Philippine Army Journal 1st Quarter 2013

The ARMY
JOURNAL
The ACADEMIC Journal of the Philippine Army
January - March 2013
The Road to Proficiency:

The PGS Proficiency Report of the Philippine Army
by THE Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO) After-Activity Report on the Philippine Armys Journey towards PGS Proficiency
by JACKIE LYN N NUNAG, Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO)
Non-International Armed Conflicts in the Philippines

by LTGEN RAYMUNDO B FERRER AFP & LTC RANDOLPH G CABANGBANG (INF) PA
A Case for Increasing the Australian Defense Training Aid to the Philippines
by LTC ROMEO N BAUTISTA III (INF) PA
The Sabah Claim: A Historical and Factual Narrative

by MAJ WILFREDO B MANALANG III (MI) PA
The Asian Arms Race
by MAJ LEAH L SANTIAGO (FA) PA
The Relationship between Terror Groups and the Media: Its Impact in Combating the Terrorist Threats
By MAJ MARIA VICTORIA B AGONCILLO (CAV) PA
JOURNAL
Editorial board
LTGEN NOEL A COBALLES AFP MGEN MAXIMO G CARO AFP
The ARMY
in this issue
1 The Road to Proficiency: The PGS Proficiency Report of the Philippine Army (Executive Summary)
by JACKIE LYN N NUNAG, Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO)
Chairman
Vice Chairman Secretary
COL GERRY P AMANTE GSC (OS) PA COL MACAIROG S ALBERTO GSC (MI) PA COL MELQUIADES L FELICIANO GSC (INF) PA COL RAMIRO MANUEL A REY GSC (INF) PA LTC RANDOLPH G CABANGBANG (INF) PA
7 After-Activity Report on the Philippine Armys Journey towards PGS Proficiency
by JACKIE LYN N NUNAG, Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO) by LTGEN RAYMUNDO B FERRER AFP & LTC RANDOLPH G CABANGBANG (INF) PA by LTC ROMEO N BAUTISTA III (INF) PA
Members
17 Non-International Armed Conflicts in the Philippines
Editorial staff
COL GERRY P AMANTE GSC (OS) PA
27 A Case for Increasing the Australian Defense Training Aid to the Philippines 35 The Sabah Claim: A Historical and Factual Narrative
by MAJ WILFREDO B MANALANG III (MI) PA by MAJ LEAH L SANTIAGO (FA) PA
Editor-in-Chief
MAJ RUEL G ROMBAOA (INF) PA
Managing Editor
LTC VINCE JAMES DG BANTILAN (MI) PA MAJ JIMMY V JIMENEZ (INF) PA MAJ BENJAMIN C SOLIS JR (INF) PA MAJ CRIZALDO A FERNANDEZ (INF) PA
45 The Asian Arms Race
Associate Editors
59 The Relationship between Terror Groups and the Media: Its Impact in Combating the Terrorist Threats
By MAJ MARIA VICTORIA B AGONCILLO (CAV) PA
Copy Editor & Circulation Manager

Warlou Joyce S Antonio Ma. Kathleen C Cabal Ma. Patricia M Lansang Ais Lynn Fabiola G Manuel
LINUS VAN O PLATA
Proofreaders
Harry JAMES A Creo
Layout Artist
The Army Journal is an academic journal published quarterly by Headquarters, Philippine Army with the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO) as the office of primary responsibility. It serves as a tool to publish original research or related literature on subjects relevant to the PA or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). It also makes such information available to other scholars and researchers. Furthermore, the journal contributes to the advancement and extent of knowledge in the PA or the AFP in particular and the Philippine society in general. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Philippine Army. The Editorial Board ensures accuracy of the information contained herein, but does not accept responsibility for errors and omissions. The authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of the material that they provide. The Army Journal reserves the right to edit the materials. Submissions are not limited to the officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian employees of the Philippine Army and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Articles, notes from the readers, and book reviews by other writers outside the PA are highly encouraged and would be greatly appreciated. Please send them to: The Editor, The Army Journal Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO), Philippine Army Fort Andres Bonifacio, Metro Manila E-mail: agsmo@army.mil.ph agsmo.pa@gmail.com
ON THE COVER: Dr. Jesus Estanislao (Chairman, Institute for Solidarity in Asia) and LTGEN NOEL A COBALLES (Commanding General, Philippine Army) place the third heart on the Armys Performance Governance System (PGS) plaque, symbolizing the third stage in the PGS Pathway that the organization has successfully passed last 19 March 2013 at the Public Governance Forum. (Photo by OACPA, PA)
TIP: SCAN THE CODE using your smartphone TO VISIT the PHILIPPINE ARMYS OFFICIAL WEBSITE.
EDITORs NOTE: A fresh army journal

The Army Journal is a venue for academic discourse that serves a three-fold purpose: one, it serves as a tool to publish research or related literature on subjects relevant to the Philippine Army; two, it makes information available to other parties for the furtherance of their scholarly pursuits; lastly, it contributes to the advancement and extent of knowledge of the Philippine Army in particular and the Philippine Society in general. All these purposes fulfill the Armys strategic objectives under the Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) to engage and partner with key stakeholders, develop and communicate a brand image consistent with the Armys Core Values, and become a professional Army loved by the people. This issue of the Army Journal - and the succeeding issues, henceforth - puts on a fresh face in many ways: first: it is now being managed by the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO), an office created last October of 2012 to ensure the success and sustainability of the Army Transformation Roadmap; second, the articles go through a systematic process of peer-review and editing to ensure that they represent more scholarly outputs; and third, it introduces a new format that is aesthetically appealing, and intellectually stimulating. For this issue, reports and perspectives on various topics and in various levels are presented from the progress of the Philippine Army on its Performance Governance System Pathway (the framework on which the Army Transformation Roadmap is anchored), to the various issues affecting not only state of affairs of the Philippine Army but also those affecting the nation as a whole. We, therefore, invite our dear readers to participate in the discourse, so that we foster a healthy exchange of ideas, and together we can all contribute to the attainment of our vision of a World Class Army that is a source of National Pride by 2028.
COL GERRY P AMANTE GSC (OS) PA Editor-in-Chief
THE ROAD TO PROFICIENCY: The PGS Proficiency Report of the Philippine ArmY
BY Jackie Lyn N Nunag, Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO)
ATR Commitment Ceremony (28 November 2012). Major subordinate unit commanders and heads and chief of offices pledge their commitment to the transformation program of the Philippine Army. (Photo by OACPA)
Background
For years, the Philippine Army (PA) has been hounded by issues and controversies that tarnished its image and integrity. Through the involvement of a few in coup dtats, various cases of corruption, as well as the violation of human rights, have been further magnified by the black propaganda of left leaning militants. Further, times are changing and so are the needs of the nation. Although war fighting remains as the core function of the Armed Forces, the Army is also increasingly expected to perform non-traditional roles in disaster response, peacekeeping operations, and national development support.
Army Vision: By 2028, a world-class Army that is a source of national pride
ATR Base Camps. Since the ATR is a long-term plan, the Army identified four (4) base camps from the time the ATR was conceived in April 2010 up to 2028, the vision year. (Diagram by OG5, PA and AGSMO)
Rationale for Change and Change Agenda

In view of these, the PA saw the need to reform its ways and focus on addressing the following: (1) improve public perceptions and meet the peoples expectations; (2) be a better army; (3) synchronize systems and processes to the Defense System of Management (DSOM), and support the thrusts of the AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan (IPSP); and (4) ensure organizational cohesion. These very reasons led to the formulation the ATR that highlights the commitment of the PA to pursue genuine reforms founded on good governance and performance excellence. It sets the focus on the institution rather than individual personalities, considers long-term strategies rather than short-term tactics, and, approaches all matters from a systems perspective in order to address interconnected priorities instead single issues. Its primary purpose is to transform the PA into a more capable, responsive, reliable, and professional organization committed to its mandate by addressing noted deficiencies on systems, organizational and individual levels.
Components of Transformation
This strategic shift in the management of the PAs affairs is aimed at the attainment of the Armys ultimate vision to be a world-class Army that is a source of national pride by 2028. The Army Governance Charter articulates the concepts and principles defining the character and purpose of the PA while the Army Strategy Map illustrates the strategy and outlines the goals that must be achieved in order to realize the vision. Furthermore, the Army Performance Scorecard, which is what differentiates the ATR from previous reform programs of the Army, is composed of objectives, measures and performance targets that translate the vision into actionable details to address the strategy implementation gap.
Army Performance Report

Using this scorecard mechanism, the Army was able to assess its performance for CY 2012 vis--vis the set targets. Based on the Army Performance Scorecard Report for CY 2012, out of the 25 performance indicators, 7 or 28% of the indicators fall significantly short of their target or data is unavailable; 15 or 60%
Army Core Purpose: Serving the people, securing the land
Army Governance Charter and Strategy Map. While the Charter articulates the concepts and principles defining the character and purpose of the Army, the Strategy Map visually captures the organizations strategy to realize its vision. (Diagram by OG5, PA and AGSMO)
fall just below the expected targets; while 3 or 12% meet or exceed their target. In spite of these improvements, there is still a need to further refine some of the performance indicators, especially in terms of validity and reliability of data. By having a valid tool and an appropriate representation of the target respondent or data source, the PA will also be able to generalize claims in the analysis of its performance.
while 69% or 11 of the 16 strategic initiatives fall just below expected targets. Because of this, the PA saw the need to conduct a more in-depth review of the different strategic initiatives and their impact on the performance indicators of the enterprise scorecard. This requires determining which among the sixteen (16) initiatives should be managed at the strategic level, and at the office level only. Significant changes in the initiatives and resources should also be taken into consideration to drive improvement.
Performance Drivers
The PA has developed and implemented strategic programs to drive these performance measures and attain the desired end-state. Based on the latest Strategic Program Review, 31% or 5 out of these 16 strategic initiatives fall significantly short of targets,
PA Strategy Management System

Based on the results of the strategy and strategic program review, the Army needs to improve the validity and reliability of the indicators, focus on
attaining 2013 targets, and to conduct of periodic review of strategic performance. In this regard, the PA formulated the PA Strategic Management System (PA SMS) to harmonize the two strategic management tools adopted by the PA: the PGS and the Defense System of Management (DSOM). Since both systems have unique processes and deliverables, there is a need to integrate them so that the PA can function with utmost efficiency and effectiveness. Hence, the PA SMS was developed and approved on 20 May 2011 as the Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) No. 5, and was later on revised to be SOP No. 4. DSOM is reinforced and complemented by the PGS at the core of the revised PA SMS. It is an overarching framework that reconciles and governs the Philippine Armys planning and operating systems in order to achieve its long-term, medium-term, and annual goals. To ensure the synchronized implementation of the different functional systems, key PA SMS deliverables were
outlined with specific Army Staff designated as office of primary responsibility (OPRs) that will assist the Army Governance and Strategy Management System in the overall implementation of the PA SMS.
Army Governance and Strategy Management Office

Another key step towards the Armys PGS Proficiency journey is the establishment of the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO). During the initial stages of the ATR, the Army Plans Division (OG5 PA) took the primary responsibility of advocating and implementing the ATR. However, as the responsibilities in pursuing the ATR increased and involved more cross-functional processes, the need for an office of strategy management arose. Thus, the Army organized the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office last October 2012,
Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO). This office manages the implementation of the ATR. (Photo by AGSMO)
Spreading Transformation. ATR Cascading Workshop at the 2nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade, LAD, PA, Maria Cristina, Balo-I, Lanao del Norte (08-10 February 2013). (Photo by AGSMO)
which now serves as the principal staff assistant of the Commanding General in all matters pertaining to governance and strategy implementation. In the exercise of this mandate, AGSMO reports to the Chief of Staff, PA, and directly coordinates with the staff. It is the office responsible for the execution of the PA SMS, and as such, the focal point in the ATR implementation.
information and additional inputs or advice. The feedback gathered during the series of presentations will be incorporated by AGSMO in the preparation of the final report and recommendations for approval of the CGPA.
Alignment Mechanisms
Another key element in the successful implementation of the ATR is alignment. The PA has achieved organizational alignment by cascading the ATR, linking the budget to strategy, and communicating it consistently. Alignment of the organization involves creating a synergy between units by pursuing a commonality of interests and functions. Towards this end, the PA has cascaded the ATR to all the units of the PA all over the country from 07 March 2012 to 10 February 2013. Second level cascading was done in 35 HPA offices, 27 major subordinate units, and 816 army personnel. Next is linking budget to the strategy. Looking at the PA SMS, the development of budget is anchored
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism

One of the core functions of the AGSMO is the conduct of Strategy and Strategic Program Reviews as part of the PA SMS framework. The Strategy Review is done to evaluate the performance status of each measure vis--vis the strategic objectives; while the Strategic Program Review is conducted to evaluate the status of strategic programs vis--vis the performance indicators. These reviews start with AGSMO consolidating the reports of concerned offices, which is followed by the HPA Staff evaluation. Afterwards, it will be forwarded to CGPA for his guidance, and then the performance report is presented to the PA Multi-Sector Advisory Board (PA MSAB) for their
on the crafted strategy and the capability and organizational plans. Based on the Annual Plan and Budget (APB) for Fiscal Year 2013, 94.98% or 38.50 billion out of the 40.61 billion total budget of the PA budget is aligned to the ATR. Moreover, strategybudget alignment is also expressed in the development of the PA medium-term program 2014 - 2019 as manifested in its Program Objectives Memorandum. The resulting medium-term program that specifically aims to institutionalize DSOM and PGS processes among others, requires a total of 314.53 billion pesos. The PA also aligned its units to the ATR by communicating it. This was done with the PA Command Information Mechanisms based on the Army Civil-Military Operation framework and the communication plan called BREAKTHROUGH RESULTS ALPHA.
Army successfully implements the ATR and, in shortterm, realize the 2013 base camp to have a disciplined and motivated Army capable of addressing all internal security threats. The plans include the following: (1) Empowerment of Small Unit Leaders; (2) Establishment of Performance Scorecard Management Information System; and (3) Governance Pathway for Army Units; However, the PA is also focused on attaining set performance targets for the next three years, and lay down the building blocks to attain the 2016 base camp to be a well-equipped Army that has established a respectable image in Southeast Asia. To be a relevant force in the Southeast Asia, the PA shall implement its Capability Development Plan. It will strengthen its engagement with its local and international stakeholders, and endeavor to be full mission-capable in terms of internal peace and security operations. All of these are aimed to institutionalize good governance and performance excellence practices in the organization, and to make this culture of ATR, the culture of the Philippine Army.
Plans Moving Forward

Determined to attain its ultimate goal, the PA came up with plans that will help sustain its transformation agenda. These are intended to make sure that the
About the AUTHOR

Jackie Lyn N Nunag is Defense Research Officer I at the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO). She is a graduate of BA Public Administration at the University of the Philippines Diliman.
AFTER-ACTIVITY REPORT ON THE PHILIPPINE ARMYS JOURNEY TOWARDS PGS PROFICIENCY
BY Jackie Lyn N Nunag, Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO)
Lets Talk about Change. LTGEN NOEL A COBALLES AFP, Commanding General of the Philippine Army, reported on the progress of Army transformation at the Public Governance Forum on 19 March 2013. (Photo by OACPA)
I. Introduction
The Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) is based on the Performance Governance System (PGS), which espouses a performance-based good governance culture. Through the PGS, the ATR promotes an Army that is institution-led and not personality-driven; thinks of long-term rather than of short-term strategies; and pursues interconnected, sustained, and continuous priorities instead of single issues. The Philippine Armys progress in institutionalizing the culture of good governance and performance excellence in the entire organization is guided by the four-way PGS Pathway. After it was awarded the Initiated and Compliant Status last 23 September
2010 and 14 October 2011, respectively, the PA has relentlessly persevered to hurdle the next stage, Proficiency, to bring about change in the management and conduct of its affairs. With the activation of the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO), the requirement of the Proficiency stage of establishing an office of strategy management had already been satisfied. Hence, determined that the PA is prepared to comply with the rest of the requirements of being PGS Proficient, then Commanding General of the Philippine Army (CGPA) approved the PAs pursuance of the Proficiency Stage. Thus, in response to the invitation of the Institute for Solidarity in Asia (ISA) President, Mr Francisco C Eizmendi Jr, to participate in the Public Governance Forum on 19 March 2013, the PA sent a letter of confirmation to undergo the PGS Proficiency Evaluation Process.
of this stage are present and operational. The result of the third-party audit will then determine the PAs advancement to the last part of the process, the Public Revalida. The Public Revalida is the final step towards the conferral of the Proficiency Stage, which is validated by a panel of experts from different sectors of society. Serving as the PAs guide in these processes is the presence of the following PGS Proficiency elements:
1. Office of Strategy Management 2. Functional Scorecards 3. Further Cascading 4. Consistent Communication 5. Link to Budget 6. Operations Review 7. Strategy Review 8. Functional MSGC
II. Objective
Undergoing the PGS Proficiency Evaluation Process is essential in validating the PAs Proficiency level. This will confer with the Proficient Status and subsequently advance to Institutionalization, the last stage of the PGS Pathway.
IV. Results
A. Self-Assessment
III. The PGS Proficiency Evaluation Process

