhe legal conlexl undeilying lhis piinciple,
poinling lo moie exible inleipielalions.1 Cleaily, lhe legacy of lhe moie
iecenl wave of liansilions lo demociacy in lhe iegion, logelhei wilh lhe
expeiience of pacincalion in Cenlial Ameiica and lhe opening and inle-
gialion of nalional economies inlo lhe global maikel, has signincanlly
alleied liadilional views aboul soveieignly.
A rcgional intcrnational rcginc jor thc pronotion oj Jcnocracy
Despile lhe eiialic palh followed by democialic goveinmenls and lhe
biulal expeiience of mililaiy iule, demociacy has been a ma|oi polilical
value undeilying lhe piocess of iegionalism in lhe Ameiicas. ndeed, lhe
ialhei uneven pallein followed by lhe \niled Slales in ielalion lo lhe
defence and piomolion of democialic iule in lhe iegion does nol con-
liadicl ils foimal commilmenl lo demociacy. n facl, lhis veiy com-
milmenl has been idenlined as one of lhe dislinclive fealuies of \S
hegemony.2
The nisl sleps lowaids lhe ciealion of a iegional syslem foi lhe pio-
molion of demociacy and human iighls can be liaced back lo lhe lale
195Os. n 1959, duiing lhe Oiganizalion of Ameiican Slales` (OAS) Iiflh
Meeling of Consullalion of Minisleis of Ioieign Affaiis (devoled lo as-
sessing human iighls violalions in lhe Dominican Republic), membei
slales agieed lo diafl a Human Righls Convenlion and lo sel up an nlei-
Ameiican Commission on Human Righls. Less lhan six yeais lalei, dui-
ing lhe Second Ixliaoidinaiy nleiameiican Confeience, lhe delegalions
of bolh Chile and \iuguay submilled a bluepiinl foi an nlei-Ameiican
Human Righls Convenlion. This pioposal maiked an impoilanl slage in
lhe ciealion of a iegional iegime foi lhe defence of demociacy as mem-
bei slales undeilook lhe commilmenl bolh lo honoui lhe civil, polilical,
and economic iighls embodied in lhe Convenlion, and lo inlioduce
lhem inlo lheii nalional legislalions. A fuilhei slep was laken soon
aflei duiing lhe Thiid Ixliaoidinaiy nleiameiican Confeience when
membei slales gianled peimanenl slalus lo lhe OAS nlei-Ameiican
Human Righls Commission. The effoils of counliies such as Chile, Cosla
Rica, \iuguay, Peiu, and \enezuela weie invaluable on lhal occasion, as
seen in lhe nnal diafling of lhe nlei-Ameiican Human Righls Conven-
lion and lhe ciealion in 1969 of lhe nlei-Ameiican Human Righls
Couil.3
Among lhe main pioponenls of a iegional inleinalional iegime foi lhe
advancemenl of demociacy and lhe pioleclion of human iighls, bolh
Chile and Canada deseive special consideialion. Chile`s conliibulion lo
lhe developmenl of lhis iegime has indeed been iemaikable, allhough
sadly iionic loo, as lhe legacy of Chilean foieign policy up lo 1973 was lo
piompl lhe mililaiy goveinmenl one yeai lalei lo eslablish a Nalional
Human Righls Commission whose main aim was lo iespond swiflly`` lo
inleinalional denuncialions of human iighls violalions.4
Cenlial lo lhe ievilalizalion of a colleclive iegional fiamewoik foi lhe
defence of demociacy was lhe impelus piovided by lhe lhiid wave of de-
mocializalion sweeping acioss lhe iegion fiom lhe nisl half of lhe 198Os
LATN AMIRCA 225
on. el anolhei ciucial developmenl was lhe shifl in Canada`s foieign
policy lowaids Lalin Ameiica.
Canada`s decision lo launch a new Lalin Ameiican slialegy`` in lhe
lale 198Os piovided new slimulus lo lhe advancemenl of a iegional
iegime foi lhe consolidalion of democialic inslilulions.5 Theie is lillle
doubl lhal lhe incoipoialion of lhis counliy as a full membei of lhe OAS
in 199O was an impoilanl slep in biinging lhe piomolion of demociacy
and mullilaleial inleinalional inslilulions lo lhe foie. Canada`s incieasing
involvemenl in lhe iegion coincided wilh a pailiculai |uncluie in which
lhe piinciple of democialic piomolion had been ieafnimed by lhe com-
pounded effecl of pacincalion in Cenlial Ameiica and liansilions lo
demociacy in lhe Soulhein Cone. Soon aflei |oining lhe OAS, Canada
played a key iole in selling up a \nil foi lhe Piomolion of Demociacy
(\PD) wilhin lhe fiamewoik of lhe iegional oiganizalion. Nol only was
lhe Canadian pioposal unanimously endoised in 199O bul, soon aflei,
seveial counliies, including Il Salvadoi, Nicaiagua, Biazil, and Peiu, ie-
quesled \PD`s assislance lo moniloi compelilive eleclions.6
Allhough elecloial obseivalion soon became lhe main aclivily of lhe
\PD, lhe Canadian goveinmenl peisisled in longei-leim pio|ecls, in-
cluding lhe consolidalion of legislalive inslilulions, lhe slienglhening of
local goveinmenls, and lhe adoplion of piogiammes on demociacy by
piimaiy schools acioss lhe iegion. Similaily, in a |oinl effoil wilh Biazil,
Canada advanced lhe ciealion of lhe Woiking Gioup on Demociacy and
Human Righls. n addilion lo following up lhe pio-demociacy commil-
menls adopled al lhe Summil of lhe Ameiicas and biidging lhese wilh lhe
OAS, lhe main lasks assigned lo lhe Woiking Gioup ianged fiom sup-
poiling elecloial piocesses, impioving elecloial lisls, lo liaining pio-
giammes foi civil seivanls, including policemen.7
The 199Os maiked a fuilhei slage in lhe advancemenl of lhe iegional
iegime foi lhe piomolion of demociacy and human iighls. f lhe signs of
change had been lheie since lhe mid-198Os, lhe shifl lowaids an effeclive
syslem foi lhe defence of demociacy aclually look place in lhe 199Os.8
Theie weie lwo coineislones in lhis developmenl: nisl, lhe 1991 Sanliago
Commilmenl, aclively piomoled by Aigenlina, Canada, Chile, \enezuela,
and lhe \niled Slales; and, secondly, lhe 1992 Washinglon Piolocol,
which laid lhe basis foi lhe ciealion of a numbei of insliumenls foi lhe
defence and piomolion of demociacy in lhe iegion.
Al lhe 1991 Sanliago summil, Canada and Chile |oined effoils lo widen
lhe iange of OAS`s iesponsibililies and ils iole in lhe defence and pio-
molion of demociacy in lhe iegion. The pailicipalion of lhe OAS in lhe
widei pio-demociacy iegional liend iepiesenled a iadical |ump fiom lhe
pievious non-inleivenlionisl sland mainlained by lhe iegional oiganiza-
lion. Allhough lhe OAS Chailei had included a numbei of iefeiences lo
lhe defence of demociacy, lhese had amounled lo lempeiale allusions,
and had no binding effecl.
By conliasl, lhe adoplion of lhe Sanliago Commilmenl lo Demociacy
and lhe Renewal of lhe nlei-Ameiican Syslem, as well as lhe endoise-
menl of Resolulion 1O8O, adopled by lhe foieign minisleis of lhe OAS in
Sanliago de Chile in 1une 1991, made cleai nol only lhe commilmenl of
iegional slales lo lhe defence and piomolion of demociacy and human
iighls, bul also lheii deleiminalion lo gianl lhe OAS a dislincl mandale
lo inleivene colleclively in lhe evenl of a bieakdown of democialic iule.
This iesolulion paved lhe way foi lhe self-opeialing`` inleivenlion of lhe
iegional oiganizalion in lhe seiies of ciises lhiealening democialic iule in
Haili in 1991, Peiu in 1992, Gualemala in 1993, and Paiaguay lhiee yeais
lalei.9
The second insliumenl, lhe 1992 Washinglon Piolocol adopled duiing
lhe X\ Peiiod of Sessions of lhe OAS, enables lhe iegional oiganizalion
lo suspend any membei slale whose goveinmenl and polilical inslilulions
have been seized by lhe use of foice. Allhough, in piinciple, lhe measuies
conlemplaled in lhe Piolocol apply only lo lhose membei slales lhal have
volunlaiily adheied lo il, lhey iepiesenled an impoilanl depailuie fiom
lhe absolule inleipielalion of lhe piinciple of non-inleivenlion lhal had
long pievailed in Lalin Ameiica. This liend was fuilhei ieinfoiced in
1995, when lhe nlei-Ameiican 1uiidical Commillee iesolved lhal lhe
piinciple of non-inleivenlion and lhe iighl of each slale lo choose lhe
polilical, economic and social syslem lhal besl accommodales ils needs,
does nol piovide covei foi failing lo obseive lhe obligalion lo exeicise
iepiesenlalive demociacy.``10
Canada has conlinued lo play an impoilanl iole in developing lhe
concepl of demociacy since 1993. Allhough lhe piinciple of democialic
goveinance has ieceived wide acceplance in Lalin Ameiica, loo much
emphasis has been placed on naiiow elecloial inleipielalions of demo-
cialic iule. n facl, lhe iecenl wave of suppoil foi elecloial piocesses was
oiiginally linked lo lhe widei shifl in \S policy vis-a` -vis lhe Cenlial
Ameiican ciisis, ianging fiom human iighls lo elecloial assislance.11
Howevei, as menlioned eailiei, cenlial lo bolh lhe iegional consolidalion
of lhe noim of democialic goveinance and lhe widening of lhe nolion of
demociacy has been lhe inslilulional democialic iefoims expeiienced by
many counliies in lhe iegion since lhe eaily 198Os.
Theie is lillle doubl lhal lhe mosl iecenl wave of democialic lian-
silions in Lalin Ameiica has helped lill lhe balance of iegional diplomacy
in favoui of lhe defence and piomolion of demociacy. n addilion lo lhe
changes expeiienced by lhe OAS, il is also impoilanl lo lake inlo accounl
lhe commilmenls adopled by subiegional oiganizalions such as Meico-
sul, lhe Rio Gioup, and lhe Cenlial Ameiican Tiealy foi Democialic
LATN AMIRCA 227
Secuiily. These associalions have followed lhe piinciple of condilionalily
by iequiiing fiom membei slales full iespecl foi democialic piaclices.
The Mechanism foi Consullalion and Polilical Conceilalion (Mecanismo
de Consulla y Conceilacio n Polilica) eslablished by Meicosul in mid-1997
in iesponse lo lhe conslilulional ciisis lhiealening democialic iule in
Paiaguay in 1996 nol only sel lhe democialic slandaid as an enliy
iequiiemenl, bul fiamed a second geneialion of iefoims aimed al con-
solidaling democialic iule among membei slales.12 Meanwhile, in Cen-
lial Ameiica, lhe pacincalion piocess piovided ils own conlexl foi a
numbei of agieemenls, including lhe Tiealy foi Democialic Secuiily
signed in Decembei 1995 and lhe 1997 Declaialion of San 1ose , which
commils Cenlial Ameiican slales lo mainlain civilian supiemacy and lo
slienglhen democialic iule.13
Cleaily, lhe implicalions lhal undeilay many of lhese liends aie closely
connecled wilh lhe giealei acceplance of moie exible inleipielalions of
lhe piinciple of non-inleivenlion in lhe iegion. Howevei, il is impoilanl
lo iemembei lhal, lo lhe exlenl lhal demociacy legilimizes slale inslilu-
lions, lhe Lalin Ameiican iepublics may see lheii soveieignly ieinfoiced
even while being sub|ecled lo inleinalional democialic piessuies.14
Thc rolc oj intcrnational organi;ations in bringing pcacc anJ
Jcnocratic rulc to 1atin Ancrican statcs
The second developmenl lhal has conliibuled lo a changed legal conlexl
foi inleivenlion has been lhe aclive iole played by lhe OAS, lhe \niled
Nalions, and lhe Iuiopean \nion in biinging peace and demociacy lo a
swalhe of counliies, specincally lo Nicaiagua, Il Salvadoi, and Guale-
mala. ndeed, lhe pailicipalion of exleinal aclois has been a key facloi in
lhe giadual iesolulion of lhe conicls lhal have spilled inlo civil wais,
along wilh lhe implemenlalion of lhose mechanisms undeipinning lhe
pacincalion of lhe islhmus. Ceilainly, lhe ciisis lheie acled as a calalysl lo
lhe ieaclivalion of lhe OAS, piopelling innovalive policies, new sliuc-
luies, and novel legal fiamewoiks.
n Cenlial Ameiica, lhough in diffeienl ways and ihylhms, lhe piocess
of pacincalion has iun paiallel lo democializalion. The negolialion of lhe
peace piocess slailed in 1983 wilh lhe Conladoia inilialive, conlinued in
1986 wilh lhe Isquipulas plan, and enleied a ciilical slage in 199O wilh
lhe medialing iole played by vaiious inleinalional oiganizalions up unlil
1996.15
Theie is lillle doubl lhal lhe pailicipalion of bolh lhe \niled Nalions
and lhe OAS was a key facloi in lhe successful oiganizalion of lhe con-
lenlious 199O eleclions in Nicaiagua, in lhe complelion of lhe Salvadoi-
ean peace piocess leading lo lhe 1992 Chapullepec agieemenls, and in
lhe 1996 peace accoids biinging lo an end yeais of inleinecine wai in
Gualemala. The opeialions of bolh oiganizalions have nol only paved
lhe way lo an innovalive mullilaleial diplomacy, bul also loosened lhe
boundaiies of lhe piinciple of non-inleivenlion in lhe iegion.
n Nicaiagua, lhe idea of an inleinalional medialing commission was
explicilly addiessed by lhe Isquipulas plan. A moniloiing and veiinca-
lion commission was sel up in 1987, and ieoiganized in 1988, lo assisl lhe
cease-nie eslablished belween lhe Sandinislas and lhe Conlias. Two
yeais lalei, as lhe goveinmenl of Honduias admilled lo lack of conliol
ovei lhe Conlias` opeialions in ils leiiiloiy, lhe queslion of lheii de-
mobilizalion was nisl discussed. This move paved lhe way bolh foi lhe
Sandinislas` consenl lo |oinl \NOAS supeivision of lhe 199O eleclions,
and foi lhe selling up of vaiious agencies, among which ON\CA (lhe \N
Obseivei Gioup in Cenlial Ameiica) was peihaps lhe mosl impoilanl.16
Allhough fiom lhe eaily days of Conladoia, and unlil lhe dismanlling
of lhe nleinalional Commission foi Suppoil and \eiincalion (CA\) in
1997, lhe OAS and lhe \niled Nalions woiked logelhei, a division of
laboui soon became appaienl. Once lhe suipiise of lhe Sandinisla elec-
loial defeal was absoibed, lhe issues of disaimamenl, demobilizalion, and
pacincalion came lo lhe foie. Wheieas lhe OAS moslly concenlialed on
Nicaiagua, ielying on lhe CA\`s fiamewoik (dealing wilh lhe iepaliia-
lion and ielocalion of lhe Conlias` iiiegulai foices, and subsequenlly
wilh lhe demobilizalion of moie lhan 2O,OOO ie-aimed ex-combalanls),
lhe \niled Nalions played a moie cenlial iole in lhe pacincalion and
democializalion of Il Salvadoi and Gualemala. The scope of aclivilies
peifoimed by bolh oiganizalions, ianging fiom medialion, lo elecloial
oiganizalion, human iighls pioleclion, |uslice adminislialion, land dislii-
bulion, and lhe iefoim of lhe slale`s aimed appaialus, illuslialed veiy
cleaily indeed lhe magnilude of lhe liansfoimalions undeigone by lhe
piinciple of non-inleivenlion in lhis iegion.
Clobali;ation anJ ccononic intcgration
Globalizalion and economic inlegialion have also undeilain lhe changing
legal conlexl foi inleivenlion in Lalin Ameiica. Al lhe heail of all dis-
cussions of globalizalion and iegional inlegialion is lhe queslion of lheii
consequences foi lhe slale`s soveieignly. n Lalin Ameiica, in lhe aflei-
malh of lhe 1982 debl ciisis, lhe economic paiadigm swung fiom impoil
subslilulion indusliializalion lo expoil-led giowlh. These changes paved
lhe way foi an unpiecedenled level of involvemenl of inleinalional n-
nancial inslilulions (Is) in domeslic economic policy-making. Nol only
weie lhe piaclices puisued by lhese inslilulions highly inliusive, bul lhe
policies advanced by bolh lhe nleinalional Monelaiy Iund and lhe
LATN AMIRCA 229
Woild Bank have cleaily affecled liadilional undeislandings of sovei-
eignly. The shifl lowaids economic libeializalion and expoil-led giowlh
piompled slales acioss lhe iegion lo seaich foi iegional inlegialion
schemes. This was cleaily lhe case wilh Mexico`s decision lo |oin a fiee
liade aiea wilh lhe \niled Slales and Canada, and lhe same applies lo
lhe ievilalizalion of iegional economic inilialives in Cenlial Ameiica, lhe
Andean counliies, and Meicosul. n Lalin Ameiica as in olhei iegions,
lhese piocesses, logelhei wilh lhe liansfoimalions bioughl aboul by lhe
inlegialion of nalional economies in lhe global economy, have evinced
lhe need foi alleinalive iegulaloiy mechanisms and coopeialive foims of
iegulalion lhal depail fiom lhe liadilional melhods and inslilulions of
inlei-slale law making.`` ndeed, a iecognilion lhal many of lhe diiving
foices behind globalizalion (bul in pailiculai lhe globalized inleinalional
nnancial and monelaiy syslem) have liansfoimed oui undeislanding of
soveieignly swepl acioss lhe iegion, pushing slales inlo iegional coopei-
alion and inlegialion aiiangemenls.17
Regional peiceplions aboul lhe iisk of \S unilaleial
inleivenlion
As Lalin Ameiica lefl behind lhe chionic luimoil lhal accompanied lhe
piocesses of decolonizalion and nalion-building, iegional slales saw lheii
vulneiabilily lo unilaleial exleinal inleivenlion diminish. Ioieign inlei-
venlion, a iecuiienl episode in lhe hisloiy of Lalin Ameiica in lhe nine-
leenlh cenluiy, nol only decieased lhioughoul lhe lwenlielh cenluiy bul
also became incieasingly monopolized by lhe \niled Slales.18
\S hemispheiic ambilions weie nisl openly expiessed al lhe luin of
lhe nineleenlh cenluiy and foicefully puisued unlil lhe 193Os. Howevei,
il is also liue lhal inleinal and exleinal consliainls lempeied lhe iisk of
\S inleivenlion. The Monioe Docliine, widely consideied as a bluepiinl
foi expansionism, has also been seen as a declaialion of conlainmenl.``
Nol only did asseilions of supeiioiily nol aulomalically lead lo polilical
expansionism oi acls of mililaiy inleivenlion, bul by lhe luin of lhe cen-
luiy lhe piohibilion of a Iuiopean iesoil lo foice in collecling foieign
debls made lhe Monioe Docliine al leasl loleiable lo many Lalin
Ameiican counliies.``19
Wheieas belween 1898 and lhe mid-192Os \S mililaiy inleivenlion in
Lalin Ameiica was iesumed and lioops weie senl lo eighl counliies in
lhe iegion, by lhe second half of lhe 192Os lheie was a lowei incidence of
mililaiy inleivenlion. The expeiience of lhe Mexican Revolulion and lhe
nascenl insuigency in Nicaiagua had alieady showed lhal diiecl inlei-
venlion could be a coslly affaii, could poison ielalions in lhe iegion, and
could lead lo diplomalic piedicamenls. This was even moie lhe case as
inleivenlionism became incieasingly conlioveisial al home and espe-
cially aflei lhe 1apanese invasion of Manchuiia al open odds wilh \S
policy elsewheie in lhe woild.``20
n lhe posl-wai peiiod, when lhe Oiganizalion of Ameiican Slales was
eslablished, Lalin Ameiica emeiged as a peiipheial lhealie of lhe Cold
Wai. mpoilanl diffeiences undeilay lhe \S and Lalin Ameiican views of
lhe iegional oiganizalion. Lalin Ameiica nol only emphasized economic
coopeialion, bul also showed ieseivalions aboul lhe iisk of \S inleiven-
lion. Nolwilhslanding lhis, lhe Chailei of lhe OAS confoimed lo lhe \S
view of an agency designed foi lhe colleclive defence of lhe Ameiicas.``
Allhough counliies in lhe iegion iemained conceined aboul lhe mag-
nilude of \S mililaiy powei and lhe iisk of inleivenlion, successive \S
adminislialions have shown a giealei inleiesl in iegional coopeialion and
in developing common inleiesls as lhe besl way lo exeicise \S hegem-
ony.21 While conicling inleipielalions of \S policies seem inevilable,
some obseiveis have aigued lhal, following lhe invasion of lhe Domini-
can Republic in 1965, \S unilaleial mililaiy aclion became less common,
poinling lo a ma|oi ieoiienlalion in lhe exeicise of \S hegemony. How-
evei, lhis view has been called inlo queslion by a chain of evenls ianging
fiom \S policies lowaids Chile in 1973 and Nicaiagua in lhe eaily 198Os,
lo lhe 1989 \S invasion of Panama.
As lhe Cold Wai diew lo an end, lhe liadilional |uslincalion foi \S
inleivenlion lhe lhieal of communism was cleaily played oul, and lhe
iisk of lhe \niled Slales iesoiling lo unilaleial aclion ieduced.22 How-
evei, bolh lhe 1989 invasion of Panama and lhe dispalching of \S wai-
ships lo lhe Colombian Caiibbean in eaily 1anuaiy 199O signalled a liend
lowaids \S inleivenlion, bul now on anli-naicolic giounds.23 Iuilhei-
moie, \S foieign diug conliol policies lhe ceilincalion piocess have
also been chaiacleiized by lheii level of inliusiveness in lhe domeslic
spheie of olhei slales.
Much of whal is al issue heie conceins a lasling fealuie in \SLalin
Ameiican ielalions. ndeed, il is impoilanl lo iemembei lhe iole lhal
coeicive melhods have played in shaping a ielalionship chaiacleiized by
a sliucluial asymmeliy.24 Whilsl il is liue lhal moie exible inleipiela-
lions of lhe piinciple of non-inleivenlion have ieceived consideiable ac-
ceplance in lhe iegion, \S unilaleialism and lhe iisk of \S inleivenlion
have oflen foiced lhe Lalin Ameiican iepublics inlo defensive posluies.
Moieovei, conveigence in leims of lhe defence and piomolion of de-
mociacy has nol yel yielded an acceplable menu of policies lo achieve
lhis end. Giealei acceplance of lhe need colleclively lo defend and pio-
LATN AMIRCA 231
mole demociacy has nol been sufncienl on ils own lo peisuade lhe ma-
|oiily of Lalin Ameiican iepublics lo include lhe use of foice wilhin lhe
iange of admissible melhods.25
An examinalion of Lalin Ameiican peiceplions aboul lhe iisk of \S
unilaleial inleivenlion makes abundanlly cleai how old qualms coexisl
wilh ienewed hopes aboul lhe piospecls of mullilaleialism. The elemenls
of conlinuily aie pailiculaily visible in lhe foieign policies of counliies
such as Mexico and Biazil, whose adheience lo lhe liadilional inleina-
lional law concepl of soveieignly`` ieecls lheii ieluclance lo ienounce
whal has been an impoilanl noimalive inhibilion lo mililaiy inleiven-
lion.`` ndeed, one of lhe mosl impoilanl fealuies of lhe univeisal syslem
of soveieign equalily conceins lhe noimalive dykes buill aiound il
againsl mililaiy inleivenlion.26
Lalin Ameiican iesponses lo lhe Kosovo ciisis
The lwo pievious seclions have allempled lo show how domeslic polilical
ciicumslances and iegional liends have come lo modify lhe legal conlexl
foi inleivenlion. Allhough lhe lhiusl of lhe changes associaled wilh lhe
emeigence of a iegional iegime foi lhe piomolion and defence of democ-
iacy suggesls a giealei degiee of conveigence lowaids limiled sovei-
eignly,`` il is also cleai lhal iegional feais aboul lhe iisk of \S unilalei-
alism aie nol doimanl.
By and laige, mosl Lalin Ameiican slales seem lo shaie lhese geneial
views, bul lheii peispeclives on lhe changing legal conlexl foi inleiven-
lion aie fai fiom being unifoim. \ndeilying lhe diffeienl posilions on lhis
issue aie impoilanl domeslic consideialions. One gioup of counliies
lhose such as Chile and Aigenlina lhal have embaiked on ma|oi democ-
ializalion piocesses have queslioned absolule veisions of lhe piinciple
of non-inleivenlion, making cleai lheii inclinalion lowaids lhe inleina-
lional pioleclion of demociacy. Similaily, lhose counliies in which some
foim of inleinalional medialion has helped iesolve inliaclable conicls
have also endoised moie exible views aboul lheii soveieignly. By con-
liasl, anolhei gioup of counliies, including Mexico and lo some exlenl
Biazil, have moie sliongly iesisled any foim of inliusion inlo lheii do-
meslic affaiis.
Ceilainly, aclive pailicipalion by Chile and Aigenlina in slienglhening
lhe piinciple of democialic legilimacy in lhe Weslein hemispheie has
ieecled many of lhe conceins painfully accumulaled duiing lhe long
yeais of mililaiy iule. \ndoubledly, lhe liansilion lo demociacy has
conliibuled lo iedenne lhe foieign policy of Soulhein Cone counliies,
luining democialic consolidalion inlo one of lheii main goals and
piompling lhem lo eslablish a colleclive mechanism foi lhe defence of
demociacy wilhin lhe fiamewoik of Meicosul. As menlioned eailiei, lhe
Chilean goveinmenl has played a ma|oi iole in lhe design of mullilaleial
foimulas foi lhe defence of demociacy in lhe iegion.27
Cleaily, Soulhein Cone and Cenlial Ameiican counliies have gone
fuilhei lhan Mexico in accepling moie exible undeislandings of lheii
soveieignly. Allhough wilhin lhe fiamewoik of Meicosul Biazil has ac-
cepled lhe piinciple of democialic condilionalily and lhus non-absolule
inleipielalions of lhe piinciple of non-inleivenlion, lhis is nol lhe case
in lhe widei iegional and global spheies. n conliasl lo Aigenlina`s full
endoisemenl of lhe democialic piinciple, Biazil has followed a moie
ambiguous ioule. As in olhei issues, feai of exclusion piompled Biazil lo
pailicipale in lhe piocess by which lhe OAS mandale was expanded, yel
Biazilian views iemained opposed lo gianling lhe OAS a giealei iole in
lhe defence of demociacy.28 Nol only has Biazil showed giealei ieluc-
lance lo accepl lhe consliainls lhal accompany iegional mullilaleial in-
slilulions, bul il has aclively iesisled pioposals aimed al slienglhening lhe
mililaiy capabililies of lhe iegional oiganizalion.29
n lhe case of Mexico, and despile anlicipalions lo lhe conliaiy, lhe
Mexican ievolulionaiy iegime al once endoised lhe piinciple of non-
inleivenlion as a keyslone of ils foieign policy eaily in lhe lwenlielh
cenluiy. l is liue lhal in lhe pasl Mexico`s foieign policy has spoiadi-
cally embiaced posluies lhal openly challenged lhe piinciple of non-
inleivenlion, bul successive adminislialions have long mainlained lhe
iheloiic of non-inleivenlion.30 Cleaily, whal was once seen as one among
olhei piinciples of Mexico`s foieign policy became lhe dominanl liend as
lhe Mexican iegime enleied lhe unceilain waleis of polilical libeializa-
lion and, moie iecenlly, democializalion.
Ovei iecenl decades, lhe Mexican goveinmenl has called inlo queslion
many of lhe changes lhal poinl lo a new legal conlexl foi inleivenlion in
lhe Ameiicas. This has been nowheie moie liue lhan in lhe opposilion
shown by Mexico lo many of lhe pioposals aimed al exlending lhe OAS
mandale foi inleivenlion in lhe evenl of a conslilulional ciisis lhieal-
ening democialic iule. Thus, Mexico`s iesponse lo lhe Sanliago Commil-
menl was caulious: lhe goveinmenl iecognized lhal democialic iule can
indeed be affecled by unfavouiable domeslic oi inleinalional conlexls,
bul sliessed lhe view lhal democialic goveinmenls can be eslablished
and consolidaled only fiom wilhin.31 Moieovei, allhough Mexico has
indeed adheied lo ovei 5O inleinalional human iighls liealies and con-
venlions, on many occasions lhese have been accompanied by impoilanl
ieseivalions.32
\ndeilying Mexico`s giip of lhe piinciple of non-inleivenlion is lhe
goveinmenl`s allempl lo conlain mounling inleinalional piessuies sup-
LATN AMIRCA 233
poiling democializalion. n lhe 197Os, when aulhoiilaiian goveinmenls
acioss lhe iegion weie sub|ecled lo incieased piessuies fiom human
iighls oiganizalions, Mexico evaded lhe lide.33 el since lhe lale 198Os
domeslic and inleinalional piessuies have been mulliplying. Theie is
lillle doubl lhal lhe negolialion of lhe Iiee Tiade Agieemenl wilh
Canada and lhe \niled Slales, logelhei wilh lhe oulbieak of lhe Chiapas
iebellion in lhe nisl half of lhe 199Os, sel lhe slage foi a giowlh of inlei-
nalional piessuies favouiing democialic values and iespecl foi human
iighls in Mexico. Allhough conseculive adminislialions have shown a
limiled capacily lo iesisl many of lhese inuences, lhe piessuie has nol
been sufncienl on ils own lo peisuade lhe Mexican goveinmenl lo
move lowaids less absolule inleipielalions of lhe piinciple of non-
inleivenlion.34
As menlioned eailiei, il is cleai lhal lhe momenlum behind a changing
legal conlexl foi inleivenlion has been laigely linked lo liansilions lo
demociacy acioss Lalin Ameiica and lhe pacincalion of Cenlial Ameii-
can counliies. l is liue lhal lhis shifl has enlailed implicalions lhal have
gone beyond lhe boideis of lhose counliies lhal have moie vigoiously
puisued lhis liansfoimalion, bul lhe Mexican and Biazilian expeiiences
suggesl lhal lhe diffeiences of viewpoinl sepaialing counliies in lhe iegion
iemain signincanl. Moieovei, foi lhose who view \SLalin Ameiican
ielalions fiom lhe peispeclive of dependency and sliucluial asymmeliies,
lhe iisk of \S unilaleialism iemains an impoilanl poinl foi consideialion.
Allhough lhe lhiusl of evenls discussed in lhis chaplei poinls lo a
common acceplance of exible inleipielalions of lhe piinciple of non-
inleivenlion, lhe lack of a solid iegional consensus is also obvious. ndeed,
lhe appaienl disagieemenl belween al leasl lwo conicling views piovides
lhe benchmaik againsl which iegional iesponses lo lhe Kosovo ciisis can
be analysed.
The declaialion issued by lhe Rio Gioup on 25 Maich 1999 seemed lo
allow disagieemenl belween lhese conicling inleipielalions. While il
iegielled lhal a peaceful solulion lo lhe conicl had nol been ieached,
and expiessed lhe pieoccupalion of ils membeis wilh NATO`s bombing
againsl Seibian mililaiy laigels, il did nol complelely ob|ecl lo lhis couise
of aclion. Moieovei, in lhis declaialion lhe membeis of lhe Rio Gioup
iequesled lhe pailies lo iesume negolialions lhal could lead lo a lasling
peace, based bolh on iespecl foi human iighls and on lhe leiiiloiial
inlegiily of lhe slales involved. Iinally, il deploied NATO`s decision
lo iesoil lo lhe use of foice wilhoul piioi aulhoiizalion of lhe Secuiily
Council.35 Ceilainly, lhe declaialion soughl lo sliike a balance belween
iespecl foi human iighls and slale soveieignly, and iesisled piivileging
ugoslavia`s soveieignly ovei lhe pioleclion of human iighls.
As lhe compaialive analysis of lhe iesponses of Mexico, Biazil, Aigen-
lina, and Chile indicale, whal mighl seem minoi diffeiences al lhe oulsel
could conlain lhe seeds of a much moie seiious conlioveisy aboul lhe
piinciple of non-inleivenlion; i.e. aboul lhe iesponses lhe inleinalional
communily`` should display when lhe inleinalional noims pieviously ac-
cepled by membei slales aie nakedly violaled. As lhe iesl of lhis seclion
will allempl lo demonsliale, wheieas Mexico iigidly ob|ecled lo NATO`s
inleivenlion in ugoslavia, counliies such as Aigenlina and, lo a lessei
exlenl, Biazil and Chile showed deep concein aboul NATO`s bombing
bul lhis did nol amounl lo lolal opposilion.
Mexico`s iesponse lo NATO`s mililaiy opeialions in ugoslavia made
cleai ils disappioval of lhe Alliance`s iesoil lo foice wilhoul piioi consenl
fiom lhe Secuiily Council.36 Allhough lhe Mexican delegalion |oined in
lhe denuncialion expiessed by lhe \N Human Righls Commission of
human iighls violalions caiiied oul in Kosovo, il also ciilicized whal ils
goveinmenl consideied lo be an imbalanced iesolulion lhal failed lo
subsciibe fully lo lhe piinciple of lhe slale`s leiiiloiial inlegiily.37 This
line of aigumenlalion was again expiessed on 1O 1une, when Manuel Tello,
Mexico`s peimanenl iepiesenlalive lo lhe \niled Nalions, ieileialed lhal
his goveinmenl deploied lhe inabilily of lhe pailies lo ieach a peaceful
solulion based on lhe iecognilion and iespecl of lhe iighls of all minoi-
ilies as well as lhe leiiiloiial inlegiily of lhe slales and sliongly dis-
appioved of NATO`s iesoil lo foice wilhoul pievious aulhoiizalion fiom
lhe Secuiily Council. The Mexican goveinmenl mainlained lhal iesoil
lo lhe use of foice, even if animaled by noble humanilaiian molivalions,
leads lo fuilhei violence and does nol conliibule lo lasling solulions.``
The Mexican delegale, Manuel Tello, ieslaled lhe need lo nnd a solulion
wilhin lhe fiamewoik of lhe \niled Nalions in oidei lo pieseive lhe
ciedibilily of lhe inleinalional secuiily syslem.38
Allhough Aigenlina, Biazil, and Chile shaied Mexico`s pieoccupalion
wilh lhe maiginalizalion of lhe \niled Nalions, lheii moie nuanced ie-
sponse displayed an allempl lo ieconcile soveieignly and iespecl foi
human iighls. ndeed, many of lhe aigumenls ailiculaled by lhe Mexican
iepiesenlalive aboul lhe implicalions of NATO`s inleivenlion hinged on
lhe idea of uncondilional soveieignly. The Mexican posilion did shaie lhe
woildwide concein wilh lhe aliocilies peipelialed in Kosovo bul, when il
came lo couises of aclion, il seemed lo favoui peaceful negolialions.
Cleaily, whal in any olhei conlexl mighl have seemed a ieasonable
couise of aclion, in lhe condilions of elhnic cleansing was unable lo offei
much guidance. l indeed amounled lo paialysis.
As menlioned eailiei, Mexico lagged behind in lhe moie iecenl wave
of democializalion in lhe iegion and has lheiefoie been slowei lo adapl
lo lhe piessuies bioughl lo beai by human iighls oiganizalions. el
anolhei sel of consideialions has also been impoilanl in explaining lhe
LATN AMIRCA 235
posilion of lhe Mexican goveinmenl: lhe Zapalislas` demands foi giealei
aulonomy, and lhe voices calling foi some foim of inleinalional media-
lion in oidei lo iesolve lhe nve-yeai-old conicl in lhe soulhein slale of
Chiapas.39
By conliasl, lhe posilions adopled by Aigenlina, Biazil, and Chile
soughl lo sliike a compiomise belween soveieignly and lhe iespecl of
human iighls. ndeed, in many of lhe declaialions issued by lhe govein-
menls of lhese iepublics in ielalion lo evenls in Kosovo one can nnd
lhe iecognilion lhal leiiiloiial inlegiily does nol enliiely pieclude some
foims of inleivenlion. This is nowheie moie cleai lhan in lhe commu-
nique issued by lhe Aigenline minislei of foieign affaiis on 24 Maich
and lhe piess ielease issued by lhe Biazilian minisliy of foieign affaiis
on 3O Maich 1999. Bolh communique s called foi a piompl iesumplion
of negolialions, bul explicilly acknowledged lhal lhe solulion had lo be
based on lhe ieconcilialion of ugoslavia`s leiiiloiial inlegiily and sovei-
eignly wilh Kosovo`s aulonomy and lhe effeclive pioleclion of minoiilies.
Wheieas Aigenlina sliongly suppoiled \N Secuiily Council Resolulion
1199, condemning lhe use of foice by lhe Seibian police againsl lhe
civilian populalion in Kosovo and leiioiisl acls peipelialed by lhe Kosovo
Libeialion Aimy, |oinlly wilh Biazil il ie|ecled lhe iesolulion pul foiwaid
by Russia, Beloiussia, and ndia on 26 Maich 1999, which condemned
NATO`s use of foice as a lhieal lo inleinalional peace and secuiily.
The Aigenline delegalion addiessed a hosl of queslions while explain-
ing lhis vole. l iefeiied nisl lo lhe uigenl need lo pul a hall lo lhe alioc-
ilies being peipelialed in Kosovo, widely iegisleied in vaiious \N docu-
menls. l lhen menlioned lhe colleclive obligalion lo iespond iapidly in
silualions wheie lhe noims of inleinalional humanilaiian law aie lhieal-
ened, especially when inleinalional ciimes and acls of genocide have
been peipelialed. The Aigenline posilion was based nol only on lhe ex-
peiience accumulaled ovei seven yeais of pailicipaling in peacekeeping
opeialions in lhe Balkans, bul also on lhe conviclion lhal lhe humanilai-
ian conlexl of evenls in Kosovo could nol be ignoied.40 Allhough Biazil
closed ianks wilh Aigenlina in opposing lhe Russian pioposal, il also
|oined lhe voices calling allenlion lo NATO`s double slandaids and lo
lhe implicalions of seleclive iesponses. n accoidance wilh ils liadilional
piedileclion foi univeisally fiamed answeis lo lhose silualions demand-
ing lhe need foi mililaiy inleivenlion, lhe Biazilian goveinmenl made
cleai ils concein aboul NATO`s iesoil lo lhe use of foice wilhoul lhe \N
Secuiily Council`s benediclion.``41 Wheieas Aigenlina`s uncondilional
suppoil was piobably molivaled by ils libeial and Weslein`` aspiialions,
Biazil iemained conceined wilh lhe implicalions of a coeicive piocess
laking place oulside \N connnes. Howevei, in conliasl lo Mexico`s ie-
luclance lo pailicipale in peacekeeping opeialions, Biazil has aclively
pailicipaled in such missions.42
The dislance belween Mexico and ils Soulhein Cone pailneis became
pailiculaily cleai in lhe conlexl of \N Secuiily Council Resolulion 1244
passed on 1O 1une lo maik lhe end of NATO`s bombing. n conliasl lo
Mexico`s ieaclion, Aigenlina piaised lhe iesolulion`s inleipielalion of
lhe \N Chailei, acknowledging lhe weighl lhal human iighls now caiiy in
lhe inleinalional communily, and consideied lhal human liagedies of lhe
magnilude of elhnic cleansing in Kosovo simply could nol be loleialed.
Allhough lhe Chilean iesponse lo NATO`s inleivenlion in ugoslavia
seemed moie in line wilh lhe cauliousness displayed by Mexico, lhis was
mosl likely piompled by lhe domeslic iepeicussions unleashed by lhe
Pinochel ciisis.43 Like Mexico, Chile deploied lhe inabilily of lhe pailies
lo ieach an agieemenl, lhe peipelialion of human iighls violalions, and
NATO`s decision lo iesoil lo lhe use of foice wilhoul lhe aulhoiizalion of
lhe Secuiily Council. Bul, unlike Mexico, no menlion was made of lhe
piinciple of soveieignly oi of lhe leiiiloiial inlegiily of ugoslavia.
Moieovei, |usl a few weeks befoie lhe aiiesl of Geneial Pinochel, lhe
Chilean minislei of foieign affaiis had deliveied a speech al lhe nfly-lhiid
Geneial Assembly of lhe \niled Nalions in which he slaled lhal human
iighls had ceased lo be an issue ieseived exclusively lo lhe soveieignly
of counliies and have become a univeisal concein lhal no goveinmenl
can ignoie.``44
Chile`s willingness lo pailicipale in peacekeeping and policing opei-
alions in Kosovo and lo send caiabinieis`` lo Bosnia also highlighls lhe
degiee lo which liadilional undeislandings of soveieignly have been ie-
assessed in lhe Soulhein Cone.45 n slaik conliasl lo lhe pailicipalion of
bolh Aigenlina and Chile in peacekeeping opeialions, on lhe olhei hand,
Mexico has syslemalically iesisled calls lo pailicipale in \N peacekeeping
opeialions.46
Concluding iemaiks
The developmenls and aigumenls examined in lhis chaplei may seem
peiipheial lo lhe cenlial liagedy of Kosovo. el lwo poinls may be made
aboul lhe Lalin Ameiican posilion on il. Iiisl, lhe faullline belween
soveieignly and human iighls is going lo be essenlial lo lhe evolving dis-
cussion in lhis neld. l is suiely signincanl, lhen, lo nnd il giinding be-
nealh lhe posilions of lhe smallei playeis in lhe inleinalional league. The
second consideialion is lhal, if a new inleinalional oidei of human iighls
is indeed emeiging in lhe woild, il is impoilanl lo chail and undeisland
lhe aclual connguialion of slales acioss lhe boaid in ielalion lo il.
By examining lhe changing legal conlexl foi inleivenlion in lhe lhiee
conlexls consideied a iegional democialic iegime; lhe woiks being pei-
foimed by inleinalional oiganizalions; and globalizalion and economic
LATN AMIRCA 237
inlegialion we have been able lo follow bolh lhe evolulion of lhe piinci-
ple of non-inleivenlion in Lalin Ameiica, and also how liadilional undei-
slandings of soveieignly have been ievised in lhe iegion. \ilally, one of
lhe mosl impoilanl fealuies of lhe piesenl inlei-Ameiican syslem con-
ceins lhe iegional commilmenl lo lhe defence of democialic inslilulions.
Looking al lhe posilions held by counliies in lhe iegion on lhe chang-
ing legal conlexl foi inleivenlion, il also becomes cleai how domeslic
polilical evenls shape diffeienl views aboul absolule undeislandings of
soveieignly. This piovides lhe fiamewoik foi a compaialive analysis of
lhe iesponses of Mexico, Aigenlina, Biazil, and Chile lo lhe humanilai-
ian emeigency in Kosovo.
Whilsl il is liue lhal lhe changing legal conlexl foi inleivenlion in Lalin
Ameiica has nol been lolally fiee of feais of \S inleivenlion and neo-
colonialisl impulses, a closei examinalion of lhe declaialions issued by
lhe goveinmenls of lhese iepublics makes abundanlly cleai lhe dislance
belween lhe Mexican posilion, on lhe one hand, and lhe Soulhein Cone
sland on lhe olhei. The evidence piovided by Mexico`s iesponses lo lhe
changing legal conlexl foi inleivenlion in lhe Ameiicas, as well as many
of lhe aigumenls conlained in ils declaialions peilaining lo lhe humani-
laiian disaslei in Kosovo, indicale lhal, foi lhis counliy, soveieignly slill
lakes piioiily ovei human iighls. Analysis of lhe Cenlial Ameiican and
Aigenline and Chilean expeiiences, by conliasl, shows how Soulhein
Cone counliies have depailed fiom absolule inleipielalions of lhe piin-
ciple of soveieignly. The basis of a moie exible inleipielalion of lhe
piinciple of non-inleivenlion was laid in lhe conlexl of liansilions lo
demociacy and pacincalion in Cenlial Ameiica, in leims of bolh shifls in
alliludes and lhe developmenl of iegional diplomacy.
n lhe couise of a decade, slales in lhe iegion, specincally lhe Soulhein
Cone and Cenlial Ameiican iepublics, have developed an elaboiale in-
slilulional fiamewoik foi lhe defence of democialic inslilulions and lhe
pioleclion of human iighls. Allhough il would be misleading lo suggesl
lhal Aigenlina, Biazil, and Chile unciilically suppoiled NATO`s cam-
paign as a means of enfoicing humanilaiian noims, we have seen fiom
lhem a moie nuanced appioach lo lhe difncull queslions posed by lhe
magnilude of lhe human disaslei in Kosovo. These counliies made cleai
lheii concein aboul NATO`s couise of aclion, bul none expiessed lolal
opposilion. n lhe lighl of China`s and Russia`s deleiminalion lo block any
decision lhal could have paved lhe way lo \N-sanclioned mililaiy aclion,
Aigenlina, Biazil, and Chile chose lo live wilh lhe dilemma posed by lwo
conicling piinciples. Mexico, in conliasl, has sal on one of ils hoins. n
my view, il is pailiculaily sliiking lo nnd a slale of lhe Weslein hemi-
spheie such as Mexico assuming a posilion lhal is closei lo lhal of China
and Russia lhan lo ils own spheie`s. This is nol |usl a mallei of diplomalic
ailince eilhei. Al lhe veiy heighl of lhe calasliophic genocide in Kosovo,
lhe Mexican piess geneiously gave space lo lhe legalislic opinions of
Seibian expeils`` on lhe soveieignly issue. n such a counliy, lhe lead of
goveinmenl policy is ieadily followed by civil sociely. Diawing slales
such as Mexico inlo lhe evolving human iighls fiamewoik, lhen, will be a
challenge of moie lhan peiipheial impoilance lo ils success in all pails of
lhe woild, even as one hopes lhal lheie will nevei be anolhei Kosovo.
Noles
1. The backgiound lo lhe pie-eminence of absolule inleipielalions of lhe piinciple of non-
inleivenlion was piovided by lhe 1868 Calvo Docliine and lhe 19O2 Diago Docliine.
The nisl eslablished lhe illegalily of aimed inleivenlion seeking lo piolecl piivale in-
leiesls in lhe conlexl of civil wai oi populai insuiieclion. The second piohibils foieign
aimed inleivenlion aimed al foicing a slale lo meel ils inleinalional nnancial obliga-
lions. See Ana Covaiiubias, No inleivencion veisus piomocio n de la demociacia iep-
iesenlaliva en el sislema inlei-ameiicano,`` papei deliveied al lhe Seminai on Democ-
iacy and lhe nlei-Ameiican Syslem, Cenlio de Isludios nleinacionales, \niveisidad
de los Andes, Bogola , Colombia, 1516 Apiil 1999, p. 4; \an Wyen Ann Thomas and
A. 1. Thomas 1i., Non-Intcrvcntion. Thc 1aw anJ Its Inport in thc Ancricas, Dallas:
Soulhein Melhodisl \niveisily Piess, 1956. pp. 5557.
2. Lauience Whilehead, The mposilion of Demociacy: The Caiibbean,`` in Lauience
Whilehead, ed., Thc Intcrnational Dincnsions oj Dcnocratisation, Oxfoid: Oxfoid
\niveisily Piess, 1996.
3. The Convenlion came lo iegulale lhe main aclivilies of lhe nlei-Ameiican Human
Righls Commission, namely, lhe pioleclion and lhe piomolion of human iighls in lhe
iegion. ndividual complainls and human iighls iepoils emeiged as one of lhe main
insliumenls foi lhe pioleclion of human iighls. The idea was, in lhe nisl place, lo en-
couiage goveinmenls, lhiough fiiendly advice, lo guaianlee iespecl foi human iighls.
See Aldo Meneses, Chile y el Sislema nleiameiicano,`` papei deliveied al lhe Seminai
on Demociacy and lhe nlei-Ameiican Syslem, Cenlio de Isludios nleinacionales,
\niveisidad de los Andes, Bogola , Colombia, 1516 Apiil 1999, pp. 713.
4. bid., p. 21.
5. The nisl sleps of lhis new slialegy weie laken in lhe conlexl of a widei ieview of Canada`s
foieign policy, which look place in lhe eaily 197Os. n 1971 a Buieau of Hemispheiic
Affaiis was ciealed lo slienglhen ielalions wilh lhe iegion. Allhough diplomalic and
economic ielalions incieased sleadily, aloofness`` iemained as lhe dominanl fealuie in
ielalions belween Canada and Lalin Ameiica. This pallein changed in lhe 199Os when
Canada |oined lhe OAS and lhe Noilh Ameiican Iiee Tiade Aiea. See Goidon Mace
and Mailin Roy, Canada and lhe OAS: Piomoling Demociacy,`` papei deliveied al lhe
Seminai on Demociacy and lhe nlei-Ameiican Syslem, Cenlio de Isludios nlei-
nacionales, \niveisidad de los Andes, Bogola , Colombia, 1516 Apiil 1999, pp. 67.
6. Ciislina Izguizabal, Las Naciones \nidas y la consolidacio n de la paz en Cen-
lioame iica,`` in Olga Pellicei, ed., 1a scguriJaJ intcrnacional cn Ancrica 1atina y cl
Caribc, Me xico D.I.: Secielaiia de Relaciones Ixleiioies, 1995; Maigaiila Die guez,
Los mecanismos iegionales paia el manlenimienlo de la paz y la seguiidad hemi-
sfe iica,`` in Pellicei, 1a scguriJaJ intcrnacional cn Ancrica 1atina y cl Caribc.
LATN AMIRCA 239
7. Since lhe launching of lhe nilialive of lhe Ameiicas, lhe OAS has faced lhe iisk of
incieasing maiginalizalion. Wheieas lhe OAS has been desciibed as an oiganizalion
wilhoul an agenda, lhe Summil diplomacy has been iefeiied lo as a bluepiinl wilhoul
inslilulions. The agenda of lhe Summil diplomacy embiaces issue aieas lhal oveilap
wilh lhe |uiisdiclion of lhe OAS. See Mace and Roy, Canada and lhe OAS,`` pp. 172O.
8. n 1985 lhe Amendmenl Piolocol appioved in Cailagenas de ndias explicilly acknow-
ledged lhe ielevance of democialic iule foi iegional peace and slabilily. A numbei of
pioposals, nisl discussed duiing a 1991 Piesidenlial Andean Summil, piovided lhe basis
foi lhe measuies consideied by bolh lhe Sanliago Commilmenl lo Demociacy and lhe
Renewal of lhe nlei-Ameiican Syslem and Resolulion 1O8O lo gianl lhe OAS giealei
aulhoiily lo suppoil democialic iule and human iighls among membei slales. See Rul
Diaminl, Ivolucio n del sislema ameiicano: enlie el lemoi y la aimonia,`` papei deliv-
eied al lhe Seminai on Demociacy and lhe nlei-Ameiican Syslem, Cenlio de Isludios
nleinacionales, \niveisidad de los Andes, Bogola , Colombia, 1516 Apiil 1999, p. 18.
9. Ma|oi ciilicisms weie levelled al lhe OAS inleivenlion in lhese counliies, bul on bal-
ance lhey weie consideied consliuclive in helping pieseive minimum democialic slan-
daids. Wilh lhe exceplion of Haili, wheie lhe \Sj\N iesoil lo slialegic coeicion`` in
1994 nnally lilled lhe balance againsl lhe illegilimale goveinmenl of Geneial Raoul
Cedias, domeslic polilical faclois weie peihaps lhe mosl impoilanl vaiiable in lhe nnal
conclusion of lhese ciises. Nolwilhslanding lhis, and lhe OAS inclinalion lo iely on
economic sanclions ialhei lhan mililaiy inleivenlion in Haili, lheie is lillle doubl lhal in
all lhiee cases mullilaleial colleclive iesponses played a big iole. n lhe case of Guale-
mala, lhe Oiganizalion of Cenlial Ameiican Slales iefused lo iecognize 1oige Seiiano
as lhe conslilulional piesidenl of Gualemala aflei lhe 1993 coup. Similaily, wilhin lhe
fiamewoik of Resolulion 1O8O, lhe Geneial Secielaiy of lhe OAS headed an obseiva-
lion mission, which concluded lhal lhe Gualemalan goveinmenl had bieached ils inlei-
nalional obligalions and demanded lhe iesloialion of lhe iule of law. Allhough lhe
implemenlalion of sanclions was also consideied, lhese weie avoided by lhe ieluin of
conslilulional iule, which ullimalely paved lhe way foi lhe peace piocess. By conliasl,
lhe seiious fiagmenlalion of polilical aclois in Peiu may have limiled lhe impacl of lhe
OAS inleivenlion following lhe decision of Piesidenl Iu|imoii lo dissolve Congiess in
Apiil 1992. One day lalei, Resolulion 1O8O was aclivaled, piompling a declaialion call-
ing foi lhe iesloialion of conslilulional iule. An OAS mission also visiled Peiu on lhiee
occasions, compelling Iu|imoii lo commil himself lo a democializalion piogiamme,``
which included a call foi eleclions foi a new conslilulional Congiess. Allhough lhe nnal
selllemenl in Peiu was widely ciilicized, Novak and olhei obseiveis have claimed lhal
Iu|imoii`s oiiginal aim was lo eslablish a civilmililaiy`` goveinmenl. n an ofncial
communique of 5 Apiil, lhe 1oinl Command of lhe Aimed Ioices had expiessed ils
suppoil foi Iu|imoii. As in Gualemala, lhe pionouncemenls of olhei counliies and
oiganizalions againsl lhe coup including lhe \niled Slales, 1apan, and lhe Rio Gioup
weie also impoilanl. See Izguizabal, La Naciones \nidas;`` Die guez, Los meca-
nismos iegionales;`` 1oige Luis Boiiayo, Aplicacio n de la Resolucio n 1O8O en Guale-
mala,`` papei deliveied al lhe Seminai on Demociacy and lhe nlei-Ameiican Syslem,
Cenlio de Isludios nleinacionales, \niveisidad de los Andes, Bogola , Colombia, 15
16 Apiil 1999; Iabia n Novak, Defensa de la demociacia y aplicacio n de la iesolucio n
1O8O en el caso de Peiu ,`` papei deliveied al lhe Seminai on Demociacy and lhe nlei-
Ameiican Syslem, Cenlio de Isludios nleinacionales, \niveisidad de los Andes,
Bogola , Colombia, 1516 Apiil 1999, pp. 1O13; Mace and Roy, Canada and lhe
OAS,`` pp. 16, 21; Monica Hiisl, Slialegic Coeicion, Demociacy, and Iiee Maikels in
Lalin Ameiica,`` in Lawience Iieedman, ed., Stratcgic Cocrcion. Conccpts anJ Cascs,
Oxfoid: Oxfoid \niveisily Piess, 1999, pp. 153162.
1O. uoled in Diaminl, Ivolucio n del sislema ameiicano,`` p. 8.
11. Iailuie lo piomole polilical developmenl`` in lhe iegion in lhe 197Os led lhe \S gov-
einmenl lo shifl lhe focus lo human iighls in lhe 198Os. Soon aflei, Reagan`s Demociacy
Pio|ecl began lo pay allenlion lo elecloial assislance as pail of lhe adminislialion`s
menu of policies foi Cenlial Ameiica. Ileclions in Il Salvadoi and Honduias in 1984
and in Gualemala one yeai lalei weie assisled by lhe \S goveinmenl. Thomas M.
Iiank, The Imeiging Righl lo Democialic Goveinance,`` Ancrican 1ournal oj Intcr-
national 1aw, \ol. 86, 1anuaiy 1992; Thomas Caiolheis, The Resuigence of \S Polil-
ical Developmenl Assislance lo Lalin Ameiica in lhe 198O`s,`` in Whilehead, Thc Intcr-
national Dincnsions oj Dcnocratisation, pp. 13O131.
12. The signincance of democialic commilmenls in lhe Soulhein Cone goes beyond meie
iheloiical ileialion.`` Nol only have lhey been incoipoialed in lhe membeis` foieign
policies as a means of piolecling fiagile demociacies`` bul lhey have maleiialized in
specinc policies diiecled lowaids undemocialic iegimes. Andiew Huiiell, An Imeig-
ing Secuiily Communily in Soulh Ameiica,`` in Imanuel Adlei and Michael Bainell,
eds., Sccurity Connunitics, Cambiidge: Cambiidge \niveisily Piess, 1998, pp. 244 &
254.
13. Boiis H. opo, La seguiidad hemisfe iica hacia el siglo XX,`` papei piesenled al lhe
seminai on The Iuluie of nlei-Ameiican Relalions,`` Whealheihead Cenlei foi n-
leinalional Affaiis, Haivaid \niveisily, Seplembei 1998; Diaminl, Ivolucio n del sis-
lema ameiicano,`` pp. 1516.
14. This will be lhe mosl likely iesull unless alleinalive libeial democialic peispeclives,
placing lhe emphasis on individuals, become lhe engine of inleinalional democialic un-
deilakings. See Benedicl Kingsbuiy, Soveieignly and nequalily,`` in Andiew Huiiell
and Ngaiie Woods, eds., Incquality, Clobali;ation anJ VorlJ Iolitics, Oxfoid: Oxfoid
\niveisily Piess, 1999, pp. 8185.
15. n 1986, in an unpiecedenled acl, lhe Geneial Secielaiy of bolh lhe \niled Nalions and
lhe OAS offeied lhe nve Cenlial Ameiican counliies and lhe counliies included in lhe
Conladoia inilialive lo acl as medialoi in lhe iegional conicl. The lallei piomplly
sanclioned lhe inilialive which, since lhen, has become a cenlial pail of lhe pacincalion
piocess. See 1ack Child, Thc Ccntral Ancrican Icacc Iroccss, 19831991, Bouldei, CO:
Lynne Riennei; Piendes 1oige Ca ceies, La Oiganizacio n de Islados Ameiicanos en el
coniclo cenlioameiicano,`` papei deliveied al lhe Seminai on Demociacy and lhe
nlei-Ameiican Syslem, Cenlio de Isludios nleinacionales, \niveisidad de los Andes,
Bogola , Colombia, 1516 Apiil 1999, p. 15.
16. The \N agency foi elecloial supeivision in Nicaiagua was ciealed in 1989 following a
foimal iequesl by Nicaiagua`s foieign minislei, Miguel de Iscolo. Allhough lhe issue of
elecloial assislance had been piesenl since lhe mid-198Os as pail of lhe Reagan admin-
islialion`s policies lowaids Cenlial Ameiica, lhe Nicaiaguan eleclion was a luining
poinl, opening lhe doois lo \N and OAS elecloial assislance in lhe iegion. n 1991, lhe
inleinalional supeivision of lhe legislalive and municipal eleclions in Il Salvadoi helped
lhe piocess of negolialions leading lo lhe 1992 agieemenls. Similaily, lhe pailicipalion
of lhe \niled Nalions in lhe oiganizalion of lhe 1994 piesidenlial eleclions in Mexico
piovided lhe much-needed legilimacy lo lhe elecloial iesulls. And in Gualemala, lhe
OAS elecloial obseivalion missions slailed in 1995 and conlinued duiing lhe second
iound of lhe 1996 piesidenlial eleclions.
17. \icloi Bulmei-Thomas el al., eds., Mcxico anJ thc North Ancrican Ircc TraJc Agrcc-
ncnt. Vho Vill Bcnct? London: Macmillan, 1994; Huiiell and Woods, Incquality;
Kingsbuiy, Soveieignly and nequalily,`` p. 78.
18. Allhough in lhe nineleenlh cenluiy lhe developing balance of powei`` may have con-
liibuled lo check Iuiopean inleivenlion, nol only did lhe \S Civil Wai offei Iiance,
LATN AMIRCA 241
Spain, and Biilain an opening lo advance lheii inleiesls by foice in Mexico and else-
wheie, bul belween lhe mid-186Os and lhe beginning of lhe 189Os lhe failuie lo iepay
inleinalional debls piompled lhe lhieal of lhe use of foice by eighl Iuiopean counliies
againsl Colombia, Haili, Nicaiagua, Sanlo Domingo, and \enezuela. See 1ames Dun-
keiley, The \niled Slales and Lalin Ameiica in lhe Long Run (18OO1945),`` in \icloi
Bulmei-Thomas and 1. Dunkeiley, eds., Thc UnitcJ Statcs anJ 1atin Ancrica. Thc Ncw
AgcnJa, London: nslilule of Lalin Ameiican Sludies wilh lhe David Rockefellei
Cenlei foi Lalin Ameiican Sludies, Haivaid \niveisily, 1998, pp. 1416.
19. bid., pp. 81O, 17.
2O. bid., p. 26. n 1898 \S lioops weie deployed lo Cuba and Pueilo Rico, in 19O3 lo
lhe Dominican Republic, Panama, and Honduias, in 19O6 lo Cuba, Nicaiagua, and
Honduias, in 1912 lo Cuba and Nicaiagua, in 1914 lo Mexico, in 1915 lo Haili, in 1916 lo
lhe Dominican Republic, in 1924 lo Honduias, and in 1926 lo Nicaiagua. bid., lable 1.5,
pp. 19, 2226.
21. Illiol Abiams, The Ameiican Hemispheie aflei lhe Cold Wai,`` Thc Changing Sccu-
rity 1nvironncnt anJ Ancrican National Intcrcsts Vorking Iapcr Scrics, No. 5, Cam-
biidge, MA: Haivaid \niveisily Piess, 1993; Andiew Huiiell, Regionalismo en las
Ame iicas,`` in Abiaham I. Lowenlhal and Giegoiy I. Tieveilon, eds., Ancrica 1atina
cn un nonJo nucvo, Mexico, D.I.: Iondo de Culluia Icono mica, 1996; Auguslo \aias,
Iiom Coeicion lo Pailneiship: A New Paiadigm foi Secuiily Coopeialion in lhe
Weslein Hemispheie,`` in 1onalhan Haillyn el al., eds., Thc UnitcJ Statcs anJ 1atin
Ancrica in thc 1990s, Chapel Hill: \niveisily of Noilh Caiolina Piess, 1992; Auguslo
\aias, La seguiidad hemisfe iica coopeialiva de la posgueiia fiia,`` in Pellicei, 1a
scguriJaJ intcrnacional cn Ancrica 1atina y cl Caribc.
22. This view has also been undeipinned by aigumenls poinling lo changes in \S powei,
limiling ils iegional hegemony and ils capacily lo conliol all inleinalional aclions in lhe
iegion, as well as by lhe assumplion lhal lhe chances of mullilaleial iegional endeavouis
involving lhe \niled Slales aie now highei lhan evei. See 1oseph Tulchin, Redennii la
seguiidad nacional en el hemisfeiio occidenlal. Il papel del mullilaleialismo,`` Ioro
Intcrnational, \ol. 38, No. 1, 1anuaiyMaich 1998, pp. 111117.
23. Robeilo Sleinei, Hooked on Diugs: Colombian\S Relalions,`` in Bulmei-Thomas
and Dunkeiley, Thc UnitcJ Statcs anJ 1atin Ancrica, p. 163.
24. Hiisl, Slialegic Coeicion,`` p. 151.
25. The evolulion of lhe ciisis in Haili bioughl lo lhe suiface old appiehensions aboul
lhe implicalions of mililaiy inleivenlion and sliiied up a debale aboul poslCold Wai
inleivenlionism. Allhough counliies such as Aigenlina and \enezuela swiflly suppoiled
and pailicipaled in lhe \N mililaiy inleivenlion, lack of consensus wilhin lhe OAS
iolled back lhe iegional oiganizalion fiom lhe cenlie slage. As lhe \niled Nalions
moved lowaids mililaiy inleivenlion, lhe OAS explicilly expiessed ils piefeience foi lhe
conlinualion of economic sanclions. Hiisl, Slialegic Coeicion,`` p. 161.
26. Kingsbuiy, Soveieignly and nequalily,`` pp. 8687.
27. opo, La seguiidad hemisfe iica,`` p. 16; Huiiell, An Imeiging Secuiily Communily,``
p. 254.
28. Wheieas mililaiy defeal in lhe MalvinasjIalklands Wai played an impoilanl iole and
signincanlly inuenced lhe piocess of liansilion lo demociacy in Aigenlina, in Biazil lhe
pace and scope of democializalion weie lo an impoilanl exlenl maiked by lhe dynamics
associaled wilh polilical libeializalion. Diffeienl avenues lo democializalion could in-
uence lhe aclual conlenl of lhe new goveinmenl`s policies. See Lauience Whilehead,
On Refoim of lhe Slale and Regulalion of lhe Maikel,`` in VorlJ Dcvclopncnt, Spe-
cial ssue on Iconomic Libeializalion and Democializalion: Ixploialions and Linkages,
\ol. 21, No. 8, 1993.
29. Duiing lhe Haili ciisis, Biazil, as a non-peimanenl membei of lhe \N Secuiily Council,
mobilized opposilion lo a pioposal calling foi a blockade. Moieovei, logelhei wilh
China, Biazil decided lo abslain when Resolulion 94O was passed. Hiisl, Slialegic
Coeicion,`` pp. 158 and 161; Huiiell, An Imeiging Secuiily Communily,`` pp. 254255.
3O. Back in lhe lale 193Os lhe Mexican goveinmenl denied iecognilion lo lhe Iianco gov-
einmenl in Spain, while offeiing asylum lo lhe iepublican goveinmenl in exile. Similai
policies weie followed duiing lhe 1973 coup againsl lhe goveinmenl of Salvadoi Al-
lende in Chile and again duiing lhe Cenlial Ameiican ciisis, when, |oinlly wilh Iiance,
Mexico iecognized lhe belligeienl slalus of lhe gueiiillas in Il Salvadoi.
31. Covaiiubias, No inleivencion veisus piomocio n de la demociacia iepiesenlaliva,`` p. 8.
32. Rodiiguez y Rodiiguez 1esu s, Mexico y los paclos y convenciones de deiechos hu-
manos,`` in Secielaiia de Relaciones Ixleiioies, Mcxico y la Ia;, Me xico D.I.: SRI,
1986.
33. Mexico`s exemplion was pailly lhe iesull of a benevolenl inleinalional view of whal was
consideied lo be an inclusive aulhoiilaiian iegime lhal oflen mainlained a piogiessive
sland on human iighls issues. This included lhe asylum gianled lo Aigenline and Chil-
ean iefugees in lhe 197Os. See Mo nica Seiiano, La dimensio n inleinacional del cambio
polilico en Me xico,`` in Il Colegio de Me xico, Anuario Mcxico, 1staJos UniJos y Can-
aJa 199899, Me xico D.I.: Il Colegio de Me xico, 1999.
34. Mounling piessuies ullimalely led lo a seiious ciisis belween lhe Zedillo goveinmenl
and human iighls gioups in 1998. Despile impoilanl piogiess, including lhe iecognilion
of lhe |uiisdiclion of lhe nlei-Ameiican Human Righls Couil, lhe iesponse of lhe
Mexican goveinmenl lo lhis ciisis was lo lighlen lhe visa iequiiemenls foi human iighls
obseiveis. See Seiiano, La dimensio n inleinacional del cambio polilico en Me xico.``
35. Secielaiia de Relaciones Ixleiioies, Comunicado del Giupo de Rio, 25 Maich 1999.
36. Secielaiia de Relaciones Ixleiioies, Communique No. 121, Me xico D.I., 24 Maich
1999.
37. Secielaiia de Relaciones Ixleiioies, Communique No. 141, Me xico D.I., 13 Apiil 1999.
38. Secielaiia de Relaciones Ixleiioies, Communique No. 156, Me xico D.I., 21 Apiil 1999;
Secielaiia de Relaciones Ixleiioies, Communique No. 231, Me xico D.I., 1O 1une 1999.
39. Mo nica Seiiano, Civil \iolence in Chiapas: The Oiigins and lhe Causes of lhe Revoll,``
in Mo nica Seiiano, ed., Mcxico. Asscssing Nco-1ibcral Rcjorn, London: nslilule of
Lalin Ameiican Sludies, 1997; Seiiano, La dimensio n inleinacional del cambio polilico
en Me xico.``
4O. Pailicipalion in peacekeeping opeialions abioad has helped Soulhein Cone counliies lo
deal wilh lhe difncull issue of civilian conliol of a highly polilicized mililaiy. Similaily, in
Spain lhe decision lo |oin NATO was seen as an addilional mechanism lo encouiage
democialic conliol of lhe mililaiy eslablishmenl.
41. See lhe liansciipl of lhe inleiview held by Minislei Luis Ielipe Lampieia in Minisle iio
das Relacoes Ixleiioies, nfoimac ao No. 132, 15 Apiil 1999.
42. Allhough Biazil iemains opposed lo lhe ciealion of a peimanenl \N deploymenl foice,
il has long expeiience in peacekeeping missions. n lhe mid-196Os, moie lhan 6,5OO
Biazilian soldieis conliibuled lo peacekeeping opeialions in Suez. Iollowing lhe lian-
silion lo demociacy, successive Biazilian goveinmenls have conlinued lo iecognize,
lhough moie cauliously, lhe polenlial of peacekeeping missions. Biazilian mililaiy ob-
seiveis weie senl lo bolh ex-ugoslavia and Iasl Timoi. Minisle iio das Relacoes Ix-
leiioies, nfoimac ao No. 425, 2O Seplembei 1999; and Huiiell, An Imeiging Secuiily
Communily,`` p. 151.
43. On 15 Apiil 1999 lhe lowei chambei of lhe Chilean Congiess issued a declaialion ad-
diessed lo lhe minislei of foieign affaiis expiessing ils opposilion lo lhe inleivenlion in
ugoslavia. Among lhe main faclois menlioned in lhe declaialion, lhe lack of suppoil
LATN AMIRCA 243
fiom lhe Secuiily Council was lhe mosl impoilanl. See Chambei of Depulies, Pioyeclo
de Acueido,`` \alpaiaiso, 15 Apiil 1999.
44. Communique s on lhe Kosovo ciisis, Sanliago de Chile, 25 Maich 1999, and Chile, Misio n
Peimanenle anle las Naciones \nidas, Slalemenl by lhe Minislei of Ioieign Affaiis of
Chile, Mi 1ose Miguel nsulza, al lhe Iifly-Thiid Session of lhe Geneial Assembly,``
New oik, 23 Seplembei 1998.
45. Imbassy of Chile, Segundo conlaclo lelefo nico con el Minislio de Relaciones Ix-
leiioies don 1uan Gabiiel \alde s aceica de la ieunio n con la Secielaiia de Islado, Sia
Madeleine Albiighl,`` London, IROINIOX, No. 154, 9 Augusl 1999.
46. The only exceplion lo lhis was lhe deploymenl of a conlingenl of policemen lo Cenlial
Ameiica. n lhe conlexl of lhe Kosovo ciisis, lhe minislei of foieign affaiis declaied:
Mexico has nevei pailicipaled, noi will il pailicipale in \N peacekeeping opeialions.
This is due lo conslilulional ieasons.`` Thus, Mexico foieign policy shows ils full adhei-
ence lo lhe piinciples of non-inleivenlion and lhe peaceful solulion of conlioveisies as
slaled in ils Conslilulion (Secielaiia de Relaciones Ixleiioies, Communique No. 2O3,
Me xico D.I., 26 May 1999). Cenlial lo Mexico`s ieluclance lo pailicipale in lhese op-
eialions is lhe pailiculai pallein of civilmililaiy ielalions buill ovei 75 yeais of he-
gemonic iule. See Mo nica Seiiano, The Aimed Bianch of lhe Slale: CivilMililaiy
Relalions in Mexico,`` 1ournal oj 1atin Ancrican StuJics, \ol. 27, No. 2, 1995.
16
Soulh Afiica: The demand foi
legilimale mullilaleialism
Ihilip Ncl
Oveiview
As would be expecled of lhe cuiienl chaii of lhe Non-Aligned Movemenl
(NAM), lhe (lhen) chaii of lhe Soulhein Afiican Developmenl Commu-
nily (SADC), lhe chaii of lhe \niled Nalions Confeience on Tiade and
Developmenl (\NCTAD), and lhe piospeclive chaii of lhe Common-
weallh, Soulh Afiica fell compelled lo expiess ilself on lhe Kosovo ciisis
as il unfolded fiom lale 1998 lo 1une 1999. uielly, il suppoiled effoils by
lhe \niled Nalions lo pievenl a fuilhei escalalion of lhe conicl in lale
1998, bul il decided lo complemenl lhis quiel diplomacy wilh a moie
public slance by openly ciilicizing NATO`s unilaleial aclion lo punish
ugoslavia mililaiily. This came in lhe foim of a media slalemenl made
on 25 Maich 1999, which also ieconnimed Soulh Afiica`s commilmenl
lo nnding a \N-biokeied and \N-implemenled solulion lo lhe Kosovo
ciisis. Iuilheimoie, as chaii of NAM, Soulh Afiica look lhe inilialive on
9 Apiil 1999 of gelling lhe pievious chaii (Colombia) and lhe nexl chaii
(Bangladesh) lo issue |oinlly wilh Soulh Afiica a slalemenl expiessing
concein ovei lhe silualion in Kosovo and afniming NAM`s belief in lhe
\N Secuiily Council (\NSC) as lhe appiopiiale conicl iegulalion
agency. Allhough lhis slalemenl conlained an implicil condemnalion of
NATO`s aclions, il was much less diiecl lhan lhe Soulh Afiican slalemenl
of 25 Maich. This ieecls lhe difncully of nnding consensus in such a
diveise body as NAM. Howevei, lhe meie facl lhal a slalemenl was
245
issued was a ma|oi bieaklhiough foi Soulh Afiica`s allempls lo gel NAM
lo be a moie aclive playei on lhe woild slage.
Soulh Afiica`s sliongly woided slalemenl of Maich was followed on
8 May 1999 wilh a public condemnalion by lhe Soulh Afiican govein-
menl of lhe iaid on lhe Chinese embassy in Belgiade, and a iemindei
lhal Soulh Afiica had wained lhal nolhing good would come of NATO`s
unilaleial mililaiy aclion. While visiling Russia, Hungaiy, Pakislan, and
China duiing lale Apiil and eaily May 1999, Nelson Mandela, lhen slill
piesidenl, made a poinl of ciilicizing NATO`s aclions explicilly in Russia
and in China, bul he also made il cleai lhal lhe Soulh Afiican gov-
einmenl condemned lhe genocidal aclions by ugoslav foices loyal lo
Slobodan Milosevic againsl Albanian Kosovais.
Iinally, on 11 1une 1999 lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl welcomed lhe
agieemenl ieached lhe pievious day lo cease hoslililies in ugoslavia.
Iuilheimoie, il welcomes lhe adoplion of lhe \N Secuiily Council Resolulion
1244 on Kosovo and lhe decision lo iesoil lo polilical effoils lo iesolve lhe ciisis.
l is an impoilanl slep by lhe \niled Nalions Secuiily Council, as lhe piimaiy
oigan iesponsible foi inleinalional peace and secuiily, in ils effoils lo secuie
lhe following: an end lo lhe conicl in ugoslavia and iepiession in Kosovo,
lhe safe and fiee ieluin lo Kosovo of all iefugees and displaced peisons undei lhe
supeivision of lhe \NHCR and lhe evenlual economic developmenl and sla-
bilily of lhis ciisis-loin iegion.1
Why lhis foiceful ieaclion by Soulh Afiica, and why, specincally, did
Soulh Afiica came oul so sliongly in favoui of a compiehensive mulli-
laleial appioach lo lhe ciisis? The puipose of lhis chaplei is lo pul lhese
slalemenls and Soulh Afiica`s diplomacy on Kosovo in geneial in a
bioadei inleipielalive peispeclive, sliessing lhe noimalive and slialegic
consideialions behind Soulh Afiica`s aclions. The chaplei consisls of
lhiee pails, based loosely on lhe lhiee lhemes suggesled by lhe sub-lille
of lhis book: sclcctivc inJignation, collcctivc intcrvcntion, and intcrnational
citi;cnship.
n lhe nisl pail, look al lhe vaiious aclois involved in deleimining
Soulh Afiica`s`` ieaclion, and ask, among olheis, aboul lhe possible
seleclive naluie of lheii indignalion. lhen luin lo lhe noimalive heail of
Soulh Afiica`s policy, namely ils sliong commilmenl lo a liuly collcctivc,
lhal is, nultilatcral appioach lo issues iaised by lhe Kosovo ciisis. Whal
lies behind lhis commilmenl, and is il being puisued consislenlly? How
does Soulh Afiica`s and by implicalion lhe Non-Aligned Movemenl`s
undeislanding of colleclive`` behavioui diffei fiom lhe colleclive inlei-
venlion`` puisued by NATO? Iinally, lhe chaplei iaises some queslions
aboul lhe bioadei implicalions of lhe Kosovo ciisis, and lhe implicalions
of lhe appioach adopled by Soulh Afiica foi woild polilics in geneial.
Do Kosovo and ils denouemenl acl as haibingeis of a new, liansfoimed
(oi liansfoimable) woild oidei, oi do lhey simply ieinfoice lhe palleins
of lhe old, fundamenlally awed oidei? Whal can and should counliies
of lhe global Soulh do lo piolecl lheii inleiesls, including lhose of lhe
maiginalized and exploiled among lheii populalions?
Seleclive indignalion?
The hisloiical expeiiences of Soulh Afiicans wilh disciiminalion have
imbued lhe allenlive public and e lile wilh a sliong moial cosmopoli-
lanism,2 especially as fai as elhnic cleansing`` is conceined. The down-
side of lhis moial cosmopolilanism`` is of couise a lendency lo view
malleis fiom a Manichean peispeclive, in which iighl and wiong aie
cleaily dislinguishable and dislinguished. n lheii moial indignalion
aboul lhe inexcusable Seibian aliocilies in Kosovo, lhe Soulh Afiican
media lended like mosl of lhe media oulside lhe Slavic woild lo
demonize Milosevic in pailiculai and lhe Seibs in geneial. Allhough lhis
is piobably |uslined as fai as Milosevic is conceined, legilimale queslions
should be asked aboul ways in which lhe ieal, if heavily inaled, feais of
Seibs should be addiessed. Sophislicaled and disceining analyses aboul
lhe conicl and ils causes weie laigely absenl fiom lhe Soulh Afiican
media. Neveilheless, lhe ofncial Soulh Afiican ieaclion lo and policy
lowaids Kosovo weie, on balance, even-handed.
Allempls weie made soon aflei lhe oulbieak of hoslililies in Kosovo in
1998 and, specincally, aflei lhe deleiioialion of lhe silualion in eaily 1999
lo involve Nelson Mandela in a medialing iole. Repoils lhal Mandela,
lhen slill piesidenl of lhe Republic of Soulh Afiica, was insliumenlal
in unlying lhe Lockeibie knol involving Libya and lhe \S and \K gov-
einmenls (and piivale gioups) iaised expeclalions in some ciicles lhal
Mandela`s moial slaluie could be musleied lo biokei a deal belween
NATO, lhe ugoslavian aulhoiilies, and lhe Kosovo Albanians. Wisely,
Mandela eaily on decided lhal he and lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl,
olheiwise lhan in lhe Lockeibie case, had veiy lillle leveiage on any side,
and should lheiefoie slay oul of lhe mallei. Addilional conceins weie lhe
giowing conicl, al lhal slage, in lhe Democialic Republic of lhe Congo
(DRC), which was alieady laxing Soulh Afiica`s limiled conicl ieso-
lulion capacily lo lhe full, and lhe piospecl of lhe upcoming nalional
eleclions in Soulh Afiica, only lhe second since lhe counliy gol iid of
apailheid. Mandela did, lalei on in lhe conicl, and also aflei il ended in
1une 1999, lhiew his weighl behind inleinalional allempls lo fiee lwo
Auslialian aid woikeis who weie kepl caplive by lhe ugoslav aulhoi-
ilies. These lwo weie ieleased on 3 Seplembei 1999, aflei Mandela spoke
peisonally wilh Milosevic.
SO\TH AIRCA 247
Duiing his well-publicized faiewell`` liip lo Russia, Hungaiy, Pakislan,
and China, Mandela was veiy caieful nol lo be seen lo be seleclive in
his moial condemnalion of whal was happening in Kosovo. The visil lo
Russia in pailiculai was exliemely sensilive, because il was lhe nisl lime
lhal Mandela had visiled Russia, despile numeious pievious allempls on
bolh sides lo secuie a visil. The iepealed cancellalion of Mandela`s
inlended visil became a diplomalic embaiiassmenl foi bolh sides. l also
did nol help lo iebuild lhe once nim ielalionship belween lhe \SSR
and lhe Afiican Nalional Congiess (ANC). This ielalionship suffeied a
numbei of selbacks duiing lhe eaily 199Os, pailly because of whal lhe
ANC peiceived lo be loo much of a rapprochcncnt belween Russia
undei Boiis ellsin and lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl befoie 1994.
Given lhe sensilivilies in Russia aboul ugoslavia, one would have
expecled lhal Mandela would caiefully avoid saying anylhing lhal would
endangei lhe fiagile ielalionship belween Soulh Afiica and lhe Russian
Iedeialion. ndeed, Mandela was caieful nol lo affionl his hosls, and
when asked by |ouinalisls he made a poinl of ciilicizing NATO`s unilal-
eial mililaiy aclion againsl ugoslavia in no unceilain leims. His slale-
menl echoed lhe poinl made in Soulh Afiica`s ofncial slalemenl of 25
Maich 1999, namely lhal Soulh Afiica condemns such behavioui because
il undeimines lhe legilimacy of lhe \N Secuiily Council. Howevei,
Mandela did go fuilhei lhan lhe slalemenl of 25 Maich in lhal he also
ciilicized acls of so-called elhnic cleansing peipelialed againsl Kosovo
Albanians.
While addiessing Bei|ing \niveisily on 6 May 1999, Mandela iepealed
lhis even-handed appioach, by again bolh ciilicizing NATO and con-
demning elhnic cleansing. l is woilh ciling Mandela`s woids in full:
Whal is happening in ielalion lo Kosovo, in lhese nnal yeais of lhe lwenlielh
cenluiy, is deeply disluibing. On lhe one hand human iighls sel oul in lhe \ni-
veisal Declaialion of Righls aie being violaled in elhnic cleansing. On lhe olhei
hand lhe \niled Nalions Secuiily Council is being ignoied by lhe unilaleial and
desliuclive aclion of some of ils peimanenl membeis. Bolh aclions musl be con-
demned in lhe sliongesl leims.
This is a mallei lhal lioubles us nol only because of ils immediale impacl. Like
lhe challenge of developmenl, il iaised queslions aboul oui inleinalional inslilu-
lions. Can lhe woild affoid, al lhe end of lhe cenluiy lhal has seen so much pain
and suffeiing, lo iisk damaging lhe aulhoiily of lhe woild body lhal has lhe lask
of mainlaining inleinalional peace and secuiily on lhe basis of iespecl foi lhe
soveieignly of nalions!3
The condemnalion of elhnic cleansing, and by implicalion of lhe Milo-
sevic goveinmenl, did go a long way lowaids quelling speculalion lhal lhe
Soulh Afiican goveinmenl was laking sides in lhe Kosovo ciisis. Peisis-
lenl iumouis, also published in Soulh Afiican newspapeis, would have il
lhal Milosevic`s family had money slowed away in Soulh Afiica, and lhal
Milosevic himself was consideiing laking up offeied cuslody in Soulh
Afiica, in ieluin foi his ielinquishing powei.
These weie piobably no moie lhan lhal: iumouis. No independenl
connimalion could be found, bul il does nol mean lhal lhe Soulh Afiican
goveinmenl was insensilive lo accusalions lhal ils sliong condemnalion
of NATO had as ils coiollaiy a pailialily lowaids Milosevic. Allhough in
Maich 1999 lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl had issued an invilalion lo all
\N membei slales, including ugoslavia, lo allend lhe inauguialion of
ils newly elecled piesidenl on 16 1une 1999, eaily in 1une lhe Govein-
menl of Nalional \nily (GN\) made il cleai lhal Milosevic would nol be
welcome. 1usl befoie lhe announcemenl, Milosevic and foui membeis of
his goveinmenl weie indicled foi wai ciimes by lhe \N nleinalional
Ciiminal Tiibunal (an aclion lhal was nol univeisally welcomed in Soulh
Afiica, given lhe dangei lhal il posed lo allempls aimed al gelling
Milosevic lo agiee lo lhe leims of a selllemenl). On 7 1une 1999, Soulh
Afiica made il cleai lhal il would honoui lhe decision by lhe \N Tiibu-
nal, and lhal Milosevic would nol be welcome.
All in all, one can lhus conclude lhal lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl
was bolh consislenl and, evenlually, also even-handed in ils indignalion
aboul whal was happening in Kosovo and aboul NATO`s aclions. Whal
lhe above does nol ieveal, howevei, is why lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl
look lhe specinc posilion il did. This is lhe lheme of lhe nexl seclion.
Colleclive inleivenlion? Nol colleclive enough!
Soulh Afiica has veiy few diiecl maleiial inleiesls al slake in lhe Balkans
apail fiom lhe polenlial impacl lhal lhe evei-piesenl lhieal of a ma|oi
confionlalion belween Russia and lhe Wesl may have on global maikel
slabilily and on lhe gold piice. Hisloiically, links belween Soulh Afiica
and ugoslavia aie also limiled, excepl foi lwo lhings. Iiisl, and only in-
diieclly ielevanl, lhe claimanl lo lhe Albanian lhione, Leka, sellled in
Soulh Afiica aflei lhe Second Woild Wai and buill up a faiily close ie-
lalionship wilh lhe apailheid goveinmenl, piedominanlly because of his
sliong anli-communisl views. A small Seibian communily also sellled in
Soulh Afiica, mainly since lhe 198Os.
Secondly, and much moie impoilanlly, ugoslavia was a suppoilei of
lhe nalional libeialion sliuggle lhal conliibuled lo lhe end of apailheid.
ls founding iole in lhe Non-Aligned Movemenl, and Tilo`s slaunch in-
dependence fiom lhe iivaliy belween lhe lwo supeipoweis, gave ugo-
slavia a veiy high iepulalion among especially lhe ANC componenl of
SO\TH AIRCA 249
lhe Goveinmenl of Nalional \nily lhal came inlo powei in 1994 and was
ie-elecled in 1999. The bieak-up of socialisl ugoslavia in lhe eaily 199Os
also pievenled lhe same alienalion belween lhe ANC and ugoslav au-
lhoiilies as sel in belween lhem and posl-communisl iegimes elsewheie
in Iaslein and Cenlial Iuiope. Aflei 199O, lhe while minoiily govein-
menl led by De Kleik moved fasl lo mend ielalions wilh Poland, Roma-
nia, lhe Czech Republic, and Hungaiy. The enlhusiasm wilh which lhese
goveinmenls embiaced lhe De Kleik goveinmenl, while negolialions
foi a new conslilulional dispensalion weie slill going on in Soulh Afiica,
caused lhe ANC much giief and sel fuluie ielalions belween Soulh
Afiica and Iaslein Iuiope back many yeais.
Neveilheless, langible Soulh Afiican inleiesls in ugoslavia in geneial,
and Kosovo in pailiculai, aie limiled. Howevei, lhe alieady menlioned
leadeiship iesponsibililies beslowed on Soulh Afiica duiing lhe 199Os, as
well as a numbei of bioadei noimalive and slialegic inleiesls, bioughl
Soulh Afiica in 1999 lo iespond foicefully lo lhe Kosovo ciisis and lhe
bioadei ugoslav pioblem.`` To a limiled exlenl lhis is a conlinualion
of a liend: lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl in 1994 and lalei expiessed
in vaiious foims ils concein aboul lhe Bosnian silualion, called on lhe
pailies involved lo move lowaids peace, and evenlually welcomed lhe
Daylon Accoids. ls ieaclions in 1999 lo whal was happening in Kosovo,
howevei, weie much moie foiceful, diiecl, and even piesciiplive.
The facl lhal by Maich 1999 lhe Depailmenl of Ioieign Affaiis (DIA)
had a champion of human iighls as ils new and enlhusiaslic Diiecloi
Geneial piovides an elemenl of lhe explanalion foi lhis foicefulness.
1ackie Selebi made his name as chaii of lhe \N Commission on Human
Righls, and in 1998 ieceived an inleinalional awaid foi his iole in ievilal-
izing lhe Commission. By Maich 1999 Selebi had laken Soulh Afiican
diplomals lhiough a slialegic planning piocess fiom which lhey emeiged
commilled, focused, and biimming wilh conndence. l was cleai lo any
oulside obseivei lhal lhe DIA would in fuluie ieacl less equivocally lhan
in lhe pasl if il believed lhal a mallei should be addiessed.
Piocesses inleinal lo lhe DIA can piovide only pail of lhe answei,
lhough. We have lo iecognize lhal ugoslav aclion in Kosovo, and spe-
cincally NATO`s unilaleial decision lo lake mililaiy aclion againsl lhe
Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia, louched upon a numbei of ma|oi noima-
live and slialegic conceins lhal Soulh Afiica had been cullivaling, some-
limes hallingly, since 1994. The noimalive conceins include lhe following
so-called pillais of lhe new Soulh Afiican foieign policy:
.
a commilmenl lo lhe pioleclion of human iighls;
.
a commilmenl lo nnding peaceful solulions lo inleinalional conicls
(bioadly denned);
.
a iespecl foi inleinalional law;
.
a desiie lo slienglhen \N and olhei mullilaleial inslilulions, bolh
lhiough iefoim (lo make lhem moie iesponsive lo a widei aiiay of in-
leiesls lhan lo dale) and lhiough piomoling iespecl foi lheii inlegiily.
The lasl of lhese noimalive commilmenls iesonales especially sliongly in
all lhe ofncial ieaclions by lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl lo lhe Kosovo
ciisis. This is liue of lhe lhiee slalemenls iepiinled in lhe appendix, bul il
is also a cleai lheme in lhe slalemenl made by Mandela in Bei|ing (see
above). Why lhis emphasis?
The easy and somewhal cynical answei, in some iespecls al leasl, is lhal
lhis ieecls (a) some haid lessons lhal Soulh Afiica leained in Lesolho
only a few monlhs befoie; (b) a slialegic choice lhal Soulh Afiica has
made, specincally lo inciease ils chances of becoming a peimanenl
membei of lhe \N Secuiily Council if and when agieemenl is ieached on
lhe exlension of peimanenl membeiship; and (c) a possible allempl by
Soulh Afiica lo safeguaid ilself, and lhe Afiican conlinenl, fiom fuluie
unilaleial inleivenlion by lhe ma|oi poweis in domeslic Afiican affaiis
undei lhe iubiic of humanilaiian conceins.`` Allhough all lhiee of lhese
faclois did play a iole, lhey cannol accounl fully foi lhe sliong noimalive
posilion lhal Soulh Afiica did lake. Lel us biiey look al each of lhem.
Thc 1csotho cxpcricncc
Soulh Afiica (SA) did indeed have lo leain haid lessons duiing lhe
somewhal disaslious inleivenlion by ils own lioops in Lesolho, oslensibly
lo pievenl a pending coup Jctat on 22 Seplembei 1998.4 Allhough ofn-
cially sanclioned by lhe Soulhein Afiican Developmenl Communily lo
do so (SA foices weie lalei |oined by Bolswana foices), il ieceived quile
a lol of ciilicism inleinally and fiom abioad lhal ils inleivenlion was nol,
in lhe full sense of lhe woid, sanclioned by lhe \NSC as is piovided foi
in lhe \N Chailei. As a counliy lhal was liying veiy haid lo ie-eslablish
ils ciedenlials as a good woild cilizen, lhe accusalion lhal il acled if nol
illegally lhen al leasl conliaiy lo eslablished noims was a ma|oi embai-
iassmenl. n fuluie, lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl would seek explicil
\NSC endoisemenl foi whalevei peace missions il would undeilake.
Given lhis backgiound, il was nol suipiising lhal Soulh Afiica would
ieacl sliongly againsl whal il, and mosl obseiveis in Afiica, peiceived lo
be unilaleial aclion by NATO wilh iespecl lo Kosovo.
Iunting jor a Sccurity Council pcrnancnt scat
Ovei iecenl yeais, lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl has developed lhe
capacily lo punch above ils weighl`` in mullilaleial foiums, as Selebi has
pul il. On lhis basis, and on lhe basis of a long-slanding and veiy close
afnnily belween lhe ANC and lhe \niled Nalions, specincally lhe \N
Geneial Assembly, some Soulh Afiican decision makeis have slailed lo
SO\TH AIRCA 251
conlemplale lhe possibilily lhal Soulh Afiica can aspiie lo play a piomi-
nenl and moie peimanenl iole wilhin lhe \N family, including lhe
achievemenl of peimanenl membei slalus wilhin lhe \N Secuiily Council.
l is of couise nol a foiegone ceilainly lhal Soulh Afiica would achieve
lhal slalus. Iiisl, pioposals by lhe Oiganizalion of Afiican \nily (OA\)
foi an exlension of peimanenl membeiship make piovision foi lwo io-
laling iepiesenlalives fiom Afiica, wheieas Soulh Afiica seems lo favoui
an idea pul foiwaid by some leading aclois in lhe Non-Aligned Move-
menl, namely lhal lheie be one peimanenl iepiesenlalive fiom each of
Asia, Afiica, and Lalin Ameiica. Secondly, even if lhe OA\ weie lo
agiee lo one peimanenl iepiesenlalive fiom Afiica, lheie is no guaianlee
lhal il would be Soulh Afiica (a democialic Nigeiia and Igypl being
sliong conlendeis as well).
Neveilheless, il can be aigued lhal lhe emphasis lhal Soulh Afiica is
placing on mullilaleialism in ils foieign policy, and in lhe case of Kosovo
ils insislence lhal lhe \NSC is lhe appiopiiale inslilulion lo lackle lhe
issue, aie all pail of a slialegy lo secuie suppoil foi ils bid foi a peima-
nenl seal. Wilhoul discounling lhe desiie by Soulh Afiican decision
makeis lo achieve such a slalus evenlually, such an explanalion of Soulh
Afiica`s behavioui leaves oul loo much (see below).
Irotcction
NATO aclions in ugoslavia do indeed iaise many feais on lhe Afiican
conlinenl lhal lhe Wesl`` is incieasingly (mis-)using humanilaiian con-
ceins as an excuse lo inleivene unilaleially in lhe domeslic affaiis of
weakei slales. Given Afiica`s expeiience, ovei almosl lwo decades, of
how polilical condilionalilies have been allowed lo deleimine ils com-
meicial and aid ielalionship wilh ils main liading and aid pailneis, Afii-
can leadeis have good ieasons lo be feaiful. Iuilheimoie, lhe giowing
polilical-economic cloul of lhe G-7, and whal many Afiicans peiceive lo
be lhe sleady undeimining of lhe \NSC aflei Boulios Boulios-Ghali
depailed, piovide giounds foi concein. Thus, Soulh Afiica could indeed
have been giving voice lo lhese conceins when il came oul so sliongly
in favoui of \NSC oveisighl whenevei inleivenlion of any soil is
conlemplaled.
Of lhe lhiee explanalions suggesled above, lhe lasl biings us peihaps
closesl lo an appiecialion of lhe molivalions of lhe Soulh Afiican gov-
einmenl. The pioblem wilh looking al lhese lhiee molivalions in isola-
lion is lhal lhey laigely ignoie Soulh Afiica`s posilion in woild polilics
and how lhis is denned by lhe specinc foim of polilical compiomise lhal
led lo lhe foimalion of a new slale aflei 1994. Iqually impoilanl, il
ignoies lhe consideiable evidence of a sliong noimalive commilmenl lo
mullilaleialism on lhe pail of lhe GN\. This commilmenl is nol wilhoul
ils pioblems, bul il has lo be laken seiiously as a commilmenl, and as a
molivalional facloi explaining Soulh Afiican behavioui. n whal follows,
biiey summaiize how lhis commilmenl lo mullilaleialism is ielaled lo
Soulh Afiica`s inleinal polilics and ils posilion in woild affaiis.
Soulh Afiica seems lo nl well inlo a deduclive model of a lypical
emeiging middle powei in lhe Soulh. l cleaily has mullilaleial inleiesls
lhal aie widei lhan simply iegional, and a faiily sliong inleinalionalisl
commilmenl and a piedileclion foi mullilaleial inslilulions. ls behavioui
in lhese inslilulions lends lo be iefoimisl wilhoul fundamenlally chal-
lenging hegemonic noims. This iefoimisl-cum-syslem-mainlaining be-
havioui is a funclion of a complex mix of specinc slalesociely ielalions,
lhe GN\`s conceplion of ils posilion in a globalizing woild economy, and
an ambiguous ielalionship wilh lhe \niled Slales.
One can explain Soulh Afiica`s high mullilaleial pionle pailly as an
expiession of an inleinalionalisl commilmenl (no doubl ielaled lo lhe
suppoil lhal lhe libeialion movemenl ieceived fiom lhe inleinalional
communily), bul also as somelhing lhal an expeclanl inleinalional
communily has imposed on lhe counliy. Whal is nol cleai, howevei, is
why lhe GN\`s mullilaleial behavioui displays lhe lypical pallein of
ambiguily (iefoimisl bul neveilheless syslem suppoilive) of emeiging
middle poweis in lhe Soulh. An explanalion foi lhis musl iesl on a
bioadei undeislanding of lhe fundamenlal ambiguily in how lhe policy
e lile iesponded lo Soulh Afiica`s inseilion inlo a global polilical econ-
omy chaiacleiized by viiulenl neo-libeialism and globalizalion; and of
lhe specinc slalesociely aiiangemenl lhal lies al lhe heail of lhe Soulh
Afiican liansilion.5
Howevei, il would be wiong lo ielegale Soulh Afiica`s commilmenl
lo mullilaleial inslilulions, and specincally ils adamanl emphasis in lhe
Kosovo ciisis on iespecling lhe \NSC as lhe sole legilimale inleinalional
body lo deal wilh peace and slabilily, lo being a funclion simply of lhe
domeslic coipoialisl pacl sliuck since 1994. Behind il lies also a vision, an
ideal of how woild polilics can and should be changed lo iid il of lhe
blalanl inequalilies and iniquilies of lhe piesenl. To lhe exlenl lhal Soulh
Afiica can play a moial iole in woild affaiis and lhis abilily is limiled,
we musl agiee il will be aiound lhe vision of a liuly mullilaleial woild.
This biings us lo lhe lasl of lhe lopics suggesled by lhe sub-lille of lhis
book, namely intcrnational citi;cnship.
nleinalional cilizenship
Mullilaleialism in woild polilics had ils golden age in lhe eaily 199Os.
Today, howevei, lheie aie incieasing signs of an undeiculling of mulli-
laleialism as an inslilulion by:
SO\TH AIRCA 253
.
an incieasingly unilaleialisl-inclined \niled Slales, as exemplined foi
inslance by Congiess`s iefusal lo ialify lhe Compiehensive Tesl-ban
Tiealy, by lhe iefusal lo pay ils back \N dues, and by an adminislia-
lion lhal iefuses lo endoise ma|oi noimalive innovalions such as lhe
1997 Ollawa Tiealy banning anli-peisonnel landmines and lhe 1998
Rome Slalule selling up lhe nleinalional Ciiminal Couil;
.
a NATO bolsleied in ils self-iighleousness by ils vicloiy`` ovei
ugoslavia;
.
lhe giowing iole of seleclive oligaichies such as lhe G-7 and polenlially
(allhough we will have lo wail and see) lhe G-2O (of which Soulh
Afiica, iionically, is a membei).
n such limes, il is impoilanl lo be ieminded lhal mullilaleial inslilulions
aie nol |usl useful insliumenlally (because lhey cul liansaclion cosls).6
l is also impoilanl lo iemembei lhal lhe veiy inslilulion of mullilalei-
alism, allhough veiy demanding, neveilheless iepiesenls noims lhal aie
fai supeiioi lo lhe alleinalives, as 1ohn Ruggie aigues.7 One way lo
paiaphiase Ruggie`s views is lo diaw a dislinclion belween lhiee ideal-
lypical inleinalional oideis.
The nisl is an oidei in which slales aie lefl lo fend foi lhemselves, and
in which lhe sliongesl pievail and lhe weak have lo suffei whal lhey
musl. We can call lhis an oidei in which unilatcralisn has been in-
slilulionalized. This oidei is lhe one lhal iealisls say is pioduced by lhe
inescapable anaichic naluie of lhe inleislale syslem. mpeiialism, and
counlei-impeiialism, aie some of lhe ways in which unilaleialism mani-
fesls ilself. This is a self-defealing oidei, howevei, because il undeimines
lhe coie piinciples of lhe modein slale syslem: leiiiloiial inlegiily and
exleinal soveieignly.
A second possible oidei is one in which bilatcralisn foims lhe domi-
nanl inslilulional pallein of behavioui, lhal is, an oidei in which slales
liy lo minimize lheii unceilainly and maximize lheii secuiily by foiming
sliong bilaleial lies wilh olhei slales. Alliance foimalion, balancing
againsl powei oi lhieal, bandwagonning,`` sepaiale peace,`` and chain-
ganging`` aie some of lhe manifeslalions of bilaleialism in lhe secuiily
domain, bul one nnds similai slialegies also in lhe economic spheie (foi
example in piefeienlial liade agieemenls). Bilaleialism oveicomes lhe
conliadiclion al lhe heail of unilaleialism and hisloiically has, lhiough
balance-of-powei laclics, pievenled impeiialism fiom becoming lhe
dominanl oidei. Bilaleialism also has ils limilalions, lhough: il is incapa-
ble of dealing wilh high levels of syslemic inleidependence and il oflen
encouiages opposilional ideology-foimalion.
A lhiid possible oidei is one in which nultilatcralisn is a widely
accepled inslilulional foim. The specinc noimalive conlenl of mulli-
laleialism is ieecled in ils inslilulionalizalion of lhe iecognilion lhal,
because aclois in lhe woild aie nol only inleiconnecled bul also inlei-
dependenl (lhal is, mulually albeil asymmeliically vulneiable), lhe besl
way lo achieve a |usl and slable oidei in a woild of decenlialized au-
lhoiily is via:
.
geneialized piinciples of conducl applicable in a non-Jiscrininatory
way lo all slales lhal wanl lo coopeiale, wilhoul negaling lhe individ-
ualily and aulonomy of each acloi;
.
disliibuling lhe cosls and benenls of inleiaclion acioss lhe syslem
(inJivisibility);
.
developing incenlives foi aclois lo suspend lhe uige foi inslanl gialin-
calion on eveiy single issue, and lo iecognize and puisue |oinl salis-
faclion on many issues (Jijjusc rcciprocity).
Mullilaleialism, lhus conceived, is nol |usl a pioceduial leim, iefeiiing
lo a specinc foim of diplomalic piaclice. l is above all a slale of affaiis,``
an inleinalional oidei, oi, even bellei, a syslem of goveinance; lhal is, a
syslem lhal embodies lhe capacily lo gel lhings done wilhoul lhe legal
compelence lo command lhal lhey be done,``8 chaiacleiized by lhe veiy
specinc noimalive and pioceduial fealuies of non-disciiminalion, indi-
visibilily, and diffuse iecipiocily.
Iinally, Ruggie aigues lhal lhe exacling and demanding fealuies of
mullilaleialism as he has denned il could be mel aflei lhe Second Woild
Wai because of ils inslilulionalizalion on lhe back of a veiy specinc kind
of hegemonic powei. Ruggie is caieful lo dislinguish his posilion fiom lhe
slandaid hegemonic-powei aigumenl, namely lhal coopeialive inleina-
lional oideis aie possible only because of a hegemon being piepaied lo
beai lhe cosl of pioviding public goods. Allhough il is liue, on a veiy
supeincial level, lhal any hegemon will liy lo shape lhe woild oidei lo ils
liking, Ruggie aigues lhal lhe impoilanl queslion lo ask is nol whelhei
hegemonic powei is oi is nol a ciucial independenl vaiiable. We should
ialhei ask aboul lhe typc of hegemony al play, because he believes lhal
nol all hegemons aie alike, and lhal vaiialion on lhis scoie explains much
of lhe vaiialion on lhe dependenl vaiiable, lhal is, lhe naluie of hegem-
onic oideis.
Seen againsl lhis backgiound, lhe Soulh Afiican commilmenl lo
mullilaleialism can besl be desciibed as an insliumenlal oi laclical``
appioach. As in lhe case of an incieasing numbei of developing coun-
liies, Soulh Afiica`s favouied foim of mullilaleialism slails fiom lhe
conclusion lhal conlempoiaiy mullilaleial inslilulions ieecl lhe values
of globalized Ameiican libeialism. Howevei, inslead of celebialing lhis
foim of mullilaleialism, lhis appioach is inlenl on modifying lhe woisl
aspecls of il, wilhoul gelling iid of lhe inslilulion allogelhei.
This appioach emeiged fiom lhe failed expeclalions aboul lhe possi-
bilily of ciealing a woild oidei lhal would successfully challenge, and
SO\TH AIRCA 255
even ieplace, global libeialism. Wilh lhe collapse of lhe dieam of a New
nleinalional Iconomic Oidei, and wilhoul any cleai alleinalive lo
global libeialism in sighl, aclois ciilical of lhe ieigning oidei incieasingly
opled lo |oin lhe eslablished oidei. Thus, wheieas in lhe eaily 198Os laige
seclions of lhe developing woild slill ie|ecled lhe Geneial Agieemenl on
Taiiffs and Tiade, foi inslance, by 1995 lhey weie queuing lo |oin lhe
ianks of lhe Woild Tiade Oiganizalion.
Pail of lhe explanalion lies in lhe facl lhal many developing slales weie
lefl wilh no alleinalives (oi so lhey weie led lo believe, al leasl). How-
evei, lheie is also a sense in which lhe decision lo |oin ialhei lhan lo iesisl
mullilaleial iegimes is based on a ienewed appiecialion of lhe laclical
advanlages lhal mullilaleialism offeis. say ienewed appiecialion,`` be-
cause a case can be made lhal a commilmenl lo mullilaleialism, especially
as embodied in lhe \N Chailei, always foimed pail of lhe ideological
aisenal of lhe oiganized developing woild, specincally lhe Non-Aligned
Movemenl.
l is an open queslion, and one on which fuilhei woik musl be done,
whelhei lhe new commilmenl lo mullilaleialism is indeed infoimed by
lhe oiiginal transjornativc conceins of NAM, oi whelhei il does nol
ialhei ieecl a tactical move on lhe pail of diplomals and slale leadeis
looking foi ways lo cieale moie negolialing space foi lhemselves in a
hoslile inleinalional climale. Recenl slalemenls by NAM make me sus-
pecl lhal lhis commilmenl lo mullilaleialism is indeed newly found, and
lhal il iegaids mullilaleial diplomacy as an insliumenl lo be used in off-
selling lhe powei of lhe counliies of lhe Oiganisalion foi Iconomic Co-
opeialion and Developmenl.9 Hence my usage of lhe leim insliumenlal
mullilaleialism.``
Howevei, il is becoming incieasingly cleai lhal lhis (ienewed) com-
milmenl lo univeisal mullilaleial coopeialion and dialogue also has a
sling lo il. The piice lhal NAM would wanl lo exliacl fiom lhe Noilh, in
ieluin foi lhe Soulh`s willingness lo ieplace confionlalion wilh coopeia-
lion, is lhal lhe Noilh will be held accounlable lo iules of economic non-
disciiminalion, which have been lhiashed oul duiing vaiious mullilaleial
iounds. A conslanl lheme in NAM declaialions since 1995 has been lhe
need foi lhe developed counliies lo piaclise whal lhey pieach. l was
you who piessuiized us inlo lhe emeiging mullilaleial liade and invesl-
menl iegimes,`` NAM seems lo be saying lo lhe Noilh. Now you had
bellei slail behaving like people who lake mullilaleialism seiiously.``
This is lhe poinl, believe, lhal lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl wanled
lo diive home wilh ils foiceful slalemenls condemning NATO`s unilaleial
aclions in lhe Kosovo ciisis. We had bellei lake mullilaleialism, wilh all ils
failings, seiiously, il is saying, because lhe alleinalives aie much woise.
Whal was al slake in lhe Kosovo ciisis was nol only lhe issues of
soveieignly veisus cosmopolilan moialily. Iiom lhe viewpoinl of Soulh
Afiica, il was aboul lhe choice belween a woild oidei in which unilaleial
behavioui by lhe sliong is loleialed and an oidei in which inslilulion-
alized mullilaleialism soflens lhe iough edges of powei and piovides al
leasl some pioleclion foi lhe weak and vulneiable. The sliuggle lo secuie
lhe lallei woild oidei slill conlinues, and challenges us all lo make oui
choice.
Appendix
The ofncial ieaclion by lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl is neally summa-
iized by lhiee media slalemenls issued by lhe Depailmenl of Ioieign
Affaiis (iepioduced below): lhe nisl on lhe day lhal lhe NATO aii sliikes
began (25 Maich 1999); lhe second following lhe bombing of lhe Chinese
embassy in Belgiade by NATO aiiciafl (8 May 1999); and lhe lhiid on
lhe day following lhe conclusion of a polilical agieemenl belween lhe
pailies lo lhe conicl (11 1une 1999). An impoilanl slalemenl was also
issued by lhe Soulh Afiican goveinmenl on 9 Apiil 1999 on behalf of lhe
Non-Aligned Movemenl.
McJia statcncnt on NATO nilitary action against thc IcJcral
Rcpublic oj Yugoslavia
The Soulh Afiican Goveinmenl has noled wilh giave concein lhe cui-
ienl mililaiy aclion againsl lhe soveieign slale of lhe Iedeial Republic
of ugoslavia. This is in violalion of lhe \niled Nalions Chailei and
accepled noims of inleinalional law and il has exaceibaled lhe silualion
in lhe Balkans. The Soulh Afiican Goveinmenl would like lo sliess lhe
need lo iesolve dispules by peaceful means and in lhis conlexl il sliongly
emphasises lhe piimaiy iesponsibilily of lhe \niled Nalions Secuiily
Council in lhe mainlenance of inleinalional peace and secuiily.
The eiosion of lhe \niled Nalions Chailei and lhe aulhoiily of lhe
\niled Nalions Secuiily Council cannol be loleialed by lhe inleinalional
communily. The Soulh Afiican Goveinmenl fuilhei calls on all pailies lo
lhe conicl lo iespecl \niled Nalions Secuiily Council iesolulions 1199
and 12O3 and lo aclively exploie a diplomalic solulion in lhis iegaid.
ssued by lhe Depailmenl of Ioieign Affaiis, Pieloiia, 25 Maich 1999
McJia statcncnt on NATO raiJ oj Chincsc cnbassy in BclgraJc
The Soulh Afiican Goveinmenl has consislenlly expiessed concein aboul
lhe NATO bombing iaids of ugoslavia. l has also piedicled lhal lhe
SO\TH AIRCA 257
bombing iaids would nol only exaceibale lhe humanilaiian liagedy bul
lhal lhey would lead lo unfoilunale incidenls such as lhe bombing of lhe
Chinese Imbassy and olheis. While il condemns lhe elhnic cleansing
policies of lhe Milosevic Goveinmenl, lhe Soulh Afiican Goveinmenl
believes lhal lhe only way lo iesolve lhe Kosovo ciisis is lo sliongly sup-
poil lhe cuiienl inleinalional diplomalic inilialives, which aie aimed al
ensuiing a peaceful iesolulion lo lhe pioblem. Iuilheimoie, lhe Soulh
Afiican Goveinmenl believes lhal lhe mallei should uigenlly ieveil back
lo lhe \niled Nalions Secuiily Council, lhe supieme body in malleis of
inleinalional peace and secuiily.
ssued by lhe Depailmenl of Ioieign Affaiis, Pieloiia, 8 May 1999
McJia statcncnt on agrccncnt in Yugoslavia
The Soulh Afiican Goveinmenl welcomes lhe agieemenl ieached yes-
leiday lo cease hoslililies in ugoslavia. Iuilheimoie, il welcomes lhe
adoplion of lhe \N Secuiily Council Resolulion 1244 on Kosovo and lhe
decision lo iesoil lo polilical effoils lo iesolve lhe ciisis. l is an impoilanl
slep by lhe \niled Nalions Secuiily Council, as lhe piimaiy oigan ie-
sponsible foi inleinalional peace and secuiily, in ils effoils lo secuie
lhe following: an end lo lhe conicl in ugoslavia and iepiession in
Kosovo, lhe safe and fiee ieluin lo Kosovo of all iefugees and dis-
placed peisons undei lhe supeivision of lhe \NHCR and lhe evenlual
economic developmenl and slabilily of lhis ciisis-loin iegion.
ssued by lhe Depailmenl of Ioieign Affaiis, Pieloiia, 11 1une 1999
Statcncnt by thc NAM on thc situation in Kosovo, IcJcral
Rcpublic oj Yugoslavia
The Non-Aligned Movemenl, ieafniming lhe Movemenl`s commilmenl
lo lhe soveieignly, leiiiloiial inlegiily, and polilical independence of all
slales, and ieafniming lhe NAM`s piinciples and lhe sanclily of lhe
\niled Nalions Chailei, is deeply alaimed al lhe woisening ciisis in
Kosovo, Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia and lhe Balkan iegion.
The NAM ieafnims lhal lhe piimaiy iesponsibilily foi lhe mainlenance
of inleinalional peace and secuiily iesls wilh lhe \NSC.
The NAM is deeply conceined by lhe deleiioialing humanilaiian silu-
alion in Kosovo, and olhei pails of lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia,
and lhe displacemenl, bolh inleinal and lo neighbouiing counliies, of
vasl numbeis of lhe Kosovo civilian populalion. n lhis iegaid, lhe NAM
uiges lhe Secielaiy Geneial lo inlensify lhe iole of lhe \N in allevialing
lhe suffeiing of lhe displaced peisons and iefugees who aie eeing
Kosovo, and lo invesligale all abuses of human iighls.
The NAM calls foi an immediale cessalion of all hoslililies, and lhe
swifl and safe ieluin of all iefugees and displaced peisons.
The NAM nimly believes lhal lhe uigenl iesumplion of diplomalic
effoils, undei lhe auspices of lhe \N and lhe ielevanl \NSC iesolulions
1199 and 12O3, conslilules lhe only basis foi a peaceful, |usl and equilable
solulion lo lhe conicl.
ssued in New oik on behalf of lhe NAM, 9 Apiil 1999
Noles
1. See lhe appendix lo lhis chaplei foi lhe full lexl of lhe slalemenls by Soulh Afiica and
NAM.
2. See Philip Nel, The Ioieign Policy Beliefs of Soulh Afiicans: A Iiisl Cul,`` 1ournal oj
Contcnporary Ajrican StuJics, \ol. 17, No. 1, 1999, pp. 123146.
3. Speeches by Mi N R Mandela,`` GN\ websile, al hllp:jjwww.gov.za, 6 May 1999.
4. See K. Lambiechls, ed., Ciisis in Lesolho: The Challenge of Managing Conicl
in Soulhein Afiica,`` IounJation jor Clobal Dialoguc Ajrican Dialoguc Scrics, No. 2,
1ohannesbuig, 1999.
5. See P. Nel, . Tayloi, and 1. van dei Weslhuizen, Mullilaleialism in Soulh Afiica`s
Ioieign Policy: The Seaich foi a Ciilical Ralionale,`` Clobal Covcrnancc, \ol. 6, No. 1,
2OOO, pp. 436O.
6. R. Keohane, Ajtcr Hcgcnony. Coopcration anJ DiscorJ in thc VorlJ Iolitical 1conony,
Piincelon, N1: Piincelon \niveisily Piess, 1984.
7. See 1. Ruggie, Mullilaleialism: The Analomy of an nslilulion,`` in 1. Ruggie, ed., Multi-
latcralisn Mattcrs. Thc Thcory anJ Iraxis oj an Institutional Iorn, New oik: Columbia
\niveisily Piess, 1993; and 1. Ruggie, Mullilaleialism al Cenluiy`s Ind,`` in 1. Ruggie,
Constructing thc VorlJ Iolity. 1ssays in Intcrnational Institutionali;ation, London:
Roulledge, 1998.
8. I.-O. Czempiel, Goveinance and Democializalion,`` in 1. Rosenau and I.-O. Czempiel,
eds., Covcrnancc without Covcrnncnt. OrJcr anJ Changc in VorlJ Iolitics, Cambiidge:
Cambiidge \niveisily Piess, 1992, p. 25O.
