strategic asia 200506

military modernization
in an Era of Uncertainty
Edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills

Country Studies
Chinas Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress David Shambaugh

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Executive Summary
This chapter analyzes the direct and contextual factors driving Chinese military modernization efforts, evaluates the current capabilities and development trajectories of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), and assesses the likely impact that an increasingly modern Chinese military will have on Asian regional security.

main argument: Although Chinese modernization has accelerated and improved in pace and scope at a surprising rate, this should not be misconstrued to mean that the PLA can transform itself into a first-class military with global reach over the next decade. The PLAs regional reach will, however, steadily improveand consequently will alter the balance of power in Asia. policy implications: Chinas military modernization is shaped not only by the military dimensions of the Taiwan issue, but also by a number of other contextual drivers (i.e., Chinas desire to become a global power, the regional security environment, the U.S. military footprint around Asia, and growing energy needs) and direct drivers (i.e., Chinas military budget, domestic politics, military doctrine and defense policy, and effects of the military-industrial complex).
Chinas aspirations and plans for its military modernization program are on par for a nation of Chinas location, size, wealth, national interests, and global role.

China

Chinas Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress

David Shambaugh
This chapter explores the state of Chinas military modernization program in 2005, assesses how much progress the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has made in recent years, discusses the drivers of the program, elucidates its principal trends and trajectories, identifies important indicators to monitor in the future, and notes important policy implications for the United States. There are two main types of drivers that shape Chinas military modernization program: contextual and direct. Contextual drivers include a range of external factors in Chinas national security environment that shape Chinas threat perceptions, strategic outlook, and contingency planning. Direct drivers include a range of financial, political, and technological factors more internal to China. These contextual and direct drivers are thus respectively the focus of the first two sections of the chapter. Sections three and four overview PLA capabilities. Section three is an inventory of PLA forces and weapons capabilities, while section four offers a net assessment of the current state of Chinas military modernization program by evaluating progress made, as well as deficiencies and challenges ahead. A concluding section identifies indicators to watch in assessing future progress in Chinas military modernization and offers implications for U.S. policy.

David Shambaugh is Professor of Political Science & International Affairs at The George Washington University, where he also directs the China Policy Program. In addition, he is a nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program and the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution. He can be reached at <shambaug@gwu.edu>. The author wishes to thank Dennis Blasko, Paul H.B. Godwin, and Eric McVadon for their excellent comments and suggestions on previous drafts, and Peter Mattis for his research assistance.

68 Strategic Asia 200506

Contextual Drivers of Chinas Military Modernization

Taiwan
Preventing Taiwan independence (and concomitantly bringing about reunification with the mainland) is one of Chinas highest priorities. For the PLA this translates into a military mission, if so ordered, of forcibly preventing Taiwan independence. As the 2004 Defense White Paper boldly warned: Should the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of Taiwan independence, the Chinese people and armed forces will resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any cost. In actuality, preparing for a series of potential conflict scenarios with Taiwan (and the United States) is the nearest-term catalyst for defense resource allocations and military preparations, and is driving a number of decisions regarding weapons procurements and deployments, training and readiness, and other elements of the PLAs order of battle. These preparations include attaining the capabilities to perform the following military tasks: launch precision strikes against high-value command, control, and political targets using special operation forces, undertake sabotage attacks against key military and civilian infrastructure targets on Taiwan and adjacent islands ground Taiwans air force by saturating airfields, runways, and aircraft shelters with ballistic or cruise missiles deafen and blind Taiwans command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure through a combination of missile strikes and electronic and information warfare attacks (including, perhaps, atmospheric electromagnetic pulse [EMP] detonations) bottleneck/blockade Taiwans navy in ports at Tsoying, Suao, Keelung, and Kaohsiung, which would also effectively blockade civilian shipping in and out of the latter two ports, thus stifling the islands merchandise trade and energy imports take control of the airspace over Taiwan and the entire Taiwan Strait in order to launch amphibious landings and air-drops of paratroopers or airborne troops

Information Office of the State Council, Chinas National Defense in 2004, 4, http://news.xinhuanet. com/english/2004-12/27/content_2384679.htm.

Shambaugh China 69

create a cordon sanitaire around Taiwan to force the U.S. Navy to base operations at a distance interdict the logistical supply lines of U.S. forces in the western Pacific attack U.S. carrier strike groups (possibly with ballistic missiles) deter or prevent U.S. (and Taiwan) forces from attacking targets on mainland China One can trace much of recent PLA procurement, deployments, and training to attaining this range of capabilities. Following the 199596 Taiwan Strait crises, the Chinese military performed after-action assessments and discovered that, at the time, PLA capabilities against Taiwan were, in fact, quite limited. The ballistic missile option existed for the purpose of taking out military targets, terrorizing the civilian population, and destabilizing the economy, but PLA offensive strike capabilities in these other areas were very limited or non-existent. Nor were ballistic missile deployments sufficient in number or accuracy to fulfill all of the PLAs missions: ground Taiwans air force, knock out other high-value targets, and keep American aircraft carrier strike groups at bay. Today the PLA is increasingly capable of carrying out this wider spectrum of coercion or warfighting. Since 1996 the Chinese military has worked very assiduously to attain this broader range of deterrence, compellence, and attack capabilities. In just about every area noted, the PLA has, in this authors estimation, now achieved sufficient capabilities to prosecute a broadgauged campaign across a horizontal spectrum of contingencies and up a vertical hierarchy of thresholds. Attaining sufficient numbers of boots on the ground to successfully occupy Taiwan (via amphibious landings and air-drops) remains the greatest difficulty, but the PLA has attained sufficient capabilities in virtually every other category. To be sure, occupation is likely the PLAs last priority should conflict erupt. A much more probable strategy would consist of launching quick saturation strikes over the course of 4872 hours in order to compel Taiwan to surrender and/or negotiate before the United States could arrive in force. Yet Chinas military modernization cannot be explained by Taiwan contingencies alone. There are five other broader and longer-term considerations that underlie and shape decisions and directions in Chinas military modernization program.