To successfully obtain the Proficient Status, the PA has to undergo the rigid PGS Proficiency Evaluation Process, which is a 3-step procedure that includes: (a) Self-Assessment; (b) Third-Party Audit; and (c) Public Revalida. The first stage is the self-assessment, which consists of the following: strategic readiness test, focused group discussion and interviews. This phase of the process is essential in determining the PAs progress in terms of embedding the PGS in the organization. The third-party audit is designed to validate the level of Proficiency of the PA by ensuring that the elements
The self-assessment phase started with the distribution of the survey questionnaires for the Strategic Readiness Test starting 16 January 2013. The PA employed the use of online and paper and pen survey, generating a total of 109 respondents. The respondents profile is summarized in the table below:
PERSONAL INFORMATION
BY POSITION Senior Leader Leader Assistant to Leader Supervisor Staff TOTAL BY DESIGNATION General Headquarters Combat Units Combat Support Units 50 11 19 2 5 15 50 37 109
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Service Support Units TOTAL BY MEMBERSHIP Officer Enlisted Personnel Non-uniformed personnel TOTAL ATTENDANCE TO ATR SESSIONS Has attended at least one ATR Session Has not attended any ATR Session TOTAL 104 5 109 78 19 12 109 29 109
For the Office of Strategy Management, the smooth transition of the function of managing the implementation of the ATR from Plans Division (OG5) to the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO) was observed. This was attributed to the proper keeping in place of the formers systems and processes. Through the creation of AGSMO, it is apparent that more focus is given on strategy execution. The report also cited that the Army Performance Scorecard is already operational, and that it is continuously being improved, along with its subsidiaries. This is being done to enhance the validity of the performance measures. On further cascading, it was reported that the PA is capable of conducting cascading workshops to generate the scorecards of infantry divisions. Also, a distinct observation is the PAs creation of modules and templates to help make the PGS more suitable to military culture and conditions. The PAs internal communications on the other hand, is deemed as one of its strongest feature. This was observed through the effective use of the components of the ATR in speeches, documents, and reports. It was also noted that social media has been the main channel in communicating the ATR externally. However, the use of social media still needs to be improved. Furthermore, the ATRs link to the PA budget is ensured through the inclusion of AGSMO in the program and budget advisory committee. This guarantees that the ATR strategic initiatives that drive performance measures are actually funded. Other than that, the monitoring of the performance of these initiatives and the performance measures is ascertained through the conduct of strategy and strategic programs (operations) review. Lastly, the regular conduct of the PA Multi-Sector Advisory Board (MSAB) meetings and the productive results of these meetings demonstrated the presence of a functional multi-sector governance coalition (MSGC) in the PA.
Another tool for the self-assessment is the focus group discussion held last 29 January 2013, which was facilitated by Ms Ma Socorro L Escueta from ISA. During this activity, the members of the technical working group were asked about the accomplishments of the ATR after almost three years of implementation. The group was also asked about the notable changes brought about by the establishment of AGSMO. Accordingly, the creation of a separate office that oversees the cross-functional processes related to strategy management is a good move to ensure the progress of the ATR. For the interviews, the following personalities were interviewed to further determine the level of Proficiency of the PA:
Interviewee
LtGen Noel A Coballes AFP MGen Nicanor E Dolojan AFP Col Gerry P Amante (OS) GSC PA Ms Samira Ali Gutoc-Tomawis
Date
01 Feb. 2013 29 Jan. 2013 29 Jan. 2013 01 Feb. 2013
From the results of the aforementioned activities, ISA came up with an initial proficiency evaluation report. According to the said report, the components of the ATR have already demonstrated real, transformative and attainable attributes with the organization focusing on internal development in terms of clarity of strategy. There is also a sense of ownership of the strategy from the top leadership down to the lower units.
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Based on these observations, it was determined that the PA is eligible to proceed to the next phase of the evaluation process. The initial performance evaluation report was then forwarded to the third-party auditors to serve as their guide.
B. Third-Party Audit
For the third-party audit, select auditors from the Institute of Internal Auditors-Philippines (IIA-P) were commissioned by ISA to verify if the aforementioned Proficiency elements are present and operational, thus determining their level of the entrenchment in the PA. These auditors include the following:
1. Mr Amador Racpan 2. Mr Alvin Mendoza 3. Mr Mags Mendez 4. Ms Richel Mendoza 5. Mr Eric Ebro 6. Ms Tanya Teves
The kick-off meeting with the auditors was conducted last 25 February 2013 wherein the AGSMO team presented the overview of the ATR. The audit team then gave a short briefing on how they will conduct the auditing process. On the same day, the team requested for the documents to demonstrate the presence of the Proficiency elements in the organization. The off-site auditing was from 25-27 February, while the on-site audit was conducted from 28 February-01 March 2013. During the on-site auditing, the team visited the different key HPA Staff and two of the major subordinate units, namely, the Light Armor Division (LAD) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The table below provides a quick look on the findings of the audit-team:
ELEMENT
MAIN ASSESSMENT
NOTES
ATR is shown to be internalized well by those who are aware of it. Systems have been placed to ensure sustainability and support from the top. Cascading of vision and mission down the line must persist. Alignment to AFP and DND strategy has to be validated. The creation of a separate OSM is a good step towards the progress of
Clarity of Strategy
Good Practice
Office of Strategy Management Functionality of Scorecards
Good Practice
the ATR. Full utilization of the roles of the OSM to ensure sustainable strategy execution, and improve on the systems and processes within OSM, and its relation with other units should be looked into. Measures and data in the first-level scorecard should be finalized and made operational. Constant reviews and refinements should be done for second-level scorecards to be fully functional. Enthusiastic effort to cascade the strategy covering all infantry divisions is shown. This has become instrumental in the commitments of secondlevel leaders to the CGPA. Continuous efforts to cascade the strategy must be sustained.
Getting Started
Further Cascading
Emerging Best Practice
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ELEMENT
Consistent Communication
MAIN ASSESSMENT
NOTES
There is good utilization of subliminal messages aimed at PAs internal audience and active usage of new media. Feedback mechanisms for internal and external communication could be strengthened. Annual planning for the budget takes into consideration the targets of the ATR as quick win projects are also seen to be moving. Monitoring of the initiatives progress is also being regularly done. Stronger internal controls for funds outside GAA need to be established. Regularization of reviews have to be sustained while measures must be operational and data inflow more available. Analysis on how the impact
Link to Budget Monitoring & Reporting Mechanisms:

1. Operations Review 2. Strategy Review
Good Practice
Getting Started
of measures or initiatives affects each other has to be strengthened. Breakthrough results should be more present and communicated down the line. Dynamic relationship with MSAB paves way for sustainment of the ATR. Accountabilities are more permanently set. Duplicating effective mechanisms such as the formation of a third-level MSAB could be explored more.
Functional MSGC
According to the audit report submitted, the PAs consistent communication, MSAB, and further cascading efforts are emerging best practices, while the AGSMO and link of the ATR to PA budget are good practices.
C. Revalida
Through the report and findings of the audit team, the PA has qualified to proceed to the next and final part of the Proficiency Evaluation Process. Hence, last 19 March 2013, the PA participated in the Public Governance Forum, which was organized by ISA in cooperation with the National Competitive Council. The Commanding General, Philippine Army, LtGen Noel A Coballes AFP, delivered the PAs revalida presentation at the Edsa Shangri-La Manila. Supporting him during the public revalida were chiefs of the key HPA offices. The presentation lasted twenty (20) minutes, which was broken down into the following:
MINUTES
2 minutes
ITEMS/CONTENT
CONTEXT SETTING (AVP or PPT Slides)
Current realities and reasons for adopting a good governance program Strategic change agenda, or major transformations expected as a result of implementing the strategy Major issues encountered in strategy implementation
PERFORMANCE PROGRESS OF THE ENTERPRISE STRATEGY

3 minutes
Highlight the critical elements of the strategy using the: 1. Charter Statement 2. Strategy Map 3. Governance Scorecard 4. Strategic Initiatives
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MINUTES
3 minutes
ITEMS/CONTENT
PA Strategic Management System OFFICE OF STRATEGY MANAGEMENT
Creation and Sustainability of the Office for Strategy Management 1. Placement in the organization 2. OSM full-time plantilla 3. OSM Part-time counterparts Main functions and process flow in the OSM Calendar of activities
3 minutes
MONITORING AND REPORTING MECHANISMS

3 minutes
Operations Review Strategy Review Multi Sector Governance Coalition
ALIGNMENT MECHANISMS
Scorecard Infrastructure
Status of Second level scorecards Further cascading to lower unit levels

4 minutes Link to Budget
How the strategy drives key strategic initiatives Link initiatives and strategy to budget
Alignment of strategy to command guidance, key priorities, etc. Communication materials and paraphernalia
PLANS MOVING FORWARD

2 minutes
Soft and hard benefits attained as a result of using the PGS Emerging best practices 2015 Commitments Emerging breakthrough results Plans moving forward
The revalida presentation was immediately followed by the panel evaluation, wherein the panel members were given ample time to raise questions and clarifications, and provide inputs and recommendations. The panel was composed of these select PGS and Balanced Scorecard experts and members of the PA Multi-Sector Advisory Board (MSAB):
1. Dr. Jesus P. Estanislao
Chairman, Institute for Solidarity in Asia & Institute for Corporate Directors (Panel Chair)
2. Mr. Pedro P. Benedicto Jr.

President, Republic Surety & Insurance Co. Inc.
3. Mr. Gordon Alan Joseph

Director and CEO, Phil-Pacific Insurance Brokers
4. Asec. Danilo Francia

Department of National Defense
5. Atty. Fe B. Barin
Fellow, Institute for Corporate Directors
6. Ms. Doreen Yu
Columnist, Philippine Star
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revalidated. The Philippine Army passed the PGS Proficiency Stage and acquired the Silver Trailblazer Seal at the Public Governance Forum. Dr. Jesus Estanislao, Chairman of the Institute for Solidarity in Asia (ISA), awarded these distinctions to LTGEN COBALLES. (Photo by OACPA)
7. Ms. Solita Collas-Monsod

Professor, University of the Philippines, School of Economics
8. Atty. Alexander Lacson

Partner, Malcolm Law
9. Mr. Alberto A Lim

Director, Development Bank of the Philippines
Thereafter, the aforementioned personalities deliberated on whether or not the PA has successfully completed the Proficiency requirements. Each panellist was given a score sheet in which they graded the PA based on the revalida. The passing score for the revalida is 7.5, while it takes a rating of at least 8.5 for an organization to be conferred with a Governance Trailblazer seal. After the panel deliberation, the PA garnered an over-all rating of 8.8 which enabled it to pass the PGS Proficiency Stage, and acquire the Silver Trailblazer Seal. The breakdown of this 8.8 mark is shown in the following table:
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Category
Commitment to Transformation
Remarks
The commitment in seeing the Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) through is clearly seen in the members of the Philippine Army (PA). Several panel members commended the PA for showing their dedication to the ATR as seen in its progress and sustainment despite changes in leadership. This connotes the enculturation of the transformation program in the organization, rather than mere compliance to the demands of the Commanding General (CGPA). The panelists have noted the establishment of the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office as a positive movement towards magnifying the needs of the ATR and, at the same time, providing solutions to hit targets or amend the strategy. Its set-up and organization is seen to be effective in so far as the office has been fulfilling its roles as the OSM. Guarantees that would ensure sustainability of the office should, however, be more evident. Internal monitoring of units and the analysis of the data gathered appears to be present in the PA. While this is so, external body monitors that aims to check the movement of targets should be an alternative that could be looked into. As suggested by one panelist, this mechanism could authenticate and provide more substance to the findings of AGSMO or the Inspector General of the PA. The panel noted that the PA must strengthen the statistical assessment of the data of the scorecard such as in percentage improvements. PA can strengthen how an improvement in one measure or initiative affects another scorecard component. Nonetheless, the act of regular reporting and monitoring is already a step forward in setting accountability within the organization. With respect to the usage of data, assessment of the strategy, and the operations should be able to provide assistance in decision-making, particularly in the capability development aspect of the PA. The panel has acknowledged the dynamic relationship of the Multisectoral Advisory Board (MSAB) members with the PA. Due to the positive effect of the MSAB in
Rating
9.50
Office of Strategy Management
9.19
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms
8.81
Accountability to the MSGC
being a functioning tool towards improving the PA and keeping those in the first and second level units in check, duplication in the provinces must be done to ensure that transformation is dispersed even in the grassroots level as the strategy is being brought down. Functionality of the CGPA Scorecard has been recognized but it is apparent that some measures such as the Quality Recruit Index should be reviewed. As noted by one of the panel members, a more coherent way of gauging the movement of targets
8.81
Scorecard Infrastructure
should also be explored to provide a clear picture of where the PA is at, in relation to its progress. Moreover, the thrust of the new CGPA, LTGEN NOEL A COBALLES, to bring the scorecard down to the line should be pursued aggressively. Another panelist noted that cascading must be a two way process and that inputs from the field must enrich the enterprise strategy. While there is a direct relation to the strategy and the budget, some of the panelists were not very clear on the linkage of the PA to the Department of Budget and
8.88
Link to Budget
Management and the Congress. It was mentioned that the allocation of funds for strategic initiatives should be well-communicated to these two bodies to ensure that the important ATR-related projects are factored in the approved GAA.
8.75
15
Category
Remarks
The communication strategies for both the internal and external audience of the PA are seen to be impressive. Some panelists have commended the approach to focus on communicating the strategy to the lower units as this indicates the desire for truly institutionalizing the ATR. In fact, it was relayed during the revalida that officers assigned in far-flung areas such as Basilan and Samar know about the ATR and have found their place in the strategy. External communications, on the other hand, is seen to be well-conceptualized but public knowledge of the PAs efforts towards transformation must be measured to ensure that the approach being used now is successful. Efforts to cascade the strategy down to the individual have been highlighted as the focus of the PA with regard to the ATR. For the panel members, it is clear that the
Rating
8.63
Plans Moving Forward
organization is certain on what they want and are consciously competent at their work towards becoming a world-class Army that is a source of national pride. Therefore, the PA needs to ensure sustainability and continue to improve in their performance of the strategy.
9.06
V. Recommendations
In view of the above, the following are recommended:
1. Ensure the sustainability of the ATR; 2. Monitor responsiveness of external communications; 3. Duplicate effective mechanisms like the MSAB in the provincial-level; 4. Strengthen review mechanisms of the objectives and measures in the Army Performance Scorecard; 5. Align the ATR with current realities through a Strategy Refresh; 6. Communicate stories of individuals to garner more external stakeholder support; and 7. Move towards PGS Institutionalization.
About the AUTHOR

Ms Jackie Lyn N Nunag is Defense Research Officer I at the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO), PA. She is a graduate of BA Public Administration at the University of the Philippines Diliman.
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED 1 CONFLICTS IN THE PHILIPPINES

BY LTGEN Raymundo B Ferrer AFP & LTC Randolph G Cabangbang (INF) PA
Many US soldiers in the Joint Special Task Force Philippines (JSOTF-P) who had been deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other theaters of war have repeatedly described the non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in Mindanao to be particularly complex. In a place where you have a strong gun culture, where local residents are part-time insurgents, and kinship ties serve as force multipliers, how indeed do we distinguish civilians from armed insurgents? This article discusses NIAC in the Philippines and, towards the end, briefly notes the challenges it poses on the security sector in applying the rules of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). To provide readers the basic framework in understanding the nature of conflict in the Philippines, we begin with an organizational level of analysis of the NIAC. However, it must be noted that on the ground, that is, from the individual and operational levels of analysis, it is not so neatly delineated. For example, organizational identities in southern Mindanao, unlike in the West, are highly temporal and fluid. Civilians could be recruited to work seasonally for an insurgent group and then quickly and seamlessly resume their civilian life after operations are completed. Added to this complexity are the changing organizational labels civilians effortlessly assume without much question. Some civilians may work for one insurgent group that has an outstanding peace agreement with the government, then on the same day join a command structure of a known terrorist group, and then very quickly switch to supporting relatives
and kin who belong to a group currently in peace negotiation with the government. Organizations in the Philippines revolve around personalities rather than positions.2 We in the Armed Forces of the Philippines strive to have interoperability among ourselves and our allies, but here is our enemy for whom interoperability seems like second nature. NIAC in the Philippines is largely a homegrown phenomenon with some components heavily influenced by foreign elements. Conflicts rooted in ideologies outside the Philippines have been co-opted to provide a philosophical justification for a grassrootsdriven insurgency. This paper will primarily focus on two major NIAC facing the Philippines for convenience, we shall call them the two Ms: the Maoist group and the Moro group. We will quickly trace their origins and describe some of their basic strategy and structure. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New Peoples Army (NPA), use a Maoist ideology to justify its armed struggle against the government. The CPP is considered the biggest threat in the security of the Philippines.3 Their scope is nationwide. While strongest in the northern region of the Philippines, the Maoist group also has a presence in northern and eastern Mindanao where it tends to target for recruitment farmers in the rural areas, workers in mining industry, teachers, youth, women groups, and many other segments in the working class population that are vulnerable to the persuasion of the Maoist ideology.
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The Moro group, on the other hand, limits itself to southern Philippines. Like the CPP-NPA, it is also homegrown a secessionist movement that has been fighting for independence for more than a hundred years now. Islamic ideology inspires its members to fight for self-determination and recognition of their ethnic identity. The Maoist and Moro groups both exploit conditions of poverty and marginalization in marshalling their armed struggle against the government. According to the Asian Development Bank in 2008, about 26 million Filipinos out of 92 million live below the Asian Poverty Line.4 In other words, they are living on about USD1.35 per day. The poorest of the poor live in Muslim Mindanao. The Muslim poor are particularly marginalized from mainstream Filipino society and this fuels much of their grievance against the Philippine government. So while the Maoist group targets people through their occupation, the Moro group on the other hand appeals to ethnicity and shared history in their recruitment efforts.
CPP-NPA, together with its legal arm, the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP),6 seeks to overthrow the Philippine government. The CPP was established in 1968 as part of a larger sociological wave that was then taking the world by storm the rise of student activism in the 1960s and 1970s. However, many scholars argue that the roots of the organization could be traced all the way back to the Hukbalahap a contraction of the Filipino term Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon which means Peoples Army against the Japanese.7 Also known as the Huks, these fighters mobilized against Japanese occupation. The Huks were largely farmers from central Luzon, estimated by one source to have about 15,000 to 20,000 active members and 50,000 in reserve in the early 1940s. After World War II, the Huks moved on to wage a guerilla war against the United States. By the early 1960s, the Huk campaign began to wane and the Sino-Soviet split at that time further fractured the group. The CPP established itself separate from the Soviet-style organization and in 1969 renamed the remnants of the Huks as the New Peoples Army. The current strength of the NPA is estimated to be around 4,200. The Maoist group believes that the power of the gun is necessary to protect ordinary citizens from human rights abuses perpetuated by the government and local politicians. For the NPA, a protracted peoples war would bring about the downfall of the status quo and the Philippine government would be replaced by a socialist state. The modus operandi of the NPA involves the targeting of foreign investors and businesses for extortion, or what it euphemistically terms as revolutionary taxes. The ultimate goal is to drive these investors out of the Philippines and to bankrupt the economy. NPAs also admit to assassinate individuals such as politicians, members of the media, and other personalities they deem to stand in the way of them in attaining their objectives.
THE MAOIST MOVEMENT