9. See P. Nel, n Defence of Mullilaleialism: The Movemenl of Non-Aligned Counliies in
lhe Cuiienl Global Oidei,`` in Pielei Iouiie and Riaan de \illieis, eds., South Ajrica anJ
thc Non-AligncJ Movcncnt in an 1ra oj Rcgionalisation anJ Clobalisation, 1ohannes-
buig: Ioundalion foi Global Dialogue, 1998, pp. 112.
SO\TH AIRCA 259
17
ndia: An uneasy piecedenl
tish xmir
n lhe moie lhan 5O yeais lhal lhe \niled Nalions oiganizalion has sui-
vived as an embodimenl of lhe will of lhe peoples`` of lhe woild, ex-
piessed lhiough iepiesenlalives of lhe signaloiy nalion slales, ndia has
looked upon lhis woild body wilh enduiing failh and suslained hope.
ndia`s conliibulion lo lhe foimulalion of lhe Chailei, lo lhe implemen-
lalion of ils piinciples, and lo lhe evolulion and funclioning of lhe vaiious
aims of lhe \niled Nalions is a mallei of piide lo all ndians. The
\niled Nalions loday iepiesenls lhe neai univeisalily of lhe inleinalional
syslem in ils complele sense. Iven so, il would be an exaggeialion lo
suggesl lhal il has mel lhe expeclalions of any signincanl seclion of lhe
inleinalional communily. Al vaiious slages, il has been ciilicized as an
insliumenl of lhe lyianny of lhe minoiily,`` and al olhei slages il has
been denounced as lhe insliumenl of lhe lyianny of lhe ma|oiily.`` The
poweiful and developed nalions aie as dissalisned wilh il as aie lhe pooi
and developing nalions. All lhe same, whal has kepl lhis oiganizalion
alive is lhe colleclive failh of all ils membeis lhal lhis is lhe only inlei-
nalional inslilulion lhiough which humankind can be saved fiom lhe
scouige of wai and lhe cuise of poveily and depiivalion. ndia is one of
lhe counliies lhal conlinue lo dislinguish lhemselves by upholding lhis
failh and conliibuling eveiylhing possible lo suslain il. n lhe conslanl
sliuggle belween lhe ob|eclives puisued by some of lhe poweiful and
dominanl nalions and lhe aspiialions of humankind as a whole, il is nol as
if lhe poweiful have always had lheii way. The voice of humanily, when
26O
expiessed wilh peisislence and deleiminalion in lhe vaiious oigans of lhe
\niled Nalions, has yielded iesulls such as lhe dismanlling of colonial
iegimes and lhe end of apailheid.
Howevei, we enlei lhe new millennium wilh lhe speclie looming laige
of lhe \niled Nalions becoming a loolhless and impolenl oiganizalion.
The ieason foi lhis gloomy piospecl is lhe iecenl expeiience of lhe hand-
ling of lhe Kosovo silualion. The meiils of lhe iespeclive slands of lhe
belligeienls nolwilhslanding, lhe mannei in which lhe \niled Nalions
was lolally ignoied and bypassed, doublless delibeialely in oidei lo pie-
clude whal would have been a dennile exeicise of lhe velo by Russia and
possibly by China, has given cause foi deep disquiel aboul lhe fuluie of
lhis augusl body. The slialegic communily in ndia has commenled on lhe
iecenl developmenls wilh neai unanimily as iegaids lheii long-leim im-
plicalions. The aspecls lhal have geneialed pailiculai disliess and concein
aie lhe aiioganl violalion of all inleinalional liealy noims, lhe liansgies-
sion of slale soveieignly as one has always undeislood il, lhe indisciimi-
nale desliuclion of civilian infiasliucluie, and lhe killing of innocenl
civilians, by a iegional oiganizalion compiising mosl of lhe developed
counliies of lhe Weslein woild. The inleinalional communily needs lo
ieview lhe implicalions of lhis advenluie uigenlly.
Ioi lhe puiposes of lhis discouise, ndia`s close associalion wilh lhe
foimei ugoslavia needs lo go back only lo lhe middle of lhe lwenlielh
cenluiy, when ndia`s nisl piime minislei, 1awahailal Nehiu, |oined piesi-
denls Tilo of ugoslavia, Gamal Abdel Nassei of Igypl, and Sukaino of
ndonesia lo iniliale lhe piocess of a global non-aligned movemenl. This
movemenl was lo play a signincanl iole in lhe conlexl of lhe bipolai
sliucluie lhal lhen pievailed. The close lies lhal weie foimed belween
ndia and ugoslavia owed lheii mainlenance nol only lo lhe peisonal
bonds lhal developed belween Nehiu and Tilo, bul also lo lhe shaied
values and peiceplions of lhe inlelligenlsia and lhe oidinaiy people of
lhe lwo counliies. This helped nuiluie lhe liadilional bonds of fiiendship,
and encouiaged lhe developmenl of culluial lies and giealei conlacls
and inleiaclion belween lhe people. Theie was also a mulualily of views
on mosl inleinalional issues. Nehiu`s dealh in 1964 and lhal of Tilo some
yeais lalei, and lhe consequenl polilical changes in bolh counliies, ie-
sulled in some dilulion of lhe close lies. The new geneialion of leadeis
lhal was lhiown up in bolh counliies was inwaid looking, focused moie
on iegional lhan on global issues. Howevei, lhe sliong links iemained,
fuilhei fosleied by conlinued liade ielalionships and culluial aclivilies.
The evenls of lhe lale 198Os, leading lo lhe end of lhe Cold Wai, lhe
collapse of communisl ideology in Iaslein Iuiope, and lhe bieak-up of
lhe Soviel \nion, and lhe mannei in which lhe foimei Waisaw Pacl
counliies bioke fiee fiom lhe shackles of Moscow seemed lo leave lhe
NDA 261
ndian polilical syslem ialhei confused. l look some lime foi ndia`s
polilical leadeiship and diplomalic communily lo assess lhe changes and
ad|usl policy foimulalions lhal weie sel in lhe pasl. n lhe meanwhile,
ugoslavia slailed disinlegialing. Ivenls in lhe Balkans in 199O1991
weie only maiginally moniloied oi followed in ndia, pieoccupied as lhe
counliy lhen was wilh domeslic and iegional commilmenls such as deal-
ing wilh leiioiisl aclivily in lhe slales of Pun|ab, 1ammu and Kashmii,
and Assam and wilh lhe opeialions of lhe ndian Peace-Keeping Ioice in
Sii Lanka. The alleged aliocilies commilled in lhe Balkans, lhe peiceived
inliansigence of lhe Bosnian Seibs, and NATO`s bombing of lhis com-
munily in 19941995 did nol piovoke any signincanl ieaclion fiom lhe
ndian goveinmenl one way oi lhe olhei.
Howevei, non-goveinmenl wiilings disappioved of whal was peiceived
as lhe machinalions of some of lhe moie poweiful counliies of Weslein
Iuiope and lhe \niled Slales in conliibuling lo lhe bieak-up of lhe
Socialisl Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia. Despile lhe Weslein bias ie-
ecled in local Inglish-language media iepoiling, lheie was consideiable
suppoil and sympalhy foi ugoslavia in geneial, and lhe Seibs in pailic-
ulai. Theie was sliong non-ofncial disappioval of lhe bombings undei-
laken by NATO in BosniaHeizegovina, as much because lhey appeaied
lo be in puisuance of an eslablished bias againsl lhe Bosnian Seibs, as
because lhe aclions seemed lo have ignoied lhe aulhoiily of lhe \niled
Nalions. The sceplicism in iegaid lo lhe piovisions of lhe Daylon Accoids
was consideiable, as il piobably was in many Weslein capilals. ndian
analysls of lhe Balkan silualion nnd il incieasingly difncull lo compie-
hend lhal lhe \niled Slales and lhe counliies of Weslein Iuiope did
nol apply lheii effoils lo a iesolulion of lhe Kosovo silualion duiing lhe
delibeialions al Daylon. l is inconceivable lhal anyone dealing wilh
developmenls in lhe Balkans, even in a supeincial mannei, could have
failed lo iecognize lhal Kosovo was a powdei keg wailing lo explode,
pailiculaily in lhe conlexl of whal had lianspiied in BosniaHeizegovina
in lhe pieceding foui yeais. l is possibly no ievelalion lo lhose who aie
willing lo face iealily lhal, when Piesidenl Gligoiov of lhe Ioimei ugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia iequesled deploymenl of \N foices in his
iepublic al lhe end of 1992, he was nol ieally conceined aboul any im-
pending mililaiy aclion by lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia. He was
looking foi insuiance againsl possible fall-oul fiom Kosovo boiling ovei
lhen, and lhe impacl il mighl have on his iepublic`s populalion of Alba-
nian oiigin. ( was slill lhe Ioice Commandei and Head of Mission of lhe
\N Pioleclion Ioice in ugoslavia al lhal lime, and was iesponsible foi
selling up lhal mission.) Given all lhal has lianspiied in lhe iegion in lhe
pasl 1O yeais, lhe only aspecl of lhe Kosovo silualion lhal could be con-
sideied a suipiise is lhal il look so long lo explode. The \niled Slales
and lhe counliies of Weslein Iuiope lhal weie insliumenlal in gelling
lhe Daylon Accoids signed aie lheiefoie moially culpable foi lhe loss of
life, desliuclion, and miseiy lhal have occuiied in ugoslavia in lhe pasl
few monlhs. (Physical culpabilily is a mallei foi sepaiale discussion.)
When lhe silualion slailed gelling oul of hand wilh allacks by lhe
Kosovo Libeialion Aimy (KLA) on lhe Seib police and paiamililaiy,
who iesponded heavy-handedly, lhe aclions of lhe Weslein poweis, iep-
iesenled by lhe Allanlic Alliance, weie seen in lhe slialegic communily
in ndia as pailiculaily biased againsl lhe ugoslav aulhoiilies. Though
lhe ndian goveinmenl posilion al lhal lime was low-key, many analysls
and media commenlalois expiessed consideiable sceplicism aboul lhe
Weslein alliludes. Howevei, when NATO iesoiled lo aii sliikes and
bombing in ugoslavia on 24 Maich 1999, lheie was sliong condemna-
lion in ndia, fiom bolh wilhin lhe goveinmenl and oulside.
ndia`s peimanenl iepiesenlalive al lhe \niled Nalions was scalhing in
his iemaiks duiing lhe Secuiily Council debale on lhe ciisis on 24 Maich
1999:
The allacks lhal have slailed on lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia a few houis
ago aie in cleai violalion of Ailicle 53 of lhe Chailei. No counliy, gioup of
counliies, oi iegional aiiangemenl, no mallei how poweiful, can aiiogale lo ilself
lhe iighl of laking aibiliaiy and unilaleial mililaiy aclion againsl olheis. Thal
would be a ieluin lo anaichy, wheie mighl is iighl . . . Whal is pailiculaily dis-
luibing is lhal bolh inleinalional law and lhe aulhoiily of lhe Secuiily Council aie
being ouled by counliies lhal claim lo be champions of lhe iule of law, and
which conlain wilhin lheii numbei, peimanenl membeis of lhe Secuiily Council,
whose piincipal inleiesl should suiely be lo enhance, ialhei lhan undeimine lhe
paiamounlcy of lhe Secuiily Council in lhe mainlenance of inleinalional peace
and secuiily . . . Whal NATO has liied lo do is lo inlimidale a goveinmenl
lhiough lhe lhieal of allack, and now lhiough diiecl and unpiovoked aggiession,
lo accepl foieign mililaiy foices on ils leiiiloiy . . . Ioieign mililaiy inleivenlion
can only woisen malleis, il will solve nolhing.1
n lhe debale in lhe Secuiily Council on 26 Maich 99, he slaled, among
olhei lhings:
l is cleai lhal NATO will nol lislen lo lhe Secuiily Council. l would appeai lhal
il believes ilself lo be above lhe law. We nnd lhis deeply uncomfoilable. n New
Delhi, eailiei loday, lhe Ixleinal Affaiis Minislei said lhal ndia cannol accepl
any counliy laking on lhe gaib of a woild policeman. NATO aigues lhal lhe Seib
police in Kosovo acl violenlly and wilhoul iespecl foi law. \nfoilunalely, NATO
seems lo have laken on lhe peisona and melhods of opeialion of lhose whose
aclivilies il wanls lo cuib.2
NDA 263
These sliong slalemenls weie nol howevei followed up wilh any gieal
commilmenl by lhe ndian goveinmenl, pieoccupied as il lhen was wilh
polilical developmenls wilhin lhe counliy and in lhe subconlinenl, and
possibly in lhe knowledge lhal lheie was nolhing il could aclually do lo
ieveise lhe piocess lhal had been sel in molion. Repoils of NATO ac-
lions in lhe eleclionic and piinl media in Inglish paiioled exliacls fiom
CNN and lhe BBC; and lhe veinaculai piess was nol seiiously inleiesled.
Iven so, iemaiks by membeis of lhe slialegic communily in lhe elec-
lionic media, analylical columns in lhe piinl media, and commenls al
symposiums and discussions weie univeisally ciilical of lhe NATO inlei-
venlion, lo lhe poinl of ouliighl condemnalion.
nsofai as lhe slialegic communily in ndia is conceined, NATO inlei-
venlion in ugoslavia iaises a numbei of issues lhal need ob|eclive sciu-
liny and analysis, in oidei lo assess whal lhe fuluie holds foi lhe develop-
ing woild. Iiisl, il is appiopiiale lo louch on lhe humanilaiian dimension,
which, lo say lhe leasl, was sad and depiessing. l is lhe innocenl who
weie sub|ecled lo displacemenl, pain, and miseiy. \nfoilunalely, lhis is
lhe liagic and inevilable oulcome of all such silualions civil wai, in-
suigencies, iebel movemenls, and leiioiisl aclivily which occui fie-
quenlly in many counliies of lhe developing woild and, daie say, in
some pails of lhe developed woild also. Nolwilhslanding all lhal one
heaid and saw on CNN and lhe BBC, and olhei Weslein agencies, and in
lhe daily biienngs of lhe NATO aulhoiilies, lhe blame foi lhe humani-
laiian ciisis lhal aiose cannol be placed al lhe dooi of lhe ugoslav au-
lhoiilies alone. n facl, if go by my own expeiience as lhe Iiisl Ioice
Commandei and Head of Mission of lhe \niled Nalions foices in lhe
foimei ugoslavia fiom Maich 1992 lo Maich 1993, handling opeialions
in Cioalia, BosniaHeizegovina, and Macedonia, would say lhal iepoils
in lhe eleclionic media aie laigely unieliable because whal lhey pul oul is
oflen pie-deleimined policy, oi whal lhe piopaganda machineiy of lhe
belligeienls conveys, oi whal will alliacl maximum vieweis. Those of us
who have had lhe oppoilunily lo see such silualions al nisl hand do nol
delude ouiselves lhal lheie is liue fieedom of lhe media in lhe woild`s
giealesl demociacy, oi in some of lhe lessei ones. Whelhei lhe people of
Kosovo ed fiom lheii homes and heailhs because of NATO bombs oi
lhe Seibian aulhoiilies oi lhe KLA, oi all lhiee, can be debaled by lhose
who lhink such debale is necessaiy. Theie can be lillle doubl lhal lhe
human calasliophe lhal ensued was piovoked by lhe NATO inleivenlion
in lhe foim of bombing and aii sliikes. Allhough sympalhize wilh lhe
unfoilunale Albanian populalion of Kosovo who weie displaced, lhe
woild is only now becoming somewhal awaie of lhe suffeiings of equally
innocenl Seibs piobably because lhey aie less lhan human in lhe eyes
of lhe dispenseis of |uslice in lhe Weslein woild. The iesponsibilily foi
lhe humanilaiian ciisis iesls al NATO`s doois. Bul lhe iesl of lhe inlei-
nalional communily shaies iesponsibilily foi ils inabilily lo iaise ils voice
againsl such unilaleial aimed inleivenlion.
All lhis biings me lo lhe mosl seiious aspecl of lhe elhics of NATO`s
inleivenlion. l was againsl lhe Chailei of lhe \niled Nalions. The
queslion lhal aiises is whelhei lhe moie poweiful counliies of lhe Weslein
woild any longei caie aboul lhe \niled Nalions as an inleinalional oiga-
nizalion, since lhey seem lo be doing lheii ulmosl lo make il incieasingly
ineffeclive. The inleivenlion was againsl NATO`s own Chailei, which
slales lhal lhe Alliance can lake mililaiy aclion only if one of ils own
membeis is allacked. l cannol lake aclion undei lhe umbiella of Chaplei
\ of lhe \niled Nalions Chailei, because il is nol a iegional oigani-
zalion as envisaged by lhal piovision, bul a mililaiy alliance. The allempls
al coeicing ugoslavia by lhieals of bombing lo sign up lo whal was
diafled al Rambouillel aie in violalion of lhe \ienna Convenlion on lhe
Law of Tiealies belween Slales. Much is being made of lhe lolal endoise-
menl of lhe aclion by all NATO counliies; one has lo be ieally naive lo
believe lhal \S aim-lwisling`` is ieseived only foi counliies such as
ndia. The olhei membeis of NATO, as also lhose goveinmenls lhal
opposed lhe Russian iesolulion in lhe \N Secuiily Council, obviously
had no oplion olhei lhan lo fall in line. This is nol a veiy comfoilable
lhoughl when one looks lo lhe fuluie. Iven so, il may be of inleiesl lo
iecoid whal lhe ofncial spokesman of lhe goveinmenl of ndia had lo say
in iesponse lo a queslion al a piess confeience on 11 May 1999:
The Goveinmenl of ndia is conceined ovei lhe Defence Capabililies nilialive of
lhe new slialegic concepl of NATO lhal peimils opeialions beyond lhe Iuio-
Allanlic iegion and oulside lhe leiiiloiy of lhe Alliance. Such aclion, if undei-
laken, would conliavene inleinalional law, noims of peaceful co-exislence be-
lween nalions and lhe \N Chailei. The Goveinmenl nnds unacceplable lhe
incieasing lendency of NATO lo usuip lhe powei and funclion of lhe \N Secu-
iily Council. NATO is an alliance of a few counliies and cannol seek lo disiegaid
lhe univeisal oiganizalion, which is lhe \niled Nalions. The piopensily of NATO
lo exlend ils aieas of opeialion is a souice of concein lo all counliies, big and
small.3
As a mililaiy man wilh some expeiience of ballle and also of peace-
keeping opeialions, nnd il haid lo convince myself lhal lhe melhods
adopled in lhe conducl of Opeialion Allied Ioice weie lhe piefeiied
oplion of NATO`s mililaiy planneis. Whal was undeilaken undei lhe
guise of a mililaiy opeialion was an unpiofessional enleipiise of polili-
cians and diplomals, who quile obviously made a seiious miscalculalion
in assessing lhe capacily of lhe ugoslav leadeiship and ils people lo
sland up lo such ouliageously unacceplable inleinalional behavioui; foi
NDA 265
75 days lhey enduied lhe iigouis of a one-sided aii campaign. The piime
moveis of lhis ulleily fulile opeialion appeai lo have diawn all lhe wiong
lessons fiom whal lianspiied duiing lhe conicl in Cioalia and Bosnia
Heizegovina, pailiculaily as fai as biinging hoslililies lo a close in 1995
was conceined. The assumplion lhal il was lhe NATO bombing of lhe
Bosnian Seibs alone lhal foiced lhem lo lhe negolialing lable was basi-
cally awed. Piesidenl Milosevic and lhe Bosnian Seibs wenl lo Daylon
and evenlually signed up lo lhe Accoids nol solely because of lhe aeiial
aclion lhen undeilaken by NATO foices, which in ilself had a degiee of
|uslincalion in inleinalional noims. The Bosnian Seibs had allacked a
declaied \N safe aiea`` Siebienica. This was an allack on lhe will of
lhe inleinalional communily iepiesenled by lhe \N Blue Helmels, ex-
aggeialions aboul so-called aliocilies and genocide nolwilhslanding.
Having been pail of lhe inleinalional syslem foi so many yeais and
having pailicipaled effeclively in all lhe aclivilies of lhe \niled Nalions in
lhe pasl, lhe ugoslav polilical leadeiship was fully awaie of lhe lians-
giession of accepled inleinalional noims. Anolhei ieason was lhal lhe
Bosnian Seib leadeiship had by lhen become convinced lhal lheii main
demand (voiced as eaily as Novembeij Decembei 1992 when was slill in
command of lhe \niled Nalions opeialions in lhe iegion, bul lhen un-
ceiemoniously ie|ecled by lhe Weslein poweis), lhal lhey be iecognized
as a sepaiale enlily`` (lhe Republika Sipska) in conliol of Seib-ma|oiily
aieas in BosniaHeizegovina, was lo be conceded. The Daylon Accoids
did in facl concede such an aiiangemenl, despile iheloiical posluiing,
and lhe aiiangemenl conlinues lo lhis day. l is anolhei mallei allogelhei
lhal, had lhis iequesl been acceded lo al lhe end of 1992, much loss of
life and desliuclion of piopeily could have been avoided in Bosnia
Heizegovina.
A lhiid ieason lhe Daylon scenaiio could nevei be lhe model foi
aclions ielaling lo Kosovo is lhal lhe Bosnian Seib polilical and mililaiy
leadeiship would have been well awaie in 1995 lhal NATO aeiial bom-
baidmenl of lheii posilions would be exploiled in follow-up giound
aclion by lhe signincanl numbeis of lioops available lo lhe Bosnian
Muslims and lo lhe Cioalians, who had, by lhen, been well liained and
equipped by lhe Ameiicans. Theie was no need lhen foi Ameiican and
Wesl Iuiopean giound lioops; lheie weie olheis, moie diieclly conceined
wilh lhe local silualion, lo do lhe diily woik. Thus lhe Weslein poweis
would have had no inhibilions aboul pioceeding wilh lhe aeiial allacks.
n Kosovo, despile all lhe assislance lhal has been piovided lo lhe KLA,
il did nol appeai lo be in a posilion lo lake on lhe ugoslav aimed foices.
Theie is consideiable discussion, pailiculaily in lhe Weslein woild,
lhal seeks lo cloak NATO`s aclions in Kosovo wilh lhe manlle of hu-
manilaiian inleivenlion. Allhough lheie may be meiil in such discussion
fiom lhe moial poinl of view, lhe legal posilion cannol be ignoied. The
use of foice is goveined in inleinalional law by lhe piovisions of lhe \N
Chailei, al lhe iool of which is lhe piinciple of lhe soveieignly and in-
legiily of lhe nalion slale. As such, lhe Chailei cleaily piohibils lhe
lhieal oi use of foice againsl lhe leiiiloiial inlegiily oi polilical indepen-
dence of any slale, wilh lwo exceplions. The nisl is individual oi collec-
live self-defence when a membei slale is lhe viclim of aggiession, and lhe
second is when lhe Secuiily Council acls undei Chaplei \ lo deal wilh
a lhieal lo lhe peace, a bieach of lhe peace, oi an acl of aggiession.
Theie cannol be much disagieemenl lhal human iighls violalions and
humanilaiian calasliophes meiil lhe allenlion of lhe inleinalional com-
munily, bul il is debalable whelhei physical inleivenlion lo deal wilh
such silualions can be given piimacy ovei lhe soveieignly of slales. This
has been lhe sub|ecl of discussion al lhe \niled Nalions in iecenl yeais,
and il would appeai lhal lheie is some consensus lhal lhe inleinalional
communily has a iesponsibilily in lhis iegaid. n puisuance of lhis com-
milmenl, lheie have been occasions when humanilaiian inleivenlion has
been aulhoiized by lhe Secuiily Council. Howevei, lhe anxiely of mosl of
lhe membei slales is lhal lhe piimacy of lhe \N Secuiily Council in lhe
mainlenance of inleinalional peace and secuiily is being compiomised.
The supieme iiony in lhis conlexl is lhal, allhough lhe \niled Nalions is
nowadays peiceived as a lool of lhe woild`s pie-eminenl supeipowei, lhe
\niled Slales, in lhe case of NATO inleivenlion in Kosovo, lhe Alliance,
led by lhe \niled Slales, slill found il expedienl lo bypass lhe Secuiily
Council.
f humanilaiian inleivenlion is lo be undeilaken by some membeis of
lhe inleinalional communily on lhe basis of lhe peiceplions of lhe lead-
eiship of one oi lwo poweis, lhe veiy foundalions of lhe \N Chailei
sland eioded. Thal is lhe cenlial issue lhal needs lo be addiessed. Heie il
may be appiopiiale lo sel oul whal ndia`s peimanenl iepiesenlalive in
Geneva had lo say duiing a special discussion on 1 Apiil 1999 on lhe sil-
ualion in Kosovo:
We have lislened wilh allenlion lo lhe slalemenls made by lhe High Commis-
sionei foi Human Righls and lhe Special Rappoileui . . . As my delegalion had
slaled yesleiday, demociacy and human iighls aie bolh undeimined whenevei
policies of elhnic segiegalion and naiiow chauvinism aie legilimized oi suppoiled
on vaiious pielexls. Demociacy and lhe iule of law, full iespecl foi minoiily
iighls and special pioleclion foi lheii dislincl idenlilies aie absolulely essenlial foi
lhe effeclive iealizalion of human iighls. So aie effoils lo piomole a culluie of
loleiance, iespecl foi diveisily and pluialism . . . \nilaleial aclions in conliaven-
lion of lhe \N Chailei including lhe massive use of foice, inleifeience in inleinal
affaiis, and wanlon disiespecl foi lhe leiiiloiial inlegiily of soveieign slales will
inevilably iesull in a shaip deleiioialion of lhe enviionmenl foi inleinalional co-
NDA 267
opeialion in lhe piomolion and pioleclion of human iighls . . . ionically, while
pioleclion of human iighls and pievenlion of humanilaiian suffeiings have been
ciled as among lhe ieasons foi NATO mililaiy aclion, il is, in facl, iesulling in
even moie widespiead human iighls violalions of lhe cilizens of lhe IR as well
as lhe exaceibalion of lhe human iighls silualion in lhal counliy.4
The piimaiy concein in ndia is whelhei lhe \niled Nalions will ie-
covei fiom whal is peiceived lo be a knock-oul`` blow. Theie aie
enough indicalions lhal NATO appeais lo have aiiogaled lo ilself, on ils
own leims, iesponsibilily foi lhe mainlenance of inleinalional peace and
secuiily, which in facl is lhe piimaiy iole of lhe \niled Nalions. Wheie
will NATO send ils foices nexl, now lhal il has been eslablished lhal
biule foice is lhe panacea foi all pioblems? Having shaken off lhe colo-
nial iegimes lhal exploiled developing counliies and lheii peoples, aie we
now wilnessing a new iegime of conlinuing Weslein dominalion by lhe
inleivenlion of mililaiy foices oi lhose of lheii suiiogales? The message
lhal has been conveyed loudly and cleaily lo lhe developing counliies is
lhal, unless lhey selecl and pul in place iegimes whose leadeiship is pie-
paied lo fall in line wilh lhe diclales of lhe Weslein woild, lhey will be
sub|ecled lo sanclions, depiived of assislance fiom inleinalional oiga-
nizalions, and possibly bombed; in olhei woids, lhey will be punished foi
nominaling lo aulhoiily a peison nol acceplable lo lhose who inlend lo
iun lhe woild.
Such peiceplions have alieady begun lo geneiale lhe conviclion lhal
lhe inleinalional communily cannol and musl nol be allowed lo become
hoslage lo lhe machinalions of a few poweiful counliies of lhe Weslein
woild. Theie is a giowing body of opinion in ndia lhal il should seek an
aiiangemenl wilh Russia, and in due couise China, lo dilule lhe domi-
nalion of lhe Weslein Alliance. Such inilialives do nol howevei seem lo
lake inlo accounl lhe iealilies of lhe cuiienl silualion. Russia`s economic
silualion makes il fai loo dependenl on lhe Wesl. Hence, nolwilhsland-
ing lhe Russian leadeiship`s iesenlmenl of lhe dominanl iole of NATO in
lhe inleinalional aiena, il would be loo much lo expecl moie lhan ihel-
oiic and symbolism fiom Moscow foi some lime lo come. Thal does nol,
howevei, pieclude alignmenls wilh counliies such as ndia in ailiculaling
a peiceplion of whal should be lhe new woild oidei. As lhings sland, foi
all ils posluiing on lhe inleinalional slage, China is loo closely linked
economically wilh lhe \niled Slales and Iuiope lo indulge in moie lhan
symbolic posilions; in pailiculai, il is faiily conndenl lhal lheie is unlikely
lo be any physical inleifeience in whal is conceded lo be China`s aiea of
inleiesl.
Signincanlly, ndia, Russia, and China aiiived al similai posilions on
lhe Kosovo issue independenlly and wilhoul piioi consullalion. How-
evei, allhough lheie could be giealei consullalions belween lhe lhiee,
lheie does nol appeai lo be any move lowaids foiming new alliances oi
selling up new blocs in lhe poslCold Wai eia. Olhei counliies loo aie
conceined. The 1apanese piime minislei`s slalemenl on 19 1une 1999 al
lhe meeling of lhe G-7 aboul lhe need foi iesliucluiing lhe \niled Na-
lions is a poinlei. Many counliies lhal mighl have expiessed ieseivalions
have iemained muled in ciilicism, some because of lheii dependence on
Weslein laigess, olheis because of lhe slamic facloi (one of lhe pailies
in Kosovo being Muslim and suppoiled by NATO).
A likely fall-oul fiom NATO`s inleivenlion in Kosovo and lhe pei-
ceplions il has geneialed is lhal many developing counliies may feel
compelled lo move lowaids ensuiing giealei secuiily foi lhemselves and
self-ieliance lhiough lhe acquisilion of moie weaponiy. This is no doubl
good news foi lhe aims indusliies of lhe developed woild! As fai as ndia
is conceined, we musl iecognize lhal lheie is scope foi inleifeience in
lhe subconlinenl`s affaiis on lhe basis of any numbei of issues fiom lhe
liealmenl of Chiislian minoiilies lo human iighls. n lhis conlexl, lhe
feais of smallei neighbouis could well be played upon by inleiesled
pailies. Theie is almosl lolal unanimily wilhin ndia lhal lhe counliy needs
lo slienglhen ilself mililaiily so lhal lheie can be no scope foi any allempl
al an advenluie againsl il. This is imposed on ndia by ils size, ils geo-
slialegic localion, ils slalus in lhe comily of nalions, ils iesponsibililies as
a iegional powei, and ils commilmenls as iegaids ils exlended land boi-
deis and coasllines. Iqually, il is fell lhal lheie is a need lo iniliale ie-
gional secuiily aiiangemenls lhal piovide a degiee of assuiance lo ils
smallei neighbouis, and, nnally, lo exploie and iniliale moves wilh like-
minded counliies lo ievive \N sliucluies and neulialize Weslein domi-
nance ovei lhem.
Noles
1. Slalemenl by H.I. Mi. Kamlesh Shaima, Peimanenl Repiesenlalive of ndia lo lhe
\niled Nalions in lhe Secuiily Council`s debale on 24 Maich 1999, as ieleased by lhe
Peimanenl Mission of ndia lo lhe \niled Nalions on 24 Maich 1999.
2. Slalemenl by H.I. Mi. Kamlesh Shaima, Peimanenl Repiesenlalive of ndia lo lhe
\niled Nalions in lhe Secuiily Council`s debale on 26 Maich 1999, as ieleased by lhe
Peimanenl Mission of ndia lo lhe \niled Nalions on 26 Maich 1999.
3. Piess Release ssued by lhe Minisliy of Ixleinal Affaiis, Ixleinal Publicily Division,
Goveinmenl of ndia, New Delhi, 11 May 1999.
4. Slalemenl by Ambassadoi Savilii Kunadi, Peimanenl Repiesenlalive of ndia on behalf
of lhe ndian delegalion in Geneva duiing lhe Special Discussion on lhe silualion in
Kosovo-IR lhal followed slalemenls by lhe High Commissionei foi Human Righls and
lhe Special Rappoileui, as ieleased by lhe Peimanenl Mission of ndia in Geneva on
1 Apiil 1999.
NDA 269
rt pive
ghllenges of the postEwr order
18
NATO: Iiom colleclive defence
lo peace enfoicemenl
Nicola Butlcr
Since lhe end of lhe Cold Wai, lhe Noilh Allanlic Tiealy Oiganisalion
(NATO) has liansfoimed ilself fiom an oiganizalion conceined piinci-
pally wilh colleclive defence and deleiiing lhe Soviel \nion inlo a pow-
eiful playei in lhe neld of peacekeeping and peace enfoicemenl in Iuiope.
As \S Ambassadoi lo NATO Alexandei \eishbow desciibes il: NATO
has lileially ieinvenled ilself in len shoil yeais.``1
The Noilh Allanlic Tiealy of 1949 was oiiginally designed lo piovide
foi lhe common defence of lhe \niled Slales, Canada, and lheii Wesl
Iuiopean allies undei Ailicle 51 of lhe \N Chailei. The Tiealy spells
oul lhe geogiaphical boundaiies of Alliance leiiiloiy and emphasizes lhe
piimaiy iesponsibilily of lhe |\Nj Secuiily Council foi lhe mainlenance
of inleinalional peace and secuiily,`` woids lhal weie ieileialed al lhe
Alliance`s 1999 Washinglon summil.
n 199O, following lhe fall of lhe Beilin Wall, NATO leadeis ie-
emphasized lhal lhe Alliance would iemain defensive, sliessing lhal
none of ils weapons will evei be used excepl in self-defence.``2 The
Alliance even pioposed a |oinl declaialion wilh ils foimei adveisaiies,
lhe Waisaw Tiealy Oiganizalion slales, lhal ieafnimed oui inlenlion lo
iefiain fiom lhe lhieal oi use of foice againsl lhe leiiiloiial inlegiily oi
polilical independence of any slale.``3
l is cleai fiom NATO`s aclions in lhe Balkans lhal lhe Alliance has
undeigone a seiies of fundamenlal changes on lhese key policy issues.
Allhough individual NATO membeis have pailicipaled in mililaiy opei-
273
alions bolh individually and in coalilions, NATO`s nisl mililaiy aclion as
an Alliance look place in lhe Balkans. NATO nisl used deadly foice
againsl an adveisaiy in Iebiuaiy 1994, shooling down foui Bosnian Seib
aiiciafl in lhe \N-sponsoied no-y zone ovei lhe counliy. NATO also
undeilook ils nisl deploymenl of giound foices oul-of-aiea`` (i.e. oulside
Alliance boideis),4 in lhe mplemenlalion Ioice foi lhe 1995 Bosnian
Peace Agieemenl. n Kosovo, lhe Alliance has gone fuilhei, launching ils
laigesl and mosl complex mililaiy opeialions lo dale, againsl a soveieign
slale lhal posed no diiecl lhieal lo Alliance leiiiloiy, oulside Alliance
boideis, and wilhoul lhe backing of lhe \N Secuiily Council.
NATO`s Kosovo opeialions iaise queslions nol |usl foi lhe inleina-
lional communily bul foi lhe Noilh Allanlic Alliance ilself. Whal lessons
will NATO leain fiom ils Kosovo opeialions? Whal does Kosovo mean
foi fuluie NATO peace enfoicemenl opeialions? And whal will be lhe
impacl on ongoing inlia-Alliance debales such as lhe fuluie of NATO
ielalions wilh lhe \niled Nalions, NATO enlaigemenl, developmenl of a
Iuiopean Secuiily and Defence denlily, and lhe fuluie of aims conliol?
New concepls and slialegies
Since lhe end of lhe Cold Wai, NATO`s assessmenl of lhe lhieal lo ils
leiiiloiy and foices has changed iadically. n lhe 195Os and 196Os lhe pos-
sibilily of a geneial wai wilh lhe Soviel \nion was seen as lhe giealesl
lhieal lo lhe suivival of lhe NATO nalions.``5 Thioughoul lhe Cold Wai,
NATO docliine focused on nucleai deleiience of lhe Soviel \nion and
lhe Waisaw Pacl slales.
n Novembei 1991, heads of slale and goveinmenl allending lhe Alli-
ance`s Rome summil slailed lo iedenne lhe lhieal lo NATO nalions. The
Alliance`s new Slialegic Concepl of 1991 slales: lhe monolilhic, massive
and polenlially immediale lhieal which was lhe piincipal concein of lhe
Alliance in ils nisl foily yeais has disappeaied.``6 Risks lo allied secuiily
weie now moie likely lo iesull fiom lhe adveise consequences of in-
slabililies lhal may aiise fiom lhe seiious economic, social and polilical
difncullies, including elhnic iivaliies and leiiiloiial dispules, which aie
faced by many counliies in cenlial and easlein Iuiope.``7 \nceilainlies
conceining lhe fuluie of Russia, lhe piolifeialion of weapons of mass
desliuclion, disiuplion of lhe ow of naluial iesouices, and leiioiism
weie also highlighled as polenlial lhieals.8
NATO`s Rome summil also issued lhe Alliance`s nisl slalemenl on lhe
silualion in ugoslavia. Al lhis lime, NATO leadeis did nol foiesee
lhe fuluie exlenl of NATO involvemenl in lhe iegion, oi lhe iole lhal
lhe ciisis in ugoslavia was going lo play in ieshaping NATO slialegy.
274 CHALLINGIS OI THI POST-WAR ORDIR
nslead, lhey expiessed lheii suppoil and appiecialion foi lhe effoils
of lhe Iuiopean Communily, lhe CSCI |Confeience on Secuiily and
Coopeialion in Iuiopej and lhe Secuiily Council of lhe \niled Nalions
lo iesolve lhis ciisis.``9 Soiling oul lhe pioblems in ugoslavia was seen
as lhe iesponsibilily of lhese oiganizalions, ialhei lhan of NATO.
As lhe ciisis in lhe foimei ugoslavia escalaled duiing 1992, NATO
foieign minisleis agieed nisl lo offei suppoil on a case-by-case basis lo
CSCI peacekeeping aclivilies, and lhen lo offei suppoil lo peacekeeping
opeialions undei lhe auspices of lhe \N Secuiily Council. This opened
up lhe way foi NATO maiilime opeialions in suppoil of lhe \N aims
embaigo againsl foimei ugoslavia and sanclions againsl Seibia and
Monlenegio. l also made possible NATO aii opeialions in suppoil of
lhe no-y zone ovei Bosnia and Heizegovina and lalei pioleclion of \N
Pioleclion Ioice (\NPROIOR) lioops and \N-designaled safe aieas.
n 1995, NATO aii sliikes againsl Bosnian Seib mililaiy laigels, along
wilh lhe Zagieb-backed giound offensive againsl Seibs in Cioalia, led
lo lhe signing of lhe Daylon Peace Accoids by BosniaHeizegovina,
Cioalia, and lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia. A NATO-led imple-
menlalion foice (IOR) look iesponsibilily foi implemenling lhe mililaiy
aspecls of lhe agieemenl.
Againsl lhis backgiound, lhe Supieme Headquaileis Allied Poweis
Iuiope (SHAPI), NATO`s main mililaiy headquaileis in Iuiope, began
diafling a docliine foi peacekeeping in Oclobei 1992. NATO Mililaiy
Planning foi Peace Suppoil Opeialions,`` MC 327, was adopled by
NATO`s Mililaiy Commillee lhe following yeai. l denned peace sup-
poil`` opeialions as ianging fiom conicl pievenlion aclivilies, peace-
making, peacekeeping, humanilaiian aid missions and peacebuilding, lo
peace enfoicemenl, using mililaiy means lo iesloie peace in an aiea
of conicl undei Chaplei \ of lhe \N Chailei.``10 The new mission
of peace suppoil opeialions pul new iequiiemenls on NATO mililaiy
docliine. Ioi lhe nisl lime lhe Alliance slailed lo addiess issues such as
impailialily, limils on lhe use of foice, lianspaiency of opeialions, and
mililaiycivilian cooidinalion.11
MC 327 also indicaled lhe need foi moie exible, mobile NATO foices,
available foi iapid deploymenl. Wilh lhe ieunincalion of Geimany and
lhe eslablishmenl of coopeialive ielalionships belween NATO and many
foimei Iaslein bloc counliies, lhe Alliance`s Cold Wai slialegy of foi-
waid defence,`` involving massive foiwaid deploymenl of foices lo defend
lhe boideis belween Iasl and Wesl, was now obsolele. NATO`s 1994
Biussels summil endoised lhe new concepl of Combined 1oinl Task
Ioices (C1TIs) as lhe cenliepiece of a new NATO foice sliucluie. The
puipose of lhe C1TIs is lo impiove NATO`s capabilily lo conducl com-
plex peace suppoil opeialions. C1TIs also seive a numbei of polilical
NATO 275
funclions. They allow non-allies (such as aspiiing NATO membeis in
Cenlial and Iaslein Iuiope) lo gel involved in NATO`s mililaiy sliuc-
luie. C1TIs also piovide sepaiable bul nol sepaiale`` foices lhal could
be used by eilhei NATO oi lhe Weslein Iuiopean \nion (WI\), a key
componenl of NATO policy lo develop a Iuiopean Secuiily and Defence
denlily wilhin lhe Alliance.
The new docliine foi peace suppoil opeialions was conlioveisial wilhin
lhe Alliance, wilh lhe iesull lhal lhe Noilh Allanlic Council (NAC),
NATO`s highesl decision-making body, was nevei able lo appiove MC
327. Iiance, which is a membei of lhe NAC bul nol a membei of
NATO`s nlegialed Mililaiy Sliucluie, blocked appioval (wilh lhe lacil
suppoil of a small numbei of olhei Iuiopean allies). The Iiench piefei-
ence was foi peace suppoil opeialions lo become a mission foi a Iuio-
pean oiganizalion such as lhe Iuiopean \nion oi lhe Weslein Iuiopean
\nion. A NATO docliine foi peace suppoil opeialions was evenlually
ievised and included in MC 4OOj1, on mililaiy implemenlalion of lhe
Alliance`s Slialegic Concepl, which was appioved by lhe NAC in 1une
1996.12 l was on lhe basis of lhis mililaiy docliine lhal NATO enleied
inlo lhe wai ovei Kosovo.
Allhough MC 4OOj1 iemains classined, NATO`s appioach lo peace
suppoil opeialions was oullined al lhe lime by David Lighlbuin, a mem-
bei of NATO`s Defence Planning and Policy Division. Like many olhei
NATO commenlalois al lhis lime, Lighlbuin slails fiom lhe assumplion
lhal wilh iespecl lo lhe calegoiy of peace enfoicemenl, lhe inabilily of
lhe \N lo manage such high inlensily and complex opeialions leaves a
polenlial vacuum.``13 l was slill assumed, howevei, lhal any NATO
peace suppoil opeialion would opeiale undei a \N mandale. As Lighl-
buin wiole, NATO has a numbei of slialegic iesouices and unique
capabililies . . . As applied in lhe silualion in lhe foimei ugoslavia, lhese
iesouices can piovide lhe \N wilh a iange of suppoiling capabililies foi
mullifunclional peacekeeping opeialions, plus a deleiienl capabilily and a
ieady foice mullipliei capabilily in ceilain moie difncull ciicumslances.``14
NATO`s Slialegic Concepl of 1999 also piovides some insighls inlo
lhe Alliance`s appioach lo peace suppoil opeialions. The 1999 Slialegic
Concepl ielains NATO`s coie mission of colleclive defence, including
deploymenl of nucleai foices. l also quile cleaily adds lhe new mission
of ciisis managemenl, including ciisis iesponse`` opeialions of lhe kind
seen in lhe Balkans. The Slialegic Concepl also makes il cleai lhal
NATO inlends lo use lhe same polilical and mililaiy fiamewoik lo fulnl
bolh ioles. Refeiiing lo lhe new missions of conicl pievenlion, ciisis
managemenl, and ciisis iesponse, il slales: These missions can be highly
demanding and can place a piemium on lhe same polilical and mililaiy
qualilies |as colleclive defence opeialionsj, such as cohesion, mulli-
nalional liaining, and exlensive piioi planning . . . while lhey may pose
special iequiiemenls, lhey will be handled lhiough a common sel of
Alliance sliucluies and pioceduies.``15
NATO slialegy in Kosovo
NATO iepiesenled ils slialegy in Kosovo as diplomacy backed by
ciedible foice.`` n NATO ciicles, lheie is a geneially accepled analysis
lhal lhe aii sliikes againsl Bosnian Seib mililaiy laigels in Bosnia weie
lhe decisive aclions lhal foiced lhe pailies lo lhe negolialing lable, ie-
sulling in lhe Daylon Peace Accoids. The aii sliikes aie seen as lhe poinl
al which NATO iedeemed ils ciedibilily,``16 aflei a couple of yeais of
ineffeclive effoils lo iesolve lhe conicl in Bosnia. On lhe eve of NATO`s
aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia, Opeialion Allied Ioice, NATO Secielaiy
Geneial, 1aviei Solana, iecalled lhe lessons leained by lhe Alliance in
Bosnia:
Resolule aclion can biing iesulls. Befoie NATO look aclion in Bosnia, expeils on
all sides wained of lhe iisks. They wained lhal aii sliikes would nol encouiage
lhe pailies lo negoliale inslead lhe aii campaign diieclly led lo Daylon.17
Similaily, NATO`s slialegy in Kosovo has been based on lhe assumplion
lhal lhe lhieal oi use of mililaiy foice, in pailiculai aii sliikes, would hall
lhe violence by deleiiing Seib foices and foicing Piesidenl Milosevic lo
sign a peace agieemenl. \S Secielaiy of Slale Madeleine Albiighl high-
lighled lhis combinalion of diplomacy and foice as one of lhe basic
piinciples`` leading lo lhe successful conclusion of Opeialion Allied
Ioice.18 Despile lhis posilive assessmenl of NATO slialegy, lheie aie
slill queslions conceining lhe effecliveness of diplomacy backed by foice.
NATO`s nisl full-lenglh slalemenl on Kosovo condemned lhe aclions
of bolh sides, bul il also announced a seiies of deleiienl measuies``
aimed al lhe Milosevic iegime.19 n 1une, lhe Alliance conducled an aii
exeicise ovei Albania and Macedonia wilh lhe ob|eclive of demonslial-
ing ils capabilily lo pio|ecl powei iapidly inlo lhe iegion.``20 n Augusl,
NATO`s mililaiy aulhoiilies ieviewed mililaiy planning foi Kosovo, in-
cluding lhe use of giound and aii powei and in pailiculai a full-iange of
oplions foi lhe use of aii powei alone.``21 The nexl monlh, following
adoplion of \N Secuiily Council Resolulion 1199 calling foi a cease-nie
and lhe wilhdiawal of secuiily foices used foi civilian iepiession, NATO
wained lhal il was incieasing ils level of mililaiy piepaiedness foi bolh
a limiled aii oplion and a phased aii campaign in Kosovo.``22 Howevei,
despile lhese aclions, lhe silualion in Kosovo conlinued lo deleiioiale.
NATO 277
Deleiience appeaied lo have some success duiing Oclobei 1998. Al
lhis lime il was becoming appaienl lhal neilhei Seib mililaiy foices noi
lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy (KLA) weie in compliance wilh Resolulion
1199. Iollowing iepoils of fuilhei killings of elhnic Albanians in Kosovo,
diplomalic effoils lo iesolve lhe ciisis weie inlensined. On 13 Oclobei
1998, lo mainlain piessuie on Milosevic, NATO announced lhal il would
begin aii sliikes in 96 houis. \S Ambassadoi Richaid Holbiooke biiefed
lhe Noilh Allanlic Council lhal lheie had been piogiess in his lalks wilh
Milosevic, laigely due lo lhe piessuie of lhe Alliance in lhe lasl few
days.``23
Agieemenl was quickly ieached lo eslablish an Oiganizalion foi Secu-
iily and Co-opeialion in Iuiope (OSCI) \eiincalion Mission in Kosovo
lo moniloi compliance wilh lhe \N Secuiily Council iesolulions on lhe
giound, while NATO undeilook moniloiing fiom lhe aii. On 27 Oclobei,
Secielaiy Geneial Solana iepoiled on lhe success of lhe NATO slialegy,
saying:
l is lhis piessuie and oui ciedible lhieal lo use foice which have changed lhe
silualion in Kosovo foi lhe bellei. NATO`s unily and iesolve have foiced lhe
ugoslav Special Police and mililaiy unils lo exeicise iesliainl and ieduce lheii
inlimidaling piesence in Kosovo. We have been able lo ieduce lhe level of vio-
lence signincanlly and lo achieve a cease-nie which has held, despile some spo-
iadic incidenls.24
Allhough NATO kepl lhe oplion of aii sliikes open, by Novembei lhe
silualion in Kosovo was cleaily uniavelling again. The OSCI \eiincalion
Mission was undei-slaffed and undei-iesouiced, wilh a numbei of NATO
membeis ieluclanl lo commil peisonnel lo lhe opeialion on lhe giound.
n 1anuaiy 1999, following lhe massacie of 45 civilians by Seibian secu-
iily foices al Racak, NATO ieafnimed plans lo use aii sliikes if lhe pai-
lies in Kosovo did nol come lo a polilical selllemenl. This lime lhe lhieal
of aii sliikes was inlended lo back up Conlacl Gioup effoils lo ieach an
agieemenl in Rambouillel. Howevei, on lhis occasion lhe lhieal of aii
sliikes was nol successful eilhei in secuiing agieemenl oi in deleiiing
fuilhei allacks in Kosovo. nslead, as lhe Rambouillel lalks bioke down,
Seib mililaiy foices inlensined lheii aclion in Kosovo.
Having lhiealened lhe use of foice, NATO`s ciedibilily was now being
queslioned in lhe woild media.25 n Washinglon, \S \ndei-Secielaiy of
Defense, Wallei Slocombe, lold lhe House Aimed Seivices Commillee:
\S inleiesls in slabilily in Iuiope, and NATO ciedibilily now and in
lhe fuluie iemain on lhe line.``26 Taking aclion in Kosovo had become
a queslion of iedeeming Alliance ciedibilily.
NATO ob|eclives in lhe wai ovei Kosovo
Thioughoul lhe aii campaign, a numbei of lhemes weie ieileialed as lhe
Alliance`s polilical and mililaiy ob|eclives. The aii sliikes weie inlended
lo hall oi aveil a humanilaiian calasliophe in Kosovo and lo suppoil
inleinalional effoils lo secuie ugoslav agieemenl lo an inleiim polilical
selllemenl. The aim of mililaiy slialegy was lheiefoie piesenled as being
lo disiupl lhe violenl allacks being commilled by lhe Seib Aimy and
Special Police Ioices. The Alliance emphasized lhal il had no quaiiel
wilh lhe people of ugoslavia and was nol waging wai againsl lhem.27
Above all, lhe unily and deleiminalion`` of lhe Allies weie sliessed al
eveiy available oppoilunily.
Wilh lhe conclusion of Opeialion Allied Ioice, lhe piincipal Alliance
ob|eclive of achieving a polilical agieemenl wilh lhe Belgiade aulhoiilies,
including lhe wilhdiawal of Seib mililaiy foices fiom Kosovo, has been
achieved. A mullinalional implemenlalion foice wilh subslanlial``
NATO pailicipalion, KIOR, has been able lo enlei Kosovo and allempls
lo iebuild lhe aiea have slailed. NATO has been quick lo piesenl lhe
oulcome of lhe aii wai as a gieal success, ieafniming NATO peace
enfoicemenl slialegy. Biilish Defence Minislei Geoige Robeilson, lalei
designaled NATO Secielaiy Geneial, emphasizes lhal lhe Alliance
came lhiough uniled, deleimined, and much sliongei lhan anybody
lhoughl possible, and wilh a ienewed conndence in ils own cohesion and
sense of puipose.``28
Despile lhe claims, aii sliikes did nol have lhe quick and decisive
deleiienl effecl on lhe Milosevic iegime suggesled by NATO`s expeii-
ence wilh lhe Daylon Accoids. By lhe lime of NATO`s 1999 Washinglon
summil, in lhe middle of lhe aii wai, accusalions weie ciiculaling lhal lhe
Alliance had mis|udged Milosevic. Speaking al lhe lime, Repiesenlalive
Poilei Goss, chaiiman of lhe \S House nlelligence Commillee, said lhe
effecl of aii sliikes was lhal inslead of caving in, Milosevic sliuck back
haidei and moie iulhlessly againsl lhe Kosovo Albanians.``29
The lenglh of lhe aii campaign had lhe effecl of pushing NATO
cohesion lo lhe limils, pulling pailiculai piessuie on counliies such as
laly and Gieece wheie public opposilion lo lhe aii sliikes was high. Had
Milosevic nol conceded on 3 1une, \S Depuly Secielaiy of Slale Sliobe
Talboll lold lhe BBC, lheie would have been incieasing difncully wilhin
lhe alliance in pieseiving lhe solidaiily and lhe iesolve of lhe alliance.``30
Al a polilical level, NATO unily was lesled by diffeiences of opinion
aboul queslions such as whelhei lo use giound foices, lhe possibilily of
boaiding ships in lhe Adiialic lo enfoice lhe maiilime blockade of
ugoslavia, and lhe bombing of phase 3`` laigels such as communica-
NATO 279
lions facililies and supply sloies. Al pailiculai slages, laly, Geimany,
and Gieece advocaled a pause in lhe bombing lo enable giealei diplo-
malic effoils lo iesolve lhe conicl lo be made. Al lhe same lime, Biilish
Piime Minislei Tony Blaii was insisling lhal lheie would be no hall``
lo lhe bombing unlil NATO`s ob|eclives had been mel. Biilain was also
pushing foi giealei deploymenl of giound lioops inlo Albania and Ma-
cedonia. Such fundamenlal policy diffeiences belween lhe allies led lo a
lowesl common denominaloi appioach lo achieving mililaiy ob|eclives.
n addilion, NATO mililaiy slialegy was iesliicled by \S conceins nol
lo iisk a domeslic polilical backlash by laking any aclion lhal could
endangei Ameiican mililaiy foices.
Theie weie also lensions wilh lhe mililaiy, highlighled by lhe an-
nouncemenl soon aflei lhe end of Opeialion Allied Ioice lhal Geneial
Wesley Claik would be leaving his posl as Supieme Allied Commandei
Iuiope (SACI\R), eailiei lhan expecled. Claik had iepoiledly pushed
foi a moie aggiessive mililaiy slialegy lo achieve Alliance goals, including
lhe possibilily of a giound invasion.31 Accoiding lo piess iepoils, Claik
had also clashed`` wilh NATO`s Commandei in Kosovo, Lieulenanl-
Geneial Sii Michael 1ackson, ovei lhe handling of lhe Russian push lo
conliol lhe aiipoil al Piislina.32
As lhe campaign conlinued and lhe iange of laigels was expanded, il
also became moie difncull foi lhe allies lo aigue lhal lhey weie nol al
wai`` wilh ugoslavia. The piolonged bombing ieafnimed lhe views of
many Seibs lhal, conliaiy lo lhe public slalemenls, NATO was waging
wai againsl lhem. Despile NATO allempls lo play down lhe effecl of lhe
aii wai on Seib civilians, by May even lhe mosl hawkish NATO leadei
(Blaii) was acknowledging lhal NATO was indeed nghling a wai.
The impacl of lhe bombing on Seib opinion was exaceibaled by lhe facl
lhal many of lhe laigels did nol |usl have mililaiy funclions. The desliuc-
lion of laigels such as communicalions facililies, oil ienneiies, biidges, and
lelevision slalions killed civilians and had a seveie impacl on civilian life.
Allhough counliies such as Iiance, laly, Geimany, and Gieece weie op-
posed lo lhe bombing of some of lhese laigels, il is now emeiging lhal
SACI\R didn`l always defei lo lhose who wanled laigels wilhheld.``33
Allhough high-allilude bombing appeais lo have deliveied Alliance
ob|eclives wilhoul allied casuallies, ils success in deslioying Seib mililaiy
foices is open lo queslion. Robeilson is upbeal aboul lhe success of
NATO`s aii powei slialegy in lhe wai. n his analysis:
Piecision bombing pioduced consideiable ballle damage wilh ielalively lillle col-
laleial damage and, howevei liagic, ielalively few civilian casuallies and no Allied
losses. Theie is lillle doubl lhal lhe aii assaull on lhe highly iesilienl Seib mililaiy
machine did in lhe end make il impossible foi Milosevic lo suslain fuilhei damage
and lo keep going unlil lhe winlei.34
28O CHALLINGIS OI THI POST-WAR ORDIR
Iiguies foi lhe numbei of mililaiy laigels deslioyed by NATO aie dis-
puled.35 Repoiling fiom Kosovo, defence analysl Paul Beavei suggesls
lhal pail of lhe ieason foi lhis is lhal many of lhe laigels lhal NATO
deslioyed weie in facl decoys. He iepoils lhal in Kosovo lheie was no
ieal evidence of a successful NATO aii opeialion againsl aimouied
vehicles`` and concludes lhal allacking individual laigels hidden in lhe
neld is nol besl done fiom 15,OOO feel.``36 High-pionle laigeling eiiois,
such as lhe bombing of lhe Chinese embassy in Belgiade, lhe bombings
of Seib and Kosovo Albanian civilians, and lhe missiles lhal landed oul-
side ugoslavia, have also iaised doubls aboul lhe effecliveness of lhe aii
campaign.
Mosl impoilanlly, howevei, aii sliikes did nol pievenl widespiead
aliocilies againsl civilians on lhe giound in Kosovo oi lhe mass exodus of
iefugees inlo neighbouiing counliies. Al besl, NATO was unable lo hall
lhe humanilaiian calasliophe unlil il was loo lale foi many Kosovo
Albanians. Al woisl, lhe liansilion fiom OSCI moniloiing lo NATO aii
sliikes piecipilaled a giealei disaslei foi lhose lefl in Kosovo.
The impacl on NATO\N ielalions
n lhe face of inlense ciilicism of lheii decision lo iniliale aii sliikes againsl
ugoslavia, NATO leadeis have been keen lo emphasize lhal lheii opei-
alions weie conducled in lhe inleiesls of lhe inleinalional communily.``
Robeilson even ciles lhe speeches of \N Secielaiy-Geneial, Kon Annan,
as pioviding lhe moial impeialive`` fiom which owed lhe legal |usli-
ncalion`` foi lhe aii wai.37 When NATO inilialed Opeialion Allied
Ioice, Annan was placed in a difncull posilion. Caieful nol lo offend lhe
poweiful allies, he noled lhal lheie aie limes when lhe use of foice may
be legilimale in lhe puisuil of peace,`` bul sliessed lhal:
as |\Nj Secielaiy-Geneial have many limes poinled oul . . . lhal undei lhe
Chailei lhe Secuiily Council has piimaiy iesponsibilily foi mainlaining inlei-
nalional peace and secuiily and lhis is explicilly acknowledged in lhe Noilh
Allanlic Tiealy. Theiefoie lhe Council should be involved in any decision lo
iesoil lo lhe use of foice.38
The decision lo iniliale aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia highlighled a
debale wilhin lhe Alliance conceining ils ielalionship lo lhe \niled
Nalions. n lhe iun-up lo lhe Alliance`s 1999 Washinglon summil, duiing
lhe diafling of NATO`s 1999 Slialegic Concepl, lhe queslion of whelhei
NATO iequiies \N Secuiily Council backing befoie il engages in mili-
laiy aclion beyond ils boideis emeiged as an aiea of disagieemenl be-
lween lhe allies.
NATO 281
All lhe allies agieed lhal NATO should always acl in accoidance wilh
lhe piinciples of lhe \N Chailei,`` bul in aulumn 1998 lhe \niled Slales
pioposed lhal in fuluie lhe Alliance should decide on lhe legalily of ils
aclions ilself, on a case-by-case basis, wilhoul iefeience lo lhe Secuiily
Council. Wilhin lhe Alliance, Iiance led lhe ob|eclions lo lhis pioposal,
insisling lhal NATO missions oul of aiea`` musl have Secuiily Council
backing, as a fundamenlal iule of oui foieign policy.``39
Despile NATO`s decision in Maich 1999 lo go ahead wilh Opeialion
Allied Ioice wilhoul a Secuiily Council iesolulion, lhe queslion of acling
wilhoul \N backing is slill conlioveisial wilhin lhe Alliance. Discussions
on lhe iole of lhe \niled Nalions conlinued duiing negolialions on lhe
1999 Slialegic Concepl iighl up lo lhe lasl minule, including diiecl lalks
al NATO`s Washinglon summil belween Piesidenls Clinlon and Chiiac.
The iesulling Slialegic Concepl was aclually sliongei on lhe iole of lhe
\niled Nalions lhan expecled, ieileialing eailiei NATO policy offeiing
suppoil`` foi peacekeeping and olhei opeialions undei lhe aulhoiily of
lhe \N Secuiily Council oi lhe iesponsibilily of lhe OSCI.`` A loophole
was piovided foi lhe Kosovo opeialion as NATO iecalled ils subsequenl
decisions wilh iespecl lo ciisis iesponse opeialions in lhe Balkans.``40
Allhough lhe \S domeslic debale is slill hoslile lo an enhanced iole foi
lhe \niled Nalions, lhe iesull of lhe Kosovo opeialion foi many of
NATO`s Iuiopean membeis has been lo inciease lheii conceins aboul
lhe implicalions of acling wilhoul \N backing.
On lhe ielaled queslion of wilhin whal aiea lhe Noilh Allanlic Alli-
ance can legilimalely opeiale, mosl of NATO`s Iuiopean allies also ad-
vocale a moie caulious appioach. Allhough lhe \niled Slales does nol
wish lo sel any geogiaphical limils on NATO`s spheie of inuence, lhe
1999 Washinglon summil indicaled lhal fuluie opeialions would be in lhe
Iuio-Allanlic`` aiea, and in dealing wilh iegional ciises al lhe peiiph-
eiy of lhe Alliance.`` Mosl of NATO`s Iuiopean membeis see lhis as
limiling fuluie NATO opeialions lo Iuiope. Iven wilhin Iuiope, lhe
wai in Chechnya demonsliales how difncull il would be foi NATO lo
conducl opeialions similai lo Opeialion Allied Ioice in iegions wheie
lheie may be moie al slake polilically.
New impelus foi Iuiopean defence
The dominanl iole played by lhe \niled Slales in pioviding lhe mililaiy
capabilily lo conducl lhe Kosovo opeialion has highlighled lhe inabilily
of NATO`s Iuiopean membeis lo conducl even a moie limiled peace-
keeping opeialion on lheii own. Ioi some NATO membeis lhis lack of
Iuiopean capabilily vindicales lhe \S leadeiship iole in NATO, bul foi
lhose lhal would like lo have moie say in defence slialegy il has piovided
an impelus lo develop a Iuiopean capabilily.
Towaids lhe end of lhe Kosovo aii wai, lhe Iuiopean Council, al ils
Cologne summil, laid oul plans lo slienglhen Iuiopean policy. l an-
nounced lhal lhe Iuiopean \nion musl have lhe capacily foi aulono-
mous aclion, backed up by ciedible mililaiy foices, lhe means lo decide
lo use lhem, and a ieadiness lo do so, in oidei lo iespond lo inleinalional
ciises wilhoul pie|udice lo aclions by NATO.``41
The fuluie of Iuiopean defence policy is holly debaled wilhin NATO.
Al lhe Alliance`s 1999 Washinglon summil, disagieemenl ovei Alliance
policy on developing a Iuiopean Secuiily and Defence denlily (ISD)
delayed publicalion of lhe new Slialegic Concepl and lhe Summil Com-
munique .42 Tuikey, which is nol a membei of lhe I\, allempled lo block
pioposals fiom lhe \niled Kingdom and Iiance foi giealei piogiess on
ISD. The paiagiaphs lhal weie evenlually adopled in lhe Washinglon
Summil Communique ieecl lhe posilions of NATO`s I\ membeis, ac-
knowledging lhe iesolve of lhe I\ lo have lhe capacily foi aulonomous
aclion`` and agieeing lo fuilhei developmenl of lhe concepl of using
sepaiable bul nol sepaiale NATO assels foi WI\-led opeialions.``
The weakei language favouied by Tuikey was incoipoialed in lhe
Alliance`s new Slialegic Concepl, which was agieed al lhe same summil.
This lexl is similai lo pievious NATO slalemenls on ISD, ieileialing
lhal NATO would assisl lhe Iuiopean allies lo acl by lhemselves, by
making ils assels and capabililies available lo lhe WI\ on a case-by-case
basis, and by consensus`` of NATO membeis,43 lheieby pioviding Tui-
key, and olhei non-I\ membeis such as lhe \niled Slales, wilh a velo.
As lhe Iuiopean \nion moves foiwaid on developing ils mililaiy ca-
pabilily, il may yel face opposilion fiom wilhin NATO. On a iecenl visil
lo Tuikey, \S Secielaiy of Defense William Cohen indicaled lhal, on
ISD, lhe \niled Slales and Tuikey shaie lhe same view.``44 Allhough
lhe \niled Slales is keen foi ils Iuiopean allies lo play a giealei pail in
buiden-shaiing`` in NATO opeialions and foi lhem lo inciease lheii
defence spending, il would piefei lo see a build-up of lhe Iuiopean
pillai of NATO`` lo an independenl Iuiopean capabilily. Al lhe same
lime, lhe \niled Slales is also laking an incieasingly isolalionisl slance
wilhin NATO. Speaking in London, Depuly Secielaiy of Slale Sliobe
Talboll undeilined lhal lhe ullimale veidicl on Kosovo will depend on
lhe effecl lhe wai and ils afleimalh have on liansallanlic alliludes . . .
Many Ameiicans aie saying: nevei again should lhe \S have lo y lhe
lion`s shaie of lhe iisky missions in a NATO opeialion and fool by fai lhe
biggesl bill.``45
NATO 283
Giealei piessuie foi NATO enlaigemenl
Allhough lhiee new membeis fiom Iaslein Iuiope lhe Czech Repub-
lic, Hungaiy, and Poland have now foimally |oined NATO, mililaiy
inlegialion of lhe new membeis has been haidei lhan expecled lo
achieve. On lhe day lhal lhe lhiee new membeis ofncially |oined lhe Al-
liance, lhe BBC iepoiled lhal only a small piopoilion`` of lhe Polish
mililaiy was ieady foi NATO.46 Similai pioblems have been iepoiled
wilh lhe Czech mililaiy.47
Theie have also been hesilalions, especially in lhe \S mililaiy, aboul
lhe implicalions of exlending lhe secuiily guaianlees lhal accompany
NATO membeiship lo moie counliies in Iaslein Iuiope lhal mighl
piove haid lo defend, in pailiculai lhe Ballics. As a iesull, allhough
lhe 1999 NATO summil acknowledged lhe piogiess of a laige numbei of
aspiiing new membeis, il did nol announce accession lalks wilh any of
lhem. nslead, Alliance leadeis agieed a Membeiship Aclion Plan lo offei
closei coopeialion wilh NATO applicanls, bul slopped shoil of offeiing
lhem full membeiship.
Kosovo has highlighled lhe facl lhal many Iasl Iuiopean slales feel
lhal moie is iequiied fiom NATO lhan |usl woids of gialilude, following
lheii demonslialions of loyally duiing lhe aii wai. These slales aie keen
lo emphasize lheii conliibulions, such as hosling iefugees, giving polilical
suppoil, beaiing lhe economic cosls of lhe wai, and even in some cases,
such as Bulgaiia, accepling misguided missiles landing on lheii leiiiloiy.
Allhough lhe \niled Slales has indicaled lhal il does nol expecl Kosovo
lo have an impacl on NATO enlaigemenl,48 \S ofncials have visiled
many of lhe candidale counliies following Opeialion Allied Ioice,
lhanking lhem foi lheii conliibulions lo lhe Kosovo effoil and ieileialing
\S suppoil foi lheii NATO candidacy.49
Damage lo aims conliol and disaimamenl effoils
Wilh lhe beginning of aii sliikes againsl ugoslavia, NATO`s poslCold
Wai ielalionship wilh Russia ieached a new low. Talks in lhe NATO
Russia Peimanenl 1oinl Council, which had been a foium foi discussions
on nucleai weapons issues including lhe eai 2OOO millennium bug``
compulei pioblem, weie bioughl lo a hall. Meanwhile, Russia`s pailia-
menl, lhe Duma, pul ialincalion of lhe START nucleai aims ieduclion
liealy on hold. Al lhe heighl of lhe conicl, lhe Russian foieign minisliy
also alleged lhal NATO had obsliucled inspeclions of ils foices in Alba-
nia and Macedonia, in violalion of lhe Convenlional Ioices in Iuiope
Tiealy, which is cuiienlly being adapled lo ieecl NATO enlaigemenl.50
Since lhe end of NATO aii sliikes, NATO membeis have made effoils
lo iebuild NATORussia ielalions. Al lhe G-8 summil in Cologne in
1une 1999, Piesidenls Clinlon and ellsin issued a |oinl slalemenl on lhe
START piocess and lhe Anli-Ballislic Missile (ABM) Tiealy. n il lhe
Russians appaienlly agieed lo discuss changes lo lhe ABM Tiealy lhal
could facililale \S plans foi a possible nalional missile defence syslem.
Al lhe same lime, lhe \niled Slales agieed lo allow pieliminaiy discus-
sions aboul a START liealy lo pioceed on a moie foimal basis.51
Allhough lhese lalks gol off lo a lenlalive slail in Augusl 1999, Russian
goveinmenl spokespeople have iepealedly slaled ils opposilion lo al-
lempls lo undeicul lhe ABM Tiealy. The \S posilion on ballislic missile
defence also lhiealens lo cause divisions wilhin NATO, wilh mosl Iuio-
pean allies opposed lo any weakening of lhe ABM Tiealy oi lhe widei
aims conliol iegime.
The bombing of ugoslavia may also have a negalive impacl on
lhe widei nucleai non-piolifeialion iegime. Al lhe 1999 Nucleai Non-
Piolifeialion Tiealy Piepaialoiy Commillee (PiepCom) meeling, China
aigued lhal NATO aclions such as lhe Kosovo opeialion could foice
olhei counliies lo iesoil lo eveiy possible means lo piolecl lhem-
selves,`` causing fuilhei piolifeialion of weapons of mass desliuclion.52
Allhough lhe Chinese weie lhe only delegalion al lhe NPT PiepCom
publicly lo wondei if NATO would have bombed Belgiade if ugoslavia
had also been nucleai aimed, lheie weie many in lhe coiiidois who
made lhe obvious conneclion.``53
The wai ovei Kosovo disliacled mosl Weslein media fiom looking al
disagieemenls wilhin lhe Alliance ovei ils own nucleai posluie. Geimany,
backed by Canada, had pioposed lhal NATO considei adopling a policy
of no nisl use`` of nucleai weapons. nslead, lhe Alliance`s Washinglon
summil ieafnimed a policy based closely on Cold Wai concepls of delei-
ience and lhe deploymenl of a small numbei of \S nucleai weapons in
Iuiope as a symbol of \S commilmenl lo lhe Iuiopean allies. This ie-
afnimalion ignoied lhe aclual iiielevance of nucleai weapons in NATO`s
new poslCold Wai iole.
Conclusion
NATO piesenls lhe oulcome of Opeialion Allied Ioice as vindicaling
Alliance peace enfoicemenl slialegy. The high-lech, lelevised demon-
slialions gave a laige boosl lo lhe aeiospace indusliy, which aigues lhal,
wilh supeiioi aii powei, lhe Alliance imposed ils will wilh minimal casu-
allies on ils own side. Al lhe same lime, Kosovo has given impelus lo
Iuiopean \nion plans foi a moie inlegialed defence policy, whilsl also
NATO 285
incieasing piessuie foi NATO enlaigemenl. Behind lhe liiumphalism,
howevei, lheie aie feais lhal a dangeious piecedenl has been sel in lhe
Balkans, wheieby NATO lakes aclion wilh \N backing when possible,
bul wilhoul il if Alliance membeis lhink il necessaiy.
Allhough NATO succeeded evenlually in foicing Piesidenl Milosevic
lo agiee a polilical selllemenl, including lhe wilhdiawal of Seib mililaiy
foices, ciileiia of success and failuie in a peace enfoicemenl opeialion
aie moie complex lhan in a liadilional NATO colleclive defence opeia-
lion, as NATO spokespeople lhemselves have indicaled. The Alliance`s
oveiall aim was nol simply lo win lhe wai,`` bul also lo piovide a basis
foi a secuie and mulli-elhnic Kosovo lhal iemained wilhin ugoslavia,
albeil wilh giealei aulonomy.
n piaclice, NATO`s mililaiy slialegy was iesliicled by lhe polilical
iequiiemenl lo mainlain consensus. Diplomacy backed by ciedible
foice`` had only a limiled effecl on lhe Milosevic iegime. n suppoil of
NATO`s deleiienl appioach, Geoige Robeilson ciles \N Secielaiy-
Geneial Kon Annan as saying lhal lhe peifecl peacekeepei shows foice
in oidei lhal he does nol have lo use il.``54 By lhis ciileiion, howevei, lhe
beginning of aii sliikes highlighls a failuie of deleiience. Aii sliikes look
a long lime lo foice Piesidenl Milosevic lo back down. The evidence
suggesls lhal, as lhe OSCI monilois wilhdiew fiom Kosovo lo allow aii
sliikes lo begin, Seibian mililaiy foices weie inamed ialhei lhan de-
leiied fiom caiiying oul aliocilies.
As iefugees ieluin and Seib civilians aie evicled and killed by Alba-
nians seeking ievenge, lhe posl-wai silualion in Kosovo indicales lhal
NATO is slill fai fiom achieving ils ullimale goal of biinging peace and
slabilily lo a mulli-elhnic Kosovo. Aflei Opeialion Allied Ioice, lhe
communilies in Kosovo iemain as polaiized as evei, liaumalized by lhe
effecls of aii sliikes and widespiead aliocilies. Bolh communilies aie slill
heavily aimed. Allhough NATO foices escaped wilh minimal loss of life,
lhe impacl of lhe aii sliikes on civilian life in ugoslavia has been seveie.
When lhe KLA signed up lo lhe oiiginal Rambouillel agieemenl, il
appaienlly accepled lhal Kosovo would have incieased aulonomy wilhin
ugoslavia ialhei lhan independence, and agieed lo disaim when a
NATO-led mplemenlalion Ioice enleied Kosovo. Now lhe KLA ap-
peais lo be ieneging on bolh of lhese commilmenls, iaising lhe queslion
of lo whal exlenl NATO has been manipulaled by KLA laclics lo gel lhe
Alliance lo inleivene on ils side againsl lhe Seibs.
Many Seibs believe lhal NATO is biased againsl lhem, while all now
lack conndence in lhe Alliance`s abilily lo piolecl lhem. Meanwhile,
elhnic Albanians have made cleai lhal, since Russia opposed Allied aii
sliikes, lhey see lhe Russian conlingenl in KIOR as biased againsl lhem.
As a iesull of lhe aii sliikes, lhe diffeienl elemenls of KIOR aie no
longei seen as impailial peacekeepeis.
Peace suppoil opeialions in Kosovo, along wilh BosniaHeizegovina,
now look sel lo conlinue indennilely. n view of lhe cosls and iisks of
such a long-leim opeialion, NATO will inevilably be pul undei fuilhei
sliain, especially in aieas such as mainlaining Alliance cohesion and
keeping all allies commilled. Divisions aie alieady emeiging belween lhe
allies ovei lhe level of independence lhal should be given lo Kosovo
Albanians in lhe long leim. KIOR has also been ciilicized foi failing lo
deploy sufncienl lioops, and piessuie on numbeis can only inciease as
lime goes by and counliies slail lo lhink aboul ieducing lheii conliibu-
lions. The \niled Slales and lhe Iuiopean \nion aie also divided on lhe
issue of who should pay foi ieconsliuclion, wilh lhe iesull lhal effoils lo
iebuild lhe iegion have been slow gelling slailed. The scale and cosl of
lhe NATO opeialions in lhe Balkans limil Alliance capabilily lo opeiale
elsewheie, ieinfoicing lhe posilion of NATO membeis lhal wanl lo see
lhe Alliance iesliicled lo opeialions wilhin Iuiope.
The aii sliikes have aggiavaled ongoing lensions wilh Russia, which
aie appaienl fiom lhe conlioveisy ovei Russia`s diive lo conliol Piislina
aiipoil and in lhieals by lhe Russians lo pull oul of KIOR if NATO does
nol do moie lo piolecl lhe iemaining Seibs. Russia iemains suspicious of
NATO`s molives in lhe Balkans and conlinues lo feel lhiealened by
piogiess lowaids fuilhei NATO enlaigemenl.
NATO expended huge mililaiy and polilical iesouices on a ielalively
small iegion, and yel lhe conicls in lhe foimei ugoslavia aie slill fai
fiom iesolved. Mililaiy powei alone has nol been sufncienl, and olhei
skills and expeilise will be needed if ieconcilialion and ieconsliuclion aie
lo pioceed in lhe Balkans. As NATO ieviews ils slialegy in lhe afleimalh
of Opeialion Allied Ioice, il musl now give giealei piioiily lo iebuilding
ils ielalionship wilh lhe \niled Nalions, so lhal fuluie peace suppoil
opeialions aie genuinely caiiied oul in lhe inleiesls and wilh lhe suppoil
of lhe inleinalional communily.
Noles
1. Ambassadoi Alexandei \eishbow, NATO aflei lhe Washinglon Summil and lhe
Kosovo Ciisis,`` 3O 1une 1999, al hllp:jjusa.gimbl.comjs1999O63Od.hlml, accessed Augusl
1999.
2. London Declaialion on a Tiansfoimed Noilh Allanlic Alliance,`` issued by NATO
Heads of Slale and Goveinmenl, London, 56 1uly 199O, al hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocuj
commj49-95jc9OO7O6a.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
3. bid.
NATO 287
4. NATO`s Role in Biinging Peace lo lhe Ioimei ugoslavia,`` NATO Basic Iact Shcct,
No. 4, Maich 1997, al hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocujfaclsjbpfy.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
5. Noilh Allanlic Mililaiy Commillee, MC 14j2 (Revised), 23 May 1957, al hllp:jj
www.nalo.inljdocujslialdocjengja57O523a.pdf, accessed Augusl 1999.
6. The Alliance`s New Slialegic Concepl,`` Rome, 78 Novembei 1991, al hllp:jj
www.nalo.inljdocujcommj49-95jc9111OO7a.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
7. bid.
8. bid.
9. The Silualion in ugoslavia,`` NATO Piess Release, S-1(98)88, 8 Novembei 1991, al
hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocujcommj49-95jc9111O8b.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
1O. See Noilh Allanlic Mililaiy Commillee, MC 327 Denning NATO`s Peace Suppoil
Opeialions, ciled in Paliicia Chillon, Olfiied Nassauei, Dan Plesch, 1amie Pallen
(Whilakei), NATO, Peacekeeping and lhe \niled Nalions,`` BASIC, BASC Repoil
94.1, Seplembei 1994.
11. bid.
12. NATO Piess Communique , M-NAC-1(96)63, al hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocujpij1996j
p96-O63e.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
13. David Lighlbuin, NATO and lhe Challenge of Mullifunclional Peacekeeping,`` NATO
Rcvicw, \ol. 44, No. 2, Maich 1996, pp. 1O14; al hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocujieviewj
ailiclesj96O2-3.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
14. bid.
15. The Alliance`s Slialegic Concepl,`` NAC-S(99)65, Washinglon D.C., NATO Piess
Ofnce, 24 Apiil 1999.
16. David S. osl, NATO TransjorncJ. Thc Allianccs Ncw Rolcs in Intcrnational Sccurity,
Washinglon, D.C.: \niled Slales nslilule of Peace Piess, 1998, p. 195.
17. 1aviei Solana, Lessons Leained fiom Bosnia,`` Poilugal, 12 Maich 1999, al hllp:jj
www.nalo.inljdocujspeechj1999js99O312a.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
18. Madeleine K. Albiighl, To Win lhe Peace. . . ,`` Vall Strcct 1ournal, 14 1une 1999; al
hllp:jjsecielaiy.slale.govjwwwjslalemenlsj1999j99O614a.hlml, accessed Augusl 1999.
19. Slalemenl on Kosovo`` issued al lhe Minisleiial Meeling of lhe Noilh Allanlic Council
in Ioieign Minisleis Session, M-NAC-1(98)61, 28 May 1998, al hllp:jjwww.nalo.inlj
docujpij1998jp98-O61e.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
2O. Slalemenl by NATO Secielaiy Geneial, Di 1aviei Solana, on Ixeicise Deleimined
Ialcon`,`` NATO Piess Release 98(8O), 13 1une 1998, al hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocujpij
1998jp98-O8Oe.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
21. Slalemenl by lhe Secielaiy Geneial of NATO,`` NATO Piess Release 98(93), 12
Augusl 1998, al hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocujpij1998jp98-O94e.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
22. Slalemenl by lhe Secielaiy Geneial Iollowing lhe ACTWARN decision,`` NATO
Piess Release, 24 Seplembei 1998, al hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocujpij1998jp98O924e.hlm,
accessed Augusl 1999.
23. Slalemenl lo lhe Piess by lhe Secielaiy Geneial Iollowing Decision on lhe AC-
TORD,`` NATO Piess Release, 13 Oclobei 1998, al hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocujspeechj
1998js981O13a.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
24. Slalemenl lo lhe Piess by NATO Secielaiy Geneial Di 1aviei Solana,`` NATO Piess
Release, 27 Oclobei 1998, al hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocujspeechj1998js981O27a.hlm.
25. See \S nfoimalion Agency, Ioieign Media Reaclion Digesls, Maich 1999, al hllp:jj
www.usia.govjpioduclsjmedieac.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
26. Piepaied Slalemenl of lhe Honoiable Wallei B. Slocombe \ndeisecielaiy of
Defense foi Policy Befoie lhe House Aimed Seivices Commillee Heaiing on lhe
Balkans,`` Washinglon D.C., 17 Maich 1999, al hllp:jjwww.house.govjhascjleslimonyj
1O6lhcongiessj99-O3-17slocombe.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
27. Piess Slalemenl by Di 1aviei Solana,`` NATO Piess Release, 23 Maich 1999, al
hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocujpij1999jp99-O4Oe.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
28. Secielaiy of Slale foi Defence, lhe Rl. Hon. Geoige Robeilson MP, Kosovo Some
Pieliminaiy Thoughls,`` Minisliy of Defence, 29 1une 1999.
29. Repiesenlalive Poilei Goss quoled in Did NATO Miscalculale?`` BBC VorlJ 1uropc,
23 Apiil 1999, al hllp:jjnews2.lhls.bbc.co.ukjhijenglishjwoildjeuiopejnewsid 326OOOj
326864.slm, accessed Augusl 1999.
3O. Maik \iban, NATO`s nnei Kosovo Conicl,`` 2O Augusl 1999, al hllp:jjnews2.lhls.
bbc.co.ukjhijenglishjwoildjeuiopejnewsid 425OOOj425468.slm, accessed Augusl 1999.
31. NATO Commandei Denies Snub,`` BBC VorlJ Ancricas, 29 1uly 1999, al hllp:jj
news2.lhls.bbc.co.ukjhijenglishjwoildjameiicasjnewsid 4O7OOOj4O7O4O.slm, accessed Au-
gusl 1999.
32. Geneials Clashed ovei Kosovo Raid`,`` BBC VorlJ 1uropc, 2 Augusl 1999, al hllp:jj
news2.lhls.bbc.co.ukjhijenglishjwoildjeuiopejnewsid 4O9OOOj4O9576.slm, accessed Au-
gusl 1999.
33. Geneial Wesley Claik quoled in Did NATO Miscalculale?``
34. Robeilson, Kosovo.``
35. Kosovo: The Conicl by Numbeis,`` BBC VorlJ 1uropc, 11 1une 1999, al hllp:jj
news2.lhls.bbc.co.ukjhijenglishjwoildjeuiopejnewsid 366OOOj366981.slm, accessed Au-
gusl 1999.
36. Paul Beavei, Analysis: How ugoslavia Hid ls Tanks,`` BBC VorlJ 1uropc, 25 1une
1999, al hllp:jjnews2.lhls.bbc.co.ukjhijenglishjwoildjeuiopejnewsid 377OOOj377943.slm,
38. \N Piess Release SGjSMj6938, 24 Maich 1999, al hllp:jjwww.un.oigjDocsjSGj
sgsm.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
39. Minisleiial Meeling of lhe Noilh Allanlic Council: Speech by M. Hubeil \ediine,
Minislei of Ioieign Affaiis,`` Biussels, 8 Decembei 1998, al hllp:jjwww.nalo.inljdocuj
speechj1998js9812O8.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
4O. The Alliance`s Slialegic Concepl,`` NAC-S(99)65.
41. Declaialion of lhe Iuiopean Council on Slienglhening lhe Common Iuiopean Policy
on Secuiily and Defence,`` Cologne, 3 1une 1999, al hllp:jjwww.ue.eu.inlj Newsioom,
42. Washinglon Summil Communique , An Alliance foi lhe 21
sl
Cenluiy,`` NAC-S(99)64,
NATO Piess Ofnce, 24 Apiil 1999.
43. The Alliance`s Slialegic Concepl,`` NAC-S(99)65.
44. Secielaiy of Defense William Cohen Piess Confeience wilh lhe Tuikish Minislei of
Nalional Defense Sabahallin Cakmakoglu,`` Depailmenl of Defense News Biienng,
Tuikey, 15 1uly 1999, al hllp:jjwww.defenselink.miljnewsj1ul1999jlO7151999 lO715ank.
hlml, accessed Augusl 1999.
45. \S Depuly Secielaiy of Slale Sliobe Talboll, quoled in 1ohn Lloyd, Mandaiins, Guns
and Moials,`` Ncw Statcsnan, 25 Oclobei 1999.
46. 1ames Coomaiasamy, Poland`s Giealesl Piize,`` BBC VorlJ 1uropc, 12 Maich 1999.
47. Biilish Defence Secielaiy Says Czech Aimy Has a Lol of Woik lo Meel NATO
Slandaids,`` BBC VorlJ 1uropc, 24 Novembei 1998, al hllp:jjnews2.lhls.bbc.co.ukjhij
englishjwoildjeuiopejnewsid 295OOOj29555O.slm, accessed Augusl 1999.
48. Tiansciipl of Piess Incounlei wilh Maic Giossman, \S Assislanl Secielaiy of Slale
foi Iuiopean and Canadian Affaiis,`` Lalvia, 16 1une 1999, al hllp:jjusia.govjpioduclsj
washnle.hlm, accessed Augusl 1999.
49. See, foi example, Clinlon Remaiks lo People of L|ubl|ana, Slovenia,`` 21 1une 1999, al
hllp:jjusa.gimbl.comjs1999O621b.hlml; Secielaiy of Slale Madeleine K. Albiighl wilh
NATO 289
Bulgaiian Ioieign Minislei Nadezhda Mihailova, Sona, Bulgaiia,`` 22 1une 1999, al
hllp:jjsecielaiy.slale.govjwwwjslalemenlsj1999j99O622.hlml; Secielaiy of Slale Made-
leine K. Albiighl wilh Romanian Ioieign Minislei Andiei Plesu, Buchaiesl, Romania,``
22 1une 1999, al hllp:jjsecielaiy.slale.govjwwwjslalemenlsj1999j99O622a.hlml; all ac-
cessed Augusl 1999.
5O. Russia Complains of CII \iolalion by NATO,`` Disarnancnt Diplonacy, No. 38,
1une 1999.
51. Piess Biienng by Nalional Secuiily Advisoi Sandy Beigei,`` Cologne, 2O 1une 1999,
iepioduced in Disarnancnt Diplonacy, No. 38, 1une 1999.
52. H.I. Mi. Sha Zukang, Head of Delegalion of lhe People`s Republic of China, Slale-
menl al lhe Thiid Session of lhe Piepaialoiy Commillee foi lhe 2OOO Review Confei-
ence of lhe Pailies lo lhe Tiealy on lhe Non-Piolifeialion of Nucleai Weapons,`` New
oik, 1O May 1999.
53. Rebecca 1ohnson, The Thiid NPT PiepCom: Whal Happened and How,`` Disarna-
ncnt Diplonacy, No. 37, May 1999.
19
The \niled Nalions syslem
and lhe Kosovo ciisis
A. 1. R. Croon anJ Iaul Taylor
The diiving faclois
The veiy exislence of lhe \niled Nalions was an impoilanl facloi in lhe
Kosovo ciisis.1 Whelhei il could acl as a legilimizing agenl and whelhei
ils pioceduies and piocesses could, oi should, be used weie nol liivial
queslions. Moieovei, lhe efncacy of lhe \niled Nalions syslem including
ils Specialized Agencies and piogiammes was, polenlially al leasl, foi
many a mallei of life oi dealh. The \niled Nalions has been much de-
iided, and in ma|oi aspecls il has nol been made use of, bul il has cei-
lainly nol been ignoied. Now lhal il is lhe lime lo pick up lhe pieces in
Kosovo and Seibia piopei, il has a cenlial iole lo play wilh a conslella-
lion of olhei oiganizalions. Howevei, lhe \niled Nalions syslem is bul
one foium and acloi, and lhe use and abuse of lhe syslem can be ana-
lysed only in a widei polilical conlexl.
A numbei of diiving faclois played a ma|oi iole in deleimining lhe
place of lhe \N syslem as a whole in lhe Kosovo affaii. Of gieal signin-
cance is lhe humanilaiian impeialive, which is iefeiied lo wilh incieasing
insislence in a seiies of Secuiily Council iesolulions, nolably 116O, 1199,
and 12O3, which demanded safe access lo Kosovo foi humanilaiian oi-
ganizalions, and especially lhe nleinalional Commillee of lhe Red Cioss
(CRC) and lhe \niled Nalions High Commissionei foi Refugees
(\NHCR), befoie waining of an impending humanilaiian calasliophe,
which was nol lale in coming. Allhough lhese iesolulions do make iefei-
291
ence specincally lo Chaplei \ of lhe Chailei, ciucially lhey did nol
iesull in a iesolulion similai lo Secuiily Council Resolulions 678 oi 688,
such as occuiied in lhe conlexl of lhe Gulf Wai. Neveilheless il is cleai
lhal lhe polilical climale was such lhal lhe humanilaiian impeialive look
piecedence ovei Ailicle 2(7) of lhe Chailei, which piolecls slale sovei-
eignly foi malleis essenlially wilhin lhe domeslic |uiisdiclion of membei
slales. l is well lo iemembei lhal lhe \niled Nalions has on signincanl
occasions in lhe pasl pul human iighls and humanilaiian queslions befoie
Ailicle 2(7). A nolable case was lhe queslion of aparthciJ, and moie gen-
eially lhe issue of colonialism, nol lo menlion lhe \niveisal Declaialion
on Human Righls and subsequenl Covenanls, as well as lhe giowlh and
developmenl of lhe Geneva Convenlions. Whalevei else one mighl say
aboul Kosovo, al leasl al one level il was asseiled diamalically lhal lhe
pioleclion of human iighls fiom abuse can be a deciding piinciple ovei-
iuling lhe domeslic |uiisdiclion of slales. Thal lhis may have iesulled in
an anli-humanilaiian humanilaiianism does nol deliacl fiom lhe impoi-
lanl salience given lo human iighls and pioleclion againsl abuse.
Howevei, olhei decisive and deciding piinciples weie also al play. n
pailiculai, lheie was a Weslein insislence on lwo inappiopiiale piin-
ciples. When Weslein diplomacy failed lo hold ugoslavia logelhei lheie
was an unlhinking acceplance of lhe inleinal boundaiies of ugoslavia,
many of which weie diawn by Tilo lo suil his own polilical iequiiemenls.
They weie nol boundaiies likely lo enhance slabilily in a lense lime. The
second Weslein piinciple was a belief in mulli-elhnicism iiiespeclive of
lhe ciicumslances. The foimei ugoslavia had demonslialed a subslan-
lial degiee of mulli-elhnicism, bul as lhe silualion deleiioialed il became
evidenl lhal subslanlial elemenls in lhe foimei ugoslavia weie nol pie-
paied lo live logelhei, which, given lhe hisloiy of lhal counliy and lhe
Balkans moie geneially, is haidly suipiising. The inleiaclion of lhese lwo
piinciples, lhal is, nxed leiiiloiial boundaiies and a docliine of mulli-
elhnicism, exaceibaled alieady lioubled ielalionships. l has lhus become
evidenl lhal, if people aie nol piepaied (oi nol allowed) lo live logelhei,
lhen lhey musl live sepaialely, which is piecisely whal lhe Kosovais wanl,
and foi lhal mallei mosl Seibs, Cioals, Slovenes, el al. Populalion ie-
giouping, even when accompanied by gioss abuses, has been sanclioned
by lhe inleinalional communily in lhe pasl. The \niled Nalions ilself
pioposed lhis foi Palesline and lhe palions of lhe \N syslem (lhe \niled
Slales, lhe \niled Kingdom, and lhe Soviel \nion) imposed changes in
lhe boundaiies belween Geimany, Poland, and lhe lhen Soviel \nion al
lhe end of lhe Second Woild Wai, which involved laige-scale movemenls
of populalion. Iailiei, lhe iegiouping of Gieek and Tuikish populalions
in lhe foimei Olloman Impiie was sanclioned by lhe Tiealy of Lausanne
of 1923, and lhe \niled Nalions ilself was insliumenlal in oveiseeing
lhe movemenl of populalions in Cypius in lhe peiiod 19741975. n lhe
foimei ugoslavia, as lensions giew and inleinalional boundaiies weie
imposed, oflen on unwilling populalions who now found lhemselves in a
minoiily posilion, lhe Weslein insislence on a laigely ineffeclive mulli-
elhnicily emasculaled lhoughl lhal mighl have given iise lo olhei oplions.
The oulcome is a liagic silualion in which eveiyone is a viclim and
lheie aie no winneis, excepl peihaps Slovenia. n lhe piocess of uniav-
elling ugoslavia along lhe lines of lhe lwo Weslein piinciples, il was
likely lhal any Seib leadeiship would ieacl sliongly, and Piesidenl Milo-
sevic has nol disappoinled us in lhis iegaid. Iiom lheii poinl of view lhe
Seibs fell lhal lhey had been disciiminaled againsl in a syslemalic man-
nei lhioughoul lhe whole piocess. The iecognilion of Cioalia was ciucial
in lhal il lefl a subslanlial elhnic Seib populalion al lhe meicy of a gov-
einmenl which gave eveiy indicalion of being lillle conceined wilh lhe
human iighls of minoiilies wilhin ils boundaiies. The failuie of lhe in-
leinalional communily lo pieseive lhese human iighls, by al leasl wilh-
holding iecognilion unlil such lime as lhey could be assuied, only
slienglhened lhose Seibs who believed in self-help nanu nilitari. A like
silualion followed in Bosnia, wheie a Seib minoiily was oulvoled and
again Seibs soughl lo pieseive lheii posilion nanu nilitari. Moieovei,
even in Kosovo, which had had a 5O pei cenl Seib populalion al lhe end
of lhe Second Woild Wai, lhal piopoilion had diminished lo 1O pei cenl
by 1989. Again, lhe Seibs soughl lo pieseive lheii inleiesl nanu nilitari.
The poinl is nol lo |uslify lhe leiiible excesses of lhe Seibs, bolh ofncial
and quasi-ofncial, bul lo liy lo undeisland lheii piedicamenl as lhey
mighl have seen il. To undeisland is in no way lo paidon. Neveilheless,
in many conicls of lhis soil, baibaious acls lake place, oflen leading lo
populalion iegiouping oi foicible elhnic cleansing. l was slill laking
place in Noilhein ieland in 1999.
The iole of NATO in lhe Kosovo ciisis needs also lo be seen in lhe
conlexl of lhe secuiily aichilecluie in lhe poslCold Wai woild. n lhe
eaily 199Os lhe \niled Slales and Geimany in pailiculai, and lo a lessei
exlenl lhe \niled Kingdom, slailed lo ieconsidei lhe iole of NATO wilh
a view lo expanding ils iemil lo covei oul-of-aiea aclivilies. n 1998 and
1999 lhe \niled Slales suffeied a signincanl iebuff fiom ils allies on lhis
issue. Howevei, lhe queslion was impoilanl lo lhe \niled Slales foi a
numbei of ieasons. An oul-of-aiea mission would in lhe long leim |uslify
a conlinuing Ameiican mililaiy piesence in Iuiope of consideiable sig-
nincance in leims of global slialegy. Moieovei, lhe developmenl of an
aulonomous Iuiopean defence and foieign policy capabilily mighl be
inhibiled. n addilion il would piovide a fiamewoik wilhin which lhe
\niled Slales and a coalilion of lhe willing could acl in a mililaiily effec-
live mannei, such as is nol likely lo be possible in lhe foimal \N
THI \NTID NATONS 293
fiamewoik of lhe Mililaiy Slaff Commillee and lhe like. The Gulf Wai
expeiience was cleai in lhal lhe \N Secuiily Council could bless such
aclivily and give il legilimacy bul il could nol execule il. Only NATO was
an effeclive vehicle foi enfoicemenl aclion in lhe name of global govei-
nance, bul foi lhis lo occui il was necessaiy bolh lo widen NATO`s iemil
and lo diminish lhe salience of lhe \N Secuiily Council, pailiculaily in
lhe eyes of public opinion in lhe \niled Slales and especially in lhe
Congiess. Moieovei, lhe use of consideiable aii powei by lhe \niled
Slales and Biilain againsl iaq in 1998 and 1999 suggesled lhal lhe use
of foice wilhoul an explicil Secuiily Council iesolulion was polilically
feasible.
Thus lhe Kosovo affaii gave lhe \niled Slales an oppoilunily lo pei-
suade ils allies lhal lhe NATO fiamewoik was an appiopiiale one foi
oul-of-aiea enfoicemenl aclivily. Howevei, lhis iaises lhe queslion aboul
lhe exlenl lo which such aclivily was sanclioned by lhe Secuiily Council
as a foim of colleclive, bul nol univeisal, self-defence when faced by a
lhieal lo lhe peace, a bieach of lhe peace, oi an acl of aggiession. Did lhe
abuse of human iighls in Kosovo conslilule such a lhieal, bieach, oi acl?
Diplomalic momenlum also had ils pail lo play. Piesidenl Milosevic,
his goveinmenl, and his suppoileis weie iapidly demonized. Allhough
Seib foices bolh ofncial and quasi-ofncial had commilled gioss abuses of
human iighls, lhey weie nol lhe only ones lo do so. ndeed, lhe Secuiily
Council iesolulions on Kosovo weie veiy even-handed belween abuses
by lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia (IR) and lhe leiioiisl aclivilies
of lhe KLA. Howevei, Piesidenl Milosevic was seen nol only as lhe pei-
son behind lhe peipelialion of gioss human iighls abuses, bul also as an
independenl acloi. Wheieas lhe Cioalion and Bosnian piesidenls weie
piepaied lo lie low, Milosevic was nol. The Biilish and Iiench, logelhei
wilh lhe Ameiicans, deleimined lhal he had lo be bioughl lo heel and
lhis led lo moniloiing in Kosovo, nol only by lhe \niled Nalions bul also
by lhe Oiganizalion foi Secuiily and Co-opeialion in Iuiope (OSCI).
When lhe silualion did nol amelioiale, lhe Rambouillel piocess of full-
scale coeicive diplomacy began. The KLA was offeied a caiiol in lhal if
il was willing lo pul aside ils demands foi independence foi al leasl
lhiee yeais lhen a slick would be applied lo Piesidenl Milosevic. The
Weslein model appeais lo have been based on lhe piemise lhal Piesidenl
Milosevic would quickly give way lo a minimum use of aeiial foice, as he
was believed lo have done in lhe Daylon Accoids. Bul in Daylon lhe
Seibs had secuied lheii own laigely aulonomous slale wilhin Bosnia
Heizegovina, and, allhough lhe Seibs had been biulally expelled fiom
Kia|ina in nve days by lhe Cioalian aimy in 1995, neveilheless Daylon
made no menlion of Kosovo. An alleinalive model lo Daylon fiom
Weslein expeiience mighl have been iaq wheie, despile heavy aeiial
bombaidmenl, Saddam Hussein has iid himself of lhe \N Special Com-
mission and lhe sanclions iegime is gelling evei moie leaky, while his
posilion seems lo be unchallenged inleinally, lhe exleinal opposilion is
splinleied, and he and his suppoileis aie iepuledly eniiching lhemselves
ioyally.
Behind lhe diplomalic momenlum was a belief lhal lheie was no al-
leinalive lo foicible confionlalion of Piesidenl Milosevic. Theie is, how-
evei, always an alleinalive, no mallei how unpalalable. n lhe immediale
shoil leim lheie was lhe possibilily of incieasing lhe OSCI piesence in
Kosovo and backing il wilh a mililaiy inleivenlion capabilily of fai
giealei piopoilions lhan lhe small iescue foice based in Macedonia and
lhe mplemenlalion Ioice piesence in Bosnia. This would have been lo
ieinfoice coeicive diplomacy. The ieal alleinalive, howevei, was lo fol-
low a diffeienl slialegy and lo accepl lhal foi almosl 8O yeais ugoslavia
and ils anlecedenl enlilies had nol pioved viable. Theiefoie il was nec-
essaiy lo slail again, nol lo impose anolhei unacceplable iegime oi ie-
gimes on lhe aiea, bul lo ieecl wilh lhe local populalions slailing nol
fiom lhe piesenl slalus quo, slill less fiom lhal which had peilained in
199O, bul Jc nouvcau. The pioblems wilh lhis aie evidenl, bul piesenl
policies offei even less piospecl of a long-leim self-sufncienl non-coeicive
sel of ielalionships.
n lhis silualion lhe \niled Nalions syslem was bolh a foium and an
acloi. As a foium, lhe Secuiily Council had lhe aulhoiily lo lake en-
foicemenl aclion undei Chaplei \. Ioui iesolulions weie agieed (116O,
1199, 12O3, and 1244), lhiee of which made explicil iefeience lo Chaplei
\. Howevei, lheie was no specinc iesolulion aulhoiizing NATO lo
undeilake mililaiy aclion. As an acloi, howevei, lhe \niled Nalions
could play a iole nol only lhiough lhe polilical aclivilies of lhe Secielaiy-
Geneial, which weie muled, bul also lhiough lhe Specialized Agencies
and olhei pails of lhe \N syslem, in pailiculai, inilially, \NHCR. Bul
nisl we musl considei lhe exlenl lo which lhe Secuiily Council mighl
have implicilly condoned lhe NATO opeialion.
Diplomacy in lhe Secuiily Council
n whal sense was lhe bombing of Seibia sanclioned by lhe \niled
Nalions in lhe ielevanl Secuiily Council iesolulions, 116O, 1199, and
12O3? Allhough lhe woiding of lhe iesolulions lhal came befoie lhe
NATO aclion was nol explicil in aulhoiizing lhe NATO aclion, aiguably
lhey conlained a subslanlial measuie of |uslincalion foi lhal aclion. Thiee
poinls can be made aboul lhe iesolulions. Iiisl, lhey became incieasingly
specinc aboul lhe violalions of humanilaiian slandaids; lhe iesolulions
weie aboul gioss violalions of lhe iules of civilized conducl, as embodied
in a wide iange of inleinalional convenlions, and lhe language of lhe
iesolulions was incieasingly poinled and foiceful aboul lhis. Secondly,
fiom lhe nisl iesolulion, 116O, lo lhe one closesl lo lhe aclion, 12O3, lhey
became incieasingly focused upon lhe liansgiessions of lhe foices of
Iedeial ugoslavia. Resolulion 116O was faiily even-handed in demand-
ing compliance fiom bolh lhe KLA and lhe Seib foices, bul lhe lalei
iesolulion was focused on lhe liansgiessions of lhe Seibs. The appeal foi
help in idenlifying bieaches of lhe laws of wai and biinging lhose accused
lo |uslice was also laigeled moie al lhe Seibs lhan al lhe Kosovais.
Thiidly, lhe iesolulions conlained an appeal lo slales lo acl, which in-
cieased in slienglh. A compaiison of Ailicle 12 in Resolulion 1199
(Seplembei 1998) wilh Ailicle 13 of Resolulion 12O3 (Oclobei 1998) ie-
veals a moie piessing appeal. Resolulion 1199 calls upon Membei Slales
and olheis conceined to proviJc aJcquatc rcsourccs foi humanilaiian as-
sislance in lhe iegion,`` wheieas Resolulion 12O3 urgcs Membei Slales
and olheis conceined to proviJc aJcquatc rcsourccs foi humanilaiian as-
sislance in lhe iegion.``2 Slales weie asked lo acl in suppoil of humani-
laiian assislance, and, in lhe conlexl of lhe naluie of Piesidenl Milose-
vic`s aclions in Kosovo and lheii vigoious and explicil condemnalion, lhis
could be ieasonably inleipieled as including lhe use of mililaiy foice,
since Chaplei \ was menlioned specincally. The ciisis was lheie; lhe
ciy was foi someone lo do somelhing aboul il.
Demands weie made foi lhe aiiesl of lhose in Kosovo who weie guilly
of wai ciimes, foi a ieluin lo negolialion wilh lhe Kosovais, and foi lhe
suspension of lhe exlieme measuies used againsl lhem. The Secuiily
Council also implied in Resolulion 1199 lhal whal was happening wilhin
ugoslavia consliluled a wai in lhe sense iequiied by lhe leims of lhe
legislalion on lhe Wai Ciimes Tiibunal, and lheie weie appeals in lhe
iesolulions foi lhe colleclion of evidence of wai ciimes. Neveilheless il
musl be agieed lhal lheie was no explicil iequesl foi lhe use of lhe
NATO mililaiy, and lhis is deemed by many lo be ciucial. Al lhe same
lime lhis iaises lhe fuilhei queslion of whelhei a measuie of inleipiela-
lion of \N iesolulions was likely so lhal lhey could be seen as implying
appioval.
Theie aie lwo answeis lo lhis queslion. One is lhal lhe hisloiy of Se-
cuiily Council iesolulions is full of examples of coded language iegaiding
lhe use of foice. Secondly, on 26 Maich 1999 lhe Secuiily Council was
asked by lhe Russians lo condemn lhe use of foice.3 Thal was lwo days
aflei lhe aclion by NATO had slailed. Bul lhe iesolulion was ovei-
whelmingly ie|ecled by 12 voles lo 3. The lhiee slales lhal condemned
NATO aclion weie Russia, China, and Namibia, albeil lhe nisl lwo aie
peimanenl velo-holding membeis of lhe Secuiily Council. The ieasons
foi lhe posilion laken by Namibia aie obscuie. Counliies lhal opposed
lhe Russian condemnalion included Biazil and Malaysia; lhe goveinmenl
of Malaysia oveiiuled lhe advice of ils own \N delegalion lo vole againsl.
l could haidly be aigued lhal lhe membeis of lhis coalilion weie lackeys
of lhe Ameiicans oi lhe Biilish!
The Russians agieed lo all of lhe sliicluies in lhe pievious iesolulions
of lhe Secuiily Council. el lhey denied lhal lhey had foieseen lhe use of
foice in Kosovo when appioving such sliicluies and lheii implied con-
sequences (including iefeience lo Chaplei \) while uiging slales lo
piovide adequale iesouices foi humanilaiian assislance. Bul lhe Russians,
like lhe olhei membeis of lhe Council, weie used lo lhe coded language
of ils iesolulions il was noimal piaclice lhal lhey weie nol explicil
aboul lhe use of mililaiy sanclions. The ieasons foi Russian behavioui
aie complex, bul suiely include lhe idea of a lwo-level game. Al one level
lheie was a feeling lhal somelhing had lo be done in Kosovo and Piesi-
denl Milosevic iesliained, bul al anolhei level lheie was an awaieness on
lhe pail of lhe goveinmenl lhal inleinal divisions, and populai sympalhy
wilh lhe Seibs, meanl lhal lhis view could nol be made explicil. Theie
was also evidence lo suggesl lhal, when lhe aclion slailed, lhe Russian
public weie ill infoimed aboul Kosovo il alliacled lillle allenlion in lhe
Russian piess bul lhal, as infoimalion incieased, lhe willingness lo iisk
conicl wilh lhe Wesl in oidei lo defend Piesidenl Milosevic declined.
The Russians weie lheiefoie pushed lo follow lwo appaienlly conliadic-
loiy lines in lhe cause of lheii own inleinal slabilily. Bul lheie was likely
lo be an undeislanding in lhe Russian foieign minisliy of whal lhe
woiding of lhe iesolulions meanl because lheie was a iecoid of lhe need
lo inleipiel lhe specinc woiding.
Ioi inslance, lhey had laken lhe message lhal lhe foimula of all nec-
essaiy means`` which had been used in Resolulion 678 lhe legal basis
of lhe use of foice againsl Saddam Hussein in 1991 had meanl wai.4
Similaily Resolulion 77O of 13 Augusl 1992 duiing lhe Bosnian ciisis
used lhe woids all measuies necessaiy`` and was lhen inleipieled by lhe
Seibs, iecalling lhe eailiei Resolulion 678, as a lhieal of lhe use of foice.
(The people of Belgiade, il was iepoiled, lhoughl lhey would be bombed
lhal nighl.) Again, Resolulion 688, which was inleipieled as mandaling
lhe no-y zones and giound inleivenlion lo piolecl lhe Kuids in iaq,
asked iaq lo allow immediale access by inleinalional humanilaiian
oiganizalions lo all lhose in need of assislance in iaq.`` l conlained no
explicil iequesl foi lhe foimal aulhoiizalion of mililaiy aclion, bul il was
accepled as meaning lhal, and has been lhe legal basis of lhe use of aii
allacks againsl iaq in lhe noilh unlil lhe piesenl.
The poinl became incieasingly peilinenl lhal lheie was a shaip dis-
agieemenl belween lhose who said lhal Secuiily Council iesolulions
should be cleai, immediale, and piecise, and lhose who said lhey weie
cumulalive, and bases foi inleipielalion. This was one of lhose occasions
when lwo appaienlly conliadicloiy posilions weie equally liue: lheie had
been no explicil Secuiily Council iesolulion appioving lhe NATO aclion;
bul lheie was a plelhoia of iesolulions lhal could be inleipieled, and had
been inleipieled, as |uslifying lhal kind of iesponse. The inleipielalion of
Resolulion 12O3 as an invilalion foi NATO lo do whal il could lo piovide
humanilaiian assislance, including lhe use of mililaiy means, was nol
unieasonable and such an inleipielalion was |uslinable in lhal il was lhe
kind of lhing lhal had been done befoie.
Whal explained lhis chaiacleiislic of Secuiily Council iesolulions?
Somelimes, as wilh lhe Russians, lhe explanalion mighl be lo do wilh in-
leinal divisions: ambiguily was lhe iesull of lhe wish lo conceal aclions
fiom lhose who opposed il wilhin lhe slale. On olhei occasions lhe am-
biguily mighl be explained by lheii wish lo mainlain lwo conliadicloiy
posilions, nisl, lhe view lhal lhe exclusive domeslic |uiisdiclion of slales
meanl lhal inleinalional agencies should have no poweis oi iighls lo acl
wilhin lhem, and, second, lhal mainlaining inleinalional oidei mighl
somelimes iequiie inleinalional inleivenlion lo coiiecl pioblems in
slales. Thus lhe iisks of eslablishing a piecedenl would be obvialed and a
post hoc vole, convenienlly losl, would give an oslensibly cleai conscience
bul, moie impoilanlly, open lhe way foi a medialoiy iole, lo lhe benenl
of all, lalei in lhe conicl. Many, and nol leasl Geneial 1ackson, have
paid handsome liibule lo lhe posilive diplomalic iole lhal Russia was
able lo play in secuiing an agieemenl which led lo Resolulion 1244.
China may also be laken as an illuslialion of lhis laclic. Ioi bolh
inleinalional and domeslic ieasons China was deleimined lo iesisl lhe
slienglhening of lhe gcncral piinciple lhal lhe soveieignly of slales was
condilional upon mainlaining acceplable slandaids of human iighls
wilhin lheii fionlieis, bul accepled lhal aclion mighl be iequiied in pai-
liculai inslances. The liick was lo nnd a way of allowing aclion, wilhoul
conceding lhe piecedenl. Theie weie lwo ways of achieving lhis. One was
lo abslain; anolhei was lo insisl upon a foim of woids lhal was nol
explicil in gianling poweis lo acl. China insisled on bolh of lhese in lhe
Gulf Wai iesolulions. Ixplicilness was moie likely lo ieinfoice piecedenl
and slienglhen lhe view lhal lhe noimal piaclice was lo inleivene. A
coded message was moie likely lo allow appioval foi aclion in lhe pai-
liculai inslance, wilh a lessei iisk lhal lhis acl of inleivenlion, howevei
caulious and condilional, would conliibule lo lhe slienglhening of lhe
noim.
f necessaiy, conseivalive slales could aigue lalei lhal lhey had nol
undeislood lhe coded message, and lhal lhe slales lhal acled had oppoi-
lunislically exploiled a lack of claiily in lhe iesolulion. Ioi lhose slales
lhal had lhe velo, lhe ideal would be lo have a lack of explicilness com-
bined wilh abslenlion, bul olhei membeis could have ieasons foi favoui-
ing lhe coded message. This laclic was symbolic of lhe cuiienl phase in
lhe evolulion of inleinalional sociely: il is shoil of a secuie inleinalional
aulhoiily bul moving beyond lhe liadilional, iealisl view of soveieignly.
Howevei, lhe use of lhe laclic by lhe conseivalive slales in facl conceded
lhe poinl lhal lhe noim of inleivenlion was becoming sliongei.
Neveilheless lhis slill does nol answei lhe queslion of whelhei NATO
could be seen as having been aulhoiized lo acl undei lhe Chailei, in
pailiculai Chaplei \ on iegional oiganizalions` iole in mainlaining
peace and secuiily. n one sense lhal answei is simple: slales had been
asked lo do somelhing and NATO was an available gioup of slales lhal
had lhe will, lhe equipmenl, and lhe expeilise. l could have been any
giouping of slales, bul NATO was lheie and piepaied lo do il. Theie
weie, howevei, lwo unceilainlies, each of which could be inleipieled in
NATO`s favoui. Iiisl, Chaplei \ could be inleipieled as applying only
lo bieaches of lhe peace belween membeis of a iegional oiganizalion; lhe
aclion in Kosovo was oulside lhe leiiiloiy of NATO, and, if lhis inlei-
pielalion was coiiecl, lhe Alliance should nol have acled. The counlei-
aigumenl is lhal lhe lioubled aiea was immedialely ad|acenl and posed a
ieal lhieal lo lhe secuiily of NATO membeis, especially Gieece and
Tuikey. Secondly, lhe ciisis had nol been ieluined lo lhe Secuiily
Council, as iequiied by Chaplei \, because of Russian opposilion. Bul
Chaplei \ did nol slale lhe lime peiiod in which iegional aclions
should be ieluined lo Secuiily Council supeivision, and lhal could be
when lhe ciisis was moving lowaids a selllemenl as long as lhe delay
was nol unieasonably pioliacled when Russia would be anxious lo be
involved and welcome lo do so. Al lhal poinl lhe Secuiily Council`s iole,
whelhei oi nol il was undei lhe leims of Chaplei \, could be iesumed.
l was neveilheless impoilanl lhal in lhe couise of lhe aclion lhe special
iesponsibilily of lhe Secuiily Council was acknowledged and iespecled.
Thal was connimed by lhe facl lhal lhe Secuiily Council was iegulaily
and, accoiding lo a Biilish Ioieign Ofnce ofncial, compiehensively in-
foimed aboul lhe piogiess of lhe wai.5 This ieecled compliance, lhough
il is haid lo connim ils exlenl, wilh lhe iequiiemenl in Chaplei \ lhal
lhe Secuiily Council should be kepl fully infoimed.
Theie aie lheiefoie giounds foi saying lhal lhe NATO aclion in
Kosovo had indeed ieceived a degiee of |uslincalion in Secuiily Council
iesolulions, as well as in lhe geneial suppoil in lhe Chailei foi slale
aclion in cases of gioss violalions of human iighls. Iven when a membei
slale of lhe \niled Nalions was invaded and annexed, lhe Secuiily
Council slill iefeiied only lo all necessaiy means.`` n lhe Kosovo case
lheie was no explicil iesolulion and lhe silualion ieecled lhe ambiguilies
belween a piagmalic will lo acl oi al leasl nol lo pievenl a coalilion of
lhe willing fiom acling, despile ieseivalions aboul lhe means and a feai
of eslablishing polenlially uncomfoilable piecedenls. The Secuiily
Council is nol a foium in which lo give hoslages lo foilune.
Wai and lhe iefugees
\NHCR was aclive in Kosovo befoie lhe aeiial bombaidmenl began.
ndeed, in eaily 1999 il was alieady conceined wilh 4OO,OOO inleinally
displaced people in Kosovo wheie il had eslablished a well-oiganized and
well-cooidinaled piogiamme in associalion wilh olhei \N agencies and
non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions (NGOs). Ioi ovei a yeai pieceding
lhe aeiial bombaidmenl, \NHCR had mel wilh donois lo discuss lhe
evolving silualion, and nobody piedicled lhe mass oulux lhal occuiied.
ndeed, \NHCR was being asked lo piepaie lo look aflei iefugees in
Kosovo ialhei lhan oulside Kosovo, since lhe piincipal oulside pailies
consideied lhal lhe Rambouillel piocess would nol fail. n shoil, nobody
piedicled a silualion iesembling in any way lhe one lhal aclually occuiied.
The scale of lhe pioblem can be |udged fiom nguies published in
1c MonJc.6 Of lhe 986,7OO iefugees, 444,2OO weie in Albania, 245,1OO in
Macedonia, 69,7OO in Monlenegio, 21,7OO in Bosnia, and 2O6,OOO in olhei
counliies. n addilion lo lhal, lheie weie 6O,OOO iefugees in Seibia, ac-
coiding lo Belgiade`s nguies,7 lo which should piobably be added olhei
iefugees fiom lhe Seib communilies in Cioalia and Bosnia. Al lhe be-
ginning of lhe ciisis \NHCR had a lolal of 2O exleinally ieciuiled ofnceis
in Albania, Macedonia, and Monlenegio, and 33 locally ieciuiled ofnceis
spiead among lhose lhiee counliies, in addilion lo which lheie weie 6O
inleinalional slaff evacualed fiom Kosovo. By lhe end of Apiil lhis nguie
had iisen lo 2OO in lolal, which piovides a ialio of 1 foi 3,5OO iefugees, in
compaiison wilh lhe mililaiy, who had 1 foi eveiy 4O iefugees. Moieovei,
in vilal queslions such as ighl slols lhe demands of lhe mililaiy and \Ps
such as \S Senalois look piecedence ovei \NHCR emeigency ielief
ighls.8
Theie had lheiefoie been a giowing iefugee pioblem in Kosovo, bul
lhis was gieally exaceibaled by lhe aeiial bombaidmenl, which iesulled
in a massive campaign of populalion iegioupmenl and expulsion by Seib
aimy and secuiily foices backed by Seib mililias using all coeicive mea-
suies and inlimidalion, including summaiy execulion, iape, and olhei
foims of abuse. Theie may have been olhei causes of populalion ie-
giouping, foi example feai of lhe aeiial bombaidmenl, oi in oidei lo
escape lhe giound waifaie belween Seib and KLA foices. The aeiial
bombaidmenl, lheiefoie, in lhe woids of lhe Russian ambassadoi lo lhe
\niled Nalions, Seigei Laviov, luined a ciisis inlo a calasliophe.9
3OO CHALLINGIS OI THI POST-WAR ORDIR
\NHCR`s iesponse lo lhis calasliophe was lhal lhe oulux of iefugees
fiom Kosovo lefl lhem psychologically and physically oveiwhelmed.``10
The iefugee ow was one foi which \NHCR had nol been lold lo pie-
paie, and il had neilhei lhe peisonnel noi lhe iesouices lo meel lhe lask.
\NHCR was weak on lhe iegislialion of iefugees and in lhe selling up
of camps, and, in addilion, lhe oiganizalion was ciilicized foi ils lack of
effeclive leadeiship and cooidinalion.11 n a conlexl of a lolally unex-
pecled calamily lheie was a fiee-foi-all involving nol only \NHCR bul
also a iange of NGOs and piogiammes undeilaken lhiough bilaleial
aiiangemenls belween donoi goveinmenls and lhe hosl counliies of
Albania and Macedonia. The pioblems of cooidinalion and communica-
lion weie lheiefoie difncull, allhough il has lo be acknowledged lhal
\NHCR does nol have a iepulalion foi being a good nelwoikei. On lhe
olhei hand, lhe iole of lead agency in lhe \N syslem, pailiculaily in such
a silualion, is veiy difncull, especially when lheie is a high degiee of polil-
icizalion. Ciilicisms do, howevei, iemain. Ioi example, even aflei foui
weeks lhe \NHCR did nol have a decenl ieceplion syslem foi iefugees
al lhe boidei and lheie was insufncienl communicalion wilh iefugees
lo iealize lhal lhey would wish lo ieluin immedialely aflei lhe Seib
aulhoiilies had wilhdiawn, and nol in lhe slaged piogiamme envisaged
by \NHCR. This suggesls lhal lhe iefugees weie liealed loo much as
ob|ecls and lheie was insufncienl lwo-way communicalion. Neveilheless,
\NHCR and olheis can be pioud lhal lhe immediale life-saving needs of
lhis enoimous gioup of iefugees weie mel wilh a minimal numbei of
avoidable dealhs. \NHCR iecognizes lhal il should ceilainly have been
bellei piepaied,``12 and il has sel up an Ivalualion Commillee of expeils
lo considei ils emeigency piepaiedness and iesponse in lhe Kosovo ief-
ugee ciisis.
\NHCR is essenlially a ieaclive oiganizalion lhal does nol have laige
numbeis of well-liained peisonnel and exlensive sloies on which il can
diaw foi iefugee ciises such as lhal in Kosovo. l is woefully undeifunded
and fiequenlly has lo ieciuil peisonnel al veiy shoil nolice. \NHCR,
and indeed olhei \N agencies, weie papei-lhin on lhe giound and oflen
had lo iely on young and inexpeiienced peisonnel. n shoil, \NHCR is
nol ieally an oiganizalion in being, liained and equipped lo leap inlo
aclion on call. ls silualion is in shaip conliasl wilh lhal of lhe mililaiy,
who, geneially speaking, aie laige in numbeis, exliemely well liained,
and piofessional, and who have available subslanlial budgels and sloies.
This poinls lo a sliucluial weakness foi global goveinance lhal slems
fiom lhe unwillingness of goveinmenls lo piovide foi humanilaiian pui-
poses whal lhey have ioulinely piovided foi mililaiy puiposes.
When lhe ciisis bioke, lhe mililaiy weie piesenl in bolh Albania
(7,OOO) and Macedonia (14,OOO). They weie lheiefoie able lo undeilake a
numbei of humanilaiian lasks. This caused some heail-seaiching among
THI \NTID NATONS 3O1
NGOs, because, as a paily lo lhe conicl, il was difncull foi lhe mililaiy
lo be an impailial humanilaiian acloi. Wheieas mililaiy logislical suppoil
was acceplable, mililaiy cooidinalion of a humanilaiian opeialion was nol.
Ioi ils pail, \NHCR was able lo coopeiale in a ieasonable mannei wilh
NATO foices, bul lhis does iaise lhe queslion of ils giowing polilicizalion
ovei lhe decade since lhe afleimalh of lhe Gulf Wai. To do ils woik mosl
effeclively il needs lo be accepled, as lhe CRC is, by all lhe pailies lo a
conicl. The ending of hoslililies and lhe immediale ieluin of iefugees lo
Kosovo changed bolh lhe foimal wilhin which \NHCR was woiking, as
well as lhe naluie of lhe lasks wilh which il was confionled. l is lo lhal
foimal and lhose lasks, as sel oul in Resolulion 1244, lhal we now luin.
Resolulion 1244
Resolulion 1244, adopled on 1O 1une 1999 wilh 14 voles in favoui and an
abslenlion fiom China, includes lwo annexes, namely, lhe slalemenl by
lhe chaiiman al lhe conclusion of lhe G-8 foieign minisleis meeling on
6 May 1999, and lhe agieemenl of a sel of piinciples by lhe ugoslav
goveinmenl on 2 1une 1999. The iesolulion and ils annexes conlain a
ma|oi bone of conlenlion, which bids faii lo sel lhe \niled Nalions and
lhe Kosovo Ioice (KIOR) on lhe couise of a seiious clash wilh all lhe
elhnic Albanian polilical pailies and polenlial mililia in Kosovo who
demand independence. f lhe \niled Nalions, wilh lhe suppoil of lhe
inleinalional communily, insisls on mainlaining lhe soveieignly and
leiiiloiial inlegiily of lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia,`` as is slaled in
lhe pieamble lo lhe iesolulion, lhen lhe silualion may evolve inlo one in
which lhe \niled Nalions Mission in Kosovo (\NMK) is in a posilion
nol dissimilai lo lhal of a colonial powei denying ils colonial people lhe
iighl of self-deleiminalion. Alieady lhe advocales of self-deleiminalion
aie cheiiy-picking lhe documenl lo |uslify lheii case. The documenl ilself,
howevei, while nol slaling any piedeleimined oulcome, does ieafnim lhe
call foi subslanlial aulonomy and meaningful self-adminislialion foi
Kosovo.`` l also peimils lhe ieluin of an agieed numbei of ugoslav
and Seib mililaiy and policy peisonnel`` in due couise and decides on
lhe deploymenl in Kosovo, undei \niled Nalions auspices, of inlei-
nalional civil and secuiily piesences,`` which should cooidinale closely.``
Seib mililaiy police and paiamililaiy foices aie lo wilhdiaw, and lhe
KLA is lo be demililaiized. The puipose of lhe inleinalional civil pies-
ence in Kosovo is lo piovide an inleiim adminislialion foi Kosovo
undei which lhe people of Kosovo can en|oy subslanlial aulonomy wilhin
lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia.`` Al lhe same lime, lhe civilian pies-
ence is lo facililale a polilical piocess designed lo deleimine Kosovo`s
fuluie slalus, laking inlo accounl lhe Rambouillel Accoids`` as well as lo
3O2 CHALLINGIS OI THI POST-WAR ORDIR
suppoil a numbei of funclions such as ieconsliuclion, humanilaiian and
disaslei ielief, mainlaining civil law and oidei, and piomoling human
iighls. The inleinalional civil and secuiily piesences aie eslablished foi
an inilial peiiod of 12 monlhs, lo conlinue lheieaflei unless lhe Secuiily
Council decides olheiwise.``
On lhe vilal issue of lhe fuluie slalus of Kosovo, lhe G-8 agieemenl
slales lhal lheie shall be a polilical piocess lowaids lhe eslablishmenl of
an inleiim polilical fiamewoik agieemenl pioviding foi a subslanlial self
goveinmenl foi Kosovo, laking full accounl of lhe Rambouillel Accoids
and lhe piinciples of soveieignly and leiiiloiial inlegiily of lhe Iedeial
Republic of ugoslavia . . . and lhe demililaiizalion of lhe KLA.`` The
agieemenl wilh ugoslavia iefeis lo a subslanlial aulonomy wilhin lhe
Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia`` foi lhe people of Kosovo, and lalei iefeis
lo a polilical piocess laking full accounl of lhe Rambouillel Accoids
and lhe piinciples of soveieignly and leiiiloiial inlegiily of lhe Iedeial
Republic of ugoslavia . . . and lhe demililaiizalion of \CK |KLAj.`` l is
lhus cleai lhal Kosovo is lo have aulonomous self-goveinmenl, bul il
is nol cleai lhal il will have self-deleiminalion wilh lhe oplion of full
independence.
The iesolulion is a sliong one, because lhe Secuiily Council aulhoiizes,
ialhei lhan endoises, lhe inleinalional civil and secuiily piesence and il
is cleai lhal, in compaiison wilh lhe Rambouillel Accoids, lhe \niled
Nalions is now in lhe lead, wheieas lhe OSCI is suboidinale, logelhei
wilh lhe Iuiopean \nion and \NHCR. Kosovo has become, in facl,
a piolecloiale, which is nol dissimilai fiom lhe condilion of Class A
mandales of lhe League of Nalions, which weie soveieign bul nol inde-
pendenl. Such mandales weie enlilies whose exislence as independenl
nalions can be piovisionally iecognised sub|ecl lo lhe iendeiing of ad-
minislialive advice and assislance by a Mandaloiy unlil such lime as lhey
aie able lo sland alone.``13
The eslablishmenl of a \N piolecloiale is nol enliiely a new phenom-
enon. n lhe pasl lheie was \NTIA in Wesl ian and lhe \N Tiansi-
lional Aulhoiily in Cambodia, and neaiei al hand was lhe \N Tiansi-
lional Aulhoiily in Iaslein Slavonia, which, unlike \NMK, had a fully
inlegialed |oinl mililaiy and polilical conliol syslem. n addilion, lhe
\niled Nalions has been called upon lo exeil many quasi-goveinmenlal
lasks in a numbei of peacekeeping opeialions, ianging as fai back as lhe
\N Opeialion in lhe Congo.
The \niled Nalions Mission in Kosovo
Aflei a ceilain amounl of polilical manoeuviing, \NMK was eslablished
wilh Beinaid Kouchnei as Special Repiesenlalive of lhe \N Secielaiy-
Geneial and 1ames Covey of lhe \niled Slales as his depuly, conceined
piincipally wilh cooidinalion of foui main bianches: one iemained wilh
lhe cenlial \N Secielaiial, namely, lhe one conceined wilh lhe inleiim
civil adminislialion, wheieas lhe olheis weie disliibuled lo \NHCR foi
humanilaiian affaiis, lo lhe OSCI foi inslilulion-building, and lo lhe I\
foi ieconsliuclion (see ng. 19.1). Thus, lhe fiamewoik in Kosovo is com-
plicaled because il involves an alliance belween lhe \N Secielaiial, an
independenl \N body, and lwo iegional bodies, logelhei wilh a sepaiale
mililaiy piesence, which includes a sliong conliibulion fiom NATO.
Nolwilhslanding lhal lhe iesolulion is undei Chaplei \ and fiom lhe
Secuiily Council, lhe pioblems of cooidinalion aie easy lo imagine.
Below lhe geneial sliucluie of \NMK is a paiallelism belween lhe
nve mililaiy zones of KIOR and lhe nve adminislialive disliicls of
\NMK, each of which has a Iiench-slyle prcjct of Biilish, Danish,
Iiench, iish, and Mexican nalionalily. How lhen has lhis oiganizalional
sliucluie faied on bolh lhe secuiily and civilian side?
The wilhdiawal of all Seib and ugoslav aimy, police, and paiamililaiy
unils wenl accoiding lo limelable and veiy smoolhly. Ioi all lhal, lhe
secuiily silualion has been veiy pooi, in lhal Kosovo Albanians have
exacled ieliibulion on lhose lhey see as lheii foimei loimenlois. Howevei,
lhose who weie laigely iesponsible foi lheii loimenl lefl wilh lhe Seib
wilhdiawal, so lhal ievenge was wieaked inslead on lhe Seib populalion,
many of whom wilhdiew lo Seibia, leaving a much-ieduced communily in
Kosovo. The Roma populalion was also laken lo lask and aliocilies weie
commilled againsl bolh lhe Seib and Roma populalion. n addilion, lheie
weie clashes wilh lhe 12,OOO Goiani people, who aie Albanian-speaking
Muslim Slavs. Theie has been some movemenl of people olhei lhan
Kosovo Albanians inlo Kosovo, namely, Albanian-speaking people fiom
Seibia piopei and a veiy small numbei of Seibs, including some Seib
paiamililaiy unils, numbeiing peihaps 5OO.14 The queslion iemains of lhe
exlenl lo which ieliibulion was oiganized againsl Seibs, Romas, and
Goianis by lhe KLA, oi whelhei il was a fieelance aclivily by individuals
oi small gioups. Theie is some evidence lhal il was a mixluie of bolh.
l should be iemembeied lhal in all lhe \N iesolulions, and, indeed,
moie widely, lhe KLA was, almosl unlil lhe beginning of lhe aeiial
bombaidmenl, consideied lo be a leiioiisl oiganizalion, oi al leasl one
lhal indulged in leiioiisl aclivilies. Theie have also been suggeslions lhal
in ceilain pails il has Mana links in Albania and lhal inleinal powei
sliuggles have been bloody. n lhe powei vacuum lhal occuiied belween
lhe wilhdiawal of Seib foices and lhe full eslablishmenl of KIOR mili-
laiy conliol, lhe KLA, being alieady deployed on lhe giound, was able
lo eslablish an embiyonic adminislialive fiamewoik lhiough a paiallel
adminislialion. ls foices numbeied 1O,OOO2O,OOO, compaied wilh lhe
Iig. 19.1 The \niled Nalions Mission in Kosovo (Nole: adminislialive and logislical suppoil aie nol shown).
3
O
5
high-poinl slienglh foi KIOR of 48,OOO. The KLA`s slienglh lies in lhe
counliyside, ialhei lhan in lhe lowns.
KIOR eslablished nve secuiily zones, which, allhough mullinalional,
weie dominaled by Biilain, Iiance, laly, Geimany, and lhe \niled Slales,
iespeclively. Signincanlly, Russia was nol gianled a secuiily zone because
of feais lhal il would alliacl lhe Seib populalion and lhus lead lo a de faclo
paililion of lhe piovince. Moieovei, lheie was also lhe consideialion lhal
lhe Russians had nol played lhe game in lhe way lhal lhe NATO poweis
wished in Bosnia. n facl, howevei, a Russian zone mighl have slemmed
lhe ow of Seibian iefugees oul of Kosovo, and lhus pieseived a giealei
degiee of mulli-elhnicily lhan cuiienlly pievails. The Chinese weie also
asked lo pailicipale by Mi. Cheinomyidin when he visiled Bei|ing, bul
lhey declined lo do so.15 Theie aie, of couise, consideiable conliibulions
fiom olhei donoi counliies.
Resolulion 1244 slales explicilly lhal lhe KLA shall be demililaiized,
and an agieemenl on demililaiizalion was signed on 2O 1une 1999 be-
lween Hashim Thaci foi lhe KLA and Geneial Sii Michael 1ackson foi
KIOR. The piocess of demililaiizalion was lo be compleled wilhin lhiee
monlhs and lhis has now occuiied aflei some haid baigaining. n lhe
place of lhe KLA is a civil oiganizalion called lhe Kosovo Pioleclion
Coips, which is conceined piimaiily wilh ieconsliuclion and humanilai-
ian opeialions. l consisls of 5,OOO men, of whom 2,OOO aie ieseivisls, and
ils Commandei is Agim Ceku, lhe foimei Commandei of lhe KLA. l is
iequiied lo be mulli-elhnic and is made up of a numbei of unils: a iapid
inleivenlion unil, a helicoplei unil, and a ceiemonial unil, which will
be based in six zones. Membeis of lhe Coips may caiiy lighl aims, bul,
allhough Beinaid Kouchnei has insisled lhal lhe Coips cannol liansfoim
ilself inlo an aimy, numeious KLA leadeis have slaled lhal Kosovo will
need an aimy when KIOR depails and lhal lhe Pioleclion Coips will
be lhe basis of such an aimy.16 On lhe nol uniealislic pielexl lhal lhe
Kosovo Pioleclion Coips will, in facl, be a Kosovo Albanian foice, lhe
Seib iepiesenlalives on lhe Tiansilional Council have wilhdiawn as a
sign of piolesl, and leadeis in Seib enclaves have slaled lhal lhey will
oiganize lheii own nalional guaid, peihaps wilh lhe suppoil of Seibian
paiamililaiies who have innllialed back inlo Kosovo.17
The silualion is lheiefoie an uneasy one, since KIOR wishes lo main-
lain a nim conliol of lhe secuiily silualion and cannol biook lhe idea of a
Kosovo aimy, pailiculaily in lhe lighl of mosl Kosovais` desiie foi inde-
pendence. Small aims aie abundanlly available in Kosovo, and il would
nol be difncull lo conceive of lhe Kosovo Pioleclion Coips as an aimy in
wailing. Again, lheie is lhe speclie of an anli-colonial oi aimed move-
menl foi lhe iighl of self-deleiminalion.
l is lhis unceilainly in Resolulion 1244 and lhe silualion on lhe giound
lhal gives added impoilance lo lhe inleiim Consullalive Council, oi
Tiansilional Council, lhal has been sel up undei lhe auspices of lhe
\niled Nalions. Theie aie 12 seals on lhe Council: Di. Rugova`s paily
has lhiee, Mi. Thaci`s paily and allies have foui, and lheie aie lwo
independenls, lwo Seibs (who have now wilhdiawn), and one membei
fiom lhe \nined Democialic Movemenl (LBD). Besides Piesidenl``
Rugova, lheie aie lwo piovisional goveinmenls, one led by Mi. Thaci,
which came oul of lhe Rambouillel piocess, and lhe olhei, of longei
slanding, led by Mi. Bukoshi, which owes giealei allegiance lo Di.
Rugova. Geneially speaking, Mi. Thaci has lhe suppoil of young people
in lhe counliyside and is liying lo secuie nnances by iaising paiallel
laxes, wheieas lhe lowns suppoil Di. Rugova. The inleinalional com-
munily wanls eleclions foi a legislalive assembly lo be held in spiing of
2OOO, wheieas Di. Rugova is insislenl lhal lheie should be a diiecl elec-
lion foi piesidenl.
n lhe meanlime, Beinaid Kouchnei is quielly eslablishing a civil ad-
minislialion. The Deulschmaik has been made lhe ofncial cuiiency, and
cusloms dulies aie now being collecled lo nnance public piogiammes.
The use of lhe ugoslav dinai has been discouiaged; indeed, lhose who
insisl on using il have lo pay a piemium. Belgiade was nol consulled
aboul lhese aiiangemenls, noi has il yel been inviled lo send obseiveis lo
lhe inleinalional boideis of lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia. Schools
have ie-opened, bul any school lhal is 1OO pei cenl fiom one elhnic gioup
does nol have lo use lhe language of olhei gioups. Schools aie lheiefoie
almosl all elhnically based. Di. Kouchnei faced a ievoll by |udges who
had been appoinled when he asked lhem lo acl on lhe basis of exisling
ugoslav law wilh some ad|uslmenls. Now, howevei, exisling law is being
puiged and cooidinaled undei lhe auspices of lhe Council of Iuiope,
which expecled lo have a legal code foi woiking puiposes available by
lhe end of Seplembei 1999. The civil adminislialion of lhe \niled Nalions
also issues documenls, which is a vilal concein because many Kosovais
losl lheii documenlalion oi had il connscaled when lhey weie foiced lo
leave lhe counliy. A numbei of iival iadio slalions have been eslablished,
bul now lhe Iuiopean \nion of Radio and Television has eslablished a
iadio and T\ slalion lhal slailed bioadcasling on 19 Seplembei. How-
evei, lhe giealesl lack lhal lhe \N civilian adminislialion has fell has
been of civilian police. KIOR soldieis have been acling in a quasi-police
iole, bul lhey aie nol liained foi, oi pailiculaily adepl al, lhe funclion.
Wilhoul civilian police lhe \niled Nalions is likely lo lose lhe iace foi
conliol of Kosovo lo polilico-mililaiy movemenls oi ciiminal elemenls.
The inilial plan was foi a coie of 3,OOO4,OOO police, and Di. Kouchnei
now wanls a foice of 6,OOO. The lask of such police is exceedingly difncull
foi bolh linguislic and culluial ieasons, as well as lhe lense silualion,
pailiculaily belween lhe elhnic gioups iemaining in Kosovo. Moieovei,
Kosovo may nevei have had, ceilainly wilhin living memoiy, a happy
expeiience of civil policing.
Refugees and ieconsliuclion
KIOR and \NMK aie nol lhe only elemenls of lhe \N syslem aclive in
Kosovo. Theie is also lhe conlinuing iole of lhe \NHCR, which foims
one of lhe foui pillais of \NMK. \NHCR is lhe lead agency foi iefu-
gees and inleinally displaced peisons in Kosovo. n lhis iole il is liying lo
piomole lhe pooling of infoimalion, lhe eslablishmenl of a communily-
wide syslem foi emeigency communicalion, and common assessmenls,
and lo ensuie lhal lhe mililaiy acl in suppoil of humanilaiian puiposes.
The nnancial iesouices lhal lhe \NHCR has al ils disposal aie piliful in
ielalion lo lhe need, bul lhe lolal sums iequiied aie nol laige some
\S$4OO million unlil lhe end of 1999 when compaied wilh lhe cosl of
puisuil of lhe aimed conicl. The nnancial silualion is nol helped by
counliies such as Macedonia chaiging veiy high liansil fees foi \NHCR
convoys.
n leims of aclual help on lhe giound, lhe \NHCR is pioviding emei-
gency shellei, including limbei and nol |usl plaslic, sloves, and lhe like, so
lhal families will be able lo consliucl al leasl one winleiized ioom befoie
lhe onsel of winlei wealhei. Howevei, \NHCR is nol piimaiily con-
ceined wilh ieconsliuclion, which is lhe funclion of lhe Iuiopean \nion.
The I\, howevei, aigues lhal il will nol be ieady wilh a ma|oi inleiven-
lion befoie lhe spiing of 2OOO and in lhe meanlime \NHCR has lo do lhe
besl il can. Ioilunalely food is nol a pioblem, and lhe disliibulion syslem
is adequale. Of pailiculai concein lo \NHCR is lhe posilion of Romas in
Kosovo, who aie especially vulneiable lo coeicion.
Theie has been a consideiable movemenl of Seibs oul of Kosovo and a
smallei movemenl of Albanian-speaking people fiom Seibia inlo Kosovo.
The \NHCR has now developed ciileiia lo advise KIOR on whelhei il
is appiopiiale lo escoil minoiily gioups in oi oul of Kosovo, giowing oul
of a suspicion lhal some of lhe ieluining Seibs weie nol ieluining undei
lheii own fiee will. Appioximalely half lhe Albanian-speaking popula-
lion in Seibia has now moved lo Kosovo (some 4,5OO people), wheieas
aboul 18O,OOO Seibs and a signincanl numbei of Romas have gone lo
Seibia, which is now acling as hosl foi 7OO,OOO iefugees. The Kosovo Seib
iefugees aie mainly housed wilh hosl families oi in schools and commei-
cial cenlies fiom which ovei lime lhey aie being evicled. \NHCR has
ieasonable access lo lhese iefugees and lhey aie nol now being senl back
lo Kosovo againsl lheii will. Howevei, lhe goveinmenl of Piesidenl
Milosevic is giving lhe iefugees veiy lillle aid, and lheii main foim of
local suppoil comes fiom lhe chuich. Relalions belween \NHCR and
lhe Milosevic goveinmenl aie also helped by lhe small leam fiom lhe \N
Ofnce foi lhe Cooidinalion of Humanilaiian Affaiis, which was based in
Belgiade unlil Maich 1999; il has now ieluined lo cooidinale aid pio-
giammes in Seibia piopei and lo negoliale agieemenls wilh Milosevic`s
goveinmenl. Howevei, lhe oulslanding chaiacleiislic of lhe allempl al
humanilaiian ielief foi iefugees, bolh in Kosovo and in Seibia piopei, is
lhe lack of donalions, a silualion lhal is only likely lo deleiioiale fuilhei
because lheie aie olhei calls on lhe iesouices of lhe \NHCR, nol leasl in
Iasl Timoi.
The lask of ieconsliuclion, allhough undei lhe geneial umbiella of
\NMK, has been made lhe basic concein of lhe Iuiopean \nion, which
has allied ilself closely wilh lhe Woild Bank on lhis issue. The \niled
Nalions has nol deall much wilh lhe I\ as an inslilulion because ils mosl
fiequenl pailneis in Iuiope have been lhe OSCI and lhe \N Iconomic
Commission foi Iuiope. Thus lhe lwo oiganizalions have lo leain lo
woik logelhei, which may nol be an easy lask, pailiculaily in lhe conlexl
of lhe phenomenon lhal, when a ciisis is in full ood, money is piomised
foi a posl-conicl silualion, bul il iaiely aiiives, al leasl in plenilude.
Moieovei, lheie is also some evidence lhal funds aie meiely being
swilched fiom olhei highly deseiving accounls and eslimales ieduced lo
lhe level of lhe likely supply of funds ialhei lhan aclual need. l is also
impoilanl lo iemembei lhal lhe I\ has lillle expeiience in undeilaking a
lask of lhis magnilude. ls piaclices aie highly complex and ils secielaiial
is small. ndeed, il has alieady slaled lhal il will nol be opeialional unlil
lhe spiing of 2OOO, leaving lhe \NHCR lo do lhe besl il can on a lem-
poiaiy basis lo gel lhe people of Kosovo lhiough lhe winlei. Despile
foiebodings, lhe piocess gol off lo a good slail.
On 28 1uly 1999, a donois` confeience pledged \S$2 billion foi iecon-
sliuclion. n addilion lo lhis, a Regional Slabilily Pacl foi lhe Balkans as
a whole of \S$5 billion ovei a decade has been mooled. Such monies will
be needed, foi in Kosovo alone 119,5OO houses have been damaged, of
which 78,OOO weie deslioyed, and 534 schools have been damaged, of
which 189 have been deslioyed.18 Moieovei, lheie is no adminislialive
infiasliucluie, civil seivanls have lo be paid and equipped, and vilal
public seivices, such as iefuse colleclion, have lo be ie-eslablished. n lhe
lighl of such needs lheie will be a second donois` confeience in Oclobei.
The queslion of ieconsliuclion is complicaled by pioblems of ownei-
ship. \NMK has laken ovei lhe assels in Kosovo of some ugoslav slale
inslilulions, bul lheie is also lhe queslion of piivalely owned assels. A
ma|oi such assel is lhe mining complex of Tiepca in noilhein Kosovo,
which \NMK would like lo adminislei as a mulli-elhnic enleipiise lhal
would cieale signincanl employmenl. Howevei, owneiship of lhe Tiepca
complex is highly complicaled, including nol only ugoslav slale inslilu-
lions, bul also lhe Milosevic family and a numbei of piivale inslilulions,
which aie nol likely lo bend lo \NMK`s will. Moieovei, Kosovo Alba-
nian woikeis weie dismissed a decade ago and ieplaced by elhnic Seibs
and now lhe Albanians wish lo ieveise lhe piocess.19
\NMK is conceined piimaiily wilh ieconsliuclion in Kosovo, yel
Kosovo has lo be seen in conlexl. l is legally pail of lhe Iedeial
Republic of ugoslavia (IR), and iecognized as such by \NMK, and
il is also funclionally linked lo Seibia lhiough ils infiasliucluie. The
queslion is lheiefoie iaised of whelhei lheie can be seleclive ieconsliuc-
lion, lhal is, ieconsliuclion in Kosovo wilhoul ieconsliuclion in Seibia,
and, if lheie is lo be ieconsliuclion in Seibia nnanced by lhe inleina-
lional communily, is lhis lo be only foi humanilaiian puiposes, oi will il
lake inlo accounl lhe iebuilding of lhe Seib infiasliucluie wilhoul which
Kosovo will nnd il difncull lo funclion?
The aeiial bombaidmenl had lillle diiecl effecl on lhe mililaiy capacily
of Seibia in Kosovo, and in pailiculai on lhe capacily of lhose on lhe
giound lo expel viilually lhe enliie Albanian populalion of lhe piovince.
The bombing did, howevei, have a veiy signincanl effecl on Seibia
piopei. Allhough il was nol lhe equivalenl of say, Diesden, Hambuig, oi
Tokyo in lhe Second Woild Wai, il was, neveilheless, a ma|oi campaign
againsl lhe economic syslem and infiasliucluie of Seibia, as well as lhe
will of lhe geneial populalion such lhal Seibia is now in iuins. How-
evei, lhis means lhal, in effecl, much of lhe iegion is also affecled and, in
pailiculai, Kosovo. The lianspoil infiasliucluie, and especially lhe use of
lhe Rivei Danube and lhe abilily lo cioss iiveis, has been seveiely ham-
peied. Moie geneially, Seibia piopei was lhe economic poweihouse and
Kosovo was beholden lo il. Theie can, lheiefoie, in effecl be no seleclive
ieconsliuclion lhal will exclude Seibia if Kosovo and olhei neighbouiing
slales aie nol lo feel lhe effecls of lhe failuie lo ieconsliucl Seibia. n
shoil, lhe coopeialion of Piesidenl Milosevic is necessaiy if lhe goal of
ieconsliuclion is lo be allained in Kosovo.
Allhough lhe OSCI is nol lhe lead agency of lhe inleinalional com-
munily in Kosovo, ils iole undei lhe umbiella of \NMK is vilal if evei a
suslainable non-coeicive peace is lo visil lhal land. OSCI is conceined
wilh inslilulion-building, and pailiculaily lhe piomolion of democializa-
lion, human iighls, and goveinance. el lhe climale of halied has nol yel
dissipaled, noi is il likely lo do so in lhe foieseeable fuluie. Theie is,
moieovei, a lack of democialic culluie, lhe exislence of piivale aimies,
and an inux of naosi in a conlexl wheie small aims aie ieadily avail-
able. Some lasks have alieady begun, such as lhe appoinlmenl of |udges,
bul lheie can be no shoil-leim pallialives, since lhe aim is nolhing less
lhan lhe ciealion of a civil sociely wilh a democialic polilical culluie.
Two legal inslilulions of lhe \niled Nalions syslem aie involved in
lhe Kosovo conicl.20 The mosl piominenl body is lhe nleinalional
Ciiminal Tiibunal foi Ioimei ugoslavia.21 This is a body eslablished by
lhe Secuiily Council in Resolulion 827 of 25 May 1993. ls aclivilies covei
lhe whole of lhe foimei ugoslavia since 1991, and il is conceined wilh
queslions of lhe giave violalion of inleinalional humanilaiian law. n
shoil, il is an inslilulional expiession of lhe piimacy of human iighls ovei
domeslic |uiisdiclion in iegaid lo foimei ugoslavia. The ialionale of
lhe Couil was summed up succinclly by ils foimei Pioseculoi, Louise
Aiboui, when she slaled lhal lheie is no duiable peace wilhoul |uslice.22
Howevei, malleis aie nol lhal simple and lhe Couil has had a numbei of
difncullies in funclioning effeclively.
Any such couil is plagued by a queslion of double slandaids, and, in
pailiculai, whelhei ils aclivilies should be polilicized oi a unifoim enacl-
menl. Piesidenl Milosevic has been indicled in diamalic leims, bul olhei
piominenl polilical nguies in lhe iegion have nol, al leasl publicly. Iui-
lheimoie, lhe degiee of coopeialion fiom a wide iange of bodies, such as
lhe goveinmenl of Cioalia oi lhe Slabilizalion and mplemenlalion
Ioices, has vaiied consideiably. n lhe conducl of ils business lhe Tiibu-
nal has vaiied fiom an exliemely high-pionle iole lo discieel aclivily.
Moieovei il is evidenl lhal lhe Tiibunal has loo many aclual and polen-
lial cases and il deals wilh lhem loo slowly. n addilion, il suffeis fiom a
clash of legal culluies, which is pailiculaily impoilanl in lhe degiee of
pioof necessaiy befoie lhe puisuance of an individual can lake place.
Moieovei, lhe pioseculois have nol always had lheii way in lhe |udgmenl
of lhe liibunal. l is, foi example, nol al all suie lhal Piesidenl Milosevic
will be condemned.23 A fuilhei lwisl has been given lo lhe woik of lhe
nleinalional Ciiminal Tiibunal in lhal a gioup of lawyeis fiom a numbei
of NATO counliies have named individuals foi violalions of inleinalional
humanilaiian law and have iequesled lhal lhe Pioseculoi piepaie in-
diclmenls againsl lhese individuals, who include lhe polilical and mililaiy
leadeis of seveial of NATO slales.
The nleinalional Couil of 1uslice (C1) is a piincipal oigan of lhe \N
syslem and lhe IR look NATO lo lhe Couil on lhe giounds lhal ils
aclion was illegal because lheie was no Secuiily Council iesolulion; il
also accused lhe Alliance of genocide. The C1 ie|ecled lhe ugoslav bid
foi piovisional measuies by a vole of 12 lo 4, bul il could go on lalei lo
considei in giealei delail whelhei oi nol il has |uiisdiclion. On lhe whole
NATO membei slales claim eilhei lhal lhe Couil does nol have |uiisdic-
lion (lhe \niled Slales, laly, Geimany, Iiance) oi lhal lhe Iedeial Re-
public of ugoslavia is nol a membei of lhe \niled Nalions (Belgium,
Nelheilands, Canada).
The aeiial bombaidmenl of Seibia in pailiculai led lo a consideiable
amounl of enviionmenlal damage. ndeed, lhe bombing of ienneiies,
chemical planls, and lhe like in Novi Sad and Pancevo |usl noilh of
Belgiade had seiious deleleiious effecls. Bolh lhe I\ and lhe \niled
Nalions Woiking Gioup on lhe Inviionmenl in lhe Balkans have given
some indicalion of lhe scale of lhe pioblem, which affecls nol only Seibia
piopei, bul also Romania, Bulgaiia, and Macedonia. The naluie of lhe
calamily is such lhal il can be iemedied only if lhe whole of lhe affecled
iegion, and especially Seibia, is cleansed. The piincipal difncullies24
concein lhe Danube. Pollulanls going inlo lhe iivei have enleied lhe
diinking walei syslem of ma|oi cilies, as well as conlaminaling lhe im-
mediale aiea of lhe laigel. Theie is also pollulion liapped in lhe ion
Gales Dam, and lheie aie dioxins in lhe almospheie. Despile ils small
size, Seibia is home lo signincanl examples of 5 of lhe 12 ma|oi global
lypes of biodiveisily, and lhe effecl on wildlife, especially on biids in lhe
wellands, has been consideiable. n addilion, NATO has admilled lo
signincanl use of weapons involving depleled uianium. None of lhe coun-
liies piincipally affecled by lhe enviionmenlal pollulion is fully capable
of iemedying il. l is lheiefoie likely lo fall lo lhe \niled Nalions lo play
a ma|oi iole in iemedial opeialions, pailiculaily in Seibia.
Seibia
The queslion of enviionmenlal pollulion illusliales lhe exlenl lo which
lhis chaplei has so fai been like Hamlel wilhoul lhe Piince of Denmaik,
since lhe iole of Seibia in lhe success oi failuie of \niled Nalions
undeilakings has been menlioned only cn passant. \iews aboul helping
Seibia eilhei wilh humanilaiian issues oi wilh ieconsliuclion vaiy con-
sideiably. Bolh Secielaiy-Geneial Annan and Piesidenl Chiiac suppoil
lhe nolion of a full piogiamme of aclivily,25 wheieas Piesidenl Clinlon is
al lhe olhei end of lhe scale.26 His posilion is lhal helping Seibia while
Piesidenl Milosevic slays in powei will only add lo lhe suffeiing of lhe
Seib people. The mosl lhal Clinlon can conlemplale is some help foi
opposilion gioups. The \niled Kingdom`s posilion, and lhal of Geimany,
appeai lo suppoil humanilaiian aid bul nol ieconsliuclion in Seibia,
allhough lhe Geiman dennilion of whal conslilules humanilaiian aid is
less sliicl lhan lhe Biilish. Howevei, we have alieady seen lhe key posi-
lion of Seibia in economic and ecological queslions, and il is difncull lo
conceive of a ieconsliuclion piogiamme in Kosovo and a slabilily plan
foi lhe iegion wilhoul a de faclo incoipoialion of Seibia, iiiespeclive
of whelhei Piesidenl Milosevic iemains in powei. We aie lhus likely lo
see piogiammes being |uslined on lhe giounds lhal lheie would be a
humanilaiian iisk if lheie was a lack of ieconsliuclion, as well as pio-
giammes consliluled undei lhe iubiic of emeigency iehabililalion.``
Seibia ceilainly has such need foi emeigency help and ieconsliuclion.
The Iconomic nslilule of Belgiade27 has suggesled lwo models foi
lhe iehabililalion of Seibia. The nisl would allow foieign inveslmenl and
a fiee maikel wilh some slale inleivenlion. ndeed, lo a limiled exlenl
lhis is beginning alieady, wilh Daewoo laking ovei lhe Zaslava cai fac-
loiy.28 The monelaiy syslem of lhe counliy would be slabilized wilh a
new dinai being lied lo lhe Deulschmaik, which is now lhe cuiiency of
Kosovo and widely used in lhe iegion as a whole. Such a piogiamme
would allow Seibia lo ievive. The second model would involve Seibia,
eilhei of ils own will oi because of lhe iefusal of olheis lo help, having lo
iely on ils own iesouices. Heie lheie is a lack of inveslmenl, and lhis
would lead lo a giadual slowdown of economic aclivily, which would en-
gendei giealei unemploymenl. Alieady lhe nguies aie depiessing, in lhal
lheie has been a diop of 4O.7 pei cenl in GDP and of 44 pei cenl in in-
dusliial pioduclion, and unemploymenl has incieased by 33 pei cenl, and
lhis in a conlexl wheie lheie aie 7OO,OOO iefugees. Moieovei, lhe aveiage
monlhly salaiy fell fiom DM 14O in 1998 lo DM 9O in May 1999, and DM
6O was foiecasl foi Seplembei 1999. Again, salaiies and pensions aie
oflen unpaid. n addilion, lhe elecliicily supply is al 3O pei cenl of
capacily, allhough lhe goveinmenl expecled lhis lo impiove befoie lhe
winlei. Only agiiculluie is in a ieasonably heallhy slale. To give an indi-
calion of lhe magnilude of lhe pioblem, il is eslimaled lhal il would lake
1O yeais foi Seibia lo iebuild lhe Danube biidges oul of ils own ie-
souices, lhus leaving lhe iivei blocked, which would have a deleleiious
effecl on lhe Balkan slabilily plan.
The queslion is lhus iaised of whelhei oi nol excluding Seibia fiom lhe
Balkan Secuiily Pacl would slienglhen Piesidenl Milosevic. l is likely
lhal including Seibia in lhe Balkan Slabilily Pacl would slienglhen Pies-
idenl Milosevic, because il would be haid lo help lhe Seib people and
economy wilhoul helping ils goveinmenl. Al lhe same lime, lo exclude
Seibia fiom lhe Balkan Secuiily Pacl and ieconsliuclion schemes would
help Piesidenl Milosevic even moie wilhoul giving any aid lo lhe Seib
people, on whom NATO always mainlained il was nol making wai. A
policy of economic ieliibulion on lhe Milosevic goveinmenl, and lheieby
on lhe Seib people, is likely lo lead lo an iaqizalion of Seibia. Sanclions
againsl iaq have slienglhened Saddam Hussein and lhe clan syslem
aiound him. Some people always gel iich oul of lhe miseiy of olheis, and
Saddam Hussein has ceilainly done lhis. Moieovei, lhe syslem of sanc-
lions has deslioyed lhe infiasliucluie, a facl made woise by lhe cuiienl
bombing campaign, and il has deslioyed lhe middle class. The opposilion
is lolally al odds wilh ilself. On lhis model il is easy lo conceive lhal an
isolalion of Seibia lhal slienglhened lhe Milosevic iegime would inciease
lhe suffeiing of lhe Seib people and blighl lhe iegion as a whole.
Ralhei sliangely, in lhe conlexl of lhe Rambouillel agieemenls and
even lhe Daylon Accoids, Resolulion 1244 makes no menlion of Kosovai
piisoneis in oi liansfeiied lo Seibia duiing and aflei lhe aeiial bom-
baidmenl. The nleinalional Commillee of lhe Red Cioss has a lisl of
1,925 names and lhe Seibs have iecenlly slaled lhal lhe numbei is
2,O5O.29 Al lhe same lime, il is eslimaled lhal lheie aie 25O Seibs in lhe
hands of lhe KLA, allhough lheii silualion may now have been iegu-
laiized wilh lhe demililaiizalion of lhal oiganizalion. These aie lhe foi-
gollen people of lhe conicl, and, given lhe pievious pioclivilies of lhe
Seib aulhoiilies, lhey do conslilule a polenlial foi blackmail. Howevei,
lhey aie nol lhe only caid in Piesidenl Milosevic`s hands.
Wilh his counliy physically devaslaled, ils economy in iuins, and a
massive iefugee pioblem, as well as lhe loss of all inleinalional legili-
macy, lhe posilion of Piesidenl Milosevic`s goveinmenl is nol a happy
one. el il does have, oi may see ilself lo have, some caids lo play. n his
bioadcasl aflei lhe agieemenl lhal led lo lhe cessalion of lhe aeiial
bombaidmenl, Piesidenl Milosevic sliessed lhal lhe counliies of G-8 and
lhe \niled Nalions had guaianleed lhe inlegiily and soveieignly of lhe
Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia, including Kosovo.30 This is cleaily, lo
his mind, an advanlage ovei lhe condilions offeied al Rambouillel, wheie
lheie was lo be a iefeiendum aflei lhiee yeais. Moieovei, Piesidenl Mi-
losevic may be counling on a change in lhe ielalionship belween lhe
\niled Nalions, and especially KIOR, wilh lhose associaled wilh lhe
foimei KLA. The KLA has been demililaiized, bul lhe will of all Kosovo
Albanians foi independence is veiy evidenl, and if lhe sliuggle foi self-
deleiminalion begins lhen il would be in diiecl conliadiclion wilh lhe
policy of lhe G-8, NATO, and lhe \niled Nalions. Thus, Milosevic may
believe lhal, |usl as NATO did lhe diily woik of lhe KLA lhiough lhe
aeiial bombaidmenl, lhe bool is now on lhe olhei fool and lhe \niled
Nalions and KIOR will be a consliaining facloi on lhe ambilions of lhe
Kosovo Albanians foi independence.
Theie weie some indicalions in lhe couise of negolialions lhal Piesi-
denl Milosevic mighl have been alliacled by lhe idea of lhe paililion of
Kosovo. l is cleai lhal foi lhe foieseeable fuluie any nolion of mulli-
elhnicily in Kosovo is likely lo be meie window-diessing and lhal a pio-
cess of canlonizalion is developing in lhe noilh. Wilh a physical Seib
piesence on lhe giound and adioil manipulalion of lhe owneiship of
piopeily, a de faclo paililion could emeige lo become Jc jurc on lhe
independence of lhe iesl of Kosovo.
n his dealings in lhe fuluie Piesidenl Milosevic may seek some com-
foil in lhe nolion lhal he is dealing wilh lhe \niled Nalions and G-8 and
nol wilh NATO, and in lhis he may considei lhal he has scoied a signin-
canl vicloiy. Again, on lhe economic fionl he musl know lhal lheie can
be no successful Slabilily Pacl, oi, indeed, a iehabililalion of Kosovo,
wilhoul lhe coopeialion of lhe Seib aulhoiilies, which will iequiie a quiJ
pro quo. Iinally, if malleis do luin oul foi lhe woise and lhe IR is
isolaled and foiced lo luin back on ils own iesouices, lhen lheie will be
lillle lo pievenl Piesidenl Milosevic fiom speeding up lhe piocess of lhe
iaqizalion of Seibia lo lhe benenl of his pockel and al lhe gieal cosl of
lhe Seib people.
n lhe meanlime, olhei agencies and piogiammes of lhe \niled Nalions
aie woiking essenlially as pallialives in Kosovo and Seibia: lhe Woild
Heallh Oiganizalion, lhe Woild Iood Piogiamme, lhe nleinalional
Oiganizalion foi Migialion, lhe \N Human Righls Commission, and
\NCII lo name bul a few. Ioi lhe \N syslem lo be effeclive, howevei,
il needs lo have, pailiculaily in Kosovo, a unily of command, bolh civil
and mililaiy. Olheiwise lhe iisk is lhal lheie will be inconsislencies, gaps,
and even conliadiclions belween lhe goals of lhe lwo dimensions, and,
even if lhe goals aie shaied, lhe melhods of achieving lhem may nol be
compalible lhe one wilh lhe olhei. Mi. Thaci has accused Di. Kouchnei
of being a king, and Di. Kouchnei in his luin mighl wish lhal such weie
lhe case. The \niled Nalions has a pooi hisloiy of combining ils mililaiy
and civil effoils. f il fails in Kosovo lo achieve unily of puipose in a sin-
gle command sliucluie, il will nol only lel down lhe people of Kosovo
and Seibia, bul also damage ils own ciedibilily. Ioi lhe momenl, how-
evei, lheie has been a ieluin lo giace foi lhe \niled Nalions. Wheieas il
was ioughly pushed aside inilially, in lhal lheie was no Secuiily Council
iesolulion aulhoiizing lhe aeiial bombaidmenl, lhe end lo hoslililies
would have been difncull wilhoul a \N iesolulion. l is inleiesling lo
nole lhal a \N iesolulion was iequiied befoie \N foices enleied Iasl
Timoi, nolwilhslanding lhe iionic facl lhal only Auslialia had iecognized
ndonesian soveieignly ovei lhal leiiiloiy.
Oplions and lessons
To ieluin lo Kosovo. l is unlhinkable lhal il can iemain an aulono-
mous pail of Seibia oi a consliluenl pail of lhe Iedeial Republic of
ugoslavia. l is, howevei, lhe oveiwhelming view of lhe populalion lhal
any acl of self-deleiminalion would lead lo independence foi Kosovo. l
should be noled lhal, wheieas in lhe pasl lhe \niled Nalions Geneial
Assembly favouied ieslilulion, il now has a sliong inclinalion lowaids lhe
piinciple of self-deleiminalion. Bul if lhe Kosovais can have an acl
of self-deleiminalion, why should lhey be piivileged in iegaid lo olhei
elhno-culluial polilicized communilies in foimei ugoslav successoi
slales? The Seibs and Cioals in Bosnia and lhe Albanians in Macedonia
and Monlenegio may all seek an acl of self-deleiminalion. This is pie-
sumably lhe gieal feai of lhe ma|oi Iuiopean poweis and lhe \niled
Slales, nol lo menlion olhei ma|oi poweis such as Russia, China, and
ndonesia, which would all be feaiful of lhe piocess of disinlegialion. Bul
lhese feais may be unfounded, since lhe lwenlielh cenluiy has given a
numbei of examples of lhe bieak-up of slales in a peaceful and laigely
acceplable mannei. Moieovei, lhe Iuiopean \nion is a piime example
of building up lo lhe |oinl managemenl of pooled soveieignly, while al
lhe same lime building down lo iegions and slienglhening liansnalional
lies by building acioss.
s lheie anylhing inheienlly wiong oi oveiwhelmingly dangeious aboul
lhe nolion of a giealei Seibia, a giealei Cioalia, oi a giealei Albania, pai-
liculaily if lhey aie oiganized along fedeial oi canlonal lines? Peihaps
lheie would also be some mulli-elhnic enlilies, such as Macedonia, Mon-
lenegio, and a iump Bosnia, while \o|vodina mighl conlinue lo see ils
fuluie in a ieconsliucled giealei Seibia. Theie mighl, loo, be a Council
of lhe Ioimei ugoslavia along lhe lines of lhe pioposed Council of lhe
slands in lhe Good Iiiday Agieemenl, which would biing logelhei iepie-
senlalives of lhe Republic of ieland and lhe Assemblies and Pailiamenls
of Noilhein ieland, Scolland, Wales, and lhe \niled Kingdom. n such a
conlexl, a Balkan Slabilily Pacl and piivale inveslmenl mighl seem much
moie piomising, especially if lheie weie a sliong human iighls iegime.
As il is, lhe lwin piinciples of lhe impeialive of mulli-elhnicily and lhe
saciosancl naluie of lhe inleinal boideis of lhe foimei ugoslavia have
pioved an impoilanl facloi in wieaking havoc in lhe Balkans. Whalevei
mighl have been, lheie is now a silualion in which people cannol live
logelhei, and lheiefoie lhey have lo live apail. Those who have suffeied
and lheie aie only viclims naluially nnd il haid lo iesisl seeking ven-
geance. Bul, on a widei scale and inslilulionally, will ieliibulion seive lhe
puipose of achieving a viable fuluie by bieaking lhe cycle of viclimhood
and vengeance? The case of Soulh Afiica, wilh ils Tiulh and Reconcilia-
lion Commission, poinls in a diffeienl diieclion. The pasl cannol be de-
nied, bul il can be giieved ovei, huil can be acknowledged, and, given
lime, hisloiy may nol foim lhe dead hand of lhe pasl lhal deleimines lhe
fuluie. Resolulion of deep-iooled pioliacled conicl can occui, as lhe
Iianco-Geiman ieconcilialion, which lies al lhe heail of lhe Iuiopean
\nion, allesls. Howevei, such a iesolulion of lhe conicl can only come
fiom lhe local pailies. l cannol be imposed fiom oulside if il is lo be self-
suslaining in lhe long iun. f lheie aie winneis and loseis lheie will be no
safe peace. The fundamenlal iole of lhe inleinalional communily is,
lheiefoie, lo facililale a piocess of iesolulion, lhe basis of which only lhe
local aclois can decide. l is nol lo impose a selllemenl.
And whal of NATO, which usuiped lhe iole of lhe \niled Nalions?
The piincipal membeis of lhe Alliance, and especially lhose in Iuiope,
aie likely lo pay a conlinuing cosl in polilical, economic, and peihaps
even mililaiy leims, as lhe piolecloiale diags on inlo an unceilain fuluie.
On lhe olhei hand, il is iemaikable lhe degiee lo which lhe Alliance
slayed logelhei and even lhe usual suspecls,`` such as Iiance, lhe Scan-
dinavians, and Gieece, did nol, in lhe lasl iesoil, iock lhe boal. Nevei-
lheless, lhe mililaiy opeialions made obvious a humilialing gap belween
lhe mililaiy capacilies, pailiculaily in advanced lechnology, such as com-
municalions, of lhe piincipal Iuiopean membeis of lhe Alliance and
lhose of lhe \niled Slales. The gap may be of such piopoilions lhal in
fuluie, unless il is closed, lhe lwo aims of lhe Alliance may nol be able lo
lalk`` lo each olhei al lhe same level. This is likely, lheiefoie, lo induce
lhe piincipal Iuiopean membeis of lhe Alliance lo lhink and acl in a
moie uigenl mannei foi lhe ciealion of a Iuiopean defence capabilily.
l is evidenl, loo, lhal lhe new membeis of lhe Alliance gol moie lhan
lhey had baigained foi. A shoil demonslialion of aii powei was whal
lhey weie piomised, wheieas a ma|oi campaign was whal lhey gol. This
will have long-iun effecls on lheii economic inleiesl because il has de-
giaded lhe infiasliucluie of lhe iegion. l also enlailed olhei enviion-
menlal and polilical iisks.
Theie is, loo, a moial iepugnance caused by a slialegy lhal seeks zeio
losses of lhe mililaiy, bul al lhe cosl of a wai aimed incieasingly nol al a
iegime bul al a people, nolwilhslanding lhe low level of civilian casuallies
given lhe inlensily of lhe bombaidmenl. Theie was, neveilheless, a cleai
asymmeliy belween mililaiy and civilian lives of dubious moialily lhal is
nol likely lo appeal lo NATO public opinion.
Theie will be olhei exleinal polilical iepeicussions, in lhal lheie has
been a rapprochcncnt belween Russia, China, and ndia, which now all
view NATO and ils leading poweis wilh a giealei degiee of suspicion lhan
heielofoie, even if il is unlikely lhal NATO could acl unilaleially in a
similai way oulside of Iuiope oi againsl lhe wishes of a ma|oi iegional oi
global powei.
Theie is also lhe mililaiy queslion. Did NATO aclually win lhiough
lhe aii campaign, which il now appeais was much less effeclive, in leims
of lhe desliuclion of lhe Seib mililaiy capabilily and lhe capacily of paia-
mililaiies and olhei secuiily foices lo coeice lhe populalion of Kosovo,
lhan was hilheilo lhoughl? Oi weie lheie olhei faclois? Piesidenl Milo-
sevic slill has some caids lo play and lheie aie consideiable giounds, in-
cluding ideas expiessed by lhe mililaiy lhemselves, foi believing lhal
Russian diplomacy was a key facloi leading lo Resolulion 1244.
As foi lhe \niled Nalions and ils membeis, lhey have slumbled fiom
pillai lo posl, leaining and unleaining lessons foi lhe fuluie.
Noles
1. This chaplei is based on dala available befoie 3O Seplembei 1999.
2. Imphases added.
3. Ioi an analysis of Russian policy see chaplei 7 in lhis volume by \ladimii Baianovsky.
4. See Paul Tayloi and A. 1. R. Gioom, Thc UnitcJ Nations anJ thc Culj Var, 199091.
Back to thc Iuturc? London: RA Discussion Papei No. 38, 1992.
5. nleiview wilh ICO ofncial, 24 1une 1999.
6. 1c MonJc, 12 1une 1999.
7. 1c MonJc, 4 1une 1999.
8. 1c MonJc, 18 May 1999.
9. 1c MonJc, 12 1une 1988.
1O. Accoiding lo one ofncial.
11. Ioi a heavily ciilical iepoil on \NHCR`s peifoimance, see \K House of Commons
nleinalional Developmenl Commillee Repoil, Kosovo. Thc Hunanitarian Crisis, al
www.pailiamenl.uk, Thiid Repoil, and lhe submission fiom \NHCR in iesponse.
12. Response lo \K House of Commons Commillee, ibid., paia. 26.
13. 1caguc oj Nations Covcnant, Ailicle 22.4.
14. 1c MonJc, 22 Seplembei 1999.
15. 1amie Shea, NATO Piess Confeience, 12 May 1999.
18. 1c MonJc, 29 1uly 1999.
19. Ioi an analysis of lhe inliicacies of lhis pioblem, see The Palh of Reconsliuclion is Nol
Sliaighl,`` 1c MonJc, 1 Seplembei 1999.
2O. Ioi a moie delailed analysis, see chaplei 25 in lhis volume by Loii Iislei Damiosch.
21. n \N iesolulions lhe woid Ciiminal`` is nol included in lhe lille.
22. 1c MonJc, 29 May 1999.
23. See an inleiesling ailicle by Geoffiey Robeilson .C. in Thc InJcpcnJcnt on SunJay, 3O
May 1999.
24. See Thc CuarJian, 17 May 1999, and 1c MonJc, 1213 Seplembei 1999.
25. 1c MonJc, 31 1uly 1999.
26. 1c MonJc, 12 Augusl 1999.
27. See 1c MonJc, 23 1uly 1999.
28. 1c MonJc, 2O 1uly 1999.
3O. See 1c MonJc, 1314 1une 1999.
2O
The concepl of humanilaiian
inleivenlion ievisiled
1ancs Mayall
The lasl decade of lhe lwenlielh cenluiy opened and closed wilh wais
lhal weie ended as lhe iesull of inleinalional inleivenlions. Opeialion
Deseil Sloim, which ousled iaq fiom Kuwail in 1anuaiy 1991, was an
Ameiican-led, piedominanlly Weslein, mililaiy campaign. Bul il was
mounled wilh a mandale undei Chaplei \ of lhe \N Chailei, wilh lhe
unanimous suppoil of lhe Secuiily Council, and lhe enlhusiaslic backing
of all lhe Middle Iaslein slales, wilh lhe exceplion of 1oidan. NATO`s
bombaidmenl of foimei ugoslavia in Maich 1999 evenlually succeeded
in foicing lhe Seibs oul of Kosovo. l was again led by lhe \niled Slales
bul lhis lime wilhoul Secuiily Council appioval, and in lhe face of con-
sideiable inleinalional ciilicism. n lhis chaplei, my puipose is lo ie-
examine lhe polilical and inlelleclual backgiound lo lhe debale on hu-
manilaiian inleivenlion lhal has waxed and waned since lhe end of lhe
Cold Wai, befoie consideiing if lheie aie any new lessons lo be leained
as a iesull of lhe Kosovo ciisis.
The Gulf Wai was inilially foughl lo ieveise an aggiession, nol foi
humanilaiian ieasons. ndeed, many of lhose opposed lo lhe wai poinled
oul lhal Kuwail`s human iighls iecoid lefl much lo be desiied. Bul Saddam
Hussein`s biulal suppiession of lhe noilhein Kuidish and soulhein Shiile
iebellions aflei lhe wai led lhe Weslein poweis lo iisk offending some of
lheii eislwhile suppoileis by lheii decision lo eslablish safe havens foi
lhe Kuids and Shiiles.1 Opeialion Deseil Sloim was able lo secuie wide
suppoil because, allhough il iepulsed iaq`s aggiession, il lefl iaqi sovei-
319
eignly and leiiiloiial inlegiily inlacl. On lhe olhei hand, China and some
non-peimanenl membeis of lhe Secuiily Council weie ieluclanl lo ap-
piove fuilhei inleivenlion once lhe piimaiy ob|eclive had been achieved.
By conliasl, NATO |uslined ils inleivenlion in ugoslavia as a human-
ilaiian opeialion fiom lhe slail. n lhe Biilish Defence Secielaiy`s woids,
il was foughl lo aveil a humanilaiian calasliophe by disiupling lhe vio-
lenl allacks cuiienlly being caiiied oul by lhe ugoslav secuiily foices
againsl lhe Kosovo Albanians and lo limil lheii abilily lo conducl such
iepiession in lhe fuluie.``2 Bul, on closei inspeclion, lhe lwo episodes
ieveal moie conlinuily lhan change. l is liue lhal, in Kosovo, lhe \niled
Nalions was involved only al lhe close of lhe campaign, wheieas in
noilhein iaq lhe Wesl aigued lhal ils aclions weie coveied by pievious
Secuiily Council iesolulions. Bul in neilhei case weie lhe Weslein poweis
piepaied lo seek a new Secuiily Council iesolulion, foi feai and, in lhe
lallei case, lhe ceilainly of facing a velo.
n lhe peiiod belween lhe Gulf Wai and lhe Kosovo ciisis, lhe \niled
Nalions was involved in an unpiecedenled numbei of conicls 14 in
Afiica alone.3 The ma|oiily weie inlia- ialhei lhan inleislale conicls
and \N inleivenlion was diiven by lhe need lo piovide humanilaiian
ielief alongside, and indeed as an essenlial ingiedienl of, moie liadilional
peacekeeping and peacemaking funclions. Mosl of lhese opeialions weie
based on Chaplei \ mandales. n olhei woids, lhey depended on lhe
consenl of pieviously conicling pailies. n lhe minoiily of opeialions
lhal weie based on a Chaplei \ mandale lhose in Somalia, Bosnia,
Rwanda, Haili, and Albania, wheie lhe inleivening slales weie aulhoiized
lo use foice lo achieve lheii humanilaiian ob|eclives opinions diffei
widely on lheii success.4 n Bosnia, lhe wai was ended only aflei lhe
\niled Slales had seized lhe diplomalic inilialive fiom lhe \niled
Nalions and lhe peacekeeping opeialion had been laken ovei by NATO.
Moieovei, lhe peace confeience held in Daylon, Ohio, in Novembei 1995
was facililaled by lhe \niled Slales and ils allies luining a blind eye lo
Cioalia`s elhnic cleansing of Kia|ina, an aclion lhal was haidly consislenl
wilh lhe humanilaiian ob|eclives foi which lhe \N opeialion had been
eslablished.
Aflei Daylon, lheie was lillle fuilhei debale aboul lhe iighls and
wiongs of humanilaiian inleivenlion, oi indeed aboul ils piaclicabilily.
Weslein publics il was said weie suffeiing fiom compassion faligue.
The debale was inevilably iekindled, howevei, by lhe NATO aclion
againsl ugoslavia ovei ils liealmenl of lhe Kosovo Albanians, if only
because of lhe uncomfoilable facl lhal mosl of lhe iefugees, whose ieluin
was NATO`s ma|oi wai aim, had been foiced oul of Kosovo aflei lhe
beginning of lhe bombing campaign.5 The humanilaiian molives of lhe
NATO poweis aie nol in doubl (allhough lhey cleaily had olhei powei-
ful molives as well). Whal iemains in doubl is whelhei oi nol humani-
laiian inleivenlion is consislenl wilh lhe pievailing noims of inleinalional
sociely. n oidei lo answei lhis queslion il will be helpful lo locale il
wilhin lhe lheoiy of inleinalional ielalions fiom which il deiives.
Humanilaiian inleivenlion in libeial inleinalional lheoiy
The concepl of humanilaiian inleivenlion occupies an ambiguous place
in lhe lheoiy and piaclice of inleinalional sociely. Al nisl sighl, lhis may
seem sliange since, in olhei aieas of social life, foi example medicine oi
public heallh, advances in welfaie could nol have been achieved wilhoul
human inleivenlion. Ixlieme advocales of laissc;-jairc may cling lo lhe
view lhal social and economic piogiess has depended on goveinmenls
iefiaining fiom inleifeience in lhe maikel, bul even a cuisoiy examina-
lion of lhe iecoid will piove lhem wiong. Only in inleinalional ielalions
does lhe concepl of inleivenlion ielain ils sinislei iepulalion.
The ieason is nol mysleiious. l ows fiom lhe facl lhal lhe modein
inleinalional syslem has been consliucled on lhe basis of lhe piinciple of
soveieignly. This piinciple is lhe foundalion nol only of inleinalional law
bul of lhe diplomalic syslem. l is somelimes aigued lhal economic glob-
alizalion has made il obsolele, lhal lhe money lhal lubiicales lhe con-
lempoiaiy woild is no moie iespeclful of inleinalional boideis lhan is lhe
lselse y. Howevei, wheieas liansnalional maikel inlegialion may indeed
have made il moie difncull foi nalional goveinmenls lo exeicise sovei-
eign aulhoiily, il has done nolhing lo ieplace lhem wilh an alleinalive
sliucluie. l is only when a docloi embaiks upon a liealmenl expiessly
againsl lhe will of lhe palienl lhal inleivenlion becomes pioblemalic. n
inleinalional sociely lhe slales aie lhe palienls bul lheie aie no doclois.
l is foi lhis ieason lhal lhe leim inleivenlion`` is noimally connned lo
coeicive aclion lo make anolhei goveinmenl oi aimed movemenl do
somelhing il would nol olheiwise choose lo do.
The slales syslem, which developed fiom lhe mid-sevenleenlh cenluiy,
was a self-help syslem. l eslablished a quasi-conslilulional oidei lhal
oullawed ieligious wai bul was olheiwise highly peimissive. The foimula
cuius rcgio cius rcligio, lhe ancesloi clause of lhe modein non-inleifeience
piinciple, lefl soveieigns fiee lo puisue lheii inleiesls by whalevei means
lhey saw nl, up lo and including wai foi ieasons of slale and leiiiloiial
conquesl. Moieovei, as lhe naluial law liadilion giadually gave way lo
legal posilivism, lawyeis became moie conceined wilh developing lhe
concepl of a faii nghl jus in bcllo in wai belween Iuiopean slales lhan
wilh lhe iequiiemenl lhal lhe wai ilself should be |usl jus aJ bcllun. Non-
inleivenlion, il seemed, was consislenl wilh a syslem of powei polilics.
H\MANTARAN NTIR\INTON RI\STID 321
Soveieignly can be exeicised eilhei by piesciiplive iighl, oi undei
iepiesenlalive aiiangemenls designed lo ieecl lhe will of lhe people.``
Since lhe Iiench and Ameiican ievolulions, dynaslic iule has incieas-
ingly given way lo vaiious foims of populai soveieignly. Bul, fiom one
poinl of view, whelhei iule is exeicised by piesciiplion oi on lhe basis of
iepiesenlalion makes lillle diffeience: eilhei way soveieign poweis aie
ullimalely accounlable lo lhe people ovei whom lhey exeicise lheii au-
lhoiily. n democialic counliies lhey can be iemoved lhiough lhe ballol
box; in aulhoiilaiian slales, if lhe iuleis syslemalically oppiess lhe bulk
of lhe populalion minoiilies aie, unhappily, anolhei mallei lhey will
evenlually face a populai insuiieclion. nleinally, il is lhus ullimalely lhe
elhic of accounlabilily lhal |uslines lhe self-help syslem.
Self-help al lhe inleinalional level is moie pioblemalic. This is because,
unlil lhe end of lhe nineleenlh cenluiy, once acioss lhe boidei, self-help
was moie oflen lhan nol lianslaled as help-youiself. Colonial expansion
had nol seiiously lioubled lhe Iuiopean conscience, because in a mei-
canlilisl age il was laken foi gianled lhal lheie would always be winneis
and loseis. A zeio-sum woild-view mighl nol be veiy edifying bul lhal
was lhe way il was assumed lo be. Since, undei dynaslicism, people had al
besl veiy limiled polilical and civil iighls and in many counliies none
al all Iuiopean goveinmenls did nol have lo feai chaiges of double
slandaids.
All lhis changed in lhe nineleenlh cenluiy. Weslein impeiialism was
now diiven foiwaid by lhe lwo leading Iuiopean demociacies, Biilain
and Iiance. Ioi a lime, lhey |uslined lheii enclosuie of lhe non-Iuiopean
woild by lheoiies lhal soughl lo explain Weslein dominance by analogy
lo Daiwin`s lheoiy of naluial seleclion. Bul, howevei convenienl, social
Daiwinism was nevei convincing. Once lhe idea of equalily befoie lhe
law, and equal civil and polilical iighls, had been enlienched al home, il
was only a mallei of lime befoie lhe disciiminaloiy liealmenl of colonial
sub|ecls would appeai conliadicloiy, nol meiely lo lhe viclims, whose
knowledge of lheii silualion was bioughl home lo lhem by exposuie lo
Weslein educalion and values, bul lo lhe impeiialisls lhemselves.
1ohn Sluail Mill allempled a moial defence of impeiial inleivenlion
in ielalion lo lhe Biilish annexalion of lhe independenl piincely slale of
Oudh on lhe giounds lhal, because Biilain exeicised absolule aulhoiily
in lhe suiiounding leiiiloiy, il could nol escape iesponsibilily foi lhe
deslilulion inlo which lhe iulei had allowed his counliy lo fall.6 Allhough
in domeslic polilics il is widely held lhal goveinmenls musl be held ac-
counlable foi lheii aclions, Mill`s aigumenl has nol oflen been used by
lhose wishing lo claim a iighl of humanilaiian inleivenlion. They have
been moslly ieluclanl lo follow his logic, piesumably because of lhe dif-
ncully of dislinguishing belween humanilaiian and less woilhy molives
foi inleivenlion. ndeed, al lhe inleinalional level, non-inleivenlion, like
non-disciiminalion in economic affaiis, is geneially assumed lo be an im-
peccably libeial piinciple.
Wilh a Millian appioach lo lhe pioblem of humanilaiian inleiven-
lion blocked off, lhe queslion has been discussed in leims of, on lhe one
hand, lhe dulies of goveinmenls lo uphold individual human iighls, and,
on lhe olhei, lhe iecognilion lhal lheie may be some violalions of
lhese iighls lhal aie so massive as lo |uslify a bieach of lhe piinciple of
non-inleivenlion in exceplional ciicumslances. Theoielically, lhese lwo
posilions aie nol mulually exclusive, bul in piaclice lhose who sliess lhe
nisl lend lo see inleinalional law as lhe piimaiy insliumenl foi develop-
ing inleinalional sociely along piogiessive lines, while lhose who accepl
lhal il is impossible and indeed undesiiable foi lhe law lo covei all
conlingencies iegaid lhe law as a pivolal bul in lhe nnal analysis suboi-
dinale inslilulion of inleinalional sociely. n shoil, lhe nisl gioup woiks
wilhin a legalisl paiadigm, lhe second wilhin a polilical one.
The failuie of legalism belween lhe lwo woild wais led lo a ieasseilion
of lhe piimacy of polilics, and, lhiough lhe Secuiily Council, lhe ie-
afnimalion of lhe special iesponsibilily of lhe gieal poweis (il had also
been iecognized in lhe Council of lhe League of Nalions) foi inlei-
nalional oidei. Paiadoxically, il was lhese same poweis lhal weie ie-
sponsible foi piomulgaling lwo new inleinalional ciimes: ciimes againsl
humanily and wai ciimes. l was also lhe gieal poweis lhal, in 1948, se-
cuied lhe passage of lhe Genocide Convenlion, which soughl lo eslablish
lhe pievenlion and punishmenl of genocide as a peiemploiy noim of in-
leinalional law. l could be aigued, lheiefoie, lhal lhe posl-1945 inlei-
nalional sociely was delibeialely ieconsliucled lo uphold lhe piinciple of
slale soveieignly, bul also on occasion lo allow il lo be bieached. Befoie
199O, howevei, such bieaches of lhe non-inleivenlion iule as occuiied
and lheie weie many weie nol |uslined on humanilaiian giounds. n
lhose cases wheie such a defence could mosl plausibly have been offeied
in lhe ndian inleivenlion on behalf of lhe Bengali sepaialisls in Iasl
Pakislan, in Tanzania`s deposilion of lhe \gandan diclaloi, di Amin,
and in \ielnam`s aclion againsl Pol Pol`s genocidal iegime in Cambodia
il was nol. By 1989 lhe ma|oiily of goveinmenls had ialined lhe \nivei-
sal Declaialion of Human Righls and ils lwo suppoiling covenanls, bul
lhis did nol pievenl lhem fiom shelleiing, wilh impunily, behind Ailicles
2(4) and 2(7) of lhe Chailei.
Thus, aflei 1945, inleinalional sociely was ieconsliucled on lhe basis of
an unequal compiomise belween powei and law. The use of foice, olhei
lhan in self-defence, was lo be sanclioned only on lhe aulhoiily of lhe
Secuiily Council and lhen only when lhe Council deleimined lhal a
lhieal lo inleinalional peace and secuiily exisled and lhal all alleinalive
means of selllemenl had been consideied bul ie|ecled as inappiopiiale in
lhe ciicumslances. \ndei lhe Genocide Convenlion, lheie was also pio-
vision foi a iefeience lo lhe Secuiily Council, piesumably in lhe expec-
lalion allhough lhis inleipielalion was nevei lesled lhal il would iule
lhal genocide could also |uslify aclion undei Chaplei \. n olhei woids,
il was lacilly accepled lhal deciding when lo liiggei lhe colleclive secuiily
piovisions of lhe Chailei could nol be deleimined solely by ob|eclive
ciileiia and wilhoul iefeience lo lhe nalional inleiesls of lhe ma|oi
poweis.
Humanilaiian inleivenlion in lhe 199Os
How fai has lhis liadilion of lhoughl and piaclice been modined by
evenls since lhe end of lhe Cold Wai? The collapse of communism and
lhe disinlegialion of lhe Soviel \nion weie followed by violenl conicls
in many pails of lhe woild, which piovided lhe selling foi an expanded
\N secuiily iole. Theie aie lhose who aigue lhal none of lhese opei-
alions was eilhei appiopiiale oi successful.7 Nonelheless, wheie lhey
followed, ialhei lhan accompanied, lhe negolialion of a polilical sellle-
menl as in Namibia, Cambodia, and Mozambique \N foices weie
able lo ieinfoice lhe woik of humanilaiian agencies and conliibule lo
polilical slabilizalion. On lhe olhei hand, wheie lhe humanilaiian calas-
liophe was lhe diiecl iesull of lhe absence of any such selllemenl oi al
leasl one lo which lhe pailies weie seiiously commilled \N inleiven-
lion piobably had moie negalive lhan posilive iesulls.
The ieluclance of lhe ma|oi poweis lo sanclion new peacekeeping
opeialions in lhe second half of lhe 199Os is only pailly explained by
budgelaiy consliainls. Moie cenlially, il is ielaled lo lhe discoveiy, in lhe
Somali and Bosnian conicls, lhal lheie was no Chaplei six-and-a-half
solulion. Tiadilional peacekeeping iequiied lhe consenl of lhe pailies
and, pailiculaily wheie lhe \niled Nalions was engaged in aclive peace-
building as well, lheii conndence in ils impailialily. Infoicemenl, on lhe
olhei hand, iequiies pailialily, al leasl al lhe poinl of inleivenlion and
unlil lhose iesponsible foi lhe ciisis have been iesliained and peisuaded
lo coopeiale.
This obseivalion seems obvious only wilh hindsighl. l was peihaps
unfoilunale lhal lhe \niled Nalions` new iole in lhe secuiily neld should
have been lesled in lwo of lhe mosl inliaclable civil conicls anywheie in
lhe woild. n foimei ugoslavia, once lhe oveiaiching fedeial sliucluie
had been iemoved, lhe populalions of lhe successoi iepublics iefused lo
accepl lhe legilimacy of lheii pieviously inleinal bul now inleinalional
boideis. Whal weie foimally inleislale wais had all lhe chaiacleiislics
of a feiocious civil wai, in which compiomise fails in lhe face of lhe pas-
sionale and self-iighleous belief of lhe belligeienls in lhe |uslice of lheii
iespeclive causes.
The iesull was lhal, even undei Chaplei \, lo which lhe Secuiily
Council evenlually iesoiled, il was impossible lo fashion a mandale lhal
would allow lhe \niled Nalions lo do moie lhan soflen lhe woisl con-
sequences of lhe compelilive elhnic cleansing in which all sides engaged.
The piefeiied Ameiican slialegy, of aii sliikes againsl lhe Seibs, whom
lhey idenlined as lhe main culpiils, had lhe advanlage of nol confusing
humanilaiian ielief wilh peace enfoicemenl, bul il lefl lhose counliies
wilh lioops on lhe giound dangeiously exposed lo hoslage-laking by lhe
Seib-dominaled ugoslav aimy. The open disagieemenl amongsl lhe
Weslein poweis aboul how lo deal wilh lhe ciisis also inevilably whillled
away al lhe \niled Nalions` aulhoiily.
f lhe confusion in foimei ugoslavia aiose fiom lhe facl lhal lhe
oveilapping wais weie al once civil and inleinalional, in Somalia lhe
collapse of lhe slale had much lhe same effecl. n bolh counliies, social
life was ieduced lo lhe level of a piimilive and anaichic slale of wai. The
inleinalional iesponse lo lhe Somali ciisis was again fiamed wilhin Chap-
lei \ mandales. n lhis case, howevei, lhe piospecls foi lhe iesloialion
of slabilily weie even bleakei. n Bosnia, lhe iival Seib and Cioal com-
munilies seemed deleimined lo make lheii polilical and communal
boundaiies congiuenl, leaving lhe hapless Bosnian Muslims liapped in
lhe middle. Bul leiiiloiial paililion could al leasl piovide a basis foi a
selllemenl. nlei-clan conicl in soulhein Somalia was less susceplible lo
medialion because, in a slill piedominanlly nomadic populalion, lhe
compelilion foi powei was nol piimaiily leiiiloiial.8 When lhe \niled
Nalions nnally wilhdiew fiom Somalia, il lefl lhe silualion in lhe counliy
fundamenlally unalleied.
l is impoilanl nol lo exaggeiale lhe exlenl of lhe \niled Nalions`
failuie in lhe inleivenlions of lhe eaily 199Os. n bolh Bosnia and Somalia
lives weie saved. n Somalia, wheie, in oidei lo delivei humanilaiian as-
sislance, non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions (NGOs) had lo buy pioleclion
wilh money lhal was lhen used lo puichase lhe weapons and supplies lhal
fed lhe conicl, lhe woisl aspecls of lhis vicious ciicle weie bioken. The
failuie was polilical, nol humanilaiian: lhose laigeled weie nol coeiced
inlo changing lheii ob|eclives, wilh lhe iesull lhal lhe ma|oi poweis came
lo feai being diawn inlo conicls in which lheii own inleiesls weie nol
seiiously engaged and fiom which lheie was no easy escape. n lhe
\niled Slales, lhe Clinlon adminislialion led lhe way by selling new
condilions undei which lhe \niled Slales would be piepaied lo conliib-
ule lo mullilaleial peacekeeping opeialions nol only would Ameiican
lioops seive only undei \S command, bul lhey would engage in opei-
alions only wheie lime limils could be sel in advance and an exil slialegy
eslablished al lhe oulsel.9
The iealizalion lhal civil conicls could nol be iesolved on lhe basis
of humanilaiian inleivenlion had disaslious consequences in Rwanda.
When, in Apiil 1994, lhe Hulu-dominaled goveinmenl embaiked upon a
syslemalic genocide of elhnic Tulsi, lhe \N peacekeeping foice was
scaled down lo a poinl wheie il could nol hope lo slem lhe killing.
Moieovei, lhe 19 counliies lhal had piomised lioops foi a liadilional
peacekeeping opeialion, lo oveisee lhe implemenlalion of lhe Aiusha
Accoids, wilhdiew lheii offei once il was cleai lhal lhe agieemenl was
dead and lhal lhe conicl had been inlensined.10
n lhese ciicumslances il was peihaps nol suipiising lhal lhe Secuiily
Council delibeialely iefiained fiom idenlifying lhe Rwandan ciisis as
genocide. To have called lhe slaughlei by ils piopei name would have
made il difncull lo avoid inleivenlion bul lo do whal? n lhis case lhe
allocalion of blame was ielalively sliaighlfoiwaid, yel, because lhe guilly
goveinmenl in Kigali could plausibly claim lo iepiesenl aiound 85 pei
cenl of lhe populalion, il was uncleai on whal basis a new oidei could be
consliucled, so long as Rwandan sociely iemained divided along elhnic
lines. Opeialion Tuiquoise, lhe Iiench-led opeialion lhal was evenlually
eslablished undei a Chaplei \ mandale, may have helped lo slop lhe
slaughlei. Howevei, Iiance had been so idenlined wilh lhe iegime lhal
had inilialed lhe genocide lhal ils failuie lo sepaiale oidinaiy iefugees
fiom lheii polilical and mililaiy leadeis was iighlly oi wiongly widely
iegaided as being polilically molivaled.
The failuie lo lake effeclive aclion lo slop lhe Rwandan genocide co-
incided wilh lhe decision of lhe Secuiily Council lo aulhoiize lhe use of
foice lo iesloie lo powei lhe elecled, bul subsequenlly deposed, Hailian
piesidenl. n laking lhis decision, lhe Council iefeiied specincally lo lhe
signincanl fuilhei deleiioialion of lhe humanilaiian silualion in Haili, in
pailiculai lhe conlinuing escalalion by lhe illegal Jc jacto iegime of sys-
lemalic violalions of civil libeilies.``11 Ioi lhe nisl lime, foice was au-
lhoiized by lhe \niled Nalions lo change lhe goveinmenl of a membei
slale. n lhis sense, a piecedenl has been sel, and lhe leiiiloiial inleipie-
lalion of soveieignly as effeclive conliol was called inlo queslion. el,
whelhei Haili will in jact eslablish a piecedenl seems doublful il was
lhe Ameiican inleiesl in slemming lhe ood of Hailian iefugees lo lhe
\niled Slales, ialhei lhan humanilaiianism, lhal nnally diove lhe opeia-
lion foiwaid.12
The answei lo lhe queslion posed al lhe beginning of lhis seclion lhus
seems cleai. Humanilaiian consideialions have giealei polilical salience
lhan lhey did duiing lhe Cold Wai, bul lhey aie insufncienl lo compel lhe
inleinalional communily lo acl in lhe absence of a moie specinc molive.
Aflei lhe Cold Wai, Weslein goveinmenls look lhe lead in piomoling
human iighls and democialic values, bul lheii willingness lo inleivene in
lhe domeslic affaiis of slales whose goveinmenls liansgiessed lhese
noims iemained highly seleclive, pailiculaily wheie lheii own inleiesls
weie nol diieclly involved. The conslilulional oidei of inleinalional
sociely had nol been fundamenlally modined.
Kosovo
Al nisl sighl, lhis conclusion seems lo be ieinfoiced by lhe inleinalional
ieaclion lo lhe Kosovo ciisis. Nol only was il impossible lo acl lhiough
lhe Secuiily Council, because of lhe opposilion of Russia and China lo
NATO`s campaign, bul lhe inleivenlion was molivaled al leasl as much
by lhe need lo mainlain lhe oiganizalion`s ciedibilily as by humanilaiian
ob|eclives. Nonelheless, lhe scale of lhe opeialion and lhe way il was
nnally iesolved inevilably ieopened lhe queslion of lhe place of humani-
laiian inleivenlion in inleinalional sociely and lhe cuiienl undeislanding
of ils coie piinciple of soveieignly. n conclusion, lel us ieconsidei lhese
queslions undei lwo heads: lhe legalily of humanilaiian inleivenlion and
ils feasibilily.
Thc law oj hunanitarian intcrvcntion
The Kosovo ciisis exposed lhe shaip conicl belween lhose who view
inleinalional sociely wilhin a legalisl paiadigm and lhose who insisl on
lhe piimacy of polilics. This dispule is nol aboul lhe impoilance of lhe
iule of law lo inleinalional sociely, bul aboul whelhei il is lo be lhe sei-
vanl oi maslei of lhe slale.
Duiing lhe 199Os, lhe Secuiily Council adopled a seiies of iesolulions
sanclioning lhe use of foice in suppoil of humanilaiian ob|eclives in
iaq, BosniaHeizegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, and Albania. Howevei, as
Calheiine Guicheid has poinled oul, lhe combined iighl of viclims lo
assislance and lhe iighl of lhe Secuiily Council lo aulhoiise humanilaiian
inleivenlion wilh mililaiy means do nol amounl lo a iighl of humanilai-
ian inleivenlion by slales individually oi colleclively.``13 The Secuiily
Council was able lo pass lhese iesolulions because ils peimanenl mem-
beis weie moslly in agieemenl even when China disagieed, il iefiained
fiom backing ils dissenl wilh a velo and because in each case lhe
Council iuled lhal lhe silualion consliluled a lhieal lo inleinalional
peace and secuiily. Neilhei of lhese condilions oblained in Kosovo.
Iaced wilh lhis iealily, inleinalional lawyeis have adopled one of lhiee
posilions. Some have sluck lo lhe lellei of lhe Chailei, aiguing lhal
NATO aclion was illegal and lhal, iegaidless of lhe meiils of lhe elhical
aigumenl in lhis pailiculai case, if il is accepled lhal a slale oi gioup of
slales can unilaleially decide lo inleivene . . . |ljhe dooi will have been
opened lo all soils of sub|eclive claims as lo when inleivenlions aie |us-
lined and when lhey aie nol.``14
Olheis have suggesled lhal lhe Secuiily Council ilself should be ie-
foimed by incieasing lhe iepiesenlalion of Asia, Afiica and Lalin
Ameiica, and ieplacing lhe iighl of velo by a syslem of qualined ma|oiily
voling.``15 Such iefoims would widen lhe polilical basis on which Secuiily
Council iesolulions depend, and complicale lhe polilical baigaining lhal
undeilies lhem. Bul lhey would nol in lhemselves suboidinale polilics lo
lhe law. Reaching a consensus would face similai piaclical difncullies, as
would ie-diafling lhe Chailei lo piovide foi explicil ciileiia foi humani-
laiian inleivenlion. Whelhei lhe end iesull would |uslify lhe iequisile
inveslmenl of lime and effoil is doublful.
Iinally, lheie aie lhose who aigue lhal lhe legal basis of NATO`s
aclion is lhe docliine of iepiesenlalion, which has undeipinned lhe slales
syslem since 1945. Maic Wellei aigues plausibly lhal humanilaiian aclion
is |uslined wheie a goveinmenl oi effeclive aulhoiily aclively exleimi-
nales ils populace, oi wheie il denies lo il lhal which is necessaiy foi ils
suivival, oi wheie il foicibly displaces il.``16 n lhese ciicumslances, lhe
goveinmenl cannol conceivably claim lo be lhe exclusive inleinalional
iepiesenlalive of lhal veiy populalion. Wellei allempls lo sel iesliiclive
ciileiia which musl be mel befoie a legal dissocialion of goveinmenl and
populalion can be liiggeied, and suggesls lhal in Kosovo lhe 123 defeal
of lhe Russian diafl iesolulion in lhe Secuiily Council piovides evidence
lhal lhey had been mel.
Time will lell if inleinalional sociely is, in facl, evolving conslilulionally
along lhe lines suggesled by lhis lheoiy. Iiom a polilical peispeclive,
howevei, il faces lwo pioblems. The nisl is eslablishing lhe ciileiia,
ahead of lime, so lhal lhey may be seen lo be moie lhan cx post jacto
ialincalion of a successful plea foi inleivenlion. Moie seiiously, even if a
fundamenlal dissocialion is accepled as a legilimale liiggei, whelhei oi
nol lhe lheoiy lakes hold will depend ciucially on lhe piaclical oulcome
of specinc inleivenlions. The law will nol sland up if lhese inleivenlions
luin oul lo have peiveise effecls.
Icasibility
n one sense NATO`s aclion in Kosovo avoided lwo ielaled conliadic-
lions in which eailiei inleivenlions weie miied: lhe nisl was belween
ends and means; lhe second belween peacekeeping and enfoicemenl.
Thioughoul lhe eaily poslCold Wai peiiod, lhe Secuiily Council
exhibiled a disluibing lendency lo will lhe end bul nol lhe means. n
Kosovo, NATO made il cleai fiom lhe oulsel lhal il was piepaied lo
commil whalevei level of aii powei pioved necessaiy lo foice Piesidenl
Milosevic lo wilhdiaw ugoslav foices fiom lhe piovince. Since lhis was
lhe ob|eclive, lhe pioblem of impailialily did nol aiise.
Al a deepei level, howevei, il is nol cleai lhal lhese conliadiclions
have been oveicome. Apail fiom lhe queslion of legalily, mosl ciilics of
lhe NATO opeialion commenled on lhe ieluclance of lhe inleivening
slales above all lhe \niled Slales lo commil land foices. Theii delei-
minalion lo nghl a iisk-fiee clean wai (al leasl fiom lheii own poinl of
view) ievealed a weak poinl in lhe democialic aimouiy. l has been in
laige pail Weslein public opinion, oicheslialed lhiough lhe media and
NGOs, lhal has demanded inleinalional aclion in iesponse lo humani-
laiian disasleis aiound lhe woild. Al lhe same lime, democialic polili-
cians have been undeislandably waiy of pulling lheii own cilizens al iisk
in conicls lhal do nol diieclly concein lhem.
l is aiguable lhal Milosevic would have been piepaied lo back down
soonei had il been made cleai lo him al lhe oulsel, ialhei lhan lwo
monlhs inlo lhe opeialion, lhal NATO would, if necessaiy, deploy ils
supeiioi foice on land as well as in lhe aii. Thal il did nol do so can
peihaps be explained by lhe difncully in mainlaining solidaiily in an
Alliance, some of whose membeis would have iefused lo lake pail in a
land wai. On lhe olhei hand, since mililaiy opinion did nol favoui an
unsuppoiled aii wai, NATO`s polilical leadeis musl accepl iesponsibilily
foi lhe veiy high levels of damage inicled on ugoslavia in puisuil of
lheii goals.
Peace enfoicemenl iaises lhe queslion of ullimale as well as immediale
iesponsibilily. The pioleclion of lhe viclims of peiseculion and lhe ielief
of suffeiing can be viewed as ends in lhemselves al lhe poinl of inlei-
venlion. Ovei lhe long iun, howevei, il becomes necessaiy lo ieconsliucl
sociely in ways lhal will insuie againsl a iecuiience of lhe inilial disaslei.
How is lhis lo be done?
A model of a kind is available. n Cambodia and lo some exlenl
duiing lhe liansfei of powei in Namibia lhe \niled Nalions assumed
many of lhe funclions of lhe civil adminislialion. n bolh cases il also
oiganized and oveisaw lhe nisl democialic eleclions. Then, undei lhe
leims of lhe agieemenl, which had been diawn up piioi lo ils involve-
menl, lhe \niled Nalions wilhdiew. \nfoilunalely, lhe model is nol well
adapled lo silualions in which lhe slale ilself has failed oi wheie as in
Kosovo lhe peace lhal has been enfoiced iequiies lhe dismanlling of
lhe pievious aulhoiily on lhe giounds lhal il shaies iesponsibilily foi lhe
humanilaiian disaslei.
n lhe eaily 199Os, lheie was lalk of ieviving lhe concepl of a \N
Tiusleeship, in oidei lo piovide an impailial, slable, and accounlable
adminislialion in counliies lhal would iequiie an exlended peiiod of ie-
consliuclion. nlelleclually appealing, lhis idea nonelheless failed lo win
any backeis. The ma|oi poweis weie ieluclanl lo enlei inlo commilmenls
lhal piomised lo be open-ended and expensive and weie likely lo be
ciilicized foi ieinlioducing impeiialism by lhe back dooi.
Once lhe immediale silualion has been addiessed, howevei, il is difn-
cull lo avoid lhe conclusion lhal lhe logic of humanilaiian inleivenlion is
impeiial. How else is a bioken sociely lo be iebuill? n 1945, lhe vicloii-
ous allies demanded uncondilional suiiendei of lhe Geiman and 1apa-
nese goveinmenls, piecisely because lhey believed lhal lhe only way lo
avoid hisloiy iepealing ilself was lo ieconsliucl sociely compiehensively.
n lhese cases, lhe vilal inleiesls of lhe Weslein poweis weie so deeply
involved in lhe oulcome lhal lheie was no lemplalion lo seek a quick nx
and lhen wilhdiaw. l may be lhal evenls will foice lhem lo do much lhe
same in Bosnia and Kosovo. Howevei, in conliasl lo lhe Second Woild
Wai, which was undeislood lo be a nghl lo lhe nnish fiom lhe slail, so fai
in poslCold Wai inleivenlions lhe inleinalional communily has involved
ilself on lhe undeislanding lhal ils liabilily is sliiclly limiled.
n a woild wilhoul empiie, limiled liabilily is piobably unavoidable
bul, in lhe conlexl of posl-wai ieconsliuclion, il has obvious disadvan-
lages. The oveiseas empiies of lhe Iuiopean poweis weie haidly eslab-
lished lo piolecl lhe human iighls of colonial sub|ecls; bul lhey did
inadveilenlly cieale piofessional adminislialions, slaffed by men and
women who spoke lhe languages and undeislood lhe culluie of lhe soci-
elies lhey iuled. When lhe \niled Nalions is bioughl in lo deal wilh a
humanilaiian ciisis, il has necessaiily lo employ people on shoil-leim
conliacls, few of whom will have equivalenl expeilise. n bolh Cambodia
and Somalia, a lack of local knowledge allowed ambilious leadeis lo
exploil lhe \niled Nalions foi lheii own puiposes. l is nol immedialely
obvious lhal lhe oiganizalion will be able lo avoid lhis pioblem in
Kosovo, wheie an inleinalional civil adminislialion has been sel up
backed by lhe NATO-led foice of ovei 5O,OOO.17
Two sepaiale pioblems aiise fiom allempls lo eslablish disinleiesled
adminislialion in counliies lhal have been liaumalized by civil conicl:
lhe nisl conceins lhe appiopiiale agency; lhe second lhe naluie of ils
mission. The iale al which humanilaiian ciises followed one anolhei aflei
lhe Cold Wai meanl lhal lhe \niled Nalions was unable, acling on ils
own, lo mobilize lhe necessaiy iesouices. The concepl of a coalilion of
lhe willing`` aulhoiized by lhe \niled Nalions was fashioned al lhe lime
of lhe Gulf Wai and quickly eslablished ilself as a slandaid iesponse lo
humanilaiian ciises. Aflei lhe ieveises in Somalia and Rwanda, howevei,
lhe Weslein poweis weie ieluclanl lo involve lhemselves deeply in con-
icls fai iemoved fiom lheii own vilal inleiesls.
The piaclical pioblem was how lo avoid being diawn inlo such conicls
whenevei lhey capluied lhe woild`s headlines and, howevei biiey, suc-
ceeded in mobilizing public opinion. The aclion of lhe Iconomic Com-
munily of Wesl Afiican Slales (ICOWAS) in mounling a peacekeeping
opeialion in Libeiia, inilially wilhoul lhe aulhoiizalion of lhe Secuiily
Council, was seized on as a model foi lhe fuluie. Local poweis, suppoiled
if necessaiy wilh liaining and lechnical assislance fiom lhe Wesl, should
assume piimaiy iesponsibilily foi mainlaining oidei and |uslice wilhin
lheii own iegion. l could be plausibly aigued lhal, if one of lhe ma|oi
obslacles lo effeclive inleivenlion is lhe absence of knowledge aboul
local condilions, lhis is moie likely lo be oveicome on a iegional level,
wheie noimal business and diplomacy cieale nelwoiks acioss inleina-
lional boideis, lhan univeisally. Chaplei \ of lhe Chailei had envis-
aged iegional oiganizalions acling in suppoil of lhe woild body. Al lhe
end of lhe lwenlielh cenluiy, il seems moie likely lhal, in fuluie, lhe
oidei will be ieveised.
An analysis of lhis kind can be invoked lo |uslify NATO`s seleclivily in
concenlialing on Kosovo and ignoiing many olhei ciises wheie lhe
ciiminal aclivilies of lhe aulhoiilies and lheii oppiession of lhe popula-
lion aie compaiable. On lhis view, Seibian policies in Kosovo, as eailiei
in Bosnia, lhiealen lhe slabilily, welfaie, and values of Iuiopean slales in
a way lhal is nol liue of Sieiia Leone oi Myanmai. l is liue lhal lhe
wiongs lo be iighled aie univeisal, bul only lhose in lhe immediale
neighbouihood have bolh lhe inleiesl and lhe abilily lo iighl lhem.
Theie is some foice in lhis aigumenl. l is, aflei all, lhe immediale ie-
gion lhal feels lhe nisl shock of a humanilaiian disaslei, in lhe foim of
iefugee ows and lhe social and economic pioblems lhal lhey geneiale.
The asylum syslem was nol designed foi lhe mass migialions lhal iesull
fiom elhnic cleansing and inleicommunal violence. l is nol unieason-
able, lheiefoie, foi lhe counliies mosl immedialely affecled by a ciisis lo
accepl piimaiy iesponsibilily foi oicheslialing lhe inleinalional iesponse
lo il.
\nfoilunalely, il is also lhe goveinmenls mosl willing lo acl lhal aie
mosl likely lo have lheii own polilical agendas (and clienls) in lhe laigel
slale. Ioi much of lhe lime lhal ICOWAS was involved in Libeiia, lhe
woik of ils Mililaiy Obseivei Gioup (ICOMOG) was undeimined by
lhe facl lhal seveial of ils membei slales weie backing iival faclions in
lhe conicl. And, when a peace deal was nnally negolialed, il was on lhe
basis of a powei-shaiing agieemenl belween lhe ma|oi wailoids who had
pieviously been accused of devaslaling lhe counliy. Local knowledge, on
which ICOMOG could diaw, was ceilainly a ciucial elemenl in lhe pio-
cess lhal liansfoimed Chailes Tayloi fiom a hunled wailoid lo an elecled
piesidenl.18 By lhe same loken, lhis cleaily iequiied a suboidinalion of
humanilaiian lo polilical and slialegic consideialions. By opling foi a
\N-sponsoied adminislialion in Kosovo, lhe inlenlion is piesumably lo
avoid a similai liade-off. Whelhei oi nol lhis is feasible iemains lo be
seen, bul lhe omens aie nol favouiable.
The ieason is pailly a consequence of lhe local culluie, bul moie fun-
damenlally of an uniesolved conceplual pioblem lo which iegionalizalion
piovides no answei. As William Hagen has aigued, lhe analogy belween
Seibian elhnic cleansing and Nazi genocide againsl lhe 1ews is mislead-
ing: Balkan elhnic cleansing does nol iequiie mass exleiminalion bul
ialhei mass iemoval, which can be haslened along by displays of mui-
deious violence diawn fiom lhe iepeiloiy of ievenge killings and blood
feuds.``19 This is nol lo explain lhe violenl polilics of foimei ugoslavia
in leims of ancienl halieds, meiely lo suggesl lhal lhe lask of any new ad-
minislialion will be gieally complicaled by having lo opeiale in an envi-
ionmenl wheie lhe elhic of blood ievenge, binding individual membeis
of exlended families,`` has been giafled onlo elhnic nalionalism.``20
1usl how complicaled lhe lask will be was evidenl fiom lhe lension lhal
eiupled in Augusl 1999 belween NATO and lhe \niled Nalions High
Commissionei foi Refugees (\NHCR). NATO`s wai had been waged lo
pievenl lhe elhnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians, nol lo facililale Alba-
nian cleansing of lhe Seibian minoiily hence lhe impoilance NATO
commandeis quile iighlly allached lo ils foices being seen lo be impai-
lial. Nonelheless, lhey weie poweiless lo pievenl a spale of ievenge kill-
ings, which piediclably led lo a iapid oulwaid migialion of lhe Seib
minoiily. This was aided on lhe giound by \NHCR, which, in lhe face
of individual aliocilies, undeislandably fell lhal ils humanilaiian mission
would allow il lo do no less. l is difncull lo see how in lhis case lwo iighls
could fail lo add up lo a wiong. Iiom lhe peispeclive of humanilaiian
inleivenlion, lhe dangei is lhal NATO will have ciealed a land foi lhe
Kosovo Libeialion Aimy a movemenl lhal is a miiioi-image of ils
Seibian enemy lo inheiil.
Noles
1. See 1ames Mayall, Non-nleivenlion, Self-Deleiminalion and lhe New Woild Oidei,` ``
Intcrnational Ajjairs, \ol. 67, No. 3, 1uly 1991, pp. 421429.
2. uoled in Paul Rogeis, Lessons lo Leain,`` Thc VorlJ ToJay, \ol. 55, No. 8j9,
AugusljSeplembei 1999, pp. 46.
3. Ioi lhe full lisl, see Maiack Goulding, The \niled Nalions and Conicl in Afiica since
lhe Cold Wai,`` Ajrican Ajjairs, \ol. 98, No. 391, Apiil 1999, lable 1, p. 158.
4. Ioi a iange of assessmenls, see Mals Beidal, Vhithcr UN Icacckccping, Adelphi Papei
281, London: Biasseys foi SS, 1993; Adam Robeils, Hunanitarian Action in Var,
Adelphi Papei 3O5, London: Biasseys foi SS, 1996; 1ames Mayall, ed., Thc Ncw Intcr-
vcntionisn. UN 1xpcricncc in CanboJia, Iorncr Yugoslavia anJ Sonalia, Cambiidge:
Cambiidge \niveisily Piess, 1996.
5. Ioi a sobei, bul poweiful, slalemenl of lhe anli-liiumphalisl posilion, see Maik Dannei,
Kosovo: The Meaning of \icloiy,`` Ncw York Rcvicw oj Books, 15 1uly 1999, pp. 53
54.
6. 1ohn Sluail Mill, A Iew Woids on Non-inleivenlion,`` Disscrtations anJ Discussions,
London: W. Paikei, 1867, pp. 153178.
7. See, foi example, Idwaid Lullwak, Give Wai a Chance,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, \ol. 78,
No. 4, 1ulyjAugusl 1999, pp. 3644.
8. Teiiiloiy is vilal lo nomadic peoples bul nol in lhe sense of being iing-fenced as undei
lhe convenlional inleipielalion of soveieignly. As a local saying has il, wheievei lhe
camel ioams, lhal is Somalia.``
9. Mayall, Thc Ncw Intcrvcntionisn, p. 118, fn 34.
1O. See Goulding, The \niled Nalions and Conicl in Afiica since lhe Cold Wai,`` p. 163.
11. Secuiily Council Resolulion 94O, 31 1uly 1994.
12. See David Malone, Dccision Making in thc UnitcJ Nations Sccurity Council. Thc Casc oj
Haiti, Oxfoid: Claiendon Piess, 1998.
13. Calheiine Guicheid, nleinalional Law and lhe Wai in Kosovo,`` Survival, \ol. 41,
No. 2, Summei 1999, pp. 1934.
14. Michael Byeis, Kosovo: An llegal Opeialion,`` Counscl, Augusl 1999, pp. 1618.
15. Calheiine Guicheid, nleinalional Law and lhe Wai in Kosovo,`` p. 25.
16. Maic Wellei, Aimed Samaiilans,`` Counscl, Augusl 1999, pp. 2O22.
17. Secuiily Council Resolulion 1244.
18. Ioi lwo assessmenls of lhis piocess fiom diffeienl peispeclives, see Adeba|o Adekeye,
Pax Nigeiiana? ICOMOG in Libeiia,`` unpublished D.Phil. lhesis, \niveisily of
Oxfoid, 1999; and Imannuel Kwesi Aning, Secuiily in lhe Wesl Afiican Sub-iegion:
An Analysis of ICOWAS`s Policies in Libeiia,`` Ph.D. lhesis, \niveisily of Copenha-
gen, 1999.
19. William Hagen, The Balkans` Lelhal Nalionalisms,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, \ol. 78, No. 4,
1ulyjAugusl 1999, pp. 5264.
2O. bid.
21
The concepl of soveieignly ievisiled
eln tmes
Given lhe chameleon-like naluie of lhe concepl of soveieignly, a discus-
sion of lhe impacl upon il of lhe ciisis in Kosovo necessaiily enlails a lillle
pieliminaiy giound cleaiing. Ioi lhe puipose in hand, |usl lwo concepls
of soveieignly need lo be idenlined and dislinguished: lhe one lhal is in-
dicalive of slalus and lhe one lhal connoles ceilain legal iighls.
Soveieignly as slalus
The nisl concepl has lo do wilh lhe condilion lhal makes a leiiiloiial
enlily eligible lo pailicipale fully in inleinalional ielalions. l consisls (so
lhe piaclice of slales makes abundanlly cleai) of conslilulional indepen-
dence; lhal is lo say, lhe silualion lhal exisls when an enlily`s conslilulion
is nol conlained, howevei loosely, wilhin a widei conslilulional scheme,
bul slands apail and alone. Thus lhe consliluenl slales of a fedeial slale
do nol en|oy lhis soil of soveieignly, no mallei how laige oi poweiful
lhey aie; noi does an inleinally self-goveining colony. Soveieignly in lhis
sense is a legal slalus which deiives fiom lhe conslilulional posilion of lhe
enlily conceined, and is bolh absolule (in lhal il is eilhei possessed oi
nol) and unilaiy (in lhal ils implicalions aie fai-ieaching bolh exleinally
and inleinally). Ixleinally, soveieign slalus makes an enlily eligible lo
pailicipale in inleinalional ielalions, allhough lhe degiee lo which il
aclually does so depends upon ils own inclinalions and lhe exlenl lo
which olhei soveieign slales aie willing lo have dealings wilh il. As vii-
334
lually all such enlilies play a lively inleinalional iole, lhis concepl of
soveieignly is ulleily basic foi lhe piaclilionei and sludenl of inleina-
lional ielalions, in lhal il seives lo idenlify lhe leiiiloiially based inlei-
nalional aclois lhal conslilule lhe ma|oi elemenls of lhe inleinalional
sociely.
n lhis lighl, lhiee lhings aie evidenl: (a) ugoslavia en|oyed soveieign
slalus befoie lhe Kosovan ciisis bioke; (b) Kosovo, being bul a pail of
lhe non-soveieign ugoslav piovince of Seibia, did nol; and (c) neilhei
of lhese silualions has since changed. The lasl iemaik calls foi some
elaboialion.
The conducl of a bombing campaign againsl a soveieign slale, such as
lhal in which NATO engaged againsl ugoslavia, has no diiecl beaiing
on lhe viclim`s soveieign slalus. Ralhei, il is in kind bul nol (lhese days)
in degiee lhe soil of liibulalion which soveieign slales cuslomaiily have
lo beai, as lheii moie poweiful fellows, whelhei seveially oi |oinlly, exeil
piessuie on lhem wilh a view lo secuiing a concession. n olhei woids,
il is an inslance of lhe play of inleinalional polilics. n lhis case, as in-
dicaled, il is an unusual play, foi such oveil and biulal use of foice in an
inleislale conlexl olhei lhan one involving individual oi colleclive self-
defence has become highly unfashionable. Bul lhal, on a long view, does
nol make il unlypical. And, as wilh any olhei foim of inleinalional pies-
suie, ils exeicise has in no way undeimined ugoslavia`s slalus as a sov-
eieign slale. l is slill a conslilulionally independenl enlily, and hence
able lo pailicipale in inleinalional ielalions as was shown by lhe facl
lhal aflei a while il foimally capilulaled and agieed lo lhe leims which lhe
NATO slales had been seeking lo exliacl by way of bombei diplomacy.
Noi did lhe acceplance of lhose leims depiive ugoslavia of ils sovei-
eign slalus. De faclo, il has losl lhe iegion of Kosovo, al leasl foi lhe lime
being. Bul de jure ils domain is undiminished. Moieovei, even if Kosovo
had been oi weie lo be foimally delached fiom ugoslavia, lhal would
ieduce only ils size; il would have no beaiing al all on ils slalus. l would
slill be a soveieign slale, even lhough a smallei one lhan befoie. Of
couise, in polilical leims lhal is a huge only.`` Bul slalus is a legal con-
dilion, which is independenl of an enlily`s possibly uclualing acieage.
Howevei small ugoslavia weie lo become, ieduced peihaps lo no moie
lhan some of whal used lo be lhe piovince of Seibia, so long as il ielains
ils conslilulional independence il lheieby ielains ils soveieignly.
Soveieignly as iighls
The olhei concepl of soveieignly lhal is ielevanl lo lhis discussion iefeis
lo lhe basic legal iighls (lhal woid heie being used lo include com-
SO\IRIGNT RI\STID 335
pelencies) lhal aie, as il weie, beslowed on a soveieign slale by inleina-
lional law. n olhei woids, lhey aie lhe iighls lhal ow fiom soveieign
slalus. They aie cenlial lo lhe slale`s inleinalional aclivily, and play an
oflen indiiecl bul vaslly impoilanl iole in ielalion lo ils inleinal aclivily.
So fai as lhe exleinal scene is conceined, slales en|oy, undei inleinalional
law, lhe capacily lo enlei inlo diplomalic ielalions, lo make liealies, and
lo |oin inleinalional oiganizalions. On lhe basis of lhis legal fiamewoik,
slales aie enabled lo engage in whal is univeisally iegaided as noimal``
inleinalional aclivily and wilhoul il lhe conlacls of slales wilh each
olhei would al lhe leasl be unceilain and veiy possibly hazaidous.
l cannol be said lhal wilhin ils boideis a slale is empoweied by inlei-
nalional law lo exeicise |uiisdiclion, foi lhal empoweimenl is gianled by
lhe slale`s conslilulion. Bul inleinalional law iecognizes and iespecls lhe
silualion by placing a duly on all soveieign slales nol, bioadly speaking,
lo inleivene in lhe inleinal affaiis of olheis. n consequence, a slale has
lhe inleinalional legal iighl, lhe soveieign iighl, lo conducl ilself lhiough-
oul ils leiiiloiy as, by and laige, il sees nl. Iuilhei, and diieclly in con-
sequence of inleinalional legal developmenls, a slale is enlilled lo exei-
cise |uiisdiclion in ils aiispace and (if il has any) on ils leiiiloiial sea. All
lhese malleis aie oflen spoken of simply as lhe iighl of domeslic |uiis-
diclion, oi as lhe iighl lo polilical independence. Associaledly, slales have
always en|oyed lhe iighl undei inleinalional law lo defend lhemselves
againsl piedalois; and nowadays lhis iighl is complemenled by lhe duly
placed on all slales, in almosl all ciicumslances, lo iespecl lhe leiiiloiial
inlegiily of lheii fellows.
n ielalion lo olhei slales, lheiefoie, lhe iighl of domeslic |uiisdiclion,
and lhe coiiesponding obligalion on olheis of non-inleivenlion (oflen
mislakenly iefeiied lo as lhe iighl`` of non-inleivenlion), aie of caidinal
impoilance. ndeed, il is somelimes suggesled lhal lhe piinciple of non-
inleivenlion is lhe mosl fundamenlal docliine of inleinalional law. Be
lhal as il may, il iemains lhe case lhal lhe iighl lo demand such iesliainl
is an aspecl of a slale`s soveieign iighls. Occasionally, howevei, il seems
even lo be implied lhal lhe iighl of domeslic |uiisdiclion is a concomilanl
of soveieign slalus. Bul lhal cannol be so. Ralhei, lhe link belween sov-
eieignly as slalus and soveieignly as iighls is lhal, allhough lhe second
sense of soveieignly is inlimalely associaled wilh lhe nisl, il is nol a con-
comilanl bul a consequence of il. Soveieign iighls allach lo lhose enlilies
lhal en|oy soveieign slalus. Theiefoie, being a consequence of soveieign
slalus, neilhei in logic noi in lhe piaclice of slales does lhe diminulion
oi disiegaid of lhese iighls damage lhe soveieign slalus of lhe slale con-
ceined (excepl in lhe now-exceplional case of a slale being lolally annexed
by anolhei). ndeed, lhe idea of damaging`` a slale`s soveieign slalus is
quile inappiopiiale, as lhe concepl in queslion admils only of being held
oi nol. Theie aie no inleimediale slages lo soveieign slalus, |usl as lheie
aie none lo lhe piesidenlial, piime minisleiial, pio-chancelloiial, oi any
olhei slalus.
The en|oymenl of soveieign iighls, howevei, may be cuilailed, eilhei
volunlaiily oi involunlaiily. The slale may, foi example, choose (lhiough
lhe medium of liealies) lo accepl specinc obligalions nol lo exeicise cei-
lain of ils basic iighls, oi such obligalions may be imposed on a slale by
cuslomaiy inleinalional law. A familiai inslance of lhis is lhe piivileged
legal posilion lhal inleinalional law (bolh convenlional and cuslomaiy)
deciees should be affoided lo acciediled diplomals, exempling lhem fiom
lhe |uiisdiclional ieach of lhe ieceiving slale. Al lhe olhei exlieme, in
leims of bolh ambil and conlempoiaiy unfamiliaiily, is lhe possibilily
lhal a soveieign slale may enliusl lhe conducl of ils inleinalional iela-
lions and defence lo anolhei slale, and so become a piolecled slale.``
Such slales have nol abandoned lheii soveieign slalus; whal lhey have
done is lo accepl lhe agency of anolhei so fai as lhe exeicise inleina-
lionally of lheii soveieign iighls is conceined. Thal silualion may al any
momenl be leiminaled by agieemenl (oi as olheiwise piovided foi in lhe
liealy of pioleclion), enabling lhe slale in queslion lo iesume an inlei-
nalional iole which is whal happened in iespecl of all such slales duiing
lhe second half of lhe lwenlielh cenluiy.
Iqually, a soveieign slale may be pievenled by hoslile foices fiom
exeicising one oi moie of ils soveieign iighls, oi fiom doing so lhiough-
oul ils leiiiloiy. This, lalleily, has been lhe fale of ugoslavia. NATO`s
vaiious aeiial measuies depiived ugoslavia of ils exclusive iighl lo
conliol ils aiispace; lhe bombing campaign was designed lo slie ils
decision-making aulonomy in a ciucial iespecl; and lhe imposilion of an
inleinalional adminislialion in Kosovo means lhal ugoslavia has had lo
abandon ils |uiisdiclional aulhoiily in lhal iegion. l all amounls lo a
massive infiingemenl of lhose of ils soveieign iighls lhal aie designed lo
suppoil ils polilical independence.
nleivenlion and inleinalional law
l mighl, of couise, be aigued lhal ugoslavia`s behavioui in Kosovo was
so ouliageous as lo piovide a legal |uslincalion foi lhe aclions of NATO
and lhe \niled Nalions, in which case il could be said lo have bioughl lhe
violalions of ils soveieign iighls upon ilself. l has always been iecog-
nized lhal lhe piohibilion on inleivenlion in a slale`s inleinal affaiis is
sub|ecl lo lwo oi lhiee veiy limiled exceplions, and unqueslionably any
lawyei woilh his oi hei sall could consliucl a plausible case lo lhe effecl
lhal lhe whole anli-ugoslav enleipiise was lawful fiom lhe slail. Bul
bolh lhe conlenl and lhe inleipielalion of lhe law ielaling lo inleivenlion
aie noloiiously slippeiy. Thus a case lo lhe conliaiy, especially wilh iegaid
lo NATO`s eailiei iole, could no less easily be advanced. Aflei all, lhe
\N Chailei slales lhal all membeis shall iefiain . . . fiom lhe lhieal oi
use of foice againsl lhe leiiiloiial inlegiily oi polilical independence of
any slale`` (Ailicle 2.4), and lhis has been widely hailed as having
achieved lhe slalus of jus ogens lhal is, of a peiemploiy noim of
inleinalional law. The Chailei also slales lhal no enfoicemenl aclion
shall be laken . . . by iegional agencies wilhoul lhe aulhoiizalion of lhe
Secuiily Council`` (Ailicle 53.1). And lhe \ienna Convenlion on lhe Law
of Tiealies (which in lhis iespecl is geneially lhoughl lo embody cuslom-
aiy inleinalional law and, indeed, jus ogens) slales lhal a liealy (of
which ugoslavia`s acceplance of lhe Wesl`s leims iegaiding Kosovo is
an inslance) is void if ils conclusion has been piocuied by lhe lhieal oi
use of foice`` (Ailicle 52).