The communist insurgency the longest-running Maoist insurgency in the world is waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing the New Peoples Army (NPA). In August 2002, the United States designated the NPA as a foreignterroristorganization; not too long after, on November 2005, so would the European Union.5 The
Gearing up. Members of the leftist New Peoples Army (NPA) performing military drills at an unidentified location in the Philippines. (Photo by Keith Bacongco)
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It is observed that the general trend of the rise and fall of the CPP-NPA membership coincides with the level of violence associated with each presidential administration. During the Marcos era (1965 to 1986), rampant human rights abuses fueled the rise of membership in the CPP-NPA. Followers of Marx and Mao in Philippine colleges and universities formed student organizations protesting the plight of farmers in the countryside and the urban poor. Anti-government activism was fashionable back in the 1970s. College students then did not carry cell phones. Instead, they carried a small red book which they used as a reference when they gathered together to talk about the ideology of Mao Tse Tung and a classless society. In 1972, Marcos declared Martial Law and for the next 13 years under that dictatorial leadership, the CPP attracted many recruits. But the trend shifted in 1986 when Corazon Cory Aquino, the mother of the current president Benigno Aquino III, came to power. She became the first woman president through the seminal people power movement in 1986 which was largely propelled by the outpouring of outrage against Marcos over the assassination three years earlier of her husband, Ninoy.8 Early into Corys term (1986 to 1992), ceasefire with the NPA was declared, political prisoners were released, and peace talks with the CPP-NDF-NPA were initiated. However, when the talks collapsed in 1987, the NPA returned to arms. The situation worsened when security forces violently dispersed and killed some peasants rallying for land reform one year after Cory assumed power. Acting under the advice of the United States, Cory launched a total war against the NPA. Sustained military offensives successfully reduced the communist forces from 25,200 in 1987 to 14,800 in 1991. A two-pronged strategy was used that could be described in current counterinsurgency parlance as hard power or military offensive and soft power or socio-economic development. To aid matters along,
Perilous. Talks between the government and the NPA have been touch and go. (Photo and caption by the BBC)
there were also brutal purges within the Maoist group that further demoralized its rank and file.9 On 11 September 2001, the NPA declared an all-out war against the central government, believing it to be controlled by the United States through its global war on terror. Although the NPA most likely will not win a military victory against government forces, its presence persists in the countryside where poverty, injustice, and the lack of social services provide conditions for marshalling the peoples grievance against the government.
THE MORO FRONT THREE FORMS OF STRUGGLE

In contrast to the CPP-NPA, the secessionist Moro insurgency largely limits its armed struggle in the southern portion of the country where the majority of Muslim Filipinos reside. Similar to the organizational pattern of the CPP-NPA, the oppressive rule of former President Marcos Martial Law in the 1970s triggered the Moro outcry against the central government which they believed to be the cause of Moro suffering. Like the CPP-NPA, the perception of marginalization drives the underlying anger that fuels the Moro armed struggle. For three centuries under Spanish rule and nearly 50 years of US dominance in the Philippines, the Moros were never conquered as a group. However, they feel that they have to live under the Filipino Christian rule of the central government and abide by its non-Islamic way of governance.
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southern Mindanao. The current President however is trusted by many Muslims and the attempt of Manila to extend various social services into the far reaches of Mindanao is slowly defeating the perception of hopelessness in many Muslim sectors in southern Philippines. These six elements of Muslim grievance have been used in one form or another in the rhetoric of many insurgent groups. Two major Moro insurgent groups in the southern Philippines are the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the notorious Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The MNLF already signed a Final Peace Agreement with the government in 1996, although it argues that such has not been fully implemented. For its part, the ASG lacks command and control and in many ways, like the MNLF, is no longer a formidable fighting might.
Moment of peace. The MNLF signed a significant peace agreement with the government in 1996. (Photo and caption by the BBC)
Philippine Muslim academic Macapado M. Abaton10 neatly summarized six key elements in the Moro grievance: economic marginalization and destitution; political domination; physical insecurity; threatened Moro and Islamic identity; a perception that government is the principal culprit; and a perception of hopelessness under the present order of things. Indeed, on matters of economic marginalization and destitution, the regions where most Muslims reside in Mindanao still remain among the poorest regions in the Philippines. Unemployment, illiteracy, and poverty rates are highest in Muslim Mindanao.11 In terms of political representation in the government, Muslims in Mindanao still feel that they do not have a voice in the central government.12 And while tremendous gains have been made over the past several years to reduce the extremist hold in the various islands in Mindanao, the condition for physical security is still not where it should be. There is more to be done in order to encourage business investments in Mindanao and change the perception of rampant lawlessness in the islands. The fifth and sixth elements are also related to the Moro identity, namely the perception of the inability of the central government to understand Muslim Mindanao and the general apathy of most politicians in the north with matters concerning the south. Marginalization of the south has always been an effective rallying cry for those who seek to manipulate Moro grievance for ultimately extremist causes. The perception of hopelessness in the status quo is partly driving the moral justification for an armed struggle in
The MNLF and the Origins of the MILF

Around the same time the CPP-NPA was formed, Nur Misuari, who was very much influenced by the Maoist ideology, founded the MNLF in 1972. He started an underground youth movement in Mindanao. His goal was to free the Muslims from what he described as the terror, oppression, and tyranny of Filipino colonialism and to secure a free and independent state for the Bangsamoro.13 Bangsa means country or nation. Moro is derived from the term early Spanish colonizers used to refer to the Moors, and had over time stuck as the collective word used to call all the various Muslim ethnic groups in Mindanao. Muslims in Mindanao turned this pejorative term into a badge of honor. Bangsamoro means Moro Nation. When Nur Misuari declared Jihad against the Philippine government, the MNLF led the armed resistance of all Muslims in Mindanao against Martial Law in 1972. The MNLF became the organizational vehicle that symbolized the Moro cause of 13 disparate Islamized ethno-linguistic groups in Mindanao. Their aim the establishment of an independent Moro nation.
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Four years of bloody war in Mindanao prompted the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to pressure the MNLF to accept some form of political autonomy in lieu of secession and independence. The MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement in 1976 but frustrations over its implementation a year later led Misuari to revert back to armed struggle while his Vice Chairman Salamat Hashim broke away from the MNLF to establish the second Moro secessionist group, the MILF, in 1984. The MNLF-MILF split was largely based on differences in political strategy and ideological orientation. The MILF could be described as Islamic revivalist while the MNLF is more secular-nationalist. Hashim of the MILF wanted to push for the peace process under the Tripoli Agreement and his commitment to peace negotiations remains to be one of the defining points of the MILF. The MNLF, however, believe in the use of force the same armed struggle that Maoists find necessary in achieving peace in southern Philippines. The MILF wants to govern the Moro homeland under the ideals of Islam and the Shariah law. Religion is central to the workings of the MILF, as could be seen in the active involvement of the Ulama or Islamic scholars in the leadership and internal workings of the organization. The MNLF, on the other hand, largely concerns itself with fighting for independence. The leadership style of the MILF is consultative where a central committee drives the organizations agenda, while the MNLF is centralized where decisions revolve around the leader. In addition, the MILF is mostly dominated by the Maguindanaos from central Mindanao, while the MNLF is largely composed of ethnic Tausugs, the warrior class, from the Sulu Archipelago. Traditionally, these two Muslim tribes could not stand each other. The rise of the MILF coincided with Misuaris descent. The MNLF became increasingly fragmented in 1982 and ceased to be a formidable fighting force when it inked the Final Peace Agreement with the government of the Philippines in 1996. Some of the MNLF rebels were integrated into the armed forces and national
Home. The MILF is mostly based in remote islands in central Mindanao. (Photo and caption by the BBC)
police and some of them joined various livelihood programs to help them reintegrate back into society. Many of these livelihood programs were sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and these have been very successful. Fisheries, seaweed farming, and various other livelihood programs benefited many former MNLF rebels in the Sulu archipelago.
The MILF Today

The 12,000-strong MILF is mainly based in central Mindanao, although it has presence in Palawan, Basilan, and other islands in the Sulu Archipelago. Since 1997, it has been pursuing peace negotiations with the government. The MILF leaders have put in significant effort in bringing in international audience into its peace negotiations. The International Monitoring Team (IMT) composed of representatives from Malaysia, Brunei, Libya, Japan, Norway and European Union oversee the ceasefire agreement between the MILF and the GPH. With international monitoring, over 70 agreements have been reached between the MILF and the Philippine government since 1997.
Alliance with the ASG

One Moro group that remains without any form of ceasefire agreement with the government and is not considered by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a NIAC is the Abu Sayyaf Group
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obligation of every Muslim to carry out this Jihad and failure to do so would be a sin against Allah. Driven by its secessionist and extreme Islamic ideology, the ASG quickly became internationalized with the involvement of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), whose goal is to establish a Muslim caliphate throughout Southeast Asia. However, with the death of Janjalani and the demise of several key ASG leaders, ASGs Jihadist ideological fervor has died down particularly among the rank and file. Many argue that the ASG has now degraded into criminality.14 Kidnapping has always been a consistent staple for ASG to raise funds, prompting many observers to argue that Janjalanis Jihad has become a cloak to justify the criminality of ASG. While the old timers remain loyal to the cause, the financial pressures, lack of loyalty among the rank and file, and the US-backed military offensives against the ASG have degraded the once notorious Moro fighters into a bunch of thugs.
ORIGIN. The Abu Sayyaf is a breakaway faction from the MNLF. (Photo and caption by the BBC)
(ASG). However, in its early years, one could argue that it could be considered as a NIAC. The inspiration for the al Qaeda-linked ASG came from radical Islamism notably the jihad against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Around the time that the MNLF was engaged in peace negotiations with the Philippine government in the late 1980s/early 1990s, an underground movement of disenchanted youth began to be mobilized by a charismatic preacher in Basilan, Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani. Janjalani wanted an independent state for the Muslims in Mindanao. Academics continue to debate whether Janjalani in fact fought during the Afghanistan war. Whether he did or not, the primary driving force behind ASGs formation is rooted in a Jihadist war that the MNLF failed to follow through according to the perception of many idealistic Muslim youth. The disenchanted Muslim youth felt that the older cadres abandoned the spirit of the Bangsamoros struggle against the government in the 1970s. They felt that the MNLF leaders betrayed their cause and acquiesced to the Philippine government when it entered into peace negotiations. Janjalani formally founded the ASG in 1992 and justified his Jihad based on the following arguments: (1) The Philippine government with the help of its Christian allies, notably the US, severely oppressed the Bangsamoro people; (2) This oppression came about by the unwelcome intrusion of Christians into the Muslim homeland; (3) To defeat this oppression, the struggle for the cause of Allah must be waged against the Christian invaders; and (4) It is the personal
CHALLENGES IN APPLYING THE RULES OF IHL

The rules of the IHL apply to war and armed conflict that, for humanitarian reasons, seek to limit the harmful effects of these on non-participants. While these rules do not prevent the use of force by the state, these laws and customs do restrict the means and methods to be employed for warfare. Memorandum Order #9 issued on 7 August 1998 directed state security forces in the Philippines to implement the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and the International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), which was signed by the NDFP and the Philippine government five months earlier in The Hague.15 Earlier than this, the issue of human rights protection and the application of the IHL rules were not clearly spelled out to parties to the NIAC in the Philippines. For over forty years, the two concurrent NIACs in the southern Philippines have extracted an exorbitant toll in the number of lives, damage to property and government resources, and economic opportunities lost due to prolonged wars. The social cost of the
23
conflict in terms of damaged social cohesion and the diaspora of Muslims in Mindanao is arguably much bigger a price. During the early years of the conflict, there were indeed some violations committed by the major players the government forces, the Moro rebels, and communist insurgents. Most of the abuses blamed on the government forces happened during the Martial Law years from 1972 to 1981. The protracted conflicts,16 however, make it appear that there were widespread and continuing violations of human rights. In fact, during the early years of the Moro secessionist and the Maoist communist insurgencies, NIAC rules were not at all clear to state security forces. The Cold War period was characterized by wars of national liberation or internal wars. The Geneva Conventions I-IV were made in 1949 as an offshoot of World War II, while the Additional Protocols I and II were made only in 1977. These rules would emerge after either front had already initiated hostilities with the state forces. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has been involved in Internal Security Operations (ISO) since Martial Law was declared by President Marcos in September 1972. Since then, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) had been performing law enforcement and combat operations against insurgent groups. For lack of legal framework, the Human Rights Law (HRL) and the IHL rules got mixed up in these two types of missions. The nature of the NIAC in the Philippines today and the operational strategies they employ pose serious challenges to the enforcement of the IHL rules. Discussed below are some of the finer points of these challenges.
No finger in the pie. Military wouldnt meddle in Sayyaf-MNLF fighting last February. (Photo and caption by philstar.com)
group uses unarmed civilians as couriers, messengers, early warning system, and bearers of logistics for their fighters. When arrested, these civilians invoke their human rights to be distinguished as non-combatants. Note that most cases of such arrests are carried out by government troops based only on intelligence information. And while no arrest is made until the intelligence information is corroborated by informants or captured enemy personnel, such information will not hold in court without physical evidence, which, in most cases, could not be supplied. Regular communist guerillas usually carry guns similar to those issued to the state security forces. Disguised in regulation uniforms and bearing arms, the insurgents can deceive civilians enough to avoid detection and get inside police stations or military detachments to successfully conduct raids. In their operations, communist guerillas are known to mingle with civilians. They move around villages for propaganda work and to solicit foodstuffs. When government troops come upon them in the villages, civilians could get caught in the crossfire. Also, within NPA camps, civilians who are mostly relatives of the rebels are utilized as cooks, errand persons, or lookout. So while these camps are situated well away from civilian villages and are no problem at targeting, endangering the civilians within could become a human rights issue that their Maoist groups mass organizations and propaganda desks could exploit.
On the Principle of Distinction

The Principle of Distinction requires that combatants be distinguished from non-combatants. This distinction is hard to make out in the case of militias employed by the Maoist group who can be farmers during the day and fighters at night. Habitually, also, the Maoist
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For the MILF, on the other hand, their camps are also their communities. It is not uncommon then for MILF villages to be fortified with trenches, firing positions, outposts, guard posts, and other defense structures. Usually, Muslims build a mosque or madrasah within their camps where, because of the communal nature of their society, houses are clustered around. During ceasefire, the MILF members have their families staying in the camps to farm and to do other chores. The AFP does not have precision-guided munitions in its inventory, such that its system of targeting is not very accurate. Civilian objects are sometimes hit by the AFPs bombs or artillery rounds. In order to address this limitation, the AFP has established a Rule of Engagement (ROE) whereby a Forward Air Controller (FAC) of a Forward Observer (FO) is required to engage a target with indirect fires.
On Children Involved in Armed Conflict

The Maoist group use children as child soldiers. There were many incidents when our troops captured child soldiers, both male and female.
On the Use of Landmines

Landmines of various kinds continue to be used by rebel groups particularly by the NPA, MNLF, and the ASG in the several armed conflicts in the Philippines. Some of its uses are in accordance with IHL, while some are not. In the period 2000-06, total reported landmine and improvised explosive device (IED) casualties (killed and wounded) were 362, of which 299 were soldiers and policemen while 63 were civilians, some of them children. In addition, unexploded ordnance (UXO) or explosive remnants of war (ERW) left in the battlefield pose danger to IDPs returning to their homes and farms in conflict-affected areas. That is why during the cessation of hostilities, the AFP is taking extra effort to recover these UXOs and ERWs.18 The Maoist group commonly uses improvised command-detonated anti-personnel mines (APMs) and anti-vehicle mines (AVMs). In recent years they have extensively used improvised Claymore mines in command-detonated mode, using scrap metal in lieu of steel balls. Because of CARHRIHL, the CPP-NPANDFP made certain commitments which generally adhered to IHL rules on the use of landmines.
Principle of Proportionality and Limitation on the Use of Methods and Means of Combat
This principle is generally defined by AFP ROEs issued by higher authorities to operational commanders. It is, for example, generally prohibited to use artillery or bombs to attack NPA camps unless it is well fortified since the NPAs do not use big guns17 and to avoid creating fear among the civilians living nearby.
Childrens rights are also human rights. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continues its mandate to protect childrens rights in conflict areas. (Photo by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process or OPAPP)
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On the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Small arms and light weapons proliferate in the Philippines, complicating the armed conflicts especially in the Southern Philippines. There are an estimated 1 million licensed firearms in the country and more than 2 million illegally acquired firearms in Mindanao alone.19 The proliferation of SALW contributes to the formation of private armed groups and warlordism, as well as the frequency and intensity of lawlessness and clan wars in Mindanao.
And yet, there is hope for the future generation where the fatigue of war and the rhetoric of grievance no longer inspire the same intense anger. In my experience working with variouscommunities in promoting peace as another way to defeat the enemy, I have learned that people will behave according to the way they are viewed: If you treat them as an enemy then they will become one; if you treat them as partners then they will respond in kind. With all their complexities, non-international armed conflicts in the Philippines could be viewed simply as a cry for human security the need to have a dignified way of life where the basic necessities of survival become a fundamental right for each and every individual.
ADDRESSING NIAC IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