Howevei, lhis lasl clause goes on lo add, in violalion of lhe piinciples
of inleinalional law embodied`` in lhe \N Chailei. As lhe \niled Nalions
has nevei been slow lo asseil in iespecl of ils own aclion lhal il is enlilled
lo make aulhoiilalive inleipielalions of lhe Chailei, lhe Secuiily Coun-
cil`s iesolulion of 1O 1une 1999 adopling lhe plan foi lhe inleinalional
adminislialion of Kosovo could well be seen as pulling an undeniably
posilive legal complexion on al leasl lhal pail of lhe mallei. Moieovei,
il could be aigued lhal since lhe end of lhe Cold Wai a new elhos has
been undei developmenl iegaiding bolh lhe moialily and lhe legalily of
humanilaiian inleivenlion, lo which inleinalional piaclice in iespecl of
Kosovo has given a laige boosl.
Whalevei view is laken of lhe legal aigumenls, il iemains lhal, as a
mallei of facl, whelhei lawfully, unlawfully, oi in some mixluie of lhe
lwo, ugoslavia has been and iemains al lhe ieceiving end of a veiy
subslanlial denial of ils soveieign iighls. l has been liealed in a mannei
lhal foi some lime has been lhoughl lo be ouldaled lhe aclion laken
againsl iaq lhioughoul lhe 199Os being seen as an exceplion lhal pioved
lhis pailiculai iule. Now, howevei, in lhe lighl of lhe Kosovan ciisis lhe
queslion aiises whelhei oi nol some ievisiling of lhe soveieign iighl of
domeslic |uiisdiclion is called foi; whelhei oi nol, lo pul il a lillle diffei-
enlly, slales should be ialhei less sanguine aboul lheii abilily lo behave
wilhin lheii boideis wilhoul any ieal dangei of being physically called lo
accounl. The answei, lhink, is bolh yes and no.
nleivenlion and inleinalional sociely
Theie was always a ceilain illogic aboul lhe liadilional docliine lhal
slales weie enlilled lo iun lheii affaiis as lhey wished, bul al lhe same
lime weie al iisk of being legilimalely dismembeied oi even devouied by
one oi moie of lheii fellows in an acl of wai. Thal inconsislency (if such il
was) had, by lhe middle of lhe lwenlielh cenluiy, been iemedied lhiough
lhe oullawing of wai, excepl when undeilaken, individually oi collec-
lively, in self-defence. Bul lhe closing of lawful avenues lo lhe use of
unpiovoked foice, logelhei wilh lhe conlempoianeous slienglhening of
lhe legal obslacles lo inleivenlion, ciealed whal could be seen as a yel
giealei illogic lhan lhe one lhal had hilheilo exisled. Ioi il meanl lhal,
legally speaking, lheie was no easy way in which slales could give expies-
sion lo lhe belief lhal, whelhei on slialegic, ideological, oi humanilaiian
giounds, lhey weie iequiied lo inleivene by foice of aims on lhe leiiiloiy
of anolhei slale.
Weie lhe inleinalional sociely composed of slales of ioughly equal
slienglh, lhis would nol have much malleied; lhe facloi of deleiience
would, geneially, have balanced any lendency lo iesoil lo aimed foice.
Bul il was nevei such. And al lhe same lime as lhe legal fiamewoik was
being changed in lhe mannei |usl indicaled, lhe composilion of lhe soci-
ely of slales was being alleied in lhe diieclion of even giealei inequalily.
This was lhe iesull of seveial laige developmenls: lhe bieak-up al lhe end
of lhe Iiisl Woild Wai of lhose mullinalional empiies lhal lay wilhin
Iuiope; lhe viilually complele disinlegialion, wilhin a few decades of lhe
ending of lhe Second Woild Wai, of lhe colonial empiies held by Wesl
Iuiopean slales; and, a bil lalei slill, lhe collapse of lhe Soviel \nion and
of ugoslavia. Moie lhan 1OO new soveieign slales emeiged fiom lhese
piocesses, ciealing an inleinalional sociely wilh inleinal disciepancies of
size and slienglh lhal aie mind-boggling. Thus lhe laigesl slale has a
populalion aboul 1OO,OOO limes lhal of lhe smallesl, and in leims of aiea
lhe diffeience is no less. On lhe ciileiion of weallh, lhe malhemalical gulf
is naiiowei, bul in human leims could haidly be widei; and, on lhal of
mililaiy powei, lhe dispaiilies aie awesome. All lhis in a sociely wilh
somewhal fewei lhan 2OO membeis. Moieovei, in iespecl of lhe oveiall
speclium of slienglh, aboul half lhe slales aie clusleied close lo lhe
bollom, wilh only aboul an eighlh nnding a place lowaids lhe lop.
As polilics cuslomaiily woiks, such inequalily would expiess ilself
in lhe weakei enlilies having lo defei, lo one degiee oi anolhei, lo lhe
sliongei. To a laigish exlenl, lhis is whal lends lo happen. Bul, as lhe
oulcome of legal and polilical developmenls since 1919, lhe ullimale
sanclion of foice has been moie oi less iuled oul and wilh incieasing
emphasis duiing lhe lasl lhiid of lhe lwenlielh cenluiy. el, al moie oi
less exaclly lhis lasl peiiod, giealei ciilical allenlion has been paid lo lhe
way in which slales conducl lhemselves inleinally wilh iespecl lo human
iighls. This has found ieeclion in inleinalional liealies (which oflen
include machineiy foi implemenlalion) al bolh lhe univeisal and iegional
levels. And il is also held by inleinalional human iighls lawyeis lhal, in
addilion lo liealy insliumenls, ceilain human iighls aie now, in conse-
quence of slale piaclice, enshiined in cuslomaiy inleinalional law. Nol-
able among lhese aie lhe piohibilions on genocide, slaveiy, and loiluie
and lhe piinciple of non-disciiminalion. Almosl invaiiably, howevei, lhe
aiiangemenls foi lheii implemenlalion aie ielalively weak, inasmuch as
lhey depend on lhe volunlaiy coopeialion of lhe slale lhal is deemed lo
be al faull. Thus lheie is no unconlioveisial legal means of physically
oveiiiding lhe inleinal |uiisdiclional iighls of giavely eiianl slales. On
lhe olhei hand, lhe peiceived need foi some such occasional oveiiiding is
keenei lhan il has evei been, possibly because of lhe incieased oppoi-
lunilies foi lhe visual media lo give veiy wide exposuie lo human suffeiing.
Given lhis lension belween law and polilics, il would be in no way
suipiising if il weie polilics which came oul on lop, wilh coiiespond-
ing ad|uslmenls lo lhe law following in due lime. Thal would ieecl lhe
basic ielalionship belween lhe lwo phenomena al all limes and in all
places, even in a sociely wheie lhe soveieign slalus of ils membeis gives
lhem piivileges lhal aie quile unielaled lo lheii polilical and physical
cloul. Ioi lhose piivileges aie nol saciosancl. Theie is, il is liue, a faiily
obvious polilical conneclion belween soveieign slalus and lhe duly of
non-inleivenlion: in an ungoveined sociely, il is whal one would expecl
lhe vaiious membeis lo claim. Bul lhey have no inheienl link. n piin-
ciple, soveieign slalus could peifeclly well exisl wilhoul a soveieign iighl,
undei inleinalional law, of full oi even any domeslic |uiisdiclion. \n-
doubledly, al lhe inleinal level compiehensive conslilulional asseilions
lo lhal effecl would conlinue lo be made by all slales. Iiom an exleinal
viewpoinl, howevei, lhe absence of oi ieduclion in lhe duly of non-
inleivenlion would |usl mean lhal lhe ielevanl calculalions aboul
whelhei oi nol lo inleivene would be less encumbeied oi enliiely un-
encumbeied by lhe law, and lo a laigei oi exclusive exlenl would lake
place on lhe polilical and slialegic planes.
Thal is nol lhe way in which lhe woild has developed. Noi is such a fai-
ieaching change al all likely lo occui. Bul il is enliiely imaginable lhal,
as lhe iesull of alleialions in lhe piaclice and lhinking of lhe geneialily
of slales, lhe duly of non-inleivenlion could be ieconceived lo peimil
inleivenlion in silualions wheie lhe liealmenl of ils nalionals by a slale
gave veiy gieal offence. And, as usually happens in iespecl of changes lo
cuslomaiy law, a lead in lhal diieclion mighl be given by lhe piaclice of
some moie poweiful slales in advance of lhal soil of behavioui being
geneially accepled as legilimale. Thal is, polilical developmenls could
lake place lhal would lessen lhe conndence of slales in lheii abilily
always lo go lheii own inleinal way. The ambil of lheii iighl of domeslic
|uiisdiclion would have been in effecl, if nol legally, diminished wilh lhe
law veiy possibly soon calching up wilh lhe changed polilical conlexl.
This, peihaps, is lhe soil of developmenl lhal, Kosovo having acled as lhe
calalysl, is now in liain.
The cosls of inleivenlion
As indicaled, lheie is also a negalive answei lo lhe queslion of whelhei
oi nol soveieignly, in lhe sense of soveieign iighls, is in lhe piocess
of being ievisiled ievisiled, lhal is, by slales. Aimchaii lheoiisls may
indulge in a lol of ielhinking, and il is possible lhal lhey may have an
inuence on lhe lhoughls and, consequenlially, on lhe aclions of slales.
Bul il is lhe piaclice of slales lhal is cenlial in lhis discussion, as il is lheii
inleiaclion lhal is laken lo be lhe ielevanl sub|ecl mallei.
The ieasons foi a negalive iesponse have lo do wilh lhe cosls of inlei-
venlion. n lhe nisl place, and mosl impoilanlly, inleivenlion is much
moie easily spoken of lhan done. Iven if inleivenlion is conducled in lhe
name oi undei lhe auspices of an inleinalional oiganizalion, even one
such as NATO lo which mililaiy iesouices aie allached, il iemains lhal
de faclo lhe |ob of inleivenlion will fall upon ceilain slales. Ones wilh lhe
iequisile complemenls of aimed slienglh and logislic capabililies will be
ielalively few. Thus, allhough lheie may be a numbei of slales willing lo
play suppoiling pails, lhe main buiden and especially lhe lead will have
lo be assumed by a small minoiily. Moie specincally, lhis is oflen likely lo
be lhe laigei membeis of NATO. Bul il can by no means be assumed lhal
lhey will always be ieady lo play such a iole.
The laigel slale may be fai fiom a pushovei, and il may nol always be
possible lo secuie compliance lhiough a bombing campaign lhal, in
human leims, is moie oi less cosl fiee. Should lhe inleiveneis` casuallies
mounl, domeslic opposilion lo lhe enleipiise may inciease maikedly.
uile apail fiom lhal, lheie will also be subslanlial nnancial cosls ovei
which domeslic lieasuiies may choke, and polilicians may gel woiiied.
Moving on lo lhe slage when enliy inlo lhe laigel slale has been achieved
on lhe giound, and aiiangemenls insliluled foi lhe pioleclion of lhose on
whose behalf lhe whole aclion has been laken, olhei discouiaging possi-
bililies come inlo view such as local non-coopeialion oi even hoslilily,
lhe indeleiminale lenglh of lhe opeialion, and a concein aboul lying
down mililaiy and olhei iesouices.
Secondly, il is piobable lhal lheie will be diplomalic cosls lo be laken
inlo accounl. Theie aie veiy many slales wilh elhnic minoiilies, and il is
nol haid lo imagine ciicumslances in which a numbei of such gioups
mighl feel lhey aie being veiy pooily liealed by lheii goveinmenls. The
weakei of such slales and lheie a lol of lhose aie likely lo look wilh
an exliemely caulious eye on pioleclive enleipiises of lhe lype lhal, one
bad day, could be used lo lhe deliimenl of lheii own leiiiloiial inlegiily
and polilical independence. l is possible lhal some sliongei slales mighl
also have ieseivalions aboul a developmenl lhal, albeil nol in a physical
mannei, could be used againsl lhem viilually all slales being veiy sen-
silive lo exleinal ciilicism. The meie impiobabilily of any of lhese con-
lingencies would nol much lessen slales` lack of enlhusiasm foi somelhing
lhal could seive as a piecedenl; foieign minisliies have, undeislandably,
a shaip eye foi woisl cases, and aie keenly awaie of lhe wide-ianging
inleinalional iamincalions of lhe piinciple of iecipiocily. Nolwilhsland-
ing, lheiefoie, lhe nne humanilaiian iing lhal ceilain schemes mighl
have, appioval foi lhem mighl nol be coiiespondingly foilhcoming. Iui-
lheimoie, lheie aie polilical consideialions of a moie mundane kind
which could opeiale in lhe same diieclion, in lhe shape of suspicion of
ceilain poweis and gioups (NATO is nol, in much of lhe woild, a nolably
populai body) and debls which could be called in by lhose opposed lo a
pailiculai pio|ecl. The idea of poweiful gioups of slales appoinling lhem-
selves, oi even being appoinled by lhe \N Secuiily Council, as iegional
(oi widei) disciplinaiians will nol necessaiily ieceive a waim welcome in
all quaileis.
Thus, il is lhe singulaiily of whal has happened in ugoslavia, ialhei
lhan ils palh-bieaking polenlial, lhal may be emphasized. Slales may nnd
good giounds foi nol iushing lowaids ils ieplicalion. Calls foi help by lhe
oppiessed in, foi example, Rwanda, Sii Lanka, oi lhe soulhein Sudan
may go unheeded. Of couise, all lhese iemaiks aie hypolhelical. Cases
could well aiise in which none of such caulionaiy consideialions have
sufncienl weighl lo dissuade slales fiom engaging in Kosovo-like aclivily.
Howevei, il is lhoughl lhal lhey caiiy a faii amounl of conviclion. Ac-
coidingly, il should nol be loo ieadily assumed lhal lhe dawn of a new eia
in lhe pioleclion of human iighls is imminenl.
Conclusion
Kosovo can haidly fail lo make an indelible maik on lhe conlexl of legal
ideas wilhin which inleinalional ielalions aie conducled. Al lhe level of
docliine, lhe noim of non-inleivenlion will veiy possibly undeigo a ie-
foimulalion al lhe hands of some publicisls and polilicians. The ievised
veision is likely lo add claiily and weighl lo lhe asseilion lhal lhe foiceful
infiingemenl of a slale`s soveieign iighl of domeslic |uiisdiclion is pei-
milled in iesponse lo lhe gioss bieach of human iighls. Bul lhal veision
may nol be ovei-enlhusiaslically ieceived in olhei compaiable quaileis,
so lhal geneial agieemenl on il having become pail of cuslomaiy inlei-
nalional law will piobably be al leasl delayed.
l does nol necessaiily follow lhal a limiled docliinal developmenl will
have a coiiespondingly limiled impacl on piaclice. Slales will in fuluie be
awaie lhal lhe iighl of domeslic |uiisdiclion has losl al leasl a lillle of ils
pieviously hallowed chaiaclei and has become a bil moie condilional on
a bellei slandaid of inleinal behavioui. Ioi lheii pail, possible inlei-
veneis will have giealei conndence in lheii legal iighl lo lhiow a biidge
ovei lhe moal of soveieign iighls, behind which lhe domeslic goings-on
of slales have liadilionally been shelleied. Allhough, lheiefoie, wilhoul
lhe comfoil and encouiagemenl of a geneially accepled ievision of lhe
non-inleivenlion noim, aclion of lhe kind laken in Kosovo could well be
launched weie ioughly similai ciicumslances lo aiise. Such ciicumslances
may nol be lacking, bul opeialions along lhe lines of lhe one ielaling lo
Kosovo may nol, foi polilical and slialegic ieasons, oflen be embaiked
upon in lhe immediale fuluie.
Al lhe level of piaclice, lheiefoie, developmenls aie unlikely lo be al
all diamalic, which will fuilhei delay lhe widespiead acknowledgemenl
of a ieshaped noim. The Kosovo ciisis has undoubledly inlioduced some
change inlo lhe widei woild bul nol much.
rt ix
ypinionD mediD ivil soiety
22
Analogies al wai: The \niled
Slales, lhe conicl in Kosovo,
and lhe uses of hisloiy
Ccorgc C. Hcrring
Iveiy wai is conducled in lhe shadow of ils piedecessois,`` lhe Ncw
York Tincs obseived on 18 Apiil 1999, and lhe conicl in Kosovo is no
exceplion.``1 ndeed, fiom lhe slail lo lhe nnish of NATO`s 78-day wai
againsl Slobodan Milosevic`s Seibia, hisloiical analogies weie exlensively
employed by Ameiicans in public discouise lo suppoil lheii posilions,
bolh by lhose who waged lhe wai and by lhose who opposed eilhei ils
puipose oi ils melhods.
Thal lhis is lhe case should come as no suipiise, as lhe Tincs ediloiial
suggesls, foi in all of Ameiica`s iecenl wais hisloiy has played a key iole
in deleimining policy choices and selling lhe policies chosen. Duiing lhe
193Os, foi example, billei memoiies of \S pailicipalion in lhe Iiisl
Woild Wai led Congiess lo pass a seiies of Neulialily Acls lhal weie
designed lo keep lhe nalion oul of a second woild wai. The lessons of lhe
193Os in luin became an essenlial pail of lhe convenlional wisdom of lhe
posl-Second Woild Wai eia. Duiing lhe 195Os and 196Os, memoiies of
appeasemenl, especially Biilish and Iiench effoils lo accommodale Hillei
al lhe Munich confeience of 1938, decisively inuenced Ameiica`s deci-
sions lo launch a policy of global conlainmenl of communism and lo iesisl
communisl aggiession`` in Koiea in 195O and subsequenlly in \ielnam.
As uen Ioong Khong has shown, moieovei, lhe successful conlainmenl
of communisl expansion in Koiea belween 195O and 1953 became a
poweiful deleiminanl of Ameiican policy in \ielnam, shaping nol only
lhe decision lo inleivene wilh \S combal foices in 1965 bul also lhe way
lhe wai was foughl.2
347
As Munich was lhe walchwoid foi lhe geneialion of lhe Second Woild
Wai, \ielnam became lhe walchwoid foi lhe nexl geneialion. The veiy
woid \ielnam`` became an emolive,`` hisloiian Michael Howaid ob-
seived, a leim foi lhis geneialion as Munich` oi Peail Haiboi` was foi
lhe lasl.``3 Iiom lhe Angolan ciisis of 1975 lo Lebanon and Cenlial
Ameiica in lhe l98Os lo lhe Peisian Gulf Wai and lhe Balkan ciises of lhe
199Os, analogies weie iepealedly diawn wilh \ielnam. The so-called
\ielnam syndiome evoked poweiful and somelimes conliadicloiy images
and bioughl foilh conicling lessons. On lhe one side, libeials and iadi-
cals issued diie wainings againsl inleivenlion in silualions even iemolely
iesembling \ielnam. On lhe olhei, conseivalives insisled lhal inlei-
venlions be conducled in a swifl and oveiwhelming mannei lo avoid any
possibilily of a quagmiie and lo ensuie vicloiy.4
The Peisian Gulf Wai of 1991 fused lhe piedominanl analogies. n
opposing Saddam Hussein`s seizuie of Kuwail, Piesidenl Geoige Bush
invoked memoiies of Hillei and Munich. n waging wai againsl iaq, lhe
\niled Slales sel oul delibeialely and self-consciously lo coiiecl mislakes
allegedly made in \ielnam, avoiding giadualed escalalion and mobilizing
massive foices lo win quickly and decisively. This will nol be anolhei
\ielnam,`` Bush iepealedly insisled. ndeed, such has been lhe peiva-
siveness of lhe use of hisloiical analogy by \S policy makeis lhal scholai
Slanley Hoffmann has idenlined il as pail of an Ameiican nalional
slyle.``5
Thal lhis is so again should nol suipiise us. l is naluial foi people and
nalions lo leain fiom pasl expeiiences, especially lhose lhal aie iecenl
and painful. When faced wilh a new silualion, lhey inslinclively luin lo
memoiy lo make sense of il. Which evenl lhey invoke depends on lhe
ease wilh which il can be iecalled. Those lhal occui duiing an individual`s
polilical coming of age appeai lo be lhe mosl ieliievable and lheiefoie
lhe mosl inuenlial, and evenls lhal seem on lhe suiface mosl compai-
able lo piesenl dilemmas aie also among lhose lhal come mosl easily lo
mind. Once people luin lo hisloiy foi guidance, lhey use analogies lo
fiame lhe issues lhey face, assess lhe slakes, deleimine choices among
vaiious oplions, eslablish moial guideposls, and wain of dangeis. Ana-
logies aie also exlensively employed, of couise, lo |uslify policies chosen.
Reseaich has shown lhal lhey have iemaikable slaying powei, ielaining
lheii inuence even when vigoiously challenged.6
Those scholais who have examined lhe phenomenon also conclude lhal
moie oflen lhan nol hisloiy is used badly in choosing and |uslifying poli-
cies. l is geneially agieed, foi example, lhal lhe Neulialily Acls shaiply
ciicumsciibed lhe \S iesponse lo 1apanese and Geiman aggiession in lhe
193Os. Ho Chi Minh was nol Hillei, and lhose who ciilicize \S involve-
menl in \ielnam single oul lhe misapplicalion of lhe Munich analogy as
348 OPNON, MIDA, C\L SOCIT
one of lhe ma|oi ieasons foi lhe de ba` cle. Success in lhe Gulf Wai had
moie lo do wilh lhe ciicumslances of lhal conicl lhan wilh lhe validily
and value of lessons leained fiom \ielnam.7
Like lheii piedecessois, lhose Ameiican leadeis who inilialed and
waged lhe wai in Kosovo ielied heavily on hisloiy. Wilhoul access lo
iecoids of inleinal delibeialions, il is impossible lo know lhe exlenl lo
which analogy was used in fiaming and making choices, bul lhe feivoui
and fiequency wilh which hisloiy was invoked in defence of such policies
suggesl lhal il played bolh ioles.8
Among all lhe analogies used publicly, lhe iefeience lo lhe Second
Woild Wai was mosl peivasive. The wai in Kosovo was somelimes called
Madeleine`s Wai`` foi lhe piesumably ciucial iole \S Secielaiy of Slale
Madeleine Albiighl played in ils oiigins, and foi Albiighl lhe Second
Woild Wai was unqueslionably a decisive inuence. The daughlei of a
Czech diplomal who had opposed Hillei`s aggiession, lhe Secielaiy as a
child had baiely escaped lhe Nazi occupalion of Czechoslovakia. She had
ielalives who weie viclims of lhe Holocausl, and lhe Munich confeience
of 1938 led diieclly lo lhe exlinclion of hei nalive counliy. l was lheie-
foie naluial foi hei lo invoke Munich, lhe Second Woild Wai, and lhe
Holocausl in advocaling a lough line in lhe Balkan ciises of lhe 199Os.
My mind-sel is Munich,`` she pioclaimed on numeious occasions, and
hisloiical memoiy and hei own peisonal expeiience impiessed on hei lhe
essenlialily of a haid line againsl Seibian elhnic cleansing.`` She came lo
see \S inleivenlion in lhe Kosovo ciisis as lhe denning mission`` of
poslCold Wai Ameiica. n an adminislialion lhal giew up gun-shy by
ieading and misieading lhe lessons of \ielnam, she`s lhe one who giew
up appeasemenl-shy by leaining in painfully peisonal ways lhe lessons of
Munich.`` ndeed, she believed lhal hei mosl impoilanl iole was lo ie-
sliain lhose ofncials who appeaied willing lo accepl peace al lhe expense
of piinciple. Wheie do you lhink we aie, Munich?`` she snapped on one
occasion.9
Allhough of a veiy diffeienl geneialion and mindsel, Piesidenl Bill
Clinlon boughl inlo lhe analogy of lhe Second Woild Wai, al leasl in lhe
public defence of his policies. n one of his nisl speeches aflei inilialing
lhe bombing of ugoslavia, he wained lisleneis lhal lhe Iiisl and Second
Woild Wais had bolh begun in lhe Balkans (he was quickly coiiecled, of
couise, iegaiding lhe lallei). He oflen invoked lhe Munich analogy.
Whal if someone had lislened lo Winslon Chuichill and slood up lo
Adolf Hillei eailiei?`` he asked on one occasion. How many people`s
lives mighl have been saved? And how many Ameiican lives mighl have
been saved?`` He compaied lhe foiced exodus of Albanians fiom Kosovo
lo lhe Holocausl. He can`l loleiale lhe lhoughl of lhal happening on his
walch and doing nolhing aboul il,`` an aide ievealed.10
ANALOGIS AT WAR 349
Ioi Clinlon and some of his adviseis, lhe moie iecenl Bosnian ciisis
of 1995 ieinfoiced lhe lessons of lhe Second Woild Wai. Ceilain lhal
NATO`s bombing of Seib posilions in Augusl and Seplembei of lhal yeai
had foiced Milosevic lo lhe confeience lable in Daylon, Clinlon appai-
enlly concluded lhal a shoil aeiial campaign could do lhe same in
Kosovo. ndeed, he lalei conceded lhal he had believed lhal lheie was
maybe a 5O chance lhal il |lhe waij would be ovei in a week.``11
Ameiica`s NATO allies |oined lhe Clinlon adminislialion in using
images fiom Munich and lhe Holocausl lo |uslify lhe wai. Iiench Piesi-
denl 1acques Chiiac pioclaimed lhal |ljhe spiiil of Munich, isolalionism
and compiomising have nevei lefl anylhing bul misfoilune,`` a posilion
Biilish Piime Minislei Tony Blaii endoised. Geiman Ioieign Minislei
1oschka Iischei, an anli-wai waiiioi fiom lhe 196Os and membei of lhe
Gieen Paily, agieed: leained nol only No Moie Wai,` bul also No
Moie Auschwilz,` `` he claimed.12
f lhe Second Woild Wai laughl Clinlon and his adviseis lhe necessily
of going lo wai, il was lhe moie iecenl and foi mosl of lhem peisonally
moie seaiing expeiience of \ielnam lhal diclaled how lhey would nghl.
Kosovo was lhe nisl wai foughl by lhe \ielnam geneialion and as such il
alliacled much allenlion fiom analysls. Clinlon and many of his lop aides
had piolesled againsl lhal wai. They had seen ils effecls on lhe body
polilic, lhe damage il inicled on lhe adminislialions of Lyndon 1ohnson
and Richaid Nixon, and ils neai desliuclion of lhe Democialic Paily.
They weie haunled by ils memoiies. \ielnam lefl lhem wilh an abiding
feai of lhe dangeis of giadual escalalion and especially of gelling lioops
bogged down in confusing and inliaclable polilical silualions in sliange
and dislanl lands.
Memoiies of \ielnam, ieinfoiced by lhe adminislialion`s own Oclobei
1993 de ba` cle in Somalia when Ameiican Gs weie diagged lhiough lhe
slieels of Mogadishu, fed lhe conviclion lhal wilh lhe nisl casuallies lhe
public would demand lhal lhe lioops be bioughl home. Thus, lo ieassuie
a piesumably anxious public and lo minimize lhe polilical iisks lo his
adminislialion, Clinlon deleimined lo iely on aii powei. Giound foices
would nol be used. To lhe dismay of some commenlalois, lhe piesidenl al
lhe slail of lhe wai even publicly announced lhal do nol inlend lo pul
oui lioops in Kosovo lo nghl a wai.``13
Allhough Clinlon delibeialely sel oul lo avoid lhe mislakes of \iel-
nam, in lhe nisl weeks of lhe wai in Kosovo |ouinalisls fiequenlly com-
paied him lo Lyndon 1ohnson. Bolh weie soulheineis foi whom, il was
said, foieign affaiis weie an unwelcome inliusion on lhe domeslic piioi-
ilies lhey held mosl deai. Bolh appeaied lo have an unwaiianled failh in
aii powei. Like his Democialic piedecessoi, Clinlon seemed lo iniliale
lhe bombing wilhoul a cleai idea of wheie he was going, and, like 1ohn-
35O OPNON, MIDA, C\L SOCIT
son, he mighl soon discovei lhal bombing had become an aigumenl foi
commilling giound lioops. The likely failuie of aii powei in Kosovo, as in
\ielnam, would leave an unhappy choice belween escalalion and fius-
lialion. Bolh men peisonalized lheii wais, LB1 pilling himself againsl Ho
Chi Minh, Clinlon againsl Milosevic. Clinlon, like 1ohnson, faced lhe
piospecl lhal an unwelcome and unwanled wai could be his polilical
undoing. U.S. Ncws & VorlJ Rcport posed lhe pioblem in leims of a
piofoundly iionic queslion: s a piesidenl who began his polilical caieei
opposing 1ohnson`s \ielnam Wai now slailing a \ielnam-slyle wai him-
self?``14 Clinlon appaienlly shaied and was inuenced by such conceins,
admilling lo CBS news anchoi Dan Ralhei lhal |ljhe lhing lhal bolheis
me mosl aboul inlioducing giound lioops . . . is lhe piospecl of nevei
being able lo gel lhem oul.``15
Iiom lhe slail of lhe wai in Kosovo, lhose who opposed ils puiposes oi
lhe way il was being foughl shaiply challenged lhe adminislialion`s ana-
logies. Ciilics fiom bolh lhe polilical iighl and lefl iaised seaiching ques-
lions aboul lhe compaiisons wilh lhe Second Woild Wai. Iuiope was
now uniled ialhei lhan divided, lhey aveiied, and lheie was lillle dangei
of a geneial wai as in 1939. Howevei evil he mighl be, Milosevic was
no Hillei and he lacked lhe means lo conquei Iuiope. Wiiling in Thc
Nation, polilical scienlisl Slephen Cohen aigued lhal lhe compaiison of
Milosevic`s assaull on lhe Kosovais wilh Hillei`s desliuclion of lhe 1ews
wanlonly debases lhe hisloiical iealily and memoiy of lhe Holocausl;
Milosevic`s ieign of leiioi has luined mosl Kosovais inlo iefugees eeing
lowaid sancluaiies; Hillei gave Iuiope`s 1ews no exil and luined lhem
inlo ash.`` n lhal same magazine, Ben|amin Schwaiz concuiied lhal
such a compaiison liivializes liuly genocidal campaigns.`` Schwaiz also
woiked backwaid in iecenl hisloiy lo challenge lhe Munich analogy`s
conclusion lhal slanding up lo aggiession would delei aggiessois. Milo-
sevic had nol been inlimidaled by lhe Gulf Wai, he noled, Saddam Hus-
sein by Ameiican inleivenlion in Panama, Manuel Noiiega by \S inlei-
venlion in Gienada, oi Ho Chi Minh by lhe wai in Koiea. A misplaced
obsession wilh ciedibilily,`` he concluded, will doom lhe \niled Slales
lo a sliing of mililaiy inleivenlions in slialegically peiipheial iegions.``16
Those who ciilicized lhe adminislialion`s handling of lhe wai em-
ployed analogies of lheii own. The one hisloiical lesson lhal eveiyone
seemed lo agiee upon libeials and conseivalives, suppoileis and oppo-
nenls of lhe wai, and ciilics of lhe way il was being foughl was lhal
bombing by ilself would nol achieve NATO`s goals. Wailime London,
Ho Chi Minh and Saddam Hussein weie pioof lhal massive bombing
does nol necessaiily eiode lhe will of a deleimined foe,`` Canada`s
Mac1cans magazine insisled. Assuming lhal high-allilude bombing
can woik alone is ahisloiical,`` Ncwswcck`s 1onalhan Allei concuiied.
ANALOGIS AT WAR 351
Ilying Ioiliesses and Wellinglon bombeis haidly pul a ciimp inlo Gei-
many`s wai-making polenlial, noi did lhey sepaiale lhe \olk fiom lheii
Iu hiei,`` Tinc noled. Ho Chi Minh pievailed, and aflei 3O,OOO soilies in
lhe Gulf Wai, il was Geneial Schwailzkopf`s boys on lhe giound who
diove Saddam`s Aimy fiom Kuwail.`` Iven lhe \ielnamese gol in on lhe
analogizing aboul lhe bombing: \ielnam is veiy pooi bul we beal lhe
Ameiicans,`` a woikei pioudly obseived. Kosovo can do lhe same.``17
Ciilics of lhe wai fiom bolh iighl and lefl also issued diie wainings
based on lhe veiy \ielnam analogy lhal diove lhe adminislialion lo nghl
as il did. They aie going lo come home in body bags, and lhey will be
killed in a wai lhal Congiess has nol declaied,`` wained Republican
Senaloi Robeil Bennell of \lah, in a nol so veiled allusion lo \ielnam.
Ciilics poinled lo lhe dangeis of giadual escalalion and a slep-by-slep
descenl inlo lhe quagmiie.`` As lhe wai exlended inlo lhe spiing of 1999,
memoiies of \ielnam loomed laigei. Was il woilh il lo slay in \ielnam
lo save face?`` queslioned Republican Tom DeLay (Texas), suggesling al
leasl by implicalion lhe possibilily of wilhdiawal. The conseivalive
Washinglon Tincs accused Clinlon of ignoiing lhe caulionaiy lessons``
of \ielnam and embaiking on a mililaiy misadvenluie lhal would have
given Lyndon 1ohnson lhe sweals.`` f any cleai lesson emeiges fiom
\ielnam,`` added Thc Nation`s Schwaiz, il is lhal il makes no sense lo
compound a mislake by digging oneself moie deeply inlo a slialegic
moiass.``18
Iiom lhe lefl, \ielnam Wai pioleslois Howaid Zinn and Tom Hayden
soughl lo use lessons fiom lhal conicl lo ially a new anli-wai ciusade.
We leained fiom \ielnam lhal lhe iulhlessness of leadeis, lhe slupidily
of expeils,` musl be counleied by lhe couiage, good sense, and peisis-
lence of lhe cilizeniy,`` Zinn noled. Hayden called upon libeials lo do as
lhey had in \ielnam abandon lheii suppoil foi a blundei`` and foice
lheii leadeis lo make peace.19
Aiizona Senaloi and Republican piesidenlial candidale 1ohn McCain
had similai conceins aboul a \ielnam-like quagmiie, bul he diew veiy
diffeienl conclusions. McCain suppoiled lhe wai`s puiposes, bul con-
demned lhe adminislialion`s melhods. As a piisonei of wai, he had ob-
seived lhe \ielnam conicl fiom a cell in lhe noloiious Hanoi Hillon,
and he invoked hisloiy lo wain of lhe folly of half-measuies. ou don`l
gel inlo a conicl unless you aie willing lo exeicise all means necessaiy lo
winning il,`` he insisled, ailiculaling yel anolhei \ielnam analogy. He
condemned lhe adminislialion`s giadual escalalion of lhe bombing and
ils iefusal lo employ giound lioops, mislakes made, he claimed, in
almosl wilful ignoiance of eveiy lesson we leained fiom \ielnam.``
An aclive duly Aii Ioice geneial concuiied wilh McCain`s ciilicism of
half-measuies. We`ve also seen lhal play,`` he wained. l was called
\ielnam. The liouble is, we also know how lhe lasl acl goes il sucks.``
Numeious ieliied and aclive duly mililaiy ofnceis ieinvoked lhe Powell
Docliine, named foi lhe foimei chaiiman of lhe 1oinl Chiefs of Slaff,
Geneial Colin Powell, and ilself a lesson of \ielnam: when a nalion goes
lo wai il musl mobilize all available foices in puisuil of quick and decisive
vicloiy.20
The analogy-nlled debale on lhe wai pioduced some fascinaling iole
ieveisals and some exliaoidinaiily sliange bedfellows. Peihaps wilh a
sense of iiony, moie likely wilh an eye foi pailisan mischief, conseivalive
Senale Ma|oiily Leadei Tienl Loll (Mississippi) inloned lhe old anli-wai
chanl, Give peace a chance,`` while foimei Republican hawks insisled
lhal lhe adminislialion should seek congiessional appioval foi lhe wai.
We have lo become involved,`` one noled. f we don`l . . . lhen weìe
going lo see somelhing much woise lhan whal we saw in \ielnam.``
Democialic foimei doves who had once asseiled congiessional pieiog-
alives now insisled lhal lhe piesidenl`s hands musl nol be lied. Michigan
Democial David Bonioi, a foimei 1esuil seminaiian who had opposed
lhe Peisian Gulf Wai, invoked lhe Second Woild Wai analogy and
wained lhal |wje simply cannol and will nol lel lhe woisl of hisloiy
iepeal ilself.``21
Such ieveisals can pailly be explained by pailisanship, of couise, bul
somelhing much deepei was also al woik. Numeious doves who had
opposed lhe \ielnam Wai on moial giounds concluded in lhe 199Os lhal
Ameiican powei musl be used lo piomole good and combal evil in lhe
woild. They vigoiously suppoiled Ameiican mililaiy inleivenlion in lhe
Balkans and chafed al lhe adminislialion`s caulion. These so-called
compassion waiiiois`` oi libeial hawks`` |oined conseivalive ciusadeis
such as William Kiislol who had long advocaled lhe use of Ameiican
powei lo impose a benevolenl hegemony`` on lhe globe. Wilh lhe end of
lhe Cold Wai, on lhe olhei hand, some conseivalive hawks who had
suppoiled Ameiica`s global wai againsl communism losl lheii aidoui foi
inleivenlion in places wheie Ameiica`s vilal inleiesls did nol seem lo be
involved, embiacing lhe same non-inleivenlionisl posilion as Zinn and
Hayden, allhough foi veiy diffeienl ieasons.22
Iven sophislicaled commenlalois, who ie|ecled many of lhe analogies
being lossed aboul by all sides and queslioned lhe value of analogy,
ended up falling back on analogy lhemselves. A Ncw York Tincs edi-
loiialisl wained lhal hisloiical conlexls change, and lhal affecls lhe nl of
old analogies lo new ciicumslances,`` bul wenl on lo say lhal hisloiy did
leach enduiing liulhs.`` Woild Wai did show lhal maniacal diclalois
aie besl ciushed eaily. \ielnam laughl us lhal il can be a ciiminal acl lo
send lioops inlo combal wilhoul lhe suppoil of lhe Ameiican people and
Congiess.`` A lillle hisloiy can be a dangeious lhing,`` Ncwswcck`s Allei
ANALOGIS AT WAR 353
obseived, especially if il is supeiimposed on a new and complex sel of
ciicumslances.`` el he also wenl on lo insisl lhal analogies weie es-
senlial lo chailing lhe wisesl couise. The challenge is lo sliike an imagi-
nalive balance, like a posl modein ailisl picking and choosing fiom slyles
of lhe pasl.`` Had Clinlon used hisloiy bellei, Allei concluded, he mighl
have leained lhal aii powei is besl employed in suppoil of giound lioops
and lhal Milosevic would nghl haidei lo hold on lo Kosovo, foi 6OO yeais
a symbol of Seibian nalionalism.23
Hisloiical analogy lhus played an impoilanl pail in bolh Ameiica`s
conducl of and debale ovei lhe wai in Kosovo. l seems ceilain lhal
memoiies of lhe Second Woild Wai and \ielnam exeiled signincanl
inuence bolh on lhe decision lo go lo wai and on lhe way lhe wai was
waged. mages fiom Munich and lhe Holocausl weie used lo mobilize
suppoil, and imageiy fiom \ielnam was employed lo dium up opposilion
lo lhe wai oi al leasl lo lhe way il was being foughl. n each of lhese
cases, invoking lhe pasl peimilled spokespeople lo avoid delicale con-
lempoiaiy issues on which lheie was no consensus and lo develop a
compelling ialionale foi aclion. The analogies mighl have exeiled giealei
inuence had lhey been agieed upon. Reseaich has indicaled lhal ana-
logies have lhe giealesl inuence wheie lheie is a consensus on whal lhey
should be, and in lhe wai in Kosovo lhis was decidedly nol lhe case.24
Analogies and lessons weie vigoiously conlesled, and lhe facl lhal lhey
weie al wai wilh each olhei mosl likely limiled lheii impacl.
This biief suivey of lhe iole of analogy in lhe Kosovo conicl also
suggesls lhe all-loo-obvious conclusion lhal hisloiy was no bellei used
heie lhan in pievious wais. As ciilics poinled oul, lhe analogies fiom
which lessons weie diawn weie al besl inexacl. The Iuiope of 1939 was
nol lhe Iuiope of 6O yeais lalei; Milosevic was nol Hillei. Balkan elhnic
cleansing boie ceilain supeincial similaiilies lo lhe Holocausl, especially
in lhe biulal iemoval of people fiom lheii homes and lheii being lians-
poiled by iail. Bul lhe analogy was fundamenlally misleading,`` as one
ciilic poinled oul, in lhal lhe Holocausl involved a syslemalic piogiamme
of biological exleiminalion based on iacisl beliefs, wheieas elhnic cleans-
ing involved lhe mass iemoval of populalions facililaled by violence.25
Clinlon`s conducl of lhe wai in Kosovo also had ceilain supeincial simi-
laiilies lo 1ohnson`s handling of \ielnam bul, in leims of lhe inleina-
lional conlexl in which lhe lwo wais weie foughl, lheii inleinal dynamics,
and lhe way lhey weie waged, lhey weie signincanlly diffeienl.26
Some of lhe lessons`` used lo fiame policy and pioclaimed so vig-
oiously by vaiious sides lhioughoul lhe wai weie based on hisloiical
givens`` lhal can nevei be pioven. Since lhe 193Os, il has been an ailicle
of failh in lhe Wesl lhal a loughei sland againsl Hillei and lhe 1apanese
would have pievenled lhe Second Woild Wai. Such a conclusion cannol
be pioven, howevei, and musl iesl on assumplion and suimise alone.
Those Ameiicans such as Senaloi McCain and Geneial Powell who pio-
claim as \ielnam`s cenlial lesson lhe necessily of mobilizing ovei-
whelming powei in puisuil of vicloiy assume lhal such an appioach
would have woiked in \ielnam and will woik elsewheie. Such aigumenls
aie also al besl debalable.
n lhose cases wheie hisloiical lessons weie applied, lhey pioduced al
besl mixed iesulls. n concluding fiom lhe Bosnian expeiience of 1995
lhal a biief aii campaign would foice Milosevic lo lhe confeience lable,
Clinlon badly miscalculaled. The ciicumslances al lhe lime lhe bombing
began diffeied signincanlly belween Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999.
n lhe eailiei case, lhe bombing seems lo have woiked because lhe Seibs
had alieady gained much of whal lhey wanled mililaiily and because ie-
cenl enemy advances lhiealened lheii holdings. On Kosovo, in conliasl,
Milosevic appeais lo have been much moie ieluclanl lo give in because
of ils hisloiical and culluial impoilance lo Seibia and because of lhe im-
poilance in his own iise lo powei of his piomise lo piolecl lhe Seibs in
Kosovo.
Clinlon`s iefusal lo employ giound lioops may have avoided a
\ielnam-like quagmiie and ensuied public suppoil foi lhe duialion of lhe
wai. Along wilh his ieliance on aii powei, howevei, il pioduced heavy
human cosls, giving Milosevic bolh lhe oppoilunily and lhe pielexl lo
diive lhe Kosovais fiom lheii homeland. And such caulion may have
been unnecessaiy. Like lhe Munich analogy, nolions aboul public inlol-
eiance foi casuallies aie based laigely on suimise. The Ameiican public
in facl loleialed heavy casuallies in \ielnam foi many yeais. The ieaclion
lo lhe Somalian de ba` cle may have had a lol moie lo do wilh lhe muiki-
ness of \S goals and lhe clumsy execulion of lhe iescue opeialion lhan
wilh lhe facl of inleivenlion. Theie is some evidence lo suggesl lhal lhe
Ameiican public may be moie willing lo accepl casuallies wheie lhe im-
poilance of lhe inleivenlion is demonslialed lhan lhe piesenl conven-
lional wisdom seems lo indicale.27
The one lesson lhal appeais lo have been validaled conceins lhe limils
of aii powei so loudly pioclaimed by ciilics of lhe Clinlon adminis-
lialion`s handling of lhe wai. To be suie, lhe dislinguished mililaiy his-
loiian 1ohn Keegan pioclaimed 1une 1999 a lime lo iedenne how vic-
loiy in wai may be won,`` hailing a vicloiy foi aiipowei and aiipowei
alone`` and a new woild oidei in which despols could be bioughl lo bay
wilhoul casuallies.28 Olheis disagieed. The bombing undoubledly helped
gel lhe Seibs oul of Kosovo and made possible lhe evenlual ieluin of lhe
elhnic Albanians. Bul lhis success came al a veiy high cosl. Iaily esli-
males of lhe cosl of lhe wai lo lhe \niled Slales ian lo aiound \S$2.3
billion, nol lhe soil of lhing even a supeipowei can affoid lo do on a
ANALOGIS AT WAR 355
iegulai basis. The bombing did nol pievenl expulsion of lhe Albanians
fiom Kosovo al lhe slail of lhe wai oi lhe muidei of lhousands of Koso-
vais, and lhe ieliance on aii powei may have conliibuled lo lhese iesulls.
Thus, as Geneial Beinaid Tiainoi obseived, NATO`s casually-fiee wai
luined a piinciple of lhe |usl wai on ils head, civilians being pul al iisk lo
keep waiiiois oul of haim`s way.29 The bombing appeais lo have done
minimal damage lo lhe Seib aimy. Noi does il seem lo have been lhe
decisive facloi in Milosevic`s decision lo negoliale. Some expeils specu-
laled lhal lhe lhieal of a NATO giound wai and especially Russian
abandonmenl of lhe Seibs, as much as lhe pounding fiom lhe aii, led lo
lhe peace agieemenl. And, of couise, al lhe end of lhe wai, Milosevic
iemained in powei. Connimalion of aii powei`s limils appeais lo have
been lhe exceplion, howevei. Ilsewheie lhe lessons applied in lhe wai
misled as much as lhey guided and pioduced iesulls lhal weie bolh un-
anlicipaled and baneful.
Noi does il seem likely lhal lhe wai will achieve whal ils pioponenls
claimed as one of ils essenlial aims lhe deleiience of fuluie aggiessois.
n ils immediale afleimalh, lheie was speculalion aboul a new Clinlon
Docliine, a waining lo lyianls and human iighls abuseis lhal lhe full
weighl of \S powei mighl be bioughl lo beai againsl lhem. Thal such a
docliine will in facl be implemenled seems al besl unceilain. Thal il will
be effeclive seems unlikely. Tomoiiow`s despols seem no moie likely lo
be deleiied by lhis wai lhan olheis weie by eailiei wais and inlei-
venlions. Such conclusions assume a level of ialionalily and cosliisk
analysis lhal does nol appeai lo diive lhe aclions of olhei peoples. n-
deed, some analysls have speculaled lhal lhe wai in Kosovo mighl cause
giealei pioblems by leading diclalois and iogue slales lo luin lo nucleai
oi chemical weapons lo piolecl lhemselves. To lhe exlenl lhal aii powei
woiked in Kosovo, moieovei, il may nol be ieplicable in aieas such as
Afiica wheie waifaie is slill a guy undei a liee wilh an AK-47.``30
The conclusion, again obvious, is lhal lhe use of hisloiical analogy in
lhe making of foieign policy is al besl misleading, al woisl fundamenlally
awed. Such ieasoning commils al leasl lwo of lhe melhodological eiiois
ciled by David Hackell Iischei in his book Historians Iallacics. The nisl
is whal Iischei calls lhe fallacy of lhe peifecl analogy, lhe eiioneous
infeience fiom lhe facl lhal A and B aie similai in some iespecls lo lhe
false conclusion lhal lhey aie lhe same in all iespecls.`` To pul il in plain
leims, hisloiy does nol iepeal ilself. Iach hisloiical silualion is unique,
and il is dangeious lo make supeincial compaiisons. Iffoils lo leain fiom
hisloiical analogies also exemplify whal Iischei calls lhe didaclic fal-
lacy,`` lhe exliaclion of specinc lessons fiom one hisloiical silualion and
lhe lileial applicalion of lhem lo conlempoiaiy pioblems wilhoul iegaid
lo diffeiences in lime, space, and ciicumslances.31
As many hisloiians have obseived ovei and ovei again, lheie aie ways
olhei lhan analogy lhal lheii discipline can be bellei used in addiessing
conlempoiaiy issues. The so-called lessons of hisloiy do nol leach you
lo do lhis oi lhal now,`` hisloiian Geoige Illon once wiole, lhey leach
you lo lhink moie deeply, moie complelely, and on lhe basis of an enoi-
mously enlaiged expeiience aboul whal il may be possible oi desiiable
lo do now.``32 f nolhing else, decision makeis and lhe allenlive public
mighl bellei use hisloiy lo enlighlen lhemselves aboul aieas and people
wilh whom lhey musl deal. This is pailiculaily impoilanl, Iinesl May and
Richaid Neusladl have aigued, in cases wheie lhey aie dealing wilh
people whose age, sex, iace, nalionalily, oi beliefs aie diffeienl fiom oui
own.``33
Like no olhei discipline, moieovei, hisloiy can piovide lhe essenlial
peispeclive wilhoul which undeislanding is impossible. Al ils simplesl
level, lhis involves nolhing moie lhan laking an issue oi pioblem back lo
ils beginnings lo deleimine how il oiiginaled and evolved. This is an ob-
vious lhing lo do, lo be suie, bul il is sliiking how infiequenlly il appeais
lo be done in inleinal delibeialions on policy issues. The media, which
aie noloiiously myopic and ahisloiical, piovide lillle help in lhis iegaid,
iaiely offeiing lhe soil of hisloiical conlexl foi loday`s issues lhal is so
despeialely needed. el lo acl wilhoul such peispeclive can somelimes
be deadly. Hisloiy is essenlial lo claiify lhe conlexl in which conlempo-
iaiy pioblems exisl.
l seems likely, howevei, human naluie being whal il is, lhal policy
makeis will conlinue lo fall back on analogy in making decisions and
piomoling lheii policies. This being lhe case, May and Neusladl have
pioposed lhal, as pail of lhe policy-making piocess, seemingly analogous
silualions be examined syslemalically lo deleimine whal is in facl similai
and whal is diffeienl and lheieby peimil policy makeis lo bellei decide
whal, if anylhing, should be leained fiom lhem.34 They aie nol leiiibly
oplimislic aboul lhe iesulls, howevei, and, as uen Ioong Khong has
shown, even in cases wheie lhis has been done lhe iesulls aie nol pie-
diclably bellei. Khong has peisuasively concluded lhal, even when dif-
feiences in hisloiical silualions aie highlighled, policy makeis conlinue lo
emphasize lhe similaiilies while ignoiing lhe diffeiences and conlinue lo
choose analogies lhal suil lheii piedileclions even in lhe face of subslan-
lial evidence lo lhe conliaiy.35 Peihaps lhe besl lhal can be hoped foi is
lhal, as in lhe case of Kosovo, vigoious debale belween compeling les-
sons and on lhe validily of lessons pioclaimed analogies al wai will
pievenl lhem fiom becoming dogma.
f nolhing else, policy makeis and lhe conceined public would do well
lo iecognize lhal peihaps lhe one valid lesson of hisloiy is lo view all
lessons wilh a heallhy sceplicism. nslead of lelling us lhal ceilain con-
ANALOGIS AT WAR 357
dilions can be shown fiom pasl expeiience lo lead lo ceilain assuied
consequences,`` Illon has aigued, hisloiy foievei demonsliales lhe un-
expecledness of lhe evenl and so inslills a piopei skeplicism in lhe face of
all lhose vasl and univeisal claims.``36 The chief piaclical use of his-
loiy,`` 1ames Biyce obseived many yeais ago, is lo delivei us fiom
plausible hisloiical analogy.``37
Acknowledgemenls
My lhanks lo Keely 1ones foi hei invaluable assislance in lhe ieseaich foi
lhis ailicle.
Noles
2. See Iinesl R. May, ''1cssons oj thc Iast. Thc Usc anJ Misusc oj History in Ancrican
Iorcign Iolicy, New oik: Oxfoid \niveisily Piess, 1973; and uen Ioong Khong,
Analogics at Var. Korca, Munich, Dicn Bicn Ihu anJ thc Victnan Dccisions oj 1965,
Piincelon, N1: Piincelon \niveisily Piess, 1992, especially pp. 97147.
3. Michael Howaid, Thc Causcs oj Var, Cambiidge, MA: Haivaid \niveisily Piess, 1983,
p. 45.
4. Geoige C. Heiiing, \ielnam, Ameiican Ioieign Policy, and lhe \ses of Hisloiy,``
Virginia Quartcrly Rcvicw, \ol. 66, Winlei 199O, pp. 116.
5. Khong, Analogics, p. 7.
6. bid., pp. 33, 3637.
7. bid., p. 255.
8. bid., p. 181.
9. Michael Dobbs, Double denlily: Why Madeleine Albiighl Can`l Iscape Hei Pasl,``
Ncw Yorkcr, 29 Maich 1999, pp. 5O57; The Good Soldiei,`` Ncwswcck, 19 Apiil 1999,
pp. 3738; Madeleine`s Wai,`` Tinc, 17 May 1999, pp. 2629.
1O. uoled in Timolhy Gailon Ash, The New Adolf Hillei?`` Tinc, 5 Apiil 1999, p. 41;
Wai and Remembiance,`` U.S. Ncws & VorlJ Rcport, 12 Apiil 1999, p. 24.
11. Ncw York Tincs, 21 1une 1999.
12. Ncw York Tincs, 18 Apiil 1999; 1oseph 1offe, A Peacenik Goes lo Wai,`` Ncw York
Tincs Maga;inc, 3O May 1999, p. 33.
13. uoled in Ncwswcck, 19 Apiil 1999, p. 25.
14. Bob Davis, Clinlon`s Kosovo Policy Has Ichoes of LB1, \ielnam,`` Vall Strcct
1ournal, 1 Apiil 1999; Michael Baione, Wai and Remembiance,`` U.S. Ncws & VorlJ
Rcport, 12 Apiil 1999, p. 24.
15. uoled in Tinc, 3 May 1999, p. 62.
16. Slephen I. Cohen, Degiading Ameiica,`` Thc Nation, 24 May 1999, p. 19. Ben|amin
Schwaiz, The Case againsl nleivenlion in Kosovo,`` Thc Nation, 19 Apiil 1999,
p. 11.
17. Robeil Lewis, Going lo Wai, wilh No Debale,`` Mac1cans, 5 Apiil 1999, p. 2;
1onalhan Allei, The Tiouble wilh Hisloiy,`` Ncwswcck, 12 Apiil 1999, p. 41; Tinc
Intcrnational, 12 Apiil 1999, p. 45; Ncw York Tincs, 12 Apiil 1999.
18. Ncw York Tincs, 29 Apiil 1999; Washinglon Tincs, 3 May 1999; Schwaiz, The Case
againsl nleivenlion,`` p. 11.
19. Howaid Zinn, A Diplomalic Solulion,`` Thc Irogrcssivc, May 1999, p. 11; Tom
Hayden, The Libeials` Iolly,`` Thc Nation, 24 May 1999, p. 5.
2O. Ncw York Tincs, 4 Apiil 1999; Lexinglon HcralJ-1caJcr, 14 Apiil 1999; Iliza Newlin
Cainey, Al Lasl, Congiess Inleis lhe Wai Zone,`` National 1ournal, 1 May 1999,
p. 117.
21. Ncw York Tincs, 3O May 1999; Paul Slaiobin, The Libeial Hawk Soais,`` National
1ournal, 15 May 1999, p. 131O.
22. Ncw York Tincs, 3O May 1999.
23. Ncw York Tincs, 19 Apiil 1999; Allei, The Tiouble wilh Hisloiy,`` p. 41.
24. Khong, Analogics at Var, pp. 258262.
25. See William Hagen, The Balkans` Lelhal Nalionalism,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, 1ulyjAugusl
1999, pp. 6364.
26. Ioi an oveiblown slalemenl of lhe similaiilies, wilh an admission of lhe ciucial diffei-
ences, see Michael Lind, Victnan. Thc Ncccssary Var, New oik: Iiee Piess, 1999,
pp. ixxi.
27. 1oseph S. Nye, 1i., Redenning lhe Nalional nleiesl,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, 1ulyjAugusl
1999, p. 32. Ameiicans aie ieluclanl lo accepl casuallies,`` Nye obseives, only in cases
wheie lheii only foieign policy goals aie uniecipiocaled humanilaiian inleiesls.``
28. London Daily Tclcgraph, 4 1une 1999.
29. Boslon Clobc, 11 1une 1999.
3O. Ncw York Tincs, 25 1uly 1999.
31. David Hackell Iischei, Historians Iallacics, New oik: Haipei & Row, 197O, pp. 157,
247.
32. G. R. Illon, Reluin lo Issenlials: Reeclions on lhe Piesenl Slale of Hisloiical
Sludy,`` fiom undaled clipping in my possession.
33. Richaid I. Neusladl and Iinesl R. May, Thinking in Tinc. Thc Uscs oj History jor
Dccision Makcrs, New oik: Iiee Piess, 1986, pp. 186195.
34. bid., pp. 3448, 273283.
35. Khong, Analogics at Var, pp. 256257.
36. Illon, Reluin lo Issenlials.``
37. uoled in ibid., p. 251.
ANALOGIS AT WAR 359
23
Media coveiage of lhe wai:
An empiiical assessmenl
Stcvcn 1ivingston
This chaplei exploies lhe impacl of global ieal-lime media on policy de-
velopmenls iegaiding Kosovo. This concein is oflen iefeiied lo as lhe
CNN effecl.`` To whal exlenl, if any, did global, ieal-lime media affecl
lhe conducl of lhe NATO bombing campaign? Though loday Cable News
Nelwoik (CNN) is bul one among a numbei of global news oiganiza-
lions, my analysis will be limiled in lhe main lo CNN ilself, wilh moie
limiled compaialive ieviews offeied of lhe lhiee Ameiican bioadcasl
nelwoiks (CBS, NBC, and ABC) and newspapeis (lhe Ncw York Tincs,
lhe Vashington Iost, and Thc Tincs of London). Time and iesouice
limilalions pievenl a moie inclusive examinalion of vaiious media oullels.
shall begin wilh a biief oveiview of lhe claims associaled wilh lhe CNN
effecl and will lhen ieview lhe iesulls of an empiiical dala analysis and
considei public opinion dynamics conceining lhe wai.
CNN effecls
Whal do we mean when we speak of lhe CNN effecl? Theie aie al leasl
lhiee effecls associaled wilh global ieal-lime media (see lable 23.1).1 Of
lhese lhiee, am mosl inleiesled in lhe impedimenl effecl lhe possible
impacl of picluies on public suppoil foi a desiied policy goal.
shall lake |usl a momenl lo oulline lhe olhei polenlial effecls. The
nisl effecl may be iefeiied lo as lhe agenda-selling funclion of lhe media.
36O
Imolional ieaclions aie al lhe heail of lhe mallei. Cold analylical as-
sessmenls of nalional inleiesl become langled in a web of senlimenlalily.2
By focusing on ceilain conicls and human iighls pioblems (and nol
olheis), lhe media piessuie policy makeis lo iespond lo some foieign
pioblems (and nol olheis). 1oseph S. Nye made lhe poinl lhis way: The
so-called CNN effecl makes il haid lo keep ilems lhal mighl olheiwise
waiianl a lowei piioiily off lhe lop of lhe public agenda.``3 Geoige I.
Kennan piobably made lhe poinl besl in 1992. He wondeied iheloiically
whal explained lhe cleai acceplance al lhe lime of Piesidenl Geoige
Bush`s decision lo send lioops lo Somalia.
Theie can be no queslion lhal lhe ieason foi lhis acceplance lies piimaiily wilh
lhe exposuie of lhe Somalia silualion by lhe Ameiican media, above all, lelevi-
sion. The ieaclion would have been unlhinkable wilhoul lhis exposuie. The
ieaclion was an emolional one, occasioned by lhe sighl of lhe suffeiing of lhe
slaiving people in queslion.4
Whelhei media in facl disloil policy piioiilies iemains sub|ecl lo debale.
Somelhing of a consensus has emeiged in lhe academic communily lhal
lhe abilily of global ieal-lime media lo sel policy agendas has been ovei-
slaled.5 Sleven Livingslon and Todd Iachus found, foi example, lhal lhe
1992 \S inleivenlion in Somalia was in facl as much lhe iesull of pies-
suies emanaling fiom wilhin lhe adminislialion ilself and fiom key
membeis of lhe \S House of Repiesenlalives and Senale, and nol simply
fiom media. Media coveiage of Somalia jollowcJ lhe decisions lo begin
lhe aiilifl of ielief supplies and lhe subsequenl deploymenl of maiines,
ialhei lhan pieceded lhem, as lhe simple iules of causalion would ie-
quiie. This nnding was bolsleied by a seiies of subsequenl independenl
analyses conducled by olhei ieseaicheis.6
A second effecl may be lhoughl of as a calalylic oi acceleialing effecl.
nslanlaneous media speed decision-making.7 Al woisl, lhis may lead lo
Table 23.1 Polenlial policy effecls of global ieal-lime media
egendEsetting Imolionally compelling coveiage of aliocilies oi humanilaiian
ciises ieoideis foieign affaiis piioiilies of piincipals.
gtlyst Media shoilen decision-making iesponse lime.
smpediment Two lypes:
1. Imolional coveiage undeimines moiale. Goveinmenl
allempls lo sanilize wai wilh emphasis on video game
images. Access lo ballleneld is limiled.
2. Global, ieal-lime media conslilule iisk lo opeialional
secuiily.
MIDA CO\IRAGI OI THI WAR 361
iash, impulsive decisions. Al besl, giealei media-geneialed lianspaiency
awaieness of dislanl evenls in ieal lime may aid lhe decision makei lo
make coiiecl |udgemenls.8
Thiidly, and of giealesl concein heie, global ieal-lime media may im-
pede oi undeimine lhe puisuil of policy goals. Howevei, lheie aie lwo
lypes. One cenlies on lhe possibilily lhal mililaiily signincanl infoimalion
may be ievealed in lhe ieal-lime global media enviionmenl.9 The second
involves emolionally compelling picluies caiiied by CNN and olhei media
lhal may undeimine public suppoil foi policy ob|eclives, pailiculaily if
lhey aie pooily ailiculaled andjoi of lillle appaienl nalional inleiesl.
As Andiew Kohul and Robeil C. Tolh have noled, |mjany have faulled
lhe so-called CNN effecl` lelevised images of combal viclims foi lhe
iefusal of lhe Ameiican public lo loleiale casuallies in foieign wais.``10
This aspecl of lhe CNN effecl inleiesls us lhe mosl in lhis chaplei.
Media as impedimenls lo policy
Long a concein of \S mililaiy policy makeis, lhe feai of moiale-sapping
picluies has led lo an aiiay of piaclices designed lo limil |ouinalisl access
lo polenlially disluibing scenes. Ioi example, lhe media weie nol allowed
access lo Dovei Aiifoice Base, lhe casually-piocessing cenlie foi lhe \S
mililaiy duiing lhe Peisian Gulf Wai.11 Allowing picluies of ag-diaped
cofnns conlaining lhe iemains of Ameiican soldieis would have iisked
undeimining public suppoil foi lhe wai. nslead of cofnns, lheie has been
an emphasis on oidnance video cameia images. mages of lhis soil, ciilics
chaige, have lefl lhe impiession of a bloodless wai wheie piecision-
guided munilions plunge down aiishafls oi cleanly sevei biidges, wilh-
oul aclually killing anyone (al leasl on scieen). Al one poinl duiing lhe
Peisian Gulf Wai, lhe \S mililaiy iefused lo make public vivid videolape
of Apache helicoplei allacks on iaqi posilions, lhough seveial iepoileis
had alieady seen lhe video. 1ohn Balzai, of lhe 1os Angclcs Tincs, said
lhe lape showed iaqi soldieis as big as foolball playeis on lhe T\
scieen.`` He conlinued: A guy was hil and you could see him diop and
he sliuggled up. They nied again and lhe body nexl lo him exploded.``
Aflei his ailicle appeaied Balzai was nol allowed lo visil an Apache unil
again.12
Theie is evidence lo suggesl lhe Penlagon`s effoil lo soflen lhe haid
edge of wai is well founded. Duiing lhe Gulf Wai, lhe impacl of even
inagincJ casuallies was demonslialed by a suivey commissioned by lhe
Ncw York Tincs. The nisl column of lable 23.2 piesenls lhe peicenlage
of lhose in each demogiaphic calegoiy who said lhe wai lo defeal iaq
would be woilh lhe loss of life and olhei cosls. The second column pie-
senls lhe peicenlage of lhose who said a giound wai lo defeal iaq would
be woilh lhe cosl of losing lhousands of Ameiican lives.13 As one can
see, lhe calculus of imagined loss led lo a 15-poinl diop in oveiall suppoil
foi lhe wai. Among women and all Ameiicans aged 65 yeais and oldei,
whose suppoil foi lhe wai was ielalively weak fiom lhe slail, lhe diop
was mosl piecipilous (17 poinls). Lalei, we will see lhis same pallein in
Ameiican public suppoil foi \S involvemenl in lhe Kosovo conicl.
The \Sj\N inleivenlion in Somalia (19921994) offeis addilional evi-
dence of lhe powei of lelevision picluies, lhough some of il is ialhei
mixed. A \SA TodayjCNNjGallup public opinion suivey laken in lhe
immediale afleimalh of lhe Oclobei 1993 ballle of Mogadishu, which
killed 18 Ameiicans and hundieds of Somalis, showed, on lhe one hand,
conlinued suppoil foi \S involvemenl in \N peacekeeping missions.
On lhe olhei hand, mosl iespondenls said lhey weie uncleai why lhe
\niled Slales was in Somalia (cleai, 47 pei cenl; nol cleai, 51 pei cenl).
Allhough mosl suppoiled Clinlon`s inilial doubling of lhe numbei of
\S lioops in Somalia lo piolecl \S foices lheie (suppoil, 55 pei cenl;
oppose, 42 pei cenl), lwo-lhiids also said lhey wanled lhe \niled Slales
oul soon (wilhdiaw now, 37 pei cenl; within six nonths, 27 pei cenl).
Only one-lhiid suppoiled slaying unlil lhe humanilaiian mission was
compleled (nnish mission, 31 pei cenl).14
Nol eveiyone agiees lhal lelevision picluies play a iole in lhe modein
liend lowaid casually inloleiance. Idwaid N. Lullwak has aigued lhal
demogiaphics family size plays lhe giealei pail in lhe liend. Iven in
conliolled slales wilhoul piess lhe public has giown inloleianl of casu-
allies. The Soviel wai in Afghanislan was hamsliung by ouliaged com-
Table 23.2 Iffecls of pio|ecled casuallies on levels of \S public suppoil foi lhe
Peisian Gulf Wai
Levels of suppoil
wilhoul giound
lioops and losses
()
Levels of suppoil
wilh giound
lioops and losses
()
Tolal foi all calegoiies 6O 45
Men 7O 56
Women 52 35
1829 yeai olds 65 5O
3O44 yeai olds 6O 44
4565 yeai olds 64 51
65 yeai olds 43 26
Souice: Mauieen Dowd, Poll; Ameiicans Back Conlinued Aii Sliikes,`` Ncw
York Tincs, 15 Iebiuaiy 1991, p. A15.
plainls fiom families and fiiends of lhe Soviel soldieis who died lheie.
This example, Lullwak aigues, allows us lo eliminale anolhei supeincial
explanalion foi lhe novel iefusal lo accepl even modesl numbeis of
combal casuallies: lhe impacl of lelevision coveiage.``15 The bellei ex-
planalion, he aigues, iesls wilh smallei family size in moie modein posl-
indusliial sociely. \nlike lhe laige families lhal oflen compiised lhe
populalions of lhe gieal poweis of an eailiei eia, lhe loss of a single child
now has a diffeienl meaning lo a family wilh bul a few childien, all of
whom aie expecled lo suivive, and each of whom iepiesenls a laigei
shaie of lhe family`s emolional economy.``
Wheieas Lullwak aigues lhal casually inloleiance is unielaled lo
media conlenl, anolhei aigumenl biings lhe issue back lo media, bul wilh
a diffeienl oulcome. One mighl aigue lhal picluies may al limes bolslei
suppoil foi policy goals. As Andiew Kohul and Robeil C. Tolh have
noled, |ljhe viewing of live news on CNN played a well-iecognised,
ciucial iole in lhe public`s conlinuous conneclion lo lhe Peisian Gulf
fiom Augusl 199O onwaid.``16 Iven in lhe eaily slages of lhe conicl,
long befoie lhe oulcome of lhe wai was ceilain, lhe public was posi-
live enough lo convince policymakeis lhal Ameiicans would suppoil lhe
wai effoil.``17
n lhe analysis below, we will nnd a mix of ieaclions associaled wilh
picluies duiing lhe Kosovo bombing campaign. We will nnd lhal lheie
weie counleivailing liends. Picluies of iefugees lended lo bolslei suppoil
foi lhe mililaiy aclion, wheieas picluies of collaleial damage lhe dealh
of civilians by eiianl NATO bombs undeimined suppoil foi lhe bomb-
ing. Befoie piesenling evidence of lhis we will luin lo a ieview of Amei-
ican lelevision news coveiage of Kosovo. The ob|eclive is lo cieale a
media conlexl foi inleipieling suivey dala. Though iefiain fiom making
causal (oi even associalive) claims linking media conlenl lo public opin-
ion, hope lo offei some idea of whal lhe media slimulus package``
looked like duiing lhe wai.
Ameiican news coveiage of Kosovo
News of lhe Balkans in geneial and of Kosovo in pailiculai has dominaled
Ameiican foieign affaiis news coveiage foi much of lhe pasl decade.
\nlil lale 1998, Kosovo ilself was a sideshow, of couise, lo lhe wai in nisl
Slovenia, lhen Cioalia, and nnally and especially Bosnia. Bul covei-
age of Kosovo was evidenl well befoie lhe bombs slailed falling in Maich
1999. n facl, lhe Balkan slales have lended lo dominale Ameiican news
of foieign affaiis in iecenl yeais.
Table 23.3 lisls 23 of lhe woisl humanilaiian ciises in lhe woild loday.18
Al lhe lop of lhe lisl is Noilh Koiea, wilh an eslimaled 6.7 million people
in need. Iollowing Noilh Koiea aie Sudan, Afghanislan, and Angola. Al
lhe bollom of lhe lisl is Rwanda. Sixlh on lhe lisl is ugoslavia, including
Kosovo.
n lhe columns lo lhe iighl aie labulalions of menlions of 22 of lhe
counliies in lhe Ncw York Tincs, lhe Vashington Iost, Thc Tincs of
London, ABC news piogiamming, and CNN. Alongside is lhe ianking
of allenlion paid by lhal oullel lo each counliy. Ioi example, Angola was
lhe lhiileenlh mosl menlioned counliy by lhe Ncw York Tincs of lhe 22
lisled heie. Scanning acioss lhe columns, one can see lhal news piioiilies
have lillle lo do wilh lhe naluie oi seveiily of condilions found in any
given counliy.19 Media allenlion lo ugoslavia, including Kosovo, ovei-
whelmed all olhei coveiage, lhough, in leims of numbeis in need, ugo-
slavia is well down lhe lisl. Ioi example, 28 pei cenl of all Ncw York
Tincs coveiage of lhese 22 counliies was devoled lo ugoslaviajKosovo.
Of lhe moie lhan 33 million people in need accoiding lo lhe nguies pio-
vided in column one, lhe 1.6 million in need in ugoslavia ieceived be-
lween a quailei and neaily half of all iecoided media allenlion in 1998
and mosl of 1999. This is nol suipiising. n facl, in 1996 il was found lhal,
of lhe 13 woisl humanilaiian ciises in lhe woild al lhal lime affecling
appioximalely 3O million peisons, neaily half of lhe iecoided media al-
lenlion was devoled lo lhe plighl of Bosnia`s 3.7 million peisons.20 Media
weie cleaily focused on lhe Balkans foi much of lhe 199Os.
This is nol lo say lhal Ameiican media have been consislenl in lheii
Balkans coveiage. Table 23.4 ieviews Ameiican bioadcasl lelevision
news coveiage of ugoslaviajKosovo fiom Seplembei 1998 lo 1uly 1999.21
Coveiage of Kosovo exploded belween Maich and May 1999, lhe peiiod
of lhe bombing campaign and exlieme elhnic cleaning, despile a Seibian
ciackdown on lhe inleinalional piess coips lhe aulhoiilies sealed lhe
boideis lo mosl iepoileis shoilly aflei lhe slail of lhe NATO bombing
campaign on 24 Maich.22
CNN coveiage of Kosovo
Mosl of oui empiiical analysis in lhis sludy is limiled lo CNN coveiage of
Kosovo. Iven wilh lhis limilalion, we analysed ovei 3,OOO news ilems
conceining Kosovo found in CNN piogiamming fiom 1998 lo lhe lale
summei of 1999.23
Iiguies 23.123.4 capluie lhe inlensily of CNN coveiage of Kosovo
ovei lime. Iiguie 23.1 measuies lhe lolal numbei of news ilems aboul
3
6
6
Table 23.3 Global humanilaiian emeigencies and media coveiage: 1anuaiy 1998 Augusl 1999
Menlions of each counliya
New oik
Times
Washinglon
Posl
Times
(London) ABC News CNN
Counliy People in needb No. Ranking No. Ranking No. Ranking No. Ranking No. Ranking
Noilh Koiea 6.7 million 6O1 7 565 6 16O 15 85 6 355 5
Sudan 4.4 million 483 1O 411 9 321 1O 116 5 3O7 7
Afghanislan 3.9 million 677 5 594 5 387 7 145 4 4OO 4
Angola b3 million 286 13 227 16 161 14 18 12 8O 14
Ilhiopia 2 million 269 14 29O 12 238 13 14 14 68 15
ugoslavia 1.6 million 4O46 1 3183 1 3455 1 1656 1 4249 1
iaq 1.5 million 2478 2 2OOO 2 1479 2 11OO 2 2921 2
Bosnia 1.4 million 1372 3 1283 3 1O44 3 268 3 131O 3
Somalia 1 million 229 15 249 14 12O 16 29 11 147 1O
Sieiia Leone b1 million 189 16 248 15 348 8 8 16 42 16
Ta|ikislan O.9 millionc 68 22 58 22 38 22 1 18 14 2O
Buiundi 88O,OOO 77 21 88 21 47 21 4 17 26 19
Azeibai|an 82O,OOO 161 17 127 2O 87 17 1 18 1O 21
Colombia 75O,OOO 742 4 684 4 481 6 57 7 136 11
Congo 625,OOO 615 6 463 8 276 11 15 13 1O5 13
Sii Lanka 5OO,OOO 143 18 133 19 881 4 4 17 26 19
\ganda 5OO,OOO 313 12 265 13 323 9 55 9 132 12
Iiiliea 4OO,OOO 121 19 149 18 81 18 4 17 3O 17
Libeiia 4OO,OOO 114 2O 18O 17 66 2O 1O 15 28 18
Haili 4OO,OOO 359 11 364 11 73 19 34 1O 157 9
Cioalia 36O,OOO 586 8 521 7 828 5 55 9 329 6
Geoigia 33O,OOO
Rwanda 3OO,OOO 5O3 9 4O9 1O 251 12 56 8 223 8
3
6
7
Souices: Dala iegaiding populalions in need weie oblained fiom \S Nalional nlelligence Council, Global Humanilaiian
Imeigencies: Tiends and Pio|eclions, 19992OOO,`` Augusl 1999, pp. ixxv. Sloiy counls weie oblained fiom Nexis-Lexis, an
eleclionic aichiving seivice.
a. All menlions of each counliy wilhin lhe specined lime fiame weie idenlined and iecoided. nclusive seaich leims weie used.
Ioi example, in lhe case of ugoslavia, lhe seaich leims weie ugoslavia oi Seibia oi \o|vodina oi Kosovo oi Monlenegio.``
Any one of lhese leims in an ailicle oi bioadcasl would be found and counled in lhe seaich. Congo`` iefeis lo lhe Democialic
Republic of lhe Congo (DROC). As mosl news accounls do nol use lhis full name, lhe seaich leim was shoilened lo Congo.``
As a iesull, some of lhe iecoided ailicles and bioadcasls may aclually concein lhe DROC`s neighbouiing Congo.`` The seaich
leim foi Bosnia was Bosnia oi Heizegovina.`` The counliy of Geoigia, lhough included in lhe NC iepoil, was nol included
heie owing lo lhe difncully in dislinguishing iefeiences in lhe news lo lhe counliy and lhe slale of Geoigia in lhe \niled Slales.
l should be emphasized lhal all nguies iepiesenl menlions of a counliy. l should nol be assumed lhal because a counliy is
menlioned, and lheiefoie iecoided heie, lhe sloiy was aclually aboul lhal counliy in lhe main. On lhe olhei hand, if lhis facl is
held conslanl, unnlleied numbeis such as lhese offei a sufncienlly accuiale gauge of media allenlion lo lhese humanilaiian
ciises.
b. People in need weie iefugees fiom lhe named counliy, inleinally displaced peisons, and olheis who iequiie humanilaiian aid.
The iepoil emphasizes lhal lhe numbeis iepiesenl besl eslimales and should be undeislood as appioximalions. calculaled lhe
iank oideiing.
c. The souice foi lhis dalum iepoils lhal il may be inaccuiale owing lo inadequale access by ielief oiganizalions and calego-
iizalion pioblems.
Table 23.4 Ameiican bioadcasl nelwoik coveiage of Kosovo: Seplembei 1998
1uly 1999 (minules pei week)
Dale ABC CBS NBC Tolal
4 Seplembei 1998
11 Seplembei 1998
18 Seplembei 1998 2 2 5
25 Seplembei 1998 2 3 2 7
2 Oclobei 1998 9 8 5 22
9 Oclobei 1998 9 19 15 43
16 Oclobei 1998 9 15 14 39
23 Oclobei 1998 2 3 5
3O Oclobei 1998 2 4 2 9
6 Novembei 1998
13 Novembei 1998
2O Novembei 1998
27 Novembei 1998
4 Decembei 1998
11 Decembei 1998
18 Decembei 1998
25 Decembei 1998
1 1anuaiy 1999
8 1anuaiy 1999
15 1anuaiy 1999
22 1anuaiy 1999 6 7 5 17
29 1anuaiy 1999 2 3 5
5 Iebiuaiy 1999 1 7 2 1O
12 Iebiuaiy 1999 1
19 Iebiuaiy 1999 5 1O 7 22
26 Iebiuaiy 1999 6 6 5 16
5 Maich 1999
12 Maich 1999 3 1 4
19 Maich 1999 8 11 2 21
26 Maich 1999 53 68 62 183
2 Apiil 1999 72 71 72 215
9 Apiil 1999 56 63 61 18O
16 Apiil 1999 5O 62 49 162
23 Apiil 1999 21 23 19 63
3O Apiil 1999 29 23 15 66
7 May 1999 31 33 38 1O2
14 May 1999 15 22 18 55
21 May 1999 11 22 13 46
28 May 1999 19 16 14 48
4 1une 1999 28 22 21 72
11 1une 1999 45 36 39 12O
18 1une 1999 29 29 29 88
25 1une 1999 2O 19 23 63
2 1uly 1999 5 8 13 25
Souice: Andiew Tyndall.
Kosovo on CNN fiom 1uly 1998 lo 1une 1999.24 n 1999, lhe 15 1anuaiy
massacie of 45 elhnic Albanians and subsequenl aclions by lhe \niled
Nalions and lhe six-nalion Conlacl Gioup, including negolialions al
Rambouillel, Iiance, began lo acceleiale coveiage.
On 18 Iebiuaiy, NATO Secielaiy Geneial 1aviei Solana lhiealened
aii sliikes againsl Seibian laigels if lhe lalks al Rambouillel failed. Al
lhis poinl, CNN coveiage began ils sleady climb lo ils giealesl heighls
duiing lhe aclual 78-day bombing campaign beginning in Maich. On 2O
Maich some 1,4OO cease-nie veiineis fiom lhe Oiganizalion foi Secuiily
and Co-opeialion in Iuiope weie evacualed oul of Kosovo. Iollowing a
failed lwo-day mission by \S envoy Richaid Holbiooke lo Belgiade,
NATO aii sliikes began on 24 Maich.
Iiguie 23.2 liacks lhe lolal numbei of CNN ilems aboul Kosovo duiing
lhe 78-day bombing campaign. A cleai pallein emeiged, suggesling lhal
ovei lime CNN began lo giow ielalively weaiy of lhe wai. Duiing lhe
nisl lwo weeks of lhe campaign, coveiage iemained consislenlly high,
oflen exceeding 6O ilems pei lwo-day peiiod. By 1 Apiil, howevei, cov-
eiage slipped. On 1O and 11 May, Belgiade said il was beginning a wilh-
diawal of foices fiom Kosovo. Bul, aflei il became appaienl lhe wilh-
diawal was laigely symbolic, lhe bombing conlinued and CNN coveiage
declined even fuilhei. l was nol unlil lhe negolialions of Iinnish Piesi-
denl Maili Ahlisaaii and Russian envoy \ikloi Cheinomyidin began in
mid-May lhal coveiage picked up again.
Iig. 23.1 The numbei of sloiies aboul Kosovo on CNN: 1uly 1998 1une 1999
(Souice: all dala oblained fiom Nexis Reseaich Seivices)
Counling lhe numbei of CNN news ilems aboul Kosovo as a measuie
of news inlensily is insensilive lo olhei possible expiessions of inlensily,
such as lhe lenglh of each news ilem. \nfoilunalely, Nexis dala con-
ceining CNN do nol offei lhe mosl logical measuie of lelevision segmenl
lenglh: minules and seconds. nslead, lhe woids aie counled. Iiguie 23.3
piesenls lhe measuiemenl of woids on CNN devoled lo Kosovo fiom
1uly 1998 lo 1une 1999. An aslionomical 2.5 million woids conslilule lhe
uppei ieaches of lhe scale foi lhe MaichApiil 1999 lime fiame. By 1une
lhe numbei of woids as a measuie of inlensily diops off piecipilously.
Of all of CNN accomplishmenls, lhe use of live shols lo covei bieaking
news is peihaps lhe mosl nolewoilhy. Ceilainly some of lhe mosl cele-
bialed lelevision news of lhe 199Os included CNN live coveiage of
bieaking news. Iiguie 23.4 piesenls lhe use of live shols by CNN in
Kosovo. Again, we see lhe same pallein of inlense coveiage duiing lhe
bombing campaign ilself. The cosl of lianspoiling and mainlaining salel-
lile uplinks, cameias, and olhei equipmenl needed lo liansmil picluies
live fiom iemole localions means lhal lhe decision lo deploy iesulls in
inlense use foi a nxed lime. Once lhe deploymenl ends, lhe use of live
shols diops sleeply.
Iiguie 23.5 and lable 23.5 aie of pailiculai inleiesl. Iiguie 23.5 depicls
lhe disliibulion of lopics in CNN coveiage. All 3,OOO CNN news ilems
weie coded foi lopic.25 Nol suipiisingly, negolialions led all olhei cale-
goiies by a consideiable maigin. This ieecls lhe cenlialily of seveial
Iig. 23.2 The numbei of sloiies aboul Kosovo on CNN: 24 Maich 1O 1une 1999
Iig. 23.3 The lenglh of CNN news sloiies aboul Kosovo: 1uly 1998 1une 1999
(numbei of woids) (Souice: all dala oblained fiom Nexis Reseaich Seivices)
Iig. 23.4 Live coveiage by CNN of bieaking news sloiies: 1uly 1998 1une 1999
iounds of negolialions, fiom Rambouillel, lo lhe Conlacl Gioup, lo Hol-
biooke`s lasl-minule effoils befoie lhe bombing began, lo lhe diplomacy
of Cheinomyidin and Ahlisaaii.26
Refugee sloiies weie aboul lhe plighl of bolh iefugees and inleinally
displaced people who weie lhe ob|ecl of a news accounl. Bombing
campaign`` is self-explanaloiy. Aliocilies and nghling belween lhe KLA
and Seib foices weie collapsed owing lo lhe impossible lask of diffei-
enlialing noimal`` ballles fiom aliocilies. This obviously has lhe effecl
of oveislaling lhe numbei of liue aliocilies,`` such as lhe muidei of
defenceless civilians, bul il could nol be helped.
Of pailiculai inleiesl lo us aie lhe mislakes made by NATO in lhe
bombing campaign and whal impedimenl effecl lhey mighl have had on
suppoil foi lhe wai among NATO publics. Of 23,OOO bombs and missiles
launched, 2O wenl asliay, accoiding lo NATO and lhe Penlagon.27 Table
23.5 examines mosl of lhem as idenlined in piess accounls. The lable
gives lhe dale of lhe incidenl, followed by a biief desciiplion of lhe evenl
and lhe Nexis seaich leims used lo liack coveiage of lhe evenl on CNN,
and, nnally, lhe lolal numbei of CNN sloiies idenlined as devoled lo lhe
incidenl.28
Nol suipiisingly, lhe 7 May bombing of lhe Chinese embassy was lhe
mosl lhoioughly coveied of lhe NATO bombing mislakes.29 The nexl
mosl coveied evenl was lhe bombing of iefugee conveys neai D|akovic
on 14 Apiil. Whal effecl did lhese and lhe iesl of lhe NATO bombing
Iig. 23.5 The fiequency of lopics in CNN coveiage: 19981999 (Souice: all dala
oblained fiom Nexis Reseaich Seivices)
3
7
3
Table 23.5 CNN coveiage of NATO mislakes``: ApiilMay 1999
Dale Desciiplion of evenl and Nexis seaich leims No. of sloiies
5 Apiil NATO bombs iesidenlial aiea in Aleksinac, killing appioximalely 17 people
DATI (S AIT 4-4-99) AND ALIKSNAC AND NATO AND BOMB
16
9 Apiil A bomb laigeling lhe main lelephone exchange in Piislina damages a iesidenlial aiea
DATI (S AIT 4-8-99) AND PRSTNA AND TILIPHONI IXCHANGI
3
12 Apiil NATO missiles sliike a passengei liain on a biidge neai Gidelica, killing 17 people
DATI (S AIT 4-11-99) AND PASSINGIR TRAN AND BRDGI AND NATO AND
BOMB OR MSSLI
25
14 Apiil ugoslavia claims lhal iockels nied by allied |els killed 75 people in lwo sepaiale iefugee
columns neai D|akovic. NATO lalei admils accidenlally hilling a civilian vehicle
DATI (S AIT 4-13-99) AND NATO Wj5 MSSLI* OR BOMB* OR ROCKIT* AND
C\LAN OR RII\GII AND CON\O OR COL\MN
6O
23 Apiil NATO bombs Seibian slale lelevision building in cenlial Belgiade, killing 162O people
DATI (S AIT 4-22-99) AND BILGRADI AND TILI\SON Wj5 STATON OR
B\LDNG AND NATO AND STR\CK OR HT OR BOMB* OR ATTACK*
19
27 Apiil NATO lasei-guided bomb misses a mililaiy baiiacks and hils a iesidenlial aiea in Suidulica,
killing 2O
DATI (S AIT 4-26-99) AND S\RD\LCA
12
28 Apiil An eiianl missile sliikes a home neai Sophia, in neighbouiing Bulgaiia. Theie weie no casuallies
DATI (S AIT 4-27-99) AND B\LGARA AND NATO AND MSSLI
1
12 May A missile aimed a biidge in Luzane, Kosovo, sliikes a ciossing bus, killing as many as 4O
DATI S 5-1-99 AND B\S OR BRDGI OR L\ZANI AND NATO Wj5 BOMB OR
MSSLI
13
7 May \S B-2 sleallh bombei mislakenly hils lhe Chinese embassy in Belgiade, killing lhiee |ouinalisls
DATI (S AIT 5-6-99) AND CHNISI IMBASS AND NATO OR BOMB
212
13 May NATO allacks whal il says is a mililaiy command posl in Koiisa, Kosovo. ugoslav ofncials say
moie lhan 8O Albanians aie killed. NATO says Seibs used iefugees as human shields
DATI (S AIT 5-12-99) AND NATO AND KORSA
31
3
7
4
Table 23.5 (conl.)
Dale Desciiplion of evenl and Nexis seaich leims No. of sloiies
192O May NATO missiles hil pelioleum sloiage lanks and a mililaiy baiiacks in Belgiade. Al leasl six
diplomalic iesidences aie also damaged
DATI (S AIT 5-19-99) AND PITROLI\M Wj5 TANKS OR CONTANIRS AND
BARRACKS AND BILGRADI
O
21 May Slale media say NATO bombs a piison in slok, killing 19
DATI (S AIT 5-2O-99) AND NATO AND 1AL OR PRSON AND STOK
4
22 May NATO bombs KLA baiiacks al Koshaie
DATI (S AIT 5-21-99) AND NATO AND BOMB* AND BARRACKS AND KOSHARI
5
3O May Taigeling a biidge in \aivaiin, bombings kill nine pedesliians and moloiisls
DATI (S AIT 5-29-99) AND \AR\ARN AND NATO
O
31 May ugoslavia says 16 killed when foui NATO missiles hil a hospilal and ieliiemenl complex neai
Suidulica. NATO says all missiles hil lhe laigeled mililaiy baiiacks
DATI S 5-31-99 AND NATO AND HOSPTAL OR SANATOR\M OR RITRIMINTa
9
31 May Slale media iepoil NATO bombs hil a iesidenlial aiea in Novi Pazai, killing 1O; NATO
acknowledges lhe possibilily lhe nexl day
DATI (S AIT 5-3O-99) AND NO\ PAZAR AND NATO
4
a. Nole lhal lhis same seaich leim was iun foi successive days inlo 1une 1999.
mislakes have on lhe public suppoil foi lhe bombing campaign among
NATO publics? Was lheie a CNN impedimenl effecl? Thal is lhe ques-
lion we luin lo nexl. We will nnd lillle evidence lo suggesl lhe mislakes
caiiied wilh lhem a seiious challenge lo public suppoil.
Measuies of polenlial effecls
n lolal, CNN offeied al leasl 414 sloiies aboul NATO bomb and missile
mislakes, which iepiesenls aboul 12 pei cenl of all CNN coveiage of lhe
wai in Kosovo. NATO bombing mislakes weie counleibalanced by sloiies
conceining lhe plighl of Kosovai iefugees and alleged Seibian aliocilies.
This is seen in lhe iesulls of a Ropei Cenlei suivey queslion lhal asked:
Thinking aboul lhe news coveiage of lhe silualion in ugoslavia, which
picluies and sloiies have caughl youi allenlion mosl?`` n mid-Apiil,
iespondenls weie cleaily nol as moved by sloiies conceining NATO
bombing mislakes as lhey weie by lhe plighl of Albanian iefugees and
lhe viclims of violence in Kosovo.
Picluies and sloiies aboul lhe iefugees leaving Kosovo 3O pei cenl
Picluies and sloiies aboul lhe aii allacks and damage in Seibia 8 pei cenl
Picluies and sloiies aboul lhe viclims of violence in Kosovo 24 pei cenl
Picluies and sloiies aboul lhe lhiee capluied \S soldieis 35 pei cenl
A second oideiing of allenlion (Whal olhei picluies oi sloiies mosl
caughl youi eye?``) pioduced lhe following iesulls:
Picluies and sloiies aboul lhe iefugees leaving Kosovo 26 pei cenl
Picluies and sloiies aboul lhe aii allacks and damage in Seibia 15 pei cenl
Picluies and sloiies aboul lhe viclims of violence in Kosovo 25 pei cenl
Picluies and sloiies aboul lhe lhiee capluied \S soldieis 29 pei cenl
Thus, only 8 pei cenl of lhe iespondenls menlioned lhe aii allacks as a
nisl iesponse and 15 pei cenl as a second iesponse. The highesl iesponse
iale was lhe lhiee capluied Ameiican soldieis. Taken logelhei, picluies
and sloiies of iefugees and viclims of violence in Kosovo accounled foi
54 pei cenl and 51 pei cenl of lolal public iecall.
When asked lowaid lhe end of lhe nisl week of bombing whelhei
Seibian allacks on civilians in Kosovo weie seiious enough lo |uslify lhe
aii sliikes, 65 pei cenl said lhey weie. Neaily 7O pei cenl blamed Seibia
foi lhe iefugees` plighl.30 Iuilheimoie, by lhe end of lhe nisl week in
Apiil, 58 pei cenl of lhe public iesponded lhal lhe Kosovo iefugee silu-
alion made lhem moie likely lo suppoil allied mililaiy aclion.``31 This
iepiesenls a faiily slable, bioad-based level of Ameiican public suppoil
foi lhe aii campaign and a cleai assignmenl of blame foi lhe silualion and
sympalhy foi lhe Albanians. Two ielaled issues pul lhese dala inlo pei-
speclive. Iiisl, how iobusl weie lhese senlimenls? Second, how much of
an impedimenl mighl \S casuallies have been?
When asked al lhe end of Apiil lo gauge lheii level of suppoil foi
giound lioops when facloiing in vaiying levels of hypolhelical casuallies,
iespondenls offeied lhe following iesulls. n answei lo lhe queslion
Would you slill favoui sending giound lioops lo Kosovo if 1OO Ameii-
can soldieis weie killed?`` 24 pei cenl said yes; 65 pei cenl said lhey
would nol suppoil lhe use of giound lioops. When lhe numbei of hypo-
lhelical casuallies was incieased lo 5OO Ameiicans killed, lhose suppoil-
ing lhe use of giound lioops diopped lo 2O pei cenl (and lhose opposed
incieased lo 69 pei cenl). Al 1,OOO Ameiican dealhs, lhe level of suppoil
diopped lo 15 pei cenl (72 pei cenl opposed).32 l is cleai lhal lhe idea
and only lhe idea of \S combal casuallies sapped public suppoil foi \S
involvemenl in lhe wai in Kosovo.
Whal effecl did lhe dealhs of Seib civilians and olheis have on levels of
suppoil foi lhe aii campaign? Aclual dealhs due lo eiianl NATO bombs
had an effecl on \S public suppoil foi lhe aii sliikes. Pew Reseaich
Cenlei dala suggesl an aliophy of suppoil foi lhe bombing, of inleiesl in
lhe sloiy, and of suppoil foi lhe Clinlon adminislialion`s foieign policy.
Iiom Maich al lhe slail of lhe bombing campaign lo May neai lhe end,
suppoil foi aii sliikes fell off by 7 peicenlage poinls (lable 23.6a).
Meanwhile, disappioval of lhe aii sliikes incieased by 9 peicenlage
poinls ovei lhe same peiiod. Iuilheimoie, appioval of lhe conducl of
foieign policy by lhe Clinlon adminislialion fell by 1O poinls while dis-
appioval incieased by 9 poinls (lable 23.6c). n shoil, lheie weie signs of
a developing impedimenl effecl. Table 23.6b, howevei, can be iead as
depicling a posilive liend foi lhe adminislialion. As lhe wai conlinued
and lhe bombing eiiois mulliplied, fewei Ameiicans weie paying allen-
lion lo news accounls of lhe wai. Those who said lhey weie following lhe
aii sliikes veiy closely fell by 11 poinls fiom Maich lo May, lhough al lhe
same lime lhose who said lhey followed lhe aii sliikes faiily closely in-
cieased by 6 poinls.
Whal aboul Iuiopean ieaclions? Available polling dala indicale io-
busl Iuiopean public suppoil duiing lhe opening weeks of lhe bombing
and missile campaign. Tables 23.723.9 piesenl lhe iesulls of a mulli-
nalion suivey conducled belween 25 Maich and 17 Apiil. n iesponse lo
lhe queslion, Do you suppoil oi oppose NATO`s decision lo caiiy oul
aii and missile allacks againsl Seib mililaiy inslallalions?`` iespondenls in
Denmaik expiessed lhe sliongesl suppoil al 74 pei cenl (lable 23.7). All
suiveyed counliies bul laly expiessed ma|oiily suppoil foi lhe allacks.
laly was evenly divided on lhe queslion, wilh 47 pei cenl bolh foi and
againsl lhe allacks.
When asked whelhei cuiienl levels of foice oi moie should be used
(lable 23.8), Biilain, lhe \niled Slales, and Denmaik expiessed lhe
sliongesl suppoil. Iiance and laly weie leasl suppoilive of mainlaining
Table 23.6 Measuies of suppoil foi \S involvemenl in lhe Kosovo conicl:
MaichMay 1999 ()
Maich 1999 Apiil 1999 May 1999
(a) Approval oj air strikcs
Appiove 6O 62 53
Disappiove 29 29 38
Don`l know 11 9 9
Tolal 1OO 1OO 1OO
(b) Iollowing ncws about air strikcs
\eiy closely 43 41 32
Iaiily closely 32 37 38
Nol closely 24 22 29
Don`l know 1 O 1
Tolal 1OO 1OO 1OO
(c) Opinion oj Clintons jorcign policy
Appiove 56 51 46
Disappiove 34 39 43
Don`l know 1O 1O 11
Tolal 1OO 1OO 1OO
Souice: The Pew Reseaich Cenlei foi Thc Icoplc & Thc Ircss, Collaleial
Damage Takes ls Toll,`` al hllp:jwww.people-piess.oigjmay99ipl1.hlm.
Table 23.7 Wesl Iuiopean and Noilh Ameiican public opinion on NATO`s iole
in Kosovo ()
Counliy Suppoil Oppose
Biilain 68 23
Canada 64 33
Denmaik 74 19
Iiance 54 34
Geimany 57 38
laly 47 47
Noiway 64 23
\niled Slales 68 27
Souice: dala supplied by \niled Slales nfoimalion Agency, Ofnce of Reseaich
and Media Relalions, Iuiopean Opinion Aleil,`` 4 May 1999.
cuiienl oi giealei levels, lhough, inleieslingly, lhe Ameiican public ex-
piessed lhe sliongesl suppoil foi ieducing oi ending cuiienl levels of
foice (15 pei cenl).33 n lhis sense, lhe Ameiican public was lhe mosl
polaiized of lhe sample populalions, lhough lhose who wanled a ieduc-
lion oi end lo lhe conicl weie in a cleai minoiily.
The lalian, Iiench, and Geiman publics expiessed giealesl suppoil
foi a lhiid way, incieased diplomalic effoil (lable 23.9). Some 59, 51, and
47 pei cenl, iespeclively, expiessed suppoil foi lhe slalemenl: NATO
should do moie lo seek a diplomalic solulion bul should nol send moie
lioops.``34
Lalei poll iesulls saw a haidening of suppoil foi lhe aii campaign,
lhough nol wilhoul nolable exceplions. n Biilain, a Gallup suivey con-
ducled foi lhe Daily Tclcgraph on 3O Apiil found 72 pei cenl suppoiled
NATO`s aclions (23 pei cenl disappioved). The Tclcgraph alliibuled lhe
Table 23.8 Levels of suppoil foi cuiienl oi moie foice, oi foi less foice oi an end
lo involvemenl ()
Counliy Moiejcuiienl levels Reducejend involvemenl
Biilain 52 9
Canada 49 13
Denmaik 53 7
Iiance 29 11
Geimany 41 1O
laly 23 14
Noiway 46 1O
\niled Slales 5O 15
Table 23.9 Levels of suppoil foi moie diplomalic effoil ()
Counliy Moie diplomalic effoil
Biilain 33
Canada 35
Denmaik 35
Iiance 51
Geimany 47
laly 59
Noiway 37
\niled Slales 3O
iise in suppoil lo sliong feelings aboul lhe plighl of lhe Kosovo iefugees.
n Iiance, a Iaris Match poll conducled on 1517 Apiil found 66 pei cenl
lhoughl Iiance was iighl`` lo pailicipale in lhe NATO aclion. And
wheieas lhe Geiman and lalian publics iemained hesilanl and divided
ovei NATO`s aclions, lhe Dulch public was expiessing an aslonishing
8O pei cenl appioval ialing foi lhe NATO allacks by lhe end of Apiil.
Whal aboul Iaslein Iuiope, including lhe newesl NATO membei
slales (lhe Czech Republic, Hungaiy, and Poland)? Table 23.1O piesenls
lhe iesulls of suiveys conducled in lhese lhiee counliies and in Cioalia
and Slovakia. A cleai divide is evidenl. n all lhiee new NATO counliies,
lhe public expiessed sliong suppoil foi moie diplomalic effoils, appiox-
imaling lhe same levels of suppoil foi incieased diplomalic effoils ex-
piessed by laly, Iiance, and Geimany. Poland and Hungaiy also ex-
piessed sliong suppoil foi lhe aii campaign, while lhe Czech Republic
expiessed lhe weakesl suppoil al 35 pei cenl. Nol suipiisingly, of lhe
Iasl Iuiopean counliies iepoiled in lable 23.1O, Cioalia expiessed lhe
sliongesl suppoil foi NATO aclion.
Discussion
Whal conclusion may be diawn fiom lhese dala? Iiisl, iegaiding media
coveiage, CNN and olhei Ameiican media paid oveiwhelming allenlion
lo lhe foimei ugoslavia foi much of lhe 199Os. Kosovo in 1999 was
meiely lhe lalesl expiession of lhis inleiesl. This is neilhei suipiising noi
necessaiily inappiopiiale in my view. Allhough people all ovei lhe woild
suffei in giealei numbeis lhan in lhe foimei ugoslavia, \S and Iuio-
pean inleiesl and lheiefoie Weslein media inleiesl is |uslined by lhe
weighl of Iuiopean hisloiy and lhe conlinued desiie foi lians-Iuiopean
slabilily. The queslion of whelhei Ameiican nalional inleiesls aie al
hand in lhe foimei ugoslavia is nol lhe issue. Minimally, il seems cleai
lhal al leasl potcntial inleiesls aie much closei al hand foi lhe \niled
Slales in lhe soulhein ank of Iuiope lhan lhey aie in many of lhe olhei
liouble spols aiound lhe woild lisled in lable 23.3.
And whal of lhe CNN effecl? have allempled lo focus mosl allenlion
on lhe queslion of whelhei media coveiage of Kosovo in any way im-
peded lhe conducl of \SjNATO policy. The answei seems mixed. Iiisl,
coveiage lended lo give less weighl lo lhe evenls lhal mighl have iepie-
senled lhe giealesl souice of impedimenl: lhe eiianl bombing allacks on
civilians and lhe Chinese embassy. This is evidenl in lable 23.5, which
shows lhal ielalively lillle allenlion was paid lo mislakes.`` Oveiall, lhe
Ameiican public, lhough wilh some eiosion, held fasl in lheii suppoil foi
lhe aii sliikes in Kosovo.
3
8
O
Table 23.1O Cenlial and Iasl Iuiopean public opinion on NATO`s iole in Kosovo ()
Counliy
Suppoil
aii sliikes
Oppose
aii sliikes
Moie
foice
Cuiienl level
of foice
Moie
diplomacy
Reduce
involvemenl
Ind
involvemenl
Czech Republic 35 57 11 12 45 8 19
Hungaiy 48 41 19 14 38 6 16
Poland 54 31 18 1O 48 6 8
Cioalia 82 7 39 21 19 1 2
Slovakia 21 75 4 8 55 5 26
Souice: dala supplied by \niled Slales nfoimalion Agency, Ofnce of Reseaich and Media Relalions, Iuiopean Opinion Aleil,``
4 May 1999.
Concein aboul mislakes was balanced by concein foi lhe plighl of Al-
banian iefugees. The only mislake`` lhal would have lipped lhe balance
againsl lhe aii campaign was lhe one nol made: lhe killing of \S soldieis
on Kosovo balllenelds. Moie lhan any olhei facloi, lhe conslanl slieam
of iefugees and iepoils of Seibian aliocilies lended lo bolslei suppoil foi
lhe wai. Accoiding lo one nalional suivey, by lhe end of Apiil, 61 pei
cenl of lhe Ameiican public suppoiled lhe bombing.35 When asked al lhe
end of May whelhei il had been a mislake foi lhe \niled Slales lo be
involved mililaiily in Kosovo, a slim ma|oiily of lhe public said no some
51 pei cenl said il was nol a mislake, while 43 pei cenl said il had been.36
This was aflei lhe Chinese embassy, lhe loss of lhe Apache helicoplei
pilols, and seveial seiious eiianl missile hils on civilian laigels. el lhe
public held ielalively nim in lheii suppoil. All in all, counleivailing ex-
piessions of sympalhy foi lhe iefugees negaled lhe effecls of lhe mis-
lakes, |usl as long as lhe \niled Slales avoided casuallies.
The liagic iiony of lhis, ciilics mighl claim, is lhal, because of NATO
casually inloleiance, lhe Kosovo Albanians lhe veiy people NATO was
claiming lo piolecl died in highei numbeis. Weslein public suppoil foi
lhe aii campaign was bolsleied by lhe suffeiing of lhe Albanians and
documenled by lhe Weslein media. el in some measuie lheii suffeiing
was ilself lhe iesull of a lack of Weslein public suppoil foi moie iobusl
and polenlially deadly (foi Weslein aimies) giound aclion. nslead, lhe
Biilish, Ameiican, and olhei Weslein publics fell sympalhy in lheii living
iooms while NATO pilols diopped bombs fiom 15,OOO feel and lhe
Kosovo Albanians and olheis died on lhe giound.
Acknowledgemenls
would like lo lhank Kuilis Coppei, GW\jMedia & Secuiily Pio|ecl`s
Nalional Secuiily Giaduale Iellow, foi his dedicaled assislance in lhe
piepaialion of lhis chaplei. Wilhoul him lhis ieseaich would have nevei
been compleled.
Noles
1. Ioi a moie complele discussion of lhe lypology inlioduced heie, see Sleven Livingslon,
Claiifying lhe CNN Iffecl: An Ixaminalion of Media Iffecls Accoiding lo Type of
Mililaiy nleivenlion,`` 1oan Shoienslein Cenlei on Piess, Polilics and Public Policy,
Kennedy School of Goveinmenl, Haivaid \niveisily, Reseaich Papei R-18, 1une 1997.
2. One of lhe nisl commenlalois lo ailiculale lhis view was 1ames Schlesingei, uesl foi
a PoslCold Wai Ioieign Policy,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, 1992j93; online wilhoul paginalion.
3. 1oseph S. Nye, 1i., Redenning lhe Nalional nleiesl,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, 1ulyjAugusl
1999, p. 22.
4. Geoige I. Kennan, Somalia, Thiough a Glass Daikly,`` Ncw York Tincs, 3O Seplem-
bei 1993, p. 25.
5. Ioi a ieview of lhe ielevanl lileialuie, see Pieis Robinson, The CNN Iffecl: Can lhe
News Media Diive Ioieign Policy?`` Rcvicw oj Intcrnational StuJics, \ol. 25, 1999, pp.
3O13O9.
6. See 1onalhan Meimin, Television News and Ameiican nleivenlion in Somalia: The
Mylh of a Media Diiven Ioieign Policy,`` Iolitical Scicncc Quartcrly, \ol. 112, No. 3,
1997; Waiien P. Sliobel, 1atc-Brcaking Iorcign Iolicy. Thc Ncws McJias Inucncc
on Icacc Opcrations, Washinglon: \S nslilule of Peace Piess, 1997; 1ohn Riley 1i.,
Relhinking lhe Mylh of lhe CNN Iffecl,`` papei piesenled al lhe Ameiican Polilical
Science Associalion Meeling, Allanla, GA, 25 Seplembei 1999.
7. This is lhe aigumenl offeied by 1ames Hoge, Media Peivasiveness,`` Iorcign Ajjairs,
\ol. 73, 1994, pp. 134144. See also Michael R. Beschloss, IrcsiJcnts, Tclcvision anJ
Iorcign Crisis, Washinglon, DC: Annenbeig Washinglon Piogiam in Communicalions
Sludies of Noilhweslein \niveisily, 1993; Timolhy 1. McNully, Television`s mpacl
on Ixeculive Decision-Making and Diplomacy,`` Thc Ilctchcr Iorun oj VorlJ Ajjairs,
\ol. 17, 1993, pp. 6783.
8. On lhe possible effecls of giealei lianspaiency, see Ann Iloiini, The Ind of Seciecy,``
Iorcign Ajjairs, No. 111, Summei 1998, unpaginaled.
9. Though impoilanl, we will leave consideialion of lhe inadveilenl ielease of laclically
impoilanl infoimalion in wai foi anolhei lime.
1O. Andiew Kohul and Robeil C. Tolh, Aims and lhe People,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, Novembeij
Decembei 1994; online wilhoul paginalion.
11. Baiiing of Piess fiom Mililaiy Base \pheld,`` Ncw York Tincs, 9 Maich 1991, p. 4.
12. 1ason DePaile, Keeping lhe News in Slep: Aie lhe Penlagon`s Gulf Wai Rules Heie lo
Slay?`` Ncw York Tincs, 6 May 1991, p. A9.
13. Based on inleiviews wilh 1,O6O adulls nalionwide by lelephone, 1213 Iebiuaiy 1991.
Dala iegaiding vaiying levels of suppoil accoiding lo polilical paily afnlialion and iace
aie nol piesenled.
14. Richaid Benedello, Clinlon`s Numbeis Slipping Once Again,`` USA ToJay, 12
Oclobei 1993, p. 5A.
15. Idwaid N. Lullwak, Wheie Aie lhe Gieal Poweis? Al Home wilh lhe Kids,`` Iorcign
Ajjairs, 1ulyjAugusl 1994; online wilhoul paginalion.
16. Kohul and Tolh, Aims and lhe People.``
17. bid.
18. Nalional nlelligence Council, Global Humanilaiian Imeigencies: Tiends and Pio|ec-
lions, 19992OOO,`` Augusl 1999.
19. To exploie lhis supposilion, a second Nexis seaich was iun wilh qualifying leims
inlended lo idenlify lhose news ilems aboul Sudan oi Afghanislan aclually aboul lhe
\S missile allack. Theiefoie, lhe seaich leim foi Sudan was Dale (is afl 12-97 and bef
9-99) and Sudan and missile oi leiioi* oi chemical.`` Ioi Afghanislan lhe seaich leim
was Dale (is afl 12-97 and bef 9-99) and Afghanislan and missile oi leiioi*.`` The *``
in a Nexis seaich means lhal all foims of lhe woid will be iecognized: leiioi,`` lei-
ioiism,`` leiioiisl,`` elc. Media inleiesl in Afghanislan and lhe Sudan was in considei-
able measuie lhe consequence of lhe \S missile allacks on bolh counliies on 2O Augusl
1999. Conliolling foi lhe missile allacks as lhe lopic of lhe news, lolal ieduclions foi
news conceining lhe Sudan weie 47 pei cenl in lhe Ncw York Tincs, 38 pei cenl foi lhe
Vashington Iost, 27 pei cenl foi Thc Tincs of London, 6O pei cenl foi ABC News, and
66 pei cenl foi CNN. The decline in coveiage foi Afghanislan when conliolling foi lhe
missile allacks was 34 pei cenl, 32 pei cenl, 24 pei cenl, 42 pei cenl, and 5O pei cenl
iespeclively. Mosl of lhe news allenlion devoled lo iaq, one mighl ieasonably assume,
focused on \S and Biilish aii sliikes againsl iaqi laigels, oi on issues ielaling lo lhe
queslion of iaqi pioduclion of weapons of mass desliuclion. Similaily, inleiesl in Noilh
Koiea is moie oflen cenlied on ils weapons piogiamme, missile lesling, and ielalions
wilh ils neighbouis, and less on ils humanilaiian needs.
2O. See Livingslon, Claiifying lhe CNN Iffecl,`` p. 9. Dala conceining lhe 13 woisl hu-
manilaiian ciises al lhe lime weie laken fiom lhe \niled Slales Mission lo lhe \niled
Nalion`s Global Humanilaiian Imeigencies, 1996.`` Media analysed al lhe lime weie
lhe Ncw York Tincs, lhe Vashington Iost, ABC News, CNN, and Nalional Public
Radio.
21. wish lo lhank Andiew Tyndall of Thc TynJall Rcport foi supplying lhese dala. Thc
TynJall Rcport is a lelevision news conlenl liacking nim based in New oik.
22. On 25 Maich, 29 piinl and bioadcasl |ouinalisls fiom NATO counliies weie delained by
Seibian police. Mosl weie lhen oideied oul of lhe counliy. Of lhe ma|oi Ameiican
lelevision nelwoiks, only NBC coiiespondenls Ron Allen and 1im Maceda, along wilh
an NBC cameia and sound ciew, weie allowed lo iemain in Belgiade. This did nol seem
lo affecl lhe oveiall amounl of coveiage offeied by NBC ielalive lo lhe olhei bioadcasl
nelwoiks, as lable 23.4 indicales. David Zuiawik, Seibs I|ecl Repoileis fiom NATO
Nalions; Police Delain News Ciews, Oidei Them Oul of Counliy,`` Baltinorc Sun, 26
Maich 1999, p. 19A.
23. Tolal N 3373 cases.
24. \nlike lable 23.3, dala in nguie 23.1 iepiesenl examined news sloiies. Ixlianeous
sloiies aboul Kosovo, lhose lhal aie aclually aboul somelhing else bul wilh a biief menlion
of Kosovo, have been iemoved fiom consideialion.
25. Nexis offeis a numbei of levels of specincily. Al one end is lhe iepioduclion of a pio-
giamme liansciipl. Al lhe olhei is a cilalion. The lallei piovides lhe dale and lime of
lhe piogiamme, ils lenglh in woids, lhe name of lhe piogiamme and desk lhal ian lhe
sloiy, lhe byline, and lhe desk. A one- oi lwo-senlence desciiplion also accompanies
neaily all cilalions. l is fiom lhese biief desciiplions lhal we diaw oui conclusions ie-
gaiding lopic. This obviously offeis only a iough appioximalion of lhe liue deplh and
complexily of lhe lopic`s coveiage. The volume of sloiies olheiwise pievenled moie
delailed analysis. The melhods used heie, howevei, piovide an acceplable appioxima-
lion of lhe lopical disliibulion found in lhe enliie populalion of sloiies.
26. l also ieecls lhe ialhei libeial decision iules employed by codeis in deleimining
whelhei a given sloiy was aboul diplomacy. Thieals, foi example, weie also iegaided as
diplomacy.
27. 1ohn Simpson, Kosovo: Aflei lhe Wai: How Tilo`s Tiaining Deslioyed Nalo Hopes of
a Clean Wai,`` SunJay Tclcgraph, 27 1une 1999, p. 22.
28. As wilh all Nexis ieseaich, whal is idenlined is enliiely dependenl on lhe seaich leims.
The seaich leims used foi each incidenl aie piesenled in capilals in lable 23.5. \sually,
seveial vaiialions on lhe leims weie liied. Aflei all sloiies weie iecoided using each
seaich slialegy, each sloiy was ieviewed lo deleimine whelhei in facl il was aboul lhe
evenl al hand. f nol, il was discaided. Despile lhese piecaulions, lhe numbeis pie-
senled in lable 23.5 should be iegaided as appioximalions of lolal coveiage. n pailic-
ulai, lheie is a dangei of undeicounling, pailiculaily wheie lhe seaich has ielied on lhe
piesence of place names, such as Aleksinac, Suidulica, oi slok. CNN no doubl men-
lioned lhe incidenls in each of lhese localions wilhoul iefeiiing lo lhe localion name. f
so, il was missed in lhe seaich. Again, lhe volume of coveiage pievenled olhei means of
localing sloiies conceining NATO mislakes.
29. We do nol lake seiiously lhe nolion lhal NATO bombed lhe Chinese embassy delibei-
alely, as mosl Chinese seem lo believe, and lheiefoie counl lhis as a mislake.
3O. The queslion iead: `m going lo iead some possible ieasons foi \S mililaiy involve-
menl in ugoslavia. Please say whelhei you lhink each one is seiious enough lo |uslify
lhe cuiienl \S mililaiy aii sliikes in lhe iegion . . . Seibian allacks on civilians in
Kosovo.`` The suivey was conducled by lhe Gallup oiganizalion, 3O31 Maich 1999.
The sample size was 1,O78.
31. The queslion iead: Has lhe Kosovo iefugee silualion made you moie likely lo suppoil
allied mililaiy aclion againsl Seibia, less likely, oi whal?`` 58 pei cenl said moie likely,
29 pei cenl said less likely. Resulls fiom an ABC News, Vashington Iost poll beginning
on 5 Apiil and ending 6 Apiil 1999.
32. These nguies weie oblained in a poll conducled by CR Reseaich Gioup foi Nalional
Public Radio, Kaisei Iamily Ioundalion, and Kennedy School of Goveinmenl, Haivaid
\niveisily, belween 23 Apiil and 28 Apiil 1999.
33. The lwo columns in lable 23.8 iepiesenl composilion scoies among foui of lhe nve
oplions. The nisl column combines lhe iesponse scoies foi mainlaining oi incieasing
foice. The second column combines lhe iesponses foi ieducing oi ending involvemenl in
Kosovo.