There are now two parallel peace tracks currently underway in connection with non-international armed conflicts in southern Philippines. The Philippine government (GPH) is pursuing peace negotiations with the CPP-NPA and with the MILF. Localized conflicts these days have become increasingly intertwined with the social values of a larger international audience, bringing about the downfall of institutions and governments. Small grassroots movements and extremist cells throughout the world have capitalized on social media networks to gain sympathy from an international audience all too willing to impose their moral values and judgments on the legitimacy of armed conflicts. In the case of the Philippines, however, one could argue that these two NIACs with long roots from the past largely remain outside the reach of an increasingly globalized world. These NIAC appear to be propagated in the hearts and minds of people who simply refuse to let go of the past.
Conflict in the South. The southern Philippines has a long history of conflict, with armed groups including Muslim separatists, communists, clan militias and criminal groups all active in the area. (Photo and caption by the BBC)
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Lt Gen Raymundo B Ferrer AFP commanded the Western Mindanao Command in Zamboanga City from November 2010 to January 2012 while Lt Col Randolph G Cabangbang PA served as the Assistant Chief of Unified Command Staff for CMO, U7 and Spokesman of WestMinCom from November 2010 to November 2012. Both officers aregraduates of the Civil Affairs Qualification Course and Psychological Operations Course at US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
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Endnotes
1 Revised from the authors presentation delivered during the Conference on Non-international Armed Conflict at the US Naval War College, Newport, R.I. on 22 July 2011. See The Mindanao-Sulu Power Game: An Ethnography of Emergent Players Final Report. This is a commissioned research recently completed by BrandLab for a restricted audience. See the First Semester 2011 Intelligence Report of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, J2, Armed Forces of the Philippines. This restricted source is also used for figures on enemy strength and operational strategies employed by armed threat groups that are cited elsewhere in this paper. See http://beta.adb.org/news/podcasts/launch-key-indicators-2008introducing-asian-poverty-line?page=5 See http://balita.ph/2010/03/28/npa-transforms-into-terrorist-group-says-afp/. The NDFP serves as the umbrella for various mass organizations of Maoist persuasion. See http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/papa/philippines1946.htm Ninoy, or Senator Benigno Aquino, Sr., was recognized as the staunchest critic of the Marcos regime. He was assassinated on 21 August 1983. See Abinales, 2008, pp 77-98. See Abaton, 1994. See Philippine Human Development Report 2005. Positive changes may yet emerge to improve political participation with the ongoing peace process and the political will of the current president to address the Moro problem. See McKenna, 1998, p. 164. Such perception of the ASGs transition from revolutionary to criminality is picked up by community residents in Jolo and Basilan where ASG presence had been and continues to be strongest. See Ilagan, 2011, pp. 42-47. Implementation of the CARHRIHL would only be activated in 2004 with the formation of the GRP-NDF Joint Monitoring Committee. In December 2005, the NDFP Human Righs Monitoring Committee published a primer CARHRIHL that summarizes the points of the agreement. The CARHRIHL is also available on open sources in the Internet. In the southern Philippines, the conflicts were made more complicated by the proliferation of arms. Also, civilian armed group and vigilante groups are utilized to serve the personal interests of political warlords. See Santos et al., 2010. The NPAs have a few mortars only and usually have light machineguns to defend their positions. See Primer on Landmines Issue and Bill in the Philippines, 2010, pp. 28-30. See Santos et al., 2010. 2
References

Abaton, Macapado M. 1994. The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative. Marawi City: Mindanao State University. Abinales, Patricio N. 2008. Shifting Tactics: Politics and the Power of the Local in the Philippines. In Ilagan, Gail Tan and Actub, M. Isabel S., eds. Tambara (25). Davao City: Ateneo de Davao University. Civil Society Initiatives for International Humanitarian Law. 2010. Primer on RA No. 9851: A Breakthrough Law for International Humanitarian Law in the Philippines. Quezon City: Civil Society Initiatives for International Humanitarian Law. Human Development Network. 2005. Philippine Human Development Report 2005. Manila: Human Development Network. Ilagan, Gail T. 2011. The Mindanao Resilient Communities Project Report. Davao City: Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao and the United States Embassy Manila. Mastura, Datu Michael O. 2007. A Time for Reckoning for the Bangsamoro Struggle. In Alejo, Albert E., Ilagan, Gail T., & Actub, M. Isabel S., eds. Tambara (24). Davao City: Ateneo de Davao University. McKenna, Thomas M. 1998. Muslim rulers and rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press. Mindanao Development Authority and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. 2010. Unpublished policy paper on the issue of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in selected areas of Mindanao. National Democratic Front of the Philippines Human Rights Monitoring Committee. 2005. Booklet Number 5: Primer on the Comprehensive Agreement to Respect Human Rights and the International Humanitarian Law. Manila: NDFP Human Rights Monitoring Committee. Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines. 2010. Primer on the Landmines Issue and Bill in the Philippines, 2nd ed. Santos, Soliman S., Santos, Paz Verdades M., & Dinampo, Octavio M. 2010. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Quezon City: South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement and the Small Arms Survey.
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a case for increasing the australian defense training aid to the philippines
by LTC ROMEO N BAUTISTA III (INF) PA
Considering Aussie participation. CPT FELIPE ESTRADA greets Australian Armys LTC ROD LONG at a school construction site. Long is part of an observation team in the Philippines to help determine whether or not Australia would join the Balikatan Exercises. (Photo by US Marine Lance Cpl Cansin P. Hardyegritag)
Introduction
On 08 May 2012, the Australian Minister for Defense, Stephen Smith MP, announced the provision of AUD3.307 million to the Defense Cooperation Program (DCP) budget to the Philippines for 2012-2013.1 This represents an annual 13.9% decrease from the 2009-2012 DCP budgets to our country.2 Although reflecting the fiscal pressures3 experienced by Australia, there are compelling reasons to increase the defense training aid program to the Philippines based on strategic and economic interests of both.
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The aim of this essay is to discuss the need to increase Australias defense training aid to the Philippines for 2013-2014 and beyond. The objective is to provide input for policy makers and the general public of both countries given that an Australian Defense White Paper (DWP) is set to be published in 20134 and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), particularly the Philippine Army, embarks on a road for organizational transformation and the end of the four-decade insurgency.5 It will discuss the rationale and focus of the defense training aid, proceed to the arguments of increasing the aid, and provide appropriate recommendations.
Philippine Secretary of Department of National Defense (DND) signed the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) on 31 May 2007, which was subsequently ratified by the Philippine Senate on 24 July 2012.7 The rationale of Australias defense cooperation with the Philippines is mainly geographic in nature as encapsulated in its DWP 2009. It is in Australias strategic interest to have stable neighbors in Southeast Asia such as the Philippines which sit[s] astride its northern approaches.8 Owing to this, the Philippines is the 8th largest recipient of Australian aid in 2011-12 amounting to AUD123.1 million.9 This development aid will increase to AUD128.7 million in 2012-2013, with the Philippines becoming the 7th largest recipient.10 This development aid focuses on the following: basic education, local service delivery, disaster risk reduction and climate change, peace and development in Mindanao, and governance.11 As an adjunct to international aid, Australia runs a separate defense arrangement with the Philippines in the form of the Defense Cooperation Program (DCP) managed by the Australian Department of Defense
The current Australian defense training aid

The two countries defense cooperation dates back to World War II when around 4,000 Australians fought with their Philippine counterparts in the 19441945 liberation of the islands.6 This partnership was formalized when a Memorandum of Agreement was signed in 1995. Relations were further strengthened when the Australian Minister for Defense and the
HMAS NEWCASTLE at Pelorius Sound, New Zealand. Ratification of Senate Resolution 788, the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) with Australia, would face the rising challenges in the region and fortify both naval, maritime, and defense forces. (Photo by Australian Defence)
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(DoD).12 According to the 2012-2013 Australian Defense Portfolio Budget Statement, the objectives of DCP are to:13
contribute to regional security; shape a stable environment; consolidate Australias position as a key partner on
regional security issues; and encourage and assist the development of defense self-reliance within regional countries. The current DCP to the Philippines focuses on counter-terrorism, maritime security, and assistance to Philippine defense reform.14 For 2011-2012, the actual DCP fund for the Philippines was AUD3.857 million, the 4th largest among the 21 recipient countries.15 For 2012-2013, the Philippines is expected to receive a total of AUD3.307 million, making it the 5th largest defense aid among recipient countries.16 This, however, represents an annual average decrease of 13.9% since 2009. Australias DCP to the Philippines has three components.17 The first of these is the support for the Philippines Coast Watch South (CWS) which aims to improve the security in Celebes and Sulu Seas. The second component is the provision of education and
training to DND and coast guard personnel, making up approximately 85% of the defense aid. Mobile training teams are also provided in-country on diverse military subjects. The third component is the conduct of two major exercises which are both held annually. The annual Maritime Training Activity LUMBAS focuses on maritime security with Land Training Activity DAWN CARACHA focusing on special operations skills enhancement for counter-terrorism purposes.
The case for increasing the defense training aid

It is understandable that Australia is and will be providing more emphasis in its defense relationship with its immediate neighbors and other Southeast Asian states (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam) which offer more strategic weight.18 It is also understandable that with perceived human rights abuses and displacement of thousands of people committed by AFP troops, providing direct support to the AFP will unnecessarily encourage military solution in the ongoing counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism efforts in the Philippines.19 However, it is also important that it should reconsider these positions. Australias
Airboats from the Land Down Under. Australian handed over 21 airboats to the Philippines on October 2010. (Photo by the Philippine Army Public Affairs Office)
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options for its defense relationship with the Philippines must be informed by the increasing tension in the West Philippine Sea, current and potential investments in mining and oil industries, and the opportunities offered by Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Philippine military establishment. The increasing tensions in the West Philippine Sea (WPS)20 threaten the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, one of the key strategic interests of Australia.21 In April 2012, tensions flared when Chinese and Philippine navies engaged in a tense standoff in Panatag Shoal (Scarborough Shoal).22 During the annual joint meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers on the third week of July 2012, it failed to issue a joint statement over the issue of WPS. Although tensions have flared in the past decade, events in the first three quarters of 2012 point out that Chinas assertiveness continue to be a destabilizing factor in WPS. It is therefore illogical to provide emphasis on other Southeast Asian countries while leaving a small but vitally important gap in Australias northern approaches which could also threaten its northern sea lanes of communications. One development why Australia needs to reconsider its current defense relationship with the Philippines over other Southeast Asian countries is the formers investments in mining and oil industries. The Tampakan Copper-Gold Project in South-Central Mindanao is the largest undeveloped copper-gold deposit in Southeast Asia-Eastern Pacific Rim.23 Its estimated copper deposit is 15 million tons containing 17.9 million ounces of gold.24 The Australian company Indophil Resources NL holds 37.5% stake in this project. Another coppergold project commissioned in the fourth quarter of 2012 is the Didipio Gold-Copper Project in NorthCentral Philippines.25 The project contains 230,000 tons copper and 1.7 million ounces of gold. The project is operated by OceanaGold, an Australian-listed company.26 The extraction of oil resources particularly in WPS area may also be considered.27 Thus, these two potential minerals extraction industries indicate that Australias prospects in the Philippines will not only be strategically defensive in nature but also beneficial in purely economic sense.
The protection of Australias business interests provides another incentive in terms of peace-building. It has been established that business firms can also promote stability and peace in conflict-affected areas such as the Philippines. According to Keister, business firms promote stability by: providing jobs and economic opportunity; respecting rule of law as well as international labor and environmental standards; espousing principles of corporate citizenship; conducting risk assessments unique to the political environment in conflict-affected regions; and in some circumstances engaging in Track II diplomacy.28 In addition therefore to the three focus areas, resources (copper, gold, and petroleum) extraction with the bonus of business-fostering peace are important considerations for increasing the defense training aid to the Philippines. Another development why Australia needs to increase its defense training aid to the Philippines is that the latters military establishment is slowly embracing SSR. According to Banlaoi, SSR can take the form of increasing transparency on national security issues and accommodating external support.29 Significant steps in SSR include the publication and opening up for public scrutiny of the Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan (IPSP Bayanihan) to address communist insurgency. Ateneo de Manila Universitys Working Group on SSR collaborates with the AFP on the periodic evaluation of IPSP Bayanihan.30 On one hand, the Philippine Army is beginning to accommodate external support for its transformation program through the creation of an advisory body to the Commanding General of the Philippine Army (CG, PA). Composed of persons from the academe, the business community, the Philippine Congress, and non-government organizations, the Philippine Army Multi-Sector Advisory Board (PA MSAB) was specifically organized to advise CG, PA on the status and directions of the Army Transformation Roadmap.31 The AFP had also collaborated on a smaller scale with Institute for Autonomy and Governance, a Cotabatobased think-tank with AusAid as its partner, in
31
PH-AU Ties. President Aquino met with Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard on October 2012 for his state visit. (Photo by Pool/Getty Images AsiaPac)
delivering human rights and peace education for the formers personnel deployed in Mindanao.32 Opportunities therefore exist for Australia to be actively involved in making the Philippine defense establishment reformed, modernized, and professionalized. This is particularly important especially in the face of perceived human rights violations committed by AFP troops which are hampering its counter-insurgency efforts.33
Opportunities
Crossed Flags: Australia and the Philippines. (Photo from crossed-flag-pins.com)
The opportunities for more defense training aid can be gleaned from the examination of current programs on defense cooperation focus areas. There is no problem with counter-terrorism as this is addressed by Exercise DAWN CARACHA. The main issue with maritime security, through CWS, is that it is concentrated only in Southern Philippines. On defense reform, and partially on CWS, this is addressed by education and training of AFP and Coast Guard personnel in-country and mostly in Australian schools and training institutions. The main issue is that this kind of training of personnel is mostly an indirect effort. To increase the defense training aid to
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To join or not to join. The Australian government was gauging the feasibility for Balikatan 2013 participation. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chris Fahey of the US Navy)
the Philippines, the increase may consider attending to the gaps on maritime security and SSR in the Philippine military establishment. The opportunities in the sphere of maritime security may be increased through Presidential Executive Order No. 57 (EO 57).34 Owing to the success of CWS, EO 57 stretched the range to include other Philippine areas. The training aid on maritime security may therefore be expanded by increasing the number of training programs for coast guard and navy personnel. On the Philippine defense reform, an increase in the current program and inclusion of several areas may be considered. First, to spur reform and professionalization of the personnel, the number of personnel attending post-graduate courses should be increased. The quota for each branch of service (navy, air force, and army), defense department, and Philippine Military Academy (PMA) should be increased. The navy and air force should be provided with at least three post-graduate slots each, while DND and PMA with one each, and the army with at
least four slots. For better capability management and in view of the organization of the Defense Acquisition Office, there is a need to increase the Capability Management and Technology Program (CMTP) slots to at least three. Second, Australia may consider sponsoring the creation and sustainment of think-tanks at the DND, AFP, and major service levels and at select civilian universities.35 At the DND level, the creation and sustainment of a think-tank similar to the Australian Defence Forces Centre for Defense and Strategic Studies may be pursued. This center may be administered by the National Defense College of the Philippines. At the AFP level, think-tanks for counter-insurgency operations and civil-military operations may also be sponsored. At the major service levels, think-tanks may be sponsored similar to Land Warfare Studies Centre of Australian Army, Sea Power Centre-Australia of Royal Australian Navy, and Air Power Development Centre of the Royal Australian Air Force. To encourage public oversight and informed debate on national security issues as
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part of SSR, Australia may also opt to sponsor the establishment of strategy and defense studies center in one or two civilian universities in the Philippines. Third, Australia may provide assistance in developing competency-based training curricula in the AFP. The overall objective of this is to address the lack of basic skills of AFP personnel identified during the 2003 RP-US Joint Defense Assessment, and to ensure that important military skills are benchmarked in domestic and internal technical and vocational skills standards. Areas of focus for this effort shall be on curriculum review; capacity building of training institutions to analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate training programs; and providing slots for the personnel of GHQ and the major services to take up Diploma of Training and Assessment. Several slots on Certificate IV on Training Assessment may be provided in addition to these. Fourth, owing to increased tensions in the West Philippine Sea and the persistent domestic insurgency, an ADF-AFP bilateral exercise on combined operations has to be included in the DCP of both countries. It will supplement the BALIKATAN Exercises between the Philippines and the United States and provide a chance for ADF to train alongside AFP troops. Exercise DAWN CARACHA may be placed under the umbrella of this ADF-AFP bilateral exercise. Fifth, the AFPs pursuit of improving its capabilities on joint and combined operations may provide the opportunity for Australia to offer assistance to establish training maneuver areas. The Philippine Army envisions the establishment of three training maneuver areas
that are each able to support battalion-sized livefire exercises. The defense training aid under DCP may therefore be expanded to include the provision of training equipment, facilities construction, and personnel exchanges for these training areas. Sixth, Australia may provide capacity building assistance for the AFP to develop its people who respect human rights and are able to implement laws of armed conflict (LOAC). The assistance may include the curriculum review of human rights and LOAC content of professional military education; capacity building in terms of HR/LOAC education/training and investigation of Human Rights offices; and trainers training.
Concluding Remarks
The developments in WPS, the opportunities for minerals extraction, and SRR all point to the need for an increase in the defense training aid to the Philippines. This supports not only Australias strategic interest of building a stable Asia-Pacific Region but also the Philippines SSR efforts. It is therefore in the interest of Australia to consider in its 2013-2014 and subsequent years budget planning, and likewise for AFP/DND to request, the following: increase in defense training aid for additional post-graduate courses; creation and sustainment of think-tanks within the AFP and in select civilian universities; development of competency-based training; implementation of an ADFAFP exercise on combined operations; improvement of training maneuver areas; and capacity building on observance of human rights and LOAC.
About the AUTHOR