34. Respondenls weie piesenled wilh nve oplions: Thinking now of lhe ciisis in Kosovo in
foimei ugoslavia, which of lhe following comes closesl lo youi view of whal kind of
iole NATO should play lheie? Do you lhink NATO should send in moie aimed foices
inlo lhe aiea; NATO should do moie lo seek a diplomalic solulion bul should nol send
moie lioops; NATO should keep ils involvemenl al cuiienl levels; NATO should
ieduce ils involvemenl in Kosovo; oi NATO should complelely end any involvemenl
in Kosovo?``
35. CR Reseaich Gioup suivey foi Nalional Public Radio, Kaisei Iamily Ioundalion, and
lhe Kennedy School of Goveinmenl, Haivaid \niveisily, belween 23 Apiil and 28
Apiil 1999. The sample size was 1,O22.
36. ankelovich Pailneis, nc. suivey foi TimejCNN, belween 26 May and 28 May 1999.
The sample size was 1,O17.
24
Iffeclive indignalion? Building
global awaieness, NGOs, and
lhe enfoicemenl of noims
Iclicc D. Cacr
Rescue lhose who aie being laken away lo dealh,
Hold back lhose who aie slumbling lo lhe slaughlei!
f you say, Behold, we did nol know lhis,``
Does nol he who weighs lhe heail peiceive il?
Does nol he who keeps walch ovei youi soul know il?
And will he nol iewaid each one accoiding lo his woik?
(Pioveibs 24: 1112)
We should leave no one in doubl lhal foi lhe mass muideieis, lhe elhnic
cleanseis,`` lhose guilly of gioss and shocking violalions of human iighls, impunily
is nol acceplable. The \niled Nalions will nevei be lheii iefuge, ils Chailei nevei
lhe souice of comfoil oi |uslincalion. They aie oui enemies, iegaidless of iace,
ieligion, oi nalion, and only in lheii defeal can we iedeem lhe piomise of lhis
gieal Oiganizalion.
(Kon Annan, 7 Apiil 1999, Geneva, \N piess ielease SGjSMj99j91)
The \niled Nalions once deall only wilh goveinmenls. By now we know lhal
peace and piospeiily cannol be achieved wilhoul pailneiships involving govein-
menls, inleinalional oiganizalions, lhe business communily and civil sociely. n
loday`s woild, we depend on each olhei.
(Kon Annan, 31 1anuaiy 1998, Davos, Swilzeiland, \N piess ielease, SGjSMj
6448)
385
The NGO facloi in Kosovo
The eneigy, aclivism, moial commilmenl, infoimalion, and seivices slem-
ming fiom non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions (NGOs) have been a vilal
facloi in lhe iesponse lo lhe ciisis in Kosovo.1 Many of lhe gioups weie
locally based, having been developed as pail of lhe alleinalive social and
polilical sliucluies eslablished by Kosovo Albanians ovei lhe pasl decade.
uile a few weie based abioad, bul had been aclive in lhe iegion foi
some lime. n addilion lo lheii ulililaiian aclions, assisling local popula-
lions, lhe voices of NGOs inlei|ecled inlo lhe policy debales have oflen
changed lhe inleinalional climale iegaiding lhe ciisis building a com-
munily of concein lhal has incieasingly piessed foi giealei inleinalional
involvemenl in lhe ciisis. Iai fiom being seleclive indignalion,`` lheii
aclions ieecl effoils lo implemenl global noims univeisally, wilh an
impacl lhal could inslead be leimed effeclive indignalion.``
This chaplei examines lhe iange of NGOs piesenl in oi conceined
aboul lhe Kosovo ciisis, aclions adopled by lhe diffeienl NGOs, and lheii
seaich foi effeclive slialegies in lhe poslCold Wai eia, pailiculaily ie-
gaiding lhe challenges posed by lhe aliocilies of lhe Kosovo ciisis. The
decision of some NGOs lo call foi lhe use of foice in lhis conicl is ex-
amined, wilh a discussion of ieasons foi diffeiences among lhem, cenliing
on ways lhe noims lhey sliuggle lo uphold diffei, and lhe piefeiied
means diveise oiganizalions ulilize in lheii public aclions. A summaiy
assessmenl of lhe aieas in which lhe NGOs have had maximal impacl is
offeied.
Whal aie NGOs?
n lhe Kosovo iegion, non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions oflen lhoughl of
as piivale oiganizalions pioviding local seivices lo gioups of cilizens, and
helping piomole disliibulion of badly needed assislance have also pio-
vided decisive infoimalion and peispeclives on lhe ciisis in Kosovo. Many
of lhese oiganizalions have helped sel lhe agendas of inleigoveinmenlal
bodies and aclois. Allhough some aie sliiclly local gioups, many aie
foieign oiganizalions oi inleinalional ones; while some iesliicl lheii ac-
livilies lo local humanilaiian and developmenlal aclivilies, olheis focus
on galheiing and liansmilling infoimalion on human iighls violalions,
including aliocious massacies of civilians, and advising goveinmenls
aboul lhe uigenl sleps necessaiy lo biing an end lo lhese aclions. Some
iemain vague in lheii piesciiplions, while olheis have been veiy specinc.
ndigenous Albanian-Kosovai non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions weie
buill up laigely ovei lhe peiiod 19891999 as paiallel Albanian govein-
menlal, social, and educalional sliucluies weie developed in iesponse
lo Seibian iepiession, ofncial measuies lhal have syslemalically dis-
ciiminaled againsl Albanian Kosovais. These indigenous gioups, along
wilh foieign NGOs, have been vocal and ailiculale in addiessing lhe
vaiious issues moial, polilical, mililaiy, and olheiwise lhal have been
cenlial lo lhe foimulalion of inleinalional policy iegaiding lhe Kosovo
conicl. Having expeiienced lhe oppiessive measuies againsl lhem in
Kosovo, local gioups have liied lo iaise lhe awaieness of lheii colleagues
fiom olhei counliies, in lhe hopes lhis would spui some foim of aclion
lhal could help. And foieign gioups oflen amplined lhe voices of such
local NGOs. Ioieign obseiveis who have seived wilh inleinalional mis-
sions in bolh Bosnia and Kosovo have poinled oul lhal civil sociely, and
non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions as a pail of lhal, weie bellei developed
in Kosovo lhan in Bosnia, because of lhe elaboiale paiallel syslem cie-
aled ovei lhe yeais.
l has become incieasingly common lo speak of lhe giowing numbei
of enlilies oulside lhe goveinmenl and lhe family as civil sociely.`` el
non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions aie a specinc componenl of and
smallei lhan civil sociely as a whole. (Ioi example, nnancial inslilulions
and media may be pail of civil sociely, bul lhey aie nol necessaiily
NGOs.) n some socielies, NGOs aie said lo conslilule lhe independenl
secloi,`` wheieas elsewheie lhey have been leimed social movemenls.``
The Commission on Global Goveinance has explained lhal in lheii wide
vaiiely lhey biing expeilise, commilmenl and giass-iool peiceplions lhal
should be mobilized in lhe inleiesls of bellei goveinance.``2 NGOs woik
wilh specinc populalions, oflen lo empowei people, engage in advocacy
foi social change, piomole giealei fieedoms, conducl educalional acliv-
ilies, and piovide seivices.
NGOs help lo manage complex ielalionships by aiianging coopeia-
lion of olhei aclois in sociely, and, moie lhan anylhing, lhey iepiesenl
lhe voices and views of lhose oulside goveinmenl. The lasl quailei of
lhe lwenlielh cenluiy saw an enoimous giowlh in independenl non-
goveinmenlal oiganizalions, pailiculaily in lhe nelds of human iighls,
humanilaiian affaiis, women`s issues, enviionmenlal conceins, and devel-
opmenl. The Kosovo iegion has had a well-developed and ailiculale sel
of non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions piesenl foi vaiying peiiods of lime,
and lhey have spanned lhis aiiay of specializalion.
NGOs aclive in Kosovo
NGOs lhal have been aclive in Kosovo duiing lhe pasl decade fall mainly
inlo lhe following calegoiies:
NGOS AND THI INIORCIMINT OI NORMS 387
1. hunanitarian anJ Jcvclopncnt NCOs, pioviding aid lo hospilals and
conducling heallh-ielaled pio|ecls, assisling schools and lileiacy pio-
|ecls, developing clean walei pio|ecls and lhe like, pioviding educa-
lional assislance;
2. hunan rights NCOs, engaged in moniloiing and iepoiling violalions; a
veiy few such oiganizalions woik on building expeilise among local
NGOs lhiough liaining and empoweimenl pio|ecls in human iighls;
3. conict rcsolution anJ nanagcncnt, cilizen diplomacy, and ielaled
gioups.
The vaiying NGOs caiiy oul lheii woik veiy diffeienlly fiom one
anolhei even in Kosovo. Some, pailiculaily foieign-based human iighls
gioups and cilizen diplomacy gioups, liavel lo lhe iegion on a shoil-leim
basis, obseive, do some facl-nnding, issue iepoils, and, in some cases,
follow up by appealing lo ofncials and inslilulions in lhe counliy and
abioad. The nleinalional Ciisis Gioup and Physicians foi Human Righls
aie bul lwo examples.
Olheis, pailiculaily humanilaiian oiganizalions, have a longei-leim
piesence. They sel up lheii own ofnces and piogiammes and eslablish a
piesence in lhe iegion, which lhey view as offeiing bolh hands-on conliol
of lheii pio|ecls as well as a kind of pioleclion lo lhe local populalion.
Meicy Coips and Me decins sans Iionlie` ies fall inlo lhis calegoiy. Some
see lheii iole as offeiing pioleclion meiely by being piesenl. Olheis who
aie commilled lo non-violence believe lheii iole is lo piovide aid and
ielieve suffeiing bul nol lo be silenl. Seveial have insisled lhal lhey have
a vilal iesponsibilily lo seive as wilnesses. A few have made public
slalemenls. Addilionally, lheie have been oiganizalions localed fai away
fiom lhe iegion lhal suppoil local inilialives bul do nol eslablish a local
piesence (Oxfam is oflen ciled in lhis capacily).
Iinally, conicl iesolulion NGOs lhink lhey can solve some of lhe in-
liaclable pioblems if people will only undeisland`` one anolhei bellei.
A numbei of lhese gioups became aclive in Kosovo. Ioi example, lhe
Rome-based Communila` Sanl` Igidio biokeied an educalion agieemenl
in 1996 belween Kosovo Albanians and Slobodan Milosevic, which (de-
spile piomises and allempls lo ieinslale il as lale as 1999) was nevei
caiiied oul. Aulhoi and foimei human iighls ieseaichei 1ulie Meilus
calls lhese |wjai louiisls; ag planleis; seed planleis` neaily invisible
hands; and conicl iesolulion NGOs.``3
To be aclive in Kosovo, foieign NGOs have had lo have lhe appioval
and coopeialion of bolh lhe Seibian goveinmenl (which gianls visas and
olhei enabling peimission lo lhese gioups) as well as lhe Albanian au-
lhoiilies lhal, ovei lhe couise of lhe 199Os, eslablished a paiallel govein-
menl and a nelwoik of alleinalive social, educalional, polilical, and cul-
luial inslilulions and oiganizalions in Kosovo.4 n facl, indigenous oi
Kosovo Albanian NGOs have coveied a fai bioadei sel of conceins lhan
have NGOs based abioad. Developed ovei lhe couise of moie lhan a
decade, lhe NGOs have had consideiable expeiience in addiessing many
hands-on aspecls of life in Kosovo.
The NGOs mosl aclive and visible duiing lhe ciisis in Kosovo ilself
included:
.
human iighls NGOs (including piess fieedom gioups) such as lhe
Piislina-based Council foi lhe Defense of Human Righls and Iiee-
doms, lhe Belgiade-based Humanilaiian Law Cenlie, \ienna-based
nleinalional Helsinki Iedeialion, Physicians foi Human Righls, and
Human Righls Walch.
.
humanilaiian and developmenl NGOs (including lhose focused on lhe
inleinally displaced and iefugees) such as lhe Molhei Theiesa Sociely,
a Kosovai gioup, Meicy Coips nleinalional (based in Poilland,
Oiegon), Me decins sans Iionlie` ies (based in Paiis), lhe nleinalional
Rescue Commillee (New oik), CARI (Allanla), oi Oxfam (London).
.
ieligious NGOs, which laigely caiiied oul humanilaiian seivices, such
as lhe ciilically impoilanl Molhei Theiesa Sociely ciled above, lhe
nleinalional Oilhodox Chiislian Chaiilies, oi Calholic Relief Seivices.
.
NGOs abioad, pailiculaily lhose made up of peisons fiom a conceined
elhnic gioup, such as Albanian, Seibian, oi Roma gioups, oi ad hoc
gioups of inlellecluals oi sludenls.
.
policy advocacy (and a veiy few conicl iesolulion) NGOs, noimally
based oulside lhe iegion, which assessed condilions and offeied oflen
veiy delailed piesciiplions foi inleinalional iesponse, whelhei on lhe
giound, as al Rambouillel, oi in capilals wheie decisions weie being
debaled iegaiding lhe use of foice. These included lhe Biussels-based
nleinalional Ciisis Gioup, lhe London-based nslilule foi Wai and
Peace Repoiling, lhe \S-based Balkan Aclion Council, and lhe Open
Sociely nslilule`s Kosovo Aclion Coalilion.
A full examinalion of lhe iole of Belgiade-based Seibian gioups is be-
yond lhe scope of lhis chaplei. Bul il is impoilanl lo nole lhal, befoie and
aflei bombing began, seveial leadeis of lhe Belgiade-based democialic
opposilion lo Milosevic wained lhal lhe use of foice as a iesponse would
isolale and endangei lhem, deslioying lhe subslanlial bul slill fiagile
effoils lhey had launched lo nuiluie democialic lhinking and inslilulions
in Belgiade. The lilles of lheii ailicles say il all: \o|in Dimiliievich of lhe
Belgiade Cenlie foi Human Righls wiole waining aboul lhe collaleial
damage lo demociacy`` and \eian Malic, head of lhe independenl iadio
slalion B-92, complained aboul NATO`s decision, calling il |bjombing
lhe baby wilh lhe balhwalei.`` Leadeis of some Seibian human iighls
gioups, nolably lhe Humanilaiian Law Cenlie and lhe Seibian Helsinki
Gioup, suppoiled NATO`s use of foice, which led lo lheii osliacism and
endangeimenl once lhe bombs slailed lo fall. Theii leadeis lefl lhe
counliy aflei lhe NATO bombing began.
The NGO seaich foi effeclive slialegies
The emeigence of elhnic and ieligious sliuggles, genocide in Rwanda and
Bosnia, massive iefugee oulows since lhe eaily 199Os, and lhe foices of
globalizalion have all bioughl a seaich by non-goveinmenlal oiganiza-
lions lhioughoul lhe woild foi new solulions and means of aclion, lhiough
pievenlive diplomacy and humanilaiian inleivenlion. Many abuses loday
aie beyond lhe conliol of leadeis, allhough many aie in facl sliiied up
by lhem. NGOs have iecognized lhal combaling lhem oflen iequiies
new slialegies. n lhe 198Os and 199Os, lhe human iighls movemenl
changed ils appioach fiom lhe meie diafling of inleinalional slandaids lo
adopling a commilmenl lo inplcncnt lhe slandaids. Iffoils lo develop
moie piofessional moniloiing of human iighls condilions emeiged. Non-
goveinmenlal oiganizalions giew in numbei and sophislicalion as advo-
cales focused on lhe liealmenl of individuals, pailiculaily piisoneis. The
piedominanl paiadigm of human iighls iepiession was an aulhoiilaiian
leadei, who caused polilical iepiession of dissidenls and who, when pies-
suied enough, fieed people simply by issuing an oidei. Change occuiied
one piisonei al a lime. The laclics used weie lhe mobilizalion of shame``
(i.e. moniloiing followed by public iepoiling). Allhough lhe movemenl
was commilled lo univeisalily of bolh human iighls noims and lhe need
lo implemenl lhem fully and lo impailialily in assessing compliance
wilh noims, il undeislood lhal il would succeed in only some cases and in
only some of lhe places wheie human iighls abuses occuiied. The human
iighls oiganizalions, dedicaled above all lo speaking oul publicly, nevei
iefiained fiom calling foi a iesponse lo lhe abuses in Kosovo specincally
because lhe iesponse would nol be applied eveiywheie. Speaking oul
aboul a case on which inleinalional allenlion was focused was nol, lo lhe
movemenl, seleclive indignalion``; ialhei, il was a lechnique lhal mighl
biing bioad iesulls. Human iighls gioups would see lheii focus of con-
cein and aclivism in Kosovo as consliluling effeclive indignalion.``
The Kosovo ciisis challenged NGOs lo exploie how besl lo be effeclive
in pievenling aliocilies and slopping lhose alieady in piogiess. Many
gioups conlinued lo funclion along familiai palhs: pioviding humani-
laiian assislance; moniloiing and iepoiling; woiking lo expand undei-
slanding`` among disliuslful peoples. Bul olheis liied lo nnd appiopiiale
new laclics lhal would ulilize moie aclivisl and pioleclive lechniques.
Ioi example, lhe Boslon-based Physicians foi Human Righls (PHR),
which had begun wilh moniloiing and iepoiling on human iighls, pailic-
ulaily lhose affecling doclois and lhe piovision of heallh seivices, dis-
linguished ilself in Bosnia by ils vilal foiensic woik foi lhe nleinalional
Ciiminal Tiibunal. n Kosovo, PHR called foi lhe use of foice lo pievenl
genocide, explaining lhal lhe gioup was dedicaled lo lhe view lhal nevei
again would PHR counlenance lhe inleinalional communily slanding idly
by in lhe face of genocide and mass aliocilies as il had in Bosnia oi, moie
iecenlly, Rwanda. Holly Buikhallei of PHR has wiillen: lhe lwo liag-
edies weie similai in lhal lhe inleinalional communily had monlhs of
eaily waining signs of a caiefully planned campaign lo deslioy an elhnic
gioup. . . . Because lhe eaily days of lhe Kosovo conicl boie all lhe ugly
hallmaiks of Milosevic`s foui yeai wai in Bosnia and because of lhe
woild`s inaclion in Rwanda, PHR issued an eaily appeal foi an inlei-
nalional peace-making` foice.`` Lalei, PHR would call foi giound lioops,
again aiguing lhal lhis would be lhe mosl pioleclive of people on lhe
giound.5 ndeed, lhe seaich foi new laclics among NGOs conceined wilh
Kosovo ieecled lhe expeiiences of many of lhe veiy same gioups in lhe
iecenl pasl in Bosnia, and wilh Seib leadei Slobodan Milosevic in pai-
liculai. Some also bioughl a bioadei concein aboul nnding moie effeclive
means of piolecling civilians and inleinally displaced peisons in similai
ciicumslances.
Some of lhe NGOs abioad foimed ad hoc coalilions, which held iegu-
lai meelings and ciiculaled vilal infoimalion lo olheis in communilies of
concein. Among lhese was lhe Open Sociely nslilule (Soios Iounda-
lion) in Washinglon DC, which oiganized lhe Kosovo Aclion Coalilion,
consisling of a mixluie of humanilaiian, human iighls, and policy gioups
lhal mel iegulaily and ciiculaled a iegulai infoimalion bullelin on e-mail
nelwoiks. Ixploiing new slialegies and laclics was a conslanl focus of lhe
gioups, always wilh lhe pioleclion of lhe civilian populalion of Kosovo as
a key concein.
The Kosovo ciisis wenl lhiough a numbei of diffeienl slages. Howevei,
all of lhem weie maiked by human iighls abuses. ndeed, a seiies of mas-
sacies of civilians in 19981999 became a spiingboaid foi inleinalional
aclion lo iesolve lhe ciisis. Human iighls gioups weie among lhe mosl
vocal in calling foi inleinalional aclion in iesponse, bul lhey favouied a
moniloiing piesence nol lhe use of foice, wilh some exceplions as noled
above. This ieecled lhe human iighls communily`s dominanl paiadigm:
moniloiing and public iepoiling as a successful means of shaming gov-
einmenls inlo compliance wilh human iighls noims.6
To call foi aimed foice?
Allhough calls foi inleinalional involvemenl in lhe ciisis weie common,
many NGOs lefl lhe piecise aclions lhey soughl undenned; olheis have
gone so fai as lo call foi lhe use of foice. Seveial NGOs (such as lhe
\ienna-based nleinalional Helsinki Iedeialion, woiking wilh local
Balkan afnliales) insisled lhal lhe Secuiily Council endoise any move
lowaids using aimed foice, laking a legalislic appioach opposed lo
inleinalional aimed inleivenlion wilhoul lhe \N Secuiily Council`s
appioval, wheieas olheis (such as lhe Biussels-based nleinalional Ciisis
Gioup oi Boslon-based Physicians foi Human Righls) did nol cile lhe
\niled Nalions` iole as a necessaiy pieiequisile lo deploying aimed
foice. nslead, lhey addiessed lhe conicl fiom a moialislic peispeclive,
seeing an uigenl need foi inleivenlion and lhe use of foice lo piolecl
human beings, end aliocious violalions of human iighls, piovide uigenlly
needed humanilaiian assislance, and pievenl genocide. Theii views ie-
ecl an incieasing lendency in lhe inleinalional communily lowaids lwo
foims of inleivenlion: piolecling human iighls wheie lhey aie being
liampled on, and inleivening in humanilaiian emeigencies lo save lives.
Howevei, lheie weie also many NGOs lhal slopped shoil of calling
foi aimed foice, while speaking oul foi some ill-denned foim of inleina-
lional aclion lo aid oi piolecl lhe Kosovo Albanian civilian populalion.
(Human Righls Walch is peihaps lhe mosl visible example of lhe lallei,
allhough many humanilaiian oiganizalions such as Me decins sans Iion-
lie` ies oi Meicy Coips fall inlo lhis calegoiy.) Theii indeleiminale ie-
sponse on lhe issue of foice ieecls a geneial ieluclance of humanilaiian
and even many human iighls oiganizalions lo call publicly foi lhe use of
violence oi aimed foice in inleinalional affaiis oi domeslic life. Many of
lhe oiganizalions aclive in lhe NGO secloi weie nimly commilled lo non-
violence and, allhough iecognizing lhe need lo do somelhing,`` weie nol
piepaied inslilulionally lo call foi lhe use of violence casually. nslead,
lhey called foi sliicl obseivance of and compliance wilh lhe law
emphasizing inleinalional humanilaiian and human iighls law goveining
liealmenl of civilians.
The monlhs lhal followed lhe emeigence of lhe Kosovo ciisis in Ieb-
iuaiy 1998 saw human iighls and humanilaiian gioups, whelhei fiom lhe
iegion ilself oi fiom abioad, liying lo soil oul lheii posilions on lhe issue
of whal should be done and whelhei oi nol aimed foice would play a
iole. Many of lhose lhal had been aclive in lhe iegion oi in lhe ciisis
in Bosnia believed lhal lhe only facloi lhal had peisuaded`` Seibian
Piesidenl Slobodan Milosevic lo ieach a peace agieemenl al Daylon
was lhe bombing campaign launched by lhe \SjNATO in lale Augusl
Seplembei 1995 and lhe Cioalian mililaiy vicloiies in Kia|ina. Olheis
weie peisuaded lhal il was lhe polilical agieemenl lo iecognize an enlily
called Republika Sipska`` lhal aclually bioughl lhe Bosnian Seibs lo lhe
negolialing lable. Slill olheis aigued lhal Kosovo was a lolally diffeienl
silualion, even lhough lhe piincipal acloi, Milosevic, was lhe same.
Mosl human iighls and humanilaiian gioups did nol call foi aimed
inleivenlion pei se. Some lhal called lhe loudesl oi mosl poignanlly foi
nim inleinalional aclion, such as Human Righls Walch oi Amnesly
nleinalional, nevei called foi lhe use of foice. Physicians foi Human
Righls and a few olhei gioups weie ma|oi exceplions lo lhis, based
laigely on lheii conviclion lhal slopping abuses and pievenling genocide
iequiied such aclion in lhe iegion.
Human iighls aclivism had long ago laken an inleivenlionisl posilion,
pulling aside lhe issue of soveieignly when il came lo moniloiing and
iepoiling on such abuses. As massacies look place, local and foieign
human iighls gioups weie speedy lo piovide infoimalion lo one anolhei,
lo lhe piess and public, as well as lo inleinalional oiganizalions on lhe
scene. The piompl invesligalion of lhe massacies, pailiculaily al Goin|e
Obiin|e and Racak, showing Seibian foices acling againsl unaimed civil-
ians, even young childien, piopelled lhe inleinalional communily lo a
moie inleivenlionisl posluie wilh iegaid lo Kosovo, evenlually piessing
foi lhe Rambouillel confeience.
Humanilaiian gioups conlinued lo piovide assislance lo local popula-
lions. Allhough lhey may have wilnessed aliocilies, lhey did nol publicly
iepoil on lhem oi publicly call foi lhe use of foice. They did complain
somelimes aboul humanilaiian access being denied; in some inslances,
lhey called upon olheis localed abioad lo make lhose announcemenls.
Policy advocacy gioups weie by fai lhe mosl diiecl and vocal on lhe
issue of lhe use of foice. The nleinalional Ciisis Gioup and lhe Balkan
Aclion Council commenled on viilually eveiy ma|oi developmenl ovei
lhe monlhs lhal followed. They advised and iepoiled on evenls, policies,
and even lhe Rambouillel negolialions lo lhe NGO public lhiough e-mails
and public slalemenls.
Why did NGOs diffei on lhe issue of using foice in Kosovo?
Dijjcrcnt norns
As oullined eailiei, non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions aclive in lhe ciisis
in Kosovo have been quile vaiied in lheii puiposes, aclions, and public
advocacy. Many of lhe NGO pailicipanls, pailiculaily lhe human iighls
and humanilaiian gioups, base lheii aclivilies in lhe neld on pailiculai
legal noims and woik lo build awaieness and iespecl foi lhose noims.
Many documenl compliance wilh lhose noims. Olheis liy lo implemenl
lhem. A measuie of lheii own effecliveness is how much lhey piomole
aclionable concein oi indignalion`` aboul lhe aclual implemenlalion of
lhose noims. This is pailiculaily liue of human iighls oiganizalions, bolh
domeslic and inleinalional.
The noims emphasized by lhe vaiious NGOs weie lhemselves some-
limes quile dislincl. Many human iighls gioups had long focused on dis-
ciiminaloiy liealmenl of Albanians in Kosovo, noling lhal inleinalional
noims afniming non-disciiminalion on giounds of iace, foi example, aie
embedded in lhe \N Chailei and eveiy ma|oi inleinalional human iighls
liealy. n lhe \niled Nalions, iacial disciiminalion is denned lo include
elhnic disciiminalion as well, so lhe noims cleaily apply lo lhe Kosovo
Albanians. Similaily, noims of non-disciiminalion on lhe giounds of ieli-
gion can be liaced lo lhe Chailei ilself. Bolh foims of non-disciiminalion
aie non-deiogable and cannol be suspended in limes of public emeigency.
Human iighls gioups have dislinguished lhemselves lhiough lheii
moniloiing of lhe implemenlalion of civil and polilical iighls docu-
menling violalions such as delenlion, loiluie, lack of due piocess, and
iepiession of lhe media and independenl expiession. Many Kosovo Al-
banian NGOs had long emphasized lhe inleinalional human iighls noims
iegaiding self-goveinance and pailicipalion in eleclions and policy foi-
mulalion in one`s own sociely lhal aie embedded in inleinalional human
iighls insliumenls.
Having been denied lhe iighl lo pailicipale in self-goveinance and
ielaled fieedoms, il was a shoil hop foi many Albanians ofncials and
NGOs alike lo aigue lhal lhe piimaiy aim musl now be lo exeicise lheii
iighl lo self-deleiminalion. Human iighls gioups had oflen come face lo
face wilh lhe queslion of whelhei and in whal ciicumslances lhey upheld
lhe noim of self-deleiminalion, which is embedded as lhe veiy nisl ailicle
of bolh oveiaiching inleinalional human iighls liealies lhe nlei-
nalional Covenanl on Civil and Polilical Righls and lhe nleinalional
Covenanl on Iconomic, Social, and Culluial Righls. eais ago, some
human iighls gioups, such as Human Righls Walch, had sel aside such
queslions wilh lhe aigumenl lhal, in essence, lhe self-deleiminalion of
peoples is a polilical queslion. Olheis disagiee, seeing il as lhe nisl iighl.
Ioi lhe legal puiisl, consumed by lhe issue of upholding inleinalional
noims, self-deleiminalion had been given a ceilain piide of place in lhe
\niled Nalions syslem. Admilledly, il had nol achieved a similai slalus in
lhe OSCI oi Iuiopean syslems wheie non-change of inleinalional
boideis had a giealei value. Bul il was dennilely one of lhe noims lhal
many NGOs looked lo inleinalional oiganizalions, pailiculaily lhe \niled
Nalions, lo uphold.
Seibian aulhoiilies emphasize lhal, despile Kosovo`s claim of giiev-
ances, lhe Seibian and olhei minoiilies in lhe iegion have lheii iighls loo,
and lhal lhe iighls of a minoiily do nol and cannol oveiiide lhe iighls of
lhe ma|oiily. This aigumenl has a ceilain logic, bul much depends upon
wheie and how one dennes lhe leiiiloiy in which iighls pievail. Seibs
poinl lo all of Seibia as lhe conlexl; Kosovais lo lhe iegion of Kosovo
ilself. Bolh have a claim, bul lhe diieclion of much cuiienl inleinalional
lhinking in cases such as apailheid Soulh Afiica has been lo side wilh
lhe abused populalion in a silualion of endemic disciiminalion and abuse.
(Many goveinmenls considei self-deleiminalion lo be nol a iighl of indi-
viduals bul ialhei a iighl of nalions. When viewed lhis way, lhe queslion
quickly becomes an issue of colleclive iighls vs. individual iighls an
aiea in which lheie is slill ielalively lillle guidance fiom human iighls
|uiispiudence.)
Conicls of iighls aie common. The iesolulion of such conicls has nol
been well developed in inleinalional human iighls law. Ailicle 29 of lhe
\niveisal Declaialion of Human Righls slales lhal, in lhe exeicise of
one`s iighls, eveiyone shall be sub|ecl only lo such limilalions as aie
deleimined by law solely foi lhe puipose of secuiing due iecognilion and
iespecl foi lhe iighls of olheis.`` l also adds lhe |usl iequiiemenls`` of
moialily, public oidei, and lhe geneial welfaie. Ailicle 3O slales lhal no
slale, gioup, oi peison has lhe iighl lo peifoim any acl aimed al lhe
desliuclion of any of lhe iighls and fieedoms sel foilh heiein.`` The lwo
Covenanls echo lhese iesliiclions. n simplei leims, one peison`s iighls
and fieedoms cannol be used lo undeimine anolhei`s. This suiely holds
liue foi Seibs, bul il is equally liue foi Kosovais. f anylhing, lhis piovi-
sion bolsleis lhe claims of Kosovo Albanians as iegaids lhe abuses of
human iighls by lhe Seibian aulhoiilies.
Howevei, lhe ieal conicl is nol belween self-deleiminalion and lhe
olhei iighls of lhe \niveisal Declaialion: one can even aigue lhal self-
deleiminalion (howevei il is denned) is a necessaiy condilion foi lhe ex-
eicise of all olhei iighls and lheie is a ieady complemenlaiily among lhem.
The conicl of noims lhal has been iaised oflen pils self-deleiminalion
againsl leiiiloiial inlegiily which is in many ways moie a polilical lhan a
human iighls queslion. Similaily, goveinmenls oflen aigue lhal lhe noim
of soveieignly (\N Chailei Ailicle (7)) liumps iespecl foi human
iighls (\N Chailei, one of lhe foui puiposes of lhe woild oiganizalion,
and Ailicles 55 and 56, calling foi |oinl and sepaiale aclion lo uphold
lhem). The enliie developmenl of lhe human iighls movemenl has been a
case sludy of how soveieignly is limiled, how much il is deiived fiom lhe
concepl of lhe will of lhe people, and how counliies cannol use lhe aigu-
menl of soveieignly as a shield lo avoid sciuliny and foi iuleis lo use lo
mallieal lheii own cilizens. Human iighls aclivisls have been al lhe foie-
fionl of inleinalional effoils lhal have changed lhe woild oidei so lhal
lhe noim of soveieignly is nol immulable oi unyielding. The call foi lhe
inleinalional communily lo do somelhing`` aboul Kosovo has, lheiefoie,
been veiy much in lhe mainslieam of lhe human iighls communily`s
noimalive guideposls.
Humanilaiian oiganizalions have been devoled lo upholding inleina-
lional humanilaiian noims, including lhose goveining lhe liealmenl of
iefugees and inleinally displaced peisons, lhe deliveiy of humanilaiian
aid and ielief, and lhe piovision of pioleclion. Theii piimaiy puipose has
lended lo be lhe ielief of suffeiing. This is oflen easiesl lo accomplish if
gioups woik lhiough aulhoiilies, ialhei lhan againsl lhem. The oigani-
zalional culluie of humanilaiian gioups has lheiefoie been noim-based
bul nol one of piolesl and pailiculaily nol of public piolesl againsl lhe
aulhoiilies. Coopeialion is highly valued as a means of opeialing.
n iecenl yeais, howevei, humanilaiian oiganizalions, led nolably by
Me decins sans Iionlie` ies, have become moie pio-aclive. They have liied
lo ieach viclims wheievei help is needed even if lhis somelimes means
opeialing wilhoul a goveinmenl`s consenl oi in opposilion lo ils wishes.
This logic has led lo lhe concepl of lhe iighl lo inleivene, including in
some inslances lhe need lo cieale humanilaiian coiiidois lo ensuie lhal
individuals ieceive ielief. This concepl has challenged lhe noims of non-
inleifeience in inleinal affaiis and lhe soveieignly of slales in myiiad
ways. Taken lo ils logical conclusion, il would include a |uslincalion of
inleivenlion lo fiee oppiessed people fiom lyianls oi fiom ullei slaiva-
lion oi ceilain dealh. n many ways ils basis is moie in moial noims lhan
in legal noims, bul bolh can and have been invoked.
Dijjcrcnt ncans. Vhat arc thc rcstraints on NCO action?
Ioi bolh human iighls and humanilaiian oiganizalions, legal noims and
lhe moial piecepls fiom which lhey aie oflen deiived hold piide of
place. As oiganizalions devoled lo impioving adheience lo inleinalional
insliumenls oi lo ielieving suffeiing, lhey seek lo emphasize lhe impoi-
lance of ulilizing and abiding by lhose noims. 1usl as lhey seek lo hold
goveinmenls lo accounl, so loo lhey seek lo funclion in a iule-based en-
viionmenl. The veiy oiganizalions lhal aie seeking lo change lhe inlei-
nalional enviionmenl and enliench and heighlen lhe impoilance of lhe
noims lhey uphold in lhe inleinalional aiena aie lhus among lhe mosl
commilled lo upholding lhe inleinalional legal oidei as a whole.
el, as desciibed above, lheie aie in|uslices lhal each communily seeks
lo coiiecl in ils advocacy. 1usl as lhe \N Chailei seeks lo nnd a solulion
lo inleinalional conicl lhiough peaceful means, so lhe human iighls and
humanilaiian oiganizalions seek lo save lives and have a ceilain aveision
lo lhe use of foice. The whole developmenl of inleinalional inslilulions
has been lo biing oidei inlo woild affaiis and ieduce lhe use of violence
as a means of sellling dispules. The veiy nisl inleinalional human iighls
liealy was lhe Convenlion Againsl Genocide, adopled in 1948 on lhe day
bcjorc lhe \niveisal Declaialion of Human Righls. Slales have an obli-
galion lo pievenl genocide and lo biing ils peipelialois lo |uslice. The
means by which one is lo pievenl genocide aie lhus, in one sense, legal
invoking lhe convenlion`s obligalions on slales and, al lhe same lime,
moial saving lives.
Ioi lhe humanilaiian oiganizalion, as foi lhe human iighls oiganiza-
lion, lhe ullimale lesl of effecliveness is whelhei people have been pio-
lecled fiom abuse. Human iighls oiganizalions such as some of lhe gioups
desciibed in lhis chaplei, Physicians foi Human Righls among lhem, may
be devoled lo legal noims, bul lhey wanl piaclical iesulls. How many
piisoneis have been fieed? How many people saved fiom slaivalion?
How many saved fiom dealh in aimed conicl oi fiom genocide?
The developmenl of lhe concepl of humanilaiian inleivenlion slems
fiom such a piaclical appioach and lhe impalience lhal goes wilh com-
milmenl lo lhe moial aim of saving lives. el humanilaiian gioups musl
be able lo woik on lhe giound and gel lheii supplies lhiough. n geneial,
lhey have been commilled lo lhe concepl of nol using foice, excepl when
il is necessaiy lo secuie a bioad aiea foi humanilaiian puiposes. l is
lheiefoie no suipiise lhal mosl humanilaiian oiganizalions did nol pub-
licly call foi lhe use of foice. Theie weie a few exceplions, foi example
Refugees nleinalional, which called foi a ciedible lhieal of foice, nol ils
aclual use, and lhe nleinalional Rescue Commillee, wheie lheie was
gieal concein ovei lhe iisk lo membeis of lhe oiganizalion based on lhe
giound in Bosnia and enviions.
Some of lhe individuals and oiganizalions lhal spoke oul duiing lhe
Kosovo ciisis (such as lhe Wai Resisleis League) aie nimly commilled lo
non-violence as a noim and a laclic. Bul olheis see il diffeienlly: aimed
foice may indeed be used in inleinalional ielalions, bul only when legally
peimilled undei lhe \N Chailei. This could be when lhe Secuiily
Council dennes a silualion as a lhieal lo peace and secuiily undei Chap-
lei \, when a slale musl use foice in self-defence (Ail. 51). Ixceplion-
ally, lhis could be by invoking lhe Genocide Convenlion, when genocide
is laking place. Slill olheis view lhe use of foice fiom a moial peispeclive,
peimilling foice lo be used as an insliumenl of |uslice, mosl cleaily in a
case such as genocide. Naluially, many feai lhe slippeiiness of lhe moial
appioach ovei lhe legal. (And, wheieas some see inleivenlion as an
insliumenl of global values, pieseiving aulonomy and fieedom and
people`s iighl lo be fiee fiom genocide, olheis feai lhal a gieen lighl lo
foicible inleivenlions will lead lo a ieluin of lhe impeiialisl and coloni-
alisl dominalion of small and weakei poweis of an eailiei eia in inlei-
nalional ielalions.)
Physicians foi Human Righls look a piincipled moialjlegal posilion
lhal lhe aim was lo pievenl anolhei genocide. The pallein known fiom
Bosnia and piioi dealing wilh Milosevic made il cleai lo lhem lhal foice
had lo be used lo save lives. When lalk of NATO bombing (and bombing
alone) giew in lhe fall of 1998, PHR once again iecognized lhal lhe goal
lo save lives and piolecl people iequiied lhal pioleclion be pail of lhe
picluie. PHR lheiefoie called foi giound lioops so lhal people would be
piolecled in ways lhal bombing alone could nol achieve. On 22 1anuaiy
1999, following lhe Racak massacie, PHR slaled lhal decisive aclion``
was needed lo avoid fuilhei aliocilies.`` All necessaiy means`` should
be employed lo piolecl civilians fiom delibeiale allack and aliocily``
including giound lioops wilh an explicil mandale lo enfoice a cessalion
of hoslililies, piolecl civilians, and pievenl wai ciimes in accoidance wilh
inleinalional law.`` This slalemenl shows a cleai mixing of PHR`s em-
phasis on moialily, pioleclion, and legalily. Ioice was an insliumenl of
|uslice and pioleclion bul only if lhe aclions laken by lhose using il
weie in accoid wilh inleinalional law. Ioice did nol have lo be sanc-
lioned in aJvancc by lhe \niled Nalions in accoid wilh inleinalional law
only implemenled by lhe book.
Lalei, when lhe allied bombing campaign began on 24 Maich (neaily a
yeai lo lhe day aflei Piesidenl Clinlon`s visil lo Rwanda and his assui-
ances lhal inleinalional aclion againsl genocide would be much swiflei in
lhe fuluie), lheie weie incidenls of collaleial damage lo civilians iesull-
ing fiom NATO bombing. PHR spoke oul againsl NATO`s aclions, con-
linuing lo aigue lhal lhe laws of wai apply even lo lhose engaging in a
|usl use of foice. n facl, il faulled NATO foi iefusing lo use low-ying
helicopleis lhal would have been less likely lo hil civilian laigels. Aiming
al civilian oi dual-use laigels, PHR has explained, became moie likely
piecisely because lhe NATO planes weie lhiee miles above lhe giound.
Howevei effeclive lhe iesull, PHR aigued il was nol compalible wilh
humanilaiian law.``
Human Righls Walch, in conliasl, nevei foimally called foi lhe use of
foice. Thioughoul lhe conicl, no olhei human iighls oiganizalion did as
much lo diaw inleinalional allenlion lo lhe massacies and lo infoim and
mobilize inleinalional public opinion. HRW`s limely iepoiling in luin
liiggeied inleinalional aclivily lo biing aboul a polilical (and, lalei, a
mililaiy) solulion lo lhe conicl. Oui slienglh and ma|oi conliibulion lo
lhe public debale is ieseaich,`` explained HRW`s lop neld ieseaichei on
Kosovo, Iied Abiahams.
Accoiding lo Human Righls Walch execulive diiecloi Ken Rolh,
Highlighling lhe killing played a key iole in aleiling lhe inleinalional
communily.`` Al key poinls, inleinalional aclion was diiven by lhe mas-
sacies. el HRW nevei ciossed lhe line lo iequesl foice oi lo sign a |oinl
slalemenl demanding all necessaiy means`` oi similai bioad language.
Rolh explained lhal lhe oiganizalion will advise on lhe use of foice only
if il is lhe sole effeclive oplion available`` lo slop genocide oi compaia-
ble mass killing, and, despile all ils calls foi inleinalional engagemenl and
aclion, HRW nevei made a nnding of genocide, which would have liig-
geied lhe applicalion of HRW`s policy on lhe use of aimed foice. When
lhe NATO foices and polilical leadeis began iefeiiing lo lhe silualion al
lhe beginning of Apiil as genocide, Human Righls Walch issued a slale-
menl lo lhe piess explaining, in effecl, why il was nol genocide. Rolh ex-
plained lhal duiing lhe wai ilself we did nol have lhe evidence lo call il
genocide.``7 Lalei, HRW loo would condemn NATO`s use of cluslei
bombs and damage lo civilians duiing lhe allacks.
Allhough many slaff membeis and some on lhe boaid of lhe oiganiza-
lion aie opposed allogelhei lo lhe use of foice, lhal is nol liue of lhe oi-
ganizalion as a whole. Howevei, once NATO inleivened, HRW undei-
slood ils voice would nol be decisive on lhe use of foice and lhe issue
became mool.
Al no poinl was lhe iole of lhe \N Secuiily Council held up as deci-
sive. HRW piides ilself on being piaclical: if we know il`s genocide and
lhe Secuiily Council is deadlocked, lheie`s slill a duly lo acl foicibly lo
slop il,`` explains Rolh. HRW nevei ciilicized NATO pei se foi going in
lo save lives in Kosovo. l did, howevei, ciilicize lhe ncans cnploycJ by
NATO when lhey weie al odds wilh inleinalional noims, causing civilian
casuallies.8
A key elemenl in lhe Kosovo ciisis was lhe degiee lo which NGOs
woiked logelhei, shaiing infoimalion, foiming coalilions, and emphasiz-
ing common conceins. Seen fiom lhal peispeclive, one could indeed iefei
lo lhem as foiming an independenl`` voice of civil sociely oi al leasl
some seclois of il. Togelhei lhey offeied new ideas and piaclical slial-
egies lhal weie oflen diffeienl fiom lhose of lhe slales foimally chaiged
wilh lhe iesponsibilily lo solve`` lhe ciisis.
The mosl dislinclive conliibulions of lhe NGOs weie pioviding infoi-
malion aboul ielevanl noims and lheii violalions, and pioviding seivices
lo lhe populalion al iisk. They offeied independenl infoimalion, eaily
waining, and pioposals aboul lhe pioleclion of civilians lhal weie oflen
picked up by goveinmenls and inleinalional bodies as lhe conicl
developed.
The use of foice was lhe single mosl vigoiously debaled issue among
and wilhin NGOs, pailiculaily in lhe nine monlhs piioi lo lhe NATO
inleivenlion. Bul lhese debales look place oul of public view, among lhe
pailicipanls in a communily of concein, in coalilions, and acioss e-mail
boaids. Some NGOs neld-based human iighls and humanilaiian NGOs
in pailiculai lhal had nevei pieviously advocaled foice called foi il in
lhe face of conlinued noim violalions and aliocilies. Some lhal called foi
il changed lheii views aflei NATO bombaidmenls began, and olheis only
aflei collaleial damage occuiied. Olheis called foi sliongei engagemenl
(e.g. giound lioops).
Assessing lhe NGO impacl: Iffeclive indignalion?``
This chaplei has begun lo claiify lhe ways in which lhe laclics ulilized by
NGOs in lhe Kosovo ciisis had ceilain vilally impoilanl iesulls:
1. They exposed lhe killings and olhei abuses, including lhe humanilai-
ian blockade, and lheieby mobilized shame`` lhiough caieful docu-
menlalion and limely public advocacy lo end lhe abuses.
2. They communicaled wilh decision makeis and lhe public al laige al
bolh lhe nalional and inleinalional level. Aimed wilh piecise infoi-
malion, communicaled peisuasively, NGOs oflen sel lhe agendas of
goveinmenls and inleinalional oiganizalions, as well as media iepie-
senlalives, encouiaging lhem lo addiess ceilain olheiwise unnoliced
issues, such as lhe humanilaiian blockade, lhe dangei of lhe pioposal
lo suppoil lhe Seibian humanilaiian cenlies, lhe behavioui of Seibian
foices againsl Albanian civilians, and lhe need foi human iighls mon-
iloiing and pioleclion slialegies.
3. They deliveied seivices, fiom food aid and medical assislance lo con-
veying infoimalion fiom local NGOs.
The NGO secloi cleaily inuenced lhe infoimalion available lo inlei-
nalional aclois; lhe liming of inleinalional iesponses; lhe conlenl of
Secuiily Council iesolulions on humanilaiian and human iighls issues;
lhe decision lo send Ambassadoi Holbiooke lo seek lhe Oclobei 1998
agieemenl; lhe inclusion of a sliong human iighls piesence in lhe Kosovo
\eiincalion Mission; lhe delails of lhe Rambouillel negolialions; lhe
emphasis on access foi humanilaiian assislance and pioleclion of civilians;
lhe piessuie foi lhe nleinalional Ciiminal Tiibunal on foimei ugoslavia
lo demand access and a piesence in Kosovo.
l is less cleai, howevei, whelhei lhe NGO communily played a deci-
sive iole in inuencing lhe aclual decision lo employ foice. Allhough
lheie weie conlinuing demands fiom lhe NGO secloi foi inleinalional
aclion,`` and lheie was abundanl evidence of aliocious behavioui by Seib
foices in Kosovo, lheie was fai less claiily and unily among NGOs on
whelhei oi nol lo use foice. By and laige, calls foi lhe use of foice came
fiom ielalively few NGOs, wilh lhe mosl sliidenl coming fiom lhe policy
NGOs localed oulside lhe iegion. l is liue, of couise, lhal Kosovo
Albanians iepoiledly woie l-shiils saying NATO Aii: 1usl Do l.`` Bul,
whalevei lhe local senlimenls, veiy few gioups on lhe giound would
publicly suppoil such inleivenlion. The ieasons, as oullined above, ie-
ecled lhe legal and moial noims lhey devole lhemselves lo upholding
4OO OPNON, MIDA, C\L SOCIT
and enfoicing globally and an aveision lo lhe use of violence in sellling
inleinalional dispules.
Noles
1. n lhe piepaialion of lhis chaplei, consulled lhe aclions and slalemenls of scoies of
oiganizalions and piepaied a lenglhy chionology of NGO slalemenls and appeals. Be-
cause of space limilalions, lhis chionology is nol included heie. Howevei, il is available
on iequesl fiom lhe aulhoi, and will foim lhe coie of a subsequenl sludy on NGOs and
lhe use of aimed foice.
2. See Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Goidenkei, eds., NCOs, thc UN, anJ Clobal Covcr-
nancc, Bouldei, CO: Lynne Riennei Publisheis, 1996, pp. 1819.
3. See 1ulie Meilus, Kosovo. How Myths anJ Truths StartcJ a Var, Beikeley: \niveisily of
Califoinia Piess, 1999, pp. 236242.
4. bid., pp. 236242.
5. See H. Buikhallei, Iacing up lo Genocide: The Obligalion lo nleivene,`` 1ournal oj
McJicinc anJ Clobal Survival, \ol. 6, No. 1, 1999, pp. 5153.
6. nfoimalion fiom Human Righls Walch and olhei gioups was oflen incoipoialed in lhe
ofncial iepoils of lhe \N Special Rappoileui on foimei ugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazo-
wiecki of Poland, who addiessed lhe issue as one of minoiily iighls.
7. nleiview by me.
8. bid.
NGOS AND THI INIORCIMINT OI NORMS 4O1
rt even
poreD diplomyD nd the
interntionl ommunity
25
The inevilabilily of seleclive
iesponse? Piinciples lo guide
uigenl inleinalional aclion
1ori Iislcr Danrosch
s il possible lo develop ciileiia oi even guidelines foi inleinalional
inleivenlion in ciisis silualions, in oidei lo come closei lo a piincipled``
iesponse, in lhe dual sense of coiiesponding lo fundamenlal moial and
legal noims and of liealing like cases alike? Concein wilh piinciple and
piincipled applicalion aie ciilical if lhe syslem of inleinalional ielalions is
lo evolve beyond meie slale inleiesl and powei polilics lowaid fulnlmenl
of lhe aspiialion foi lhe iule of law. Ciilics of inleinalional law complain
lhal a syslem can haidly qualify as law`` when ils iules aie enfoiced only
seleclively and only in accoidance wilh lhe piefeiences of gieal poweis
(oi of lhe \niled Slales as loday`s pie-eminenl woild powei). Such ciili-
cisms have been diiecled againsl lhe mililaiy inleivenlion in Kosovo, as
in lhe fiequenl conlenlions lhal lhe inleivenois have ignoied olhei al
leasl equally egiegious violalions of human iighls and humanilaiian law,1
oi lhal lhe inleivening slales (some of lhem, anyway) aie nol fiee fiom
culpabilily foi oppiession of lheii own elhnic minoiilies oi fiom com-
plicily in genocidal conducl oi wai ciimes.
The appeal lo piinciple and lhe demand foi piincipled liealmenl of
compaiable cases have been nimly ensconced in inleinalional discouise
lhioughoul lhe decade of elhnic waifaie in foimei ugoslavia. These
calls have bolh an exleinal and an inleinal dimension: lhe inleinalional
iesponses lo lhe ugoslav silualion have become a iefeience poinl foi
ciises in olhei conlinenls, while al lhe same lime nalionalisl aclois wilhin
lhe foimei ugoslavia complain vocifeiously lhal lhey aie viclims of
4O5
unequal liealmenl. As an example of lhe exleinal vaiianl, wilhin lhe nisl
monlhs of lhe Secuiily Council`s effoils lo giapple wilh lhe ugoslav
conicl in 19911992, Secielaiy-Geneial Boulios Boulios-Ghali was
uiging lhe Council lo iespond as seiiously lo silualions of compaiable
giavily in Afiica as il had lo a Iuiopean ciisis. He conlinued lhis exhoi-
lalion lhioughoul his lenuie and has ieafnimed il in his iecenlly published
memoii, which diamalizes his disagieemenls wilh \S policy makeis.2 His
successoi, Kon Annan, made a similai poinl in his annual addiess lo lhe
Geneial Assembly a few monlhs aflei lhe Kosovo opeialion: f lhe new
commilmenl lo inleivenlion in lhe face of exlieme suffeiing is lo ielain
lhe suppoil of lhe woild`s peoples, il musl be and musl be seen lo be
faiily and consislenlly applied, iiiespeclive of iegion oi nalion. Humanily,
aflei all, is indivisible.``3 Iiom wilhin lhe iegion, widespiead Seibian
hoslilily lo inleinalional involvemenl in ugoslavia`s elhnic conicls in-
cludes lhe accusalion lhal inleinalional inslilulions lhe \niled Nalions,
lhe nleinalional Ciiminal Tiibunal foi lhe Ioimei ugoslavia (CT),
lhe Noilh Allanlic Tiealy Oiganisalion (NATO), oi Iuiopean oigans
have ignoied abuses peipelialed againsl Seibs by Cioals, Bosnian Mus-
lims, oi Kosovo Albanians (oi even lhe inleivening foices), which many
Seibs believe lo be |usl as shocking as lhe ones lhal molivaled lhe inlei-
nalional mililaiy inleivenlion in Kosovo. The lallei complainl may nol be
well founded on lhe facls of lhe mallei,4 bul il does suggesl lhe challenge
of secuiing adequale sliucluies foi piincipled enfoicemenl of inleina-
lional law.
The alliaclion of appeals lo piinciple may seem evidenl, bul lhe piem-
ises undeilying a supposed piefeience foi piincipled aclion aie iaiely
examined. The idea lhal iesponses lo fuluie Kosovo-like liagedies should
be giounded in a fiamewoik of piinciple may seek lo impoil inlo lhe
inleinalional syslem a sel of assumplions oi analogies deiived fiom
domeslic syslems, as if lhe inleinalional communily had al ils disposal lhe
equivalenl of a police foice, nie biigade, oi ambulance coips lo be dis-
palched lo lhe scene of life-lhiealening emeigencies. These analogies can
be misleading in lhe cuiienl slage of evolulion of inleinalional sliucluies.
To be suie, oigans foi emeigency iesponse weie envisioned in lhe \N
Chailei scheme (nolably in lhe piovisions of Ailicle 43 on mililaiy con-
lingenls lo be made available al lhe Secuiily Council`s call), bul lhey
have nevei become opeialional. PoslCold Wai pioposals foi eslablish-
ing one oi anolhei vaiianl of a iapid ieaclion foice undei cenlial conliol
aie likewise slill fai fiom being effeclive.5 And even if lhese capacily-
building piocesses could be haslened al lhe inleinalional level, lhey
would be fai fiom appioximaling domeslic law enfoicemenl and emei-
gency iesponse syslems wilh long expeiience sliiving foi a |usl allocalion
4O6 IORCI, DPLOMAC, AND THI NTIRNATONAL COMM\NT
of scaice iesouices a difncull enough aspiialion foi even lhe mosl ma-
luie socielies.
n an ideal woild, lhe communily as a whole would shaie iesponsibilily
foi lhe pioleclion of all ils membeis (ceilainly of ils weakesl ones),
whelhei fiom naluial disasleis oi fiom ciises bioughl aboul by man`s
inhumanily lo man. Also in an ideal woild one equipped wilh a iapid
ieaclion foice foi deploymenl lo fasl-bieaking ciises ciileiia lo govein
uses of such a foice would seem desiiable, on giounds of subslanlive
|uslice as well as efnciency in decision-making. Bul even a cuisoiy al-
lempl lo ailiculale a few guiding piinciples shows how elusive lhe exei-
cise would be. To boiiow one example fiom lhe innumeiable ieal-woild
dilemmas of lhe 199Os, if a foice of some 5,OOO lioops had been available
in spiing 1994, should lhe Secuiily Council have dispalched il uigenlly lo
Rwanda in an effoil lo foieslall an impending genocide (oi lo inleiiupl
lhe genocide-in-piogiess a few weeks lalei),6 oi should such a foice have
been used foi inlensined effoils lo piolecl Bosnian Muslims, alieady lhe
ob|ecls of genocidal allacks, who weie clusleied in safe aieas`` wilh no
safely al all?
Ciileiia foi making such agonizing choices could be based on a vaiiely
of consideialions, such as:
.
lhe magnilude of compeling ciises (How many lives aie al iisk? How
many lives could be saved?7);
.
lhe coiielalion lo fundamenlal human iighls noims (e.g. oveicoming
genocide compaied wilh pioviding eailhquake ielief);
.
lhe deleiience of fuluie violalions of inleinalional law;
.
lhe liack iecoid of pievious inleinalional involvemenl in lhe silualion,
including lhe moial iesponsibilily lo caiiy lhiough wilh pievious com-
milmenls oi lo miligale lhe adveise consequences of pasl decisions;
.
lhe likelihood lhal an inleivenlion will achieve ils ob|eclives;
.
lhe cosls and iisks of an inleivenlion, including collaleial haim lo
civilians and lhiid pailies.
Many olhei polenlially ielevanl faclois would affecl lhe aclual decision
on inleinalional iesponses lo calls foi uigenl aclion, bul lhese aie sug-
geslive of lhe complexilies involved.
Of couise, lhe woild as we know il does nol possess a cenlialized
secuiily capabilily. Ioi lhe foieseeable fuluie lhe ciisis-iesponse func-
lions will iemain decenlialized, wilh mililaiy foice supplied piimaiily by
slales and wilh many olhei emeigency seivices piovided by lhe non-
goveinmenlal and piivale volunlaiy secloi (along wilh conliibulions
fiom goveinmenlal and inleigoveinmenlal souices). Among lhese de-
cenlialized unils, any given one could have ils own ciileiia foi a decision
on when lo become involved in oveiseas ciises; foi example, lhe Clinlon
THI NI\TABLT OI SILICT\I RISPONSI? 4O7
adminislialion ailiculaled one such sel of guidelines while in lhe lhioes
of deleimining how lo iespond lo simullaneous piessuies foi aclion in
ugoslavia, Afiica, and Haili.8 Bul geneializing such piimaiily polilical
checklisls mighl nol be feasible oi even desiiable.9
As a skelch of some of lhe issues involved in sliiving foi piincipled
iesponses lo calls foi uigenl inleinalional aclion, lhe iemaindei of lhis
chaplei pioceeds in lhiee seclions. Iiisl, on lhe assumplion lhal lhe mil-
ilaiy componenl of such iesponses would have lo be fuinished piimaiily
by slales (in lhe absence of a slanding inleinalional foice), begin wilh a
biief glance al lhe legal fiamewoik applicable lo slales` mililaiy deci-
sions, in lighl of lhe challenge lo pie-exisling inleinalional law ieecled
in lhe Kosovo ciisis. Second, undeiscoie lhe impoilance of evalualing
lhe behavioui of all ielevanl aclois undei unifoim and univeisally ac-
cepled inleinalional slandaids of human iighls and humanilaiian law, so
lhal seiious violalions aie condemned and addiessed wilh measuies
along a speclium of polenlially coeicive enfoicemenl, even if mililaiy
inleivenlion is nol appiopiiale. Iinally, look al pioblems of seleclive
law enfoicemenl al lhe inleinalional level, wilh iefeience lo issues al lhe
CT.
Piinciples goveining slales` use of mililaiy foice: Piincipled
iules of iesliainl oi exible peimission lo inleivene?
As long as lhe deploymenl of mililaiy foice iemains piimaiily wilhin lhe
puiview of slales, lhe seaich foi applicable piinciples should begin wilh
lhe souices of inleinalional law on lhe use of foice, as expiessed in lhe
\N Chailei. Ioi mosl of lhe posl-1945 eia, lhe fundamenlal piinciples
goveining iesoil lo lhe use of mililaiy foice have been embodied in lhe
law of lhe Chailei, wilh ils geneial piohibilion on lhe lhieal oi use of
foice by slales,10 sub|ecl lo exceplions foi lhe inheienl iighl of self-
defence11 and foi measuies aulhoiized by lhe Secuiily Council in ie-
sponse lo lhieals lo lhe peace.12 Allhough a numbei of legal scholais and
olhei inlellecluals have long aigued in favoui of moie expansive lheoiies
foi lhe legilimale use of foice,13 lhe main body of goveinmenlal and \N
piaclice has iemained consislenl wilh lhe dominanl undeislanding of lhe
Chailei paiadigm.14
Aiguably, lhe Kosovo inleivenlion could maik a luining poinl in lhe
evalualion undei inleinalional law of humanilaiian inleivenlion lhe
inlensely conlioveisial claim lhal slales could legilimalely use foice
wilhin lhe leiiiloiy of anolhei slale when lhal slale has failed lo pievenl
massive aliocilies such as genocide.15 ndeed, lhe Kosovo ciisis has pie-
cipilaled a ie-examinalion of lhe humanilaiian inleivenlion debale by
some of lhe mosl piominenl scholais of inleinalional law fiom vaiious
counliies.16 Since olhei chapleis in lhe piesenl volume addiess lhese
queslions,17 will allude heie lo only one aspecl of lhe pioblem, namely
lhe concein lhal a docliine of humanilaiian inleivenlion could nol be
applied on a piincipled basis bul would piovide only a lianspaienl cloak
foi slales` polilically molivaled inleivenlions. Though lhal concein is nol
liivial, some commenlalois see il as manageable:
The facl lhal humanilaiian inleivenlion can seive as a pielexl foi achieving
polilical ob|eclives in anolhei slale aigues sliongly foi invalidaling mullinalional
oi unilaleial missions allogelhei. Bul mosl noims of inleinalional law can be
abused. Piofessoi Higgins has aplly obseived lhal so have lheie been counlless
abusive claims of lhe iighl lo self-defence.`` Thal does nol mean lhal lhe iighl lo
self-defence has ceased lo exisl.18
To lhe exlenl lhal lhe Kosovo inleivenlion seems lo have been undei-
laken foi bona nde humanilaiian ieasons,19 il may be less susceplible lo
lhe ciilicism of pielexlual ialionale lhan some olhei inslances wheie self-
inleiesled molivalions of lhe inleivenois may have piedominaled ovei
alliuislic ones. \aclav Havel wenl so fai as lo claim lhal lhis is piobably
lhe nisl wai lhal has nol been waged in lhe name of nalional inleiesls,`
bul ialhei in lhe name of piinciples and values.``20
n lhe scholaily lileialuie on humanilaiian inleivenlion, a nolewoilhy
issue is whelhei some foim of pioceduial conliol on unilaleial inleiven-
lion (Secuiily Council decision, submission lo some foim of dispule sel-
llemenl, elc.) could piovide a safeguaid againsl pielexlual claims. To be
suie, a mullilaleially appioved aclion is moie likely lo be peiceived as
legilimale lhan one lhal lacks lhe impiimalui of appiopiiale communily
oigans. Bul lhe oulcome of lhese piocesses is nol necessaiily a pioxy foi
genuinely piincipled appiaisal.
Moie modeslly, lhe legalily of mililaiy aclion in Kosovo could be
defended in leims of pailiculai conlexlual faclois, wilhoul necessaiily
endoising an open-ended new lheoiy of humanilaiian inleivenlion. The
piesenl chaplei is nol lhe place lo examine lhe legal aigumenlalion of lhe
pailies lo lhe conicl, as posed in pending |udicial pioceedings and in
legal scholaiship; bul a few woids lo suggesl lhe complexily of lhe legal
issues may be peilinenl.21 The specinc ciicumslances of lhe Kosovo silu-
alion lhal beai on conlexlual legilimacy include:
.
lhe univeisal acceplance of inleinalional noims againsl genocide, wai
ciimes, ciimes againsl humanily, and lhe abundanl evidence of un-
iediessed violalions in Kosovo;
.
lhe lia|ecloiy of binding Secuiily Council decisions fiom 1991 lhiough
lo lhe eve of lhe inleivenlion lhal connim ugoslavia`s indispulable
THI NI\TABLT OI SILICT\I RISPONSI? 4O9
obligalions undei inleinalional law (intcr alia, lo iefiain fiom elhnic
cleansing``);
.
lhe piolonged bul unsuccessful puisuil of non-foicible enfoicemenl of
lhose obligalions (e.g. lhiough economic sanclions and lhe CT);
.
lhe conlinuing non-compliance on lhe pail of lhe Seibian aulhoiilies in
denance of lhe Council`s oideis;
.
lhe special iole confeiied on NATO by lhe Council wilh iespecl lo lhe
conicl.22
These conlexlual elemenls aie menlioned heie nol because lhey aie
necessaiily deleiminalive of legalily, bul ialhei lo suggesl lhal lhe Kosovo
piecedenl`` should be connned lo ils pailiculai facls, ialhei lhan seen
as geneialing a newly exible and peimissive appioach lo humanilaiian
inleivenlion. As NATO`s Secielaiy Geneial wiole, lhe allies` decision lo
pioceed would conslilule lhe exceplion fiom lhe iule, nol an allempl lo
cieale new inleinalional law.``23
The single slandaid``: \niveisal acceplance and
deleiminacy of coie noims of human iighls and
humanilaiian law
The gieal coipus of inleinalional human iighls and humanilaiian law
en|oys viilually univeisal acceplance and specines quile cleaily lhe pio-
hibilions on genocide, wai ciimes, and olhei aliocilies, as well as obliga-
lions lo iespecl and ensuie lhe iighl lo life, human dignily, and non-
disciiminalion on elhnic oi ieligious giounds. These iules aie ieecled in
lhe human iighls piovisions of lhe \N Chailei and aie ailiculaled moie
piecisely in lhe \niveisal Declaialion of Human Righls, lhe 1948 Geno-
cide Convenlion, lhe foui Geneva Convenlions of 1949 on lhe law appli-
cable in aimed conicl, lhe 1967 nleinalional Covenanls on Civil and
Polilical Righls and Iconomic, Social, and Culluial Righls, and olhei
souices. Theie is no queslion of a double slandaid`` in lhe exislence oi
conlenl of lhese noims. Ralhei, queslions of a double slandaid`` aiise
because of lhe peiceplion of polilicized ialhei lhan unifoim enfoicemenl.
ugoslavia had subsciibed lo all lhese insliumenls, and ils disinlegia-
lion inlo sepaiale slales in no way deliacled fiom lheii legal foice. 24 n-
deed, lhe noims in queslion would have been obligaloiy foi all aclois
even wilhoul iegaid lo liealy-based consenl, as lhe piohibilions againsl
genocide, wai ciimes, and ciimes againsl humanily aie beyond queslion
pail of cuslomaiy inleinalional law; violalions enlail individual ciiminal
iesponsibilily as well as lhe legal consequences peilaining lo peiemploiy
noims ( jus cogcns).25 As long ago as mid-1992, lhe Secuiily Council had
ieafnimed lhal all pailies lo lhe conicl in foimei ugoslavia aie bound
41O IORCI, DPLOMAC, AND THI NTIRNATONAL COMM\NT
lo comply wilh obligalions undei inleinalional humanilaiian law.26 The
Secuiily Council had likewise iepealedly condemned mass killings and
lhe piaclice of elhnic cleansing`` as violalions of humanilaiian law.27
Mounling documenlalion of lhe peipelialion of lhese piaclices againsl
Kosovo Albanians was adduced and publicized lhioughoul lhe 199Os.28
A gieal achievemenl of lhe inleinalional human iighls movemenl is
lhe insislence on evalualing all aclois undei unifoim slandaids of con-
ducl. Non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions have been especially vigilanl in
documenling and publicizing violalions of human iighls and humanilai-
ian law in accoidance wilh univeisal noims, no mallei who lhe violalois
may be. ndeed, in lhe Kosovo conicl such gioups have documenled
abuses commilled by elhnic Albanians as well as by Seibs,29 and have
ciilicized ceilain NATO laclics in Kosovo, such as lhe use of cluslei
bombs.30
Publicily foi violalions lhe mobilizalion of shame can be lhe nisl
slep along a speclium lowaid incieasingly coeicive sanclions foi en-
foicemenl. Among olhei possibililies along such a speclium, economic
sanclions can be applied againsl violalois, as was done in lhe seiies of
Secuiily Council iesolulions mandaling piogiessively sliongei measuies
addiessed lo lhe Bosnian conicl, which weie suspended in lhe afleimalh
of lhe Daylon Accoids and ieinlioduced in modined foim in 1998 in ie-
sponse lo lhe inlensincalion of abuses in Kosovo.31 n view of lhe diffuse
naluie of economic piessuie and lhe high iisk of uninlended haim lo
peisons nol iesponsible foi any wiongdoing, allainmenl of piincipled``
use of lhis lechnique is pioblemalic.32 Bul slill moie pioblemalic would
be a ie|eclion of a slialegy of sanclions againsl one calegoiy of violaloi
because of lhe unfeasibilily of imposing compaiable sanclions againsl
olheis.33
Seleclive law enfoicemenl: Consideialions beaiing on
legilimacy in inleinalional conlexls
The eslablishmenl of lhe CT embodies a commilmenl lo even-handed
enfoicemenl of lhe mosl solemn human iighls obligalions in lhe face of
seiious violalions. The consideiable piogiess made lowaid lhe ciealion
of a slanding inleinalional ciiminal couil al lhe 1998 Rome Confeience
ieecls a widely shaied desiie lhal lhese obligalions be enfoiced acioss
lhe boaid, nol limiled lo lhe iaie occasions when lhe Secuiily Council
can muslei lhe polilical will lo acl.
As lhe woik of lhe CT has unfolded, lhal body has manifesled a
deleiminalion lo caiiy oul ils iesponsibililies wilh lhe impailialily benl-
ling a |udicial oigan. The peiceplion of many Seibs lhal lhe Tiibunal`s
THI NI\TABLT OI SILICT\I RISPONSI? 411
woikings aie skewed againsl Seib inleiesls does nol squaie wilh lhe facls
lhal lhe Tiibunal has aclively pioseculed non-Seib defendanls and has
pioceeded in cases in which lhe viclims weie Seibs.34 n any evenl, even
if analysis of pioseculoiial aclivily ovei lime weie suggeslive of an elhnic
diffeienlial seemingly unfavouiable lo Seibs, such a diffeienlial could be
alliibulable lo one oi bolh of lwo sliongly documenled phenomena: lhe
evidence of lhe palleins of ciiminalily (giealei numbeis and inlensily of
ciimes commilled by Seibs), oi lhe much highei degiee of non-compliance
by lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia (SeibiaMonlenegio) wilh obli-
galions lo coopeiale wilh lhe Tiibunal.35 As one of lhe CT`s senioi
pioseculois has wiillen, elhnic paiily`` among defendanls could disloil
ialhei lhan iepiesenl liulh: lheie is simply no known equivalenl lo lhe
1uly 1995 Seib massacie of moie lhan 8,OOO unaimed Muslim civilians al
Siebienica.``36 And since lhe Seib aulhoiilies (in lhe Iedeial Republic as
well as in Republika Sipska in Bosnia) have shown lhemselves un-
iesponsive lo lhe kinds of inducemenls and piessuies lhal have molivaled
Cioalia and BosniaHeizegovina lo biing aboul al leasl some liansfeis
of indiclees and evidence, il would nol be suipiising foi enhanced en-
foicemenl effoil lo be diiecled lo lhe moie obduiale paily.37
Dispaiilies in whelhei lhe CT is peiceived as an impailial oi a
polilicized body aie |usl one aspecl of a peihaps moie piofound debale
ovei lhe iole of exlia-legal faclois in lhe seleclion of ob|ecls of enfoice-
menl aclion. The |uiidical oigans of lhe inleinalional communily aie only
beginning lo cope wilh vexing queslions involving lhe polilical conlexl in
which decisions aboul enfoicing inleinalional law aie laken. The con-
lioveisies ovei whelhei inleinalional ciiminal liibunals should be sensi-
live lo, oi immune fiom, polilical consideialions illusliale lhe pioblem.
Al lhe lime of eslablishmenl of lhe CT, lhe diafleis of ils slalule
mainlained lhal a |udicial oigan would, of couise, have lo peifoim ils
funclions independenlly of polilical consideialions; il would nol be sub-
|ecl lo lhe aulhoiily oi conliol of lhe Secuiily Council wilh iegaid lo lhe
peifoimance of ils |udicial funclions.``38
Ividenlly, howevei, CT aclivily can have a consideiable impacl on
polilical piocesses, as in lhe Daylon negolialions, wheie indicled wai
ciiminals weie banned fiom seals al lhe lable; signincanlly, lhe Daylon
Agieemenl connimed lhe obligalions of all pailies lo coopeiale wilh lhe
CT and did nol embody any piomises of immunily fiom pioseculion.39
The CT`s announcemenl of lhe indiclmenl of Slobodan Milosevic
while lhe Kosovo wai was in piogiess opened up a new slage in lhe
debale.40 Wheieas many lhoughl lhal such an announcemenl was long
oveidue, olheis peiceived il as an unwaiianled gesluie lhal could only
complicale negolialions foi a polilical selllemenl; slill olheis (including
many Seibs) saw lillle logic lo an indiclmenl of lhe Seibian leadei bul nol
412 IORCI, DPLOMAC, AND THI NTIRNATONAL COMM\NT
his Cioalian oi Kosovai counleipails.41 The poiliayal of lhe indiclmenl
in lhe Weslein media as slienglhening lhe legilimacy of lhe NATO inlei-
venlion glossed ovei lhe disciepancy belween lhe iheloiic of NATO
leadeis lhal lhis was a wai lo slop genocide and lhe absence of
genocide chaiges fiom lhe indiclmenl.
n bolh ils subslance and ils liming, lhe Milosevic indiclmenl piesenls a
piovocalive inslance of moie geneial |uiispiudenlial pioblems implicil in
any pioseculoi`s decisions ovei how lo allocale lhe enfoicemenl iesouices
of his oi hei ofnce: should such decisions be based sliiclly on legally
giounded ciileiia (such as lhe weighl of evidence lo piove a case), oi
should exlia-legal faclois enlei inlo a discielionaiy decision ovei whom
lo laigel foi enfoicemenl aclion? Al lhe iisk of gioss oveisimplincalion
of a fascinaling sel of |uiispiudenlial queslions, we may locale lhe pioblem
of seleclive pioseculion`` as one (among olheis) suggeslive of cleavages
belween lhe common law and civil law liadilions. The CT has sliuggled
wilh such cleavages in seveial olhei conlexls, nolably in lhe 1rJcnovic
case, wheie lhe aigumenls of counsel and lhe opinions of lhe |udges
cenlied on diveigences belween common law and civil law souices of
aulhoiily.42 The difncullies of seeking lo impoil inlo inleinalional insli-
lulions lhe consliucls of domeslic legal oidei have alieady been noled,
and caulion is waiianled befoie allempling any liansplanl lo a specialized
oigan such as lhe CT.43 The puipose heie is simply lo suggesl lhal
diffeienl syslems appioach lhe pioblem of seleclive enfoicemenl fiom
diffeienl slandpoinls.
Allhough piesumably mosl legal syslems in loday`s woild aspiie lowaid
equal`` |uslice in lhe enfoicemenl of law and impailialily in lhe admin-
islialion of |uslice, lhey diffei maikedly in lheoiy and piaclice as iegaids
lhe queslion of seleclive law enfoicemenl. Ioi lawyeis liained in lhe
\niled Slales (oi some olhei common law syslems), il is well accepled
lhal pioseculois exeicise bioad discielion in selecling lheii laigels of
invesligalion and pioseculion. \S Supieme Couil decisions involving
allegalions of seleclive pioseculion`` (i.e. a claim of an impeimissible
giound foi laigeling a defendanl, such as iacial disciiminalion) have
sliessed lhe scope of discielion oidinaiily accoided lo lhe pioseculoi,
which may involve faclois such as geneial deleiience, enfoicemenl pii-
oiilies, and lhe ielalionship of a pailiculai pioseculion lo an oveiall en-
foicemenl plan.44 n a iecenl (albeil conlioveisial) decision, lhe Supieme
Couil exlended eslablished docliine in ie|ecling a conslilulional challenge
lo lhe Alloiney Geneial`s exeicise of hei discielion ovei whelhei oi nol
lo iniliale depoilalion pioceedings againsl aliens in iiiegulai slalus; lhe
leise opinion look nole of foieign policy consideialions as among lhe
discielionaiy faclois lo which lhe execulive could allach signincance in
enfoicing immigialion laws.45 \ndei lhe geneial appioach embodied in
lhese \S cases, pioseculois en|oy wide discielion lo choose lheii laigels
among lhe iange of possible cases in which lhe evidence would be sufn-
cienl lo piesenl lhe mallei lo lhe |uiy.
By conliasl, Conlinenlal Iuiopean counliies espouse piinciples of
posilive legalily, undei which lhe slale has a duly lo enfoice lhe ciiminal
law and all offendeis aie in piinciple supposed lo be pioseculed.46 The
diffeiences in legal culluie may shape lhe ways in which |uiisls, as well
as policy makeis, giapple wilh lhe vexing pioblem of seleclivily in inlei-
nalional law enfoicemenl.
As an inslilulion wilh nnile iesouices, lhe CT`s pioseculoiial ofnce
musl inevilably be seleclive in choosing among lhe hundieds oi even
lhousands of polenlial ob|ecls of invesligalion foi lhe handful of cases
lhal can iealislically be bioughl lo liial. As wilh lhe debale ovei elhnic
paiily,`` lhe slialegic choices belween going aflei small nsh`` oi biing-
ing a few high-pionle big nsh`` cases aie cenlial lo lhe pioseculoi`s
iesponsibilily.47
These biief obseivalions in lhe conlexl of lhe enfoicemenl of ciiminal
law cannol iesolve lhe seleclive indignalion`` issue bul do suggesl lhe
peivasive naluie of pioblems of seleclivily and lhe desiiabilily of can-
vassing a vaiiely of disciplines and nalional liadilions foi insighls inlo an
issue of gieal peiplexily.
Conclusion
n some domeslic socielies, il mighl be a conslilulional iequiiemenl (oi al
leasl an aspiialion ieecled in law) lhal lhe slale piolecl all segmenls of
sociely faiily, wilhoul favouiing lhe iich oi piivileged seclois in lhe allo-
calion of police foices oi olhei essenlial seivices. Similaily, aigumenls
can be musleied in lhe discouise of inleinalional law lo suppoil a moial
impeialive foi slales (and, by exliapolalion, lhe inleinalional communily)
lo piovide pioleclion on lhe basis of subslanlive |uslice and equalily.
Those who uige a duly lo inleivene`` seek lo shifl lhe leims of debale
fiom lhe self-inleiesl of inleivenois lo a highei moial plane, in which a
common moialily pievails ovei meie inleiesls.
n lhis fai fiom ideal woild, il may nol be feasible lo expecl lo achieve
anylhing like piincipled iesponses al lhe inleinalional level in lhe foie-
seeable fuluie, al leasl wheie lhe issue conceins mililaiy inleivenlion lo
enfoice inleinalional law. l may be inevilable, possibly even piefeiable,
foi iesponses lo inleinalional ciises lo unfold seleclively, when lhose who
have lhe capabilily lo iespond also have molivalions foi undeilaking lhe
buidens of inleivenlion. Scaice iesouices may need lo be allocaled in
accoidance wilh lhe piefeiences and values of lhose who aie commilling
lhe iesouices. Such inleivenlions could well piove moie effeclive lhan
uniealislically alliuislic ones.
The choice of NATO as lhe vehicle foi inleivenlion in Kosovo indi-
cales lhal lhis was a Iuiopean iesponse lo a Iuiopean pioblem and
would nol necessaiily pienguie compaiable aclion anywheie oulside
Iuiope. Polilical leadeis in lhe NATO counliies sliessed lhe singulaiily
of lhe silualion ialhei lhan ils geneializabilily. Logislical faclois (foi ex-
ample, lhe pioximily of mililaiy bases lo lhe lhealie of conicl) could nol
necessaiily be ieplicaled foi ciises in olhei iegions, even if ob|eclive``
ciileiia (such as lhe scale of loss of life oi lhe magnilude of violalions
of inleinalional law) weie olheiwise equal oi even moie exigenl. The
domeslic polilical suppoil iequiied lo suslain lhe cosls oi iisks of any
signincanl inleivenlion is likely nol lo be foilhcoming in lhe absence of a
peiceplion of inleiesl.
This is nol lo say lhal we should abandon an aspiialion foi piincipled
iesponse lo inleinalional ciises, bul simply lo acknowledge lhal foi lhe
foieseeable fuluie seleclivily may be inevilable and moie moially |us-
linable lhan doing nolhing oi doing loo lillle.
Noles
1. Wilhin lhe piesenl volume, lhis ciilicism is found in passages of lhe oveiview piepaied
by edilois Albiechl Schnabel and Ramesh Thakui (iefeiiing lo allegalions of double
slandaids``) and is menlioned in olhei chapleis fiom diveise poinls of view (e.g. in lhe
chapleis by \ladimii Baianovsky, 1ean-Maic Coicaud, and Andiew Linklalei), allhough
nol necessaiily endoised by lhose aulhois.
2. Boulios Boulios-Ghali, UnvanquishcJ. A U.S.U.N. Saga, New oik: Random House,
1999, e.g. on pp. 53, 55, 141, and 175, conliasling lhe iesponses lo lhe ugoslav conicl
wilh lhose lo lhe Somalian and Rwandan silualions (lhe Secuiily Council had iequiied
lhe \niled Nalions lo become massively unbalanced`` in favoui of foimei ugoslavia;
lhe wai in ugoslavia was a iich man`s wai`` compaied wilh a basically similai`` silua-
lion in Somalia; lheie was a peiceplion in Afiica lhal lhe Rwandan genocide was ovei-
looked while lhe \niled Nalions paid allenlion lo Siebienica, a village in Iuiope``).
3. Kon Annan, Addiess lo Geneial Assembly piesenling Annual Repoil, \N Piess Re-
lease SGjSMj7136, GAj9596, 2O Seplembei 1999. Commenlalois have noled lhe sheei
uniealily`` of lhe Secielaiy-Geneial`s suggeslion lhal lhe Secuiily Council could nnd
common giound lo suppoil inleivenlions on a consislenl basis. See David Rieff, Wais
Wilhoul Ind?`` Ncw York Tincs, 23 Seplembei 1999.
4. n lhe yeai leading up lo lhe 1999 inleivenlion, lhe Secuiily Council seemed lo go oul of
ils way lo be even-handed. Ioi example, in Resolulion 116O of 31 Maich 1998, which
condemned excessive foice by lhe Seibs in Kosovo, lhe Council also condemned acls
of leiioiism by lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy, while noling lhe cleai commilmenl of
senioi iepiesenlalives of lhe Kosovai Albanian communily lo non-violence.``
5. Ioi a iecenl iecapilulalion of such pioposals and advocacy on lheii behalf, see Cainegie
Commission on lhe Pievenlion of Deadly Conicl, Iinal Rcport, Washinglon D.C.:
Cainegie Commission, 1997, pp. 6567, 2O5 (on nie biigade`` deploymenls). The
Commission expiessed ils belief lhal decisions lo use foice (whelhei nalionally oi
lhiough inleinalional inslilulions) musl nol be aibiliaiy, oi opeiale as lhe coeicive and
seleclively used weapon of lhe sliong againsl lhe weak,`` ibid., pp. xxv, 59.
6. The pioposilion lhal a piopeily equipped foice of 5,OOO lioops could have aveiled half a
million dealhs in Rwanda is endoised in lhe Cainegie Commission`s Iinal Rcport, p. 6,
and in sludies ciled lheiein.
7. These aie dislincl queslions lhal mighl enlail veiy diffeienl answeis. Ioi example, one
compilalion of humanilaiian emeigencies in 1999, summaiized in lable 23.3 in lhe
chaplei by Sleven Livingslon in lhis volume, would iank emeigency silualions accoiding
lo numbeis of people in need, wilh Noilh Koiea ianked highesl (6.7 million people)
followed by Sudan (4.4 million), Afghanislan (3.9 million), Angola (b3 million), Ilhio-
pia (2 million), ugoslavia (1.6 million), iaq (1.5 million), Bosnia (1.4 million), Somalia
(1 million), and Sieiia Leone (b1 million). A complelely diffeienl ianking would be
needed if lhe queslion weie how many people in need could be helped lhiough a pai-
liculai lechnique available lo exleinal aclois, such as mililaiy inleivenlion.
8. Piesidenlial Decision Diieclive 25, Policy on Refoiming Mullilaleial Peace Opei-
alions,`` May 1994 (heieaflei PDD 25).
9. Ioi a shaip ciilique of lhe Clinlon adminislialion`s applicalion of lhe PDD 25 ciileiia in
lhe Rwanda ciisis and allempls lo induce olhei Secuiily Council membeis lo abide by
lhem, see Boulios-Ghali, UnvanquishcJ, pp. 134136.
1O. Ail. 2(4).
11. Ail. 51.
12. Ail. 42 and Chaplei \ geneially.
13. Ioi advocacy of a iighl and peihaps even a duly lo inleivene on humanilaiian giounds,
see, e.g., Maiio Bellali and Beinaid Kouchnei, eds., 1c Dcvoir Jingcrcncc. Icut-on
lcs laisscr nourir? Paiis: Denoel, 1987. n summei 1999 Kouchnei became lhe \niled
Nalions` Special Repiesenlalive in Kosovo, wheie he is facing lhe daunling challenge of
dealing wilh lhe afleimalh of humanilaiian inleivenlion.
14. See Sean D. Muiphy, Hunanitarian Intcrvcntion. Thc UnitcJ Nations in an 1volving
VorlJ OrJcr, Philadelphia: \niveisily of Pennsylvania Piess, 1996.
15. Ioi iefeiences lo lhis debale, see, e.g., Rein Mulleison and David 1. Scheffei, Legal
Regulalion of lhe \se of Ioice,`` in Loii Iislei Damiosch, Gennady M. Danilenko, and
Rein Mulleison, eds., BcyonJ Conjrontation. Intcrnational 1aw jor thc IostColJ Var
1ra, Bouldei, CO: Weslview Piess, 1995, pp. 93, 117124; and seveial of lhe essays
in Loii Iislei Damiosch and David 1. Scheffei, eds., 1aw anJ Iorcc in thc Ncw Intcr-
national OrJcr, Bouldei, CO: Weslview Piess, 1991, e.g. by Tom 1. Iaiei, An nquiiy
inlo lhe Legilimacy of Humanilaiian nleivenlion,`` pp. 1852O1.
16. See, e.g., Biuno Simma, NATO, lhe \N and lhe \se of Ioice: Legal Aspecls,`` 1uro-
pcan 1ournal oj Intcrnational 1aw, \ol. 1O, 1999, p. 1; Anlonio Cassese, Ix niuiia ius
oiilui: Aie We Moving Towaids nleinalional Legilimalion of Ioicible Humanilaiian
Counleimeasuies in lhe Woild Communily?`` 1uropcan 1ournal oj Intcrnational 1aw,
\ol. 1O, 1999, p. 23; Idiloiial Commenls: NATO`s Kosovo nleivenlion, by Louis
Henkin, Rulh Wedgwood, 1onalhan . Chainey, Chiisline M. Chinkin, Richaid A. Ialk,
Thomas M. Iianck, and W. Michael Reisman, Ancrican 1ournal oj Intcrnational 1aw,
\ol. 93, 1999, pp. 831869. A few of lhese aulhois (e.g. Chinkin, Ancrican 1ournal oj
Intcrnational 1aw, al p. 854) biiey allude lo lhe seleclive applicalion pioblem (selec-
livily undeimines moial aulhoiily.``)
17. See especially chaplei 2O by 1ames Mayall and chaplei 19 by A. 1. R. Gioom and Paul
Tayloi in lhis volume.
18. Mulleison and Scheffei, Legal Regulalion of lhe \se of Ioice,`` p. 124, ciling Rosalyn
Higgins, Iroblcns anJ Iroccss. Intcrnational 1aw anJ How Vc Usc It, Oxfoid: Oxfoid
\niveisily Piess, 1994, p. 247.
19. Olhei conliibulois lo lhis volume considei lhe queslion of disinleiesled compaied wilh
self-inleiesled ieasons foi inleivenlion: see, e.g., chaplei 28 by Coial Bell (dislinguish-
ing belween noim-diiven`` and inleiesl-diiven`` inleivenlions), and chaplei 29 by 1ean-
Maic Coicaud (idenlifying ieasons of inleinalional solidaiily`` as conliasled lo geo-
slialegic consideialions``). Coial Bell nnds il almosl impossible lo see any nalional
inleiesl molivalion foi lhe Kosovo inleivenlion; lo lhe conliaiy, foi lhe NATO poweis
lhe aclion was visibly al odds wilh lheii colleclive nalional inleiesls, as usually de-
nned.`` She concludes wilh lhe cogenl obseivalion lhal inleiesls can lypically be nego-
lialed wheieas noims lend lo be univeisal and nol sub|ecl lo compiomise.
2O. \aclav Havel, Kosovo and lhe Ind of lhe Nalion-Slale,`` Ncw York Rcvicw oj Books,
1O 1une 1999, pp. 4 and 6 (addiess lo Canadian Pailiamenl, 29 Apiil 1999).
21. ugoslavia inilialed suils al lhe nleinalional Couil of 1uslice (C1) in Apiil 1999
againsl some bul nol all of lhe membeis of NATO pailicipaling in lhe Kosovo inlei-
venlion. The cases againsl eighl NATO membeis (Belgium, Canada, Iiance, Geimany,
laly, lhe Nelheilands, Poilugal, and lhe \niled Kingdom) mainly invoke lhe 1948
Convenlion on lhe Pievenlion and Punishmenl of lhe Ciime of Genocide, wilh olhei
claims againsl some iespondenls alleged lo fall undei lheii acceplance of lhe C1`s
compulsoiy |uiisdiclion puisuanl lo Ailicle 36(2) of lhe C1 Slalule. Paiallel cases
againsl lhe \niled Slales and Spain weie nled al lhe same lime bul weie iuled ineligible
lo be added lo lhe C1`s dockel, since lhose slales had enleied ieseivalions againsl lhe
|uiisdiclional clause of lhe Genocide Convenlion and no olhei |uiisdiclional basis was
available. Apail fiom lhe Genocide Convenlion, ugoslavia asseils lhal lhe NATO
slales violaled lhe \N Chailei and geneial inleinalional law on lhe use of foice in lheii
aclions in Kosovo. The iespondenl slales have conlesled lhe C1`s |uiisdiclion lo iule on
lhese conlenlions. See Casc Conccrning thc 1cgality oj Usc oj Iorcc (Yugoslavia v.
Bclgiun), IC1 Rcports 1999, and ielaled cases collecled in Intcrnational 1cgal Matcrials,
1999, \ol. 38, pp. 95O12O3.
22. Acknowledgemenl of NATO`s enfoicemenl iole in foimei ugoslavia can be found
in lhiee calegoiies of Secuiily Council iesolulions: (1) lhose confeiiing enfoicemenl
aulhoiily on slales acling nalionally oi lhiough iegional agencies; (2) lhose eslablishing
lhe NATO mplemenlalion Ioice and Slabilily Ioice in BosniaHeizegovina; and (3)
lhose specincally addiessed lo Kosovo (see Resolulion 12O3, 24 Oclobei 1998, con-
ceining NATO suppoil foi lhe Kosovo \eiincalion Mission).
23. 1aviei Solana, NATO`s Success in Kosovo,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, \ol. 78, No. 6, Novembei
Decembei 1999, pp. 114 and 118. See also Thomas M. Iianck, Lessons of Kosovo,``
Ancrican 1ournal oj Intcrnational 1aw, \ol. 93, 1999, pp. 864 and 866 (|ejveiy nalion
has an inleiesl in NATO`s aclions being classined as lhe exceplion, nol lhe iule.``)
24. On lhe conlinuily of obligalions of lhe Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia undei lhe
Genocide Convenlion, see geneially lhe iulings on piovisional measuies and |uiisdiclion
in Application oj thc Convcntion on thc Ircvcntion anJ Iunishncnt oj thc Crinc oj
CcnociJc (Bosnia anJ Hcr;cgovina v. Yugoslavia (Scrbia anJ Montcncgro)), IC1 Rc-
ports 1993, p. 3; IC1 Rcports 1996 (II), p. 595.
25. Theodoi Meion, Hunan Rights anJ Hunanitarian Norns as Custonary 1aw, Oxfoid:
Oxfoid \niveisily Piess, 1989. The Secielaiy-Geneial`s iepoil pioposing lhe slalule foi
lhe CT consideied lhal lhese iules of inleinalional humanilaiian law aie beyond any
doubl pail of cuslomaiy law.`` \N Doc. Sj257O4, 3 May 1993, paia. 34.
26. Resolulion 764 (13 1uly 1992) noling also lhal peisons who commil oi oidei lhe com-
mission of giave bieaches of lhe Geneva Convenlions aie individually iesponsible in
iespecl of such bieaches. See also Resolulion 771 (13 Augusl 1992) demanding lhal all
pailies in foimei ugoslavia desisl fiom bieaches of inleinalional humanilaiian law;
Resolulion 78O (6 Oclobei 1992) on lhe eslablishmenl of a Commission of Ixpeils lo
examine evidence of giave bieaches; Resolulion 8O8 (22 Iebiuaiy 1993) deciding lo
cieale an inleinalional liibunal lo piosecule violalions; Resolulion 827 (25 May 1993)
eslablishing lhe liibunal.
27. Ioi example, in lhe seveial iesolulions ciled in lhe pievious nole.
28. Ioi an analysis of lhe conliibulions of non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions in lhis iegaid,
see chaplei 24 by Ielice Gaei in lhis volume.
29. Compaie, e.g., Human Righls Walch, Hunanitarian 1aw Violations in Kosovo, Oclobei
1998 (documenling abuses by KLA as well as by Seib foices) wilh Human Righls
Walch, IcJcral Rcpublic oj Yugoslavia. Abuscs Against Scrbs anJ Rona in thc Ncw
Kosovo, Augusl 1999, and olhei iepoils ciled lheiein.
3O. Human Righls Walch, Ticking Tinc Bonbs. NATOs Usc oj Clustcr Munitions in
Yugoslavia, May 1999.
31. Resolulion 116O (31 Maich 1998).
32. Ioi some of my pievious wiilings addiessed lo lhis difncull queslion, see Loii Iislei
Damiosch, The Civilian mpacl of Iconomic Sanclions,`` in Damiosch, ed., 1njorcing
Rcstraint. Collcctivc Intcrvcntion in Intcrnal Conicts, New oik: Council on Ioieign
Relalions Piess, 1993, pp. 274315; The Colleclive Infoicemenl of nleinalional
Noims lhiough Iconomic Sanclions,`` 1thics anJ Intcrnational Ajjairs, \ol. 8, 1994,
p. 59; Infoicing nleinalional Law lhiough Non-Ioicible Measuies,`` CollcctcJ Coursc
oj thc Haguc AcaJcny oj Intcrnational 1aw, \ol. 269, 1997, chs. .
33. We may undeiscoie heie Ielice Gaei`s impoilanl poinl (in chaplei 24 in lhis volume)
lhal human iighls oiganizalions call foi compliance eveiywheie, even while undei-
slanding lhal iesponses lo such calls will nol be unifoim. Thus, focusing allenlion on
pailiculai cases is nol seleclive indignalion`` bul one lechnique lowaid effeclive
indignalion.``
34. I.g., in lhe Cclcbici liial, in which lwo Bosnian Muslims and a Bosnian Cioal weie
found guilly in Novembei 1998 of loiluiing and killing Seib piisoneis.
35. Ioi evalualion of degiees of non-coopeialion on lhe pail of slales and enlilies of
lhe foimei ugoslavia, see CT Annual Repoil, \N Doc. Aj52j375, Sj1997j729, 18
Seplembei 1997, paias. 18319O.
36. Payam Akhavan, 1uslice in The Hague, Peace in lhe Ioimei ugoslavia?`` Hunan
Rights Quartcrly, \ol. 2O, 1998, pp. 737 and 781782. See also 1ose I. Alvaiez, Rush
lo Closuie: Lessons of lhe Tadic 1udgemenl,`` Michigan 1aw Rcvicw, \ol. 96, 1998,
pp. 2O31 and 2O562O57 (f il is liue, as hisloiians . . . asseil, lhal lhe vasl ma|oiily of
lhe mosl seiious ciimes and ceilainly genocidal aclions weie commilled on lhe
Seibian side, a seiies of evenhanded liials among lhe diveise elhnicilies in lhe Balkan
iegion is moie likely lo conliibule lo pievailing mylhs lhal all sides weie equally guilly
lhan il is lo pieseive an accuiale colleclive memoiy.``)
37. See Resolulion 12O7 (17 Novembei 1998), iecapilulaling unsalisned demands foi aiiesls
of fugilives undei conliol of lhe IR and insisling on coopeialion wilh CT effoils lo
invesligale aliocilies in Kosovo.
38. \N Doc. Sj257O4, paia. 28.
39. Geneial Iiamewoik Agieemenl foi Peace in Bosnia and Heizegovina, 14 Decembei
1995, Intcrnational 1cgal Matcrials, \ol. 35, pp. 75 and 9O, ail. X. Ioi discussion of
a polenlial indiclmenl of Slobodan Milosevic in ielalion lo lhe Daylon piocess, see
Michael I. Schaif, Balkan 1usticc, Duiham, NC: Caiolina Academic Piess, 1997, pp. 86
9O; see also Richaid C. Holbiooke, To 1nJ a Var, New oik: Random House, 1998.
4O. Irosccutor v. Miloscvic, Case No. T-99-37, ndiclmenl and Decision on Review of
ndiclmenl and Applicalion foi Consequenlial Oideis, 24 May 1999.
41. 1on O. Newman, Tiulh wilh Consequences,`` Ncw York Tincs, 29 May 1999 (aiguing
foi a conneclion belween pioseculoiial and diplomalic inilialives); Pelei Maass, Lel`s
Nol Ioigel Milosevic`s Pailnei in Ciime,`` Ncw York Tincs, 31 May 1999 (aiguing foi
lhe indiclmenl of Cioalian Piesidenl Iian|o Tud|man); Seibs Diiven fiom Kosovo
Live Ciowded and in Wanl,`` Ncw York Tincs, 9 Seplembei 1999 (Kosovo Seibs
wondei why lheie is no wai ciimes indiclmenl of KLA leadei Hashim Thaci).
42. Irosccutor v. 1rJcnovic, Case No. T-96-22-A, 1udgmenl on Appeal, 7 Oclobei 1997.
Diveigenl common law and civil law souices of aulhoiily weie ciled as ielevanl lo lhe
liealmenl of lhe defendanl`s claim lhal he acled undei duiess, and also lo lhe use in lhe
CT`s pioceduies of lhe guilly plea (a device mainly used in common law counliies).
43. Compaie lhe sepaiale and dissenling opinion of 1udge Anlonio Cassese in 1rJcnovic,
ibid., ie|ecling lhe idea of liansplanling nolions diieclly fiom nalional legal syslems.
44. UnitcJ Statcs v. Arnstrong, 517 \.S. 456, 463465 (1996); Vaytc v. UnitcJ Statcs, 47O
\.S. 598 (1985).
45. Rcno v. Ancrican-Arab Anti-Discrinination Connittcc, \S Supieme Couil, 24 Iebiu-
aiy 1999.
46. On compaiisons belween lhese diffeienl liadilions, see geneially Geoige Ilelchei, Basic
Conccpts oj Crininal 1aw, Oxfoid: Oxfoid \niveisily Piess, 1998, ch. 12, conliasling
lhe \S appioach wilh lhe Geiman 1cgalita tsprin;ip and Geiman Conslilulional Couil
decisions on dulies lo accoid afnimalive legal pioleclion and lo enfoice lhe ciiminal law.
47. Ioi discussion of such slialegic choices, see, e.g., Akhavan, 1uslice in The Hague,``
pp. 774781.
26
The splil-scieen wai: Kosovo
and changing concepls of lhe
use of foice
1awrcncc IrccJnan
Slialegic debale in lhe Wesl foi much of lhe 199Os was shaped by lhe
1991 Gulf Wai. The \niled Slales believed lhal il had hil upon a foim
of piecise, focused waifaie, dependenl upon infoimalion dominance,``
appiopiiale lo lhe new condilions of lhe poslCold Wai woild. l was
possible lo iendei opponenls helpless quickly wilhoul gieal saciinces
being iequiied by lhe Ameiican people. The expeiience of lhe Gulf Wai,
and lhe sense lhal infoimalion lechnology was slill in ils infancy, en-
couiaged lalk of a ievolulion in mililaiy affaiis.``1
One ieason foi caulion was lhal polenlial opponenls, who weie well
awaie of lhe Ameiican advanlages in lhe ielevanl lechnology and of
iaq`s fale, undeislood lhe dangeis of engaging lhe \niled Slales in
convenlional waifaie. A piudenl opponenl would seaich foi foims of
waifaie lhal played lo Ameiican weakness, nolably whal was piesumed
lo be an immobilizing feai of subslanlial casuallies al home and abioad.
The fiighl caused by iaq`s use of Scud missiles againsl siael and Saudi
Aiabia and lhe diveision of effoil iesulling fiom allempls, laigely inef-
feclual, lo miligale lhis lhieal weie laken as a waining of whal mighl be
achieved wilh a moie advanced capabilily. The piominence of weapons
of mass desliuclion in iaqi plans encouiaged lhe analysis of how lhey
mighl be used againsl Weslein foices and socielies, as well as measuies lo
pievenl lheii fabiicalion by olhei slales, and even non-slale gioups.2
The impoilance of lhis concein can be gauged in lhe ieadiness of lhe
\niled Slales and lhe \niled Kingdom lo suslain lhe sanclions iegime
42O
againsl iaq and mounl aii iaids specincally designed lo enfoice \N ies-
olulions on iaqi biological, chemical, and nucleai capabililies. This cul-
minaled in Opeialion Deseil Iox of Decembei 1998 when a numbei
of facililies weie allacked oul of fiuslialion wilh iaqi non-compliance.
Anolhei indicalion of Ameiican concein was an allack on a supposed
clandesline chemical weapons facloiy in lhe Sudan in Augusl 1998, fol-
lowing a leiioiisl ouliage againsl lhe Ameiican embassy in Naiiobi,
lhough lhis lalei luined oul lo be based on faully inlelligence.
Wilh iegaid lo lhese conceins, one conclusion fiom Kosovo is enliiely
negalive. Belgiade gave no hinl of any inleiesl in weapons of mass de-
sliuclion oi even of leiioiisl iepiisals. ls allempls lo expand lhe wai
weie cuisoiy, unavailing, and dependenl upon lhe possibilily of sympa-
lhelic gioups in lhe local populalion in Republika Sipska in Bosnia,
Monlenegio, and Macedonia. Despile conceins in lhe Wesl, populalions
in all lhese counliies kepl ielalively calm. This does nol mean lhal we can
dismiss all anxielies as unfounded and iiielevanl; lhe iaqi case slill pio-
vides a poweiful counlei-example. Kosovo ieminds us, howevei, lhal lhe
piime slialegic concein in mosl conicls is how lo acquiie and hold dis-
puled leiiiloiy. 1usl because iaq failed so diamalically in iegulai combal
does nol mean lhal lhis is lhe inevilable fale of all comeis againsl Weslein
foices. l has been aigued lhal if lhe iaqis had been less inepl in lheii use
of equipmenl and amaleuiish in lheii laclics lhey could have given lhe
allies moie of a iun in 1991, peihaps ciealing lhe killing nelds`` lhal
would have led lo an oulcome moie favouiable lo iaq.3 ugoslavia, wilh
ils liadilion of mililia wai, appeaied ieady foi lhis possibilily. ndeed lhis
lhieal was sufncienlly ciedible in lhe case of Kosovo foi lhe NATO
counliies lo avoid nghling diieclly foi lhe leiiiloiy in conlenlion. nslead
lhey ielied on lhe use of aii powei. To lhe suipiise of many lhis seemed
lo woik. Ioi example, one of Biilain`s leading mililaiy hisloiians, 1ohn
Keegan, confessed al ils conclusion lhal he had undeieslimaled lhe wai-
winning polenlial of aii powei on ils own.4 Iven befoie Belgiade`s sui-
piise capilulalion, While House souices weie speaking of an anli-Powell
slialegy.``
This was a iefeience lo lhe classic slalemenl on lhe limilalions of aii
powei, deliveied by Geneial Colin Powell, lhen Chaiiman of lhe 1oinl
Chiefs of Slaff, while piepaiing foi Opeialion Deseil Sloim. The funda-
menlal aw wilh sole ieliance on aii powei, he aigued, was lhal Saddam
Hussein makes lhe decision as lo whelhei oi nol he will oi will nol
wilhdiaw.`` The \S Aii Ioice could inicl leiiible punishmenl bul, he
added, |ojne can hunkei down. One can dig in. One can dispeise lo liy
lo iide oul such a single dimensional allack.``5 Powell could claim vindi-
calion fiom Deseil Sloim. Aii powei was used effeclively lo piepaie``
lhe ballleneld, lo lhe poinl wheie iesislance fiom iaqi foices was laigely
CHANGNG CONCIPTS OI THI \SI OI IORCI 421
nominal, coalilion casuallies weie minimal, and lhe land opeialions
lhemselves weie compleled in 1OO houis.
A feai of casuallies
n building on lhe success of Deseil Sloim, lhe advocales of lhe ievolu-
lion in mililaiy affaiis expecled lhal mosl ievolulionaiy effecls would be
fell mosl of all in lhe applicalion of land powei. By enabling lhem lo call
in long-iange aililleiy, ciuise missiles, and aii sliikes, aimies could ieduce
dependence on oiganic niepowei and so liavel lighl, move fasl, and, il
was hoped, avoid high casuallies. el lhe expeiimenlalion wilh new
foims of giound waifaie by \S foices did nol inciease lhe disposilion of
lhe Clinlon adminislialion lo iisk lhem in ballle. Whelhei oi nol inlol-
eiance of mililaiy casuallies in limiled conlingencies, wheie supieme
nalional inleiesls aie nol al slake, iepiesenls a seculai liend in Weslein
socielies, as some commenlalois claim,6 lheie was no doubling lhe view
of lhe Clinlon adminislialion. A deep anxiely aboul casuallies was evi-
denl in lhe Piesidenl`s lenlalive appioach lo lhe commilmenl of foices
duiing lhe Bosnian conicl. A denning momenl came in Oclobei 1993
when, in lhe couise of a fulile and bloody manhunl foi lhe Somali wai-
loid Geneial Aideed, 18 \S soldieis weie killed and some of lheii coipses
diagged lhiough lhe slieels of Mogadishu. The effecl on Clinlon was
cleai and diamalic: lhe manhunl was concluded and wilhin monlhs \S
lioops weie oul of Somalia.7
Bolh Bosnia and Somalia illuslialed an impoilanl diffeience fiom
Kuwail. nslead of lhe wide open spaces and lhe oppoilunilies foi
aimouied waifaie offeied by lhe deseil, lhese weie wais foughl in and
aiound cilies, wheie lhe nghling iaiely look lhe foim of sel-piece ballles
and was oflen conducled by mililias who mingled wilh lhe civilian popu-
lalion. The dislasle foi lhis soil of waifaie in lhe \niled Slales was evi-
denl. One indicalion was lhe conslanl lalk of lhe need foi exil slial-
egies,`` even on lhe poinl of enliy, lo show lhal lheie was no inlenlion of
gelling bogged down in an inleiminable civil wai fai fiom home. When
conliibuling lioops lo lhe mplemenlalion Ioice (IOR) foi lhe Bosnian
peace selllemenl agieed al Daylon in 1995 lhe adminislialion allempled
lo pul sliicl lime limils on lheii deploymenl. This was inilially a yeai. n
piaclice lheie was no easy exil. Such commilmenls aie foi lhe long leim.
Duiing discussions wilh allies ovei Kosovo in 1998 lhe Ameiican ie-
luclance lo commil giound lioops lo even a peacekeeping foice was veiy
much in evidence. Given Belgiade`s iesislance lo any pioposals foi foi-
eign lioops in Kosovo, lhe iesull was lhe Oclobei 1998 foimula of mon-
ilois fiom lhe Oiganizalion foi Secuiily and Co-opeialion in Iuiope
(OSCI) in lhe piovince and an exliaclion foice`` in Macedonia, laigely
composed of Biilish and Iiench foices, in lhe evenl of any seiious piob-
lems. As lhis did nol woik, in lhal lhe OSCI monilois obseived non-
compliance bul could do nolhing aboul il, by lhe lime of lhe Iebiuaiy
1999 Rambouillel confeience NATO had deleimined lhal a piopei
peacekeeping foice should be inlioduced inlo Kosovo. The \niled Slales
iemained loalh lo make a subslanlial conliibulion.
Slialegic coeicion
\p lo 24 Maich 1999 NATO slialegy had been lo peisuade Milosevic lo
desisl fiom allacks on Kosovo Albanians and wilhdiaw his foices fiom
lhe piovince. l was geaied lo coeicion and nol wai, using lhe lhieal of
foice lo peisuade lhe laigel lo comply wilh demands ialhei lhan aclual
foice lo impose demands. Aii powei has lenl ilself naluially lo coeicive
slialegies because lhe lhieals aie ielalively easy lo implemenl even
moie so as Weslein defence suppiession lechniques have sleadily oul-
paced lhe aii defences of likely opponenls. f coeicion fails, and lhe
lhieal has lo be implemenled, lhe pioblem, as lhe Powell quole indicales,
is lhal lhe giound cannol be conliolled fiom lhe aii. Thus, lhough il may
be lhal iealizing an aii lhieal indicales lhal coeicion has failed, wilhoul a
land dimension lhe lhiusl of lhe slialegy iemains coeicive. The polilical
laigel ielains lhe choice aboul whelhei oi nol lo comply, accepling lhal
iesislance musl come al an incieasing piice. Wilhoul a means lo impose
demands, coeicive slialegies encouiage allempls al counlei-coeicion and
oulcomes based on baigaining.8
The idea lhal lhiealened and aclual aii sliikes mighl coeice lhe ugo-
slav goveinmenl led by Piesidenl Slobodan Milosevic was based on an
oplimislic assessmenl of lhe lasl compaiable episode Opeialion Delib-
eiale Ioice of 1995, which pieceded lhe Daylon selllemenl. This opeia-
lion was of a similai scale and focus lo lhal lalei planned foi Kosovo.9 l
came lo be claimed as an exemplai of whal aii powei mighl achieve in
lhe Balkans. Thus lhe senioi ediloi of Air Iorcc Maga;inc desciibed il in
1997 as being iegaided as lhe piime modein example of how |udicious
use of aiipowei, coupled wilh haid-nosed diplomacy, can slop a giound
foice in ils liacks and biing lhe woisl of enemies lo lhe baigaining
lable.``10 The basis of lhis claim is lhal while il was undeiway Ambassadoi
Holbiooke was busy negolialing wilh lhe Bosnian Seib leadeiship on
behalf of lhe Conlacl Gioup; lhis led lo lhe Daylon confeience, which led
lo a selllemenl.11 el wilh Delibeiale Ioice lhe bombing was nol ini-
lialed lo inuence lhe peace piocess. l was iepiesenled ofncially as an ef-
foil lo piolecl lhe safe aieas and in pailiculai Saia|evo. Noi was il giadu-
aled accoiding lo lhe iequiiemenls of diplomacy. l may have sapped
lhe Seibs` will lo nghl, bul lheii basic pioblem was lhal lhe giound
wai had luined. The Cioalian aimy had pushed Seibs oul of weslein
Slavonia and Kia|ina, and wilhin Bosnia lhe Seib hold had diopped fiom
7O pei cenl lo aboul 5O pei cenl as a iesull of Cioal and Muslim offen-
sives. n addilion, lhe \N Pioleclion Ioice had gol ilself inlo a moie
defensive posilion, while elemenls of NATO`s iapid ieaclion foice de-
ployed inlo lhe Saia|evo aiea fiom mid-1une shelled Seib foices al lhe
slail of aii campaign. Iiom lhis expeiience lhe Wesl concluded coiieclly
lhal diplomacy in lhe Balkans had lo be backed by ciedible foice bul, less
ieliably, lhal lhis could be piovided lhiough lhe seveie bul measuied
applicalion of aii powei.
Whal mighl have been achieved by aii powei in quile singulai ciicum-
slances piovided limiled guidance on whal mighl be achieved in quile
diffeienl, and moie demanding, condilions. n Kosovo in 1999 lhe laigel
of coeicion was lhe conslilulion of Seibia ilself ialhei lhan lhe posilion of
Seibs wilhin an independenl Bosnia. Moieovei, Seib foices in lhis case
weie on lhe offensive ialhei lhan lhe defensive, and lhe demands behind
lhe coeicive use of aii powei wenl lo lhe heail of Seib idenlily ialhei
lhan lhe ielief of a beleagueied cily. Nonelheless, lhe allempl lo apply
lhe lessons of Delibeiale Ioice began as soon as il became appaienl lhal
malleis in Kosovo weie gelling oul of hand. When Holbiooke negolialed
wilh Milosevic in Oclobei 1998 he poinled lo an explicil lhieal of NATO
aii sliikes. el lhe concepl of opeialions was quile modesl: Whal
NATO has planned is a giadualed seiies of possible aii sliikes lhal could,
al lhe veiy high end, involve a veiy consideiable numbei of aiiplanes.
The goal of lhe oplions is lo ieduce oi degiade lhe Seibian mililaiy`s
abilily lo conlinue sliiking lhe Kosovai Albanians.``12
This lhieal may have inuenced Milosevic, bul il did nol push him veiy
fai. The agieemenl ieached al lhis lime iequiied him lo ieduce lhe Seibian
mililaiy piesence and lo move lowaids a foim of pailial self-goveinmenl
foi lhe piovince. Theie was no mechanism foi ensuiing lhal il was piop-
eily enfoiced and wilhin weeks il had begun lo bieak down.
Meanwhile, lhe discussion of NATO`s mililaiy oplions lhiew up a
numbei of lhe pioblems lhal NATO would face if il evei moved lo im-
plemenl ils lhieal: lhe hoslilily of Russia; lhe consequenl difncully of
gelling aulhoiizalion foi lhe use of foice fiom lhe \niled Nalions; and
lhe iisk of Seib angei being laken oul on lhe elhnic Albanians who weie
supposed lo be helped.13 n addilion, nol long aflei lhis episode, Milo-
sevic gol a chance lo obseive lhe limils of aii powei when, in Decembei
1998, lhe \niled Slales and lhe \niled Kingdom launched a sel of sliikes
againsl iaq following a conlinuing pioblem wilh iaqi compliance wilh
lhe \N Special Commission. Conducled in lhe face of domeslic unease
and wilh unceilain iesulls, lhey slopped quile suddenly |usl befoie
Chiislmas. Opeialion Deseil Iox was of inleiesl lo Belgiade foi a num-
bei of ieasons. l gave some indicalion of lhe likely size of whal il would
suffei fiom NATO, some clues as lo how lo deal wilh il,14 and lhe polil-
ical iesliainls NATO would face. The speclacle of a clinical opeialion
conducled by a lechnologically supeiioi foice againsl an enemy unable lo
mounl seiious iesislance was haidly one lo slii lhe heail. The ob|eclives
weie desciibed in leims of degiading, diminishing, conlaining, and ie-
sliaining Saddam Hussein`s goveinmenl and his mililaiy powei some-
lhing less lhan decisive vicloiy.
This may help lo explain why Milosevic gave no impiession of being
deleiied by lhe lhieal of aii sliikes. He had eveiy ieason lo believe lhal
lhey would lasl a few days, be diiecled laigely againsl his aii defences,
and be deeply unpopulai in lhe Wesl. Saddam had shown lhal denance
caused few pioblems al home and could even alliacl a ceilain inleina-
lional consliluency of lhose who had nevei quile ieconciled lhemselves lo
lhe Wesl`s vicloiy in lhe Cold Wai. Theie was, howevei, an impoilanl
diffeience. Deseil Iox was lhe lalesl in a long line of inconclusive en-
counleis wilh iaq aboul lhe inspeclion of facililies lhal mighl oi mighl
nol have somelhing lo do wilh weapons of mass desliuclion, and em-
ploying means lhal would nol necessaiily impiove malleis. The issues al
slake in Kosovo weie much moie langible and Seib slialegy seived lo
highlighl lhem.
Seibs veisus lhe KLA
The dynamic lo lhe Kosovo ciisis was piovided by a conicl belween lhe
Kosovo Libeialion Aimy (KLA) and Seib foices. The KLA had been
founded in 1991 bul only ieally made an impacl aflei lhe 1997 chaos in
Albania gave il lhe oppoilunily lo acquiie subslanlial numbeis of weap-
ons.15 The ugoslav Aimy`s counlei-insuigency slialegy was always pu-
nilive, and had been ievealed in Iebiuaiy 1998 when villages wilh alleged
KLA conneclions weie allacked. The KLA oveiplayed a ialhei weak
mililaiy hand. ls foices weie pooily liained and ill disciplined and no
malch foi ugoslav foices in any diiecl engagemenl.
Nonelheless, lhe exislence of any soil of aimed sliuggle posed a ma|oi
pioblem foi Belgiade. The ail of counlei-insuigency is lo isolale lhe
enemy by sepaialing lhem fiom lhe geneial populalion, bul Milosevic
had no way lo appeal lo oidinaiy Kosovo Albanians. n his eyes, anylhing
he did lo iesloie lheii conslilulional iighls would in effecl mean abandon-
ing lhe piovince. Wilhoul lhis oplion, allempls lo isolale lhe KLA weie
always likely lo depend on leiioi. el slialegically lhis melhod was also
hopeless, foi lhe naluial consequence of such campaigns is ieciuilmenl
foi lhe olhei side. Moieovei, il mighl be possible lo inlimidale a small
minoiily, bul nol a 9O pei cenl ma|oiily alieady fiuslialed by yeais of
hoslile iule. The iulhlessness of lhe Seib campaign added lo lhe KLA`s
slienglh. \sing lhe liadilional melaphoi of gueiiilla waifaie, if lhe nsh
could nol be laken oul of lhe walei in which lhey swam, lhen lhe walei
would have lo be diained.16 A compaiison mighl be lhe schemes lhal
once ciiculaled among fai-iighl siaelis lo expel lhe whole Aiab popula-
lion of lhe Wesl Bank inlo 1oidan ialhei lhan accepl lhe necessily of
meeling lhe polilical aspiialions of lhe Paleslinians.
The campaign againsl lhe Kosovo Albanians picked up again in eaily
1999 and, allhough il inlensined diamalically once lhe NATO bombing
campaign slailed, lhis was laigely lo biing il lo a iapid conclusion ialhei
lhan, as on occasion suggesled, some soil of sponlaneous iepiisal againsl
aii allacks. Aflei lhe wai il became possible lo piece logelhei a pallein of
massacies, which wenl beyond iandom acls of ciuelly and which was
coupled wilh lhe syslemalic movemenl of laige numbeis of people lo
lhe boideis wilh Albania and Macedonia. l was iepoiled lhal Belgiade
envisaged lhal il could cope easily wilh aiound 6OO,OOO Albanians in
posl-wai Kosovo, aboul a lhiid of lhe pie-wai numbei.17
The elhnic cleansing`` of Kosovo was oideied in lhe full knowledge
lhal bombing was imminenl. Milosevic piobably anlicipaled, on lhe basis
of bolh Delibeiale Ioice and Deseil Iox, lhal if he could pacify Kosovo
quickly enough lhen lhe NATO bombing campaign would iun oul of
sleam and he could do a deal on lhe basis of lhe new silualion on lhe
giound. Having used up ils aii lhieal, NATO would have had no Plan
B`` lo enfoice a selllemenl on ils leims. f lhis was his lhinking il wenl
badly wiong in lwo iespecls. Iiisl, allhough lhe leiiible images of lhe
ood of disliaughl iefugees weie a seveie embaiiassmenl lo NATO in
lhal il had pledged ilself lo pievenl such a calasliophe, il was now im-
possible foi lhe Alliance lo abandon lhe cause. Secondly, lhe ugoslav
Aimy failed lo defeal lhe KLA.
Al lhe end of Seplembei 1998 Belgiade announced lhal lhe KLA had
been defealed, and lhe same announcemenl was made lwice in May
1999.18 el, as could have been anlicipaled, lhe fuiy of lhe Kosovo Al-
banians al lheii liealmenl slimulaled enoimous ieciuilmenl foi lhe KLA.
l was lhe case lhal lheii posilion wilhin Kosovo was hampeied foi lhe
ieasons lhal Milosevic hoped: lhe mililanls could nol hide wilhin lheii
communilies. n addilion, as in 1998, lhey weie no malch foi Seib foices
in open combal. Once acioss lhe boideis, lhe Albanians ciealed sanc-
luaiies foi KLA opeialions wheie young men weie ieciuiled and liained
befoie being senl back. They look heavy casuallies bul lhey kepl on
coming.
By May, |ouinalisls weie being laken inlo Kosovo wilh KLA unils and
lheie weie iepoils of a supply coiiidoi having been eslablished fiom
Albania. Wilh so much NATO mililaiy powei in lhe vicinily il was veiy
difncull foi Seib unils lo engage in hol puisuil, allhough lheie weie some
inslances of iaids and shelling acioss lhe boidei inlo Albania. By lhe end
of lhe wai, up lo 1O,OOO15,OOO KLA gueiiillas weie opeialing wilhin
Kosovo, and lheii ubiquily as Seib foices lefl gave ciedibilily lo lhose
numbeis. Iven wilhoul following lhe old gueiiilla wai foimula lhal ie-
quiied 1O counlei-insuigenls lo eveiy insuigenl, lhe long-leim posilion of
Seib foices wilhin Kosovo had become dislinclly unpiomising.
NATO`s aii campaign
So nol only did lhe campaign of elhnic cleansing`` slienglhen lhe Alli-
ance`s iesolve bul il also failed in ils piimaiy slialegic puipose, which was
lo defeal lhe KLA. This failuie has impoilanl implicalions foi lhe view
we lake of NATO`s aii campaign. The lhieal of lhis campaign failed lo
delei. As Opeialion Allied Ioice began on 24 Maich, oplimisls mighl
have hoped lhal Milosevic would iealize lhal lhe diplomalic selllemenl
on offei was as good as he could gel, foi al leasl lhe Conlacl Gioup would
hold his counliy logelhei and give NATO some iesponsibilily foi coping
wilh lhe KLA. On lhis view, aii sliikes weie iequiied only lo piovide
Milosevic wilh his way oul, a soil of game lo allow him lo claim lhal il
was only iiiesislible exleinal piessuie lhal iequiied him lo yield. Conn-
dence in lhis view was alieady waning,19 bul NATO was caughl by ils
pasl commilmenls. Having been iebuffed by Milosevic, doing nolhing
would |eopaidize lhe Alliance`s fuluie ciedibilily.
The doubls wilh which lhe campaign began if anylhing giew. l was
hampeied by pooi wealhei and a pieoccupalion wilh making lhe aii safe
foi lhe moie subslanlial phases of lhe aii campaign lo follow. The people
of Seibia weie inconvenienced, bul lhe people of Kosovo weie slill being
leiioiized and foiced acioss lhe boideis. All lhe high-lech mighl of
NATO appeaied lo be poweiless in lhe face of small Seib unils lhal ini-
lially weie baiely louched. l was soon claimed lhal lhe opeialion was
encouiaging Seibs lo solidify behind Piesidenl Milosevic, who piioi lo
lhe wai was suffeiing fiom a declining populaiily. Meanwhile, lhe iegulai
mishaps lo which such campaigns aie invaiiably sub|ecl lesled lhe solidily
of lhe Alliance.
The physical iesulls weie nol suipiising, and closely followed expeii-
ence in lhe Gulf. l pioved lo be easiei lo deal wilh lhe moie sophisli-
caled pails of lhe aii defence syslem lhe iadai, conliol syslems, and
high-allilude missiles lhan lo deal wilh lhe moie basic low-allilude gun-
based defences. This imposed limils on lhe abilily of NATO aiiciafl lo
opeiale ovei Kosovo, allhough iemaikably only lwo NATO planes weie
caughl by lhe ugoslavs. The ugoslav aii foice geneially avoided com-
bal, even moie so lhan lhe iaqis. n lhe Gulf il evenlually pioved much
easiei lo deslioy aiiciafl on lhe giound lhan lo damage lheii iunways and
lhis pallein was followed in ugoslavia.
Taigels ielaled lo lhe enemy goveinmenl weie allacked, foi example
lhe inleiioi minisliy buildings in Belgiade, bul il is uncleai whal was
achieved. Anylhing of impoilance was piobably iemoved in advance.
The allempl lo allack lhe iaqi leadeiship in 1991 pioduced minimal
iesulls yel involved lhe highei iisks in leims of hilling civilians. Some of
lhe mosl awkwaid blundeis in lhe Kosovo Wai, including lhe desliuclion
of lhe Chinese embassy in Belgiade, iesulled fiom allempls al lhis soil of
laigeling.
Moie effeclive weie allacks on supply ioules, pailiculaily biidges, and
fuel. Allhough lhese laigels, as all olheis, weie desciibed as being mili-
laiy in naluie, oi al leasl ielaled lo lhe mililaiy campaign, and lhey weie
ceilainly chosen and adveilised in advance lo avoid excessive casu-
allies, lheii mosl seveie impacl was piobably civilian. The mosl impoilanl
iesulls of lhe NATO campaign lay less in lhe degiadalion of lhe ugoslav
aimed foices lhan in lhe damage lo infiasliucluie, fuel supplies, and
indusliy. The alieady shaky ugoslav economy was sleadily iuined. The
condilions of life foi oidinaiy people in Belgiade and olhei Seib cilies
deleiioialed, wilhoul any obvious iespile. f il had nol been foi lhe hoi-
iois of elhnic cleansing il mighl have been difncull foi NATO lo suslain
such a punilive aii campaign foi as long as il did, bul lhe evidence of whal
was being done lo lhe Kosovo people eioded sympalhy foi lhe plighl of
lhe Seib people.
Giound wai
When lhe aii sliikes began lhey weie iegulaily desciibed as being of
value nol only in peisuading Milosevic lo oidei his foices lo desisl fiom
elhnic cleansing bul, even if he iefused, in impeding lheii effoils. Cleaily
lhis did nol woik. Seib unils weie aclive in lheii effoils lo depopulale lhe
piovince iighl unlil lhe end of hoslililies. The impacl of NATO aii opei-
alions was limiled by lhe abilily of lhe Seibs lo opeiale in ielalively small
gioups, and in ways lhal allowed lhem lo mingle wilh civilians and even
appeai indislinguishable fiom lheii viclims fiom lhe aii. Skills in decep-
lion and dispeisal developed duiing lhe yeais of liaining lo defend u-
goslavia fiom a possible Russian invasion meanl lhal aiiciafl found il
difncull lo nnd laigels and could be disliacled by dummies. The ieluc-
lance lo iisk pilols and aiiciafl, lhe mosl sliiking example of which was
lhe failuie lo use \S Aimy Apache allack-helicopleis, meanl lhal mosl
allacks weie conducled al high speed and al high allilude.
Giound opeialions would have foiced lhe ugoslav Aimy oul inlo lhe
open. An enemy lhal is able lo hide and dispeise is fai moie difncull lo
hil lhan one lhal needs lo galhei in numbeis lo piepaie lo defend ilself
in a land wai. The immediale impacl of allacks on gaiiison buildings,
ammunilion dumps, and fuel supplies on mililaiy opeialions was limiled
so long as lhe foices lhey suppoiled weie nol obliged lo keep moving and
expend iesouices. This added lo lhe signincance of KLA opeialions. The
moie successful lhey became, lhe moie ugoslav unils weie iendeied
vulneiable lo aii sliikes, and lowaids lhe end of lhe wai lhis was leading
lo incieasing casuallies. Because NATO lacked giound foices of ils own,
il became dependenl upon lhe success of lhe Albanian unils, despile an
expiessed ieluclance lo become lhe aii wing of lhe KLA.``
The public iefusal lo counlenance land opeialions, made iighl al lhe
slail of Opeialion Allied Ioice, was foi many commenlalois lhe giealesl
single slialegic eiioi of lhe campaign. l eased Milosevic`s calculalions
enoimously and meanl lhal any moves lo modeiale lhis consliainl would
appeai as a policy ieveisal. This is nol lo say lhal a land wai would have
been sliaighlfoiwaid. Aiound 13,OOO NATO lioops weie based in
Macedonia on lhe boidei wilh Kosovo al lhe slail of lhe wai, laigely
in piepaialion foi lhe evenlual peacekeeping foice. These weie lalei
ieinfoiced, including by some deploymenls inlo Albania, laigely lo deal
wilh lhe iefugee ciisis.
The facl lhal il would lake many weeks befoie a piopei invasion foice
could be assembled and liained, and NATO goveinmenls did nol wanl lo
wail lhal long, helps explain lhe ieluclance lo move in lhis diieclion. The
logislical pioblems should be iecalled when il is aigued lhal lhe wai
could have been shoilened lhiough a giound wai. The casually issue was
of gieal impoilance. Piesidenl Clinlon evidenlly look lhe view lhal public
opinion, suppoilive of lhe wai in a ialhei lukewaim soil of way, would
soon gel disillusioned should losses mounl and lhe opeialion gel bogged
down. The Biilish aigued sliongly foi moie oveil piepaialions, and did
lheii besl lo manipulale ofncial language and any aclual deploymenls lo
loughen up lhe Alliance slance. Howevei Piime Minislei Blaii appeais lo
have been held back in lhis endeavoui by Piesidenl Clinlon. The olhei
NATO membeis, and in pailiculai Geimany and laly, had seveie mis-
givings aboul lhe wisdom of such a couise and lhe ieadiness of lheii
publics lo commil giound foices. n lhe case of Gieece, opinion was
sliongly pio-Seib, which was an added complicalion because Gieece
piovided lhe besl poil of enliy. Albania, pooi and chaolic, pul ils poils
and aiinelds al lhe Alliance`s disposal, bul lhey aie, along wilh lhe ioads
lhiough lhe mounlains lo Kosovo, sub-slandaid. Macedonia was moie
piomising logislically bul fai moie difncull polilically. Many in lhe coun-
liy had gieal sympalhy wilh lhe Seibs and iesenled lhe aiiival of lens of
lhousands of Albanians. The NATO lioops on Macedonian soil weie
lheie explicilly as a peacekeeping and nol an invasion foice and lhe foi-
mal posilion was lhal any change in mission could nol be counlenanced.
Duiing May, as lhe aii wai failed lo pioduce polilical iesulls and gen-
eialed a seiies of embaiiassing incidenls, iesislance lo piepaialions foi a
giound wai began lo ease. Nobody doubled lhal giound foices would be
necessaiy al some poinl if lhe iefugees weie lo be peisuaded lo ieluin
home, and lhe demands on a peacekeeping foice had giown wilh lhe
scale of lhe effoil geneialed by lhe Seibs` elhnic cleansing and scoiched
eailh policy. The key bieaklhiough came when il was announced lhal lhe
new silualion demanded a much moie subslanlial peacekeeping foice
lhan hilheilo envisaged, and plans began lo move a 5O,OOO foice inlo lhe
iegion. This was coupled wilh incieasing all oplions aie open`` lalk, and
piess leaks lo lhe effecl lhal Clinlon was coming iound lo lhe idea of a
giound invasion if all else failed.
So in piaclice lhe lhieal of giound wai had become pail of NATO`s
slialegy. This was piobably one of a numbei of faclois leading lo Milo-
sevic`s evenlual climb-down. He had failed lo gel an end lo NATO`s
campaign by diawing allenlion lo lhe disliess il was causing oi capilaliz-
ing on Russian diplomalic suppoil. Alliance unily had held wheieas Seib
unily was slailing lo fiacluie. The economic silualion was diie. n one
sense, being indicled as a wai ciiminal meanl lhal Milosevic had lo lose
by being obduiale; in anolhei he could slail lo see how a land wai mighl
|usl end up wilh a maich lo Belgiade and his incaiceialion. Wilh lhe odds
so slacked againsl him, and lhe Russians having been convinced lhal
lheie was no compiomise foi lhem lo biokei, he decided lo cul his losses
and accede lo NATO`s demands.
Kosovo gives no suppoil lo lhe pioposilion lhal aii powei alone can
win wais. l was NATO`s appaienl ieadiness lo conlemplale lhe use of
giound foices in a non-peimissive enviionmenl`` lhal added lo lhe nnal
piessuie on Belgiade. Moie impoilanlly, Milosevic`s foices weie failing
lo beal lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy and lhis failuie added bolh lo lhe
effecliveness of lhe aii campaign and lo lhe poinllessness of a conlinuing
wai.
Kosovo was a splil-scieen wai. One scieen showed a vulneiable people,
baiely able lo iesisl a biulal onslaughl by a semi-disciplined aimy using
melhods nol unfamiliai in lhis pail of Iuiope duiing lhe lwenlielh cen-
luiy. The olhei scieen showed a sociely baiely able lo iesisl a syslemalic
high-lech aii campaign, lhe slialegy of choice foi lhe gieal poweis. The
Seibs weie defealed on bolh scieens: on lhe nisl because lheii onslaughl
geneialed sufncienl iesislance lhal lhe piospecls of evei pacifying Kosovo
sleadily ieceded; on lhe second because, allhough lhey could cope wilh aii
allacks againsl lheii mililaiy capabililies, howevei piecise lhe weapons,
lhey could do lillle lo pievenl lhe dismanlling of lheii economic infia-
sliucluie. On neilhei scieen weie we wilnessing a ievolulion in mililaiy
affaiis.
Noles
1. covei lhis debale in Lawience Iieedman, Thc Rcvolution in Stratcgic Ajjairs, Adelphi
Papeis, London: Oxfoid \niveisily Piess foi SS, 1998.
2. Richaid K. Bells, The New Thieal of Mass Desliuclion,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, \ol. 77,
No. 1, 1anuaiyj Iebiuaiy 1998.
3. Slephen Biddle and Robeil Ziiklel, Technology, CivilMililaiy Relalions, and Wai-
faie in lhe Developing Woild,`` 1ournal oj Stratcgic StuJics, \ol. 19, No. 2, 1une 1996,
pp. 171212.
4. 1ohn Keegan, Please, Mi Blaii, Nevei Take Such a Risk Again,`` SunJay Tclcgraph, 6
1une 1999.
5. 1O1sl Congiess, Second Session, \niled Slales Senale, Heaiings befoie lhe Commillee
on Aimed Seivices, Crisis in thc Icrsian Culj Rcgion. US Iolicy Options anJ Inplica-
tions, Heaiings held 11 and 13 Seplembei, 273O Novembei, 3 Decembei 199O, pp. 662
664.
6. Idwaid Lullwak, A Posl-Heioic Mililaiy Policy,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, \ol. 75, No. 4, 1uly
Augusl 1996, pp. 3344.
7. 1ames Buik, Public Suppoil foi Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing lhe
Casuallies Hypolhesis,`` Iolitical Scicncc Quartcrly, \ol. 114, No. 1, 1999, pp. 5378.
8. The concepl is discussed fully in Lawience Iieedman, ed., Stratcgic Cocrcion. Conccpts
anJ Cascs, London: Oxfoid \niveisily Piess, 1998.
9. Col. Robeil C. Owen, The Balkans Aii Campaign Sludy: Pail 2,`` Airpowcr 1ournal,
Iall 1997.
1O. 1ohn A.Tiipak, Delibeiale Ioice,`` Air Iorcc Maga;inc, \ol. 8O, No. 1O, 1997.
11. See Richaid Holbiooke, To 1nJ a Var, New oik: Random House, 1998.
12. Penlagon spokesman Kennelh Bacon quoled in Intcrnational HcralJ Tribunc, 34
Oclobei 1999. l included lhe oplion of a pause aflei a couple of days lo give Belgiade
lhe chance lo meel lhe Alliance`s demands. This was diopped foi Opeialion Allied
Ioice.
13. Thus Thc 1cononist obseived lhal lhe aii sliikes, wilhoul lhe aiiival of giound lioops,
could be disaslious. Ilhnic-Albanian iesidenls of Piislina, lhe piovincial capilal, feai lhal
lhis will only haiden lhe iesolve of Seib soldieis and unleash moie killing.`` Gelling
Ready foi Wai,`` Thc 1cononist, 1O Oclobei 1998.
14. \S inlelligence liacked a senioi ugoslav foui-man aii defence leam lo Baghdad in
Iebiuaiy foi lwo days. They appaienlly liaded mililaiy spaie pails foi iaqi inlelligence
on aspecls of \S aii allacks and oppoilunilies foi aii defences. Intcrnational HcralJ
Tribunc, 31 Maich 1999.
15. Chiis Hedges, Kosovo`s Nexl Masleis,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, \ol. 78, No. 3, 1999, foi a
delailed desciiplion of lhe developmenl and uniuly chaiaclei of lhe KLA.
16. The same analogy has been used by 1ohn Kifnei in his analysis of lhe Seib campaign, in
Hoiioi by Design: How Seib Ioices Puiged One Million Albanians,`` Ncw York
Tincs, 29 May 1999.
17. Sleven Iilangei, Seibs Sel Ceiling foi Kosovo Albanian Populalion,`` Intcrnational
HcralJ Tribunc, 26 Apiil 1999. Seib ofncials indicaled lhal lhey would accepl back iefu-
gees who could piove lhal lhey weie ugoslav cilizens. Howevei, lhe Seibs had laken
all idenlily papeis fiom eeing Albanians.
18. Ioi example Yugoslav Arny ConnanJ Rclcascs Statcncnt on Troop VithJrawal 0015
CMT, 990511: Since aclions in Kosovo and Melohi|a againsl lhe so-called Kosovo
Libeialion Aimy have been compleled, lhe Supieme Command has oideied ieluin
fiom Kosovo and Melohi|a of pail of lhe aimy and police unils. This decision is being
iealized slailing fiom 22:OO his on 9 May.``
19. Ilaine Sciolino and Ilhan Bionnei, The Road lo Wai: A Special Repoil,`` Ncw York
Tincs, 18 Apiil 1999.
27
Mililaiy hisloiy oveiluined:
Did aii powei win lhe wai?
Ray Iunncll
The conicl in Kosovo fiom Maich lo 1une 1999 was one of lhe mosl
exliaoidinaiy conicls of modein limes. n liulh, il was one of lhe mosl
exliaoidinaiy of all limes. n a peiiod of 1O weeks, enoimous damage was
done lo lhe Seibian nalion, ils infiasliucluie, ils mililaiy foices, and ils
people by lhe Noilh Allanlic Tiealy Oiganisalion (NATO), whose mili-
laiy foices suffeied almosl no damage. 1usl as exliaoidinaiy was lhe facl
lhal lhe coalilion foiced ils will on Seibia wilhoul using any of ils land
foices. NATO used only aii foices. The poilenls lhal deiive fiom lhese
facls will inuence lhe way in which mililaiy powei is conceived, devel-
oped, and used in lhe decades ahead.
n lhe immediale afleimalh of lhe conicl, lhe lessons leained`` in-
dusliy is in lop geai. \nfoilunalely, as fiequenlly occuis in such ciicum-
slances, lhe facls`` aie being benl in diffeienl ways lo suppoil pieviously
held posilions and pie|udices. Mosl disappoinlingly, lhe aigumenls lhal
have iaged foi decades ovei lhe efncacy of aii powei have iesuifaced in
modein foim and advocales of diffeienl peisuasions aie once again em-
bioiled in lhe aigumenl of aii powei veisus land powei. Meanwhile,
some liuly inleiesling and impoilanl issues aie ieceiving scanl allenlion,
al leasl in public foiums.
Bul nisl, lo answei al lhe beginning lhe queslion posed in lhe sub-lille
did aii powei win lhe wai? lhe answei is no,`` il did nol. Howevei, in
lhe complex inleiaclions lhal exisl belween and among lhe vaiious foims
of mililaiy powei, and belween mililaiy powei and polilical powei, sim-
433
plicily piovides an inadequale answei. Only by examining lhe mililaiy
and polilical foices al play in delail can we ieach a moie complex bul also
moie useful answei.
n lhis chaplei, lhe mililaiy opeialions in Seibia and Kosovo will be
desciibed in bioad leims, wilh some commenls being made wilhin lhe
desciiplion, lhe opeialions will be analysed lo deleimine issues of lasling
ielevance lo lhe use of mililaiy foice, and nnally lhe effecls lhal lhese
issues may have in lhe fuluie will be highlighled and conclusions diawn.
The mililaiy opeialions in Seibia and Kosovo
Thc opposing siJcs
The sides lhal faced each olhei al lhe beginning of lhe Kosovo conicl
weie veiy diffeienl. On one side was lhe combined mililaiy slienglh of
lhe woild`s laigesl, besl-equipped, and mosl highly liained mililaiy alli-
ance, lhe Noilh Allanlic Tiealy Oiganisalion. n lhe poslCold Wai eia
of lhe 199Os, NATO had liansfoimed ilself fiom a coalilion aiiayed
againsl lhe Soviel \nion and ils Waisaw Pacl allies inlo one lhal had a
bioadei and less focused aim of pieseiving lhe peace in Iuiope. Heading
NATO, in leims of bolh polilical and mililaiy mighl, was lhe woild`s
supeipowei, lhe \niled Slales. Also included weie ma|oi mililaiy poweis
such as lhe \niled Kingdom, Iiance, Geimany, and laly. The NATO
poweis had opeialed logelhei foi decades and had well-developed sys-
lems of command and conliol and well-lesled syslems of |oinl and com-
bined opeialions.1
An example of lheii mililaiy piowess is offeied by lhe Gulf Wai of
199O1991, lhe mosl signincanl wai of iecenl limes. n lhal wai, lhe mosl
effeclive elemenls of lhe coalilion lhal ousled iaq fiom Kuwail weie
NATO nalions. Theii well-developed docliine, opeialional concepls, and
pievious liaining in |oinl and combined opeialions weie ciucial in lhe
swifl and lolal defeal of lhe iaqi mililaiy foices.
On lhe olhei side weie lhe mililaiy and paiamililaiy foices of Seibia.
These foices weie foimidable in leims of numbeis and, lo some exlenl,
in weapons as well. Howevei, lhey had neilhei lhe lolal numbeis noi
lhe advanced weaponiy lhal weie available lo NATO. Moieovei, in lhe
seiies of conicls in which lhey had engaged in lhe 199Os, as lhe foimei
ugoslav iepublics of Slovenia, Cioalia, and Bosnia lefl lhe fedeialion,
lheii mililaiy peifoimance had been palchy. The ugoslav Aimy had
been successful al leiioiizing and muideiing civilians. To some exlenl, il
had been successful in combaling small gioups of ill-liained and pooily
equipped iiiegulai foices. l had, howevei, indicaled no capacily foi
suslained, successful opeialions againsl modein, well-equipped iegulai
foices.2 Theie was no evidence lo suggesl lhal il was anylhing bul loyal lo
lhe ugoslav piesidenl, Slobodan Milosevic.
The ugoslav aii defence syslem was well equipped wilh many iadai
siles, suiface-lo-aii missiles (SAMs), and anli-aiiciafl aililleiy (AAA).
Of signincance was lhal much of lhe syslem was mobile, wilh lhe abilily
lo move quickly lo posilions wheie deleclion and consequenlly allack
weie difncull.
The Seibian aii foices conlained only one lype of modein combal aii-
ciafl, lhe MG-29. ls numbeis weie few and ils pilols compaialively
undei-liained in modein combal lechniques. Seibia`s syslems foi lhe co-
oidinalion of ils aii defence elemenls SAMs, AAA, aii defence aiiciafl,
defensive iadai, and communicalions weie sound and lheii oiganiza-
lion well developed.
n consideiing lhe opposing sides, lwo olhei aspecls aie impoilanl.
The nisl is lhal, in pievious conicls in lhe Balkans in lhe 199Os, membei
nalions of NATO had shown a conspicuous ieluclance lo iisk casuallies
by exposing lheii foices lo Seibian defences. The iesull was and is an
emphasis on lhe use of aii foices and a maiked unwillingness lo use
giound foices. To some exlenl lhis was an oulcome of lhe Gulf Wai, in
which il had been shown lhal mililaiy success can be achieved while ex-
posing few of youi own lioops lo iisk and lhen foi only a compaialively
shoil peiiod of lime.3 The exposuie of youi own lioops lo iisk is also a
signincanl facloi when youi own nalional inleiesls aie nol seen lo be
diieclly engaged.
The second aspecl deiives fiom lhe nisl, lhe emphasis on aii foices. Of
vilal impoilance in modein aimed conicl is lhe abilily lo conliol lhe aii.
n lhis case, by lhe veiy naluie of lhe polilical conicl, lhe aii side of lhe
conicl would be conducled lhiough allacks by NATO on laigels in
Seibia, wilh Seibian aii defences being called on lo defeal oi fiusliale lhe
allacks. Seibia did nol have lhe offensive aii elemenls lo caiiy lhe nghl
inlo NATO leiiiloiies, even if il had lhe polilical will lo do so. Howevei,
Seibia did know oi al leasl ils leadeis would have had a veiy good idea of
how lhe NATO aii campaign would be conducled. The model developed
foi lhe Gulf Wai and piomoled in NATO and lhiough lhe piofessional
lileialuie since lhen calls foi lhe eaily and swifl desliuclion of enemy
aii defences, lheieby eslablishing a safe enviionmenl foi fuilhei mililaiy
aclions. Of signincance heie is lhe success en|oyed wilh lhis model in
foicing Milosevic lo lhe negolialing lable in lhe Bosnian selllemenl of
1995.
NATOs stratcgic ain
The slialegic vision consliucled by NATO foi Kosovo was simple bul
limiled: hil Seibian mililaiy laigels wilh bombs and missiles unlil Seibia`s
DD AR POWIR WN THI WAR? 435
piesidenl, Slobodan Milosevic, agieed lo NATO`s demands. Those de-
mands weie, in essence, lhe leims lo which lhe Kosovo Albanians had
agieed following lhe Rambouillel lalks. The limil lo lhis vision was lhal,
if il was nol successful, all lhal could be done shoil, lhal is of a ma|oi
change in allilude of a numbei of membei nalions was lo conlinue wilh
il.
The secondaiy effecl of lhis policy, which iuled oul lhe use of NATO`s
foimidable giound foices, was lo biing a uiiy of commenl fiom aiound
lhe woild lo lhe effecl lhal aii powei alone could nol be successful.4
Typical was lhe commenl of lhe \S Aimy Secielaiy, Louis Caldeia,
quoled in Tinc magazine: Theie aie limils lo whal one can do wilh
bombing and ciuise missiles.``5 To which lhe Tinc iepoil iemaiked: f
lhe Aimy Secielaiy knows lhal giunls on lhe giound aie needed lo foice
lhe Seibs lo slop killing Kosovais, il`s a safe bel lhal Milosevic knows
il loo.``6 This and similai commenls fiom a mullilude of so-called mili-
laiy expeils musl have given gieal comfoil lo Milosevic and slienglhened
his iesolve, especially when NATO`s leadeis had afnimed publicly lhal
giound foices would nol be used.
Of inleiesl heie is lhe facl lhal lhe leadeis of NATO seemed lo expecl
Milosevic lo bend lo lheii will once lhe bombing began and he iealized
lhal NATO was nol blufnng. As menlioned above, lhe analogue being
used seemed lo be lhe Bosnian conicl of 1995 in which Milosevic folded
aflei being allacked fiom lhe aii in a ialhei limid campaign lhal lasled
foi only 22 days. f lhis is so, lhen lhe pail played by giound foices in lhal
conicl musl have been oveilooked. The aclions of lhe Cioalian mililaiy
and lhe Biilish and Iiench aililleiy in lhe aiea of Saia|evo weie a mosl
impoilanl ad|uncl lo lhe aclions of lhe NATO aii foices. n lhe Kosovo
conicl, lheie weie no equivalenls.
The olhei fealuie of lhe delailed polilical inliusion inlo lhe opeialional
calculus of NATO`s mililaiy leadeis and mission planneis in lhe Kosovo
conicl was lhe ie|eclion by polilical leadeis of mosl of lhe laigels lhal
lhe mililaiy planneis idenlined. Of lhe 2,OOO idenlined, only 2OO weie
(inilially) polilically acceplable.
Military planning
Iiom lhe slail of lhe planning of lhe NATO campaign, lhe necessily lo
minimize allied casuallies and civilian casuallies was uppeimosl in lhe
minds of bolh polilicians and mililaiy planneis. Theie was, lheiefoie, a
sliong emphasis on piecision, bolh in localing laigels wilh an obvious
mililaiy puipose and in weapons deliveiy. l was fell lhal lhe combinalion
of piecision, slandoff weapons, and sleallh lechnology would be decisive
in changing Milosevic`s mind.
Moieovei, il was fell lhal bombing was lhe only couise of aclion lhal
could be laken quickly lo combal lhe cleansing of Albanians fiom Kosovo
lhal had alieady commenced. Wilh no NATO giound foices of any size
and capacily in lhe Balkans, lhe lime iequiied lo build and deploy lhem
would be consideiable.7
Aii powei in ils vaiious foims would lheiefoie use sleallh and pieci-
sion-guided munilions in a ma|oi campaign lhal would be poweiful and
concenlialed, and would minimize lhe piobabilily of killing civilians,
damaging civilian piopeily, oi laking casuallies among NATO`s foices.
These weie seen as being impoilanl foi mainlaining coalilion unily
abioad and polilical suppoil al home.
Aii powei in lhe foim of bombs and ciuise missiles would gain conliol
of lhe aii. Thal would be followed by allacks on lhe mililaiy foices in
bolh Seibia and Kosovo lhal weie planning and conducling lhe leiioi
campaign againsl lhe Kosovo Albanians.
Thc prcluJc
As lhe opposing sides conducled diplomalic manoeuvies in Iebiuaiy and
Maich of 1999, Seibian foices had inlensined lheii leiioi campaign in
Kosovo lhe so-called elhnic cleansing`` of lhe piovince. Slobodan
Milosevic was given an ullimalum: slop lhe elhnic cleansing`` oi you will
be bombed. Now, almosl all aspecls of lhe opeialionally impoilanl ele-
menl of suipiise had been iemoved. Milosevic knew whal would be al-
lacked, how il would be allacked, and wheie il would be allacked. Then
he was lold on 23 Maich 1999 by lhe Secielaiy Geneial of NATO
when he would be allacked.
Iollowing lhe unsuccessful conclusion of lalks in Belgiade on 23 Maich
belween a leam led by Richaid Holbiooke on behalf of NATO and a
ugoslav leam led by Piesidenl Slobodan Milosevic, lhe Secielaiy Gen-
eial of NATO, 1aviei Solana, issued a slalemenl lale lhal day in which he
announced lhal he had diiecled lhe Supieme Allied Commandei in Iu-
iope (SACI\R), Geneial Wesley Claik, lo iniliale aii opeialions in lhe
Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia. n his slalemenl, lhe Secielaiy Geneial
slaled lhal NATO was nol waging wai againsl ugoslavia and lhal lhe
mililaiy aclion was aimed al disiupling lhe violenl allacks being com-
milled by lhe Seibian Aimy, mililaiy police, and special foices in Kosovo.
Thc start oj opcrations
Opeialion Allied Ioice commenced on lhe evening of lhe nexl day, wilh
NATO launching bombing iaids and ciuise missiles againsl ugoslavian
aii defences and olhei mililaiy laigels. As expecled, lhis was lhe slail of
lhe campaign lo oblain conliol of lhe aii. The laigels, howevei, weie
limiled in numbei and lhe pace of opeialions ielalively slow. This was
lypical of lhe nisl phase of lhe mililaiy opeialions.
Olhei faclois weie signincanl. The wealhei in lhe eaily weeks of lhe
campaign was pooi. The ugoslavian aii defence iadais and missiles
weie used cauliously and spoiadically, and lhe mobilily of many elemenls
of lhe syslem was exploiled. Consequenlly, allhough lhey weie nol suc-
cessful al whal mighl be seen as lheii piimaiy lask of deslioying NATO`s
aiiciafl, lhey weie difncull lo delecl and allack, and, as long as lhey weie
opeialional and lhe NATO piecepl of minimizing iisk applied, lhey weie
an effeclive baiiiei lo low-level opeialions.
n lhese eaily exchanges, bolh sides losl aiiciafl. The ugoslav side
losl a numbei of MG-29 aiiciafl in aii-lo-aii combal. Ioi ils pail, on 27
Maich, lhe \niled Slales Aii Ioice (\SAI) losl an I-117A Sleallh``
nghlei lo lhe wesl of lhe ugoslav capilal, Belgiade. This was lhe nisl
combal loss of an I-117A and, as such, a consideiable public ielalions
coup foi lhe ugoslav side, a facl lhal was fully exploiled by lhem.8 Of
opeialional signincance was lhal lhe pilol was iescued by a \S combal
seaich and iescue leam. The abilily lo nnd and iescue a pilol fiom deep
inside enemy leiiiloiy is a veiy impoilanl capabilily, nol leasl foi lhe
moiale of opeialional aiiciew.9
Al lhe same lime as lhese eaily opeialions weie being undeilaken,
a picluie was developing of a iulhless campaign being undeilaken in
Kosovo by Seibian secuiily foices (lhe Aimy, lhe police, and paiamili-
laiy foices). The ow of iefugees inlo lhe neighbouiing slales of Albania
and Macedonia incieased, lhe iefugees biinging wilh lhem lales of loi-
luie, muidei, iape, and olhei foims of leiioiism. Allhough lhe main
aim of lhe Seibian secuiily foices seems lo have been lo expel lhe Alba-
nians fiom Kosovo, evidence was also accumulaling of muidei in laige
numbeis.
Allhough NATO foices weie liying lo disiupl Seibian opeialions in
Kosovo, lhe main concenlialion was slill on lhe ugoslav aii defence
syslem and associaled mililaiy laigels. Pooi wealhei iesliicled oppoi-
lunilies foi effeclive aclion againsl Seibia`s foices in Kosovo, wheie lhe
leiioi campaign was being conducled by ielalively small, highly mobile
gioups wilh a small logislic liain. Such gioups aie difncull lo locale,
idenlify, and allack fiom lhe aii. f lhe wealhei is pooi and if aii elemenls
aie consliained lo opeiale fiom medium level (15,OOO feel above lhe
leiiain), lhe lask is all bul impossible.
l was al lhis slage lhal lhe paiallel naluie of opeialions in Kosovo
became obvious. NATO was, wilh ielalive impunily, hilling mililaiy and
infiasliucluie laigels, mainly in Seibia, while lhe Seibs weie leiioiizing
and muideiing Albanians in Kosovo.
1arly opcrational asscssncnt
Iaily assessmenls of NATO opeialions weie nol favouiable. The cam-
paign had slailed slowly and, despile lhe besl effoils of lhe NATO public
ielalions machine, geneial woildwide feeling was lhal Milosevic`s alli-
lude had haidened and lhal no easy palh lo vicloiy ovei him exisled. The
slialegic miscalculalion conlained wilhin lhe oiiginal opeialional plan
was incieasingly obvious. Bul now NATO`s iepulalion was on lhe line.
Having been ieluclanl lo commil, il was now foiced lo conlinue lo an
acceplable conclusion oi lose ciedibilily.
The slow slail using limiled foice including lhe explicil ie|eclion of
lhe use of giound foices againsl a limiled lisl of laigels ian diieclly
counlei lo lhe Powell docliine, espoused by Geneial Colin Powell when
he was Chaiiman of lhe 1oinl Chiefs of Slaff. Thal called foi lhe \niled
Slales, lhe ma|oi conliibuloi of mililaiy powei lo lhe coalilion, lo use
oveiwhelming foice fiom lhe slail of a conicl and nol lo become in-
volved unless lheie was sliong public suppoil foi mililaiy aclion, logelhei
wilh a high piobabilily of success and a cleaily denned exil slialegy. As lo
lhe use of giound foices, Geneial Powell himself said in an addiess lo lhe
Nalional Piess Club on 17 May: would have aigued foi a campaign
lhal, if il couldn`l include giound lioops, lhen don`l lake away also lhe
lhieal lo use giound lioops.``10 This is a poinl lo which we will ieluin.
Thc tcnpo incrcascs
Duiing Apiil, lhe lempo of NATO opeialions acceleialed, albeil slowly.
Damage lo lhe ugoslav mililaiy, including ils aii defence syslem, had
been modeiale al besl and lhe iefugee pioblem on lhe boideis of Kosovo
was engaging lhe woild`s allenlion. Howevei, lhe laigel lisl had ex-
panded and now included laigels in Belgiade. Theie weie, howevei, no
signs lhal Milosevic had as much as blinked. SACI\R iequesled al leasl
anolhei 3OO aiiciafl lo biing lhe lolal numbei deployed lo aiound 1,OOO.
Then, in lale Apiil, 24 Apache helicopleis of lhe \S Aimy deployed
fiom Geimany lo Albania. Apaches aie heavily aimed and aimouied
allack-helicopleis wilh lhe abilily lo delivei gieal foice wilh high accu-
iacy fiom low level againsl giound foices. Having undeilaken considei-
able pie-deploymenl liaining befoie aiiival, lhe ciews commenced in-
counliy piepaialion foi conicl.11
Al lhis lime, wilh lhe lempo of opeialions incieasing and wilh giealei
piessuie being exeiled foi iesulls, NATO suffeied a numbei of unfoilu-
nale incidenls, in pailiculai a numbei involving dealh and in|uiy lo civil-
ians. Mosl unfoilunale of all weie lhose involving Kosovo Albanians, foi
whose well-being lhe campaign was being waged. The mosl damaging of
lhese in Kosovo al leasl as fai as NATO`s public image was conceined
was lhe one in which a convoy of Albanian iefugees was allacked by
NATO aiiciafl neai lhe boidei wilh Albania on 14 Apiil. NATO spokes-
men offeied a seiies of possible explanalions of lhe incidenl, none of
lhem convincing, befoie admilling lo lhe eiioi some nve days lalei.
The mosl publicized collaleial damage`` incidenl of lhe Kosovo con-
icl occuiied on lhe evening of 7 May when lhe Chinese embassy in
Belgiade was mislakenly and accuialely allacked by \SAI B-2 Sleallh``
bombeis opeialing fiom lhe Midwesl of lhe \niled Slales. Thiee Chinese
nalionals weie killed and 2O olheis in|uied. The eiioi was desciibed as an
inlelligence eiioi, lhe iesull of an oul-of-dale and faully map, coupled
wilh inadequale laigeling pioceduies. NATO`s iegiels ovei lhe mislake
weie swifl bul appeaied lo have lillle effecl on lhe Chinese, whose leadeis
weie vehemenl in lheii ieaclion. Mass piolesls, endoised al high polilical
level, weie conducled in Bei|ing, and China announced lhe suspension of
a numbei of diplomalic inilialives wilh lhe \niled Slales, including dia-
logue on human iighls. Ioi ils pail, lhe \S iesponse wenl as fai as Pies-
idenl Clinlon lelephoning Piesidenl 1iang Zemin lo offei his peisonal
apology and explanalion.
Opcrations continuc with sonc changcs anJ aJJitions
Duiing Apiil and May, as piessuie buill foi a decisive oulcome lo lhe
conicl in ugoslavia, lhe lisl of laigels available lo lhe mililaiy foices
was expanded. \aiious elemenls of lhe aii defence syslem weie slill dif-
ncull lo nnd and allack. Less so weie laige infiasliucluie laigels lhal
weie classed as being mililaiily ielevanl. This lisl now conlained nol only
oil ienneiies and sloiage aieas, ammunilion depols and biidges, bul
lelevision and iadio liansmilleis, melal piocessing planls, and, on 22
Apiil, lhe piesidenl`s villa oulside Belgiade.
Al lhe summil of NATO leadeis held in Washinglon D.C. on 2325
Apiil lo celebiale lhe nflielh anniveisaiy of lhe Alliance, lhe issue of lhe
use of giound foices in Kosovo was iaised. The Biilish piime minislei,
Tony Blaii, conlinued lhe pievious Biilish line lhal giound foices could be
used once a semi-peimissive`` enviionmenl had been ciealed in Kosovo.
n olhei woids, Biilain would accepl some giound foice casuallies in
puisuil of lhe Alliance`s goals. On lhe olhei hand, in lhe immediale
afleimalh of lhe NATO summil, lhe \S House of Repiesenlalives voled
by a laige maigin lo iequiie Piesidenl Clinlon lo seek congiessional
appioval befoie commilling any lioops lo Kosovo. n a somewhal simi-
lai vein, lhe ieliiing Chaiiman of lhe Mililaiy Commillee of NATO,
Geneial Klaus Naumann of Geimany, slaled in his faiewell piess con-
feience lhal lheie was no need foi giound lioops excepl in a peimissive
enviionmenl.``
Neveilheless, lhe NATO summil seems lo have been a waleished. The
lempo of opeialions incieased, lhe laigel lisl was fuilhei expanded, and
laigel appioval pioceduies weie simplined.
Thiough May, as lhe wealhei impioved and lhe aii foices became moie
alluned bolh lo lhe opeialional enviionmenl and lo lhe polilical fiame-
woik wilhin which lhey necessaiily opeialed, iesulls impioved. Moie
aiiciafl weie available. Anolhei highly impoilanl facloi was lhal lhe
Kosovo Libeialion Aimy (KLA) began lo have an effecl. \nlil May, lhe
aclivilies of lhe KLA had been of lillle impoilance. Howevei, lheii
numbeis had incieased consideiably wilh lhe addilion of Kosovai iefu-
gees and expaliiale Albanians fiom aiound lhe woild. The KLA had also
benenled fiom lhe ow of funds fiom abioad, lhe acquisilion of bellei
weapons, and a giealei emphasis on liaining. Now lhe KLA plus NATO
special foices weie pioviding bellei laigeling infoimalion foi lhe aii
foices.
By lale May, lhe KLA was able lo mounl a ma|oi offensive wilh moie
lhan 5,OOO lioops fiom ils bases in Albania inlo soulh-wesl Kosovo. One
oulcome of lhe ieaclion of lhe Seibian mililaiy lo lhis incuision was
lo piovide bellei laigels foi NATO aii foices, in pailiculai lhe A-1O
Wailhog`` and B-52 aiiciafl of lhe \SAI. These moie inlense and moie
diiecl allacks on Seibian giound foices conlinued inlo eaily 1une.
Opcrations concluJc
On 2 1une, Piesidenl Maaili Ahlisaaii of Iinland, who had been ap-
poinled by lhe Iuiopean \nion and lhe \niled Nalions as an envoy, and
\ikloi Cheinomyidin, who had been appoinled as lhe Russian envoy,
mel wilh Piesidenl Milosevic in Belgiade. The nexl day, Milosevic ac-
cepled lhe leims of lhe peace agieemenl submilled lo him by lhe lwo
envoys.12
Despile lhe agieemenl, bolh Piesidenl Clinlon and Piime Minislei
Blaii wained lhal expeiience wilh Milosevic has shown lhal caulion was
iequiied and lhal offensive aii opeialions should conlinue unlil Seib
foices had begun a veiinable wilhdiawal foim Kosovo. Consequenlly, aii
opeialions conlinued unlil a foimal hall was declaied by lhe Secielaiy
Geneial of NATO on 1O 1une.
The mililaiy opeialions analysed
Air powcr
The mosl oulslanding fealuie of lhe Kosovo conicl is lhal lhe NATO
aim was achieved by aii foices alone and wilhoul lhe loss of a single aii-
ciew membei. This is nol lo say lhal lives weie nol losl. NATO foices
killed many people duiing lheii opeialions. These included nol only
Seibian mililaiy peisonnel bul also many civilians, including Kosovo Al-
banians. Also, allhough lhe Seibs weie able lo claim nol one NATO life,
lhey killed many Albanians in Kosovo duiing lhe 11 weeks of lhe conicl.
Howevei, lo say lhal aii powei won lhe wai is lo considei mililaiy op-
eialions in a way lhal is nol helpful and can in facl be dysfunclional. Iiisl,
mililaiy powei is and should be consideied as an inlegialed and coheienl
whole, a facl of which NATO planneis and decision makeis seemed lo
be unawaie. To considei mililaiy powei as lhey did, namely in ils dis-
aggiegaled foims of sea, aii, and land powei, is lo misconceive ils naluie.
The sea, lhe aii, and lhe land aie lhe opeialing enviionmenls in which
mililaiy powei is foimed and used. All inleiacl and all aie impoilanl, al-
lhough, on some occasions, one oi olhei of lhe opeialional enviionmenls
may be moie impoilanl lhan lhe olheis.
Mililaiy foices aie oiganized lo exploil mililaiy powei. Mosl owe lheii
foim of oiganizalion moie lo hisloiy lhan lo oiganizalional logic.13 The
foices lhal use lhe iespeclive enviionmenls aie designed lo maximize
lheii effecliveness in lheii pailiculai enviionmenl. Ioi example, aimies
aie designed lo maximize lheii effecliveness on lhe land, navies on and
undei lhe sea, and aii foices in lhe aii. Thal does nol mean, howevei,
lhal each does nol use olhei foims of mililaiy powei. n pailiculai, bolh
aimies and navies consciously use aii powei lo impiove lheii peifoi-
mance in lheii piimaiy opeialing enviionmenl.
The eiioi comes in failing lo conceive of mililaiy powei holislically.
Consequenlly, when deleimining how lo use mililaiy powei, eilhei as a
iesponse lo a piedicled slialegic fuluie oi lo conducl a specinc mililaiy
opeialion, loo oflen lhe analysis becomes a nghl among lhe aimy, navy,
and aii foices foi inuence ialhei lhan a deleiminalion of whal mililaiy
powei is iequiied foi lhe ciicumslances being faced.
The sel of alliludes desciibed above spill ovei inlo bolh populai and
polilical consciousness. l was noimal behavioui on lhe pail of polilicians,
lheii adviseis, mililaiy ofnceis, commenlalois, and lhe media lo see lhe
Kosovo conicl befoie, duiing, and aflei lhe evenl as also being, in one
iespecl, a conlesl belween aii powei and land powei foi piimacy in
modein mililaiy opeialions. Thal was mosl unfoilunale, foi il had im-
poilanl polilical and mililaiy consequences. f mililaiy powei had been
consideied as a coheienl enlily whose vaiious chaiacleiislics weie lo be
used as lhe ciicumslances iequiied, lhe opeialional planning foi Kosovo
would have been conducled diffeienlly and so loo would have been lhe
decision-making fiamewoik in which il woiked. n pailiculai, giound
foices would nol have been excluded because lhey would have been seen
as an essenlial elemenl wilhin lhe mililaiy powei iequiied. The effecl lhal
lheii possible use would have had on lhe opeialional and polilical calcu-
lus of Slobodan Milosevic would have been appiecialed and exploiled.14
The deploymenl of even small numbeis of combal soldieis inlo lhe aiea
would ceilainly have unsellled him. The conlinuance of a build-up even
if small and even if lheie was lillle inlenlion lo use lhese foices olhei
lhan as a lhieal would have been a ielalively cheap bul possibly inu-
enlial elemenl wilhin lhe conicl.
Kosovo shows us lhal senioi decision makeis, especially polilicians,
senioi mililaiy ofnceis, and defence buieaucials, logelhei wilh lhose who
advise lhem, musl become moie knowledgeable of and moie adepl al
using mililaiy powei. Thal musl include lhe insighl lhal comes fiom
viewing mililaiy powei holislically. n doing so, we mighl slie foievei
lhose infanlile aigumenls aboul aii powei veisus land powei lhal have
abounded in lhe peiiod since lhe Kosovo conicl ended. Moie impoi-
lanlly, we mighl develop decision-making e liles wilh lhe expeilise and
lhe maluie |udgemenl lo use mililaiy powei wisely and lhe knowledge lo
avoid ils misuse.
And, lo ieluin lo lhe queslion of whelhei oi nol aii powei won lhe
wai: no, il did nol. Mililaiy powei won lhe wai, and il will win lhe nexl
and lhe one aflei lhal.
Howevei, lo considei lhe Kosovo conicl in leims of winning and losing
is suiieal. Lillle, if anylhing, has been won. n facl, in piaclical leims, lhe
silualion in lhe Balkans has nol impioved. Thousands have been killed, a
ma|oi pail of ugoslavia`s infiasliucluie has been deslioyed, elhnic en-
milies have been ieinfoiced, and lhe woild lhiough lhe \niled Nalions
and NATO has laken on a peacekeeping lask lhal will be veiy de-
manding of polilical, mililaiy, and nnancial iesouices foi a long lime.
Ceilainly, lhese facls aie offsel by lhe facl lhal Kosovo showed lhal lhe
ma|oi poweis would use mililaiy powei lo pievenl ciimes againsl human-
ily, which will ceilainly inuence lhe behavioui of fuluie Milosevics.15
Less ceilain, howevei, aie lhe ciicumslances in which human iighls will
be similaily defended in lhe fuluie.16
Casualty avoiJancc
Minimizing casuallies was of gieal impoilance lo NATO. The emphasis
on minimizing civilian casuallies in ugoslavia was noled above. Seem-
ingly of even giealei impoilance lo NATO polilicians, howevei, was lhe
avoidance of casuallies lo NATO`s mililaiy foices. Given whal has oc-
cuiied in lhe Gulf Wai, Bosnia, and now Kosovo, lhis emphasis is ceilain
lo conlinue wilh NATO and olhei like-minded nalions.17
Whal Kosovo showed, howevei, is lhal zeio-casually oi minimum-
casually campaigns aie difncull lo conducl if lhe opposilion is inliansi-
genl, and especially if lhe opposilion is nol suffeiing heavy losses oi has
lhe capacily lo absoib losses wilhoul inching. The combinalion of polil-
ical iesliainls on NATO foices and bad wealhei in lhe eaily weeks of lhe
campaign iesulled in low levels of Seibian opeialional losses. NATO
foices could nol locale and deslioy lhe Seibian mililaiy, in pailiculai lhe
Seibian giound foices lhal weie conducling lhe elhnic cleansing`` and
lhe Seibian aii defences lhal weie keeping lhe NATO aii foices above
15,OOO feel. As a consequence, an inoidinale amounl of damage was
inicled on ugoslavia`s infiasliucluie befoie Milosevic yielded. This
would nol have been necessaiy al leasl nol lo lhe exlenl lhal did occui
and many Albanians lives would have been saved, if lhe Seibs had suf-
feied ma|oi opeialional losses lhiough moie diiecl NATO assaull.
To oveicome lhis pioblem while slill mainlaining a low level of iisk lo
youi own lioops will almosl ceilainly iequiie lhe use of foims of iecon-
naissance, laigeling, and weapons deliveiy lhal minimize lhe iisk lo
NATO lioops. The piesenl slandoff weapons and sleallh lechnology have
shown lhal lhey have limilalions. The way is open foi olhei lechnologies,
especially lhose lhal will piovide lhe means foi piecise weapons deliveiy
in all wealheis, day and nighl.
Iffecls on lhe fuluie
The lalesl in lhe conlinuing seiies of bloody conicls in lhe Balkans will
have many effecls on fuluie behavioui. As has been lhe case wilh pievi-
ous aimed conicls, many of lhese effecls aie difncull lo piedicl, espe-
cially so close lo lhe evenl. Also, in lhe afleimalh, lhe poinl will be made
and iemade lhal Kosovo was unique and should nol be used as a
lemplale foi lhe fuluie. Neveilheless, much can be leained fiom lhis
conicl lhal will be of use. Given lhe ciicumslances of Kosovo, much of
lhe analysis will concenliale on lhe polilical implicalions. This will spill
ovei inlo lhe mililaiy policies of lhe woild`s nalions in diffeienl ways.
Kosovo has ie-emphasized a slaik facl. Wilh powei geneially, and wilh
mililaiy powei in pailiculai, lheie is lhe \niled Slales and lhen lheie aie
all olheis. Consequenlly, wheieas lhe \niled Slales will concenliale al-
lenlion in lhe mililaiy spheie on coiiecling peiceived denciencies in ils
panoply of mililaiy capabililies, olhei nalions have difncull |udgemenls
of olhei lypes lo make. Ioi example, lhose nalions involved in mililaiy
alliances wilh lhe \niled Slales have lo deleimine lo whal exlenl lhey
believe lhey can iemain liuly inlei-opeiable wilh lhe woild`s sole supei-
powei. And lhal, of couise, assumes lhal lhey need lo. n lhe main, lhe
mililaiy alliances lhal connecl many nalions lo lhe \niled Slales weie
consliucled in quile diffeienl slialegic ciicumslances as a counlei lo a
specinc and diffeienl lhieal. Some nalions may well decide lhal, in lhe
absence of a disceinible lhieal, having lheii mililaiies lied closely lo lhe
\niled Slales is nol only nnancially impossible bul also no longei neces-
saiy. This is nol lo say lhal lhe Alliance would be bioken; ialhei, in ils
mililaiy aspecls, il would lake new foims. This has peilinence foi \S
allies in Iuiope and in lhe Asia Pacinc.
The olhei slaik facl lhal emeiges is lhal mililaiy powei is nol well
undeislood and consequenlly is fiequenlly misused. The decision lo use
mililaiy powei is and should be a mosl difncull one foi any polilical
leadei. To decide lo visil dealh and desliuclion on olhei human beings is
a huge iesponsibilily, especially as ils concomilanl is lhe decision lo
expose a numbei of one`s fellow cilizens lo peisonal iisk and possible
dealh. The decision should nevei be laken lighlly. Alleinalives lo ils use
should be diligenlly puisued unlil lhey have been exhausled, foi mililaiy
powei should be lhe insliumenl of lasl iesoil.
Having decided lo use mililaiy powei, polilical leadeis need lo appie-
ciale lhal il is a leiiible, blunl, and biulal insliumenl. Howevei, il is nol
made less so by nddling wilh il.18 Once lhe polilical decision lo use mili-
laiy powei has been laken, in almosl all cases humanily is besl seived by
hilling haid and conlinuing ielenllessly unlil lhe polilical ob|eclives aie
achieved.
Whal slands oul boldly in NATO`s Opeialion Allied Ioice is lhal lhe
oiiginal mililaiy plan was badly awed. Tiue, lhis is being wise in hind-
sighl bul, if we cannol use hindsighl lo illuminale oui eiiois, we will
nevei leain. A much boldei and moie concenlialed use of mililaiy powei
was iequiied, one lhal used massive foice deliveied fiom lhe aii againsl
laigels of ieal signincance lo Milosevic, accompanied by a public decla-
ialion wilh associaled giound foice mobilizalion and deploymenls
lhal lhis was being done lo piepaie lhe way foi a ma|oi giound offensive.
Whal should have been piomised was lhal lhe aii allacks would be
ielenlless, and lhal is piecisely whal should have been deliveied no
bombing pauses, no hinl lhal lhe allacks would ease if Milosevic did
anylhing olhei lhan fully accepl NATO`s leims. Thal was lhe way lo
achieve lhe aim quickly wilh minimum casuallies lo bolh lhe lioops of
NATO and lhe civilians of Seibia and Kosovo.
Conclusion
The conclusion lhal emeiges fiom lhe conicl in Kosovo is lhal lhe
decision-making e liles of lhe woild and, in lhis case in pailiculai, of
NATO do nol know how lo use mililaiy powei piopeily. f lhe leadeis of
NATO had had a bellei knowledge of mililaiy powei, wilh lhe conse-
quenl abilily lo use il wisely and lhe skill lo avoid ils misuse, Kosovo
would nol be lhe polilical and social mess il is loday and lhousands of
Kosovais, Seibs and Albanians alike, would nol now be dead. The
|udgemenl is haish bul lhoioughly deseived. n a similai vein, bul occa-
sioned by lhe aclions nol of NATO leadeis bul of Russia`s, 1im Hoagland
of lhe Vashington Iost has commenled: The abilily of a modein mililaiy
lo pio|ecl desliuclive powei abioad has fai oulpaced lhe abilily of polil-
ical leadeis lo use lhal powei lo achieve polilical goals and lo manage
wai`s consequences.``19
Bul how do we coiiecl lhis? How do we liy lo educale lhose who
govein us in lhe appiopiiale use of violence? Suiely we cannol accepl
lhal il is fulile even lo liy.
As slaled eailiei in lhis chaplei, mililaiy powei is a complex enlily
whose vaiious chaiacleiislics inleilwine and inleiacl in ways lhal aie
difncull lo undeisland. Bul lhe same can be said of polilical powei and
economic powei, and yel we expecl oui nalional leadeis and lheii ad-
viseis lo be knowledgeable of lhose foims of powei and skilful in lheii
applicalion. Suiely we should expecl no, suiely we should demand al
leasl a similai level of knowledge and compelence wilh mililaiy powei.
The woild of loday and lhe fuluie is a dynamo pioducing change al a
veiy high iale, wilh no ieduclion in piospecl. Given lhis lype of envi-
ionmenl and lhe cuiienl polilical landscape, few lhings aie ceilain. One
ceilainly, howevei, is lhal lhe leadeis of mosl nalions, acling alone oi in
conceil wilh olheis, will need lo exeicise |udgemenl on how, when, and
wheie mililaiy powei is lo be applied. Lel us hope lhal lhe leadeis of lhe
fuluie have lhe knowledge and lhe wisdom lo do lhal bellei lhan lhe
cuiienl gioup of leadeis did in Kosovo.
Noles
1. NATO conlained lhiee of lhe woild`s nucleai poweis: lhe \niled Slales, lhe \niled
Kingdom, and Iiance. ugoslavia had no nucleai weapons. Howevei, in lhis conicl,
nucleai weapons weie nol an issue. Whelhei NATO would have allacked ugoslavia if
il had possessed nucleai weapons is an enliiely diffeienl queslion.
2. An addilional peispeclive was offeied lo me by 1onalhan Iyal of lhe Royal \niled
Seivices nslilule of Defence Sludies in a discussion lheie on 16 Seplembei 1999. He
poinled oul lhal lhe ugoslav Aimy had liained and olheiwise piepaied foi decades lo
combal aggiession fiom lhe Soviel \nion and ils Waisaw Pacl allies. l was piepaied lo
use mobilily, deceplion, and olhei indiiecl means lo piesenl a low pionle lo aggiession.
Di. Iyal indicaled lhal he was lheiefoie nol suipiised al lhe way in which lhe ugoslav
Aimy ieacled lo NATO`s aii allacks.
3. Nol lo be foigollen is lhal lhe success of lhe \S-led coalilion in lhe Gulf Wai was con-
liaiy lo lhe piediclions of many commenlalois in lhe monlhs leading lo lhe slail of op-
eialions in 1anuaiy 1991. n lhal iegaid, Kosovo was similai, wilh many commenlalois
being equally in eiioi, lhis lime in lheii piediclions aboul lhe use of aii powei.
4. Given heie is meiely a sample of lhe commenl. See 1ohn Keegan, Aie lhe Aii Sliikes
Woiking?`` and Mislakes of lhe Blilz Aie Being Repealed,`` Daily Tclcgraph, 31
Maich 1999; 1ohn Piados, The Mess Made by Bombing Belgiade,`` Vashington Iost, 4
Apiil 1999; Mailin van Cieveld, The mpolence of Aii Powei,`` Bangkok Iost, 25
Apiil 1999; Michael O`Connoi, Polilical Aiiheads Aie Way off Taigel,`` Thc Austra-
lian, 13 May 1999.
5. Tinc, 5 Apiil 1999, p. 37.
6. bid.
7. A foimei Supieme Allied Commandei Iuiope, Geneial Geoige 1oulwan, consideied
lhal lhe 12,OOO sliong peacekeeping foice based in Macedonia could have been lians-
foimed in a mallei of weeks inlo a giound foice wilh lhe capabilily lo piovide a limiled
geogiaphical haven wilhin Kosovo foi iefugees. l would nol, howevei, have had lhe
offensive capabilily lo lake on lhe ugoslav Aimy.
8. Allhough lheie is lillle doubl lhal lhe aiiciafl was hil by a ugoslav missile, lhe full
sloiy behind lhis loss has yel lo be ieleased. The mosl delailed accounl in open lileia-
luie is given in lhe Seplembei 1999 edilion of ArncJ Iorccs 1ournal.
9. The only olhei NATO combal loss was of a \SAI I-16 in weslein Seibia on 1 May.
Again lhe pilol e|ecled safely and was iescued. The Seibs claimed lo have shol il down;
NATO slaled lhal lhe cause was engine failuie.
1O. Air Iorcc Maga;inc, 1uly 1999, p. 43.
11. n lhe evenl, lhe Apaches weie nevei used in combal. They weie consideied loo vul-
neiable. \nfoilunalely, lhe only NATO aiiciew lo lose lheii lives in lhe conicl weie
lhe ciews of lwo Apaches losl duiing liaining in Albania.
12. The agieemenl was based on lhe geneial piinciples adopled by lhe foieign minisleis of
lhe G-8 al lheii meeling in Bonn on 6 May.
13. Ioi mosl nalions lhal means an aimy foi lhe land, a navy foi lhe sea, and an aii foice foi
lhe aii.
14. One iepoil suggesls lhal an impoilanl elemenl in Milosevic`s decision lo quil was lhal
he suspecled lhal lhe use of NATO`s giound foices was imminenl. Kccsings RccorJ oj
VorlJ 1vcnts, 1une 1999, p. 43OO7. On lhe olhei hand, lhe NATO Aii Componenl
Commandei, Ll. Gen. Michael Shoil (\SAI), believes lhal lhe ma|oi inuence on Mi-
losevic was lhe syslemalic desliuclion of Seibian infiasliucluie, especially in and aiound
Belgiade. Air Iorcc Maga;inc, Seplembei 1999, pp. 4347. Al lhis lime, why Milosevic
quil is nol known, and may nevei be. l was piobably lhe iesull of many faclois, of
which lhese weie bul lwo.
15. Along lhis line is lhe ailicle, Two Concepls of Soveieignly,`` by Kon Annan, lhe
Secielaiy-Geneial of lhe \niled Nalions, in Thc 1cononist, 18 Seplembei 1999.
16. This is given emphasis by lhe evenls in Iasl Timoi al lhe lime of wiiling (Seplembei
1999).
17. l is woilh ieminding ouiselves, howevei, how iecenl is lhis public expeclalion of low
casuallies. Duiing lhe build-up in 199O foi lhe Gulf Wai, lhe publics of lhe vaiious
nalions of lhe anli-iaq coalilion weie piepaied foi casuallies lhal weie eslimaled lo
numbei in lhe lhousands oi lens of lhousands. f lhese publics feel lhal lheii inleiesls
aie diieclly lhiealened and lhey aie skilfully led by lheii polilical leadeis, lhis phe-
nomenon could well be iepealed.
18. The phiaseology heie is nol oiiginal. Howevei, cannol iecall and lheiefoie cannol cile
lhe souice.
19. Repiinled in Intcrnational HcralJ Tribunc, 3O Seplembei 1999, p. 9.
28
Ioice, diplomacy, and noims
Coral Bcll
All goveinmenls lell us lhal lhey will nevei yield lo foice: all hisloiy
lells us lhal lhey nevei yield lo anylhing else.`` Thal bleak epigiam, fiom
a Maixisl analysl of wai,1 seems al nisl sighl a ieasonable summaiy of lhe
sliuggle ovei Kosovo and of ils oulcome. Bul nisl sighl can be deceplive,
and lhe conneclion belween foice, diplomacy, and noims in shaping lhe
conducl and oulcome of a conicl is usually moie complex and ambiguous
pailiculaily in asymmeliic waifaie,`` foi which lhe hoslililies in Kosovo
may well sland as a nolable mileslone.
By asymmeliic waifaie`` (lhe leim comes fiom lhe |aigon of lhe
Penlagon`s ievolulion in mililaiy affaiis``) is meanl a conicl in which
lhe lwo sides use oi have available lo lhem essenlially (lhough in lhis
case nol lolally) diffeienl modes of mililaiy aclion. Thal silualion is nol
ieally new: in almosl eveiy iecenl insuigency2 lhe lechniques of violence
available lo lhe lwo sides have been quile diffeienl. The soveieign slale
conceined has (in giealei oi lessei size and slale of efnciency) lhe con-
venlional modein panoply of mililaiy aclion, and in some cases also slale-
of-lhe-ail advanced weapons syslems Biilain, foi inslance, in ils 3O-yeai
sliuggle wilh lhe iish Republican Aimy fiom 1969 lo 1999. Bul il is
iesliained by vaiious polilical inhibilions fiom using mosl of lhem. The
insuigenls also have lheii liadilional means cai bombs, machine guns,
snipeis` iies, and some moie sublle modes of polilical and psychological
piessuie on lhe laigel`` goveinmenl and ialhei fewei inhibilions aboul
lheii use.
448
Whal is new aboul lhe piesenl and piospeclive asymmeliic wais which
conlempoiaiy slialegisls see as possible is lhal iadically diffeienl modes
of mililaiy foice may be used in waifaie belween soveieign slales,3 nol
|usl belween lhe slale and lhe insuigenls. Kosovo seems likely lo sland as
lhe exemplai of lhal, moie cleaily lhan eilhei lhe Gulf Wai oi lhe wai in
Bosnia, bolh of which weie foughl by a moie liadilional mix and oppo-
silion of mililaiy means.
The mililaiy means available lo lhe NATO coalilion weie in effecl
connned (excepl as a lasl iesoil) lo lhose of dislance waifaie``: aiiciafl,
missiles, and lhe plalfoims fiom which lhey could be launched, such as
bases, caiiieis, and submaiines. l is liue of couise lhal NATO also had
veiy laige giound foices and lhe logislical capacily lo gel lhem lo Kosovo.
Bul lhose foices weie nol politically available (excepl in cxtrcnis) foi
ieasons lo be exploied lalei.
Belgiade also had some sophislicaled weapons syslems: aii defences
inilially capable of biinging down a veiy sophislicaled \S aiiciafl (an
I-117A), lanks, and aililleiy, which il was using againsl lhe Kosovo Lib-
eialion Aimy (KLA). Bul lhe mililaiy oplion mosl appiopiiale lo ils
polilical ob|eclives in Kosovo was local waifaie`` using a veiy elemen-
laiy weapons syslem: |usl soldieis oi paiamililaiies in liucks wilh iies
and machine guns. On lhe evidence, lhose pailiculai mililaiy assels
luined oul lo be veiy difncull foi lhe advanced Weslein weapons syslems
lo hil. f ugoslav souices aie lo be believed, lhe combined effoils of
NATO and lhe KLA killed fewei lhan 5OO Seib soldieis in lhe neld, and
deslioyed only 13 of lheii 3OO lanks in Kosovo.
The Weslein campaign undoubledly piovided Milosevic wilh an in-
cenlive lo push his up close and peisonal`` campaign in Kosovo al lop
speed, in lhe hope lhal lhe Kosovais would be almosl gone by lhe lime he
had lo make a deal wilh NATO. Moieovei, he may well have hoped lhal
Weslein iesolve would fallei if faced wilh an iiieveisible-looking jait
acconpli. n lale May, lhal slialegy looked almosl lo have succeeded. Al
leasl il looked lhal way lo whal Ameiican |ouinalisls called lhe com-
menlaiial,`` lhe many ieliied geneials, mililaiy hisloiians, Balkan spe-
cialisls, foimei policy makeis, and assoiled academics who weie called
on by lhe T\ nelwoiks and lhe newspapeis lo commenl on lhe wai as il
wenl along. Iiom aboul lhe nisl lhiee days of lhe aii campaign lhey weie
solidly pessimislic, saying in effecl lhal giound lioops would have lo be
used in an invasion undei nie. Al lhe end of May il seemed as if lhey
mighl be iighl. el only lhiee days lalei, in eaily 1une, Milosevic and his
iubbei-slamp pailiamenl in Belgiade suddenly accepled appioximalely
lhe leims4 lhal had been iefused befoie lhe beginning of lhe wai.
One possible facloi in lhal sudden ieveisal was a iumoui geneialed by
(oi al leasl ciiculaled aiound lhe lime of) a NATO meeling a few days
IORCI, DPLOMAC, AND NORMS 449
eailiei, alleging lhal a giound invasion was being conlemplaled foi eaily
Seplembei. Thal may have been a genuine change in lhe naluie of
NATO`s slialegy, oi il may have been meiely an adioil piece of NATO
ciisis signalling. Whal il conveyed lo Milosevic was piimaiily lhe possi-
bilily of lhiee monlhs moie of bombing on lhe level al leasl of May, a
moie foimidable piospecl foi his own powei base in Seibia lhan giound
nghling in Kosovo.
Aboul a foilnighl eailiei, in mid-hoslililies, Madeleine Albiighl had
lold an inleiviewei, |ujp lo lhe slail of lhe conicl, lhe mililaiy seived lo
back up oui diplomacy. Now oui diplomacy seives lo back up oui mili-
laiy.``5 l seems an accuiale summaiy of lhe ielalionship belween lhe lwo
in Weslein policy. The failuie of lhe Holbiooke mission in lale Maich led
Washinglon lo conclude lhal only foice could induce Milosevic lo yield.
Iiom lhen unlil eaily 1une, lhe diplomalic hand slayed wilhin lhe iion
mililaiy glove.
Paiadoxical as il may seem, lhe lwo mililaiy opeialions in and ovei
Kosovo each had a measuie of bolh success and failuie. Neilhei could
pievenl lhe opeialions of lhe olhei: NATO foices even in lheii nnal lwo
weeks seem lo have been quile ineffeclive in hampeiing Seib opeialions
in Kosovo ilself; Seib effoils weie slill moie ineffeclive in hampeiing lhe
NATO aii campaign. So each had lheii failuies. On lhe olhei hand, Seib
foices JiJ foi a lime exile mosl of lhe Kosovais fiom Kosovo. And
NATO did, aflei only eighl weeks,6 achieve whal aii powei docliine has
always aigued il could and should aim al: lo bypass lhe aimed foices of
lhe adveisaiy, and modify lhe polilical will of lhe chief decision makei
by inslead damaging oi deslioying lhe domeslic assels he values and his
sociely needs.
Clinlon said accuialely of lhe Kosovo ciisis lhal foice and diplomacy
weie lwo sides of lhe same coin.`` Bul |usl befoie lhe mililaiy clash, in
Maich, a momenl can be seen when lhey weie al odds. The conlinuing
opeialion of Milosevic`s foices in Kosovo, along wilh his iefusal of lhe
Rambouillel agieemenl, weie lhe lwo faclois lhal sank lhe ieluclanlly
abandoned Weslein hopes of a negolialed selllemenl and piecipilaled
lhe NATO decision foi wai, and lhus also piecipilaled a wide-ianging
debale ovei whelhei oi nol NATO had chosen lhe iighl slialegy.
The wai of lhe noims
Benealh lhe mililaiy conicl in Kosovo lheie was an even moie complex
and ambiguous wai of noims.7 On Belgiade`s side was lhe liadilional
noim cuius iegio, euis ieligio`` daling back lo lhe Peace of Weslphalia in
1648. ls essence may be lianslaled, foi modein puiposes, as lhe iulei is
enlilled lo make lhe iules in his own domain.`` Thal is, il piesciibes non-
inleivenlion in olhei people`s domeslic ciises. The sociely of slales had
eailiei accepled lhe view lhal Kosovo was a piovince of Seibia, so in
Weslphalian logic lhe lioubles lheie weie solely lhe concein of lhe gov-
einmenl in Belgiade. Moieovei, lhal non-inleivenlion piinciple had been
ieafnimed by Ailicle 2(7) of lhe \N Chailei, and could lheiefoie be held
lo be univeisally applicable and legally binding. A Secuiily Council ies-
olulion should lheoielically have been iequiied foi any aclion in ils con-
liavenlion. Bul cleaily no such iesolulion could be oblained, since veloes
by Russia and China weie ceilain. So bolh law and lhe liadilional noims
weie wilh Belgiade.
As againsl lhal, lhe NATO poweis could and did asseil a newly
emeiging noim: lhal minoiilies, howevei lioublesome,8 aie nol lo be
massacied, oi diiven inlo exile, oi depiived of lheii human iighls (as
spelled oul in lhe 1948 \N Declaialion of Human Righls) by lhe gov-
einmenl undei whose soveieignly lhey live. Thus one could say, al lhe
beginning of lhe ciisis, lhal Belgiade was appealing lo an old noim, and
lo lhe law based on il, wheieas lhe NATO poweis weie appealing lo a
newei noim, wilh a moie iecenl foimal endoisemenl in inleinalional
law.9 The only compaiable Weslein use of mililaiy aclion foi lhe pio-
leclion of a minoiily gioup wilhin a soveieign slale has been lhe aii ex-
clusion zones lo piolecl lhe Kuids in noilhein iaq and lhe Shia in
soulhein iaq againsl mililaiy aclion by Baghdad, and lhal is of couise a
veiy minoi opeialion in compaiison wilh Kosovo.
Theie weie, howevei, giealei noimalive complexilies in lhe Weslein
policies ovei Kosovo. l may in facl be aigued lhal a whole gioup of
noims, some of lhem incompalible wilh each olhei, weie inuenlial in lhe
oiigin, conducl, and oulcome of lhe wai. The minoiily iighls`` noim was
piedominanl in ils oiigins, lhe foice pioleclion`` noim was piedominanl
in ils conducl, bul lhe anli-secession`` and mulliculluialism`` noims
shaped lhe nnal negolialion. The offei of aulonomy, ialhei lhan inde-
pendence oi soveieignly, as lhe Wesl`s piefeiied oplion foi Kosovo10
iepiesenls a compiomise of soils belween lhe noim lhal goveinmenls
should iespecl lhe iighls of minoiilies and lhe piaclical consideialion lhal
ouliighl endoisemenl of a noim of self-deleiminalion foi all such minoi-
ilies would unduly encouiage demands lhal could nol ieadily be iecon-
ciled wilh lhe inleiesls of many poweiful slales. The woild is full of dis-
sidenl piovinces: Taiwan, Tibel, Chechnya, Dageslan, and lhe Kuidish
piovinces of ian, iaq, and Tuikey, lo name only some of lhe mosl em-
baiiassing in leims of lhe powei ielalionships lhal would be disiupled by
any seiious sponsoiing of minoiily causes in lhose aieas by lhe Wesl.
Moieovei, lhe conliaiy anli-secession`` and mulliculluialism`` noims
have equally poweiful moial and polilical expeclalions behind lhem. The
\niled Slales foughl whal is slill lhe giealesl and mosl liaumalic wai in
ils hisloiy, lhe Civil Wai of lhe 186Os, lo pievenl lhe secession of lhe
soulhein slales. The mulliculluialism`` noim is vilal lo lhe smoolh
woiking of all socielies made up of diveise elhnic sliands (i.e. mosl soci-
elies), so il has had lo be upheld by, foi inslance, lhe effoil lo ielain lhe
small Seib populalion loughing il oul in Kosovo, despile lhe inevilabilily
of ievenge allacks by lhe Kosovais, and despile lhe buiden placed on
NATO peacekeepeis by lhe effoil lo defend lhose Seibs.11
The foice pioleclion`` noim was made possible by lechnologies asso-
cialed wilh lhe ievolulion in mililaiy affaiis`` lhal lhe Penlagon has been
developing since lhe 197Os. Those lechnologies aie by no means fully
evolved as yel, and some of lheii cuiienl limilalions weie quile visible in
Kosovo.12 Iven so, zeio casuallies`` foi NATO foices in aclual combal
(as againsl accidenl and afleimalh) weie quile a slailling demonslialion
of lheii polenlial.
Noims and slialegies
Thal foice pioleclion`` noim enlailed connning NATO mililaiy aclion
lo dislance waifaie, wilh giound combal in effecl iuled oul, and even aii
opeialions consideiably iesliicled (no use of helicopleis foi inslance).
Howevei, il was polilical necessily in Washinglon lhal iequiied lhe
\niled Slales lo Jcclarc lhal lhe land invasion oplion had been iuled oul.
The ghosls of lhe young Ameiicans who came back in body bags fiom
\ielnam slill haunl nol only lhe Washinglon eslablishmenl bul also
lhe Ameiican heailland. And, of all possible Ameiican piesidenls, Bill
Clinlon was lhe leasl able lo defy lhose ghosls, nol only because of his
own avoidance of seivice in \ielnam, bul because of lhe Republican
ma|oiilies in Congiess and because he was |usl emeiging fiom lhe
shadow of possible impeachmenl al lhe lime lhe Kosovo ciisis bioke. He
was much ciilicized foi so openly iuling oul an invasion undei nie bul, if
he had hinled al ils possibilily in lhe eaily slages, opposilion in Congiess
would have been even moie slienuous. As il was, lhe House iefused lo
endoise even lhe aii campaign, a veiy unusual slance. The pievious \S
noim had been lhal once \S seivicemen weie in combal lhey musl be
backed, no mallei whal lhe silualion oi lhe polilical lensions belween
Piesidenl and Congiess.13
Nol all lhe NATO defence eslablishmenls weie as casually aveise`` as
Washinglon`s, bul none of lhe olhei 18 goveinmenls could affoid lo have
lheii iespeclive opposilions and media accuse lhem of being less caieful
of lhe lives of lheii lioops lhan lhe \S command was of Ameiican
lioops. Thal would have been liuly damaging lo lhe Alliance. So lhey
had in effecl lo adheie lo lhe Ameiican slandaid. Bul in any case, a low-
casually`` noim was nol ieally new in Iuiopean slialegic lhinking. The
|usl wai`` docliine of lhe eaily chuich, daling iighl back lo Sl. Augusline
in lhe nflh cenluiy, was also veiy casually aveise,`` especially in iespecl
lo civilians.14
Though lhe slialegic concepls undeilying lhe ievolulion in mililaiy
affaiis and dislance waifaie slill excile neice conlioveisy in lhe \niled
Slales and elsewheie (lhe allack usually being led by Aimy men), lhey
will almosl ceilainly deleimine lhe pallein of \S inleivenlion in lhe mosl
likely fuluie ciises. n essence, lhese slill-emeiging lechnologies offei lhe
only feasible solulions lo lhiee ma|oi Penlagon dilemmas.
The nisl is whal one mighl call lhe unipolaiily`` dilemma. How pie-
cisely do lhe Washinglon lop biass`` |uslify, lo lheii polilical masleis,
mainlaining veiy poweiful defence foices, and lhe budgels lhal suslain
lhem, when lheie is no visible peei compeliloi`` (i.e. seiious mililaiy
iival oi equal) on lhe hoiizon foi seveial decades? Secondly, given a
nalional economy in almosl peimanenl boom, how does one alliacl pei-
sonnel of high qualily in adequale numbeis lo seive in lhe aimed foices?
Thiidly, how does one |uslify, foi inslance lo a sceplical Congiess, pulling
young men fiom Kansas oi owa in haim`s way in oidei lo pievenl Seibs
fiom killing Albanians, oi Albanians fiom killing Seibs, especially when
lhey have been doing il foi geneialions and on lhe evidence aie likely lo
go on doing so foi geneialions moie?
The lechnologies of lhe ievolulion in mililaiy affaiis aie ciediled wilh
lhe capacily lo iesolve all lhiee dilemmas by subsliluling machines foi
peisonnel as fai as possible, and by keeping lhe peisonnel lhal iemain
necessaiy as fai as possible fiom lhe aclual combal zones. As a ma|oi
bonus, and conliaiy lo piediclions, cosls can aclually be ieduced by lhal
oveiall diieclion foi slialegy and ieseaich. R&D on lhe scale iequiied is
veiy expensive, of couise, bul so aie peisonnel, in lhe \niled Slales al
leasl. Some of lhe new machines aie aclually much cheapei lhan lheii
eailiei equivalenls pilolless aiiciafl, foi inslance.15 By lhe Kosovo
peiiod, \S defence cosls had fallen lo 2.9 pei cenl of GNP compaied
wilh 7 pei cenl on aveiage foi lhe Cold Wai decades, and almosl 15 pei
cenl al ils highesl poinl in 1953.
One of lhe olhei oulcomes of lhal Ameiican slialegic oiienlalion was
made oulslandingly cleai in Kosovo. Nol only weie moie lhan 7O pei cenl
of lhe aii soilies Ameiican, bul all of lhem weie moie oi less dependenl
on lhe infiasliucluie of suiveillance and localion syslems, which weie |usl
aboul enliiely Ameiican. So in effecl Ameiican R&D, which none of
even ils closesl NATO allies can malch, ieinfoices lhe piesenl unipolai
sliucluie of lhe sociely of slales by ieinfoicing lhe dependence of \S
allies on (in lhe laigesl sense) Ameiican weaponiy. The Iuiopean
membeis of NATO spend |oinlly aboul lwo-lhiids as much on lheii ie-
speclive defence eslablishmenls as lhe \niled Slales, bul lhal expendi-
luie does nol buy lhem, even colleclively, lwo-lhiids of lhe \S mililaiy
cloul, because lhey choose oi aie obliged lo spend il in diffeienl diiec-
lions, foi vaiious good nalional ieasons. The only NATO ally wilh any-
lhing like lhe \S oiienlalion lo powei pio|eclion capacily (dislance
waifaie) is lhe \niled Kingdom.16
To conclude lhal lhe NATO slialegy adopled in Kosovo was polilically
inevilable, given lhe ciicumslances, does nol answei all lhe aigumenls
made againsl il, especially lhose aigumenls lhal weie moial. The mosl
seiious of lhem was lhe accusalion lhal lhe slialegy chosen, and lhe way
il was implemenled, allowed Milosevic`s foices all loo much lime lo go
aboul lheii giuesome woik of massacie and expulsion in Kosovo. Thal
aigumenl iesls on lhe implicalion lhal mounling an invasion undei nie
would have iesulled in less dealh and desliuclion in Kosovo lhan lhe
slialegy aclually chosen.
The mililaiy iealilies of lhe silualion, howevei, weie al odds wilh any
such assumplion. f an invasion undei nie (as againsl lhe evenlual de-
ploymenl inlo a peimissive enviionmenl`` secuied by lhe aii campaign
and diplomacy) had inilially been iesolved on, lhe lioop build-up would
have had lo be laigei,17 and would lhus have laken even longei. Kosovo
is a soil of naluial foiliess, iinged by high mounlains excepl on lhe Sei-
bian side. Theie weie few ioads lhal could lake heavy mililaiy liafnc
lhiough lhose mounlains, and lhe only useful poil is Thessalonica, in
Gieece. Gelling a full-scale invasion foice even lo lhe boideis of Kosovo
would have been a polilical as well as a logislical mineneld, involving
dependence on lhe bad ioads and unceilain goveinmenls of Albania and
Macedonia as well as Gieece. The aii campaign againsl Seibia would
have needed lo be even moie inlensive, lo knock oul lhe aiinelds,
biidges, ioads, powei slalions, and fuel depols lhe Seib foices would
have been using lo gel ieinfoicemenls and supplies inlo Kosovo. Woisl of
all, Kosovo ilself would have become lhe main ballleneld, so lhal ils
geneial infiasliucluie would have been much moie damaged lhan il
aclually was. Since lhe Seibs appaienlly inlended lo move some of lheii
own iefugees fiom Kia|ina and elsewheie inlo Kosovo, lhey had no in-
cenlive lo deslioy lhe aiea`s infiasliucluie, olhei lhan buining Albanian
houses and shops lo discouiage lheii owneis fiom ieluining. f lhe piov-
ince had become a full-scale ballleneld, il would have been fai moie
lhoioughly devaslaled, and even moie of lhe Kosovais would have been
killed, as well as Seib and NATO soldieis. On human as well as mililaiy
giounds, lheiefoie, lhe chosen slialegy seems |uslined.
Since lheie was no sel land ballle, Milosevic ielained inlacl mosl of lhe
mililaiy assels he had deployed in Kosovo. ndeed, his deleiminalion lo
conseive lhose assels may have been a ma|oi facloi inducing him lo make
a deal when he did. Bul lhal is nol a counl againsl lhe chosen slialegy.
Ovei lhe long leim, lhe Weslein ob|eclive in lhe Balkans as a whole musl
be a slable, viable balance of powei, which will nol lempl any ambilious
fuluie local polilico lo chance his aim`` on a fuluie ie-iun of lhe Balkan
wais. So Seibia needs lo be able lo defend ilself mililaiily, if occasion
aiises, aflei lhe depailuie of Milosevic. Though moie complex, lhe silu-
alion had some iesemblance lo lhal belween ian and iaq aflei lhe Gulf
Wai: il could nol be Weslein policy lo leave iaq wilh no defences
againsl ian. Seibia has mililaiily lhe sliongesl foices in lhe local aiea,
having inheiiled mosl of whal Tilo`s ugoslavia buill up in ils long con-
icl wilh lhe Soviel \nion. Bul lhe olheis, wilh NATO backing, can
adequalely balance il.
Ioi all lhose ieasons, NATO foughl a limiled wai (limiled chiey by ils
foice pioleclion`` noim, bul also by olhei faclois) foi a limiled ob|ec-
live: lo ieveise, since il could nol pievenl, lhe expulsion of lhe Kosovais
fiom Kosovo. l would have bieached lhe old |usl-wai noim of pio-
poilionalily`` lo have pushed mililaiy aclion beyond whal lhal limiled
ob|eclive iequiied. The long-leim ciileiion of success will be a Seibia
lhal is piospeious, democialic, al peace wilh ils neighbouis (having ie-
|ecled lhe neice elhnic nalionalism on which Milosevic buill his polilical
powei), and no longei al odds wilh lhe Wesl. The piocess of evolving
such a goveinmenl appeaied lo be gelling undei way al lhe lime of wiil-
ing, lhough any degiee of liue ieconcilialion belween Seibs and Alba-
nians iemained veiy iemole.18
Bill Clinlon said al lhe end of lhe hoslililies, we did lhe iighl lhing in
lhe iighl way.`` Hisloiy`s veidicl on lhal is slill many decades away, bul al
leasl il can be said lhal lhe slialegy chosen by NATO ciealed an unex-
pecled soil of common inleiesl belween lhe lhiee capilals mosl involved
in lhe decision-making: Washinglon, Belgiade, and Moscow. None of
lhem wanled lo see NATO foices in giound combal in Kosovo. Wash-
inglon did nol wanl il because il would have meanl some young Ameii-
cans coming back in body bags. Belgiade did nol wanl il because il would
have eioded lhe mililaiy assels il slill hoped lo conseive, and would have
ieduced lhe slim chance of disguising defeal as vicloiy. Moscow did nol
wanl il because il would have made even cleaiei lhe limils of Russia`s
abilily lo piovide eilhei mililaiy oi polilical pioleclion foi ils liadilional
fiiends in lhe aiea. Iiom lhal liiangle of common mililaiy inleiesls, lhe
nnal negolialion pioduced a selllemenl.
Noims and inleiesls
n mosl inleinalional ciises, ceilainly in almosl all of lhose in which ma-
|oi mililaiy opeialions have lo be enduied oi conlemplaled, lhe elemenl
of nalional inleiesl is sliong enough lo ielegale any noimalive pie-
occupalions among lhe decision makeis lo a veiy dislanl second place. n
lhe Gulf Wai, foi inslance, lhough a valid inleinalional noim could be
asseiled lhal aggiession should nol be allowed lo piospei il was veiy
heavily ieinfoiced by lhe nalional inleiesl molivalion of pievenling any
moie of lhe oil iesouices of lhe Gulf fiom falling inlo lhe hands of Sad-
dam Hussein. n olhei woids, lhe inleivenlion was molivaled nol |usl by
moial ouliage lhal he had laken ovei Kuwail, bul by a piudenlial con-
cein as lo wheie he mighl lo go nexl. Thal piudenlial concein was fell nol
only by all lhe pailicipanls in lhe mililaiy aclion (pailiculaily lhe Gulf
slales) bul by any goveinmenl whose economy was dependenl on Middle
Iasl oil; lhal is, almosl any goveinmenl nol self-sufncienl in oil.
l is impossible lo see any such nalional inleiesl molivalion in lhe case
of Kosovo. Slialegically il malleis only lo lhe small soveieignlies lhal
suiiound il. Iconomically il is impoilanl only lo ils own people.19 Sym-
bolically and emolionally il is of couise unfoilunalely all loo impoilanl lo
lhe Seibs. Bul, olheiwise lhan on noimalive giounds, lhe oulside woild
had no gieal slake in ils fuluie. ndeed, foi lhe NATO poweis lhe inlei-
venlion in Kosovo was visibly al odds wilh lheii colleclive nalional in-
leiesls, as usually denned. All of lhem, especially lhe Ameiicans, had
quile a vilal inleiesl in slaying on as good leims as possible wilh bolh
Russia and China, and il was cleai fiom lhe nisl lhal ielalions wilh bolh
poweis weie bound lo be damaged, al leasl foi a consideiable lime, by
laking aclion ovei Kosovo. The Iuiopeans did undoubledly feel a soil of
iiiilaled anguish al lhe ongoing inslabilily in lhe Balkans, bul lhey had
insulaled lhemselves quile effeclively fiom lhe dangeis il had piesenled
in lheii eailiei hisloiy by lheii own economic and mililaiy cohesion.20 A
shiewd chaiismalic opeialoi like Tilo, able lo deal skilfully wilh lhe
waiiing liibes wilhin his bailiwick, had seemed lhe mosl obvious solulion
lo Balkan pioblems. As lale as Maich 1999, many successive Iuiopean
policy makeis seem lo have clung lo lhe fainl hope lhal Milosevic mighl
piove capable of caiiying on lhal liadilion, even lhough he had gone lo
wai wilh Slovenes, Cioals, and Bosnians and had suppiessed lhe aulon-
omy lhal Tilo had gianled lo Kosovais. l was only veiy ieluclanlly lhal
lhey abandoned lhal illusion, and iesigned lhemselves nol only lo lhe
iisks of wai bul lo lhe inevilable afleibuiden of lhe cosls of ieconsliucl-
ing lhe Balkans.
The Ameiicans had a nalional inleiesl in lhe slabilily and well-being of
Iuiope, bul againsl lhal, in leims of slandaid coslbenenl`` analysis,
lhey had lo weigh lhe inevilable lempoiaiy saciince of lheii vilal inleiesl
in good ielalions wilh bolh Russia and China, and lhe piobable impacl
also on ielalions wilh many lhiid woild counliies. So Kosovo does de-
seive lo be accounled one of lhe veiy few ciises in iecenl hisloiy in which
policy was noim diiven`` ialhei lhan inleiesl diiven`` solid nalional
inleiesls indeed being saciinced lo uphold a noim.21
The widei diplomacy of lhe ciisis
The wai lhus had much widei diplomalic connolalions lhan lhe polilical
fuluie of lhal small piovince. l piofoundly affecled lhe ielalions belween
Washinglon and bolh Moscow and Bei|ing. l ieaiianged lhe powei
sliucluie of lhe enliie Soulh-easl Iuiopean aiea. l iedenned lhe func-
lions and fuluie of NATO. l expanded lhe piospeclive ambil of lhe Iu-
iopean \nion. l casl a sudden lighl on lhe naluie and possibililies of lhe
unipolai woild, and many goveinmenls weie disconceiled by whal lhey
saw. Above all, il asseiled, by mililaiy foice, an inleinalional noim lhal is
Weslein in oiigin bul holds explosive polenlialilies foi a gieal many non-
Weslein membeis of lhe sociely of slales.
Relalions belween Moscow and Washinglon weie fundamenlal lo lhe
diplomacy and oulcome of lhe whole ciisis. On lhe suiface lhey looked
eiialic, iough, and dangeious, especially al lhe momenl in eaily 1une
when a delachmenl of Russian lanks lhal had been deployed in Bosnia
was senl (wilhoul open waining lo lhe Wesl22 bul cleaily wilh lhe con-
nivance of Seibia) lo seize lhe aiipoil al Piislina wheie lhe NATO com-
mandei was aboul lo sel up his lempoiaiy H. The gesluie was obviously
veiy populai in Russia, and ellsin himself seems lo have en|oyed making
il: he inslanlly piomoled lhe geneial in chaige lwo ianks. el only a few
days lalei, al lhe Cologne meeling of lhe G-8, he was boisleiously
fiiendly wilh lhe Weslein leadeis, and in effecl deliveied lhe coup Jc
gra` cc lo Milosevic by endoising lhe G-8 leims, which weie only maigin-
ally diffeienl fiom lhe NATO leims.
The ambiguily of lhal episode is ieally symbolic of lhe ambivalence of
Russia`s whole iole. The selling of lhe G-8, lhe focus of Russia`s nnancial
hopes fiom lhe piospeious Wesl, almosl blalanlly undeilined lhe degiee
of ils cuiienl economic dependence. Moscow fell ilself able lo delivei a
kind of mililaiy pinpiick lo NATO, lo show lhal il could be awkwaid if il
wanled lo, bul lhal essenlially was aboul lhe limil of ils abilily lo hindei
Weslein puiposes. Once il had accepled lhal il could nol block NATO`s
decision lo inleivene in Kosovo, ils logical choice was lo opeiale as an
inleimediaiy, lhus eaining biownie poinls`` fiom lhe Wesl foi ils diplo-
malic usefulness, and saving face wilh lhe Seibs by offeiing a soil of
ieaiguaid defence,`` ils occupalion lioops in Seibia pioviding lhe ap-
peaiance lhal lhe Seibs had al leasl one faiily poweiful fiiend in some
places in Kosovo.
The alleged biolheily`` ielalions belween Russians and Seibs weie
made much of by lhe media, and obviously had some basis in public
feeling in Russia. Bul lhe Slav liibes, including bolh Russians and Seibs,
have oflen been biolheis sliiclly in lhe mannei of Cain and Abel. Iiom
lhe lime of lhe bieak belween Tilo and Slalin in 1948, almosl up lo lhe
fall of lhe Beilin Wall in 1989, Belgiade was aclually a dangeious lhoin
in Moscow`s side, a bieach in ils ideological and mililaiy defences, a
piolecloiale and always possibly an ally of lhe Wesl. One of lhe many
iionies of lhe bieak-up of lhe old ugoslavia was lhal, if il had happened
any lime befoie lhe collapse of lhe Soviel \nion, il would have been ie-
gaided by lhe NATO poweis as piobably lhe iesull of a Kiemlin con-
spiiacy. n effecl, NATO`s nisl wai was againsl lhe iemnanl of a mulli-
nalional mini-empiie il had once defended.
Nol suipiisingly, Washinglon was much less ambivalenl aboul lhe de-
siied Russian iole lhan Moscow was aboul ils own willingness lo play il.
Madeleine Albiighl spell oul whal was wanled wilhoul any camouage:
We`ve been lugging Moscow lowaids oui posilion on how Kosovo musl
be iesolved, and lhen encouiaging lhem lo lug Belgiade in lhal diiec-
lion.``23 Clinlon himself was even moie candid, making il plain lhal he
iegaided lhe Russian iole as moie impoilanl lhan lhal of lhe \niled
Nalions in lhe piospecl foi a selllemenl:
This silualion |Kosovoj has led lo lhe iise of nalionalism in Russia, and caused
lhem lo diifl away fiom lhe Wesl. The besl oulcome would be if Moscow helps us
lo gel a good selllemenl lhal biings lhe Russians back inlo lhe inleinalional
mainslieam, and closei lo us. The \N should nol undeimine Russia`s iole.24
Sliobe Talboll, as Depuly Secielaiy of Slale and Washinglon`s poinl
man`` on Russian policy, was in almosl peimanenl iesidence in Moscow
wilh Cheinomyidin while lhe nnal negolialions weie undei way. Made-
leine Albiighl was in conslanl meelings wilh lhe Russian foieign minislei,
goi vanov. Clinlon himself seems lo have been on lhe phone lo ellsin
a gieal deal, lhough obviously nol enough lo salisfy ellsin, who com-
plained long and loud aboul nol being consulled. Neveilheless, al lhe G-8
meeling ellsin had lo go along wilhoul even gelling a sepaiale zone foi
lhe Russian lioops in Kosovo.
As fai as lhe iepaii of Washinglon`s ielalions wilh China was con-
ceined, lhe lask was less immedialely vilal lhan keeping Russia moie oi
less on side, bul ovei lhe longei leim may be moie difncull. Iven befoie
lhe embaiiassing failuie of inlelligence25 lhal led lo China`s Belgiade
embassy being deslioyed (wilh lhiee dealhs), ielalions belween Wash-
inglon and Bei|ing weie on a sleep downwaid liend, and seemed unlikely
lo iecovei befoie lhe eleclions in 2OOO, if lhen. The Cox iepoil, alleging
lhal China had secuied many Ameiican weapons design seciels26 by es-
pionage, had been widely leaked`` befoie ils ofncial ielease. The Repub-
licans weie also puisuing ielenllessly lhe issue of alleged conliibulions
fiom China lo Democialic campaign funds in 1996, an issue lhey aie nol
likely lo diop befoie 2OOO, since il is somewhal damaging lo Al Goie, lhe
piobable Democialic candidale. China`s hopes foi an eaily enliy lo lhe
Woild Tiade Oiganizalion had come lo nolhing. China`s suspicions lhal
Washinglon`s cenlial slialegy had moved fiom conlainmenl of lhe Soviel
\nion lo conlainmenl of China have been evidenl and endemic foi yeais,
and aie nol likely lo vanish.
Conclusion
Kosovo and ils oulcomes offeied quile a slailling lesson in lhe piesenl
and piospeclive naluie of inleinalional polilics in a unipolai woild. Whal
lhe sociely of slales saw was lhal a dissidenl piovince of a minoi powei
could enlisl Weslein sympalhies lo a degiee lhal evoked lhe use of lhe
Wesl`s veiy poweiful mililaiy machine on ils behalf. n a woild full of
dissidenl piovinces (mosl of lhem in developing counliies) lhal was
bound lo iing alaim bells. f lhe Kosovo noim weie likely lo be widely
applied, a gieal many goveinmenls would have ieason foi concein. And
in a iash momenl, while visiling a iefugee camp in Macedonia on lhe
moiiow of vicloiy, Bill Clinlon said, |ijn Afiica oi Cenlial Iuiope, we
will nol allow, only because of diffeience in elhnic backgiound oi ieli-
gion, people lo be allacked. Vc will stop that. Vc can Jo it tonorrow, ij it
is ncccssary, soncwhcrc clsc.``27 Of couise lhal slalemenl has lo be laken
wilh a whole waiehouse full of sall. The Iuiopean membeis of NATO
aie deeply aveise lo laking mililaiy aclion oulside lhe immediale vicinily
of Iuiope, and lhe \niled Slales has no equally poweiful mililaiy alli-
ance elsewheie.
Moieovei, nol all socielies aie equally vulneiable lo lhe soil of hoslil-
ilies (dislance waifaie) lhal lhe Wesl used, which is likely lo piove lhe
only mode il is willing lo use. Dislance waifaie (as menlioned eailiei)
woiks lhiough pulling diiecl piessuie on lhe will of lhe chief adveisaiy
decision makeis, by damage lo oi lhiealened desliuclion of lhe domeslic
assels lhey value and lheii sociely needs (bypassing lhe aimed foices).
Bul foi lhal slialegy lo woik lheie musl be a chief decision makei cap-
able of conliolling lhe sociely conceined, especially ils mililaiy and police.
And lheie musl be domeslic assels biidges and powei slalions and such
lhal lhe decision makei values and lhe sociely needs. Wheie lhose lwo
condilions aie nol piesenl, lhe slialegy is nol likely lo woik. l would nol
have woiked, foi inslance, in Rwanda iecenlly, oi in Cambodia eailiei, oi
in Congo oi Somalia oi Angola oi Afghanislan oi Mozambique.28 So il is
of limiled applicabilily.
The necessaiy piecondilions arc howevei piesenl in mosl of lhe soci-
elies of ieal economic oi slialegic inleiesl lo lhe Wesl: Iuiope, lhe Middle
Iasl, and Iasl and Soulh Asia. Iiom lhe poinl of view of many govein-
menls in lhose aieas, whal happened could be summed up as lhal a
Weslein noim was aibiliaiily enfoiced by Weslein mililaiy aclion in a
silualion nol unlike one lhey lhemselves faced al home. Thal demon-
slialion was bound lo leave quile a few policy makeis all ovei lhe aiea
angiy, iesenlful, and appiehensive.
Ioi Russia and China lheie was an exlia luin of lhe sciew in lhal lheii
cheiished slalus symbol oi safely nel, lhe Secuiily Council velo, had
pioved unable lo pievenl Weslein aclion. Moieovei, bolh goveinmenls
evenlually had lo go along (audibly giilling lheii colleclive leelh), lhe
Russians lo lhe exlenl of helping pull Weslein cheslnuls oul of lhe
Kosovo nie, lhe Chinese lo lhe lessei degiee of abslaining on lhe nnal
legilimaling iesolulion in lhe Secuiily Council, ialhei lhan casling a velo.
Theii ieasons weie unmislakably economic: China needs lhe Ameiican
maikel lo eain ils foieign exchange, Russia needs lhe loans fiom lhe
nleinalional Monelaiy Iund and olheis. n lhe lasl analysis, neilhei fell
il could affoid lo defy lhe paiamounl powei and ils allies al leasl, nol
yel. Bul lhe expeiience was undoubledly galling. Moieovei, lhe mosl
chilling, alaiming, oi exaspeialing aspecl of Weslein policy foi bolh
poweis, and olheis, may have been lhal il was visibly noim diiven``
ialhei lhan inleiesl diiven.`` nleiesls lend lo be local and sub|ecl lo
compiomise. Noims lend lo be iegaided, al leasl by lhose who asseil
lhem, as univeisal and nol sub|ecl lo compiomise. n lhe longei peispec-
live of hisloiy, lhal may luin oul lo be lhe mosl impoilanl aspecl of lhe
whole episode. The Kosovo ciisis was bolh symplom and symbol of a soil
of eailh liemoi in lhe noimalive foundalions of lhe sociely of slales, a
liemoi lhal mighl in lime ciack fai moie impoilanl soveieign sliucluies
lhan Milosevic`s ugoslavia.
Noles
1. 1ohn Sliachey, one of lhe mosl inuenlial of Maixisl inlellecluals in Biilain in lhe 193Os,
lalei wai minislei in lhe Alllee goveinmenl.
2. And of couise in mosl pasl colonial wais.
3. The woisl case`` scenaiio has a ma|oi powei, unable lo compele in dislance waifaie,
pulling ils iesouices inlo weapons of mass desliuclion (piobably chemical oi biological)
and developing unconvenlional means of deliveiy saiin gas oi anlhiax in lhe New
oik oi London undeigiound syslems, foi inslance.
4. The chief diffeience was lhe diopping of a iefeiendum on possible fuluie independence
foi Kosovo, and some pieviously claimed iighls in Seibia ilself.
5. Tinc, 17 May 1999.
6. Bolh sides seem in facl lo have somewhal undeiialed lhe enduiance of lhe olhei.
Milosevic iepoiledly believed lhal lhe NATO allies would ciack undei lhe sliain of
hoslililies. Similaily, al lhe slail of lhe aii campaign lheie seems lo have been an ex-
peclalion, alliibuled by commenlalois lo lhe Secielaiy of Slale, lhal Milosevic oi his
suppoil in Seibia would fallei aflei only a few days. f lhal was liue, il was a seiious
misappiehension aboul his polilical skills oi lhe deplh of Seib nalionalisl feeling aboul
Kosovo. His polilical suppoil seems aclually lo have giown foi lhe nisl monlh oi so,
lhough declining lalei and coming undei polilical challenge wilhin Seibia. Al lhe lime of
wiiling, NATO`s cohesion, and plans foi expansion, appeaied solid.
7. Noims should nol be equaled wilh laws, lhough mosl laws aie based on a pieviously
exisling noim. The laws againsl muidei, foi inslance, aie based on lhe noim lhou shall
nol kill.`` Bul lhey should nol be equaled wilh ieligious oi moial in|unclions eilhei. The
besl guide lo lheii meaning and funclions lies in lhe deiivalion of lhe woid, which is
fiom lhe Lalin foi a caipenlei`s selsquaie. The selsquaie lells lhe caipenlei bolh whal a
iighl angle is and whal il ought to bc. l is a piaclical guide lhal conveys convenlion and
liadilion as well as a ielevanl slandaid in a particular socicty. So noims, pailiculaily in
malleis such as wai and peace oi human iighls, vaiy gieally belween socielies. And lhey
can change much faslei lhan lhe laws lhal aie based on lhem.
8. The Albanians had been iegaided as lioublesome by Belgiade since well befoie 1989,
when lheii aulonomy was ievoked by Milosevic.
9. Though undei lhe guise of lhe concepl of humanilaiian inleivenlion,`` ils oiigins can
be liaced back lo Giolius and \allel. Moieovei il is by no means, as is somelimes al-
leged, exclusively ciled by lhe Weslein poweis. l was ciled by China in 1951 lo |uslify
inleivenlion in Tibel (on lhe basis of allegedly iescuing lhe Tibelans fiom a feudal lheo-
ciacy); also by ndia in 1971 on lhe Bangladesh inleivenlion (Pakislani violalions of
human iighls); and by \ielnam in lhe Cambodian inleivenlion in 1979 (Khmei Rouge
violalion of human iighls).
1O. Nol necessaiily lhe piefeiied oplion of many Kosovais, noi necessaiily a iealislic hope
foi lhe fuluie of Kosovo.
11. Al lhe lime of wiiling, lhe Seib populalion of Kosovo was believed lo have fallen fiom
aboul 2OO,OOO lo aboul 97,OOO, accoiding lo NATO, bul was iising again.
12. Nol all lhe guidance and localion syslems woiked equally well, and all weie somewhal
blunled in effecl by lhe naluie of lhe leiiain and lhe inilial wealhei condilions. n ad-
dilion, some of lhe munilions unfoilunalely failed lo self-desliucl, and so weie slill kill-
ing people aflei lhe end of hoslililies.
13. Opposilion in lhe \niled Slales lo lhe inleivenlion in Kosovo came fiom seveial
souices: Ameiicans of Seib descenl, neo-isolalionisls, including Pal Buchanan as con-
lendei foi lhe piesidenlial nominalion in 2OOO, and plain Clinlon-haleis, deleimined
nol lo appiove of anylhing he did.
14. n Kosovo, as in mosl modein wais, moie civilians lhan soldieis weie killed. The dealhs
weie piedominanlly fiom lhe Seib opeialions in Kosovo, bul some of lhem (aboul 2,OOO
on Belgiade`s eslimale) weie caused by NATO aii sliikes. Dislance waifaie aims pii-
maiily lo deslioy nxed assels such as biidges, powei slalions, fuel dumps, and so on. Bul
lheie aie always civilians in lhe geneial vicinily of lhose assels. So lheie always will be
civilian casuallies, no mallei how accuiale localion and guidance syslems become. Bul a
casually-aveise mind-sel, demonslialed bolh in Kosovo and in lhe Gulf Wai, does giow
fiom lhe foice pioleclion noim and lhe CNN effecl.`` Thal is, lhe sighl of adveisaiy
casuallies, civilian oi even combalanl, on lhe nighlly T\ news iapidly alienales Weslein
vieweis, causing ievulsion againsl ofncial policy.
15. Though pilolless aiiciafl cannol as yel do all lhe lhings lhal lhose wilh pilols can do, lhe
cosl in lhe \niled Slales of pioducing a lop-of-lhe-line pilol is aboul \S$6 million, and
he oi she is sub|ecl lo even moie dangeis lhan lhe aiiciafl, which may cosl \S$2 billion.
16. The Ialklands Wai of 1982, conducled al an even giealei dislance fiom base lhan
Kosovo, ielied moie on sea powei, lhough lheie was a good deal of lhal in lhe Adiialic.
17. Piobably aboul 12O,OOO, as againsl lhe 5O,OOO aclually deployed.
18. Revenge killings of Seibs by Albanians peisisled lale inlo 1999, and lhe chances of lhe
lwo communilies evei living logelhei in peace in Kosovo appeaied slim al besl.
19. Agiiculluial land, one mine, and louiisl polenlial aie ils main assels.
2O. The main Iuiopean anxiely on polilical and social giounds was a fuilhei exodus of
Balkan iefugees acioss lheii boideis.
21. The ma|oi Weslein goveinmenls of lhe lime weie piedominanlly of a social democialic
complexion. l is inleiesling lo speculale whelhei oi nol a NATO dominaled by con-
seivalive goveinmenls would have made lhe same decision.
22. Sliobe Talboll, who had been in Moscow negolialing wilh Cheinomyidin, heaid lhe
news in ighl lo Washinglon and luined his plane aiound. Bul lheie was a iepoil lhal
lhe Russians had lold lheii fiiends in Geimany, who passed il lo NATO. Rumouis
(denied) weie of a shaip clash belween Geneial Claik and Geneial 1ackson, wilh Blaii
backing 1ackson bul Clinlon not backing Claik, whose NATO command was ended a
lillle piemaluiely.
23. Tinc inleiview, 17 May 1999.
24. bid.
25. A CA man did spol lhe misidenlincalion of lhe building in Belgiade, bul lhe message
did nol ieach NATO command in lime lo pievenl lhe aii sliike. China accepled com-
pensalion in due couise. The CA ofncei held lo be iesponsible was lalei dismissed.
26. The Chinese goveinmenl piolesled angiily lhal ils own scienlisls had peifecled lhe
neulion bomb.
27. Thc Australian, 24 1une 1999, emphasis added.
28. n Iasl Timoi a lillle lalei, heavy diplomalic piessuies, mosl fiom lhe \niled Slales,
weie enough.
29
Solidaiily veisus geoslialegy:
Kosovo and lhe dilemmas of
inleinalional democialic culluie
1can-Marc CoicauJ
Theie is a ceilain qualily of Jcja` vu aboul lhe debales liiggeied by lhe
Kosovo ciisis in lhe pasl yeai oi so, as well as aboul lhe modalilies of
aclion lhal lhe inleinalional communily decided lo adopl in lale Maich of
1999 in oidei lo oveicome lhe deadlock. Iai fiom being pail of a new
appioach lo inleinalional secuiily and humanilaiian ciisis, lhey aie, pio-
visionally, lhe lasl illuslialions of a way of handling secuiily and human-
ilaiian ciises lhal seems lo have become lhe liademaik of lhe 199Os.
Nolwilhslanding a numbei of diffeiences having lo do wilh lhe specinc
aspecls of each case, lhe debales and modalilies of aclion adopled by lhe
leading membei slales of lhe inleinalional communily vis-a` -vis Kosovo
aie ieminiscenl of key aspecls of lhe addiessing of olhei humanilaiian
conicls in iecenl yeais, especially of Bosnia and in some iespecls of
Somalia. As a iesull, allhough lhe diffeiences should ceilainly nol be
oveilooked,1 lhe piesenl chaplei will accenluale lhis sense of similaiily
lhal so chaiacleiizes lhe piesenl slale of democialic culluie as expiessed
and pio|ecled al lhe inleinalional level.
The liademaik appioach of lhe inleinalional communily lowaid secu-
iily and humanilaiian ciises in lhe 199Os may besl be chaiacleiized by lhe
facl lhal lhe inleinalional aclions inilialed lo pul an end lo conicls have
lended lo call upon lwo elemenls lo explain and |uslify lheii necessily
and modalily: a sense of liansboidei solidaiily, and geoslialegic consid-
eialions anchoied in nalional inleiesls. These lwo elemenls, and lhe
combinalion lheieof, conslilule a ma|oi noimalive iesouice oul of which
463
one can deciphei lhe molivalion, conceplualizalion, and implemenlalion
of inleinalional inleivenlions in lhe 199Os. The paiadigmalic impoilance
of lhese elemenls can only lead us lo see lhem as bolh expiessing and
shaping decisive aspecls of lhe conlempoiaiy inleinalional democialic
culluie and of ils cuiienl evolulion. This is whal lhis chaplei inlends lo
show. As such, il will bolh analyse lhe inleinalional communily`s hand-
ling of lhe Kosovo ciisis and ieecl on lhe inleinalional oidei and ils
cuiienl slale of liansilion.
n lhis conlexl, lhe chaplei will louch upon lhe lhiee following poinls.2
Iiisl, shall show lhal lhe sense of liansboidei solidaiily and geoslialegic
consideialions, as well as lhe inuence of lhe nalional conlexl of lhe key
Weslein democialic aclois in which lhese elemenls aie displayed and of
which lhese elemenls aie laigely an oulgiowlh, aie ciucial in accounling
foi lhe |uslincalion foi lhe NATO inleivenlion in Kosovo. Second, shall
demonsliale lhal lhe legilimizalion discouise buill up lo |uslify lhe mili-
laiy inleivenlion also echoes and laigely explains lhe modalilies of lhe
NATO mililaiy inleivenlion in Kosovo. The inleivenlion is veiy much
along lhe same lines as lhe pievious mullilaleial managemenl of secuiily
and humanilaiian ciises in lhe 199Os by lhe inleinalional bodies. n lhis
peispeclive, and beyond lhe case of Kosovo, whal will emeige is a picluie
of conlempoiaiy inleinalional democialic culluie inhabiled by a seiies of
dilemmas. These dilemmas aie ciealed by lhe vaiious and nol enliiely
conveigenl impeialives and demands lo which lhe inleinalional commu-
nily and ils leading democialic membeis musl iespond, and by lhe piin-
ciples and values al lhe coie of lhe conlempoiaiy polilical culluie. These
dilemmas accounl foi lhe facl lhal aclion is inilialed and laken al lhe
inleinalional level by lhe ma|oi Weslein democialic poweis. Bul lhey
also accounl foi lhe limiled inleivenlionism displayed by lhe inleina-
lional communily and ils leading democialic membeis in lhe 199Os and,
ullimalely, foi lhe lensions and polemics lhal lhis hybiid of conseivalive
and piogiessive appioaches lo secuiily and humanilaiian ciises conlinues
lo geneiale.3 Iinally, shall exploie lhe likely oulcomes of lhis mannei
of addiessing ciises in lhe 199Os foi lhe evolulion of lhe inleinalional
syslem. Heie, shall lisl a numbei of queslions lhal, while being iaised by
lhe inleinalional involvemenl in lhe Kosovo conicl, iemain unansweied.
shall sliess lhal lhe fuluie of lhe inleinalional syslem and of ils democ-
ializalion laigely depends upon lhe answeis given lo lhese queslions.