LTC ROMEO N BAUTISTA III (INF) PA is former Chief of the Plans and Research Branch of OG8, PA and the Project Manager of the PA Battalions of Excellence Project. He is currently a student of ACSC 2013 in Canberra, Australia.
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Endnotes
1 Office of the Minister for Defense, Australian Department of Defense 2012 [cited 22 Nov 12], Minister for Defense Budget 2012-13 Defense Budget Overview, Media Release 08 May 2012, URL: http://www.minister.defence. gov.au/2012/05/08/minister-for-defence-budget-2012-13-defence-budgetoverview/. Australian Government, Department of Defense 2012a [cited 22 Nov 2012], Defense Portfolio Budget Statements 2012-2013, URL: http://www.defence. gov.au/budget/12-13/pbs/2012-2013_Defence_PBS_03_department.pdf, pp 116-117; Australian Government, Department of Defense 2011 [cited 21 Nov 12], Department of Defense Annual Report 2010-2011, URL: http://www. defence.gov.au/budget/10-11/dar/dar_1011_v1_full.pdf, pp 248-249; and Australian Government, Department of Defense 2012b [cited 22 Nov 12], Department of Defense Annual Report 2011-2012, URL: http://www.defence. gov.au/budget/11-12/dar/dar_1112_3.pdf, pp 272-273. Thomson, M 2012, Crying Poor? The affordability of defense expenditure, Policy Analysis, 18 July 2012, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), p 1. Thomson, M 2012, How much is too little? Learning to live with a smaller force, Policy Analysis, 15 August 2012, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), p 3. Dizon N 2012 [cited 02 Dec 12], Defense Chief tells Palparan: Youre ruining AFPs image, Inquirer News, 30 Nov 12, URL: http://newsinfo.inquirer. net/315485/defense-chief-tells-palparan-youre-ruining-afps-image. Office of the Minister for Defense, Australian Department of Defense 2012 [cited 23 Nov 12], Australia and Philippines Strengthen Defense Ties, Media Release 31 May 2007, URL: http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/49tpl. cfm?CurrentId=6724. Philippine Senate 2012, Philippine Senate Resolution No. 788: Resolution Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of Australia Concerning the Status of Visiting Forces of each State in the Territory of the Other State. Australian Government, Department of Defense 2009 [cited 22 Nov 12], Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defense White Paper 2009, URL: http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_ paper_2009.pdf, p 42. Thomson, M 2012 [cited 24 Nov 12], The Cost of Defense: ASPI Defense Budget Brief 2011-12, May 2012, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), URL: http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details. aspx?ContentID=294&pubtype=3, p 249-256. Thomson, M 2012 [cited 24 Nov 12], The Cost of Defense: ASPI Defense Budget Brief 2012-13, May 2012, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), URL: http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details. aspx?ContentID=339, p 251-258. Australian Embassy Philippines, 2012 [cited 24 Nov 12], Australian Agency for International Development, URL: http://www.australia.com.ph/mnla/Ausaid. html. Australian Government, Department of Defense 2012b, loc cit. Australian Government, Department of Defense 2012a, loc cit. Australian Embassy Philippines, 2012 [cited 24 Nov 12], Australia-Philippines Defense Cooperation Factsheet, URL: http://www.australia.com.ph/files/mnla/ PUBLIC%20AFFAIRS%20FACT%20SHEET% 202011%20-%20Defence%20 Cooperation.pdf. Australian Government, Department of Defense 2012a, loc cit. Australian Government, Department of Defense 2012b, loc cit. ibid. hayer CA 2010, Southeast Asia: Patterns of security cooperation, Strategy, September 2010, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), p 62. Liss C undated [cited 21 Nov 12], Abu Sayyaf and US and Australian military intervention in the southern Philippines, Nautilus Institute, URL: http://nautilus. org/apsnet/abu-sayyaf-and-us-and-australian-military-intervention-in-thesouthern-philippines/. 20 Based on Administrative Order No. 29 dated 05 Sep 2012 signed by Pres Benigno Aquino, the term West Philippine Sea covers 200 nautical miles of waters from the Philippines western coast, including those areas claimed by China and other Southeast Asian states. This report was cited in Del Callar M 2012 [cited 25 Nov 12], Manila seeks international recognition of West Philippine Sea, GMA News Online, 13 Sep 2012, URL: http://www. gmanetwork.com/news/story/273891/news/nation/manila-seeks-internationalrecognition-of-west-philippine-sea. Australian Government, Department of Defense 2009, op cit, p 42. Agence France-Presse 2012, Armed conflict possible in West Philippine Sea ICG, Inquirer Global Nation, 25 Jul 12, URL: http://globalnation.inquirer. net/45361/armed-conflict-possible-in-south-china-sea-icg. Indophil Resources NL 2011 [cited 25 Nov 12], Overview of Tampakan CopperGold Project, URL: http://www.indophil.com/tampakan.asp. Olchondra RT 2012 [cited 25 Nov 12], Mining firms see more gold in Tampakan, Philippine Daily Inquirer, URL: http://business.inquirer.net/41773/ mining-firms-see-more-gold-at-tampakan. The Northern Miner 2012 [cited 02 Dec 12], Update: Oceanagold nears commissioning at Didipio, 01 Oct 12, URL: http://www.northernminer.com/ news/update-oceanagold-nears-commissioning-at-didipio/1001734394/. Australian Securities and Exchange [cited 02 Dec 2012], Listed companies directory, URL: http://www.asx.com.au/research/company-research.htm. ibid. Forrer J, et al 2012 [cited 08 Dec 12], How Business can Foster Peace, Special Report No. 315, United States Institute for Peace, September 2012, URL: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR315.pdf, p 2. Banlaoi RC 2006 [cited 02 Dec 12], Challenges for Security Sector Transformation in the Philippines, Institute for Autonomy and Governance, URL: http://iag2001.wordpress.com/policy-brief/challenges-of-security-sectortransformation-in-the-philippines/. Lapena, C 2012 [cited 09 Dec 12], Stakeholders involvement necessary for success in AFPs security plan Army chief, GMA News Online, 31 May 2012, URL: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/260123/news/nation/ stakeholders-involvement-necessary-for-success-in-afp-s-security-plan-mdasharmy-chief. Collas-Monsod, 2011 [cited 09 Dec 12], Transforming the Army, Inquirer Opinion, 09 Sep 2011, URL: http://opinion.inquirer.net/11615/transforming-thearmy. Institute for Autonomy and Governance [cited 09 Dec 12], The SSR story begins. . . ., Security Sector Reform, URL: http://iag.org.ph/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=63&Itemid=34. Abuza Z 2012 [cited 08 Dec 12], The Philippines: Internal and external security challenges, Special Report Issue No. 45, February 2012, URL: http://www. aspi.org.au/publications/publicationlist.aspx?pubtype=10, p 9. Office of the President of the Philippines 2011 [cited 25 Nov 12], Executive Number 57, series of 2011, Establishing a National Coast Watch System, Providing for its Structure and Defining the Roles and Responsibilities of Member Agencies in Providing Coordinated Inter-Agency Maritime Security Operations and for Other Purposes, Official Gazette, URL: http://www.gov. ph/2011/09/06/executive-order-no-57-s-2011/. Smith H and Bergin A 2012, Educating for the profession of arms in Australia, Special Report, August 2012 Issue 48, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), p 26.
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The Sabah Claim: A Historical and Factual Narrative

By Major Wilfredo B Manalang III (MI) PA
A Time to Claim. In the dynamic south of the Philippines, Muslims launched a foreign policy. (Photo and caption by The Economist)
I. INTRODUCTION
For a Filipino, especially a Suluanon, this is a tale of woe while for a Malaysian, a tale of achievement. The Sabah Claim has a long and convoluted account that has progress and regress spanning over one and a half century. Considering that we have not yet officially abandoned our claim to Sabah, it is noteworthy to discuss this issue on the basis of its historical perspective to better appreciate the position of both claimants. Sabah is in the northern part of Borneo Island. It is affectionately called Negeri Sabah di Bawah Bayu (the land below the wind). Sabah is bordered by Sarawak on its southwestern side and Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) to the south, the South China Sea in the west and north, the Sulu Sea in the northeast, and the Celebes Sea in the east. Sabah has a coastline of approximately 800 to 900 miles. Sabahs total land area is 76,115 sq km (29,388 sq miles). Its current population is about 3.1 Million (2010 Census). North Borneo is still largely underdeveloped while very rich in natural resources. It is blessed with oil, tin, copper, gold, an unusual flora, palm oil, and coconut
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plantations. One of the wealthiest oil producing countries is located in the same island of Borneo, the tiny Sultanate of Brunei. Sabah is 1,961 km from Hong Kong, 1,143 km from Manila, 1,495 km from Singapore, 1,678 km from Kuala Lumpur, and 2,291 km from Taipei. Note that it is nearer to Manila than Malaysias capital of Kuala Lumpur.
of the 15th century. Leadership of the Islamic faith passed to the Brunei Sultans after the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511. Under Sultan Bolkiah, the kingdom of Brunei extended its influence as far north as Luzon and Sulu, and south and west of Borneo.
IV. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A) PHILIPPINE CLAIM
II. DISPUTED AREA

The ROPs claim was over the sovereignty, jurisdiction, and proprietary ownership, as successor to the heir of the Sultan of Sulu, of the whole territory of the former British Crown Colony of North Borneo and currently one of the states of the Federation of Malaysia. In contrast, Malaysia claimed Sabah on the basis of devolution through the virtue of the treaty of cession and through self-determination. The geographical extent of the disputed territory is about 76,115 sq km. It comprises the total areas of the present West Coast, Interior, Sandakan, and Tawau Residences which were specified in the 18771878 grants and commissions to Gustavus Baron von Overbeck and Lord Alfred Dent by Sultan Mumin and Remiran Temenggong of Brunei and Sultan Al Alam of Sulu. It also includes the island of Banggui and Balembangan and the territories subsequently acquired by the British North Borneo Company in the grants and cessions of 1884 to 1903.
The Sultanate. The Sulu Sultanate was established in 1450 by Sultan Shariful-Hashim Sayid Abu Bakar who went to Sulu for missionary purposes. He married a Parmisuli or Permaisuri, the daughter of Sulus earlier ruler Rajah Baginda Ali. The burial grounds of Rajah Baginda can still be found at Bud Datu, Indanan, Sulu, the site of the former Battalion Headquarters of 4IB, 1ID, PA where the author was formerly assigned. In the early 15th century, the Sulu Sultanate territories consist of Jolo, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Palawan Islands. The Sultanate was composed of Hashemites, direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. Per historical records, North Borneo was ceded to the Sultan of Sulu as prize from the Sultan of Brunei, Abdul Mubin, for the formers military aid in settling civil war against a rival claimant to the Brunei throne in 1703. The 1878 North-Borneo Padjak Agreement. In January 1878, Sri Paduka Maulana Al Sultan Mohammad Jamalul Alam, Sultan of Sulu, leased North Borneo to Gustavus Baron von Overbeck. In return, the Company would provide arms to the Sultan to resist the Spaniards and 5,000 Malaysian ringgits annual rental based on the Mexican dollars value at that time or its equivalent in gold. In 1903, the annual payment was increased by 300 ringgits. The Malaysians have been continuing to pay its rentals of 5,300 Malaysian ringgits to this day. The key word to the agreement is Padjak that was translated by American, Dutch, and Spanish linguists to mean lease or arrendiamento. The agreement further explicitly states that the rights to the territory may not be transferred to a nation or another company without the Sultans express permission.
III. HISTORY OF SABAH