Solidaiily and geoslialegy: Two elemenls of lhe |uslincalion
foi NATO inleivenlion in Kosovo
Analysing lhe web of discouise pioduced wilhin NATO and in ma|oi
Weslein democialic ciicles (beginning wilh lhe \niled Slales and lhe
\niled Kingdom) lo |uslify lhe mililaiy inleivenlion in Kosovo,4 il ap-
peais lhal lhe |uslincalion was founded piimaiily upon lwo aigumenls
and on lheii combinalion: lhe solidaiily aigumenl and lhe geoslialegy
aigumenl. Taken logelhei, lhese lwo elemenls inuenced lhe delibei-
alions and decision-making piocesses lhal led lo lhe decision lhal lhe
inleinalional inleivenlion in Kosovo was |uslined and lhal il should be
piesenled publicly as such.
Intcrnational soliJarity as a justication jor nilitary intcrvcntion
The necessily of exlending a sense of solidaiily lo Kosovo viclims was
one of lhe piime aigumenls lhal lhe aclois favouiing mililaiy inleiven-
lion in Kosovo used in lhe monlhs and weeks pieceding lhe inleivenlion
in Kosovo lo |uslify aclion and mobilize suppoil foi il. The call foi
liansboidei solidaiily was ailiculaled in conneclion wilh lhiee elemenls.
Iiisl, lheie was lhe pio|eclion of a sense of communily wilh lhe popu-
lalion of Kosovo. Aiming al supeiseding lhe divide belween us`` and
lhem,`` lhis elemenl inviled lhe public lo idenlify wilh lhe viclims fiom
Kosovo and make lheii fale pail of lhe common iesponsibilily: whal
happens lo lhem, oi ialhei whal we aie willing oi unwilling lo allow lo
happen lo lhem, was piesenled as a denning aspecl of who we aie. n lhis
conlexl, any lemplalion lo adopl lhe allilude of a byslandei was depicled
as a foim of complicily wilh lhe ciimes commilled.
As a iesull and lhis is lhe second elemenl lhe human iighls viola-
lions inicled by lhe Seibs upon lhe Albanian people of Kosovo acled as
a iemindei of lhe iesponsibilily of lhe inleinalional communily and, wilhin
lhal communily, of lhe ma|oi Weslein democialic poweis lo inleivene.5
Thiidly, lheie was lhe use of lhe self-deleiminalion aigumenl. Heie,
owing lo lhe facls lhal Kosovo was slill legally pail of ugoslavia and
lhal lhe inleinalional communily was ieluclanl lo endoise lhe indepen-
dence claims made by lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy (KLA),6 lhis mainly
amounled lo lhe iesloialion of iighls allached lo lhe aulonomy slalus
lhal lhe piovince of Kosovo en|oyed unlil lhe lale 198Os. This was pie-
senled as lhe goal of lhe inleinalional inleivenlion.
Thc gcostratcgic Jincnsion in thc justication oj nilitary
intcrvcntion in Kosovo
The moial consideialions expiessed by calling upon a sense of solidaiily
lo be exlended al lhe inleinalional level weie nol lhe only elemenls lhal
enleied inlo lhe delibeialions and decision-making piocesses leading lo
lhe |uslincalion of mililaiy inleivenlion in Kosovo. This should nol come
as a suipiise since, in spile of lhe evei-incieasing democializalion of
inleinalional polilics, moial consideialions alone had nevei been laken
THI DLIMMAS OI NTIRNATONAL DIMOCRATC C\LT\RI 465
seiiously enough, unlil now, lo be able lo |uslify and liiggei mililaiy in-
leivenlion. Hence lhe necessily lo call upon addilional consideialions,
moie liadilional and moie polilically decisive, in lhe conducl of inleina-
lional polilics even in lhese democialic limes: geoslialegic consideialions.
These consideialions weie mainly conceined wilh a piagmalic evalualion
of lhe gains lo be achieved by mililaiy inleivenlion.
n lhe eaily spiing of 1999, ialhei lhan a hands-off slance lhal likely
would have allowed local lensions lo uniavel and spiead lo olhei pails of
lhe Balkans, lhe achievemenl of giealei mililaiy and polilical slabilily in
lhe iegion was said lo depend upon a mililaiy inleivenlion. n addiessing
and conlaining lhe violence geneialed by lhe Kosovo ciisis, nol only was
a NATO inleivenlion meanl lo slop lhe conicl in Kosovo, bul il was also
supposed lo have a pievenlive effecl on lhe enliie Balkan iegion. l was
aigued lhal il would conliibule lo a slabilizalion of lhe iegion, and even
send deleiience signals lo olhei pails of lhe woild. n lighl of lhe envi-
sioned gains, lhe case foi mililaiy inleivenlion was also enhanced by lhe
weak silualion in which Seibia found ilself, economically (owing lo yeais
of sanclions), diplomalically (owing lo yeais of isolalion lhe only channel
of communicalion iemaining moie oi less open foi Slobodan Milosevic
being Russian), and even mililaiily (lhe inlelligence iepoils of NATO al
lhal lime desciibed lhe aimy of ugoslavia as ialhei pooily equipped). l
was lheiefoie in conneclion wilh lhese elemenls lhal lhe nalional inleiesl
aigumenl was made by NATO decision makeis. As such, lhe nolion of
nalional inleiesl seived as lhe oveiall fiamewoik in which lhe goal of
secuiily slabilily lo be achieved by lhe mililaiy inleivenlion was supposed
lo nnd ils ullimale geoslialegic, and polilical, meaning.
Howevei, making lhe case of nalional inleiesl in lhe conlexl of Kosovo
was nol an easy lask. To slail wilh, logically il should have been nisl and
foiemosl lhe Wesl Iuiopean counliies lhal saw lhe Kosovo conicl as a
mallei of nalional inleiesl, because of ils pioximily, and made il lheii
own cause, bul lhis was haidly lhe case, pailly foi lack of sliong Iuio-
pean vision and leadeiship.7 As a iesull, il fell lo lhe \niled Slales lo be
lhe diiving foice behind mililaiy inleivenlion and lo demonsliale lo ils
own consliluency, pailiculaily lhe domeslic consliluency, lhal a NATO
inleivenlion in Kosovo was a mallei of nalional inleiesl. This was cleaily
a difncull sell. Consideiing lhal lhe Kosovo conicl sel lhe human iighls
issue closei lo cenlie slage lhan any secuiily lhieal, lhal human iighls do
nol yel conslilule a calegoiical impeialive foi aclion, and lhal lhe conicl
was laking place fai away fiom lhe \niled Slales and did nol lhiealen ils
immediale slialegic inleiesls, il was nol easy foi lhe Ameiican adminis-
lialion lo call upon lhe nolion of nalional inleiesl lo |uslify lhe launching
of a mililaiy inleivenlion.
As a mallei of facl, lhe difncully of piesenling lhe Kosovo ciisis as
|uslifying mililaiy inleivenlion was fuilhei exaceibaled by lhe ialhei
meicuiial commilmenl of lhe democialic Weslein poweis slailing wilh
lhe \niled Slales lo human iighls, lhe basis foi such |uslincalions.
SoliJarity anJ gcostratcgic justications anJ national contcxts oj
Vcstcrn Jcnocratic powcrs
Given lhal Weslein democialic counliies, beginning wilh lhe \niled
Slales, weie lhe key aclois in lhe mililaiy inleivenlion in Kosovo, il is
almosl naluial lhal lhe |uslincalions pul foiwaid lo convey lhe idea of
ils legilimacy had lo deal wilh some of lhe coie aspecls of lhe polilical
culluies of lhese counliies. l appeais lhal while ceilain aspecls of lheii
polilical culluies welcomed lhe inleivenlion, olheis had a laming effecl
and, in lhe end, sliongly consliained ils scope.
On lhe one hand, il is liue lhal lhe polilical culluies of lhe key Weslein
democialic poweis involved in NATO decision-making piocesses aie
veiy much conceined wilh human iighls issues and aie, lheiefoie, com-
milled lo lheii defence. Aflei all, lhe exlension of a sense of solidaiily
beyond boideis is laigely a pio|eclion, al lhe inleinalional level, of coie
elemenls of lhe legal and polilical culluie of lhe mosl poweiful Weslein
democialic poweis, as manifesled in lhe exleinalizalion and inleinalion-
alizalion of univeisalism and individualism, once classically key nalional
democialic values.8 Bolh as an oulgiowlh of lhis liend and as an addi-
lional facloi, one lhal seems lo have deepened and picked up speed since
lhe mid-198Os,9 lhe allenlion given by media lo humanilaiian ciises has
also led Weslein democialic socielies lo pul human iighls issues on lheii
polilical agenda.10
On lhe olhei hand, lhe exleinalizalion of lhis sense of solidaiily, which
is compalible wilh lhe polilical culluies of ma|oi Weslein democialic
poweis because il is made possible by lhem, is also in compelilion wilh
olhei aspecls of lhese polilical culluies. l is because of lhis compelilion
lhal lhe incieasing inclusion of human iighls issues in nalional slialegic
goals has been miligaled, in lhe end, by lheii quinlessenlially non-slialegic
chaiaclei. ndeed, even foi lhe Weslein democialic poweis mosl dedi-
caled lo human iighls issues, lhey slill conslilule moie a hypolhelical
impeialive lhan a calegoiical impeialive11 in lhe oveiall picluie of lheii
foieign policy. Human iighls aie slill only a pail, even if an incieasingly
impoilanl one, of foieign policy. n lhis conlexl, while il is liue lhal lhe
exlension of inleinalional solidaiily vis-a` -vis aieas of conicl is essen-
lially of lhe making of Weslein democialic poweis,12 il is also liue lhal
lhis commilmenl has ils limils. The limilalions laigely lake place13 wilhin
lhe fiamewoik of lhe we` vs. lhem` divide`` a divide lhal iemains in
spile of lhe sense of liansboidei solidaiily lhal lhese veiy same Weslein
democialic counliies convey and piomole and lhal makes inleinalional
solidaiily possible. The pio|eclion of lhe we` vs. lhem` divide`` can be
seen in foui complemenlaiy ways.
Iiisl, lhe exlension of compassion oi of idenlincalion al lhe inlei-
nalional level woiks in a concenliic mannei. Humanily ilself is lhe widesl
of lhe ciicles and, as such, falls mainly undei lhe iesponsibilily of inlei-
nalional oiganizalions. Howevei, humanily does nol geneiale lhe level of
commilmenl lhal lhe nalional ciicle lends slill lo pioduce, especially in
slable, developed counliies lhal aie economically, socially, and polilically
inlegialed. Hence, inleinalional inilialives lend lo be evalualed on lhe
basis of nalional consideialions especially lhose linked wilh lhe do-
meslic aiena of lhe ma|oi Weslein democialic counliies, lhe ones al lhe
coie of lhe inleinalional inleivenlion philosophy and aie ielalively
weak compaied wilh aclion al lhe nalional level.14
Hence also and lhis is lhe second poinl lhe exislence of an evalua-
lion of lhe cosls and benenls of lhe inleivenlion and of ils modalilies, an
evalualion lhal is designed lo ensuie lhal lhe cosls will nol be highei lhan
lhe benenls, especially fiom lhe nalional peispeclive of lhe inleivening
counliies.
Thiid, in lhis conlexl, lhe guiding piinciple of lhe coslbenenl assess-
menl is lhe exislence of an implicil, if nol explicil, hieiaichy in lhe iec-
ognilion and allocalion of iighls and lhe public good belween lhe do-
meslic level and lhe inleinalional level. Allhough Weslein democialic
counliies, among lhem lhe mosl poweiful ones, iecognize lhal il can be
pail of lheii iesponsibilily as essenlial aclois in inleinalional democialic
life lo acl beyond lheii own boideis in oidei lo addiess and solve conicls,
lhe exlension and implemenlalion of lhis iesponsibilily aie deployed
wilhin a hieiaichical woild-view lhal ullimalely, in assessing lhe iisks
woilh laking, lends lo give piioiily lo lhe domeslic level ovei lhe inlei-
nalional level, even if lhis means possibly |eopaidizing lhe inleinalional
inleivenlion. This hieiaichy is, aflei all, ialhei naluial in lhe piesenl in-
leinalional enviionmenl, which is slill inhabiled by sliong nalion-slale
liopisms.15 And nowheie is lhis hieiaichy moie cleaily illuslialed lhan in
lhe facl lhal, as democialic poweis place piimacy on lhe domeslic good
ovei lhe inleinalional good, nalion slales aie conslanlly conceined wilh
lhe evenlualily of casuallies (a concein lhal iises neaily lo obsession in
lhe \niled Slales) and a highei value is lheiefoie alliibuled lo nalional
lives ovei lhe lives of suffeiing populalions in aieas of conicl.16
The fouilh elemenl lhal made il difncull foi Weslein democialic
counliies involved in NATO`s decision-making piocesses lo make lhe
case foi lhe slialegic dimension of human iighls issues in Kosovo lo lheii
nalional consliluencies was moie specinc and had lo do wilh lhe Balkan
dimension of lhe conicl. Heie, lwo faclois came inlo play. Theie was,
nisl, lhe facl lhal in lhe Balkans human iighls issues aie inleilwined wilh
an elhnic vision of lhe nalion, based on lhe shaiing of key liails such as
iace and ieligion. This vision piofoundly conliadicls lhe eleclive vision of
whal a nalion is, a philosophy based on lhe will of lhose who aie pail of
lhe communily, which mosl Weslein democialic counliies lend lo value
and idenlify wilh.17 This elhnic vision is an obslacle lo lhe domeslic sell-
ing of human iighls issues as a slialegic mallei woilh full inleinalional
commilmenl. This is especially lhe case since lhe Kosovo Albanian polili-
cal gioup lhal achieved pie-eminence in Kosovo and lhe giealesl visibil-
ily and access al lhe iegional and inleinalional levels in lale 1998 and
eaily 1999 was lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy. The Kosovo Libeialion
Aimy`s leadeis, especially Hashim Thaci, while calling upon inleinalional
solidaiily and lhe cosmopolilan paiadigm lo piess foi lhe necessily of an
inleinalional mililaiy inleivenlion, al lhe same lime puisued nalionalisl
goals foi lhe fuluie of Kosovo in which iespecl foi polilical and elhnic
pluialism did nol appeai lo be a piioiily.18
n lhe end, lhe solidaiily and geoslialegic aigumenls, as inuenced by
lhe nalional conlexl of lhe Weslein democialic counliies in which lhey
weie displayed lo |uslify lhe mililaiy inleivenlion in Kosovo, lended lo
geneiale a lol of debale, hesilalion, and a ielalive ieluclance lo acl. f
lhey did conliibule lo lhe liiggeiing of an inleinalional mililaiy inlei-
venlion, il was only lo a limiled mililaiy inleivenlion in lhe sense lhal
lhe NATO slialegy in Kosovo in spiing 1999 ended up being ovei-
whelmingly supeiioi fiom lhe lechnological and logislical slandpoinls
laigely because of NATO`s ieluclance lo commil Weslein human lives lo
ensuie ils success.
The dilemmas of inleinalional democialic culluie, lheii
inuence on NATO inleivenlion in Kosovo, and lhe liend
of lhe 199Os
As a iesull of lhe |uxlaposilion of lhe solidaiily and geoslialegic nalional
inleiesl aigumenls, and of lhe impacl upon lhese aigumenls of lhe na-
lional conlexl of lhe counliies al lhe coie of lhe mililaiy inleivenlion
(pailiculaily, bul nol exclusively, lhe \niled Slales), NATO inleivenlion
in Kosovo was envisioned and look place wilhin lhe consliaining fiame-
woik of a seiies of dilemmas. These dilemmas ended up affecling bolh
lhe modalilies of lhe mililaiy inleivenlion and a laige piopoilion of ils
oulcomes. This slale of affaiis, howevei, is nolhing new: il echoes some of
lhe key palleins chaiacleiizing seveial \N opeialions involved in lhe
managemenl of secuiily and humanilaiian ciises in eailiei yeais of lhe
199Os.
Dcnocratic Jilcnnas as thc jrancwork oj thc NATO intcrvcntion
in Kosovo
Consliained by lhe domeslic polilical culluies of ils membeis, NATO
pioved ilself willing lo acl, bul only in a ielalively limiled mannei and
ceilainly nol al any cosl. ndeed, il did nol inlend lo make lhe pioleclion
of human iighls and lhe demands of lhe Kosovo Albanians lhe sole and
ullimale ciileiion foi ils delibeialions, decisions, and aclions. The besl
lhal NATO was willing lo do was lo addiess and liy lo solve lhe pioblems
on lhe giound wilhin lhe mililaiy and polilical paiameleis shaped by
lhiee main dilemmas.
The nisl of lhese dilemmas was lhe need lo exlend inleinalional soli-
daiily while pieseiving, as much as possible, lhe lives of lhe nalional and
NATO peisonnel involved in lhe mililaiy inleivenlion. The balance be-
lween lhese lwo goals pioved lo be difncull lo sliike. l led lo lhe adop-
lion of a high-allilude aii sliike campaign as lhe slialegy foi inleivenlion
in Kosovo, lhen mainly designed lo undeimine Seib mililaiy capabililies
while NATO peisonnel suslained low iisk. This lefl lhe Albanian popu-
lalion of Kosovo unpiolecled duiing lhe campaign.
The second dilemma conceined sliiking lhe iighl balance belween
piolecling human iighls, al lhe iisk of abelling and endoising nalional
paililion, and conlinuing lo uphold lhe piinciples of nalional inlegiily
and nalional soveieignly as lwo coineislones of lhe inleinalional syslem.
Some of lhe debales lhal look place bolh befoie lhe mililaiy inleiven-
lion, foi example duiing lhe negolialions al Rambouillel in Iebiuaiy, and
duiing lhe aii sliike campaign ilself, on how appiopiiale il was lo suppoil
lhe Kosovo Libeialion Aimy, had lo do wilh lhis dilemma.
Moie geneially, and embiacing lhe lwo dilemmas desciibed above, lhe
leading membeis of NATO had lo weigh, veiy oflen undei lhe piessuie
of unfolding evenls and wilhoul much lime lo ieecl, lhe polilical and
noimalive appiopiialeness of being eilhei loo conseivalive oi loo pio-
giessive in handling lhe issues on lhe inleivenlion agenda. Whal was al
slake in lhis piocess was nol only lhe fale of lhe Albanian populalion of
Kosovo, bul also lhe slanding and iepulalion of lhe ma|oi democialic
counliies involved in lhe NATO opeialion and lhe ciedibilily of NATO
ilself.19 \llimalely, il was a mallei of selling lhe lone foi lhe yeais lo come,
in cognizance of lhe implicalions lhal lhe decisions and aclions laken in lhe
conlexl of Kosovo could have on lhe fuluie of lhe inleinalional syslem.
Thc noJalitics anJ outconcs oj nilitary intcrvcntion in Kosovo
shapcJ by thc Jcnocratic Jilcnnas
n shaping lhe delibeialions of NATO membeis aboul whal should be
done and how il should be done, lhese dilemmas of democialic aclion al
lhe inleinalional level conliibuled lo fiaming lhe modalilies and oul-
comes of lhe mililaiy inleivenlion in Kosovo.
Thc noJalitics oj thc intcrvcntion
l is quile cleai lhal lhe decision lo ieduce lhe mililaiy inleivenlion lo an
aii campaign, and moie specincally, foi mosl of lhe duialion, lo a high-
allilude bombing campaign using cameias and lasei-guided weapons,20
and lo iefuse (al leasl in lhe nisl six weeks oi so of lhe campaign) lo envi-
sion and plan a giound wai,21 cannol be explained only by lhe availabil-
ily of lhe massive aii powei and high-lechnology devices placed al lhe
disposal of NATO by lhe \niled Slales.22 l is liue lhal high lechnology
piovides a ieal opeialional advanlage in wai silualions, and lhus is now
lhe ob|ecl of a phenomenon close lo adoialion, if nol idolaliy. These
fealuies indeed conslilule a key aspecl of lhe Ninlendo`` conceplion of
wai of which ceilain decision-making ciicles in lhe ma|oi Weslein poweis,
especially lhe \niled Slales, aie so fond. Howevei, lhe use of high lech-
nology would nol be valued as highly as il is cuiienlly if did nol nl veiy
well wilh anolhei ciucial chaiacleiislic of whal seems lo be an emeiging
new paiadigm of wais conceived and conducled by indusliialized ad-
vanced poweis: lhe impeialive lo avoid mililaiy peisonnel casuallies as
much as possible.23
Thc outconcs oj thc intcrvcntion
Consideiing lhe modalilies of lhe mililaiy inleivenlion in Kosovo
geneialed by lhe consliainls of lhe dilemmas lhal NATO decision
makeis accepled as basic assumplions and used as guiding piinciples foi
lheii delibeialions and aclions lhe ambiguous oulcome on lhe giound
should nol have come as a suipiise. Thiee poinls need lo be sliessed
heie.
Iiisl, allhough Belgiade had planned lhe implemenlalion of a syslem-
alic elhnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo weeks, if nol monlhs, befoie lhe
launching of lhe nisl bombs in Maich, il iemains a facl lhal cenliing lhe
mililaiy inleivenlion exclusively aiound aii powei, ialhei lhan focusing
on an immediale cessalion of human iighls violalions, fuelled lhis cam-
paign. Relying nisl and foiemosl on aii iaids ciealed an open neld lhal
lhe 4O,OOO-sliong ugoslav Aimy and special police used lo puige Kosovo
of mosl of ils 1.8 million elhnic Albanian populalion in only a few weeks.
As a mallei of facl, had lhe Alliance nol been able lo pievail in May, lhis
would ceilainly have become even moie of a mallei foi embaiiassmenl
foi NATO and ils key membei slales lhan il has luined oul lo be.
n addilion, lhe laclical choice, as pail of lhe zeio casually`` slialegy,
lo y planes al high alliludes incoipoialed a calculaled and accepled iisk
of misinleipieling lhe idenlily of laigels on lhe giound and hilling civil-
ian and iefugee populalions. l look seveial cases of giuesome civilian
casuallies, widely publicized by lhe Seib aulhoiilies, befoie NATO
planes began ying lowei.
Iinally, lhe inlensincalion of human iighls violalions lhal lhe modalilies
of lhe mililaiy inleivenlion allowed lo lake place duiing lhe lwo monlhs
of lhe aii campaign, fiom lhe end of Maich unlil mid-May 1999, veiy
seiiously endangeied lhe possibilily of ieconcilialion belween Kosovo`s
vaiious elhnic gioups aflei lhe wai. ndeed, wilh lhe level of human
iighls violalions ieaching unpaialleled levels in Kosovo duiing lhe aii
iaids, halied and lhiisl foi ievenge look lhe lead, colouiing lhe almo-
spheie of lhe place and making elhnic sepaialion, if nol leiiiloiial paili-
lion, likely scenaiios foi ils fuluie.
As a iesull, il was a iepaialoiy conceplion of inleinalional |uslice in
conliasl lo an anlicipaloiy conceplion of |uslice focusing on pievenling
ciimes and based on iighls viewed as sacied and iecognized as such by
inleinalional liealies24 lhal lhe NATO aii slialegy implicilly endoised
by planning lo libeiale Kosovo wilhoul making lhe fale of lhe Albanian
populalion ils immediale piioiily. NATO made an evalualion lhal il would
piobably be sufncienl, aflei lhe wai, lo piosecule lhe peipelialois of wai
ciimes. Thus, NATO`s puisuil of |uslice was in |eopaidy even befoie il
slailed. ndeed, by failing lo fulnl ils poilion of lhe iesponsibilily foi
pievenling lhe commission of ciimes,25 laigely lhiough lhe mililaiy
slialegy il chose and by pulling lhe buiden on lhe iepaialoiy phase of lhe
|uslice piocess, NATO inleivenlion ian lhe iisk of achieving a Pyiihic
vicloiy, one lhal could fail lo inslale slabilily and lo iool lhe eslablish-
menl of democialic piinciples in Kosovo.
Thc intcrnational hanJling oj thc Kosovo crisis as part oj thc
1990s trcnJ in thc culturc oj intcrnational Jcnocracy
The lhiee dilemmas of democialic aclion al lhe inleinalional level lhal
have idenlined aie, howevei, nolhing new. They aie nol specinc lo
Kosovo, oi lo lhe NATO inleivenlion. They aie, in facl, highly ieminis-
cenl, despile a numbei of poinls peculiai lo lhe Kosovo conlexl, of evenls
lhal happened a few yeais eailiei, undei lhe aegis of lhe \niled Nalions,
nol only in Bosnia bul also in Somalia and Rwanda.
Iiom lhis peispeclive, lhe vaiious debales liiggeied by lhe Kosovo
ciisis, especially aiound lhe issues of zeio casuallies,`` lhe use of foice
(whalevei foice il mighl be), and aii sliikes veisus giound foices, aie
laigely a ievisil of lhe debaled queslions and aclual policies eailiei in lhe
199Os in lhe conlexl of lhe \niled Nalions` managemenl of humanilaiian
and secuiily ciises. The main diffeience is lhal NATO opeialions in Ko-
sovo weie cleaily and essenlially a mililaiy venluie, benenling fiom lhe
full suppoil of lhe \niled Slales. As such and unlike lhe \N peace-
keeping opeialions in Bosnia and Somalia, which dangeiously mixed
peacemaking and peacekeeping policies, humanilaiian conceins and lhe
use of foice wilhoul sliong backing fiom membei slales (among lhem lhe
\niled Slales)26 mililaiy failuie was nol an oplion. Allhough lheie was
a liansiloiy dangei of appaienl defeal in lhe eaily days of May 1999, lhe
NATO mission would nol be peimilled lo fail because lhe pieslige of lhe
\niled Slales was al slake. Once lhe wai was undei way, lheie was a ieal
Ameiican commilmenl lo biing il lo a successful mililaiy conclusion.
Howevei, lhe commilmenl lo lhe mililaiy goals of lhe inleivenlion did
nol make lhe commilmenl lo lhe defence of human iighls any sliongei
oi cleaiei lhan il had been in lhe opeialions led by lhe \niled Nalions
belween 1992 and 1995. The debales and delibeialions lhal led lo lhe
ullimale laclical and slialegic choices in lhe inleivenlion in Kosovo weie,
especially when il came lo humanilaiian issues, essenlially lhe same as
lhose lhal had laken place in lhe conlexl of Bosnia, Somalia, oi even
Rwanda. These choices pioduced veiy mixed iesulls in Kosovo on lhe
humanilaiian fionl, echoing lhe ambiguous humanilaiian oulcomes in
Bosnia and Somalia. Iinally, lhe NATO opeialion in Kosovo, like lhe
\N involvemenl in Somalia and Bosnia, veiy much gave lhe sense of
having been envisioned in lhe hope of achieving gialincalion wilhoul ieal
commilmenl.27
This ielalive sliucluial similaiily belween lhe NATO handling of
Kosovo and lhe \niled Nalions` managemenl of humanilaiian ciises in
pievious yeais is due lo lhe facl lhal lhe dilemmas of inleinalional de-
mociacy menlioned above aie an expiession of lhe exisling and conicl-
ing legilimacies cuiienlly al woik al lhe nalional and inleinalional polil-
ical levels. As such, lhese dilemmas aie, al lhe delibeialion and aclion
levels, lhe lip of lhe icebeig, lhe manifeslalion of lhe sliucluial chaiac-
leiislics (bolh compalible and in compelilion) of lhe conlempoiaiy dem-
ocialic culluie in ils nalional and inleinalional dimensions. n lhis con-
lexl, lhe conicling legilimacies aie due lo pioblems in lhe coheience of
lhe main piinciples of inleinalional law and lo lhe lensions lhal lhe up-
holding, enfoiced compliance, and implemenlalion of lhe law cieale in
lhe inleinalional syslem, especially in silualions of ciisis.28 Bul lhey also
lie belween lhe obligalions allached lo lhe making of lhe inleinalional
communily and lhe demands of lhe nalion slale.29
Because lhe democialic culluie is incieasingly a mixluie of iespon-
sibililies al bolh lhe nalional and inleinalional levels, il is difncull foi
decision makeis involved in lhe decisive aspecls of lhe managemenl of
inleinalional ciises enliiely lo disiegaid one level and lo focus ex-
clusively on lhe olhei. Hence lhe allempl lo lake bolh inlo accounl. Bul
lhis allempl lends lo pioduce lensions and dilemmas, because lheie is a
ceilain amounl of compelilion belween lhe legilimacies and loyallies
geneialed by lhe nalional and inleinalional dimensions, and a ceilain
hieiaichy lhal conlinues lo favoui lhe nalional dimension. n lhe end, lhis
slale of affaiis confionls polilical leadeis wilh haid choices and foices
lhem lo lake a sland. Ralhei lhan choosing a one-sided couise lhal lhe
inleinalional syslem ilself has nol chosen yel (il is slill oscillaling in-
decisively belween lhe inleinalional level and lhe nalional level, belween
pieseiving nalional soveieignly and pushing foi lhe defence of human
iighls), lhey liy lo have il bolh ways. They liy lo have il bolh ways, bul
wilh a ceilain inclinalion lowaids lhe nalional pole of each dilemma.
Thus, polilical leadeis seive lhe inleinalional communily and lhose who
fall undei ils aegis, as, foi inslance, in a wai silualion, while nevei foi-
gelling lhe demands of lhe domeslic consliluency.
l is in lhis conlexl lhal one has lo undeisland lhe half-heailed mea-
suies lhal epilomize, in one way oi anolhei, lhe humanilaiian and mili-
laiy inleivenlions in lhe 199Os. Half-heailed measuies aie laken specin-
cally because human iighls ciises beyond lheii own boideis do nol yel
conslilule a mallei of nalional inleiesl foi lhe ma|oi Weslein counliies,
which aie lhe main decision makeis in inleinalional oiganizalions. As a
iesull, in a lime when even ieal, piagmalic issues of nalional inleiesl
seem less and less able lo |uslify lhe saciince of soldieis` lives, il is almosl
inevilable lhal, when il comes lo lhe exlension of inleinalional solidaiily,
lhe democialic culluie can seaich evei fuilhei foi fulnlmenl wilhoul full
commilmenl. n olhei woids, lhe lime has nol yel come when a full
commilmenl lo inleinalional solidaiily will be a goal unlo ilself.30
Conclusion: A few queslions lo answei foi lhe fuluie
As we have seen in lhis chaplei, lhe condilions lhal make inleinalional
inleivenlion possible, lhe |uslincalions lhey iequiie, and lhe value |udge-
menls lhey encompass aie elemenls lhal allow us lo unveil and undei-
sland lhe inleinalional democialic culluie of lhe 199Os, ils scope and ils
limilalions.
The |uslincalion lhal lhe solidaiily and geoslialegic aigumenls pio-
vide foi lhe NATO inleivenlion in Kosovo, lhe facl lhal lhey lead lo an
undeislanding of lhe inleivenlion wilhin lhe fiamewoik of democialic
dilemmas, and lhe inuence lhal such an undeislanding has on lhe mod-
alilies and oulcomes of lhe inleivenlion leave a numbei of queslions
unansweied. These unansweied queslions aie nol only impoilanl foi lhe
fuluie of Kosovo and lhe iegion; lhey concein lhe veiy evolulion of lhe
inleinalional syslem and lhe obligalions lhal ma|oi poweis have lo il.
Allhough il is piobably accuiale lo say lhal some piogiess has been
made in lhe pasl decade iegaiding lhe exlension of inleinalional solidai-
ily lo aieas in conicl, il iemains a facl lhal lhis exlension lakes place
amidsl a langle of pioblemalic issues.
Iiisl, can an aii sliike campaign lhal leaves a space open, al leasl mo-
menlaiily, foi elhnic cleansing be called a humanilaiian inleivenlion``?
The queslion is nol enliiely academic, since il is connecled wilh whal has
in iecenl yeais been lhe piofessed piimaiy goal of inleinalional aclion in
silualions of conicl: lo piolecl lhe viclimized populalions. n olhei
woids, can inleivenlions lhal end up liying lo ensuie and secuie lhe
safely and iighls of lhe people on lhe giound only aflei lhese veiy people
have been lolally exposed lo violence, laigely because of lhe inleivenlion
slialegy adopled, be called humanilaiian,`` in scope if nol in naluie? n
addilion, il is woilh asking whelhei oi nol lhe model of inleinalional
inleivenlion lhal is emeiging fiom lhe cloud of specincilies of cases in lhe
199Os is likely lo be a bluepiinl foi lhe fuluie.
Second, lhe NATO slialegy in Kosovo woiked mainly because of lhe
lack of paiily of mililaiy foices and equipmenl belween lhe Seibs and lhe
Alliance. ndeed, il is lhis mililaiy asymmeliy lhal allowed lhe inleiven-
lion wilhoul ieally commilling oi pulling Weslein lives al iisk. Bul whal
kind of inleivenlion oplion would we be lefl wilh in lhe case of a ielalive
paiily of foices? Would lhe iisks of casuallies allached lo lhe inleivenlion
undeimine lhe impeialive lo inleivene? n olhei woids, if lhe zeio-
casually lheoiy`` is a non-negoliable policy, whal happens in aieas wheie
an inleivenlion piesenls a veiy high level of dangei? Does il mean lhal
lhese aieas aie off-limils and oulside lhe inleinalional |uiisdiclion be-
cause of lhe facloi of lhe powei of lheii foices?
Thiid, lhe iole of media in sliucluiing lhe we` vs. lhem` `` conlexl
and in conliibuling lo lhe manufacluie of public and polilical compassion
has pioven lo be essenlial in lhe malleis consideied in lhis chaplei. l
ieveals lhe emeigence of somelhing like a pailneiship, nol always vol-
unlaiy oi conscious, belween polilical aclois and lhe media. l is, how-
evei, slill an open queslion whelhei such pailneiships coiiecl and mini-
mize lhe seleclive chaiaclei of lhe ma|oi slales` conceins foi aieas of
conicl, oi simply echo and even amplify il.
Iouilh, lhe lensions belween lhe human iighls impeialive and lhe
soveieignly impeialive have nol been lessened by lhe NATO appioach lo
lhe Kosovo ciisis oi by any olhei inleinalional involvemenl in humani-
laiian and secuiily ciises in lhe 199Os. n facl, lhey have piobably been
deepened, because lhey aie now being addiessed and iecognized as such
in lhe veiy subslance of lhe mullilaleial policies being debaled and im-
plemenled. l seems lhal lhe facl lhal lhe defence of human iighls ap-
peais lo be an evei-sliongei impeialive foi aclion does nol necessaiily
undeimine lhe slienglh of lhe piinciple of nalional soveieignly. l only
fuels debales aboul lhe piesiding piinciples of lhe inleinalional syslem, if
any, and aboul lhe compalibilily of lhe piinciples lhal conslilule il. n
whal diieclion, lhen, should we puisue lhe fuluie of lhe inleinalional
syslem and ils managemenl by lhe inleinalional communily? Should we
believe lhal nalional and inleinalional democializalion will allow us
piogiessively lo biidge lhe gap lhal slill exisls belween human iighls im-
peialives and lhe piinciple of soveieignly? And if so, how?31
Iiflh, lhe seleclive applicabilily of humanilaiian inleivenlion, geaied
by lhe abilily lo ielale culluially wilh lhe aiea in conicl, by geoslialegic
inleiesls, and by piudence and convenience, conliadicls lhe piinciple of
lhe fundamenlal univeisalily of human iighls. Can il go on like lhis, oi
aie we ieaching a luining poinl al which a moie balanced and less selec-
live policy of applicalion will lake place?
Iinally, aie lhe democialic dilemmas lhal now shape lhe debales,
modalilies, and scope of inleinalional solidaiily likely lo become lhe
slandaid basis foi fuluie inleinalional delibeialions and aclions? Oi aie
lhey signs of an emeiging and nascenl inleinalional culluie? And, if so,
whal is il like?
Al lhis poinl, il is difncull lo say how lhese queslions will be answeied,
and lhus in which diieclions inleinalional life is likely lo go in lhe coming
yeais. will lheiefoie limil myself heie lo slaling lhal, in addiessing lhe
democialic dilemmas of inleinalional aclion wilhoul lianscending lhem,
inleinalional oiganizalions whelhei NATO oi lhe \niled Nalions aie
meiely ieecling and ciyslallizing lhe pluialily of molivalions, of impei-
alives, and ullimalely of legilimacies and loyallies lhal inhabil polilical
conlempoiaiy life. n lheii delibeialions, iesolulions, and aclions, inlei-
nalional oiganizalions aie incoipoialing and lhen pio|ecling lhe oideis
and disoideis of lhe conlempoiaiy woild. They aie echoing bolh lhe ie-
sislance lo change and lhe demands foi change, and as such aie pailic-
ipaling, hesilanlly and only half-willingly, in lhe liansfoimalion of inlei-
nalional life.
This silualion, along wilh lhe ambiguilies and lensions il enlails, may
nol appeai fully salisfacloiy lo anyone eagei lo see implemenled an
inleinalional landscape displaying a sense of lolal ieconcilialion.32 How-
evei, one also has lo iecognize lhal lhe facl lhal inleinalional aclion is
laking place wilhin lhe consliainls of lhe dilemmas menlioned above can
be seen as a posilive slep, compaied wilh a woild in which lhese dilemmas
would be disiegaided allogelhei and in which meie nalional inleiesl
consideialions and iaw powei would be lhe sole ciileiia of delibeialion
and aclion al lhe inleinalional level. Allhough lhis lakes place wilhin lhe
ialhei unsocialized woild of inleinalional affaiis as slill disloiled by such
palhologies33 (as lhe iecouise lo use of foice in oidei lo solve conicls
indicales aflei all, wai iemains a ialhei paiadoxical way lo ensuie in-
leinalional socializalion34), one can aigue lhal lhese dilemmas, as pails
of lhe elemenls shaping lhe delibeialions and aclions, aie peihaps a sign
of a giowing inlegialion and socializalion of inleinalional sociely.
Acknowledgemenls
The ideas developed in lhis chaplei have benenled fiom lhe discussions
have had wilh Iianck Debie , wilh whom conducl a ieseaich pio|ecl on
geoslialegic culluie and lhe culluie of solidaiily in conlempoiaiy inlei-
nalional polilics.
Noles
1. The mosl obvious of lhese diffeiences is lhal lhe inleivenlion in Kosovo was a NATO-
led opeialion, wheieas lhe opeialions in Bosnia, Somalia, elc., look place wilhin lhe
\niled Nalions fiamewoik. n addilion, lhe \niled Nalions opeialions displayed a
mixluie of peacemaking and peacekeeping, wilh all lhe vaiious layeis of inilialives
lhal lhese enlail, wheieas lhe NATO inleivenlion in Kosovo was cleaily a mililaiy
opeialion.
2. The chaplei is nol meanl lo be analylically compiehensive. l is chiey an oulline of
ceilain issues. Howevei, il is obviously hoped lhal lhis chaplei biings inlo lhe picluie
lhe key elemenls of lhe issue and does nol leave oul loo many ciucial faclois.
3. Ioi inslance, some lhink lhal limiled inleivenlionism is nol enough. This is, foi inslance,
lhe case wilh human iighls aclivisls. Olheis lhink lhal il is loo much. The lallei posilion
is defended bolh by ma|oi poweis and by developing counliies. Among lhe ma|oi
poweis, lheie aie lwo dislincl gioups. Iiisl, lheie aie lhe ma|oi Weslein democialic
poweis, especially lhe \niled Slales, wheie conseivalives lend lo favoui a moie iealisl
appioach lo inleinalional affaiis, cenlied aiound nalional inleiesl as a main molivalion
foi inleinalional aclion, and foimal iespecl foi nalional soveieignly lhough lhis may
nol necessaiily be subslanlive (we all know cases of undeicovei opeialions conducled in
foieign counliies in lhe name of nalional inleiesl). Second, we have lhe Russian Ied-
eialion and China, which lend lo oppose inleinalional inleivenlion, nol so much al lhis
poinl because of lheii supposed polilical alliance wilh developing counliies, bul because
lhey aie lhemselves involved in ieal oi polenlial quasi-inleinal dispules, which makes
lhem quile waiy and sensilive on lhe issue of nalional soveieignly. n developing coun-
liies, polilical leadeis lend also lo oppose inleivenlionism, even in ils limiled foim, foi
lhiee specinc ieasons: (a) inleinalional inleivenlions aie always undeilaken by devel-
oped and Weslein counliies; (b) lhe inleivenlions lend lo lake place in counliies al lhe
peiipheiy of inleinalional powei; and (c) developed counliies aie pail of lhis peiipheiy,
and lhe polilical inslabilily fiom which lhey oflen suffei makes lhem piime candidales
foi lhese inleivenlions.
4. Theie aie ialhei subslanlial diffeiences in lhe discouises pioduced in each of lhe ma|oi
Weslein democialic counliies lo |uslify lhe inleivenlion in Kosovo. These diffeiences
have lo do wilh lhe specinc aspecls of lhe polilical culluie and lhe inleinalional slanding
of lhese counliies, and ceilainly inuence lhe diffeience in insislence on a given elemenl
ovei olheis in lhe |uslincalion discouise. Ioi inslance, lhe nolion of nalional inleiesl is
nol as impoilanl in Iiance as in lhe \niled Slales.
5. See, foi inslance, 1ose I. Alvaiez, Conslilulional nleipielalion in nleinalional
Oiganizalions,`` in 1ean-Maic Coicaud and \ei|o Heiskanen, eds., Thc 1cgitinacy oj
Intcrnational Organi;ations, Tokyo: \niled Nalions \niveisily Piess, 2OO1. See also
Alvaiez, in lhe same chaplei, on lhe conslilulional debale aiound lhe queslion of lhe
legalily of NATO inleivenlion in Kosovo.
6. Ma|oi Weslein democialic poweis lended lo be ieluclanl, lo vaiying degiees, lo endoise
lhe secession of Kosovo fiom ugoslavia, lo iecognize lhe independence of Kosovo and
endow il wilh lhe polilical foimalily of slalehood. This was nol only because lhe sepaia-
lion of Cioalia and Bosnia fiom ugoslavia had nol slopped lhe wai bul ialhei fuelled
il, oi because lhe independence of Kosovo could be lhe nisl slep lowaids lhe eslablish-
menl of a Giealei Albania`` (which could deslabilize lhe whole iegion, especially
Macedonia). l was also because somehow, even aflei yeais of wai and aliocilies in lhe
Balkans, lhe Weslein poweis lended lo hold fasl lo lhe following views: nisl, lhal lhe
pieseivalion of nalional inlegiily, no mallei how painful il mighl somelimes be, was a
vilal elemenl of nalional and inleinalional polilics; secondly, lhal il was polilically dan-
geious, and polenlially conliaiy lo democialic ideals (namely lo lhe iespecl of indi-
vidual iighls), lo allow nalional self-deleiminalion oi nalionhood lo emeige fiom an
aulhenlic`` oi naluial`` (i.e. elhnically based) communily; nnally, and moie geneially,
lhal lhe issue of self-deleiminalion had aflei lhe Second Woild Wai hisloiically been
conceplualized and implemenled mainly wilhin lhe conlexl of decolonizalion and in
aieas (Afiica, Soulh-Iasl Asia) lhal weie oulside lhe iing`` of developed and Weslein
counliies. As a iesull, Weslein poweis have always been a bil waiy of calling up lhe
piinciple of self-deleiminalion in a conlexl diffeienl in naluie fiom decolonizalion,
especially when allached lo lhe volalile combinalion lhal la queslion des nalionalile s el
du nalionalisme`` iepiesenls hisloiically in lhe Balkans.
7. As a mallei of facl, geneially speaking, lhe sense of nalional inleiesl seems lo have
moie oi less faded fiom lhe Wesl Iuiopean conlexl and polilical agenda. Iven Iiance,
in spile of ils iheloiical commilmenl lo il, no longei seems lo know whal ils ieal nalional
inleiesl is oi whal il should be. This laigely explains lhe difncully mosl Wesl Iuiopean
counliies have in foimulaling a foieign policy guided by cleai slialegic diieclions.
8. Ioi a hisloiical and syslemalic explanalion of lhe piocess, see Philip Alloll, 1unonia.
Ncw OrJcr jor a Ncw VorlJ, Oxfoid: Oxfoid \niveisily Piess, 199O.
9. Ioi an oveiview of lhis queslion, see Thomas M. Iianck, Iairncss in Intcrnational 1aw
anJ Institutions, Oxfoid: Oxfoid \niveisily Piess, 1995, p. 83.
1O. Such media allenlion lo humanilaiian ciises is nol, howevei, enliiely posilive. l is quile
volalile and oflen enleilainmenl and money-making diiven. n addilion, allhough lhe
piessuie lhal il exeicises on polilical decision makeis can lead lhem lo do somelhing lo
solve lhe pioblems, il can also lead lhem lo acl loo haslily and lo seaich foi shoil-leim
solulions, which casl a shadow on lhe long leim.
11. To use Kanl`s dislinclion.
12. This is obviously lhe case in lhe conlexl of NATO. Bul il is also lhe case wilh lhe \niled
Nalions. n lhis peispeclive, wilhoul lhe \niled Slales, lhe \niled Kingdom, and
Iiance, bul also, in a widei conlexl, lhe Noidic counliies, Canada, and Auslialia, one
has lo admil lhal nolhing, oi al leasl veiy lillle, would be done polilically lo push and
implemenl any opeialional foims of inleinalional solidaiily in silualions of conicl,
whelhei mililaiily, logislically, oi nnancially. ndeed, on lhis issue, lhe olhei ma|oi
woild poweis eilhei aie choosing lo iemain moie oi less in lhe back seal foi a numbei
of domeslic, iegional, and inleinalional ieasons (see, foi inslance, China and Russia and
lhe facl lhal lhe lendency lo challenge nalional soveieignly could easily be deemed lo
lhiealen China`s iule in Tibel oi Russia`s in lhe Caucasus), oi do nol have lhe nnancial
and logislic capabililies lo play an impoilanl iole.
13. A moie compiehensive accounl would also have lo dwell heie on lhe giowing sense of
individual enlillemenl in libeial democialic culluie, on lhe facl lhal lhis phenomenon
lends lo enhance a shiinking of lhe sense of communily (lo lhe poinl lhal lhe self is
oflen viewed as lhe mosl valued iefeience), and on how, in undeimining lhe idea of
social solidaiily wilhin a nalional communily, lhis liend can only endangei lhe exlension
of solidaiily al lhe inleinalional level.
14. The veiy weakness of humanily ilself as lhe widesl ciicle, and lhe slill maiginal level of
sense of iesponsibilily lhal il geneiales, explain in pail lhe low level of inslilulionaliza-
lion of lhe \niled Nalions. This weakness also accounls foi lhe ielalively fiee hand lhal
is oflen given lo wailoids in deslilule counliies silualed al lhe edges of lhe developing
woild. ndeed, if one consideis lhal lhe woild could be ioughly divided inlo lhiee oideis
(lhough, obviously, a full picluie would iequiie a much moie sophislicaled hieiaichy,
especially wilh ceilain counliies haidly inlegialed), il appeais lhal inleinalional inlei-
venlion is moie likely lo happen in counliies belonging lo lhe second oidei (pooi and
unslable counliies, nol benenling fiom an unshakeable slanding al lhe inleinalional
level bul slill offeiing, diieclly oi indiieclly, a ielalive slialegic inleiesl and piesenling a
silualion on lhe giound lhal does nol seem lo make an inleivenlion loo coslly). On lhe
olhei hand, an inleivenlion is nol likely lo happen in counliies belonging lo lhe nisl
oidei (lhe Weslein developed counliies bul also China, lhe Russian Iedeialion, and
some olheis, which eilhei aie slable and inlegialed inleinally, oi benenl fiom an inlei-
nalional slanding lhal makes lhem moie oi less unlouchable). nleinalional inleivenlion
is also unlikely lo happen in mosl of lhe counliies lhal aie pail of lhe lhiid oidei, which
piesenl haidly any slialegic inleiesl and lheiefoie lend lo fall, peihaps nol in piinciple
bul ceilainly de faclo, oulside lhe nel of inleinalional iesponsibilily.
15. Ioi inslance, lhe consliluency of polilical leadeis, even of democialic polilical leadeis,
iemains laigely nalional. l is slill mainly lo lhe opinions of lheii domeslic public and
pailiamenl lhal polilical leadeis aie accounlable. Thus policies geaied lowaids lhe do-
meslic public good conlinue lo mallei moie lhan policies conceined wilh lhe inleina-
lional good. n addilion, lhe eiosion of soveieignly is slill, in lhe piesenl oiganizalion of
powei, a mixed blessing ialhei lhan a cleai good. Allhough il may help advance human
iighls in iepiessive iegimes by exposing lhem lo inleinalional allenlion, il also poilends
consideiable disoidei and disenchanlmenl, given lhe absence al lhis lime of cleai and
ieal mechanisms lo midwife and moniloi a hypolhelical liansilion in lhe woild syslem
fiom nalion-slale lo liansnalional goveinance.
16. n sliessing lhis poinl am ceilainly nol saying lhal casuallies should nol be a concein
foi lhe inleivening lioops. am simply poinling oul lhal lhis issue is one way lo obseive
how lhe hieiaichy of values belween lhe domeslic and lhe inleinalional levels plays a
iole in conlempoiaiy inleinalional mililaiy inleivenlions.
17. On lhe dislinclion belween lhe eleclive lheoiy of lhe nalion and lhe elhnic lheoiy of lhe
nalion, see Louis Dumonl, 1iJcologic allcnanJc. Irancc, Allcnagnc ct rctour, Paiis:
Gallimaid, 1991, p. 25.
18. n a sense, one should nol be suipiised by lhis non-inlegialive vision of polilical oidei
and |uslice. The legacy of uniesolved claims foi iighls and lhe iesulling accumulalion
of iesenlmenl lend lo lead ovei lime lo a polilical culluie lhal does nol iecognize lhe
necessily of iecipiocily and mulualily of iighls, and lo a culluie of halied and ievenge.
As lhe saying goes, in eveiy leiioiisl lheie is a leiioiized peison.
19. l was NATO`s peiceplion lhal lhe slakes weie so high lhal a vicloiy was a musl``
lhal sleeled il lo suslain a bombing campaign foi 78 days wilh scanl evidence of any
polilical ieluin.
2O. See, foi inslance, Iiic Schmill and Sleven Lee Myeis: Ioi mosl of lhe six weeks of aii
and missile sliikes, feai of casuallies has limiled lhe exposuie of pilols lo ugoslavia`s
anli-aiiciafl balleiies and suiface-lo-aii missiles. As a iesull, mosl of NATO`s 3,3OO
sliike missions have been conducled fiom high alliludes, lypically moie lhan 15,OOO
feel.`` NATO Planes Ilying Lowei, ncieasing Risk of Being Hil,`` Ncw York Tincs, 4
May 1999.
21. l was only when lhe NATO slialegisls and ma|oi Weslein polilical leadeis began lo
have doubls aboul lhe mililaiy and polilical effecliveness of lhe aii campaign lhal lhey
began oaling lhe idea of lhe possible deploymenl of giound lioops.
22. See David I. Sangei, Ameiica Iinds l Lonely al lhe Top,`` Ncw York Tincs, 18 1uly
1999.
23. See, foi inslance, whal Idwaid N. Lullwack says on lhe posl-heioic`` wai in Give Wai
a Chance,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, 1ulyAugusl 1999, pp. 4O41.
24. Iiom a geneial poinl of view, one has lo concede lhal lhe ielalively low level of com-
pliance fiom which inleinalional law suffeis necessaiily affecls ils abilily lo iegulale be-
haviouis so lhal ciiminal aclions will be likely lo be pievenled.
25. The piimaiy and essenlial iesponsibilily foi lhe ciimes commilled in Kosovo duiing lhe
NATO inleivenlion obviously iesls wilh Seib aulhoiilies, as well as, moie deeply his-
loiically, wilh lhe accumulalion ovei a long peiiod of uniesolved claims, giievances, and
iesenlmenl belween Seibs and lhe Albanian communily of Kosovo.
26. Ioi a delailed accounl of lhe \niled Nalions peacekeeping opeialions in Bosnia,
Somalia, and elsewheie, and of lhe debales lhey geneialed on lhe issues lackled in lhis
chaplei, please iefei lo 1ean-Maic Coicaud, LÒN\ el lèx-ougoslavie: aclions el
acleuis,`` 1c Trincstrc Ju MonJc (Paiis), Iall 1993, \ol. 4, No. 24; Les Nalions \nies
en Somalie: enlie mainlien el imposilion de la paix,`` 1c Trincstrc Ju MonJc, Winlei
1994, \ol. 1, No. 25; LÒN\ peul-elle assuiei la paix?`` 1c Trincstrc Ju MonJc, Iall
1995, \ol. 4, No. 32.
27. Aii powei is an unusually seduclive foim of mililaiy slienglh, in pail because, like
modein couilship, il appeais lo offei gialincalion wilhoul commilmenl.`` Iliol A. Cohen,
The Myslique of \.S. Aii Powei,`` Iorcign Ajjairs, 1anuaiyIebiuaiy 1994, p. 1O9.
28. Since lhe end of lhe Second Woild Wai, lhe developmenl of inleinalional law has
laigely meanl lhe deepening, bolh in scope and in delail, of lhe consideialion of human
iighls. Howevei, lhis phenomenon in no way implies lhe eslablishmenl of an idyllic sil-
ualion, of a full conveigence and coheience among human iighls, inleinalional law, and
lhe needs of lhe inleinalional communily. Among lhe ma|oi piinciples lhal conslilule
lhe fundamenlal and sliucluial slandaids of inleinalional law which eslablish lhe
oveiall legilimacy of lhe inleinalional syslem, bolh in leims of value and in leims of
modalilies of aclion, and spell oul foi slale aclois lhe main iules of lhe game of inlei-
nalional life lhe iespecl foi human iighls slill has gieal difncully in being viewed as a
calegoiical impeialive. These ma|oi piinciples include lhe following: lhe soveieign
equalily of slales; lhe self-deleiminalion of peoples; a piohibilion on lhe lhieal oi use of
foice; lhe peaceful selllemenl of dispules; non-inleivenlion in lhe inleinal oi exleinal
affaiis of olhei slales; iespecl foi human iighls; inleinalional coopeialion; and good
failh (foi a delailed accounl of lhese piinciples and lheii inleilwining, see Anlonio
Cassese, Intcrnational 1aw in a DiviJcJ VorlJ, Oxfoid: Oxfoid \niveisily Piess, 1996,
p. 186). Allhough each of lhese piinciples is essenlial foi lhe global equilibiium of in-
leinalional law and of lhe inleinalional syslem inspiied by il and lhal inleinalional law
liies lo oiganize, lheie is obviously a compelilion and a hieiaichy among lhese piinci-
ples a compelilion and a hieiaichy lhal, in lhe end, indicale lhe piioiilies of lhe in-
leinalional syslem, lhe elemenls lo which il gives mosl value, and of lhe inslilulions
meanl lo be ils expiession and lool, among lhem lhe \niled Nalions ilself. Wilhin lhe
conlexl of lhis hieiaichy and compelilion, iespecl foi human iighls is slill nol lhe obvious
winning lickel.
29. See 1ean-Maic Coicaud, Conicling Souices of nleinalional Legilimacy and Peace-
keeping Opeialions in lhe 199Os,`` in Coicaud and Heiskanen, Thc 1cgitinacy oj Intcr-
national Organi;ations.
3O. This should nol come as a suipiise, especially when one consideis lhe facl lhal Weslein
democialic counliies have moie and moie difncully conveying lo lheii people lhe idea
lhal il would be woilh lheii dying foi lhe sake of lheii own counliy. The way lhe sense
of democialic enlillemenl seems lo evolve pulling lhe emphasis on iighls and pushing
dulies lo lhe backgiound lends lo undeimine lhe nolion of lhe iesponsible cilizen, nol
even speaking heie aboul paliiolism. This liend can only make pioblemalic lhe devel-
opmenl of a culluie of cosmopolilan cilizeniy and lhe saciinces il could imply.
31. n his book 1unonia. Ncw OrJcr jor a Ncw VorlJ, Philip Alloll seems lo lhink lhal in
an inleinalionalized democialic culluie lheie is no absolule conliadiclion belween lhe
evolulion of nalional soveieignly and lhe defence of human iighls. The lwo can be iec-
onciled. Conslilulionalism uplifled lo lhe inleinalional level seems foi him lo be lhe key
lo oveicoming lhe lensions belween nalional soveieignly and lhe defence of human
iighls. See, foi inslance, chaplei 13 of his book.
32. Tolal ieconcilialion is nol only veiy unlikely evei lo occui, bul il also seems undesiiable;
foi inslance, as lhe evolulion of Maixism lowaids lolalilaiianism in lhe Soviel \nion has
shown, aiming foi lolal social ieconcilialion is an illusoiy and dangeious polilical ideal.
33. The lack of socializalion comes nol only fiom lhe uniuly ielalionships belween slales,
bul also fiom lhe iegional and inleinalional effecls of lhe aulhoiilaiian iegime in Seibia.
34. Theoiies of wai, lhe ways in which lhey aie conceplualized and conducled, aie as much
an indicalion of lhe slale of inleinalional ielalions as of lhe idenlily (maleiial, culluial,
noimalive, elc.) of lhe sociely foimulaling lhem. n lhis conlexl, lhe modalilies foi lhe
liansboidei use of foice by lhe ma|oi Weslein democialic poweis in lheii ielalions wilh
aieas of conicl, while being an indicalion of lhe exlension of solidaiily (inleinalional
socializalion) and of ils limilalions (lhe iemaining gaps in socializalion), aie also an il-
luslialion of lhe limilalions of lhe poweis` own self-socializalion and ils abiding uncei-
lainly. On lhe one hand, il seems posilive lhal lhe |uslincalion foi wai, foi iisking lhe
lives of cilizens, has become moie difncull; on lhe olhei hand, one can ieecl upon lhe
undeimining of lhe culluie of cilizenship lhal seems lo be manifesled in lhe giowing
ieluclance of individuals lo iisk lheii lives foi lhe sake of lhe communily.
3O
The good inleinalional cilizen
and lhe ciisis in Kosovo
AnJrcw 1inklatcr
The piincipal aim of lhis chaplei is lo analyse some of lhe elhical piob-
lems iaised by NATO`s mililaiy aclion againsl Seibia. The puipose is lo
discuss moial faclois, which aie an inescapable fealuie of decisions lo
wage humanilaiian wais,`` ialhei lhan lo debale lhe elhical meiils and
shoilcomings of lhe Kosovo case.
The aigumenl begins wilh lhe piemise lhal posl-nalional oi posl-
soveieign socielies aie evolving in Weslein Iuiope, a developmenl lhal
is laken lo be a noimalive ideal.1 Of couise, lhis may be lhe only iegion
in lhe modein syslem of slales in which subslanlially new foims of polil-
ical communily appeai. On ils easlein boundaiy, foi example, lie vaiious
polilical movemenls lhal aie nimly allached lo absolulisl nolions of
soveieignly and lolalizing conceplions of communily. Imeiging posl-
nalional socielies have had lo decide how lo deal wilh slales lhal iemain
commilled lo fusing slale and nalion. They face lhe queslion of whelhei
lo iespecl soveieignly wilhoul ma|oi ieseivalion oi lo make iecognilion
condilional on adheience lo libeial nolions of human iighls and consli-
lulional polilics. Whelhei oi nol lhey have any enlillemenl lo wage
humanilaiian wai againsl socielies guilly of human iighls violalions is an
addilional consideialion. Kosovo has inlioduced lhe ciucial queslion of
whelhei Wesl Iuiopean slales and lheii Ameiican ally can acl in lhis
way wilhoul lhe expiess consenl of lhe \N Secuiily Council.
n sum, NATO`s aii wai againsl Seibia has iaised al leasl lhese lwo
impoilanl elhical queslions: nisl, whelhei membei slales have lhe legal
482
oi moial iighl lo oveiiide lhe soveieignly of a neighbouiing powei, and,
secondly, whelhei lhey can assume lhis iighl in lhe absence of \N
aulhoiizalion. The answei lo lhe nisl queslion depends on a mixluie of
piinciple and piudence, as membeis of lhe |usl wai liadilion have long
aigued. ieluin lo lhal lalei. As foi lhe second queslion, many suppoil-
eis of lhe wai aigued lhal Seib aliocilies in Kosovo, and elsewheie in lhe
foimei ugoslavia, weie so seiious lhal foice was essenlial even wilhoul
lhe appioval of lhe \niled Nalions. Ciilics aigued lhal lhe supposed cuie
was woise lhan lhe disease ilself. Iiom lhe lallei slandpoinl, lhe piaclice,
if nol lhe piinciple, of violaling lhe soveieignly of a neighbouiing slale
was manifeslly unwise, and lhe poweis lhal inilialed humanilaiian wai``
lacked lhe moial ciedenlials lo embaik on a pio|ecl of lhis kind. One
voice in lhe debale iegaided mililaiy aclion as an inslance of good inlei-
nalional cilizenship; anolhei saw il as lhe lalesl manifeslalion of lhe gieal
poweis` seleclive iegaid foi inleinalional law.2
Complex issues aie iaised by lhese inlioducloiy iemaiks, and a shoil
chaplei cannol do |uslice lo all of lhem. The discussion begins by con-
sideiing lhe liansfoimalion of polilical communily in Weslein Iuiope
and lhen luins lo lhe iules of iecognilion lhal lhis iegion has ciealed foi
oideiing ils ielalions wilh socielies wilh liadilional allachmenls lo fusing
soveieignly, nalionalism, and leiiiloiialily. Whelhei Wesl Iuiopean
slales have lhe moial iighl lo expecl neighbouiing poweis lo iespecl lheii
slandaids of polilical legilimacy, and whelhei lhey have a colleclive iighl
lo use foice againsl neighbouis lhal fail lo comply wilh lhem, aie issues
discussed in lhe nexl seclion of lhis chaplei. The nnal seclion iaises lhe
issue of whal il means lo be a good inleinalional cilizen in ciises such as
Kosovo.
Beyond Weslphalia
Iuiope invenled lhe lolalizing pio|ecl``: lhe nalionalizalion of polilical
communily and lhe insislence on shaip and moially decisive dislinclions
belween cilizens and aliens.3 This peculiai invenlion occuiied againsl
lhe backgiound of incessanl geopolilical iivaliy, and slales weie keen lo
ensuie lhe loyally of cilizens in limes of wai. The disaslious effecls of lhe
lolalizing pio|ecl duiing lhe lwenlielh cenluiy encouiaged Wesl Iuio-
pean slales lo develop new foims of polilical communily. Thiee dimen-
sions lo lhe piocess of iemaking Weslein Iuiope deseive biief commenl.
Iiisl, lheie is declining conndence in lhe idea lhal lhe only legilimale
foim of polilical associalion is lhe leiiiloiial slale, which exeicises sovei-
eign poweis ovei cilizens wilh a common nalional idenlily. Wesl Iuio-
pean slales have suiiendeied some of lheii monopoly poweis lo supia-
THI GOOD NTIRNATONAL CTZIN 483
nalional bodies. The lenel lhal cilizens musl idenlify wilh lhe nalion has
been weakened by lhe elhnic ievoll and by lhe need foi a moie pluialislic
foim of cilizenship in lhe conlexl of incieasing mulliculluialism. The
piinciple lhal individuals aie sub|ecls of inleinalional law in lheii own
iighl, and aie enlilled lo appeal beyond lhe slale lo inleinalional couils
of law, has gained giound in lhis iegion as has lhe supposilion lhal lhe
iighls of minoiily nalions should be iecognized in nalional and inleina-
lional law.
Secondly, one of lhe conslilulive elhical piinciples of lhe soveieign slale
has losl ils slalus as a self-evidenl liulh: lhe belief lhal lhe welfaie of co-
nalionals lakes piecedence ovei lhe inleiesls of aliens. Of couise, some
iegaid foi obligalions lo oulsideis has exisled lhioughoul lhe hisloiy of
lhe modein Iuiopean slales syslem and, cleaily, lhe conviclion lhal
slales have lhe soveieign iighl lo deleimine lhe naluie of lheii inlei-
nalional obligalions slill commands widespiead suppoil. n lhe Iuiopean
\nion, individuals aie nalional cilizens nisl, and Iuiopean cilizens by
viilue of lhis facl. Allhough lhe legal iighls of Iuiopean cilizens aie lhin
ialhei lhan lhick, and allhough lhey ieecl lhe iise of a liansnalional
maikelplace ialhei lhan some poweiful sense of belonging lo a iegional
polilical communily, impoilanl piogiess lowaids lhe ideal of |oinl iule
has occuiied.4 Moial piefeienlialism lhal gianls piioiily lo co-nalionals
iemains lhe dominanl ideology, bul lheie is giealei suppoil lhan in lhe
pasl foi lhe belief lhal polilical decisions should have lhe consenl of all
who sland lo be affecled by lhem, whelhei lhese aie insideis oi oulsideis.
Thiidly, lhe impossibilily of a piogiessivisl inleipielalion of inleina-
lional sociely has been a iecuiienl lheme in lhe lheoiy and piaclice of lhe
modein slales syslem. Slales in lhe liadilional Weslphalian eia weie
convinced lhal wai was unavoidable; lhe belief lhal inleinalional sociely
could evolve peaceful ways foi iesolving lheii conicls was dismissed as
ulopian. Dissalisfaclion wilh lhis bleak pioposilion is one of lhe mosl
sliiking fealuies of conlempoiaiy woild polilics. Analyses of lhe libeial
zone of peace and globalizalion have sliongly encouiaged lhe view lhal
wai, like slaveiy and lhe duel, is a leained social piaclice ialhei lhan an
immulable phenomenon.5 The so-called obsolescence of wai in lhe coie
iegions of lhe woild economy has pioduced new queslions aboul lhe moial
iesponsibilily of slales, specincally whelhei involvemenl in humanilaiian
wai is one of lhe puiposes beyond ouiselves`` lhal slales can and should
accepl in lhe posl-bipolai eia.6
One issue iaised by Kosovo is how socielies lhal seem lo have aban-
doned lhe lolalizing pio|ecl socielies lhal aie ciealing new foims of
polilical communily which aie moie univeisalislic and moie sensilive lo
culluial diffeiences lhan lheii piedecessois weie should deal wilh
neighbouiing slales commilled lo lolalizing polilics and guilly of elhnic
cleansing as lhey allempl lo align lhe boundaiies of lhe slale and lhe
boundaiies of lhe nalion. The public debale ovei Kosovo has ievealed
lhal lhe queslion of how lhese lwo woilds should be ielaled is one of lhe
mosl conlioveisial moial issues of lhe age.
New iules of iecognilion
The queslions iaised in lhe pievious paiagiaph invile consideialion of
lhe piinciples lhal govein lhe iecognilion of slales in inleinalional iela-
lions. Two iival conceplions of lhe sociely of slales addiess lhis pioblem.
Accoiding lo one conceplion of inleinalional sociely, which shall call
statisn, iegimes should liead caiefully when making |udgemenls aboul
lhe legilimacy of olhei syslems of goveinmenl.7 \ndei condilions of
ideological conicl, inleinalional oidei iequiies iespecl foi nalional sov-
eieignly and ils coiollaiy, lhe piinciple of non-inleivenlion. New slales oi
iegimes do nol have lo salisfy a moial lesl befoie lhey can become equal
membeis of inleinalional sociely lheie is in any case no consensus
aboul whal lhis lesl should be. Acls of polilical iecognilion should con-
nim lhe emeigence of new and viable soveieign slales and lhe exislence
of new cenlies of effeclive powei. They do nol confei iighls on olhei
slales oi iegimes lhal lhey would olheiwise lack. n lhe language of lhe
inleinalional lawyeis, lhe acl of iecognilion is declaialoiy`` ialhei lhan
conslilulive.``8
This appioach lo inleinalional sociely can be ciilicized foi iegaiding
iespecl foi soveieignly as moie impoilanl lhan lhe pioleclion of human
iighls. ls advocales oflen ieply by poinling lo lhe dangeis inheienl in
humanilaiian inleivenlion. Templing lhough il may be lo inleivene lo
assisl olhei peoples, lhe facl is lheie is no agieemenl aboul how lo diaw
lhe line belween seiious and less seiious violalions of human iighls,
and no consensus aboul wheie lhe boundaiy belween humanilaiian wai
and mililaiy aggiession lies. Consequenlly, lhose who inleivene in lhe
inleinal affaiis of olhei slales sel dangeious piecedenls, which make il
easiei foi piedaloiy slales lo exlend lheii powei in lhe name of humani-
laiian piinciples.9 Iiom lhis slandpoinl, emeiging posl-nalional and posl-
soveieign slales wilh pielensions lo be good inleinalional cilizens should
iespecl lhe soveieignly of olhei poweis even when lhey aie commilled lo
lolalizing polilics. Regaid foi soveieignly does nol pieclude diplomalic
effoils lo peisuade socielies lo behave diffeienlly, oi economic sanclions
and embaigoes in exlieme cases, bul il does iule oul mililaiy foice foi
humanilaiian ends. These aie impoilanl lenels of slalism.
This conceplion of inleinalional sociely has liiumphed in lhe posl-
colonial woild because new slales, anxious lo pieseive lheii soveieignly,
have ie|ecled lhe eailiei nolion lhal lhey should be accounlable lo lhe
Wesl foi lheii domeslic piaclices. Iven so, lhe inleinalional pioleclion of
human iighls has made some piogiess in iecenl inleinalional ielalions.
Iffoils in lhis domain diaw on a solidarist conception of international so-
ciety that argues that individuals are the ultimate members of that society,
and states are obliged to protect their interests.10 How lhis second con-
ceplion of inleinalional sociely is lo be ieconciled wilh soveieignly ie-
mains a dispuled issue, bul lhe global human iighls culluie has gained
giound in iecenl yeais and lheie is less iesislance lhan lheie once was lo
lhe piinciple lhal slales aie answeiable lo lhe woild communily foi lhe
liealmenl of cilizens.
Ioi some, lheie is unnnished business in lhis aiea unless slales lake lhe
addilional slep of oveiiiding nalional soveieignly when lheie aie seiious
human iighls aliocilies. \ndei lhese condilions, il mighl be aigued, good
inleinalional cilizens should be piepaied lo use foice. As cuslodians of
lhe global human iighls culluie lhey should lake aclion lo ensuie lhal
wai ciiminals aie pioseculed, and lhey should be piepaied lo ieconnguie
polilical syslems lhal violale fundamenlal moial piinciples. Islablishing
inleinalional piolecloiales, paililioning socielies, and piomoling lhe es-
lablishmenl of fedeial oi confedeial aiiangemenls aie lhiee possibililies
available lo lhe good inleinalional cilizen.
n piaclice, Wesl Iuiopean slales gave voice lo solidaiism in lheii
pionouncemenls aboul lhe iules of iecognilion lhal would govein fuluie
ielalions wilh lhe socielies of lhe foimei ugoslavia. n lheii pioclamalion
of 16 Decembei 1991, membeis of lhe Iuiopean Communily afnimed
lheii ieadiness lo iecognise, sub|ecl lo lhe noimal slandaids of inlei-
nalional piaclice and lhe polilical iealilies in each case, lhose new slales
which, following lhe hisloiic changes in lhe iegion, have consliluled
lhemselves on a democialic basis, have accepled lhe appiopiiale inlei-
nalional obligalions and have commilled lhemselves in good failh lo a
peaceful piocess and lo negolialions.`` Olhei iequiiemenls included
guaianlees foi lhe iighls of elhnic and nalional gioups and minoiilies in
accoidance wilh lhe commilmenls subsciibed lo in lhe fiamewoik of lhe
CSCI |Confeience on Secuiily and Co-opeialion in Iuiopej.``11 \nlil
Kosovo, il has been aigued lhal lhis was |usl anolhei covenanl wilhoul
lhe swoid since lhe ielevanl poweis had nol been piepaied lo suppoil
lhese pioclamalions wilh lhe iequisile mililaiy foice.
The piesenl condilion is iiddled wilh ambiguilies and conliadiclions.
Wesl Iuiopean poweis can ieasonably claim a iighl lo expiess lheii
domeslic polilical piefeiences in lhe iules of iecognilion, which peilain lo
foimei ugoslavia. They aie open olheiwise lo lhe chaige lhal in lheii
exleinal ielalions lhey aie nol liue lo lhemselves.12 They have eveiy
iighl lo be anxious aboul lhe implosion of mulli-elhnic socielies, and
aboul lhe buidens lhal fall on neighbouiing socielies as a iesull of lhe
mass exodus of iefugees. They have good ieason lo conlesl lhe slalisl
posilion lhal lhe piinciples of soveieignly and non-inleivenlion musl be
upheld in ielalions belween socielies wilh compeling ideologies, and lo
challenge lhe conviclion lhal lhe need foi inleinalional oidei musl liump
lhe ideal of piomoling cosmopolilan |uslice in lhese ciicumslances.13
Slalisl convenlions lose lheii appeal when goveinmenls aie in a slale
of wai wilh seclions of lheii own populalions and endangei iegional
slabilily.
Reluining lo lhe eailiei poinl aboul ambiguilies and conliadiclions,
lhe Wesl Iuiopean poweis and lhe \niled Slales have yel lo develop a
philosophy of humanilaiian wai. Nalional goveinmenls aie anxious lo
avoid making fai-ieaching commilmenls in lhis domain and nalional
populalions seem unenlhusiaslic aboul saciincing lhe lives of cilizens foi
despeiale sliangeis, howevei uncomfoilable lhey may be wilh slalism.
Some piinciples of lhe Weslphalian oidei have losl lheii giip on Weslein
Iuiope bul many ciilics aigued lhal lhe aii wai againsl Seibia, as op-
posed lo lhe use of giound lioops, damaged lhe cause of solidaiism,
which iequiies lhe inleinalional soldieijpoliceman (lo iisk) his oi hei
life foi humanily.``14 Ciilics of NATO include lhose who aigue lhal ils
behavioui was illegal, immoial, oi unwise, and lhose who believe mem-
bei slales weie loo hesilanl lo lake lhe necessaiy humanilaiian aclion.
No consensus exisls, lhen, aboul whal follows fiom lhe new iules of iec-
ognilion and aboul whal aspiiing good inleinalional cilizens should infei
fiom lhem.
The good inleinalional cilizen and humanilaiian wai``
The vexed queslion is whal il means lo be a good inleinalional cilizen
when neighbouiing socielies aie consumed by elhnic violence and human
iighls aliocilies as wilnessed in lhe foimei ugoslavia. Two bioad answeis
lo lhis queslion aie suggesled by lhe compeling conceplions of inleina-
lional sociely noled eailiei. Slalisls aigue lhal infiinging lhe soveieignly
of olheis, even foi humanilaiian ends, is illegal andjoi in|udicious. The
second aigues lhal slales lhal cause elhnic violence do nol deseive lhe
pioleclion of soveieignly. Some poinls of conveigence belween lhese
slandpoinls will be consideied in a momenl, bul nisl il is impoilanl lo
iecall lhal Iuiopean inleinalional inslilulions aie commilled lo suppoil-
ing conslilulional polilics in lhe posl-communisl socielies of Iaslein
Iuiope. Wesl Iuiopean slales may be ciilicized foi luining lheii backs
on human iighls aliocilies in olhei pails of lhe woild and foi acling
inconsislenlly,15 bul lhey can also claim lhal nalional inleiesls`` aie al
slake in Iaslein Iuiope and lhey have special iighls and dulies lo use
foice againsl violenl iegimes lheie.16
The queslion is whal soil of aclion lhe good inleinalional cilizen can
ieasonably lake. Iailing lo confoim wilh Wesl Iuiopean conceplions of
legilimale polilical iule aulhoiizes no pailiculai couise of aclion. As
noled eailiei, vaiious alleinalives exisl, including lhe suspension of com-
meicial and olhei conlacls, lhe imposilion of economic sanclions, and
olhei foims of non-violenl piessuie designed lo change lhe behavioui of
unacceplable iegimes. We can call lhe posilion lhal favouis puisuing one
oi moie of lhose oplions, noJicJ statisn. Modined slalism is alliaclive
lo many solidaiisls because il endoises colleclive aclion lo piomole
human iighls while iuling oul mililaiy aclion. This docliine is alliaclive
lo lhose who aie unhappy lo iecognize iegimes |usl because lhey en|oy
monopoly poweis in lheii iespeclive leiiiloiies bul who do nol wish lo
weaken convenlions limiling lhe use of foice.
One ob|eclion lo modined slalism is lhal ils measuies aie loo slow,
and loo iespeclful of lhe convenlions suiiounding soveieignly and non-
inleivenlion, lo help vulneiable populalions who do nol iegaid lhe ex-
isling iegime as a souice of pioleclion. Modined slalism may have lhe
effecl of suppoiling iegime secuiily al lhe cosl of human secuiily. Those
who suppoiled NATO`s aclion aigued lhal fuilhei violence was likely in
Kosovo and in lhe iegion, and lhal economic piessuie and diplomalic
measuies would be ineffeclual. The queslion lhough is whelhei humani-
laiian inleivenlion should be avoided in all cases oi in all bul lhe mosl
exlieme cases because of lhe dangei of eioding baiiieis lo lhe use of
foice.
The |usl wai liadilion is ielevanl in lhis conlexl because il sels oul
vaiious condilions lhal musl be mel befoie lhe use of foice can be ie-
gaided as legilimale. Many of lhese aie embedded in inleinalional law,
bul whelhei lhey aie mel in any pailiculai case is an essenlially conlesled
mallei. n summaiy, |usl wai lheoiisls aigue lhal wai is illegilimale unless
lheie is a |usl cause and all measuies shoil of foice have been exhausled.
Theie musl be a ieasonable chance of success and iespecl foi civilian life.
Civilian dealhs aie inevilable in wai, bul lhey should nol be inlended and
musl be piopoilionale lo lhe ob|eclives of lhe wai.17 Iuilheimoie, |usl
wai lheoiisls insisl lhal wai musl be declaied by a piopeily consliluled
public aulhoiily.
This lasl piinciple has been ciucial foi discussions of Kosovo because
NATO acled wilhoul \N Secuiily Council aulhoiizalion. Disiegaid of
lhe piinciple of piopei aulhoiily in essence, lhe violalion of lhe \N
Chailei has been one of lhe mosl billei complainls made by opponenls
of lhe wai. Ciilics of NATO aigued lhal il did nol have lhe legal aulhoiily
lo use foice oi lhe iighl lo usuip lhe will of lhe global communily, and, al
lhe veiy leasl, il had dubious ciedenlials as lhe self-appoinled cuslodian
of global moial piinciples. These aie cenlial elemenls in whal mighl be
called lhe lcgalist posilion.18 Iiom lhis vanlagepoinl, il would be appio-
piiale foi NATO lo lake whal lhe \N Chailei calls enfoicemenl
aclion`` only if il had alieady secuied lhe aulhoiisalion of lhe Secuiily
Council`` and en|oyed lhe unanimous suppoil of lhe gieal poweis.19 Ioi
legalisls, iegaid foi lhe \N Secuiily Council is lhe leasl lhal is lo be lo
expecled fiom lhe good inleinalional cilizen.
Howevei, ieal dilemmas aiise al lhis poinl. The unavoidable issue is
whelhei human iighls violalions can be so leiiible lhal mililaiy aclion by
oiganizalions such as NATO which legalisls aigue is nol a piopeily
consliluled public aulhoiily wilh lhe iighl lo wage humanilaiian wai``
is bellei lhan no inleivenlion al all.20 As Kon Annan has aigued, poinl-
ing lo lhe example of Rwanda, a cleai lension exisls belween Ailicle 2,
paiagiaph 7, of lhe \niled Nalions Chailei, which mainlains lhal lhe
\niled Nalions does nol have lhe aulhoiily lo inleivene in malleis
which aie essenlially wilhin lhe domeslic |uiisdiclion of any slale,`` and
suppoil foi human iighls, which inviles humanilaiian inleivenlion in
exlieme cases.21 Legalism defends soveieignly as a bulliess againsl
impeiialism, bul lheie is lhe dangei lhal il may be lillle moie lhan a
ialionalisalion of lhe exisling inleinalional oidei wilhoul any inleiesl in
ils liansfoimalion.``22
n addilion lo Rwanda, one olhei specinc case ieminds us of key issues
suiiounding lhe elhics of inleivenlion: lhe \ielnamese inleivenlion in
Cambodia. n lhis case, \ielnam did nol claim any iighl of humanilaiian
inleivenlion and mosl slales condemned \ielnam`s aclions while conced-
ing lhal leiiible aliocilies had been commilled by lhe Pol Pol iegime.23
Piivale cilizens and non-slale oiganizalions lhal suppoiled \ielnamese
aclion did so because lhe scale of lhe aliocilies peipelialed by lhe Khmei
Rouge oulweighed lheii conceins aboul lhe \ielnamese iegime, specin-
cally lhal geopolilical faclois ialhei lhan any desiie lo play lhe iole of lhe
good inleinalional cilizen liiggeied inleivenlion.
n such ciicumslances, lhose who suppoil humanilaiian inleivenlion do
so wilh qualincalions, and il is impoilanl lo ieecl on lhe slandaid ies-
eivalions. Iiisl, mullilaleial aclion is usually piefeiied lo unaulhoiized
unilaleial inleivenlion. Secondly, lheie is always a dangei lhal lhe inlei-
vening powei will abuse ils powei and puisue goals lhal aie al odds wilh
humanilaiian ob|eclives.24 Thiidly, lheie is lhe queslion of whelhei lhe
inleivening powei has a seiious commilmenl lo a global human iighls
culluie and is acling lo piomole a moie humane inleinalional oidei.
Despile lhese conceins, some may conclude lhal unaulhoiized and uni-
laleial inleivenlion even by a slale wilh no oi dubious ciedenlials as a
good inleinalional cilizen is piefeiable lo non-inleivenlion.
The complex queslion heie is deciding when human iighls violalions
aie so seiious lhal lhe piinciples of soveieignly and non-inleivenlion
should be oveiiidden. On lhis lasl poinl, many aigued lhal Seibia had
consislenlly violaled human iighls noims and would conlinue lo do so.
Olheis denied lhal lhe lhieshold had been ciossed lhal |uslined NATO`s
aclion. Likewise, debales have ievolved aiound lhe queslion of whelhei
all peaceful oplions had been fully exploied and whelhei civilian dealhs
and casuallies weie piopoilionale. These issues go beyond lhe focus of
lhis chaplei.
Two olhei issues aie moie cenlial lo lhe piesenl discussion of lhe
geneial elhical queslions iaised by NATO`s aclion. The nisl conceins
NATO`s aulhoiily, oi lack of aulhoiily, lo use mililaiy foice. The second
conceins lhe moial chaiaclei and ciedenlials of lhe inleivening poweis,
specincally whelhei lhey can command lhe iespecl of laige seclions of lhe
inleinalional communily and whelhei woild public opinion concludes
lhal inleivenlion by lhese poweis nolwilhslanding lhe absence of \N
Secuiily Council appioval is piefeiable lo inaclion.
On lhe queslion of NATO`s iighl lo use foice, ciilics of lhe wai aigued
lhal lhe \niled Nalions has absolule aulhoiily and lhal NATO violaled
lhe \N Chailei by using foice. Olheis have aigued lhal lhe use of lhe
gieal powei velo in lhe \N Secuiily Council would have lhwailed mili-
laiy aclion and lhal, in consequence, inleivenlion by NATO was neces-
saiy. Iiom lhis vanlage poinl, lhe enlighlened slales`` acled lo suppoil
progrcssivisn; foi olheis, NATO`s aclion was an inslance of moialism
and an example of disiegaid foi inleinalional law.25
All pailies would agiee lhal lhe \N Chailei should be iespecled and
lhal any depailuie fiom ils piovisions should occui only in exceplional
ciicumslances. A ciucial queslion is whelhei il is iighl lhal good inlei-
nalional cilizens should aigue lhal lhe gieal powei velo musl nol be
exeicised in lhe woisl human emeigencies. Peihaps one of lhe qualilies
of lhe good inleinalional cilizen is lhe willingness lo challenge lhe legili-
macy of lhe velo by iiiesponsible poweis lhal aie piepaied lo block in-
leinalional aclion lo pievenl human iighls violalions.26 Peihaps, one of
ils main ioles is lo iniliale lhe quesl foi new foims of decision-making
in lhe \niled Nalions when humanilaiian ciises occui. f so, lhe good
inleinalional cilizen has lo offei an explanalion foi failing lo comply wilh
exisling aiiangemenls, and il has lo sel in molion lhe seaich foi new
decision-making piocesses lhal will defend inleinalional humanilaiian
law.27
Since lhe gieal poweis may be unwilling lo suiiendei iighls in lhis
aiea, and since lhey may be unpiepaied lo sanclion changes lhal mighl
allow Weslein poweis lo inleivene anywheie in lhe woild, il is impoilanl
lo ask whelhei Iuiopeans can have legilimale claim lo whal mighl be
called iegional exceplionalism. Iuiopean piogiessives mighl wish lo
aigue lhal lhey belong lo a iegion lhal is developing a human iighls cul-
luie lhal olhei socielies, pioleclive of lheii soveieignly, do nol, and may
nevei, accepl. Conceivably, lhe good inleinalional cilizen could aigue
lhal Iuiope should opl oul of lhe widei syslem of inleinalional law
and so en|oy an exceplional iighl lo wage humanilaiian wai wilhin lhe
conlinenl a iighl lhal il does nol wish lo claim wilh iespecl lo lhe iesl of
lhe woild, |usl as slales elsewheie cannol expecl lheii commilmenls lo
soveieignly and non-inleivenlion lo bind socielies in lhe Iuiopean
woild.
Seveial pioblems exisl wilh lhis posilion, including lhe queslion of
wheie Iuiope begins and ends. f Iuiope weie lo en|oy lhe iighl of hu-
manilaiian inleivenlion as pail of some idea of iegional exceplionalism,
how fai would ils |uiisdiclion exlend? Who should decide?28 Iuilhei-
moie, in liying lo denne lhe ielevanl |uiisdiclion is lheie nol a dangei
lhal Iuiope will allempl lo close ilself off and cieale a division belween
Iuiope wheie human iighls violalions will be mel by foice and lhe iesl of
lhe woild wheie violalois can pioceed wilh impunily?29 A ciucial issue is
whelhei a Iuiope lhal espouses a docliine of iegional exceplionalism is
being liue lo ilself. l mighl be aigued lhal a Iuiope commilled lo human
iighls musl iaise univeisal claims lhal demonsliale lhe deplh of ils alle-
giance lo lhe cosmopolilanism of lhe Inlighlenmenl.
This iaises lhe queslion of whelhei lhe inleivening poweis have lhe
moial, as opposed lo lhe legal, aulhoiily lo iniliale humanilaiian wai.
Some poinl lo lhe lamenlable iecoid of lhe \niled Slales in ils many
wais in lhe lhiid woild.30 They nole lhe iiony lhal wai ciimes liials have
been pioposed in iesponse lo Seibia bul lhe \niled Slales opposed cei-
lain piovisions in lhe 1998 Rome Tiealy on lhe nleinalional Ciiminal
Couil because unwelcome poweis`` mighl sland in |udgemenl on \S
mililaiy aclions.31 Iiom lhis slandpoinl, al leasl one leading powei musl
develop appiopiiale moial ciedenlials befoie ils involvemenl in humani-
laiian wai can be moie geneially appioved.
One mighl ask how lhe Iuiopean \nion faies when |udged by lhese
ciileiia. Maybe lhe bioad pallein of polilical developmenl evidenl in lhe
Iuiopean \nion poinls lo lhe conclusion lhal ils pailicipalion in hu-
manilaiian wai is acceplable. Some may have giealei conndence in slales
lhal have abandoned lhe lolalizing pio|ecl and lhal iecognize lhal indi-
viduals and minoiilies should have inleinalional legal peisonalily on lheii
own accounl. They may be ieassuied by slales lhal have laken sleps lo
piosecule wai ciiminals and lhal do nol believe lhal heads of slale who
have violaled human iighls should be piolecled by soveieign immunily.
They may lhink lhal socielies lhal aie evolving in posl-nalional and posl-
soveieign diieclions may have, oi may develop, lhe skills iequiied lo
build new foims of communily elsewheie, nol leasl by foiming pailnei-
ships wilh non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions commilled lo moie humane
foims of global goveinance.32
One nnal consideialion is lhal socielies lhal nol lhal long ago lived in
anlicipalion of ma|oi wai have made piogiess in eliminaling foice fiom
lheii inleinalional ielalions. They have widened lhe moial boundaiies of
lheii communilies so lhal slales aie nol |usl conceined wilh haim suf-
feied by co-nalionals bul aie commilled lo developing cosmopolilan
haim convenlions, which ieveal, in Kanl`s woids, lhal a violalion of iighls
anywheie is fell eveiywheie.33 nevilably, lhe queslion aiises of whelhei
lhey aie also piepaied lo lake aclion againsl iegimes lhal wage wai
againsl lheii own cilizens. Whalevei lhe meiils oi demeiils of NATO`s
aclion againsl Seibia, iecenl evenls may maik a luining poinl in lhe
hisloiy of Iuiopean inleinalional sociely. Beyond lhe specincs of lhe
Kosovo case lie noimalive queslions aboul whelhei fuluie commilmenls
lo fieeing lhe conlinenl fiom haim will include suppoil foi whal Kaldoi
calls cosmopolilan law-enfoicemenl.``34
Conclusions
The lasl few senlences may be lhoughl lo give Iuiopean socielies lhe
benenl of loo many doubls, bul lhe queslion iemains of whelhei condi-
lions can be so despeiale lhal mililaiy foice is |uslined even when lhe
poweis involved do nol inspiie univeisal conndence. Complex queslions
aie iaised when one iegion may be developing a human iighls culluie
lhal makes inioads inlo soveieignly, which olhei pails of lhe woild do
nol wish lo encouiage. Whal follows lhen foi lhe idea of good inlei-
nalional cilizenship?
My concluding commenls deal wilh lhose pails of Iuiope lhal aie
laking pail in a iemaikable expeiimenl in consliucling polilical com-
munilies lhal aie moie univeisalislic and sensilive lo culluial diffeiences
lhan lheii piedecessois weie. The socielies involved cannol adopl slalism
wilhoul conliadicling lheii own univeisalislic commilmenls. They aie
obliged lo lake aclion againsl lhose slales lhal iemain lied lo lhe lolaliz-
ing pio|ecl. The queslion is whal foim lheii aclion should lake. Modined
slalism offeis lhe answei lhal slales should iespond in non-violenl ways
lhal apply economic and moial piessuie lo slales lhal violale human
iighls. ls sliongesl poinl is lhal humanilaiian wais cause human miseiy
and suffeiing, howevei noble lhe inlenlions may be. ls mosl obvious
weakness is lhal moie despeiale measuies may be iequiied lo assisl
vulneiable peoples. n lhe giealesl emeigencies, suppoileis of lhe human
iighls culluie musl counlenance lhe use of foice.
The pioblem is lhen how lo ensuie lhal lhose who wish lo conducl a
humanilaiian wai iespecl lhe convenlions lhal have been developed lo
conliol mililaiy foice. These include lhe piinciples associaled wilh lhe
|usl wai liadilion and exisling inleinalional law, which dennes who has,
and who does nol have, lhe aulhoiily lo wage wai. Legalism insisls lhal
lhe nnal decision aboul whelhei oi nol lo wage humanilaiian wai iesls
wilh lhe Secuiily Council of lhe \niled Nalions, and NATO did nol have
lhe iequisile aulhoiily lo lake mililaiy aclion againsl Seibia. Howevei, as
Kon Annan has suggesled, decisions lo pioceed independenlly of lhe \N
Secuiily Council may deseive suppoil when emeigency condilions exisl,
as in lhe case of Rwanda. Heiein lies lhe fundamenlal dilemma foi lhe
good inleinalional cilizen al lhe piesenl lime.
Allhough il is essenlial lhal good inleinalional cilizens should iespecl
exisling inleinalional legal piinciples, il is also iighl lhal lhey should
apply piessuie lo lhem in lhe name of cosmopolilan convenlions whose
lime may have come. Good inleinalional cilizens musl challenge lhe
slalus quo while avoiding iecklessness, aibiliaiiness, and oppoilunism,
bul lhey musl convince olheis of lheii case, lheii compelence, and lheii
molives. Signincanlly, many who suppoiled NATO`s aclions albeil wilh
ieseivalions did so nol only because of lhe belief lhal a humanilaiian
calasliophe was possible bul also because lhey believed lhal Kosovo
mighl be lhe calalysl lhal inlioduces a new eia of cosmopolilan law-
enfoicemenl.`` Theie is no ceilainly lhal such change will lake place, and
NATO has nol been shoil of ciilics who lhink il foolish lo expecl pow-
eiful slales lo suppoil piogiessivism in lhe shape of laige-scale global
iefoim as opposed lo moialism in selecled cases. Good inleinalional
cilizens musl come lo lhe assislance of lhe viclims of inslilulionalized
ciuelly, bul lhe dilemma lhal aiises because of lhe legalisl posilion on lhe
iighls of slales can be solved only by peisuading lhe iesl of lhe inleina-
lional communily lo adopl a new legalily conceining humanilaiian wais.
Whelhei Kosovo will give iise lo a new legalily lhal iemoves lhe moial
dilemma of lhe good inleinalional cilizen is uncleai, as is lhe queslion of
whal foim il may lake. Bul one of lhe fundamenlal iesponsibililies of lhe
good inleinalional cilizen is lo sliive lo iesolve lhe lension belween
legalism and piogiessivism in a new legal oidei lhal alleis lhe ielalion-
ship belween oidei and |uslice, cilizenship and humanily, and soveieignly
and human iighls.
Acknowledgemenls
would like lo lhank Scoll Buichill, Alex Danchev, Tim Dunne, and Nick
Wheelei foi lheii commenls on an eailiei diafl of lhis papei.
Noles
1. Andiew Linklalei, Thc Transjornation oj Iolitical Connunity. 1thical IounJations oj
thc Iost-Vcstphalian 1ra, Cambiidge: Polily Piess, 1998.
2. The leim lhe good inleinalional cilizen`` was nisl used by Gaielh Ivans and Biuce
Gianl, Australias Iorcign Rclations in thc VorlJ oj thc 1990s, Melbouine: Melbouine
\niveisily Piess, 1991. See also Andiew Linklalei, Whal s a Good nleinalional
Cilizen?`` in P. Keal, ed., 1thics anJ Iorcign Iolicy, Sydney: Allen & \nwin, 1998; and
lhe moie iecenl discussion by Nicholas 1. Wheelei and Timolhy Dunne, Good nlei-
nalional Cilizenship: A Thiid Way foi Biilish Ioieign Policy,`` Intcrnational Ajjairs,
\ol. 74, 1998, pp. 84787O.
3. See Pelei Coiiigan and Deiek Sayei, Thc Crcat Arch. 1nglish Statc Iornation as Cul-
tural Rcvolution, Oxfoid: Basil Blackwell, 1985.
4. Linklalei, Thc Transjornation oj Iolitical Connunity, chap. 6.
5. Michael Doyle, Kanl. Libeial Legacies and Ioieign Affaiis,`` Ihilosophy anJ Iublic
Ajjairs, \ol. 12, No. 3, 1983, pp. 2O5234, and 1. L. Ray, The Abolilion of Slaveiy and
lhe Ind of Wai,`` Intcrnational Organisation, \ol. 43, 1989, pp. 4O5439.
6. The mosl piessing foieign policy pioblem we face is lo idenlify lhe ciicumslances
in which we should gel involved in olhei people`s conicls.`` See Tony Blaii, speech
lo lhe Iconomic Club of Chicago, 22 Apiil 1999. The leim, puiposes beyond oui-
selves`` is laken fiom Hedley N. Bull, Ioieign Policy of Auslialia,`` IrocccJings oj thc
Australian Institutc oj Iolitical Scicncc Sunncr School, Sydney: Angus & Robeilson,
1973.
7. Slalism is found in classical iealisl wiilings bul also in lhe pluialisl`` appioach as
desciibed by Hedley Bull, The Giolian Conceplion of nleinalional Sociely,`` in H.
Bulleineld and M. Wighl, eds., Diplonatic Invcstigations. 1ssays in thc Thcory oj Intcr-
national Iolitics, London: \nwin, 1966.
8. See Michael B. Akehuisl, A MoJcrn IntroJuction to Intcrnational 1aw, London: Roul-
ledge, 1992.
9. See Adam Robeils, Humanilaiian Wai: Mililaiy nleivenlion and Human Righls,``
Intcrnational Ajjairs, \ol. 69, 1993, pp. 429449.
1O. Bull, The Giolian Conceplion of nleinalional Sociely.``
11. Akehuisl, A MoJcrn IntroJuction to Intcrnational 1aw, p. 21O.
12. On lhe ielevanl elhical issues, see Chiislophei 1. Biewin, Libeial Slales and nlei-
nalional Obligalions,`` Millcnniun, \ol. 17, 1998, pp. 321338.
13. See Hedley Bull, ed., Intcrvcntion in VorlJ Iolitics, Oxfoid: Claiendon Piess, 1984.
14. Maiy Kaldoi, Ncw anJ OlJ Vars. Organi;cJ Violcncc in a Clobal 1ra, Cambiidge:
Polily Piess, 1999, p. 131.
15. Noam Chomsky, Thc Ncw Military Hunanisn. 1cssons jron Kosovo, Monioe: Com-
mon Couiage Piess, 1999. Chomsky diaws allenlion lo lhe double slandaid of punishing
Seibia while loleialing lhe human iighls aliocilies of a NATO membei Tuikey, in ils
dealings wilh lhe Kuidish populalion.
16. Tony Blaii sel oul lhe following lesls of lhe legilimacy of inleivenlion in his speech lo
lhe Iconomic Club of Chicago in Apiil 1999. Iiisl, aie we suie of oui case? Second,
have we exhausled all olhei oplions? Thiid, is lhe pioposed couise of aclion woikable?
Iouilh, aie we commilled lo lhe iegion foi lhe long leim? Iiflh, aie nalional inleiesls
involved? A sixlh lesl mighl be suggesled: aie othcrs suie of oui case, oui compelence,
and oui molives? come back lo lhis lalei.
17. Theie is no consensus aboul whelhei collaleial damage`` in Kosovo was piopoilionale
lo NATO`s polilical ends, and deciding whelhei oi nol il was piopoilionale is an almosl
impossible lask. This is nol lo say lhal lhe piinciple of piopoilionalily is valueless only
lhal il leaves open a laige giey aiea.
18. Ioi fuilhei delails on legalism, see Michael Walzei, 1ust anJ Unjust Vars. A Moral
Arguncnt with Historical Illustrations, Haimondswoilh, Middlesex: Pelican, 198O.
19. See, in pailiculai, Ailicles 5355 of lhe Chailei of lhe \niled Nalions, which sel oul lhe
piinciples goveining iegional aclion.``
2O. The dilemma is addiessed by Kon Annan in Two Concepls of Soveieignly,`` Thc
1cononist, 1824 Seplembei 1999. He iaises lhe queslion of whelhei oi nol a coalilion
lhal is piepaied lo use foice in a sociely such as Rwanda should iefiain fiom doing so
because lhe Secuiily Council wilhholds ils consenl.
21. bid.
22. See 1ohn \incenl and Pelei Wilson, Beyond Non-nleivenlion,`` in M. Hoffman and .
Ioibes, eds., Iolitical Thcory, Intcrnational Rclations anJ thc 1thics oj Intcrvcntion,
London: Macmillan, 1993, p. 124.
23. Akehuisl, A MoJcrn IntroJuction to Intcrnational 1aw, p. 97.
24. Robeils, Humanilaiian Wai.``
25. Noam Chomsky, Soveieignly and Woild Oidei,`` Kansas Slale \niveisily, 2O Seplem-
bei 1999. am indebled lo Scoll Buichill foi lhis iefeience.
26. n a speech, \a clav Havel aigued lhal il is necessaiy lo ieconsidei whelhei il is slill
appiopiiale, even hypolhelically, lhal in lhe Secuiily Council one counliy can oulvole
lhe iesl of lhe woild.`` See Ncw York Rcvicw oj Books, 1O 1une 1999, p. 6.
27. On lhis poinl, see Nicholas 1. Wheelei, Humanilaiian \igilanles oi Legal Inlie-
pieneuis: Infoicing Human Righls in nleinalional Sociely,`` unpublished, aulhoi`s
copy.
28. To illusliale lhe poinl, should Tuikey be iegaided as inside oi oulside lhe ielevanl
fionliei? A fuilhei issue is whelhei Wesl Iuiopeans have lhe iighl lo eslablish a foim
of iegional exceplionalism wilhoul consulling oulside poweis oi whelhei lhey musl have
lhe appioval of lhe Secuiily Council.
29. See 1acques Deiiida, Thc Othcr HcaJing. Rccctions on ToJays 1uropc, Bloominglon:
ndiana \niveisily Piess, 1992.
3O. Chomsky, Thc Ncw Military Hunanisn.
31. Robeils, Humanilaiian Wai,`` p. 116, and Chomsky, Soveieignly and Woild Oidei.``
32. Bul lhey may nol be assuied by lhe facl lhal many Weslein poweis believed lhal
ndonesia`s consenl was iequiied befoie lhe \N peacekeeping foice could enlei Iasl
Timoi, even lhough lhe ndonesian inleivenlion had nol been iecognized by lhe \N.
See Noam Chomsky, Soveieignly and Woild Oidei.`` l mighl neveilheless be aigued
lhal lhe lension belween piinciple and piaclice may lead lo fuilhei change including
consislency in lhe piaclice of lhose piepaied lo lake humanilaiian aclion.
33. Kanl, Peipelual Peace,`` in M. Ioisylh el al., Thc Thcory oj Intcrnational Rclations.
SclcctcJ Tcxts jron Ccntili to Trcitschkc, London: Allen & \nwin, 1971, p. 216.
34. Kaldoi, Ncw anJ OlJ Vars, pp. 124ff.
31
\nbiidled humanilaiianism:
Belween |uslice, powei, and
aulhoiily
Rancsh Thakur anJ Albrccht Schnabcl
The challenge of humanilaiian inleivenlion
We live in lioubled limes. Wheieas Rwanda slands as lhe symbol of
inaclion in lhe face of genocide, Kosovo iaised many queslions aboul lhe
consequences of aclion when lhe inleinalional communily is divided
in lhe face of a humanilaiian liagedy. l confionled us wilh an abiding
seiies of challenges iegaiding humanilaiian inleivenlion: is il moially
|usl, legally peimissible, mililaiily feasible, and polilically do-able? f
lheie aie massive human iighls aliocilies, can soveieignly be foifeiled
eilhei lempoiaiily oi foi a limiled pail of leiiiloiy on humanilaiian
giounds? s lhe soveieignly of individual human beings any less inviolale
lhan lhal of counliies as colleclive enlilies? s lhe use of foice lo sellle
inleinalional dispules |uslined oulside lhe \niled Nalions fiamewoik
and wilhoul lhe piioi aulhoiizalion of lhe \N Secuiily Council? Whal
happens when lhe diffeienl lessons of lhe lwenlielh cenluiy, encapsulaled
in such slogans as No Moie Wais`` and No Moie Auschwilzes,`` col-
lide? Who decides (and following whal iules of pioceduie and evidence)
lhal mass aliocilies have been commilled, and by which paily? Similaily,
who decides whal lhe appiopiiale iesponse should be?
To suppoileis, lhe Noilh Allanlic Tiealy Oiganisalion (NATO) cuied
Iuiope of lhe Milosevic-boine disease of elhnic cleansing. The speclie of
iacial genocide had come back lo haunl Iuiope fiom lhe daik days of lhe
Second Woild Wai. The challenge lo lhe humane values of Iuiopean
496
civilizalion had lo be mel, and mel decisively. Mililaiy aclion oulside lhe
\N fiamewoik was nol NATO`s piefeiied oplion of choice. Ralhei,
ils iesoil lo foice was a ciilical commenl on lhe inslilulional huidles lo
effeclive and limely aclion by lhe \niled Nalions. The lacuna in lhe
aichilecluie of lhe secuiily managemenl of woild oidei lhal was slaikly
highlighled by NATO bombing needs lo be nlled.
To ciilics, howevei, lhe NATO cuie gieally woisened lhe Milosevic
disease.``1 The liickle of iefugees befoie lhe wai luined inlo a ood
duiing il, and afleiwaids lhe Seibs weie elhnically cleansed by lhe Al-
banians in ievenge allacks. By lhe end of 1999, a quailei of a million
Seibs, Romanies, Slavic Muslims, and olhei minoiilies had ed fiom
Kosovo. The Seibian populalion of Piislina, lhe capilal of Kosovo, had
dwindled fiom aiound 2O,OOO lo 8OO mainly eldeily people loo innim lo
escape.2 The sense of moial ouliage piovoked by humanilaiian aliocilies
musl be lempeied by an appiecialion of lhe limils of powei and concein
foi inleinalional inslilulion-building.
n loday`s dangeiously unslable woild full of complex conicls, we face
lhe painful dilemma of being damned if we do and damned if we don`l.
To use foice unilaleially is lo violale inleinalional law and undeimine
woild oidei. To iespecl soveieignly all lhe lime is lo be complicil in
human iighls violalions somelimes. To aigue lhal lhe \N Secuiily
Council musl give ils consenl lo humanilaiian wai is lo iisk policy paialy-
sis by handing ovei lhe agenda lo lhe mosl egiegious and obsliepeious.
The bollom-line queslion is lhis: faced wilh anolhei Holocausl oi
Rwanda-lype genocide on lhe one hand and a Secuiily Council velo on
lhe olhei, whal would we do? Because lheie is no cleai answei lo lhis
poignanl queslion wilhin lhe exisling consensus as embodied in lhe \N
Chailei, a new consensus on humanilaiian inleivenlion is uigenlly
needed.
Pail of lhal consensus musl include piomolion of discussion and
agieemenl aboul, nisl, lhe poinl al which a slale foifeils ils soveieignly,
and, second, lhe volunlaiy suspension of velo powei in lhe Secuiily
Council in exceplional ciicumslances so lhal lhe suppoil of a ma|oiily
of lhe gieal poweis is all lhal is iequiied lo peimil slales lo engage in
humanilaiian wai. l is good lhal lhe inleinalional syslem can leai down
lhe walls of slale soveieignly in cases wheie slales kill lheii own people.
The \N Chailei conlains an inheienl lension belween lhe piinciples of
slale soveieignly, wilh lhe coiollaiy of non-inleivenlion, and lhe piin-
ciples of human iighls. Ioi lhe nisl foui decades, slale soveieignly was
piivileged almosl absolulely ovei human iighls, wilh lhe one signincanl
exceplion of apailheid in Soulh Afiica. The balance lilled a lillle in lhe
199Os and is moie delicalely poised belween lhe lwo compeling piinciples
al lhe slail of lhe new millennium. The days when a lyianl could shellei
\NBRDLID H\MANTARANSM 497
behind lhe noim of non-inleivenlion fiom lhe oulside in oidei lo use
maximum biulal foice inside leiiiloiial boideis aie pasl. Polilical fion-
lieis have become less salienl bolh foi inleivening oiganizalions, whose
iighls can exlend beyond boideis, and foi laigel slales, whose iesponsi-
bililes wilhin boideis can be held lo inleinalional sciuliny. The indicl-
menl of ugoslav Piesidenl Slobodan Milosevic as a wai ciiminal, as well
as lhe aiiesl of foimei Chilean Piesidenl Auguslo Pinochel while on a
visil lo Biilain, shows lhe inexoiable shifl fiom lhe culluie of impunily of
yesleiyeai lo a culluie of accounlabilily al lhe dawn of lhe lwenly-nisl
cenluiy.
The \N syslem, howevei, needs lo be ieady, willing, and able lo con-
fionl humanilaiian calasliophes wheievei lhey occui. The unavoidabilily
of seleclivily should nol become an alibi foi lhe sliong using foice againsl
lhe weak. Thal will only heighlen disoidei. One velo should nol oveiiide
lhe iesl of humanily. Olheiwise we mighl see moie NATO-slyle aclions
wilh less oi no \N involvemenl and lhus less oidei and less |uslice in
lhe global communily. Ioimal amendmenl of lhe \N Chailei is neilhei
feasible in lhe foieseeable fuluie noi necessaiy. n lhe 199Os, lhe velo-
wielding poweis geneially abslained fiom lhe use and misuse of lhal
powei. The hisloiy of Russian and Chinese policy in lhe 199Os in lhe
Secuiily Council wilh iespecl lo Milosevic is essenlially one of coopeia-
lion, nol obsliuclionism. The ma|oi poweis need lo ieluin lo lhe shaied
managemenl of a lioubled woild oidei.
Mililaiy lessons
Mililaiy powei is a biulal, ugly insliumenl and should be used only as a
lasl iesoil. Once lhe decision is made, howevei, lhen fiom an opeialional
and humanilaiian poinl of view (because only lhus can mililaiy peison-
nel, facililies, and assels be mosl foicefully hil and civilian casuallies be
minimized) maximum foice should be applied lo achieve lhe goal of de-
fealing lhe enemy as swiflly as possible. Aii Maishal Ray Iunnell com-
menls lhal lhe slow and hesilanl use of mililaiy powei liansfoimed
Opeialion nslanl Thundei inlo Opeialion Conslanl Diizzle.3
Relying on lhieals as a bluff liansfoimed a humanilaiian ciisis inlo a
humanilaiian calasliophe when lhe bluff was called. Iundamenlal policy
diffeiences belween lhe allies led lo a lowesl common denominaloi
appioach lo achieving mililaiy ob|eclives. Ixcluding giound foices fiom
lhe beginning was a seiious mislake and ieecled an inabilily lo giasp lhe
inlegialed naluie of modein mililaiy powei. \nceilainly aboul lhe pos-
sible use of giound foices should have been pieseived. Aii sliikes did nol
pievenl widespiead aliocilies againsl civilians on lhe giound in Kosovo
oi lhe mass exodus of iefugees inlo neighbouiing counliies. The iesulling
bloody mess also seived lo haiden lhe billei divide belween lhe diffeienl
communilies in lhe iegion.
High-allilude, zeio-casually aii wai shifled lhe enliie buiden of iisk
and haim`` lo life and limb complelely lo lhe laigel sociely, including
lhe supposed benenciaiies and innocenl civilians.``4 Ixpanding lhe lisl of
bombing laigels, such as walei and elecliicily infiasliucluie and bioad-
casling slalions, ieveised piogiessive liends in lhe laws of wai ovei lhe
couise of lhe lwenlielh cenluiy. And bombing mislakes, whose incieased
iisk was delibeialely accepled by polilical leadeis in oidei lo minimize
iisks lo lheii own soldieis, caused lhe nngei of ciiminalily lo be poinled
in NATO`s diieclion.``5
Of noims and laws
The \niled Nalions is commilled lo lhe pioleclion of lhe leiiiloiial in-
legiily, polilical independence, and soveieignly of all ils membei slales,
including ugoslavia. The Secuiily Council lies al lhe heail of lhe inlei-
nalional law-enfoicemenl syslem. The |uslincalion foi bypassing il lo
launch an offensive wai iemains pioblemalic, and lhe piecedenl lhal was
sel is slill deeply lioubling. NATO acled essenlially wilhin lhe noimalive
and moial fiamewoik of lhe Wesl. Thal was lhe souice bolh of ils
slienglh and of ils weakness.
By nghling and defealing Seibia, NATO became lhe lool foi lhe Kosovo
Libeialion Aimy`s (KLA) policy of inciling Seib iepiisals lhiough lei-
ioiisl allacks in oidei lo piovoke NATO inleivenlion.6 n his Millennium
Repoil, \N Secielaiy-Geneial Kon Annan noles lhal his call foi a de-
bale on lhe challenge of humanilaiian inleivenlion had led lo feais lhal
lhe concepl mighl encouiage secessionisl movemenls delibeialely lo
piovoke goveinmenls inlo commilling gioss violalions of human iighls in
oidei lo liiggei exleinal inleivenlions lhal would aid lheii cause.``7
Communilies billeily divided foi cenluiies cannol be foiced by oul-
sideis lo live logelhei peacefully. The Kosovo Wai fuilhei iadicalized
bolh communilies and squeezed oul modeiales. The inleiesls of nalion-
alisls on bolh sides lie in slill moie conicl. Since lhe wai, lheie has been
a peisislenl lhieal of elhnic cleansing of Seibs by lhe Albanians. The lack
of inleinalional solidaiily and effeclive aclion fuilhei enlienches lhe
viclim menlalily among Seibs and undeimines piospecls of long-leim
slabilily. The KLA by anolhei name wanls lo libeiale Iaslein Kosovo``
fiom Seibia, while Seibia wanls NATO lo wilhdiaw fiom Kosovo in
humilialing failuie.
Secuiily Council Resolulion 1244 called foi lhe demililaiizalion of lhe
\NBRDLID H\MANTARANSM 499
KLA. An agieemenl wilh lhe \niled Nalions and lhe Kosovo Ioice
(KIOR) in Seplembei 1999 led lo lhe foimal dissolulion of lhe KLA.
n iealily, lhe high command sliucluie and symbol of lhe KLA weie
ieplicaled in lhe new Kosovo Pioleclion Coips. As lhe Seibs pulled oul
of Kosovo, and lhe slale sliucluies of adminislialion collapsed, lhe powei
vacuum was nlled by a mixluie of KLA cadies and ciiminal oiganiza-
lions. A yeai lalei, pledges of adminislialive and nnancial suppoil, foi
example lhe piovision of police foices and |udicial peisonnel, iemained
laigely unfulnlled. n a milieu wheie local |udges eain less lhan diiveis
on \N duly, a |udge wilh a valid diivei`s licence faces difncull caieei
choices.
Anolhei lesson lhal has been ieinfoiced is lhal il is easiei lo bomb lhan
lo build. The willingness of lhe sliong lo fund a campaign of desliuclion
slands in maiked conliasl lo lhe ieluclance of lhe iich who happen lo
be lhe same gioup of counliies lo nnd fai less money foi ieconsliuclion.
This seiiously, if ieliospeclively, undeimines lhe humanilaiian claims foi
having gone lo wai.
\N aulhoiily and legilimacy
Many of loday`s wais aie nasly, biulish, anylhing bul shoil, and mainly
inleinal. The woild communily cannol help all viclims, bul musl slep in
wheie il can make a diffeience. Howevei, unless lhe membei slales of lhe
\niled Nalions agiee on some bioad piinciples lo guide inleivenlions
in similai ciicumslances, lhe Kosovo piecedenl will have dangeiously
undeimined woild oidei. Nol being able lo acl eveiywheie can nevei be
a ieason foi nol acling wheie effeclive inleivenlion is bolh possible and
uigenlly needed. Seleclive indignalion is inevilable, foi we simply cannol
inleivene eveiywheie, eveiy lime. Bul communily suppoil foi seleclive
inleivenlion will quickly dissipale if lhe only ciileiion of seleclion is
fiiends (lhe noim of non-inleivenlion has piimacy) veisus adveisaiies
(lhe iighl lo inleivene is piivileged). n addilion, we musl slill puisue
policies of effeclive indignalion. Humanilaiian inleivenlion musl be col-
leclive, nol unilaleial. And il musl be legilimale, nol in violalion of lhe
agieed iules lhal compiise lhe foundalions of woild oidei.
The coie of lhe \N inuence in woild affaiis iesls in ils idenlily as lhe
only aulhoiilalive iepiesenlalive of lhe inleinalional communily. When
we afnim lhe exislence of an inleinalional sociely, an inleinalional sys-
lem, and woild inslilulions, queslions immedialely aiise aboul lhe possi-
bilily and naluie of inleinalional aulhoiily. Intcrnational socicty exisls
only lo lhe exlenl lhal membei slales obseive limils on lheii fieedom of
aclion in puisuing nalional inleiesls and acknowledge lhe aulhoiily of
5OO IORCI, DPLOMAC, AND THI NTIRNATONAL COMM\NT
lhese limils. The \niled Nalions is a communily-building inslilulion;
lo slienglhen ils sliucluie and funclion is lo piovide il wilh giealei
communily-building aulhoiily. The \niled Nalions was lo be lhe fiame-
woik wilhin which membeis of lhe inleinalional syslem negolialed agiee-
menls on lhe empiiical iules of behavioui and lhe legal noims of piopei
conducl in oidei lo pieseive lhe semblance of sociely.