Before the 16th century, Sabah, then separately known as Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak, centered on the kingdom of Brunei. In this region, the kingdom of Brunei was also the center of trade with China. This region was in turn controlled by two great empires of that period: first by the Sri Vijayan of Sumatra and then by the Majapahit of Java. However, early in the 15th century, the Malacca Empire under Parameswara spread its influence and took over the trade of Brunei. Through its traders, Islam spread to Brunei by the end
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The Royalty. Archival photo of Sulu Sultan Jamalul Kiram. (Photo by the British North Borneo Company)
There are three legal bases on which the Philippines can argue its claim on Sabah: Basis of Spanish title to North Borneo:
a) To pacify the Muslims, Spain concluded Treaties of Alliance and Friendship with the Sultan of Sulu in 1747 and 1805. Further documented was the Treaty of 1836 between Spain and Sulu, entitled Capitulation of Peace, Protection, and Commerce between the Government of Her Catholic Majesty and the Sultan and Datus of Sulu. By this treaty, Spain claimed the Sulu archipelago. However, North Borneo was not mentioned as a Sulu dependency. Likewise, on 30 August 1850, both parties again concluded annexed stipulation that again did not include North Borneo as a Sulu dependency. b) On 19 April 1851, the Act of Re-submission marked the initial interest of Spain to acquire North Borneo. The Sultans Act was the solemn act of adhesion and submission recognizing Spain as Sulus sovereign lord and protector. In 1877, having shown interest to acquire North Borneo, Spain attempted to extend her claim to North Borneo wherein Spain even attempted to
hoist her flag at Borneo. However, such attempts were for naught until the Madrid Protocol of 1885 that stated that Great Britain and Germany recognized Spanish sovereignty over Sulu, while Spain renounced her claim to North Borneo in favor of Great Britain. Therefore, the Philippines could not use as basis Spanish inheritance due to the signing of the Madrid Protocol. US claim through the Sultan of Sulu a) On 10 December 1898 and 7 November 1900, Spain ceded the Philippines to the US after losing in the Spanish-American War. This was concluded during the Treaty of Paris that was signed between Spain and the United States thus officially ceding the whole Philippine archipelago (including Mindanao and Sulu) in exchange for US$20,000,000. b) On 10 August 1899, BGen JC Bates of the US Volunteers negotiated with the Sulu Sultan an agreement (Bates Treaty or Senate Document No. 136, 56th Congress, 1st Session, Serial 3851) by which the Sultan recognized American sovereignty over the Sulu Archipelago along
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with its dependencies. In return, the US gave full protection against any foreign nations and not to sell the island of Jolo (Sulu)to any foreign nations without the Sultans consent. Sultan Jamalul Kiram II hesitatingly signed the treaty with Gen. J.C. Bates. A very critical error of translation exists in this treaty. The Tausug version states The support, aid, and protection of the Jolo Island and Archipelago are in the American nation, whereas the English version reads as The sovereignty of the United States over the whole Archipelago of Jolo and its dependencies is declared and acknowledged. The word sovereignty was not used anywhere in the Tausug version. The U.S. paid Spain another US$100,000 to incorporate the islands stretching as far as Sibutu to Cagayan de Sulu. The southernmost outlying islands of the Philippines, Turtle Island and Taganak, were incorporated at a later period. They were part of the territories originally leased by Sultan Jamalul Alam to the British North Borneo Company. c) On March 22, 1915, an Agreement between the Sulu Sultanate and America confirmed the Sultans recognition of US sovereignty in Mindanao and Sulu. Thus in 1906 and 1920, the United States formally reminded Britain that North Borneo did not belong to the British Crown and was still part of the Sultanate of Sulu. d) On 13 December 1932, a Boundary Convention was held in Washington, USA, between the UK and the US wherein the line separating the Philippine Archipelago and North Borneo was demarcated. As a direct consequence, the Preamble of the Proclamation of Philippine Independence contained specific references that the US had acquired sovereignty over the Philippines from Spain and had agreed with the UK on delimiting the boundary between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of Borneo. Therefore, the Philippines could not used the
Americans as basis in acquiring North Borneo since the US has acquired sovereignty over the Philippines from Spain but had agreed on a boundary convention with the UK on the delimitation of the boundary between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of Borneo.
ROP through Sulu Sultanate
a) The 1939 Decision of Chief Justice C.F.C. Makaskie of the High Court of North Borneo stated that it is abundantly clear that the successors in sovereignty of the Sultan (Sulu) are the government of the Philippine Islands. Against this legal basis, Malaysia however argued that in 1939, ROP was still under the USA hence sovereign authority rests with the US not ROP. The case was filed by Dayang Dayang Hadji Piando of Jolo and eight other heirs of the Sultan of Sulu to obtain judgment that as private heirs they were entitled to the annual payments stipulated in the contract of 1878 and the confirmatory deed in 1903. It can be noted that Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon previously issued a Memorandum on 20 September 1937 that it would not tolerate the exercise of powers of government in Mindanao or Sulu Archipelago by either Sultans or Datus. The heirs of the last Sultan of Sulu acquiesced to this directive and did not name a successor upon the death of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II. This High Courts decision would be later used as basis by Sultan Esmail Kiram, one of the heirs of Sultan Jamalul Alam, the original lessor, to cancel the lease publicly and formally repudiate the 1946 British Cession-Order-In-Council to effect on 22 January 1958. b) The Philippines gained its independence on 4 July 1946. The countrys constitution at that time stated that the national territory of the Philippines included, among other things, all other areas which belong to the Philippines on the basis of historical rights or legal claims. Thus, on April 1950, Congressman Macapagal filed a
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House Resolution to initiate formal institution of the North Borneo claim. However, the 1987 Constitution defines national territory differently, dropping the term historical rights. c) The heirs however originally envisaged the prospect of financial settlement whereby the annual payments would be compounded in lump sum. For this purpose, they retained a number of attorneys since 1946 and it was in early 1957 that they almost claimed success when their attorney, Nicasio Osmea, entered into negotiations with the British Foreign Office which demonstrated interest in a financial settlement. However, the deal fell through due to the alleged greediness of Osmea and his associates. Thus, on 25 November 1957, a proclamation was made by the Sultan of Sulus heirs led by Sultan Esmail Kiram canceling the 1878 lease to effect on 22 January 1958. d) In 1962, the Ramos and Salonga Resolutions were passed to initiate and authorized the President of the Republic to take all the necessary steps consistent with international law procedure for the recovery of North Borneo. Likewise, on 5 February 1962, a letter from the heirs to ROP stated that the heirs claim proprietary rights over North Borneo and their desire was to include it as part of ROPs national territory. The sultans heirs had given the Philippine government the authority to pursue the claim legally in international courts. e) On 22 June 1962, the Philippines officially registered their claim to Sabah with Great Britain, sending a delegation to London. A formal notice was then sent to the UK Government, the British North Borneo Company, and the UN Secretary General. Philippine Pres. Diosdado Macapagal formally claimed North Borneo based on the Sultanate of Sulu heirs claim on the territory. The formal notice was in response to the aide-memoire sent on 24 May 1962 by the British Government to the
Philippine Government asserting their claim to North Borneo, their plan was to integrate North Borneo with the proposed Federation of Malaysia and threatening the impairment of relations with the two countries should the Philippines continue with its claim. f) The Greater Malayan Confederation was a proposed regional confederation and anti-colonial measure initiated by President Macapagal that sought to establish the unity of the Malayan race. It was suggested that it would be composed of the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines, Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo, and later Indonesia, as part of Macapagal and Sukarnos MAPHILINDO plan. By then, it was already clear that the Federation of Malaysia would be formed hence Pres Macapagal offered his own confederation to all Malayan countries. g) A tripartite meeting between the heads of state of Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines from 30 July to 5 August 1963 known as the Manila Accord was then held. It was resolved that Indonesia and the Philippines would welcome the formation of the Federation of Malaya provided that the support of the people of Borneo would be established by an independent and impartial authority, namely the UN Secretary General. Malaya agreed to postpone the establishment of Malaysia beyond the arranged date of August 1963, in order to allow the determination of opinion in North Borneo and Sarawak. h) However, on 29 August 1963, the Malayan Government announced that it would continue with the formation of Malaysia on September 16th regardless of the result of the plebiscite conducted by the UN. On 16 September 1963, Malaysia was formed. The Philippines withheld its recognition and broke diplomatic relations with Malaysia after the Federation of Malaysia included Sabah.
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B) MALAYSIAN CLAIM
a) Significant Treaties includes treaties between the Sultan of Brunei and the British East India Company, British Government and American Trading Company. In 1865, the American Consul of Brunei, Claude Lee Moses obtained a 10year lease from the Sultan of Brunei on North Borneo. He then sold it to the American Trading Company owned by Joseph W. Torrey, T.B. Harris, and some Chinese merchants. Torrey chose Kimanis, an area south west of North Borneo as his base, and began a settlement there, naming it Ellena. Attempts to find financial backing for the settlement proved futile and the settlement was thus abandoned. Significance of the treaties no other formal claimants, British sphere of interest was established in certain parts of the Sultan of Bruneis possession. b) 1877-78 Grants of the Brunei Sultan to Gustavus Baron de Overbeck. With the imminent termination of the territorial lease at hand, J.W. Torrey, President of the American Trading Company ran out of capital to continue with his operations, he sold his rights to the Austrian/Hungarian Consul General in Hongkong, Gustavus Baron de Overbeck in 1877. Overbeck managed to get a 10-year renewal of the lease from the Tumonggong (Temenggong) of Brunei. To finance his plan for North Borneo, Overbeck found financial backers in the Dent brothers (Alfred and Edward). c) Overbeck soon learned that the Northeast coast of Borneo, a large portion of the territory ceded to him in the Brunei grants, was owned by the Sultan of Sulu. Thus, in 1878, Overbeck secured a grant from the Sultan of Sulu. The Grant by the Sultan of Sulu declared vested on the said Baron de Overbeck and Alfred Dent co-jointly their heirs, associates, successors or assigns for as long as they choose or desire to hold them. One stipulation stated that the rights and privileges conferred by the grant
shall never be transferred to any other nation or company of foreign nationality without the sanction of the British Consul General of Borneo. The grant by the Sulu Sultan did not specify the Sultans right of resumption of control of the specified territories should the annual compensation would not be paid for three successive years. As in all legal questions, it was always a matter of interpretation. The Sultans interpretation was that it would not be ceded to another country without his express approval. A Commission from the Sulu Sultan further appointed Overbeck as Bendahara and Rajah of Sandakan. As Bendahara, Overbeck became Supreme and independent ruler of the territories. He had absolute power of life and death over the inhabitants and all absolute rights of property over the soil of the country, sole power of legislation, coining money, creating an army and navy, and all other powers and rights usually belonging to sovereign rulers. d) Lack of capital compelled Overbeck to sell all his rights to Lord Alfred Dent. Dent then formed the British North Borneo Provisional Association, Ltd. e) On 1 November 1881, Dent applied for a Royal Charter and was approved by the UK in consideration of the sum of 120,000 British Pounds. In 1882, the British North Borneo Chartered Company was formed. It took over all the rights of the Provisional Association. Sir Rutherford Alcock became the first President and Alfred Dent the Managing Director. The British North Borneo Company (this Company was mentioned in the movie, Pirates of the Carribean starring Johnny Depp) applied for and received a charter from Queen Victoria. The conditions laid down were that the company must remain British and that the religion and customs of the native inhabitants must be respected. Later on, more concessions were added, granted by the Sultan of Brunei.
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Against this legal basis, the Philippines countered the Royal Charter using the statements made by British Foreign Ministers Lord Earl Granville on 7 January 1882 regarding the nature of the Royal Charter: The British Charter therefore differs essentially from previous charters granted by the Crown to the East India Company, the Hudsons Bay Company, the New Zealand Company, and other Associations of that charter, in the fact that the Crown in the present case assumes no dominion or sovereignty over the territories occupied by the (British North Borneo) Company nor does it purport to grant to the Company any powers of government thereover; it merely confers upon the persons associated with the status and incidence of a body corporate, and recognizes the grants of territory and the powers of government made and delegated by the Sultans in whom the sovereignty remains vested.
in the administration of North Borneo. The rule was generally peaceful except for small pockets of resistance, the most serious being the Mat Salleh War from 1894-1900 and the Rundum resistance by the Muruts in 1915. h) On 13 December 1932, a Convention was held in Washington, USA between the UK and the US regarding the boundary between the Philippines and Borneo. Similarly, on 26 June 1946, an agreement was made between the British North Borneo Company and the British Government to transfer Borneo sovereign rights and assets from the Company to the Crown. i) On 10 July 1946, North Borneo Cession Order-In-Council (Colony of North Borneo) empowered the Company to acquire by purchase or other lawful means from the British North Borneo Provisional Association Ltd. the full benefit of the several grants and commissions including all interests and powers vested. Through the North Borneo Cession In Council, the state of North Borneo shall be annexed to form part of the British dominions and would be called together with the settlements of Labuan as the Colony of North Borneo. The BNBC effectively ruled until 1942, after more than 60 years in North Borneo, when the Second World War rudely interrupted the peace in North Borneo. Japanese forces landed in Labuan on January 1st and occupied Sabah until she was liberated by the Ninth Division Australian Imperial Forces (A.I.F) in 1945. After the Second World War, North Borneo was administered by the British Military Administration until civil government was restored on 15 July 1946. j) On 31 August 1963, a Declaration of SelfGovernance of North Borneo from the British was made. Likewise, on 16 September 1963, Federation of Malaysia was formed consisting of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore. Since then, North Borneo has been known as Sabah. It was only when the United States had
f) From 1881-88, British North Borneo Company further gained territorial acquisitions in North Borneo. Dent acquired all remaining interests of the former American Trading Company of Borneo. g) On 12 May 1888, a Protectorate Agreement between the UK and the BNBC was established. Because of possible complications with foreign powers, a British Protectorate was declared over the northern part of Borneo, which included Sarawak, Brunei, and the state of North Borneo. The Crown took over external affairs, while the Chartered Company remained in control of internal administration of their territory. However, the Governor chosen by the directors of the company sitting in London to represent them in Borneo was to have the approval of the Colonial Secretary. As a protectorate, the British would defend it if it were attacked, making North Borneo a British sphere of influence. The Companys rule in North Borneo had the greatest impact on the development of the region. A system of indirect rule was established
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A Royal Conversation. Sultan of Sulu Jamalul Kiram III talks on a mobile phone to his brother Prince Agbimudin. (Photo and caption by GMA News)
granted the Philippines its independence that Great Britain, in the wake of the North Borneo Companys dissolution, ventured to declare North Borneo a crown colony. Though Malaya became independent of Britain in 1957, it was not until late May 1961 that there was a move to unite North Borneo with Malaya, an effort indirectly linked to Singapores desire to become a member of the nascent Malaysian Federation. Back then, Malayas Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman stated that he was willing to accept British-administered Singapore into the new federation, provided that the other British crown colonies of Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo could also be integrated. Aside from the obvious argument that there were close cultural ties with those colonies, the idea was to ensure that the Malays, and not the Chinese, would continue to constitute the majority in the future Malaysia.
k) As earlier stated, Manila agreed to a UN mission to discover the will of the indigenous people regarding their future citizenship. Malaysian control was further strengthened by two referendums: the first was facilitated by the Cobbold Commission, under the leadership of Lord Cobbold, former Governor of the Bank of England, from 19 February to 21 June 1962. The second was before the formation of Malaysia on September 1963 as agreed upon in the Manila Accord. Both referendums recorded 70% of Sabahan population voting for North Borneo to be part of Malaysia. North Borneos position within Malaysia was further reinforced by the ruling made by the International Court of Justice that Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Linggitan are under the jurisdiction and sovereignty of Malaysia rather than Indonesia.
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Legal Basis of Malaysian Claim:
Malaysian claim thus rests on the validity and effect of the treaties between Overbeck and the Sultans of Brunei and Sulu. They focused on the absolute entitlement given to Overbeck by the Sultans and their interpretation that all cessions by the Sultans to another foreign nationality should be with the consent of the British government. These provisions gave Overbeck and Dent valid authority to effect the transfer to the British government through the British Royal Charter. In turn, being British sovereignty, the British may dispose of the island in any way they see fit.
V. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS
a) Diplomatic ties between ROP and Malaysia were restored on 3 June 1966 due to the increased aggression of Indonesia and foiled the increased smuggling activities in Southern Philippines. b) ROP still refuses to establish a General Consulate at Kota Kinabalu, the capital of Sabah, despite the fact that half a million Filipinos, most of them from Sulu Province, are employed in Sabah (legally and illegally). According to former ROP Ambassador to Malaysia Jose Brillantes, setting up a Philippine consulate in Sabah would be tantamount to recognizing Malaysian sovereignty over the region. c) To the dismay of the Suluanons, however, after Macapagal, the claim to Sabah was no longer loudly voiced by subsequent Philippine presidents. Back in 1962, Sultan Esmail Kiram transferred the claim to Sabah and sovereignty over the land to the Philippine government for a 20-year period, assuming that the Philippines would be successful in pushing its claim under international law. After 20 years, according to the 1962 agreement, the claim would be reverted to the Sultan. As a sidebar, though not directly related to the Sabah issue, parallel with diplomatic attempts, the Philippine military under President Ferdinand Marcos conceived a plot in 1967 of establishing a force of Commandos to destabilize Sabah. After which, the plan was to take advantage of the instability by either intervening in the island on the pretext of protecting Filipinos living there, or by the residents themselves deciding to secede from Malaysia. The codename for the destabilization plan was Operation Merdeka which is an intriguing story in itself. It was believed that because of the revelations surrounding that incident, the Malaysians have been allegedly aiding the Muslim separatists against the Philippine government. This is to distract the attention to the claim on Sabah as the ROP shifted its focus in containing the conflict. Likewise, both Presidents Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos had plans to drop the claims but were blocked by the Philippine Senate. Succeeding Presidents were silent on the rival claim. d) In August 2002, the Malaysian authorities started deporting thousands of Filipinos from Sabah for having no necessary documents. There are allegations of inhuman treatments and rapes by Malaysian authorities that were investigated by both governments. Further, illegal Indonesians are likewise being sent home through Kalimantan (Borneo part of Indonesia). Both the Philippine and Indonesian governments have protested the mass deportation and conducted indignation rallies against the Malaysian action. Again, on 27 July 2006, at least 200 Filipinos were deported from Sabah. Due to the recent escalation of armed confrontation with the Sulus Royal Sultanate Armys arrival in Sabah, under the 33rd Sultan of Sulu Jamalul Kiram III, Filipinos are once again being deported en masse from Sabah.
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VI. PROSPECT FOR RESOLUTION

Since time immemorial, numerous ethnic tribes in southern Philippines, notably the Tausugs and Badjaos, have been traversing the Celebes Sea from Sulu to Borneo and other parts of Indonesia. These tribes are seafaring people and settle from anywhere around the region. To curtail these movements, the Malaysians have currently decided to demand documents from Filipinos in Sabah. Undocumented Filipinos are immediately deported and could only be admitted back after they have presented the necessary papers. This situation is extremely hard especially to those who have been staying in Sabah for a long time. They reason out that they are refugees who fled the secessionist war. Thus, they do not have any travel documents. These Muslim Filipinos have considered Sabah as part of their domain as their ancestors have settled there for several centuries. That part of Southeast Asia is bound by common religion, history, and people. As per official Philippine government stand, the Philippines will continue to pursue legal action possibly through elevating the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the ASEAN and also by bringing this claim again to the attention of the Malaysian government. One of the immediate objectives is to probably increase the rent to a more realistic amount while the claim is still being disputed. The Malaysians continue to ignore the request that the case be brought to the ICJ and are hoping that the issue will eventually die out for lack of will on the Philippine claimants to further pursue the claim over the years. The longer the dispute is unsettled, the harder for the claimants to get any settlement.
About the AUTHOR

Maj Wilfredo B Manalang III (MI) PA is presently assigned at OG2, 3ID, PA as its Deputy and XO. He is currently the Class Secretary and Historian of PMA Kalasag-Lahi Class of1997.
References:

Mohammed bid Dato Othman Ariff, 1970, Philippines Claim to Sabah, Its Historical, Legal and Political Implications, Oxford University Press. (Kasaysayan Section, UP-Diliman Library) Michael Leifer, 1968, The Philippine Claim to Sabah, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hull. (Kasaysayan Section, UP-Diliman Library) Capt Carlos L Albert PN, War Next Door, Philippine Herald, July 6-9, 1965 Manfred Rist, 2006, The Sultan of Sulus Lost Land, www.bangsamoro.info Madge Kho, 100 Years of Moro Resistance: A Chronology of Historical Events Paul F Whitman, The Corregidor Massacre - 1968, www.Corregidor.org/heritage_ battalion/jabidah
Missing In Action, The Manila Times, 10 January 2002, www.manilatimes.net Jeffrey G Damicog, Protest filed with Malaysia, 27 August 2002, The Manila Bulletin Online, www.mb.com.ph Discover Sabah: A Short Historical Overview, http://www.flyingdusun.com/ index_links.html Philippines Claim to Sabah, www.epilipinas.com Sabah, www.wikipedia.com, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabah North Borneo, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Borneo North Borneo Dispute, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Borneo_dispute The Sulu Sultanate Royal Families, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate_of_Sulu
THE ASIAN ARMS RACE

By MAJ LEAH L SANTIAGO (FA) PA
I. Introduction
From the early 1990s to the beginning of the 21st century, the world had seen Asias defense spending grow at an unprecedented rate. Majority of its countries maritime, ground, and air capabilities were either upgraded or acquired with the goal of modernising ones weapons inventory. More often, the rationale espoused by these countries was to meet present and future security challenges in an uncertain strategic environment. However, the perception resulting from these upgrade and acquisition activities became disturbing up to a point where people began to speculate the hidden agenda of the countries involved in arms acquisition. This situation then spawned the notion of an arms race where nations compete with one another to possess the most advanced and lethal military platforms to date. In 1993, a press account released by The Economist entitled Asias arms race: gearing up highlighted the increase of defence spending and arms trade in Asia despite the peace being experienced in the region after the Cold War. This articles forebodings had become reality and more evident at the onset of the 21st century. On August 2012, news on the launching of a home-built nuclear submarine with the ability to fire ballistic missiles by India made the headlines of the Sydney Morning Herald (Nelson 2012). Indonesia, on the other hand, had recently purchased F-16 warplanes fighters and formally signed a $1.1bn USD procurement deal of diesel-electric submarine with a European state (The Economist, 2012). Likewise, it was reported that 24% of Singapores national budget went on defence, landing fifth on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institutes list of the largest arms importer in the world (The Economist, 2012). Desmond Ball had asserted that there was no arms race during the 90s but this cannot be applicable today in the light of the current procurement and expansion of Asias defense forces to date. This essay seeks to examine the correctness of SDSC Professor Desmond Balls argument stating that there was no Asian arms race in the 90s but in the year 2000 onwards, the arms race was a reality that cannot be denied and ignored. The analysis is carried out in four sections. It starts by defining arms race and discussing its attributes. This will be followed by a brief discussion on Professor Desmond Balls claim of an absence and presence of arms race in the early 1990s and 21st century, respectively, highlighting the underlying reasons why he changed his mind. Next, the attributes or conditions of arms race as the criteria will be used to examine the correctness of Professor Balls assessment on arms race in the region in those two periods. Lastly, the sustainability of his
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Waves splashing harder. A naval arms race was gathering pace in the Asia-Pacific. (Photo and caption by The Diplomat)
arguments is discussed validating his assertion that over the next decade, arms race will continue to aggravate. Overall, this essay concludes that Professor Desmond Balls assessment holds true as manifested by todays interaction of countries in Asia, and that the conditions set by Colin Gray on arms race are met.
II. Arms Race and its Attributes

Scholars have defined arms race with varying terminologies and approaches, each stating different points of view where some, if not most, contradict one other in many ways given the absence of a universally accepted definition. Martin Wight, a British scholar of International Relations, stressed the point of being in an advantaged position by defining arms race as the competitive amassing of troops or armaments, whereby each side tries to gain advantage over its neighbour or at least not to remain at a disadvantage (cited in Sheehan
1983: p.9). On the other hand, Lewis Fry Richardson, British mathematician and analyst, came up with a mathematical equation known as the Richardson Arms Race Model that takes into account the external threats posed by rival countries. His model states that a countrys defence spending is determined by hostile military actions, the size of defence spending, accumulation of weapons by rival countries (Moon & Lee 2009: p.70). On his concept of arms race, Samuel Huntington emphasized a reciprocal interaction whereby arms race is defined as progressive competitive peacetime increase in armaments by two states or coalitions of states resulting from conflicting purposes or mutual fears, thus a form of reciprocal interaction between two states or coalitions ensues (cited in Mcguire 1965: p.38). Desmond Ball, on the other hand, underscored the rapid rate of acquiring arms and action-reaction dynamics. He argued that a very rapid rate of acquisitions, with the participants stretching their resources in order to ensure that they
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remain at the head of the race and some reciprocal dynamics in which developments in the defensive and offensive capabilities of one adversary are matched by attempts to counter the advantages thought to be gained by another characterize an arms race (Ball 1993/1994: p.94). The definitions posed by these authors are mostly inherent in Colin Grays definition, especially the underlying features of an arms race as stated by Desmond Ball. Gray (1971: p.41) defined it by citing the following conditions that must all be present for arms race to exist:
1. There must be two or more parties, conscious
astonishing rise of Asias defence expenditure. While other parts of the world were slowing down on their defence expenditures like the United States, Europe, and Soviet Union, Asias share of global military expenditure reached a peak of 20 per cent during 1995 which was twice as high as in the mid-1980s. Likewise, on its share of world expenditures on arms transfer, the percentage figure doubled from 15 per cent in the mid-1980s to 34 per cent in the early 1990s (Ball 1993/1994). Ball (1993/1994: p.81) argued that states in the region almost had the same focus on weapons enhancement. It was geared on replacing and improving their current weapon emplaced systems which were:
5. national command, control, and communications
of their antagonism; 2. They must structure their armed forces with attention to the probable effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or as a deterrent to, the other arms race participants; 3. They must compete in terms of quantity (men, weapons) and/or quality (men, weapons, organization, doctrine, deployment); and 4. There must be rapid increases in quantity and/or improvements in quality. This essay will use the four basic conditions of arms race by Colin Gray to evaluate the correctness of Desmond Balls studies.
III. Desmond Balls Asian Arms Race Conclusions Then and Now
Round 1 of Military Capability Buildup (early 1990s)
Professor Balls Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region provided an explicit and comprehensive assessment on the military acquisitions in the early 1990s in the Asian region. The varying reasons for arms acquisitions were explained, concluding the absence of an arms race during said period. He termed this robust weapons acquisition program as Round 1 during the 25th Asia-Pacific Roundtable held in Kuala Lumpur (Ball 2011: p.2). Professor Ball highlighted that before the onset of Asian economic crisis in 1997, there had been an
(C3) systems; 6. national strategic and tactical intelligence systems; 7. multi-role fighter aircraft, with maritime attack capabilities as well as air superiority capabilities (e.g., F-16s and F-18s); 8. maritime surveillance aircraft (e.g., P-3s); 9. anti-ship missiles (e.g., harpoon and Exocet); 10. modern surface combatants destroyers, frigates, ocean patrol vessels; 11. submarines; 12. electronic warfare (EW) systems; and 13. rapid deployment forces. This period saw the procurement of 3,000 new fighters and strike aircrafts with new armaments, 120 new maritime reconnaissance aircrafts, 3,000 modern anti-ship missiles, 200 new major surface combatants, and around 40 submarines (Ball 2003). These weapon systems were mostly acquired by East Asian countries.
Round 2 of Military Capability Buildup (21st Century/since around 2000)
Professor Balls Security Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region:

An Emerging Complex Arms Race, Asias Naval Arms Race: Myth or Reality, and Northeast Asia: Tensions and Action-
underscored the presence of arms race in Asia. He covered mostly Northeast Asian countries, with a minimal discussion on the countries in South Asia (India and Pakistan) and Southeast
Reaction Dynamics
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Asia (Singapore and Malaysia). He argued that these countries have been involved in an arms race since 2000. A surge in defence spending was evident in the beginning of the 21st century despite the Asian economic crisis during that time. Professor Ball argued that Northeast Asian countries (Japan, China, Taiwan, North Korea, and South Korea) were responsible for the massive weapons procurement. During the first decade of the 21st century, these countries accounted for 83 percent and 74 percent of defence expenditure of East Asia-Australasia combined and the whole of Asia, respectively (Ball 2011). He further asserted the possibility of the continued presence of arms race, with Asias complex security environment that may continue to exacerbate in the next decades (Ball 2011).
Reasons Why Ball Changed His Mind
Second, the regions rise in defence spending has become alarming to a point that global think tanks are beginning to notice. Likewise, the platforms and types of acquisitions also raise concerns most especially those of the ballisticmissile and nuclear kinds. More questions arise as to what the purpose of these acquisitions is, or if in fact these nations either just want to showcase their advanced capabilities or it may be overkill in reality. For example, what does China need an aircraft carrier for? Recently, China launched its first aircraft carrier (Perlez 2012). Or Singapore, being a small country, why would it need a submarine? And it has two at that. This situation significantly brings about more tension in a seemingly peaceful and stable scenario on the surface. This tension build-up in the region is Balls point of contention and if left unchecked may lead inadvertently to an untenable regional security environment in the future.
Desmond Ball clearly observed significant differences in and underlying the rationale of Asias defence procurement in the 90s versus 2000 onwards. Though both periods show marked growth in defence spending, Ball changed his mind by delving on the following arguments: First, the presence of reciprocal dynamics among rival nations is most evident. Gone is the notion that they are acquiring arms for the purpose of modernisation alone. Most nations in Asia like India, China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan had achieved economic growth in the succeeding years thus their defence procurement became sophisticated as well in the decades following the 90s, where they already achieved a certain level of self-reliance in the aftermath of the post-Cold War era. There is then a clear manifestation that rival nations outdo one another in quantity as well as in quality of arms procurement with the thought of securing their nations interest in this most volatile region. This is mostly evident in the more developed countries; the economic stability they possess will all go to dust without the attendant defence and security forces to back it up.
IV. Evaluating Balls Arguments Using Grays Arms Race Parameters

Basing the assessment on Colin Grays parameters of an arms race above will enable us to understand whether or not an arms race is underway in the two different periods. This section will substantiate that Professor Balls assessment is correct on the absence and presence of arms race in the early 1990s and the 21st century, respectively.
Absence of Arms Race in Early 90s
During the first round of weapons acquisition, Sam Bateman stated similar arguments with those of Professor Desmond Balls is whereby weapons-acquisition behaviour in the region is an understandable non-threatening process of modernisation (Bateman n.d.). Therefore, it is not a response to other states arms procurement, an indication that there is no action-reaction dynamics. In this respect, the parameter number (2) of Gray is already disproved at this point.
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Concurrently, an expert on Chinese foreign policy, Bates Gill, argued that the driver of arms acquisition is the post-Cold War regional order. He posited that rising powers in the region filled the power vacuum that Russia and the United Stated previously occupied. This then resulted in tensions in certain regions preexisting rivalries thereby instigating the enhancement of each nations defence capability (Gill 1998). In order to be effectively self-reliant, weapons in ones armed forces inventory needed to be modern, efficient, and possessive of the sufficient psychological and actual lethality that would prevent its rival from initiating armed conflict. Weapon systems of various nations during this period were outmoded; therefore, upgrading them became their top defence priority. For example, Chinas maritime assets and platforms were mostly using an earlier generation of weapon system without combat direction system, and its destroyer and frigates were almost 30 years old. Likewise, its maritime system was
not within the standard of modern Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems (Meconis & Wallace 2000). Other nations were of the same predicament as China, thereby prompting a surge of defence spending directed to defence modernization as presented by Professor Desmond Ball. In 1992, Myanmars corvettes; the Philippines frigates, corvettes, and landing ships; and Taiwans destroyers, frigates, and corvettes were of World War II era. Indonesia and Thailands frigate fleets were built in 1970 and some dated back to the 1950s just like South Koreas destroyers. In terms of warplanes, countries that were using pre-1966 designs were Cambodia, China, South Korea, Laos, Myanmar, Taiwan, and the Philippines (Gill 1998). Ideological rivalries and territorial disputes were prevalent in the region that seemed to accommodate the (1) parameter like the competing claims to the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea by China and Vietnam; territorial disputes in the Spratly Islands in the
WE are one. North Korean army officers and soldiers attended a rally at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, in celebration of the country's nuclear test. (Photo and caption by AP and Asahi)
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Strongman at the Forefront. Kim Jong-un attends a national meeting of chiefs of branch social security stations. (Photo and caption by the International Institute For Strategic Studies)
South China Sea, contested by China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines; dispute between Japan and South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks; and divided sovereignty in the Korean Peninsula, among others (Ball 2012). However, the focus of security concern during the period was more on the waning influence of great powers during this post-Cold War period. Concomitantly, these very conditions had become the soil from which seeds of distrust have grown into what would become the arms race of the 21st century. Presence of Arms Race in the 21st Century On the Round 2 of arms acquisitions, all parameters of Colin Gray are satisfied in terms of number (2) where they structured their armed forces with attention to the probable effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or as a deterrent to, the other arms race participants an action-reaction dynamic; number (3) where they competed in terms of quantity and quality of weapons acquisition; and number (4) where defence spending was occurring in rapid increases both in quality and quality of the procurements, thereby making the
countries mentioned by Desmond Ball on his papers undeniably involved in arms race. The following paragraphs discuss the rivalries of various countries in Northeast Asia (Japan, China, Taiwan, North Korea, and South Korea) to include India, Pakistan, Singapore, and Malaysia which had long-standing or ongoing conflicts among one another arising from sovereignty, delineation of borders, and maritime boundaries, among others, affirming the presence of Grays (1) parameter. These rivalries incited the upgrade and expansion of each nations defence capabilities that, in turn, knowingly and unknowingly threatened one another, giving evidence to the actionreaction dynamics elucidated by Gray.
South Korea and North Korea
The tension across the Demilitarized Zone continued to persist since the beginning of the conflict as an aftermath of the Korean War where despite the nonaggression agreement between the South and North, arms reduction had never been agreed upon by both parties (Bae 2004). Recently, an attack of DPRK on the South Korean ship Cheonan on March 2010 and
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Comparison of Military Capabilities between ROK and DPRK (as of 2008)

Classification Troops (Peace time) Total Army Navy Air Force Corps Army Units Divisions Maneuver Brigades Tanks Armoured vehicles Equipment Field artillery MLRS Surface-to surface Guided weapons Combat vessels Surface ships Submarines Combat aircraft C2-ISR aircraft Air Force Air mobility aircraft Training aircraft Helicopters Landing vessels Mine warfare ships Support vessels ROK
More than 655,000 522,000 68,000 65,000 10 (including Special Warfare Command) 46 15 2,300 2,400 5,200 200 30 (launchers) 120 10 10 20 10 490 50 (including naval aircraft) 40 170 680 (including all helicopters of the 3 services)
DPRK
More than 1,190,000 1,020,000 60,000 110,000 15 86 69 (10 Reserve Military Training Units not included) 3,900 2,100 8,500 5,100 100 (launchers) 420 260 30 30 70 840 30 330 (including AN-2) 180 310
Navy Principal Force Capability
7,700,000 (including Reserve Military
Reserve Troops
3,040,000
Training units, Worker/Peasant Red Guards and Red Youth Guards)
Source: Defence White Paper 2008, p. 316 (cited in Moon & Lee 2009)
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Yeonpyeong Island on November 2010 killing forty-six and four South Koreans, respectively, had increased the antagonism between the two nations more than ever (Cordesman 2011). Likewise, threatening the peace is the ongoing arms race in the Peninsula. However, John Ferrer (2009) contradicted the arms race notion arguing the non-existence of arms race in the Korean Peninsula based on two reasons (1) the asymmetry on defence spending between the two countries and (2) South Koreas interoperability with the United States. Defence spending of South Korea had been increasing while that of North Korea was on a decline. He further argued that the driver of South Koreas military spending is its alliance, interoperability with U.S., and keeping up with U.S. modernization. On the other hand, the argument posed by Ferrer cannot be proven due to the non-disclosure of North Koreas defence spending (Bae 2004). Ferrers assertion of a decline in Pyongyangs defence spending is likewise dubious, as the Korea Institute for Defence Analyses states otherwise. The Institute stated that the spending increased to USD$570m in 2009 from USD$470m in 2006 (Cordesman 2011: p.10). On the other hand, South Koreas arms build-up requires it to be interoperable with U.S. forces. This situation has then been advantageous to South Korea in ensuring its weapon systems to be at par with the quality of the defence platforms of the U.S. In comparing South Korea and North Koreas military capabilities (see Table 1), South Korea had the lesser inventory in terms of quantity. However, based on the Situation Force Scoring (SFS) which is a force assessment conducted by the Korea Institute for Defence Analyses, South Korea had an edge in terms of quality (Moon & Lee 2009: p.85). North Koreas tanks were no match to the firepower and sustainability of South Koreas tanks, and the Souths air power was of global standards compared to the Norths outmoded fighter planes. As a response to its inferiority in conventional forces, North Korea openly developed its nuclear armaments. South Koreas counter-action was the implementation of its
Revolution in Military Affairs policy with the goal of creating the most capable army; expansion of an information technology-intensive military armed with cutting edge weapons and construction of a rational, effective, and economic military (Moon & Lee 2009: p.91). Undeniably, arms race is present as manifested by the reciprocal actions of the two states. Not only in terms of quantity of armaments but quality of the forces as well. The intensity of interaction of the two parties is also prevalent so as not to be at the disadvantaged position. Knowing their limitations and improving in other means show that they are monitoring each others moves.
China and Taiwan
Taiwan has always been an annoying thorn on Chinas side as its continued existence remains a sensitive and prickly issue defying Chinas regime legitimacy and political supremacy, among others. From a geostrategic point of view, Taiwan can also serve as a foothold to invade the mainland (Odgaard 2008). stated that its defence development must be dependent on its nations economic development (Ministry of National Defense, Peoples Republic of China 2008). With Chinas economic boom in the past decade, it was not surprising that its defence acquisitions had significantly risen as well, in quantity as well as quality. This situation had raised doubts as to Chinas real motives and its attendant aggressive actions in the region, most recent of which is the Spratly Islands stand-off. Therefore, it can be argued that Chinas defence acquisitions categorically ensure that it is at the head of the arms race. Another contentious issue is its lack of transparency as the accuracy of its military spending is not consistent with estimates by other research institutes showing China is spending far more than what it declared. Also not accounted for are other expenses on military R & D (research and development) and weapons procured from abroad (Chen & Ferrer 2009).
Chinas White Paper 2008
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Its Not about the Figure. Beijing's military planners know they cannot rely on China's size alone as a deterrent. (Photo and caption by Reuters and Telegraph)
On the other hand, Taiwans military build-up is based on three guiding principles: 1) to maintain air and naval superiority over the Taiwan Strait; b) to maintain counter-blockade capabilities; 3) to be able to win the fighting at the beachhead (Lo 1998: p.184), all of which are undeniably directed to China. Thus, its arms procurement policy states that its operational requirements for weapons and equipment, consistent with the Chinshih Plan, ... required to include systematic analysis, compare force levels with those of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) (Lo 1998: p.186). This clearly shows one of the attributes of arms race as stated in parameter number (2). Another significant aspect of their competition is Taiwan and Chinas procurement of missile armaments. Chinas massive arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles like the Dong Feng 11 (with a range of 300) and Dong Feng 15 (with a range of 800) is a grave concern for Taiwan (Chang, 2011). Based on the reports by Taiwans Ministry of Defence, it is estimated that 1,600 ballistic missiles of China were aimed at Taiwan (Chang & Cole, 2012). On the other hand, Taiwan had embarked on the procurement of missiles where early this year, newly-acquired cruise missiles had been deployed (Yeh 2012). The Hsiung Feng-IIE (HF-2E), a
surface-to-surface cruise missile which cost US$1.02bn, had been ordered last 2005 and could strike at a range of 650km (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010). Taiwan likewise placed the third annual order of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles amounting to $921m USD, an addition to the 330 and 114 missiles ordered in 2008 and 2010, respectively (Cole, 2012). These actions affirm Grays parameter numbers (3) and (4) where a significant increase in armament procurement was noted in both countries in competition.
China and Japan
The rivalry between Japan and China has spanned centuries as evidenced by history and continues to this day in their dispute of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands whose strategic importance to both nations can provide them a military security advantage which can serve as a prolonged and enlarged frontier and a possible source of energy which can provide economic benefits (Pan, 2007: p.71). On September 2012, the Japanese Coast Guard reported the intrusion of three Chinese vessels in the Japanese waters near Senkaku Islands (The Japan Times 2012). Given this assertive behaviour, Japan had been reciprocating the arms
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build-up of China because the former believed that the latter is not the key to stability in Asia (Odgaard 2008, p.193). Contradicting this view is Andrew Davies, senior analyst at Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), who argued that the trend of Japans defence spending had remained relatively static over the period, undermining the concept of arms race and leading to the deduction that Japan was not reacting to China (Dobell 2008). However, this assertion appears misconstrued because Japan through the practice of deferred payments known as saimu futan koi had allowed it to extend the cost of the armaments to considerable number of years, thus, generating more than 60% of defence spending (Hughes 2009: p.90). This system had enabled Japan to continue the procurement of defence capabilities despite limitations of 1% percent GNP as its defence budget ceiling. In cognizance of the Sino threat, Japans 2007 White Paper acknowledged Chinas defence spending and military upgrade and acquisitions where it based its need to augment its own military power (Atanassova-Cornelis & Mendes 2010). This is evident in the development of both nations defence R &
D specializing in space technology deployment and application. Initially, Japans motivation to have its own satellite by 2003 was triggered by the threat from North Korea. On the other hand, Chinas development and deployment of satellite in 2000 increased Japans sense of urgency. Thus, a bill was enacted by Japan on the use of space that further allowed it to acquire early-warning satellites to detect missile launches from China in a worst case scenario (AtanassovaCornelis 2010). This clearly indicates Japans priorities of acquiring advanced intelligence capabilities to offset its perceived limitations to Chinas formidable defence inventory and capability.
India and Pakistan
India and Pakistans relationship is marred by their dispute over Kashmir which had brought them to three large-scale armed conflicts (Ganguly n.d.). Tension between the two is still intense due to their nuclear weapon programs. This competition in terms of acquiring and deploying nuclear defence capabilities manifests the evidence of an arms race unfolding in South Asia. Reciprocal actions on test and technological development efforts are apparent on both sides
GIVE AND TAKE. India and Pakistan were firing off missiles left and right. So why weren't the Chinese nervous? (Photo and caption by Foreign Policy)
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ensuring the effectiveness of ones weapons and missile platforms. Early in 2012, India had successfully tested its latest missile, the Agni-V, which had the capacity to strike China, Pakistan, and other countries in the region within its 5,000 km range (BBC News 2012). After six days, Pakistan had tested its 1,000 km range Haft 4 nuclear-capable missile with the capacity to strike deep within India (Laskar 2012). This rapid reciprocal interaction on missile testing can be a gauge to confirm the existence of an arms race considering not only the quantity of weapons acquisition but its quality effectiveness as well. The yearly tests (see Figure 1) and frequency conducted by two sides not only show the effectiveness of their weapons but also serves as a psychological deterrent to initiating actual armed confrontation, thus meeting the parameters number (2) and (3) stated by Gray. Likewise, the two countries had significant deliveries of combat aircraft from 2007 to 2011. During the period, 120 Su-30MKs and 16 MiG-29Ks from Russia and 20 Jaguar Ss from the UK were received by India while 50 JF-17s from China and 30-F-16s from the USA were received by Pakistan (Holtom et al 2012). This significant figure in combat aircraft shows that these two countries were outdoing each other in upgrading their air assets to achieve air superiority in the event of war. Singapore and Malaysia Malaysia and Singapore are both members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FDPA) that include Australia, Britain, and New Zealand. Though formally allied, both nations contended with territorial disputes and water supply issues (Smith 2004). Thus, given these points of conflicts, defence capability development of one country motivated the other to equal or enhance itself to gain capability advantages over the other. The annual report released recently by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute revealed that between the periods 2000-2004 and 2005-2009, arms imports to Singapore and Malaysia rose by 146% and
722%, respectively, mainly spent on naval platforms acquisitions and upgrade (Holtom et al 2010). Malaysia spent $1bn USD on two Franco-Spanish submarines and developed a base for these submarines at Borneo while Singapore had procured two Swedish attack submarines worth $128m USD (Marshall 2010). These indicators manifest both nations awareness of each others capabilities and show that both countries did not want to be in a disadvantaged position.
IV. Future Implications of Arms Race