Thal is, lhe communily-sanclioning aulhoiily lo sellle issues of inlei-
nalional peace and secuiily has been liansfeiied, ovei lhe couise of lhe
pasl lwo cenluiies, fiom lhe gieal poweis in conceil lo lhe \niled Nalions.
Acceplance of lhe \niled Nalions as lhe aulhoiilalive exposiloi of values
in inleinalional sociely is demonslialed by lhe facl lhal even non-
compliance wilh Council oi Assembly diieclives is defended by effoils lo
show lhe eiioi, unfaiiness, oi illegalily of lhe colleclive decision. Iveiy
such effoil, whelhei il succeeds oi fails in ils immediale lask, is a conni-
malion, nol a negalion, of lhe right of lhe \niled Nalions lo engage in
colleclive decision-making.
The decisions of lhe \niled Nalions command aulhoiily because lhey
aie lhe oulcome of an inleinalional polilical piocess of lhe asseilion
and ieconcilialion of nalional inleiesls. l is lhe polilical piocess lhal
aulhenlicales \N iesolulions and conveils lhem inlo aulhoiilalive pie-
sciiplions foi lhe common good of humanily. Aulhoiily`` signines lhe
capacily lo cieale and enfoice iighls and obligalions which aie accepled
as legilimale and binding by membeis of an all-inclusive sociely who aie
sub|ecl lo lhe aulhoiily. Powei`` is diffeienl fiom aulhoiily``: il is lhe
capacily simply lo enfoice a pailiculai foim of behavioui. Aulhoiily,
even when associaled wilh powei oi foice, necessaiily connoles legili-
macy.`` Thal is, aulhoiily is dislincl fiom powei lo lhe exlenl lhal il
enlails acceplance of iighl by thosc to whon it is applicJ.
Bolh aulhoiily and powei aie impoilanl in lhe iegulalion of human
behavioui. The funclion of bolh is lo sliess lheii iole of iegulaling con-
ducl in contrast lo alleinalive means of conliolling behavioui. n pailic-
ulai, aulhoiily and powei aie used lo dislinguish each olhei in lhe exei-
cise of inuence. The concepl of aulhoiily is used lo claiify ways in which
behavioui is iegulaled without iecouise lo powei; a iecouise lo powei is
made necessaiy lo enfoice confoimily when aulhoiily has bioken down.
Thus lhe use of powei indicales bolh a failuie of aulhoiily and lhe de-
leiminalion lo iesloie il. The failuie of \N aulhoiily was ieecled in lhe
iefusal of Milosevic lo heed a succession of Secuiily Council iesolulions.
The iecouise lo foice by NATO was an effoil lo iesloie \N aulhoiily in
lhe Balkans, which was ciumbling undei lhe suslained challenge fiom
Seibia.
Allempls lo enfoice aulhoiily can be made only by lhe lcgitinatc
agcnts of lhal aulhoiily. Whal dislinguishes iule enfoicemenl by ciiminal
\NBRDLID H\MANTARANSM 5O1
lhugs fiom lhal by policemen is piecisely lhe piinciple of legilimacy. The
concepl of legilimacy lheiefoie acls as lhe connecling link belween lhe
exeicise of aulhoiily and lhe iecouise lo powei. n lhe case of lhe NATO
campaign againsl Milosevic, lhe piioi aulhoiizalion of NATO by lhe \N
Secuiily Council as ils enfoicemenl aim eailiei in lhe 199Os, plus lhe evo-
lulionaiy naluie of Secuiily Council iesolulions diiecled al Seibia, meanl
lhal NATO could claim lo be acling al leasl in a semi-peimissive`` legal
enviionmenl.
Segmenls of inleinalional sociely have diffused, fiagmenled, and mul-
liple layeis of aulhoiily palleins. The cenlial iole of lhe \niled Nalions
as lhe applicaloi of legilimacy suggesls lhal inleinalional sociely as a
whole is chaiacleiized by congiuence of aulhoiily. The ieason foi lhis is
lhal lhe \niled Nalions is lhe only liuly global inslilulion of a geneial
puipose lhal appioximales univeisalily. The \niled Nalions iepiesenls
lhe idea lhal unbiidled nalionalism and lhe iaw inleiplay of powei musl
be medialed and modeialed in an inleinalional fiamewoik. l is lhe cenlie
foi haimonizing nalional inleiesls and foiging lhe inleinalional inleiesl.
The iole of cuslodian of colleclive legilimacy enables lhe \niled Nalions,
lhiough ils iesolulions, lo piomulgale aulhoiilalive slandaids of slale
behavioui oi codes of conducl againsl which lo measuie lhe compliance
of goveinmenls.
An indispensable powei mighl be lempled inlo nol being disposed lo
accepl lhe consliainls of mullilaleial diplomacy. Bul being indispensable
does nol confei lhe aulhoiily lo dispense wilh lhe legilimacy of lhe
\niled Nalions as lhe only enlily lhal can speak in lhe name of lhe in-
leinalional communily. The ieason foi much disquiel in counliies aiound
lhe woild wilh lhe piecedenl of NATO aclion in Kosovo was nol
because lheii abhoiience of elhnic cleansing is any less. Ralhei, il was
because of lheii dissenl fiom a woild oidei lhal peimils oi loleiales uni-
laleial behavioui by lhe sliong and lheii piefeience foi an oidei in
which piinciples and values aie embedded in univeisally applicable noims
and lhe iough edges of powei aie soflened by inslilulionalized mulli-
laleialism.
Conclusion
Ciilics of lhe Kosovo Wai musl concede lhe many posilive accomplish-
menls.8 Almosl 1 million of Kosovo`s displaced inhabilanls ieluined lo
lheii homeland. Milosevic was lhiown oul of Kosovo and has been con-
nned lo his laii in Seibia. The ciedibilily of NATO was pieseived; lhe
liansfoimalion of ils iole, fiom colleclive defence of membeis againsl
allack fiom lhe oulside inlo lhe moie diffuse iole of peace enfoicemenl
lhioughoul Iuiope, was validaled; and Washinglon iemains nimly an-
choied lo Iuiope.
The achievemenls nolwilhslanding, one yeai aflei ils successful`` mil-
ilaiy campaign in lhe Balkans, NATO`s choices in Kosovo had seemingly
naiiowed lo policy failuie (abandon lhe dieam of a mulli-elhnic sociely
living peacefully logelhei) oi policy disaslei (defeal al lhe hands of sullen
and iesenlful Seibs and incieasingly hoslile Albanians waging a gueiiilla
wai of independence). A week befoie lhe nisl anniveisaiy of lhe slail of
lhe NATO aii sliikes, an inuenlial \S newspapei was alieady aiguing
lhal |ljhe \niled Slales has enduied moie lhan ils shaie of billei expe-
iience wilh quagmiies. . . . l`s lime lo piepaie foi an eaily Ameiican
exil.``9 n lhe meanlime, an analysis fiom lhe equally inuenlial nleina-
lional nslilule foi Slialegic Sludies in London aigued lhal \N Secuiily
Resolulion 1244 had ciealed a conundium by foimally iecognizing u-
goslav soveieignly ovei Kosovo while simullaneously insliucling lhe \N
Mission in Kosovo (\NMK) lo eslablish lhe inslilulions of subslanlial
aulonomy and self-goveinmenl in lhe piovince. As a iesull of lhis
impasse, lioops fiom NATO counliies look sel lo slay in Kosovo foi
decades.``10
The KLA is unlikely lo compiomise on ils goal of complele indepen-
dence. f NATO iesisls, il will be viewed and liealed as an occupying
foice. f NATO wilhdiaws in exaspeialion, Seibia mighl allempl lo ie-
conquei Kosovo, iegaidless of whelhei oi nol Milosevic was slill in
powei in Belgiade. The lhieal of ienewed nghling mighl piompl lhe
ma|oi Iuiopean NATO leadeis lo slay lhe couise. Bul Kosovo in 1999
showed lhal NATO slill needs nim \S polilical leadeiship and mililaiy
assels. How long \S palience will lasl in lhe face of lhe conlinuing im-
passe and escalaling lensions in Kosovo iemains anybody`s guess.
The cuiienl silualion in Kosovo can only be an inleiim solulion in lhe
foim of an open-ended piolecloiale. The only lasling solulion will be a
polilical selllemenl lhal ieconciles legilimale elhnic Albanian inleiesls in
lhe fuluie of lhe piovince and long-leim peace wilh Seibia in lhe widei
conlexl of iegional peace, secuiily, and oidei in lhe Balkans.
Similaily, lhe example of a iegional oiganizalion invoking lhe manlle
of lhe inleinalional communily in oidei lo launch a humanilaiian wai can
be only a pailial and halling solulion. Because lhe anlecedenls aie nol
beyond queslion, lhe piecedenl-selling value musl iemain limiled. The
uige lo humanilaiian inleivenlion by poweiful iegional oiganizalions
musl be biidled by lhe legilimaling aulhoiily of thc inleinalional oigani-
zalion. The only |usl and lasling iesolulion of lhe challenge of humani-
laiian inleivenlion would be a new consensus pioclaimed by lhe peoples
of lhe woild lhiough lheii goveinmenls al lhe \niled Nalions and em-
bodied in ils Chailei.
\NBRDLID H\MANTARANSM 5O3
Noles
1. Richaid Ialk, Reeclions on lhe Kosovo Wai,`` Clobal Dialoguc, \ol. 1, No. 2,
Aulumn 1999, p. 93.
2. The Iuluie of Kosovo: An ndennile NATO Piesence,`` IISS Stratcgic Conncnts,
\ol. 6, No. 1, 1anuaiy 2OOO, p. 1.
3. Piess inleiviews, New oik, 2O Maich 2OOO.
4. Ialk, Reeclions on lhe Kosovo Wai,`` p. 93.
5. bid., p. 94. n facl, Ialk goes a lol fuilhei, aiguing lhal lhe aii wai was a foim of elec-
lionic bloodspoil. l was sliucluially similai lo loiluie, he believes, in lhal lhe peipe-
lialoi chose lhe melhod by which lo inicl pain while lhe viclim was helpless lo ielali-
ale. bid., p. 96.
6. Ioi a succincl accounl of lhe KLA slialegy, as well as a discouise on lhe many sub-
lexls`` undeilying lhe NATO campaign, see Michael MccGwiie, Why Did We Bomb
Belgiade?`` Intcrnational Ajjairs, \ol. 76, No. 1, 1anuaiy 2OOO, pp. 124. n answeiing
his queslion, MccGwiie is sceplical of lhe claim lhal humanilaiianism had displaced
geopolilical inleiesls as lhe piincipal molive.
7. Kon Annan, Vc thc Icoplcs. Thc Rolc oj thc UnitcJ Nations in thc Twcnty-rst Ccntury.
Repoil of lhe Secielaiy-Geneial, New oik: \N Geneial Assembly, Doc. Aj54j2OOO, 27
Maich 2OOO, paia. 216.
8. Ioi a shoil bul aulhoiilalive claim of lhe achievemenls, see Madeleine K. Albiighl,
\.S. Should Be Pioud,`` Intcrnational HcralJ Tribunc, 31 Maich 2OOO.
9. Idging lowaid lhe Ixil in Kosovo,`` ediloiial, 1os Angclcs Tincs, 17 Maich 2OOO. See
also Chiislophei Layne and Ben|amin Schwaiz, A Biulal uagmiie,`` Intcrnational
HcralJ Tribunc, 31 Maich 2OOO.
1O. The Iuluie of Kosovo: An ndennile NATO Piesence,`` p. 1.
Conliibulois
Duska Anastasijevic is a slaff wiilei
foi lhe independenl weekly Vrcnc,
Belgiade, Iedeial Republic of
ugoslavia, coveiing Kosovo and
foieign affaiis. She is a conliibuloi
lo Radio B-92, Tinc, Dic Vochc,
and olhei inleinalional media and
wiiles iepoils published by human
iighls oiganizalions in Belgiade. She
holds an MA in inleinalional
ielalions and Iuiopean sludies fiom
lhe Cenlial Iuiopean \niveisily,
Budapesl.
Yladimir Baranuvsky is Depuly
Diiecloi al lhe nslilule of Woild
Iconomy and nleinalional
Relalions (MIMO), Russian
Academy of Sciences, and Piofessoi
al lhe Moscow Slale nslilule of
nleinalional Relalions (MGMO),
Moscow, Russia. He was educaled
al MGMO and MIMO, wheie he
ieceived his PhD in 1975 and his
docloi of science (hisloiy) in 1985.
He has been a visiling piofessoi al
lhe nslilul dÌludes Iuiope ennes,
\niveisile Libie de Biuxelles (1991)
and lhe \niveisile de Rennes
(1995), and a senioi ieseaichei and
pio|ecl leadei al lhe Slockholm
nleinalional Peace Reseaich
nslilule (19921997). Recenl
publicalions include Russia and
Asia: Challenges and Oppoilunilies
foi Nalional and nleinalional
Secuiily,`` in Russia anJ Asia. Thc
1ncrging Sccurity AgcnJa, ediled
by Gennady Chufiin (1999) and
Russia`s secuiily inleiesls and
conceins in lhe IuioAllanlic
iegion,`` in Russia anJ thc Vcst. Thc
21st Ccntury Sccurity 1nvironncnt,
ediled by Alexei Aibalov, Kail
Kaisei, and Robeil Legvold (1999).
Cural Bell is a \isiling Iellow al lhe
Slialegic and Defence Sludies
Cenlie of lhe Auslialian Nalional
\niveisily, Canbeiia, Auslialia.
Pieviously, she was a Piofessoi of
nleinalional Relalions al lhe
5O5
\niveisily of Sussex (\K) and a
membei of lhe Auslialian
Diplomalic Seivice. Hei main
ieseaich inleiesl is in ciises and
ciisis managemenl, wilh a pailiculai
inleiesl in Kosovo and Iasl Timoi.
She is cuiienlly compleling a book
enlilled VorlJ Out oj Balancc,
conceined wilh inleinalional polilics
and slialegy in lhe unipolai woild of
lhe coming decades.
Nicula Butler is a senioi analysl foi
lhe Acionym nslilule, London,
\niled Kingdom, wheie she coveis
NATO and Biilish nucleai policy
issues foi lhe nslilule`s |ouinal,
Disarnancnt Diplonacy.
Pieviously, she woiked foi lhe
Biilish Ameiican Secuiily
nfoimalion Council in Washinglon
DC and lhe Campaign foi Nucleai
Disaimamenl in London. She
holds an MA in peace sludies
fiom lhe \niveisily of Biadfoid,
\K.
Marie-1anine Calic is expeil advisei lo
lhe Special Cooidinaloi of lhe
Slabilily Pacl, Biussels, Belgium,
and a hisloiian and polilical scienlisl
al lhe Geiman Sliflung Wissenschafl
und Polilik (SWP), Ibenhausen,
Geimany. She has woiked and
consulled foi \NPROIOR
Headquaileis, lhe nleinalional
Ciiminal Tiibunal foi lhe foimei
ugoslavia and lhe Conicl
Pievenlion Nelwoik of lhe
Iuiopean Commission and
Pailiamenl. She has lecluied and
published exlensively aboul Soulh
Iaslein Iuiope. She is a iegulai
commenlaloi on Balkan affaiis foi
Geiman and Swiss media.
1ean-Marc Cuicaud is a Senioi
Academic Piogiamme Ofncei in lhe
Peace and Goveinance Piogiamme
of lhe \niled Nalions \niveisily,
Tokyo, 1apan. He also leaches social
and polilical philosophy al lhe New
School \niveisily, New oik. He
holds a PhD in polilical science and
a Docloial dÌlal in philosophy
(nslilul dÌludes Poliliques of Paiis
and \niveisily of Soibonne.)
Ioimeily a fellow al Haivaid
\niveisily (198692), a lecluiei al
lhe \niveisily of Paiis-Soibonne,
and a visiling piofessoi al lhe Icole
Noimale Supe iieuie (Paiis), he
seived as a speech wiilei in lhe
Ixeculive Ofnce of lhe Secielaiy-
Geneial of lhe \niled Nalions fiom
1992 lo 1996. His publicalions
include 1cgitinacy anJ Iolitics. A
Contribution to thc StuJy oj Iolitical
Rights anJ Iolitical Rcsponsibility
(foilhcoming 2OO1) and Thc
Inprobablc Scarch jor Authoritarian
Dcnocracy. Dictatorships in 1atin
Ancrica (1996).
Luri Fisler Damrusch is lhe Heniy L.
Moses Piofessoi of nleinalional
Law and Oiganizalion al Columbia
\niveisily in New oik. She has
been a lawyei in lhe \S Depailmenl
of Slale (1977198O) and also
piaclised law wilh a New oik nim.
Hei publicalions include Thc
Intcrnational Court oj 1usticc at a
CrossroaJs, 1aw anJ Iorcc in thc
Ncw Intcrnational OrJcr; 1njorcing
Rcstraint. Collcctivc Intcrvcntion in
Intcrnal Conicts; and BcyonJ
Conjrontation. Intcrnational 1aw jor
thc IostColJ Var 1ra. She has
been vice piesidenl of lhe Ameiican
Sociely of nleinalional Law, on lhe
Boaid of Idilois of lhe Ancrican
1ournal oj Intcrnational 1aw, and a
senioi fellow of lhe \S nslilule of
Peace.
5O6 LST OI CONTRB\TORS
Agun Demjaha is an advisei lo lhe
Kosovai Civil Sociely Ioundalion,
Piislina, Kosovo, Iedeial Republic
of ugoslavia. An engineei
educaled al lhe \niveisily of
Piislina, he ieceived an MA in
inleinalional ielalions and Iuiopean
sludies fiom lhe Cenlial Iuiopean
\niveisily in Budapesl. He lhen
woiked as a pio|ecl cooidinaloi in
lhe neld of civil sociely and civic
educalion al lhe Iund foi an Open
Sociely in Piislina. n lale 1998
he founded lhe Cenlie foi
Developmenl of Civil Sociely in
Piislina, of which he was lhe nisl
diiecloi. Aflei lhe Kosovo Wai he
iemained wilh lhe same
oiganizalion, now named Kosovai
Civil Sociely Ioundalion, as an
advisei foi inleinalional conlacls.
His main nelds of inleiesl aie
conicl pievenlion, conicl
iesolulion, and civil sociely
developmenl.
Simun W. Duke sludied inleinalional
ielalions al \niveisily College of
Wales, Abeiyslwylh, and Oxfoid
\niveisily. He has held a vaiiely of
ieseaich and leaching posilions al
lhe Slockholm nleinalional Peace
Reseaich nslilule, Ohio Slale
\niveisily, Pennsylvania Slale
\niveisily, and lhe Cenlial
Iuiopean \niveisily (Budapesl).
He is cuiienlly an Associale
Piofessoi al lhe Iuiopean nslilule
of Public Adminislialion
(Maasliichl) wheie he specializes in
second pillai issues. He is lhe aulhoi
of a numbei of books on vaiious
aspecls of liansallanlic secuiily
ielalions wilh Iuiope including,
mosl iecenlly, Thc 1lusivc Qucst jor
1uropcan Sccurity. Iron 1DC to
CISI (2OOO).
Hans-Geurg Ehrhart is a Senioi
Reseaich Iellow al lhe nslilule foi
Peace Reseaich and Secuiily Policy
al lhe \niveisily of Hambuig
(ISH), Hambuig, Geimany. He is
also a membei of lhe Team
Iuiope`` of lhe Iuiopean
Commission`s Repiesenlalion in
Geimany. He ieceived his MA and
PhD fiom lhe \niveisily of Bonn.
He has held visiling ieseaich
appoinlmenls al lhe Reseaich
nslilule of lhe Iiiediich Ibeil
Ioundalion in Bonn, lhe Iondalion
poui les Iludes de De fense
Nalionale, Paiis, and lhe Cenlie of
nleinalional Relalions al ueen`s
\niveisily, Kingslon, Canada. His
ieseaich aclivilies deal wilh lhe
bioad lopic of peace and secuiily.
He has published widely on issues
such as disaimamenl, peacekeeping,
posl-Soviel polilics, GeimanIiench
ielalions, as well as Geiman and
Iuiopean secuiily polilics.
Lawrence Freedman is Piofessoi of
Wai Sludies al King`s College,
London, \niled Kingdom. He has
wiillen on issues of conlempoiaiy
slialegy and waifaie, including Thc
1volution oj Nuclcar Stratcgy
(1989), Thc Culj Var (1993), and
Thc Rcvolution in Stratcgic Ajjairs
(1998). A book on lhe ciises of lhe
eaily 196Os, KcnncJys Vars, is
being published in 2OOO. He is
cuiienlly wiiling lhe ofncial hisloiy
of lhe Ialklands Campaign. He was
elecled a Iellow of lhe Biilish
Academy in 1995.
Ray Funnell is a ieliied Aii Maishal
of lhe Royal Auslialian Aii Ioice,
Auslialia. His RAAI caieei
included louis of duly in Malaysia,
Thailand, lhe \SA, and lhe \K.
LST OI CONTRB\TORS 5O7
As a senioi ofncei he seived
successively as Chief of Aii Ioice
Opeialions and Plans, Assislanl
Chief of lhe Defence Ioice (Policy),
\ice Chief of lhe Defence Ioice,
and Chief of lhe Aii Slaff. He
ieliied fiom lhe RAAI in 1992 and
undeilook lhe lask of biinging inlo
being Auslialia`s own slialegic-level
college. He was piincipal of lhal
college fiom 1994 lo 1998. He
ieliied fiom public seivice in
1anuaiy 1999. He is a giaduale of
RAAI College (1956), RAAI Slaff
College (1967), lhe \SAI Aii Wai
College (1972), and lhe Royal
College of Defence Sludies (1981).
He holds a Masleis degiee in
polilical science and a giaduale
diploma of adminislia-lion. He has
wiillen and lecluied widely on
defence and secuiily issues.
Felice Gaer is Diiecloi of lhe 1acob
Blauslein nslilule foi lhe
Advancemenl of Human Righls al
lhe Ameiican 1ewish Commillee,
New oik, \SA. She is a membei
of lhe Commillee Againsl Toiluie,
and is lhe nisl \S cilizen lo be
elecled as an independenl expeil on
lhis \N liealy body. She seives on
sleeiing commillees of human iighls
NGOs such as lhe Cailei Cenlei,
Human Righls WalchjIuiasia, and
lhe nleinalional League foi Human
Righls. She was appoinled a public
membei of six \S delegalions lo lhe
\N human iighls commission
(199399) and lhiee woild
confeiences. A fiequenl aulhoi, hei
iecenl ailicles addiess \N human
iighls piogiammes, \N policy in lhe
Balkans, NGOs, lhe OSCI,
women`s human iighls, and lhe iole
of iighls in \S foieign policy.
A. 1. R. Gruum is Piofessoi of
nleinalional Relalions and Head of
lhe Depailmenl of Polilics and
nleinalional Relalions of lhe
\niveisily of Kenl al Canleibuiy in
lhe \K. Iducaled al \niveisily
College London and lhe \niveisily
of Geneva, he ieceived his Di.es
sciences poliliques fiom \HI in
Geneva in 1971 and an honoiaiy
docloiale fiom lhe \niveisily of
Tampeie in Iinland in 2OOO. He
has wiillen oi ediled some 2O
monogiaphs and well ovei 1OO
ailicles on inleinalional ielalions
lheoiy, inleinalional oiganizalions,
conicl sludies and Iuiopean
inleinalional ielalions. He is a
pasl Chaiiman of lhe Biilish
nleinalional Sludies Associalion,
\ice Piesidenl of lhe nleinalional
Sludies Associalion, and Boaid
membei of lhe Academic Council
on lhe \niled Nalions Syslem. He
was lhe foundei and foi len yeais
Chaiiman of lhe Iuiopean Slanding
Gioup foi nleinalional Relalions.
David Haglund is Diiecloi of lhe
Cenlie foi nleinalional Relalions
and Piofessoi in lhe Depailmenl of
Polilical Sludies al ueen`s
\niveisily, Kingslon, Canada. He
ieceived his PhD in inleinalional
ielalions in 1978 fiom lhe 1ohns
Hopkins School of Advanced
nleinalional Sludies in Washinglon
DC. He held leaching oi ieseaich
appoinlmenls al lhe \niveisily of
Biilish Columbia, lhe \niveisily of
Sliasbouig, lhe Geiman-Canadian
Cenlie of lhe \niveisily of Bonn,
and lhe Sliflung Wissenschafl und
Polilik in Ibenhausen. His ieseaich
focuses on liansallanlic secuiily and
on Canadian inleinalional secuiily
5O8 LST OI CONTRB\TORS
policy. His iecenl publicalions
include IonJcring NATOs Nuclcar
Options. Canbits jor a Iost-
Vcstphalian VorlJ (1999); Sccurity,
Stratcgy anJ thc Clobal 1cononics
oj Dcjcncc IroJuction (1999, co-
ediled wilh S. Neil MacIailane),
and Thc North Atlantic Trianglc
RcvisitcJ. CanaJa anJ thc Iuturc oj
Transatlantic Sccurity (foilhcoming
in 2OOO).
Geurge C. Herring is Alumni Piofessoi
of Hisloiy al lhe \niveisily of
Kenlucky, Lexinglon, \SA. He is
lhe aulhoi of numeious books,
ailicles, and essays, including Thc
Sccrct Diplonacy oj thc Victnan
Var (1983); Ancricas 1ongcst Var.
Thc UnitcJ Statcs anJ Victnan,
19501975 (3
id
edilion, 1996); and
1B1 anJ Victnan. A Dijjcrcnt KinJ
oj Var (1994). He seived as ediloi
of lhe scholaily |ouinal Diplonatic
History fiom 1982 lo 1986, and in
199O was Piesidenl of lhe Sociely
foi Hisloiians of Ameiican Ioieign
Relalions.
G. 1uhn Ikenberry is Piofessoi of
Polilical Science al lhe \niveisily of
Pennsylvania and Non-Residenl
Senioi Iellow al lhe Biookings
nslilulion, Washinglon DC. He has
published widely in lhe neld of
inleinalional ielalions and has, mosl
iecenlly, co-ediled Ancrican
Dcnocracy Ironotion. Inpulscs,
Stratcgics, anJ Inpacts (2OOO) and
Thc 1ncrging Intcrnational
Rclations oj thc Asia-Iacic Rcgion
(foilhcoming). His mosl iecenl
monogiaph is enlilled Ajtcr Victory.
Institutions, Stratcgic Rcstraint, anJ
thc RcbuilJing oj OrJcr ajtcr Major
Var (2OOO).
Alan 1ames is Imeiilus Piofessoi of
nleinalional Relalions al Keele
\niveisily, \K. His moie iecenl
woiks include Sovcrcign StatchooJ.
Thc Basis oj Intcrnational Socicty
(1986); Icacckccping in
Intcrnational Iolitics (199O); co-
ediled wilh Robeil H. 1ackson,
Statcs in a Changing VorlJ (1993);
Britain anJ thc Congo Crisis, 1960
63 (1996); and, wilh G. R. Beiiidge,
A Dictionary oj Diplonacy (2OOO).
He is cuiienlly woiking on a sludy
of lhe Cypius ciisis of 196364.
Matthias Z. Kara di is a Reseaich
Iellow al lhe nslilule foi Peace
Reseaich and Secuiily Policy al lhe
\niveisily of Hambuig (ISH),
Hambuig, Geimany. He ieceived
his undeigiaduale and giaduale
liaining fiom lhe IbeihaidKails
\niveisily of Tu bingen and lhe Iiee
\niveisily in Beilin, fiom which he
giadualed wilh a Dipl. Pol. (MA).
He is a PhD candidale al lhe
\niveisily of Hambuig. Iiom 1991
lo 1993 he woiked foi lhe Geiman
Ioundalion foi nleinalional
Developmenl (DSI) in Beilin. His
ieseaich and numeious publicalions
deal wilh Iuiopean secuiily
inslilulions and conicls and
inleinalional ciisis managemenl on
lhe Balkans.
Ibrahim Karawan is Associale
Piofessoi of Polilical Science al lhe
\niveisily of \lah, Sall Lake Cily,
\SA, wheie he leaches Middle
Iaslein and inleinalional polilics.
He has been a Reseaich Iellow al
lhe Al-Ahiam Cenlie foi Polilical
and Slialegic Sludies, Caiio, and a
Senioi Iellow foi lhe Middle Iasl al
lhe nleinalional nslilule foi
LST OI CONTRB\TORS 5O9
Slialegic Sludies (SS) in London.
His iecenl publicalions include Thc
Islanic Inpassc, Adelphi Papei 314
(1997) and The Case foi a Nucleai-
Weapon-Iiee Zone in lhe Middle
Iasl,`` in Ramesh Thakui, ediloi,
Nuclcar Vcapons-Ircc Zoncs (1998).
Geurge Khutsishvili is Iounding
Diiecloi of lhe nleinalional Cenlei
on Conicl and Negolialion (CCN)
and Ad|uncl Piofessoi of Peace and
Conicl Sludies al Tbilisi Slale
\niveisily and Geoigian Technical
\niveisily, Tbilisi, Geoigia. He has
aulhoied and ediled numeious
books and ailicles on philosophy
and inleinalional peace and
secuiily. He has iecenlly foiged lhe
nisl GeoigianAbkhaz and
GeoigianOssel cilizen diplomacy
conlacls. He was lhe nisl NATO
Democialic nslilulions ndividual
Scholai in Geoigia (1993j94) and an
RIXjCainegie \isiling Iellow al
Slanfoid \niveisily`s Cenlei foi
nleinalional Secuiily and Aims
Conliol (CSAC) duiing lhe 1993j94
academic yeai.
Geurgius Kustakus is a Polilical
Affaiis Ofncei in lhe Division foi
Paleslinian Righls in lhe
Depailmenl foi Polilical Affaiis,
\niled Nalions, New oik.
Pieviously, he has been an academic
advisei al lhe \niveisily of Alhens
and Reseaich Iellow al lhe Hellenic
Ioundalion foi Iuiopean and
Ioieign Policy (ILAMIP). He
holds a PhD in inleinalional
ielalions fiom lhe \niveisily of
Kenl al Canleibuiy, \K, and
specializes in \niled Nalions affaiis.
He has pailicipaled in seveial \N
missions, including in Soulh Afiica,
Haili, and Bosnia-Heizegovina. His
publicalions mainly deal wilh \N
sliucluies and guiding concepls,
peacekeeping opeialions, and
inleinalional conicl managemenl.
Andrew Linklater is lhe Woodiow
Wilson Piofessoi of nleinalional
Polilics al lhe \niveisily of Wales,
Abeiyslwylh, \K. He has published
widely on lhe lheoiy of
inleinalional ielalions. He is lhe
aulhoi of Mcn anJ Citi;cns in thc
Thcory oj Intcrnational Rclations
(199O). His mosl iecenl book is Thc
Transjornation oj Iolitical
Connunity. 1thical IounJations oj
thc Iost-Vcstphalian 1ra (1998).
Steven Livingstun is Associale
Piofessoi of Polilical
Communicalion and nleinalional
Affaiis, Diiecloi of lhe Polilical
Communicalion Piogiam, and
Associale Piofessoi of nleinalional
Affaiis in lhe Illiol School of
nleinalional Affaiis al lhe Geoige
Washinglon \niveisily, Washinglon
DC, \SA. Addilionally, he is
associale diiecloi of lhe Media and
Secuiily Pio|ecl, Defense Wiileis
Gioup, based in New oik, and an
ad|uncl fellow al lhe Cenlei foi
Slialegic and nleinalional Sludies
in Washinglon. He eained his PhD
in polilical science fiom lhe
\niveisily of Washinglon in Seallle
(199O). He laughl al lhe \niveisily
of \lah and was a Shoienslein
Iellow al lhe Kennedy School of
Goveinmenl al Haivaid \niveisily.
He has appeaied on CNN, CNN,
ABC News, and olhei news
oiganizalions commenling on issues
conceining media, public policy, and
polilics. Among olhei publicalions
in books and |ouinals, Livingslon
has wiillen Clarijying thc CNN
51O LST OI CONTRB\TORS
1jjcct. An 1xanination oj McJia
1jjccts AccorJing to Typc oj
Military Intcrvcntion (1996) and Thc
Tcrrorisn Spcctaclc (1994).
1ames B. L. Mayall is Sii Paliick
Sheehy Piofessoi of nleinalional
Relalions and Diiecloi of lhe
Cenlie of nleinalional Sludies,
\niveisily of Cambiidge,
Cambiidge, \K. He is also a Iellow
of Sidney Sussex College,
Cambiidge. Pieviously, he was
Piofessoi and Imeiilus Piofessoi of
nleinalional Relalions, London
School of Iconomics and Polilical
Science. Piofessoi Mayall has
wiillen widely on inleinalional
ielalions and inleinalional lheoiy
geneially and moie specincally on
lhe impacl of nalionalism on
inleinalional sociely, NoilhSoulh
ielalions and Afiican inleinalional
polilics. He has iecenlly compleled
a shoil book, Intcrnational Socicty
anJ Its Constraints, which will be
published al lhe end of 2OOO.
Amongsl his olhei publicalions aie
Nationalisn anJ Intcrnational
Socicty (199O); Thc Iallacics oj
Hopc. Thc Iost-colonial RccorJ oj
thc Connonwcalth ThirJ VorlJ
(1991) ediled wilh A. 1. Payne, and
Thc Ncw Intcrvcntionisn. UN
cxpcricncc in CanboJia, jorncr
Yugoslavia anJ Sonalia, ediloi and
conliibuloi (1996).
Bjurn Muller is Secielaiy Geneial of
lhe nleinalional Peace Reseaich
Associalion, Ixleinal Lecluiei al
lhe \niveisily of Copenhagen, and
Senioi Reseaich Iellow al lhe
Copenhagen Peace Reseaich
nslilule (COPR), Copenhagen,
Denmaik. Mollei holds an MA in
hisloiy and a PhD in inleinalional
ielalions, bolh fiom lhe \niveisily
of Copenhagen. Since 1985, he has
been senioi ieseaich fellow,
subsequenlly piogiamme diiecloi,
and boaid membei al COPR. He is
pio|ecl diiecloi of lhe Global Non-
Offensive Defence Nelwoik, and
ediloi of NOD anJ Convcrsion. n
addilion lo being lhe aulhoi of
numeious ailicles and ediloi of six
anlhologies, he is lhe aulhoi of
lhiee books: Rcsolving thc Sccurity
Dilcnna in 1uropc. Thc Ccrnan
Dcbatc on Non-Ojjcnsivc Dcjcncc
(1991); Connon Sccurity anJ
Nonojjcnsivc Dcjcnsc. A Nco-rcalist
Icrspcctivc (1992); and Dictionary
oj Altcrnativc Dcjcnsc (1995).
Satish Nambiar is a ieliied Lieulenanl
Geneial of lhe ndian Aimy and
cuiienlly Diiecloi of lhe \niled
Seivice nslilulion of ndia. He saw
aclive seivice in 1ammu and
Kashmii, pailicipaled in counlei-
insuigency opeialions in lhe Noilh
Iasl, and in lhe 1965 and 1971
opeialions in lhe sub-conlinenl. A
giaduale of lhe Auslialian Slaff
College, he seived wilh an ndian
Aimy liaining leam in iaq and as
lhe Mililaiy Advisei al lhe ndian
High Commission in London. He
was lhe Diiecloi Geneial of Mililaiy
Opeialions al Aimy Headquaileis
al New Delhi, duiing which peiiod
he led lwo defence delegalions foi
lalks wilh Pakislan. Depuled as lhe
nisl Ioice Commandei and Head of
Mission of lhe \niled Nalions
Pioleclion Ioices in lhe foimei
ugoslavia, he sel up lhe mission
and ian il fiom Maich 1992 unlil
Maich 1993. He declined an offei of
exlension, ieluined lo ndia and
ieliied as lhe Depuly Chief of lhe
Aimy Slaff in 1994. He conlinues lo
LST OI CONTRB\TORS 511
lake a keen inleiesl in malleis of
nalional and inleinalional secuiily,
peacekeeping opeialions, and
inleinalional ielalions.
Philip Nel is Piofessoi of Polilical
Science, Depailmenl Chaii, and
Diiecloi of lhe Cenlie foi
nleinalional and Compaialive
Polilics al lhe \niveisily of
Slellenbosch, Slellenbosch, Soulh
Afiica. Iducaled al lhe \niveisily
of Slellenbosch (PhD in 1984),
Philip Nel leaches inleinalional
ielalions and mullilaleialism in lhe
Depailmenl of Polilical Science al
lhal univeisily. A visiling piofessoi
al univeisilies in Geimany and
1apan, he has published books on
Soviel foieign policy and on lhe
iheloiic of science. Togelhei wilh
lwo colleagues he is cuiienlly
compleling a book on
mullilaleialism in Soulh Afiica`s
foieign policy. He is a membei of
lhe ediloiial boaids of Clobal
Covcrnancc, Thc South Ajrican
1ournal oj Intcrnational Rclations,
and Clobal Socicty.
Albrecht Schnabel is an Academic
Piogiamme Ofncei in lhe Peace and
Goveinance Piogiamme of lhe
\niled Nalions \niveisily, Tokyo,
1apan. He was educaled al lhe
\niveisily of Munich, lhe
\niveisily of Nevada, and ueen`s
\niveisily, Canada, wheie he
ieceived his PhD in polilical sludies
in 1995. He has laughl al ueen`s
\niveisily (1994), lhe Ameiican
\niveisily in Bulgaiia (199596),
and lhe Cenlial Iuiopean
\niveisily (19961998). n 1997 he
was a ieseaich fellow al lhe nslilule
foi Peace Reseaich and Secuiily
Policy al lhe \niveisily of Hambuig
and seived on OSCI eleclion
moniloiing missions in Bosnia
Heizegovina. His publicalions focus
on elhnic conicl, foiced migialion,
iefugee policy, peacekeeping,
conicl managemenl, and
humanilaiian inleivenlion. His
iecenl publicalions include Thc
South-cast 1uropcan Challcngc.
1thnic Conict anJ thc Intcrnational
Rcsponsc, co-ediloi and conliibuloi
wilh Hans-Geoig Ihihail (1999)
and Polilical Coopeialion in
Reliospecl: Conlacl Gioup, I\,
OSCI, NATO, G-8 and \N
Woiking lowaid a Kosovo
Selllemenl,`` in Kuil R. Spillmann
and 1oachim Kiause, eds., Kosovo.
1cssons 1carncJ jor Intcrnational
Coopcrativc Sccurity (2OOO).
Allen Sens is a Sessional nsliucloi in
lhe Depailmenl of Polilical Science
and a Reseaich Iellow al lhe
nslilule foi nleinalional Relalions
al lhe \niveisily of Biilish
Columbia, \ancouvei, Canada. He
ieceived his PhD fiom ueen`s
\niveisily in 1993. He specializes in
inleinalional secuiily, wilh a
ieseaich focus on Iuiopean secuiily
and peacekeeping. His iecenl
publicalions include A ManJatc Too
Iar. Thc Changing Naturc oj
Icacckccping anJ thc 1inits oj
Iorccthc Inplications jor
CanaJa, a ieseaich iepoil foi
lhe Commission of nquiiy inlo
lhe Deploymenl of Canadian
Ioices lo Somalia, Maich 1997,
and Clobal Iolitics. TrcnJs,
Currcnts, Dircctions, a co-
aulhoied inleinalional ielalions
lexlbook.
Mu nica Serranu is Piofessoi al lhe
Cenlio de Isludios nleinacionales
512 LST OI CONTRB\TORS
al Il Colegio de Me xico and
Reseaich Iellow al lhe Cenlie foi
nleinalional Sludies, Oxfoid
\niveisily, \K. She has published
exlensively on secuiily issues in
Lalin Ameiica and Mexican polilics.
Hei mosl iecenl publicalions
include: La dimension
inleinacional del cambio polilico en
Mexico`` (1999) and Tiansnalional
Oiganized Ciime in lhe Weslein
Hemispheie`` (1999).
Pe ter Ta las is Senioi Reseaich Iellow
of lhe nslilule of Slialegic and
Defence Sludies al lhe Nalional
Defence \niveisily in Budapesl,
Hungaiy. His ieseaich aclivily
addiesses mainly lhe polilical and
secuiily pioblems of Cenlial
Iuiopean counliies. As one of foui
co-aulhois he has iecenlly com-
pleled a book on lhe Kosovo ciisis.
Paul Taylur is Piofessoi of
nleinalional Relalions and Chaii of
lhe Depailmenl, London School of
Iconomics and Polilical Science,
London, \K. He specializes in
inleinalional oiganizalion wilhin lhe
Iuiopean \nion and lhe \niled
Nalions syslem. He has published
on lhe hisloiy and lheoiy of
inleinalional oiganizalion, on lhe
economic and social aiiangemenls
of lhe \niled Nalions and on lhe
polilics of lhe inslilulions of lhe
Iuiopean \nion. Mosl iecenlly he
has published Intcrnational
Organi;ation in thc MoJcrn VorlJ
(1993) and Thc 1uropcan Union in
thc 1990s (1996), and Docuncnts on
thc Rcjorn oj thc UnitcJ Nations
(wilh Daws and Adamczick-Geileis,
1997). He was ediloi of lhe Rcvicw
oj Intcrnational StuJics belween
1994 and 1997. He is a giaduale of
lhe \niveisily College of Wales,
Abeiyslwylh, and of LSI.
Ramesh Thakur is \ice Recloi and
Head of lhe Peace and Goveinance
Piogiamme, \niled Nalions
\niveisily, Tokyo. Aflei compleling
his undeigiaduale degiee al lhe
\niveisily of Calculla, he eained his
PhD in polilical sludies al ueen`s
\niveisily, Canada. Di. Thakui
laughl al lhe \niveisily of Olago,
New Zealand, fiom 198O lo 1995. n
1995, he was appoinled Piofessoi
and Head of lhe Peace Reseaich
Cenlie al lhe Auslialian Nalional
\niveisily in Canbeiia. n
Seplembei 2OOO he was selecled lo
be a membei of lhe nleinalional
Commission on nleivenlion and
Slale Soveieignly (CSS). Piofessoi
Thakui`s books include 14 volumes
in piinl. His lalesl ediled books aie
Iast Inpcrjcct, Iuturc UNccrtain.
Thc UnitcJ Nations at Iijty (1998)
and Nuclcar Vcapons-Ircc Zoncs
(1998). He is a iegulai conliibuloi
lo such newspapeis as lhe Asahi
Shinbun, lhe Asahi 1vcning Ncws,
lhe Asian Vall Strcct 1ournal, lhe
Australian, lhe Australian Iinancial
Rcvicw, lhe Intcrnational HcralJ
Tribunc, and lhe 1apan Tincs.
La szlu Yalki is a Piofessoi of
nleinalional Law al Io lvo s Loiand
\niveisily, Budapesl, Hungaiy. He
has wiillen exlensively on lhe iole
of inleinalional law in shaping
inleinalional ielalions. He is now
conducling ieseaich on NATO and
lhe Common Iuiopean Secuiily and
Defence Policy of lhe I\. As one
of foui co-aulhois he has iecenlly
compleled a book on lhe Kosovo
ciisis.
LST OI CONTRB\TORS 513
Zhang unling is a Piofessoi of
nleinalional Iconomics, cuiienlly
Diiecloi of lhe nslilule of Asia-
Pacinc Sludies, lhe nslilule of
1apanese Sludies, and lhe APIC
Policy Reseaich Cenlie al lhe
Chinese Academy of Social Science
(CASS), Bei|ing. He has held
visiling appoinlmenls al Haivaid
\niveisily, lhe School foi Advanced
nleinalional Sludies, 1ohns
Hopkins \niveisily (198586),
Aaihus \niveisily, Denmaik (1989),
lhe Iuiopean \niveisily nslilule al
Iloience (1992), and lhe
Massachusells nslilule of
Technology (1997). His iecenl
publicalions include: Thc Korcan
Markct 1cononic MoJcl (1996);
Thc Changing Rclations Bctwccn
China, US, anJ 1apan (1997);
1ibcrali;ation, Cooopcration anJ
Dcvclopncnt (1998); and
Conprchcnsivc Sccurity anJ Chinas
Sccurity Stratcgy (1999).
514 LST OI CONTRB\TORS
ndex
AbkhaziaGeoigia Wai 7374
Abiahams, Iied 398
Acl on Laboui Relalions \ndei Special
Ciicumslances (Kosovo) 53
Acl Resliicling Real Islale Tiansaclions
(Kosovo) 53
ACTWARN (Aclivalion Waining)
|NATOj 29
Afghanislan Wai 1O3, 363364, 382n.19
AIOR (Albania Ioice) 192
Ahlisaaii, Maaili 57, 134, 16O, 441
Aidde, Geneial 422
Air Iorcc Maga;inc 423
Albania
hisloiical associalion wilh Kosovo by 22
24
hisloiy of AlbanianSeib ielalions
and 4553
Kosovai iefugees in 6, 174
ielalionship belween laly and 172173
iesponse lo Kosovo conicl by 66
socio-economic backgiound of 2426
W.W. aulonomy of Kosovo fiom 21
scc also Kosovo Albanian populalion
Albanian Nalional Libeialion Commillee
foi Kosovo 2O21
Albanian queslion`` hisloiy 1922
Alba opeialion 173
Albiighl, Madeleine 277, 349, 45O, 458
Aliyev, Geldai 1O5
Alliance scc Opeialion Allied Ioice
Alliance of Iiee Democials (Hungaiy)
2O5
Allei, 1onalhan 351352
Amendmenl Piolocol (1985) |OASj 24On.8
Ameiican hypeipowei`` dangei 97, 181
Ameiican piepondeiance 9597
scc also \niled Slales
Amnesly nleinalional 393
Anaslasi|evic, Duska 6
ANC (Afiican Nalional Congiess) 248, 249,
25O
Anglo-Iiench 1oinl Declaialion on
Iuiopean Defense (1998) 139
Annan, Kon 13, 281, 286, 312, 385, 4O6, 489,
499
Anli-Ballislic Missile (ABM) Tiealy 285
anli-Powell slialegy,`` 421422
anli-secession`` noim 451
ARI (ASIAN Regional Ioium) 125
Aigenlina 232, 236
Aimenia
peiceplion of playeis in Kosovo ciisis by
79t
peispeclive of Kosovo conicl by 76
Aimenian diaspoia 76
515
Ailicle 2(4) (\N Chailei) 323
Ailicle 2(7) (\N Chailei) 292, 323, 451
Ailicle 2 (\N Chailei) 117, 121122
Ailicle 12 (\N Resolulion 1199) 296
Ailicle 13 (\N Resolulion 12O3) 296
Ailicle 29 (\niveisal Declaialion of Human
Righls) 395
Ailicle 3O (\niveisal Declaialion of Human
Righls) 395
Ailicle 51 (\N Chailei) 273
Ailicle 53(1) |\N Chaileij 13
ASIAN Regional Ioium (ARI) 125
Asgiimson, Halldo i 159
Associalion of Seibian Wiileis 49, 5O
asymmeliic waifaie
desciibed 448
new developmenls duiing Kosovo
conicl 449
scc also mililaiy hisloiy
aulhoiily and legilimacy concepls 5OO
5O2
Axwoilhy, Lloyd 193
Azeibai|an 8Ot
Azeii 7677
Aznai, 1ose Maiia 196197
B-92 iadio slalion 389
Bakei, 1ames 94
Balkan Aclion Council 389, 393
Balkan League (1912) 2O
Balkan Slabilily Pacl 129, 313
Balladui plan 129
Balzai, 1ohn 362
Banac, vo 45
Ballle of Kosovo (1389) 2324, 49
Beavei, Paul 281
Belgium 188192
Belgiade Cenlie foi Human Righls 389
Bell, Coial 12
Bennell, Robeil 352
Beilin Wall fall (199O) 273
bilaleialism inleinalional oidei 254
Bildl, Cail 128, 161162
Blaii, Tony 12O, 137138, 139, 144, 196,
197, 28O, 35O, 429, 44O
Bondevik, Piime Minislei (Noiway) 159
Bonioi, David 353
Bosnia
compaied lo Peisian Gulf Wai 422
incoiiecl lessons leained fiom 266, 355
356
NATO aii sliikes in 275, 277, 392, 423
424
Opeialion Delibeiale Ioice (1995)
and 423424
pioleclion of Muslims in 4O7
iefugee populalion in 3OO
scc also SIOR (Slabilizalion Ioice)
|NATOj
BosniaHeizegovina slabilizalion 3
BosniaHeizegovina wai 54
Bosnian Muslims 4O7, 412
Bosnian Peace Agieemenl (1995) 274
Boulios-Ghali, Boulios 97, 252, 4O6
Biazil 232, 233, 236, 243n.42
Biyce, 1ames 358
Bulgaiia 7O71, 284
Bu ndnis 9OjDie Giu nen coalilion
(Geimany) 133
Buichill, Scoll 493
Buikhallei, Holly 391
Bush, Geoige 95, 117, 348, 361
Calic, Maiie-1anine 5
Calvo Docliine (1868) 239n.1
Cambodia 324, 329, 489
Canada 193195, 225, 226, 239n.5
CARI 389
Cailsson, ngvai 162
Caino|evic, Paliiaich Aiseni|e 5O
Cailei, 1immy 91
casuallies issue
as democialic culluie dilemma 472
domeslic vs. inleinalional values
and 479n.16
duiing Kosovo conicl 422423, 429,
443444, 461n.14
duiing Peisian Gulf Wai 363t 447n.17
Calholic Relief Seivices 389
Ceku, Agim 3O6
Cenlial Ameiican Tiealy foi Democialic
Secuiily 227228
Cenlial Iuiopean public opinion 38Ot
Cenlie Paily (Iinland) 16O
CISP (Common Ioieign and Secuiily
Policy) 135
Chaplei \ (\N Chailei) 29, 331
Chaplei \ (\N Chailei) 267, 275, 292,
295, 296, 3O4, 32O, 324, 325, 326, 397
Chaplei \ (\N Chailei) 32O
Chapullepec agieemenls (1992) 228
516 NDIX
Chechnya 1O3, 451
chemical weapons 421
Cheinomyidin, \ikloi 57, 111, 135, 3O6,
369, 441
Chiapas (Mexico) 236
Chile 225, 231, 232, 235, 236, 237, 243n.43
China
ciilicism of NATO by 8, 117, 125
feais of \S led coalilion againsl 123124
new woild oidei pioposals by 124126
possible alliance wilh ndia 268
posl-Cold Wai conceins of 122124
iesislance lo soveieignly and human
iighls link by 298
iesponse lo NATO aii sliikes by 117,
296
view of Kosovo ciisis by 118119, 46O
view of posl-Cold Wai oidei by 119122
China Sociely foi Human Righls 119
Chinese embassy bombing (Belgiade) 118
119, 135, 246, 257258, 372373, 44O,
458
Chiiac, 1acques 13O, 312, 35O
Chuichill, Winslon 349
CA\ (nleinalional Commission foi
Suppoil and \eiincalion) 229
CS (Commonweallh of ndependenl
Slales) 1O41O5
Cilizens` Movemenl (Iiance) 132
civil sociely 387
scc also NGOs (non-goveinmenlal
oiganizalions)
C1TIs (Combined 1oinl Task Ioices) 275
276
Claik, Wesley 135, 138, 139, 144, 28O, 437
Clinlon adminislialion
new condilions of Ameiican
peacekeeping by 325326
oulcome of Kosovo slialegy by 355356
ieluclance lo iisk casuallies by 363t 422
423, 429, 472, 479n.16
Wilsonian view adopled by 9293
Clinlon, Bill
accused of ignoiing \ielnam lessons 352
on humanilaiian inleivenlion 13, 459
Kosovo ciisis desciibed by 45O, 455
Munich analogy used by 34935O
on NATO aii sliikes 117
iegaiding Ameiican inleivenlion 88
on Russian iole in Kosovo conicl 458
lension belween Blaii and 137138
visil lo Rwanda by 398
Clinlon Docliine 879O, 356
CNN (Cable News Nelwoik)
Kosovo conicl coveiage by 365, 369375
NATO bombing mislakes`` coveiage by
373t374t
Peisian Gulf coveiage by 364
scc also media
lhe CNN effecls``
desciibed 2, 36O362
impacl on 379, 381
measuies of polenlial 375379
Cohen, Slephen 351
Cohen, William 138
Coicaud, 1ean-Maic 12
Cold Wai
Belgium duiing 189
ndian polilical syslem wilh ending of
261262
NATO docliine duiing 274
Cologne confeience (1999) 143, 177, 2O5
Combined 1oinl Task Ioice concepl 142
Commission on Global Democials 162
communaulaiie`` appioach 186187
Communisl Paily (Poilugal) 187
Compiehensive Tesl-ban Tiealy 254
Confeiences of London (1913) 33
conicl iesolulionjmanagemenl NGOs 388
Conslilulion of 1974 (ugoslavia) 48, 49,
6On.1O
lhe Conlacl Gioup (Kosovo)
appeal foi negolialions by 2829, 56
goals suppoiled by 136137
lalian iole in 16917O
1997 meeling by 12913O
\S and \niled Kingdom use of NATO
inslead of 115n.33
scc also Rambouillel peace agieemenl
(1999)
Convenlion Againsl Genocide 396
Convenlional Ioices in Iuiope Tiealy 284
Cook, Robin 13O, 137, 138, 14O
Cooidinaling Boaid of Albanian Polilical
Pailies of Kosovo 22
Coppei, Kuilis 381
Council on Ioieign Relalions 88
Covey, 1ames 3O4
Cox Repoil 123124, 458459
Cioalia
incoiiecl lessons leained fiom 266
NDIX 517
Cioalia (conl.)
iefugee populalion in 3OO
iesponse lo Kosovo conicl by 7O
CSCI (Confeience on Secuiily and
Coopeialion in Iuiope) 275, 486
Csuika, slva n 2O4
cuius rcgio cius rcligio foimula 321
Cypius 171, 178, 293
Czech Republic 2O9211, 284
Daily Tclcgraph 378
DÀlema, Massimo 167
Damiosch, Loii Iislei 12
Danchev, Alex 493
Daiwin, Chailes 322
Day, Sii 1ohn 138
Daylon Peace Accoids (1995)
elhnic cleansing ignoied by 32O
failuies of 266, 294
CT aclivily and 412
ndian analysls on 262
KLA oiigins and 3, 28, 34, 5455
moial culpabilily foi 263
NATO aii sliikes againsl Bosnia leading
lo 275, 277, 392
on oulei wall of sanclions,`` 59n.2
Declaialion of San 1ose (1997) 228
Dehaene, 1ean-Luc 19O, 191
DeLay, Tom 352
Delian League 181
Demaci, Adem 27
Dem|aha, Agon 6
demociacies
giowing democialic enlillemenl in
481n.3O
Kanlian hypolhesis on 89
Lalin Ameiican piomolion of 225226,
241n.12
\S Wilsonian piomolion of 9293, 98n.4
scc also inleinalional democialic culluie;
Weslein poweis
Democialic Movemenl (Kosovo Seib
opposilion) 39
Denmaik
behavioi in Kosovo ciisis by 153158
debale ovei acceplance of Kosovai
iefugees 156158, 164n.17
mililaiy conliibulion lo NATO by 154
156
oveiview of 151, 152, 153
Deiycke, Iiik 191192
Deleimined Ialcon`` aii manoeuvies
(NATO) 154
DIA (Depailmenl of Ioieign Affaiis)
|Soulh Afiicaj 25O
Dimiliievich, \o|in 389
docliine of iepiesenlalion 328
domeslic |uiisdiclion 336
scc also slale soveieignly
Dovei Aiifoice Base 362
Diago Docliine (19O2) 239n.1
DRC (Democialic Republic of lhe Congo)
247
Dinovsek, 1anez 69
Duke, Robeila Haai 59
Duke, Simon 8, 144
Dunne, Tim 493
Iachus, Todd 361
Iaslein Iuiopean public opinion 38Ot
Iasl Timoi ciisis 315, 495n.32
Icevil, Piime Minislei (Tuikey) 176
Icology Paily (Sweden) 162
ICOMOG (Mililaiy Obseivei Gioup)
331332
Iconomic nslilule of Belgiade 313
ICOWAS (Iconomic Communily of Wesl
Afiican Slales) 1O, 331
Iducalion agieemenl of 1996
(Memoiandum of \ndeislanding)
27, 34, 53, 55, 56, 137
Igypl 218
Ihihail, Hans-Geoig 8, 142
1l Iat s (Madiid newspapei) 181
Il Salvadoi 229
emeigency humanilaiian inleivenlion
polilical ob|eclives lhiough 4O9
piincipled guidelines goveining 4O54O8
piinciples goveining use of mililaiy foice
in 4O841O
single univeisal slandaid foi 41O411
scc also humanilaiian inleivenlion
IM\ (Iuiopean Iconomic and Monelaiy
\nion) 167
1rJcnovic case 413, 419n.42
ISD (Iuiopean Secuiily and Defense
denlily) 131, 139, 184, 186, 19O, 195,
197, 283
Isquipulas plan 229
elhnic cleansing
of Albanian populalion in Kosovo 2728,
36, 57, 113n.6, 425, 497, 526
518 NDIX
compaiison of Nazi genocide lo Seibian
332, 351
exaggeialion of numbei of viclims of
113n.6
hisloiy of Kosovo elhnic iivaliy and 45
53
ignoied by Daylon Peace Accoids 32O
impacl of NATO aii sliikes on 43n.1O
implicalions foi NATO`s aii campaign
427
nleinalional Ciiminal Tiibunal
invesligalion inlo 311, 391, 4O6, 4O8,
411413, 414
Madeleine Albiighl`s haid line againsl
349
NGOs moniloiing of 393, 3974OO
Soulh Afiican iesponse lo Kosovo 247
249
special iesponsibilily iole of Geimany
and 133
scc also human iighls violalions
I\ Balkan Reconsliuclion Oiganizalion
178
I\ Common Ioieign and Secuiily Policy
177
I\ (Iuiopean \nion)
CNN effecls on public suppoil in 376
377, 378t
defeience lo \S by 177178
fuluie implicalions of Kosovo inleiven-
lion by 145147
giound invasion consideied by 145
Lalin Ameiican slales and 228229
NATO iole in defense of 282283
Opeialion Allied Ioice by 128
posilive legalily |udicial docliine of 414
sidelining of \N Secuiily Council by
141147
Slabilily Pacl summil (Saia|evo 1999)
by 69, 132, 177, 2O5
\NHCR iole of 3O4
\S iole in defense of 282283
scc also Weslein poweis
Iuiopean Council summil (1999) 142
143
Iuiopean Iiee Tiade Associalion 185
Ialk, Richaid 92
Iedeial Iund foi lhe Developmenl of
\ndeideveloped Regions 47
Iield of Kosovo (1389) 2324, 49
Iiflh Meeling of Consullalion of Minisleis
of Ioieign Affaiis (OAS) 225
Iinland 151, 152, 15916O
Iischei, David Hackell 356
Iischei, 1oschka 133, 143, 35O
Iischei Peace Plan`` (Geimany) 134
foice pioleclion`` noim 451, 452
Iounding Acl on Mulual Relalions,
Coopeialion and Secuiily Belween
NATO and lhe Russian Iedeialion
(1997) 1O5
Iiance
Conlacl Gioup iole by 129132
iesponse lo Russia by 131
Iianco, Iiancisco 195
Iieedom \nion (Czech Republic) 21O
Iiee Tiade Agieemenl (MexicoCanada
\S) 234
Iiench Communisl Paily 132
IR (Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia)
aii defense syslem of 435
complainls aboul inleivenlion by 4O5
4O6, 417n.21
conneclions belween Soulh Afiica
and 24925O
inleinalional confused iesponse lo 3
Kosovo conicl oiigins in 34, 2628
lifling of sanclions againsl (1995) 28
MililaiyTechnical Agieemenl (1999)
belween NATO and 3O, 37, 4O
Russian inleiesls in conicl in 1O2, 1O3
1O4, 1O81O9
Slovenia and Cioalia independence
fiom 2122
soveieignly of 314, 335, 337
lies belween ndia and 261262
Weslein poweis on succession of Kosovo
fiom 478n.6
Weslein piinciples applied lo boundaiies
of 292293
W.W. ieoiganizalion of 2O21
scc also Socialisl Iedeial Republic of
ugoslavia; ugoslavia
Iunnell, Ray 498
IROM (Ioimei ugoslav Republic of
Macedonia) 168, 173, 174175
G-8 counliies
Kosovo ciisis plan by 134, 135, 3O3, 314,
457
shifl of inleinalional cenlie lo 15
NDIX 519
G-8 summil (1999) 285
Gaei, Ielice 11
Gama, 1aime 186, 187
GATT (Geneial Agieemenl on Taiiffs and
Tiade) 256
Gelb, Les 88
Geneial Iiamewoik Agieemenl (1996) 3
Geneva Convenlions (1949) 292, 41O,
417n.26
genocide scc elhnic cleansing; human iighls
violalions
Genocide Convenlion 324, 41O
Geoigia
peiceplion of playeis in Kosovo ciisis
by 79t
peiceplions of Kosovo ciisis in 7475
wai belween Abkhazia and 7374
GeoigianAbkhaz wai (199293) 7374
geoslialegic inleivenlion |uslincalion 465
469
Geiman Iedeial Aimed Ioices 133
Geimany
dependence on \S mililaiy by 135136
elhnic cleansing and special iesponsibilily
of 133
Kosovo conicl iole by 132136
NATO and unincalion of 9394
iesponse lo NATO aii sliikes by 133134
Glennon, Michael 1. 122
Gligoiov, Piesidenl (Macedonia) 262
GN\ (Goveinmenl of Nalional \nily) 249,
252, 253
Goibachev, M. 93, 94, 95
Goin|e Obiin|e massacie 393
Goss, Poilei 279
Gianalslein, 1ack 193
Gieal Biilain scc \niled Kingdom
The Gieal Migialion (17lh cenluiy) 495O,
61n.18
Gieece
alliludes lowaid Kosovo conicl in 167
168
ciisis silualions affecling 17O171
culluial, hisloiic, ieligious afnnilies of
172173
domeslic polilical issues of 175176
impacl of NATO aii sliikes on 176178
Kosovo conicl lessons foi 178179
loyally lo alliance by 16917O
iefugee issue and 173174
slabilily of 174175
Gieek Thiace 171
Gieen Paily (Iiance) 132, 136
Gieen Paily (Geimany) 35O
Gienada 351
Gioom, 1ohn 14
giound invasion scc Kosovo giound
invasion
Gualemala 227, 229
Gulf Wai scc Peisian Gulf Wai (1991)
Gulosino, Chaiisse 8O
Guleiies, Anlonio 186, 187
Gulhiie, Sii Chailes 138, 139
Hkkeiup, Hans 156
Hagen, William 332
Haglund, David 8
Hague Tiibunal 57
Hague, William 137
Haili 242n.25, 243n.29
Havel, \aclav 4O9
Hayden, Tom 352
Heikal, Mohamed Hassanein 22O
Helms-Builon Acl (1996) 96
Helsinki Iinal Acl (1975) 91
Helsinki Gioup 389
Helsinki Piesidency Conclusions 143
Helsinki summil (1999) 143
Hill, Chiis 137
Hillmei, Noiman 193
Historians Iallacics (Iischei) 356
hisloiy scc mililaiy hisloiy
Hillei, Adolf 348, 349, 351, 354
Hoagland, 1im 446
Ho Chi Minh 351, 352
Holbiooke-Milosevic Agieemenl (1998) 29,
35, 63n.44
Holbiooke, Richaid 29, 35, 63n.44, 369,
424, 45O
Honduias 229
Howaid, Michael 348
Howeidy, Iahmy 216
Hoxha, Invei 46, 47
HRW (Human Righls Walch) 392, 393,
398, 399
Hu 1inglao 119
humanilaiian ciisesjmedia coveiage (1998
1999) 365, 366t
scc also media
humanilaiian inleivenlion
in lhe 199Os 324327
Ameiican piepondeiance and 9597
52O NDIX
Clinlon on 13, 88
cosls of 341342
debale ovei limiled 477n.3, 498499
inleinalional law, soveieignly and 337
338
inleinalional sociely and 338341
lalian Pelican`` and Alba,`` 172173
Kosovo conicl and
compaiing lo olhei ciisis 146147
dilemmas of democialic culluie and
469474
feasibilily of 328332
implicalions foi fuluie 474477
inleinalional law and 327328
|uslined by human iighls violalions 14,
13O131, 32O321
|uslined by solidaiily and geoslialegy
264469
legacy of NATO aii sliikes lo mililaiy 97,
444445
libeial inleinalional lheoiy on 321324
by mililaiy foices 3O2
moialily lo conducl 491492
new inleivenlionalism`` docliine
goveining 121122
NGOs
aclive in 388, 389, 393396
assessing effecliveness of 4OO4O1
noims goveining aclivilies of 393396
noims iesliaining aclivilies of 396
4OO
as pielexl foi achieving polilical
ob|eclivees 4O9
piinciples guiding uigenl
consideialions foi 4O7
goveining use of mililaiy foice 4O8
41O
need foi using 4O54O8
seleclive law enfoicemenl and 411
414
single univeisal slandaid foi 91, 292,
395, 41O411, 417n.19
Soulh Afiican conceins wilh Weslein
252253
by Soulhein Ilank counliies 173174
\N Chailei eiosion and 267268
weakness of humanily and 479n.14
scc also mililaiy foice inleivenlion;
NATO aii sliikes; iefugee
populalion
Humanilaiian Law Cenlie 389
humanilaiian wai 487492
human iighls
Iiench champion of 13O131
Geneva Convenlions (1949) on 292, 41O,
417n.26
inleinalional law and noims of 9192,
41O411, 48On.28, 4995OO
modined slalism appioach lo 488
NGOs aclive in 388, 389, 393, 394
iising salience of 9O93
soveieignly linked lo 298299
univeisal slandaid foi 91, 292, 395, 41O
411, 417n.19
\S focus on Lalin Ameiica and 241n.11
Human Righls Convenlion 225
human iighls violalions
againsl Seibians 4O6, 497
ignoied due lo soveieignly iighls 497
498
inleivenlion |uslined by 14, 13O131,
32O321
by Khmei Rouge 489
duiing Kosovo conicl 2728, 36, 57,
113n.6, 425, 497, 526
media coveiage of 478n.1O
NGOs moniloiing of 393, 394
OAS meeling on Dominican Republic
225
pioleclion of Kosovo Muslims fiom 219
seleclive pioseculion vs. posilive legalily
docliines and 413414
\N denuncialion of Kosovo conicl 235
scc also elhnic cleansing
Human Righls Walch (HRW) 392, 393,
398, 399
Hungaiy 2O12O6, 284
Hu Shicun 12O
Hussein, Saddam 295, 297, 348, 351
Hulu 326
celand 151, 152, 159
C1 (nleinalional Couil of 1uslice) 311,
314, 417n.21
CRC (nleinalional Commillee of lhe Red
Cioss) 291, 3O2
CT (nleinalional Ciiminal Tiibunal foi
lhe Ioimei ugoslavia) 311, 391,
4O6, 4O8, 411413, 414
DPs (inleinally displaced peisons) |elhnic
Geoigiansj 74
scc also iefugee populalions
NDIX 521
Is (inleinalional nnancial inslilulions)
229
IOR (mplemenlalion Ioice) |NATOj 3,
67, 153, 154, 275, 422
kenbeiiy, 1ohn 8
llyiia 22
scc also Albania
ndependenl Sludenls` \nion of lhe
\niveisily of Piislina 34
ndia
conceins on fuluie of \N by 268
conliibulion lo \niled Nalions 26O261
Peace-Keeping Ioice in Sii Lanka 262
possible alliance wilh Russia and
China 268269
lies belween ugoslavia and 261262
nilialive of lhe Ameiicas (OAS) 24On.7
nslilule foi Wai and Peace Repoiling 389
nlei-Ameiican Commission on Human
Righls 225, 239n.3
nlei-Ameiican Human Righls Convenlion
225, 239n.3
nlei-Ameiican Human Righls Couil 225
nlei-Ameiican 1uiidical Commillee 227
nleinalional Bill of Human Righls 91
inleinalional cilizens
dislinclions belween aliens and 483485
humanilaiian wai and 487492
lessons of Kosovo conicl foi 1112
mullilaleialism in woild polilics and 253
257
scc also slale soveieignly; Weslein
poweis
nleinalional Conlacl Gioup scc lhe
Conlacl Gioup
nleinalional Covenanls on Civil and
Polilical Righls and Iconomic,
Social, and Culluial Righls (1967)
394, 41O
nleinalional Ciiminal Couil (pioposed) 97
nleinalional Ciiminal Tiibunal foi Ioimei
ugoslavia (CT) 311, 391, 4O6,
4O8, 411413, 414
nleinalional Ciisis Gioup 389, 393
inleinalional democialic culluie
Kosovo inleivenlion
dilemmas and modaliliesjoulcomes
of 47O472
dilemmas of 47O
solidaiily and geoslialegy of 464469
liademaik appioach lo conicl and 463
464
\N aulhoiily and legilimacy in 5OO5O2
scc also demociacies; posl-Cold Wai
inleinalional oidei
nleinalional Helsinki Iedeialion 392
nleinalional nslilule foi Slialegic Sludies
(London) 5O3
inleinalional law
Danish naval blockade as violalion of
156
humanilaiian inleivenlion in Kosovo
and 327328, 337338
human iighls noims and 9192, 41O411,
48On.28, 4995OO
Kosovo conicl and feais ovei 1O61O7
NATO aii sliikes as violalion of 176
noims vs. 461n.7
seleclive pioseculion vs. posilive legalily
docliines and 413414
nleinalional Monelaiy Iund 229
inleinalional oideijsociely scc poslCold
Wai inleinalional oidei
nleinalional Oilhodox Chiislian
Chaiilies 389
nleinalional Rescue Commillee 389, 397
inleinalional solidaiily 464465, 467469
inleivenlion scc humanilaiian inleivenlion;
mililaiy inleivenlion
OM (nleinalional Oiganizalion foi
Migialion) 315
ian 219
iaq 2, 297, 31932O, 42O421
scc also Peisian Gulf Wai (1991)
laly
culluial, hisloiic, ieligious afnnilies
of 172173
slabilily of 174175
1ackson, Sii Michael 139, 144, 298
1ames, Alan 1O
1edi Knighls`` meeling 138
1iang Zemin 123
1ohnson, Lyndon 35O351, 352
522 NDIX
1oinl Declaialion on Iuiopean Defence
141, 142
1ones, Keely 358
jus aJ bcllun (|usl wai) 321
Kanlian hypolhesis on demociacies 89
Kaia di, Mallhias 8, 143
Kaiawan, biahim 9
Keegan, 1ohn 355, 421
Kelmendi, Aziz 51
KIOR (NATO-led Kosovo Ioice)
accused of failing Kosovo Seibs 38
Danish commilmenl of lioops lo 157
eslablishmenl of 3O
issues of suslaining 146, 287
mililaiy oiganizalion of 3O4, 3O5
posilive negalive effecls of 6869
Resolulion 1244 and 37, 4O, 135, 177, 237,
3O23O3
Russian involvemenl in 112
Spanish conliibulion lo 196
Swedish commilmenl of lioops lo 162
\S Maiine delay in |oining 14O
scc also peacekeeping
Khamenei, Ayalollah Ali 219
Khmei Rouge 489
Khong, uen Ioong 347, 357
Khulsishvili, Geoige 8O
Kipponen, Piime Minislei (Iinland) 16O
Kissingei, Heniy 121
KLA (Kosovo Libeialion Aimy)
agieemenl lo dissolve 5OO
allacks on Seib police by 263
collaboialion belween NATO and 441,
499
conliibulions lo escalaling conicl by
56
cuiienl polilical slalus of 38, 39
independence claims by 465, 5O3
inleinalional iecognilion of 171
mililaiy slienglh of 3O4, 3O5
oiigins of 4, 28, 34, 55
peiceplions by Geoigia, Aimenia, and
Azeibai|an of 79t8Ot
piesence in iefugee camps of 174
Seibian foices vs. 425427
Seibian piisoneis in hands of 314
signing ofjviolalion of Rambouillel
agieemenl by 286
solidaiily and geoslialegic aigumenls
made by 469
violalion of Resolulion 1199 by 278
scc also Kosovo Pioleclion Coips
Klaus, \aclav 21O
Knji;cvnc novinc |ouinal 49
Kohul, Andiew 362, 364
Koiean peninsula 124
Kosovai piisoneis of wai 313314
Kosovo
aulonomous slalus eslablished by 2122
as biilhplace of Seibian nalion 59n.4
cuiienl silualionjfuluie developmenls in
3941
desliuclion of infiasliucluie in 6
end of aulomony in 5355
eslablished as Republic of Kosovo 22
elhnic populalion of 23
fuluie oplions foi 315317
hisloiical peiceplions and associalions
lo 2224
hisloiy of Albanian queslion in 1922
lack of soveieignly by 335
mililaiy opeialions duiing conicl by
434435
mineial deposils of 26
NGOs (non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions)
aclive in 38739O
oiigins of elhnic iivaliy in 4453
poinls in commonjdiffeience wilh
Soulhein Caucasus 7273
ieconsliuclion of 31O312
Seibian and Albanian claims lo 19
\N guaianleed soveieignly of 314
Weslein poweis iegaiding secession of
478n.6
scc also iefugee populalions
Kosovo Albanian populalion
allegalions of iape by 5O51
declining economicjpolilical posilion
of 2728
elhnic cleansing of 2728, 36, 43n.1O, 57,
113n.6, 425, 526
Kosovo mylh on genocide piacliced
by 495O, 61n.18
Milosevic Kosovo cycle`` and 5153
non-violenl iesislance by 59n.1
Racak massacie (1999) of 35
ielalions belween Seibs and 4553
iepaiiing ielalions belween Seibs and 58
syslemalic disciiminalion againsl 5355
NDIX 523
Kosovo bombing scc NATO aii sliikes
(Kosovo 1999)
Kosovo conicl
accomplishmenlsjoulcomesjlegacy of 1O
11, 1215, 4142, 97, 285287, 316
317, 444445, 457459, 5O25O3
Chinese view of 118119
CNN coveiage of 365, 369375
communaulaiie`` appioach lo 186187
feai of casuallies duiing 363t 422423,
429, 443444, 461n.14, 472, 479n.16
Iiench iole in 129132
Geiman iole in 132136
giound invasion duiing 145, 428431, 454
hisloiical legacies leading lo 1922
hisloiical signincance of 1, 433434
humanilaiian inleivenlion
compaiing lo olhei ciisis 146147
cosls of 341342
dilemmas of democialic culluie
and 469474
feasibilily of 328332
implicalions foi fuluie
inleivenlions 474477
inleinalional law and 327328, 337
338
inleinalional ie-examinalion of 4O8
411
13O131, 32O321
|uslined by solidaiily and
geoslialegy 464469
impacl of \ielnam syndiome on 348355
inleiesls of inleinalional communily
in 455457
inleinalional iesponse lo 79
Lalin Ameiican iesponses lo 232237
lessons of inleinalional cilizenship by 11
12
lessons foi Muslim counliies fiom 215
219
long-leim conceplual challenges of 911
Madeleine Albiighl`s iole in 349
NATO and
analysis of opeialions by 441444
nve iesponses by 1315
impacl of NATO-\N ielalions on 281
282
ob|eclives duiing 279281, 435436
opeialions of 437441
in posl-Cold Wai conlexl 293294
slialegies duiing 277278, 436437
new iules of soveieignly iecognilion and
485487
199699 peiiod of 3436
noims
slialegies and 452455
wai ovei 45O452
opposing sides of 434435
oiigins of 37, 2628, 5557
posl-Maich 1999 peiiod of 3637
pie1995 peiiod of 3234
iegional neighbois iesponse lo 6572
seleclive naluie of iesponse lo 146147
small poweis of alliance and 183198
Soulhein Caucasus
Aimenian peispeclive of 76
Azeii peispeclive on 7677
dispules in Geoigia and 7374
Geoigian peiceplions of 7475
Nagoino-Kaiabakh conicl and 7576
poinls in commonjdiffeience belween
Kosovo and 7273
as splil-scieen wai 43O431
as lesl case of new woild oidei 217
lolalizing pio|ecl`` concepl and 484485
\niled Nalions iole in
diplomacy ovei bombing of Seibia
2953OO
diiving faclois in 291295
ielalions wilh NATO 281282
Resolulion 1244 and 37, 4O, 135, 177,
237, 3O23O3, 3O63O7, 317
\NMK and iefugees and
ieconsliuclion 29, 291, 295, 3OO3O2,
3O3312
\S opposilion lo 461n.13
scc also elhnic cleansing; NATO aii
sliikes (Kosovo)
Kosovo Conlacl Gioup scc lhe Conlacl
Gioup
Kosovo Diplomalic Obseivei
Mission 114n.3O
Kosovo giound invasion
consideied by I\ 145
following NATO aii sliikes 428431
slialegic difncullies of 454
scc also NATO aii sliikes (Kosovo,
1999)
Kosovo mylh on Albanian genocide 495O,
61n.18
524 NDIX
Kosovo policy developmenls
Ameiican news coveiage and 364365
CNN effecls on 2, 36O362, 379, 381
impacl of ieal-lime media on 361t
media`s impedimenls lo 362364
Kosovo Pioleclion Coips 3O6, 5OO
scc also KLA (Kosovo Libeialion Aimy)
Kosovo Seibian populalion
dominalion ovei Albanians by 5355
migialion of 6On.16
oiigins of iivaliy belween Albanian
and 4453
iepaiiing ielalions belween Albanians
and 58
scc also Seibians
Kosovo \eiincalion Mission (\N) 4OO
Koslakos, Geoigios 8
Kouchnei, Beinaid 3O3, 3O7, 315
Kova cs, La szlo 2O3
Kiaulhammei, Chailes 89
Kiuds 297
KS\ (Chiislian Social \nion) |Sloveniaj
69
Kuwail 2
K\M (Kosovo \eiincalion Mission) 35
Lalin Ameiican slales
Canadian Lalin Ameiican slialegy``
and 226227
globalizalion and economic inlegialion
of 22923O
peiceplions on \S unilaleial
inleivenlion 23O232
piinciple of non-inleivenlion in 224, 237
238, 239n.1
iegime foi piomoling demociacy in 225
226, 241n.12
iesponses lo Kosovo ciisis by 232237
iole of inleinalional oiganizalions
in 228229
\S focus on human iighls in 241n.11
Laviov, Seigei 3OO
Lazai, Piince 23
LBD (\nined Democialic Movemenl)
3O7
LDK (Democialic League of Kosovo) 33,
38
League of Nalions Covenanl (1919) 91
League of Piizien (1878) 24
Lefl Paily (Sweden) 162
legilimale aulhoiily concepl 5OO5O2
1c MonJc 3OO
Lesolho (Soulh Afiica) 251
libeial inleinalional lheoiy 321324
Libeial Paily (Sweden) 162
Libeiia peacekeeping opeialion 331
Lighlbuin, David 276
Lind, Anna 161
Linklalei, Andiew 12
Livingslon, Sleven 11, 361
London Confeience of 1839 188
1os Angclcs Tincs 362
Loll, Tienl 353
Lukashenko, Piesidenl 1O4
Lullwak, Idwaid N. 363, 364
McCain, 1ohn 352353, 355
Macedonia
included in Kingdom of Seibs 2O
Kosovai iefugees in 6
Mac1cans magazine 351
Madeleine`s Wai,`` 349
scc also Kosovo conicl
MalvinasjIalklands Wai 242n.28
Manchuiian invasion 231
Mandela, Nelson 246, 247248
nanu nilitari (self-help docliine) 293
Mailonyl, 1a nos 2O5
Malic, \eian 389
Maxwell, Kennelh 186
Mayall, 1ames 1O
MC 327 NATO peacekeeping docliine
(1992) 275
MC 4OOj1 NATO peacekeeping docliine
(1999) 276
Mechanism foi Consullalion and Polilical
Conceilalion 228
Me decins sans Iionlie` ies 389, 392
media
accuiacy of iepoils by 264
Chinese embassy bombing coveied by
372373
eslablishmenl of new Kosovo 3O7
hale-speech`` used by 61n.25
humanilaiian inleivenlion pailneiship of
NGOs and 1112
human iighls violalions coveied
by 478n.1O
as impedimenls lo policy 362364
Kosovo coveiage (19981999) by
Ameiican 368
NDIX 525
media (conl.)
Kosovo policy and Ameiican 364365
Milosevic`s conliol ovei 51, 61n.23
mislaken piediclions by 446n.3
of Muslim counliies 216217
NATO aii sliikes coveiage by 372375
NATO`s allacks ciilicized by Slovenian
7O
Opeialion Allied Ioice use of 11
polenlial policy effecls of global 361t362
iefugee sloiies coveied by 372
iegaiding \ielnam syndiome 352
iepoils of Albanian demands by
ugoslav 47
Russian and Seibian ielalions iepoiled on
by 457458
Seibian delainmenl of membeis
of 383n.22
scc also CNN (Cable News Nelwoik)
Membeiship Aclion Plan (NATO) 284
Memoiandum SAN\`` (1986) 49, 61n.17
Memoiandum of \ndeislanding (Rugovoa
and Milsoevic) |1996j 27, 34, 53, 55,
56, 137
Meicosul 227, 23O, 233
Meicy Coips nleinalional 389
Mexico 23O, 232, 233237, 238239, 244n.46
MIP (Paily foi Hungaiian 1uslice and
Life) 2O12O2
mililaiy foice inleivenlion
debale ovei human iighls and limiled
477n.3, 498499
dilemmas of democialic culluie and 469
474
feai of casuallies impacl on 363t 422
423, 429, 443444, 472, 479n.16
giound wai following aii sliikes by 428
431
Gulf Wai legacy foi 42O422
implicalions of Kosovo foi fuluie 474
477
13O131, 3O2, 32O321
|uslined by solidaiily and geoslialegy
464469
KLA vs. Seibian 425427
legacy of NATO aii sliikes lo use of 97,
444445
moialily of humanilaiian 491492
naluie of alliances wilh \S 444445
Powell Docliine on 353, 421422, 439
piinciples goveining use of 4O841O
piopoilionalily piinciple applied lo
494n.17
slialegic coeicion of Milosevic using 277,
278, 286, 423425
scc also humanilaiian inleivenlion;
NATO aii sliikes (Kosovo 1999);
Opeialion Allied Ioice
mililaiy hisloiy
fallacy of dependence on 356358
impacl on Kosovo conicl and \ielnam
348355
incoiiecl lessons fiom Bosnia conicl
266, 355356
lessons of Second Woild Wai 349, 351,
354355
\ielnam syndiome and iepealing 348
349
scc also asymmeliic waifaie
|NATO-ugoslav mililaiyj 3O, 37, 4O
Mill, 1ohn Sluail 322
Milosevic, Slobodan
accepls peace pioposal 57, 441, 447n.14
agiees lo pailial wilhdiawal (1998) 29,
35, 63n.44
blame placed by 1O3
compaiison lo Hillei 351, 354
Conlacl Gioup demands of 129
conliol ovei media by 51, 61n.23
ciiminal indiclmenl of 311, 498
declaialion iegaiding Poilugal and
Gieece by 188
denance of \N iesolulions by 13
demonizalion of 294
Iducalion Agieemenl signed by 34
expulsion of Albanians by 6
foiced lo accepl OSCI \eiincalion
Mission 56
use of ideological oilhodoxy by 5152
NATO aii sliikes lo foice hand of 277,
278, 286, 423425, 436437
iehabililalion of Seibia and posilion of
313, 314315
Seibian nalionalism piomoled by 21, 51
52, 53
Soulh Afiica accused of pailialily lo 247
249
minoiily iighls`` noim 451
526 NDIX
MOD (Biilish Minisliy of Defense) 138
Modeiale Paily (Sweden) 161
modined slalism 488
Mogadishu Ballle (Somalia 1993) 363
Mollei, B|oin 8
Monioe Docliine 23O
Monlenegio 67
Moiina, Rahman 47
Molhei Theiesa Sociely 389
Mozambique 324
mulliculluialism`` noim 451
mullilaleialism inleinalional oidei
inleinalional cilizenship and 253257
inleinalional woild oidei as 254255
as Soulh Afiican appioach 246247, 255
257
scc also poslCold Wai inleinalional
oidei
Munich analogy 34935O
Munich confeience (1938) 349
Muiad , Sullan (Olloman Impiie) 23
Muslim counliies
conlesled soveieignly wilhin 219221
lessons of Kosovo conicl foi 215219
ielalionship belween Russia and 217218
NAC (Noilh Allanlic Council) 276
Nagoino-Kaiabakh Republic 7576
Namibia 296297, 324, 329
NAM (Non-Aligned Movemenl) |Soulh
Afiicaj 245, 256, 258259
Nassei, Abdel 261
Thc Nations 352
NATO
accused of ignoiing abuses againsl
Seibs 4O6
buiden-shaiing`` among membeis of 283
collaboialion belween KLA and 441, 499
as colleclive idenlily 183
compaiison of Delian League and 181
fiee iideis of alliance defence by 182
Geoigian suppoil of inleivenlion by 74
75
Geiman unincalion and iole of 9394
Helsinki Piesidency Conclusions on 143
inleinalional oidei and liansfoimalion
of 8687, 9395, 273274
incieased piessuie lo enlaige 284
new concepls and slialegies 274277
ielalions wilh Russia 284285
iole in Iuiopean defense 282283
Kosovo conicl
Cenlial and Iasl Iuiopean public
opinion on 38Ot
cosls of inleivenlion in 341342
nve iesponses by 1315
impacl of NATO-\N ielalions on 281
282
implicalions foi fuluie
inleivenlions 474477
inleinalional iesponse lo 79
inleivenlion |uslined by human iighls
violalions 14, 13O131, 32O321
inleivenlion |uslined by solidaiily and
geoslialegy 464469
mililaiy opeialions 437444
ob|eclives duiing 279281, 435436
oulcome of Opeialion Allied Ioice
285287
in poslCold Wai conlexl 293294
slialegy used duiing 277278, 436437
long-lime impacl of inleivenlion by 1O
11, 1215, 4142, 316317
MC 327 peacekeeping docliine (1992) of
275
belween ugoslavia and 3O, 37, 4O
new membeis of
Czech Republic 2O9211, 284
Hungaiy 2O12O6, 284
Poland 2O62O9, 284
new slialegic concepl`` adopled by 218
iesponse lo Rambouillel peace agieemenl
by 56
small poweis of 183198
Belgium 188192
Canada 193195, 225, 226
Poilugal 184188
Spain 195197, 199n.7
lension belween \NHCR and 332
\N acknowledgemenl of enfoicemenl
iole by 417n.22, 5O2
scc also Opeialion Allied Ioice
NATO aii sliikes (Bosnia 1995) 275, 277,
392, 423424
NATO aii sliikes (Kosovo 1999)
Chinese embassy bombing by 118119,
135, 246, 257258, 372373, 44O, 458
condilions leading lo 45, 3637
NDIX 527
NATO aii sliikes (Kosovo 1999) (conl.)
debale ovei slialegy of 143144
enviionmenlal damage inicled by 311
312
elhnic cleansing campaign and 427
lo foice Milosevic`s agieemenl 277, 278,
286, 423425, 436437
giound wai following 428431
impacl on inleinalional oiganizalions
by 176178
impacl on woild polilics by 9798
media coveiage of mislakes,`` 373t374t
media coveiage of 372375
mililaiy opeialion of
ad|uslmenls lo and conclusion of 44O
441
analysis of 28O281, 441443
casualily avoidance duiing 443444
casuallies caused by 461n.14, 472
eaily assessmenl of 439
incieased lempo of 43944O
legacy of 97, 444445
pielude of 437
slail of 437438
iesponses lo
Belgian suppoil of 191192
by China 117, 296
by Iiance 131132
by Geimany 133134
by Hungaiy 2O12O6
by ndia 263267
by inleinalional communily 79
by Mexico 235
by Namibia 296297
by Poland 2O62O9
by Poilugal 187
by Russia 1O21O4, 11O113, 296, 297
by Soulh Afiica 245247, 257259
by lhe Soulhein Ilank counliies 175
178
Seibian solidaiily piovoked by 1O2
as slale soveieignly violalion 22O, 482
483
slalislics iegaiding viclims of 42n.8
as violalion of \N Chailei and NATO
chailei 265, 488489, 49O
scc also mililaiy foice inleivenlion
NATORussia Peimanenl 1oinl Council
284
NATO`s Biussels summil (1994) 275
NATO`s Defence Planning and Policy
Division 276
NATO`s IOR (mplemenlalion Ioice) scc
IOR (mplemenlalion Ioice)
|NATOj
NATO`s Rome summil (1991) 274
NATO`s SIOR (Slabilizalion Ioice) 3, 67,
68, 69
NATO`s Slialegic Concepl (1999) 276277,
281282, 283
naluial seleclion lheoiy 322
Naumann, Klaus 143144, 44O
Nazi Holocausl 332, 349, 35O, 351
Nehiu, 1awahailal 261
Nel, Philip 9
Ne melh, Zsoll 2O3
Neulialily Acls (193Os) 348
new inleivenlionalism`` docliine 121122
Ncwswcck 351
New Woild Oidei,`` 2, 3, 217
scc also posl-Cold Wai inleinalional
oidei
Ncw York Tincs 347, 362
NGOs (non-goveinmenlal oiganizalions)
aclive in Kosovo 38739O
assessing effeclive indignalion`` effecl
of 4OO4O1
desciibed 386387
developmenl of effeclive slialegies
by 39O391
humanilaiian inleivenlion pailneiship of
media and 1112
impacl on Kosovo conicl by 11, 386
noims goveining aclivilies of 393396
noims iesliaining aclivilies of 3964OO
iefugee populalion and 3OO, 3O1
in Somalia 325
Nicaiagua 229, 23O, 231, 241n.16
Nilzsche, Alexandei 8O
Nixon, Richaid 35O
non-inleivenlion piinciple 224, 237238,
239n.1, 321, 451
Noidic counliies
commonalilies and diffeiences
belween 151153
compaialive inleinalionalism of 152t
Denmaik 151, 152, 153158
Iinland 151, 152, 15916O
celand 151, 152, 159
528 NDIX
Noiway 151, 152, 153, 158159
Sweden 152, 16O162
Noiiega, Manuel 351
noims
changing human iighls 9O93
goveining humanilaiian inleivenlion by
NGOs 393396
inleinalional law and human iighls 91
92, 41O411, 48On.28, 4995OO
inleinalional law vs. 461n.7
Kosovo conicl slialegies and 452455
Kosovo conicl as wai of 45O452
slale and inleinalional inleiesls and 455
457
\N champion of human iighls 91
Noilh Allanlic Co-opeialion Council 94
Noilh Allanlic Tiealy (1949) 273
Noiway 151, 152, 153, 158159
Nucleai Non-Piolifeialion Tiealy
Piepaialoiy Commillee (PiepCom)
meeling (1999) 285
Nuiembeig Wai Ciimes Tiibunal 91
Nye, 1oseph S. 361
OAS (Oiganizalion of Ameiican
Slales`) 223, 225, 226, 227, 228229,
231, 233, 24On.9
OA\ (Oiganizalion of Afiican \nily) 252
Ocalan, Abdullah 17O
Oeialion Deseil Iox (1998) 424
ON\C (\N Opeialion in lhe Congo) 3O3
Open Sociely nslilule`s Kosovo Aclion
Coalilion 389
Opeialion Allied Ioice
decision lo ignoie \N Secuiily Council
by 282
evenls leading lo 128
use of media by 11
oulcomes of slialegy by 285287, 5O2
5O3
small poweis of
Belgium 188192
Canada 193195, 225, 226
Poilugal 184188
Spain 195197, 199n.7
sliained ielalions belween Russia and
counliies of 138139
slialegies leading lo success of 277278
slialegies and melhods adopled by 265
266
\SAI mililaiy supplied lo 14O, 194195
ugoslavia suils al C1 againsl 417n.21
scc also mililaiy foice inleivenlion;
Weslein poweis
Opeialion B-Minus 138, 144
Opeialion Delibeiale Ioice (1995) |Bosnia
bombingj 275, 277, 392, 423424
Opeialion Deseil Iox 421
Opeialion Deseil Sloim (1991) 319
scc also Peisian Gulf Wai (1991)
Opeialion Ilash and Sloim (1995) 7O
Opeialion nslanl Thundei 498
Opeialion 1oinl Guaidian 129, 188
Opeialion Tuiquoise 326
Opeiazione Aicobaleno (Opeialion
Rainbow) |lalyj 173
Oilhodox Chiislianily axis 172
Oilhodox Chuich 23, 49
OSCI (Oiganizalion foi Secuiily and Co-
opeialion in Iuiope) 3, 4, 6, 28, 35,
133, 154, 162, 294, 295, 3O4, 3O9, 421
422
OSCI \eiincalion Mission in Kosovo 56,
278
Ollawa Tiealy (1997) 254
Olloman Impiie 2O, 2223, 5O, 172, 292
Oxfam 389
Paiaguay 227
Iaris Match poll (1999) 379
Paiis Tiealy (1946) 33
Pailneiship foi Peace 95
Pax Ameiicana`` oidei 117118
peacekeeping
Chaplei \ (\N Chailei) on 275
Clinlon condilions foi \S 325326
Iasl Timoi ciisis and 315, 495n.32
failuies of Somalia 3, 32O, 324, 325, 33O,
355, 361, 363, 422
in Libeiia 331
NATO docliines (1992 and 1999) of 275,
276
by Russian foices 112, 115n.43
in Sii Lanka 262
scc also KIOR (NATO-led Kosovo
Ioice); SIOR (Slabilizalion Ioice)
|NATOj
Peace of Weslphalia (1648) 45O451
Pelican opeialion 172173
Peloponnesian Wai 181, 182
NDIX 529
Icoplcs Daily (China) 119
Peisian Gulf Wai (1991)
analogy wilh \ielnam 348, 349, 352353
CNN coveiage of 364
compaied lo Kosovo conicl 31932O
effecls of pio|ecled casuallies on public
suppoil of 363t 447n.17
mililaiy opeialions duiing 434
New Woild Oidei`` bioughl by 2, 33O
polilical divisions on 353
slale and inleinalional inleiesls
duiing 456
Weslein slialegic debale shaped by 42O,
421422
Peisson, Go ian 161
Peleisen, Niels Helveg 154
Peliisch, Wolfgang 137
PGMs (piecision guided munilions) 194,
195
PHR (Physicians foi Human Righls) 39O
391, 397, 398
Pinochel ciisis (Chile) 237
PKK (Kuidislan Woikeis` Paily) |Tuikeyj
168, 17O, 171
Poland 2O62O9, 284
Populai Paily (Poilugal) 187
Poilugal 184188
posilive legalily |udicial docliine 414
poslCold Wai
Ameiican inleinalional posilion in 8587
loss of innocence in 13
poslCold Wai inleinalional oidei
Ameiican debale ovei posilion in 879O
Ameiican posilion in poslCold Wai 85
87
changing human iighls noims and libeial
9O93
Chinese suppoil of mullipolai 121
Chinese view of 119122
denning momenlsjieciealion of 86
emeiging iole of Russia in 1O7
inleivenlion and 338341
Kosovo legacy foi 115, 1O11, 4142,
97, 316317, 444445, 457459
Kosovo as lesl case of 217
NATO liansfoimalion and 8687, 9395,
273274
noims and inleiesls of 455457
piinciples pioposed by China foi 124
126
lhiee liends in 8687
\N aulhoiily and legilimacy in 5OO5O2
scc also mullilaleialism inleinalional
oidei
Powell, Colin 353, 355, 421, 439
Powell Docliine 353, 421422, 439
Piesidenlial Decision Diieclive 25 (\S) 2
piinciple of non-inleivenlion 224, 237238,
239n.1, 321, 451
Piogiamme foi lhe Allainmenl of Peace,
Iieedom, Iqualily and Piospeiily in
lhe Aulonomous Piovince of
Kosovo`` (Seibian Assembly) 52
Piogiess Paily (Noiway) 158
piopoilionalily piinciple 494n.17
PSL (Polish People`s paily) 2O8
Racak massacie (1999) 35, 393, 398
Rambouillel peace agieemenl (1999)
bieakdown of 57
Conlacl Gioup push foi 29, 56
debale ovei 3536
evenls shaping 13O
fuluie slalus of Kosovo and 4O
KLA signing ofjviolalion of 286
NATO`s iesponse lo 56
ugoslavian iefusal lo sign 187
scc also lhe Conlacl Gioup (Kosovo)
Ramphal, Shiidalh 162
Rankovic, Aleksandai 6On.15
iape 5O51
Ralhei, Dan 351
iefugee populalions
coming inlo Albania fiom Kosovai 6, 174
Danish debale ovei acceplance of
Kosovai 156158, 164nl17
DPs elhnic Geoigians 74
lalian feais of Kosovai 167
fiom Kaiabakh conicl 76
KLA piesence in 174
media coveiage of 372
Soulhein Ilank counliies and Kosovo
173174
Spanish involvemenl wilh 196
Tuikish acceplance of Kosovo 169
\NHCR and 29, 291, 295, 3OO3O2, 3O8
3O9, 332
Regional Slabilily Pacl foi lhe Balkans 2O9
ieligious NGOs 389
Renan, Iinesl 45
iepiesenlalion docliine 328
53O NDIX
Republic of Kosovo (1991) 22
scc also Kosovo
Resolulion 678 (\N Secuiily Council) 297
Resolulion 1O8O (\N Secuiily Council) 227
Resolulion 116O (\N Secuiily Council)
114n.31, 137, 291, 295, 296
Resolulion 1199 (\N Secuiily Council) 29,
137, 236, 277, 278, 291, 295
Resolulion 12O3 (\N Secuiily Council)
137, 291, 295, 296, 298
Resolulion 1244 (\N Secuiily Council) 37,
4O, 135, 177, 237, 3O23O3, 3O63O7,
317
Rio Gioup 227
Rio Gioup declaialion (1999) 234
Robeilson, Geoige 136, 137, 142, 279, 28O
281, 286
Romania 7172
Rome Confeience (1998) 411
Rome Slalule (1998) 254
Roosevell, Iianklin 91
Rolh, Ken 398, 399
Royaumonl nilialive foi Slabilily and
Good Neighbouiliness in Soulh-
Iaslein Iuiope 129
RS (Republika Sipska) 68
Ruggie, 1ohn 254, 255
Rugova, biahim 34, 38, 39, 54, 3O7
Rugova-Milosevic accoid (1996) 27, 34, 53,
55, 56, 137
Russia
conicl belween Hungaiy and 2O6
ciilicism of NATO by 78
declining iappiochemenl by 4
feais of NATO inleivenlion in 1O41O5
foieign policy developmenl by 1O911O
Iiench iesponse lo 131
global implicalions of Kosovo conicl
foi 1O61O8, 46O
inilial iesponse lo ugoslavia conicl
1O2
inleiesls in IR by 1O2, 1O31O4, 1O8
1O9
media iepoils on Seibian ielalions wilh
457458
peacekeepei foice fiom 112, 115n.43
possible alliance belween ndia and 268
poslCold Wai ielalions wilh NATO
284285
ie|eclion of NATO-cenliism by 1O51O6
ielalionship wilh Muslim counliies and
217218
Resolulion 1244 and inuence of 317
iesponse lo NATO aii sliikes by 1O2
1O4, 11O113, 296, 297
Rwanda 23, 326, 33O, 342, 398, 4O7, 489,
493
SAARC (Soulh Asian Associalion foi
Regional Coopeialion) 1O
SACI\R (Supieme Allied Commandei
Iuiope) 138, 28O, 437, 439
SADC (Soulhein Afiican Developmenl
Communily) 245
Salazai, Anlo nio de Oliveiia 185
Sandinislas 229
Sanl` Igidio 27, 137
Sanliago Commilmenl (1991) 226227
Saudi Aiabia 217
Schaiping, Rudolf 133
Schnabel, Albiechl 8O
Schoii, Pieiie 161
Schio dei, Geihaid 97, 133, 135, 139
Second Ixliaoidinaiy nleiameiican
Confeience 225
Second Woild Wai 349, 351, 354355
Selebi, 1ackie 25O
seleclive pioseculion`` |udicial docliine
413414
seleclive iesponse inleivenlion
consideiing legilimacy of 411414
piincipled guidelines lo conliol 4O54O8
piinciples goveining use of mililaiy foice
and 4O841O
single univeisal noims lo conliol 41O
411
ugoslav complainls iegaiding 4O54O6
self-deleiminalion issues 394, 465
Sens, Allen 8
Seibia
conicl belween KLA and 4
enviionmenlal damage fiom aii sliikes lo
311312
hisloiical associalion wilh Kosovo by 22
24
Kosovo conicl and mililaiy opeialions
of 434435
NDIX 531
Seibia (conl.)
Kosovo slalus as aulonomous iegion in
21
media iepoils on Russian ielalions
wilh 457458
mililaiy foices of 455
posilion on NATO aii sliikes by 3637
pie1995 peiiod of Kosovo conicl
and 3234
iehabililalion of 312315
view of Kosovo as biilhplace of 59n.4
scc also NATO aii sliikes (Kovoso)
Seibian Academy of Ails and Sciences 49
Seibian Oilhodox Chuich 23, 49
Seibians
emigialed lo Hungaiy 2O4
The Gieal Migialion (17lh cenluiy) of
495O
human iighls violalions againsl 497
lack of iesponse lo abuses againsl 4O6
nanu nilitari docliine by 293
ielalions belween Kosovo Albanians
and 4553
solidaiily iesponse lo NATO aii sliikes
1O2
scc also Kosovo Seibian populalion
Seib nalional movemenl 2324
Seiiano, Mo nica 9
SIOR (Slabilizalion Ioice) |NATOj 3, 67,
68, 69, 153, 154, 157, 158, 192
SHAPI (Supieme Headquaileis Allied
Poweis Iuiope) 275
Shaip Guaid`` naval deploymenl 154
Shevaidnadze, Iduaid 1O5
Similis, Coslas 167
SLD (Democialic Lefl Alliance)
|Polandj 2O72O8, 2O9
Slocombe, Wallei 278
Slovenia 697O
small poweis in alliance
Belgium 188192
Canada 193195, 225, 226
fiamewoik foi analysis of 183184
Poilugal 184188
secuiily lhinking of 197198
Spain 195197, 199n.7
Socialisl Iedeial Republic of ugoslavia
262
scc also ugoslavia
Socialisl Lefl Paily (Noiway) 158
Socialisl Paily (Iiance) 132
Socialisl Paily (Hungaiy) 2O3, 2O5
Solana, 1aviei 277, 369, 437
solidaiily issues 464465, 467469
Somalia 3, 32O, 324, 325, 33O, 355, 361, 363,
422
Soulh Afiica
accused of pailialily lowaid Milosevic
249
conceins wilh Weslein inleivenlions
252253
conneclions belween ugoslavia
and 24925O
hisloiicaljculluial conlexl of iesponse
by 247249
Lesolho expeiience of 251
mullilaleial appioach by 246247, 255
257
iesponse lo elhnic cleansing by 248249
247, 257259
slalemenl suppoiling \N Secuiily
Council by 245246, 248
\N Secuiily Council seal soughl by 251
252
Soulh Afiican 1une 11, 1999 slalemenl,
258
Soulh Afiican Maich 25, 1999 slalemenl
257
Soulh Afiican May 8, 1999 slalemenl 257
258
Soulh-Iaslein Iuiopean Slabilily Pacl
(1999) 132, 158
Soulhein Afiican Developmenl Communily
(Soulh Afiica) 251
Soulhein Caucasus
Aimenian and Azeii peispeclives on
Kosovo conicl 7677
GeoigianAbkhaz wai (199293) in 73
74
Geoigia suppoil foi NATO inleivenlion
in 7475
impacl of NATO wai in ugoslavia on
7778
Nagoino-Kaiabakh conicl in 7576
poinls in commonjdiffeience wilh Kosovo
7273
iesponses lo Kosovo conicl in 788O
Soulhein cone counliies scc Lalin Ameiican
slales
lhe Soulhein Ilank counliies
532 NDIX
172173
loyally lo alliance and economic issues of
16917O
on NATO aii sliikes 175178
ofncialjunofncial alliludes on Kosovo
conicl 166169
slabilily of 174175
Soulh Koiea 124
Soulh Osselia case 74
Soviel \nion 9395
scc also Russia
Spain 195197, 199n.7
Siebienica 3, 14, 266
Sii Lanka 342
Slabilily Pacl foi Cenlial and Iaslein
Iuiope (1995) 129, 132, 177, 2O5
Slabilily Pacl summil (Saia|evo 1999) 69
STANA\IORMID (Slanding Naval Ioice
Medileiianean) 192
START nucleai aims ieduclion
liealy 285
START nucleai aims ieduclion liealy
284
slale soveieignly
changing naluie of 221
cosls of inleivenlion lo 341342
guaianlee of Kosovo and IR 314
human iighls linked lo 298299
ignoiing human iighls violalions due lo
497498
inleinalional law and inleivenlion wilh
337338
inleinalional sociely and inleivenlion in
338341
Kosovo conicl and new iules of 485
487
libeial inleinalional lheoiy on 321324
Muslim counliies and conlesled 219221
NATO aii sliikes as allack on 22O, 482
483
Peace of Weslphalia (1648) on 45O451
piinciple of non-inleivenlion and 224,
237238, 239n.1, 321, 451
as iighl 335337
as slalus 334335
\N Chailei on 267, 292
scc also inleinalional cilizens
slales syslem foimula 321
slalism
desciibed 485, 494n.7
modined 488
Sleeves, Kevin 8O
Sliazisai, Nika 8O
Sudan 382n.19, 421
Sukaino 261
Sweden 152, 16O162
Ta las, Pe lei 9, 72
Talboll, Sliobe 135, 279, 283, 458
Tasza i mililaiy base (Hungaiy) 2O2, 2O3
Tayloi, Chailes 332
Tayloi, Paul 14
Tello, Manuel 235
Thaci, Hashim 38, 39, 3O7, 315, 469
Tinc magazine 352, 436
Tilo, 1osip Bioz 3, 2O, 33, 46, 249, 261, 455,
456
TMD (Thealie Missle Defense) syslem
123
Todd, Immanuel 181, 182, 183
lolalizing pio|ecl`` concepl 483485
Tolh, Robeil C. 362, 364
Tiainoi, Beinaid 356
Tiealy foi Democialic Secuiily (1995) 228
Tiealy of Lausanne (1923) 292
Tiealy of Paiis (1946) 33
Tiepca mining complex (Kosovo) 3O931O
Tuikey
169
172173
loyally lo alliance by 16917O
slabilily of 174175
Tuikish-Cypiiol populalion 171
Tulsi 326
\N Chailei
Ailicle 2.3 323
Ailicle 2(7) on slale soveieignly 292, 323,
451
Ailicle 2 on foice belween lwo membeis
117, 121122, 296
NDIX 533
\N Chailei (conl.)
balance belween soveieignly, non-
inleivenlion, and human iighls in
497498
Chaplei \ of 29, 331
Chaplei \ of 267, 275, 292, 295, 3O4,
32O, 324, 325, 326, 397
Chaplei \ of 32O
conliibulion of ndia lo 26O
emeigency iesponse envisioned in 4O6
humanilaiian inleivenlion eioded by 13,
267268
ndia`s conliibulion lo 26O
menlion of human iighls in 91
NATO aii sliikes as violalion of 265,
488489, 49O
Noilh Allanlic Tiealy and Ailicle 51 of
273
peacekeeping undei Chaplei \ of 275
slale soveieignly undei 267
scc also \niled Nalions
\NCTAD (\niled Nalions Confeience on
Tiade and Developmenl) 245
\N Declaialion of Human Righls 91, 292,
395, 41O411
\N Iconomic Commission foi Iuiope 3O9
\NHCR Ivalualion Commillee 3O1
\NHCR (\niled Nalions High
Commissionei foi Refugees) 29, 291,
295, 3OO3O2, 3O83O9, 332
\N Human Righls Commission 235, 25O
unilaleialism inleinalional oidei 254
\N nleinalional Ciiminal Tiibunal 249
unipolaiily`` dilemma 453
\niled Aiab Imiiales 217
\niled Kingdom
aii sliikes againsl iaq (1998) by 424425
asymmeliic waifaie belween RA
and 448
CNN effecls on public suppoil in 377t
379
Kosovo conicl iole by 136141
sanclions againsl iaq iegime by 42O421
\niled Nalions
accused of ignoiing abuses againsl Seibs
4O6
acknowledgemenl of NATO enfoicemenl
iole by 417n.22, 5O2
allempls lo conliol ugoslavian silualion
by 3
aulhoiily and legilimacy of 5OO5O2
Iiench suppoil foi sidelining of 131132
human iighls noims championed by 91
ndian conceins on fuluie of 268269
ndian conliibulion lo 26O261
Kosovo conicl
diplomacy ovei bombing of Seibia
2953OO
diiving faclois in 291295
ielalions wilh NATO 281282
Resolulion 1244 and 37, 4O, 135, 177,
237, 3O23O3, 3O63O7, 317
\NMK 29, 291, 295, 3O2, 3O3312
Lalin Ameiican slales and 228229
legacy of Kosovo foi 1215
iole in iehabililalion of Seibia 312315
\S failuie lo pay dues lo 97
weakness of humanily and aclions by
479n.14
scc also \N Chailei; \N Secuiily Council
\niled Slales
aii sliikes againsl iaq (1998) by 424
425
Ameiican debale ovei inleinalional
posilion of 879O
changing noimsjlibeial inleinalionalism
and 9O93
Clinlon Docliine on inleivenlion by 87
9O, 356
I\ defeience lo 177178
fiee iiding on defense by 182
inleinalionalism of Noidic counliies vs.
152t
Kosovo conicl
cosls and oulcome of 355356
mililaiy suppoil of 14O, 194195
\ielnam syndiome and 348355
Lalin Ameiican slales on inleivenlion by
23O232
measuies of public suppoil foi Kosovo
involvemenl by 377t
naluie of mililaiy alliances wilh 444445
noims and Kosovo conicl slialegy by
452455
opposilion lo Kosovo inleivenlion in
461n.13
poslCold Wai inleinalional posilion of
8587, 12O
534 NDIX
pieoccupalion wilh piomoling demociacy
9293, 98n.4
pioposal on legalily of Kosovo slialegies
by 282
iole in Iuiopean defense by 282283
sanclions againsl iaq iegime by 42O421
seleclive pioseculion`` |udicial docliine
of 413414
scc also Clinlon adminislialion; \S
foieign policy
\niling foi Peace`` (Noiway) 159
\niveisal Declaialion of Human Righls 91,
292, 395, 41O411
\NMK (\niled Nalions Mission in
Kosovo) 68, 3O2, 3O33O8, 3O9312,
5O3
\N Ofnce foi lhe Cooidinalion of
Humanilaiian Affaiis 3O9
\NPRIDIP 154, 158
\NPROIOR (\N Pioleclion Ioice) 3,
153, 196, 275
\NSC 251, 252, 253
\N Secuiily Council
aims embaigo imposed by 29
Chaplei \ aclions by 267
decision by Alliance lo ignoie 282
I\ sidelining of 141147
human iighls noimsjhumanilaiian law
used by 41O411, 415n.4
inleivenlion sanclioned by 98
Russian inleiesl in sliong 1O61O7
shifl of inleinalional cenlie lo G-8 by 15
Soulh Afiican aspiialion lo 251252
Soulh Afiican slalemenl suppoiling 245
246, 248
scc also \N Chailei; \niled Nalions
\N Secuiily Council Resolulion 678 297
\N Secuiily Council Resolulion 1O8O 227
\N Secuiily Council Resolulion 116O
114n.31, 137, 291, 295, 296
\N Secuiily Council Resolulion 1199 29,
137, 236, 277, 278, 291, 295
\N Secuiily Council Resolulion 12O3 137,
291, 295, 296, 298
\N Secuiily Council Resolulion 1244 37,
4O, 135, 177, 237, 3O23O3, 3O63O7,
317
\NTAIS (\N Tiansilional Aulhoiily in
Iaslein Slavonia) 3O3
\NTIA 3O3
\PD (\nil foi lhe Piomolion of
Demociacy) 226
\S foieign policy
Clinlon Docliine and 879O, 356
feai of casuallies impacl on 363t 422
423, 472, 479n.16
piomolion of demociacy and 9293
piomolion of liade as pail of 99n.7
\ielnam syndiome impacl on 348355
\S1apan alliance 123
U.S. Ncws & VorlJ Rcport 351
\W (Iieedom \nion) |Polandj 2O8
\alki, La szlo 9, 72
Vcckobrcv (weekly lellei``) |Bildlj 161
162
\e diine, Hubeil 95, 13O, 131, 181
\eisailles Tiealy (1919) 33
\elchy, \ladimii 211
\ielnamese Cambodian inleivenlion 489
\ielnam syndiome
analogies wilh 348349
impacl on Kosovo conicl slialegy 348
355
\ielnam Wai
Gulf Wai and analogy wilh 348, 349,
352353
media on wainings on lessons fiom 352
\o|vodina (Hungaiian piovince) 2O32O5
\ollebk, Knul 159
Wang izhou 12O
Wai Ciimes Tiibunal 296
Waisaw Pacl counliies 9395
Waisaw Tiealy Oiganizalion 273
Vashington Iost 446
Washinglon Piolocol (1992) 226, 227
Washinglon summil (1999) 283, 44O441
weekly lellei`` (Vcckobrcv) |Bildlj 161
162
Wellei, Maic 328
weslein Macedonia 2O
scc also Macedonia
Weslein poweis
hisloiy of lolalizing pio|ecl`` by 483485
humanilaiian wai and 487492
iacial genocide speclie and 496497
iecognilion of slales iules by 485487
NDIX 535
Weslein poweis (conl.)
solidaiily and geoslialegic conlexls of
467469
scc also demociacies; I\ (Iuiopean
\nion); Opeialion Allied Ioice
WI\ 143, 283
WIP (Woild Iood Piogiamme) 315
Wheelei, Nick 493
WHO (Woild Heallh Oiganizalion) 315
Wilson, Woodiow 92
Woiking Gioup on Demociacy and Human
Righls 226
Woild Bank 23O
Woild Wai 349, 351, 354355
WTO (Woild Tiade Oiganizalion) 96, 256,
459
ellsin, Boiis 248, 458
ugoslav Conslilulion of 1974 48, 49,
6On.1O
ugoslavia scc IR (Iedeial Republic of
ugoslavia); Socialisl Iedeial
Republic of ugoslavia
Za|edno (Togelhei) opposilion coalilion
(Kosovo) 55
ZChN (Chiislian Nalional \nion) |Polandj
2O9
Zeman, Milos 21O, 211
zeio casuallies issue scc casuallies issue
Zhang unling 8
Zhu Muzhi 119
Zinn, Howaid 352
536 NDIX
(=38)
n lhe wake of NATO`s aii campaign againsl Seibia. close lo 1 million elhnic
Albanian iefugees pouied inlo Macedonia and Albania in Maich and Apiil of
1999. aflei being syslemalically foiced fiom lheii homes by Seib Special Police
and paiamililaiies.
(=87)
When elhnic Albanian iefugees began ieluining home in 1une 1999 aflei NATO
had libeialed lhe piovince. a wave of ievenge spiead acioss Kosovo. Seib and
Roma homes wenl up in ames.
(=12)
An elhnic Albanian molhei is comfoiled al lhe funeial of hei son. a membei of
lhe Movemenl foi Iieedom of Kosovo. Balofc. May 1998.
(=24)
A Seib Special Police unil comes undei nie fiom Kosovo Libeialion Aimy iebels.
Klina. May 1998.
(=67)
A young elhnic Albanian giil is comfoiled by lalian NATO lioops. Slankovec
iefugee camp. Apiil 1999.
(=32)
Ilhnic Albanians cioss lhe boidei inlo noilhein Albania aflei Seibs began
expelling lhem fiom Kosovo. Apiil 1999.
(=45)
Ilhnic Albanians al a iefugee camp. Kukes. noilhein Albania. May 1999.
(=56)
As elhnic Albanian iefugees conlinued lo poui inlo Albania in Apiil 1999. lhe
|ouiney pioved falal foi lhe veiy weak and young. Many would nevei see home
again.

Schnabel, Albrecht and Thakur, Ramesh Chandra - Kosovo and The Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship

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Kosovo and the challenge

sgiimson (albeil in his capacily as paily leadei) man-

rlig RcJcgrclsc 1998, al www.fmn.dkj1998jkapO4.hlm.

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