As discussed, conflicts arising from sovereignty, border, territorial claims, and resource competition issues motivate abovementioned nations to build a credible defence force in order to have better negotiating power or stance over their rivals. The strength of a defence force definitely lies on the quantity and quality of its human resource and weapon systems. Undeniably, arms acquisition of a state threatens another who may feel disadvantaged as the new weapons lethality, range, and effectiveness can incite negative and insidious perceptions among such rivals. This is the current situation faced by the Asian region to date. Assessing the weapons procured by Asian nations shows intentions of not merely self defence but also of power projection to show they are a formidable nation to contend with. Without arms control measures as argued by Desmond Ball, the ongoing arms race will continue to persist. Likewise, arms race heightens tensions in the region that may lead to a more devastating outcome like war. Michael Intriligator (1984: p.82) argued that arms races can, in certain circumstances lead to war, but they can also lead to avoidance of war, a means of deterrence against the cause of initiating war. Despite this assertion, the possibility of war is present and the threat it poses can erupt without warning regardless of the degree of provocation. In order to lessen regional tension and restrain arms racing, confidence and security building measures must be implemented through transparency and dialogue (Ball 1993/1994). Existing security and cooperation
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structures can be a venue for raising and resolving these concerns. Existing mechanisms in the region can help in this concern to prevent conflicts from erupting as a result of the ongoing arms race, to continue and build regional confidence, i.e., the ASEAN Regional Forum, Shangrila Dialogue, East Asia Summit, and Tripartite Summit of South Korea, China, and Japan (Bisley 2012). Political and economic engagement with emerging powers like India and China will also boost regional cooperation and confidence. If countries will not take the step to talk about the ongoing arms race, Desmond Balls prediction on its pessimistic outcome may yet become a reality in the near future.
V. Conclusion
Asias enormous economic growth has caught the attention of the world, as her strategic value as a fulcrum of global change is becoming evident. Events therefore such as this arms-race scenario creates various reactions and assessments. Though manifested in the early 1990s and 21st century, defence spending in Asia has created a serious debate if indeed there is an arms race or none. While maritime, ground, and aerial capabilities have been procured by various Asian nations, conditions differ significantly in the early 1990s compared to the 21st century that affirmed the absence of arms race in the former while confirming its presence in the latter. The reciprocal dynamics is not present during the earlier period and Colin Grays conditions of arms race were not met then. The declining presence and withdrawal of United States capabilities in the region after the Cold War made the countries enhance their defence capability to be self-reliant. Likewise, most of the weapon systems during the early 1990s were outmoded and needed replacement to meet the uncertain security challenges that may arise. On the other hand, todays weapons acquisition of the Asian nations is a reciprocal response to the weapon systems acquired by their rival state. The rapid responses are reinforced by the quantity and quality of the defence force capabilities acquired that become the peg from which rivals attempt to outdo one other. This situation clearly manifests the presence of arms race. The arms race will continue to persist lest definite measures be implemented soon in the region. Security and cooperation structures must be maximized to promote dialogue and common understanding to restrain the ongoing arms race. Transparency also helps in fostering better confidence and cooperation among the countries in the region. Arms race, though it may not lead to war, can stain Asias current stature in the international community as its regional tensions continue to affect to the rest of the world. The implementation of these trust-building mechanisms will be difficult but Asian nations must realize the repercussions of an arms race that will most likely affect Asias positive economic transformations, halting the regions progress and stability in this so-called Asian Century.
About the AUTHOR

MAJ LEAH L SANTIAGO (FA) PA holds a masters degree in Strategic Studies at the Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific. She is the Chief of the Strategic Alignment Branch of the Army Governance and Strategy Management Office (AGSMO).
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The Relationship between Terror Groups and the Media: its Impact in Combating the Terrorist ThreatS
By Maj Maria Victoria B Agoncillo (CAV) PA
I. Introduction
The scourge of terrorism was brought more distinctly in the consciousness of the world in the beginning of the 21st century when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center Twin Towers on 11 September 2001. The effect of that event was so massive that it highlighted the vulnerability of the nations, whether in the First World or anywhere else. Nations then heightened their security, as protection of their citizens became the highest priority. Prior to 9/11, terrorism was happening in various parts of the world as it was perpetuated by various armed groups with a range of aims political, ideological, financial, anarchical, and the like. The violent attacks were covered by various media outfits, most prominently and more up-to-date, in the broadcast media and the internet. This media phenomenon then became a vital tool of terrorists in projecting their aims and deeds in the eyes of the world. This paper will explore the relationship between terror groups and the media. It will also delve into the effects of media coverage on its target audience and consequently, how to manage these effects so as not to give terrorists the advantage.
II. Overview of the Media Industry

Media refers to any kind of format used to convey information. The term mass media was coined in the 1920s and it denoted reaching a large number of people.1 Through the years, many forms of media have developed. Printed material in the form of writing tablets was invented in ancient times by the Sumerians 4,000 years ago2 and it evolved into books and periodicals that we read today. The invention of the radio and television in the 50s3 became another form of media where news and information can be broadcast in real time. Recently, the various developments in technology and the invention of the internet during the 70s4 have revolutionized the way information is accessed. Today, newspapers worldwide reach an estimated 1.7 billion people each day5 while news broadcast programs shown on cable reach roughly 3.4 million in the US alone in 2008.6 Internet users are estimated to be a billion worldwide.7 The staggering numbers of potential target audience affect the way media present the news. Being a business in itself, the media enterprise must make money in order to survive. Profits they earn come from advertising revenue that subsequently ingrains in its culture the so-called ratings game where networks or broadsheets
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public affairs, producing glitzy, if often trivial programs that focused on crime, sex and the occult rather than hard news.12 It is in this culture therefore that terrorism finds itself thrown in the limelight. The succeeding chapters will describe how terror groups and the media maintain a relationship of quid pro quo.
III. Overview of Terror Groups

MEDIA ICON. Bin Laden in an image broadcast on April 2002 (Photo and caption by AP/MBC)
surveyed to have the highest viewership/readership would then lead to more advertisers for them.8 Consequently, there exists a stiff competition in the media as they want to be first in the scene where a newsworthy event is happening.9 Terrorist violence with its death toll and casualties are among the most reported events given that constituted headlines and main newscast reports by media networks. With this culture, the media most likely becomes vulnerable to pressures from the business owners with earning maximum profits as their main objective. Owners may also bow down to political pressure as they may not print or broadcast news that oppose or criticise the government views or policies.10 Likewise, news, both in print and broadcast, and feature documentaries produced by the media entities are packaged in a way that appeals to certain market segments (i.e., A and B refer to medium to high income families, C refers to average income, and D and E refer to low income/impoverished segments of the population). In the Philippine setting, media broadcast networks pander to the C to E segment thereby the programs are mainly shallow or mindless forms of entertainment, i.e., TV drama series and noontime variety shows. News formats likewise tend to be sensationalized.11 Coronel describes this in her case study on the rise of a Philippine media entity, the ABSCBN, who used to lag in its ratings until its rise in the 90s when they changed their concept of news and
Terror groups are organizations who are proponents of the use of violence to forward their aims. Strategically, they infuse fear, chaos, and insecurity among the masses that result in influencing policy makers to acquiesce to the terrorists demands this is the main objective of these groups. By conducting these attacks or perpetuating other acts of violence, they make governments look weak and powerless in the eyes of their constituents.13 For short-term goals, most terror groups demand ransom money to finance their operations, buy arms and ammunition or sometimes, free their comrades in prison.14 Terror groups are said to be classified in two general categories: hierarchal and networked. Hierarchal organizations have an identified leader or person in authority. Their terror operations and other related activities are coordinated through a chain of command. They are also associated with groups that have political agenda or affiliate organizations that serve as pressure groups whose role is to criticise the governments initiatives.15 Examples of this are the Sinn Fein who allegedly supports the IRA and the Herri Batasuna is to the ETA, as they purportedly act as front organisations that invest time and effort in waging propaganda warfare both at domestic and international audiences.16 Networked organizations are what Mahan and Griset called leaderless resistance groups where the members do not report to a central figure or higher command. They operate individually or in groups called cells. They may operate locally or internationally depending on the identified area of
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operations of that group.17 Al Qaeda, for example, operates in Central Asia but the Jemaah Islamiyah is believed to be its franchise that conducts terror operations in Southeast Asia in keeping with Al Qaedas aim of establishing an Islamic caliphate in Asia. Their members acquire training in Afghanistan and JIs funds and logistics are provided under the auspices of the Al Qaeda network18 The 9/11 attacks have become the benchmark of how terrorist operations are carried out in a way that is carefully planned and cunningly premeditated. According to Mahan and Griset (2008), there are four basic tactics used by terrorists: 1) assassinations of public figures, murder of civilians, and genocide; 2) hijackings; 3) kidnapping, hostage-taking, and barricade incidents; and 4) bombings and armed assaults.19 Financing their terror network is key to the survival of these groups. High profile assaults or terrorist spectaculars,20 as termed by Nacos, can persuade sponsorship of entities from states that are allegedly condoning or encouraging terrorist acts, like Iran.21 They also raise funds through donations and charity, again as in the case of Iran, where bogus foundations are set up to receive funds to support terror groups they favour with money and arms. Terror activities like kidnapping and hostage-taking become lucrative in raising funds. According to Ressa, the Abu Sayyaf is believed to have been paid a ransom of $25 million from kidnapping 21 people from seven countries in a resort in Sipadan Island, Malaysia last 23 April 2000.22 Allegedly, $5 million went to the leaders and their supporters and $5 million was used to buy arms and ammunition. The $15 million was unaccounted for and it is believed that the money and other pay-offs made from their criminal enterprise were forwarded to the coffers of Al Qaeda to support its operations elsewhere.23 Likewise, they also undertake money laundering operations and money transfers leaving no paper trail.24
IV. How Terror Groups Use the Media

The definition of terror itself which means to inspire fear through the use of violence suggests the presence of three main actors the terrorist who initiates the violent act; the victim who suffers from the act; and the audience, whose emotions, actions, and sentiments are affected by the act. How the message of terror is transmitted to the audience becomes the medium. In ancient times, violent massacres and other acts of terror were written in texts like the Torah, the Bible, and the Quran. Ancient epics that describe the brutal acts during times of war were also written in the tradition of the Song of Roland.25 These written works are initially culled from what is called the oral tradition where stories were handed down from one generation to another by word of mouth. This is the main medium during the olden times where acts of violence were passed on by survivors or witnesses telling the stories or through gossip, inspiring fear to the populace who heard them. The modern era has made advances in technology which led to the development of other forms of medium by which the message can be transmitted. With the invention of cable satellite TV, mobile phones with video cameras, and the internet, the audience can now view in real time and in graphic detail the atrocities committed by the terrorists. The effect then becomes magnified depending on how the reporters cover these events. The terrorist therefore needs to reach the vast majority of the population to include the decisionmakers so they could achieve their aims. Therefore, they need the cooperation of the media in this regard. On the other hand, with the prevailing culture of cutthroat competition among media entities, they will want to cover news with all the high drama, action, and risk in order to grab the attention of the viewers. It is but natural for them to cover violent attacks committed by terror groups, with all the footage on the damage to lives and property it has caused. They will likewise find ways to interview the terrorists themselves, the victims, or the family of the victims as this kind of drama in real life affects the emotions
62
and sentiments of the audience.26 This is the kind of coverage media networks like the most. This then leads to what Wilkinson refers to as the symbiotic relationship between the media and the terrorist. This means that one needs the other because of the mutual benefit they get from the relationship.27 Terror groups use the media as an instrument of propaganda28 where they can air their beliefs about the righteousness of their cause, their grievances, demands, and imminent threats of further violence.29 The images and how this footage was edited and finally aired in news media, for example, foster much public anxiety and uproar which more often influence the government policy on how to deal with terrorists.30 Likewise, Wilkinson adds that high profile media mileage can mobilise, incite and boost their constituency of actual and potential supporters and in doing so, (to) increase recruitment, raise more funds and inspire further attacks.31 The 90s has brought about the commercialization of the internet. It used to be the communication network that is created and used by the US Department of Defense during the 70s.32 Terrorists have adapted to using this medium in communicating to a potentially worldwide audience who are virtually connected. One apparent advantage of the internet over the traditional media is that it is interactive.33 This is because certain
internet forums like Yahoo Groups offer online response that makes the people who access them feel more involved, as their insights and opinions can be posted as it is. Another advantage is the anonymity it offers as any person can set up a website or an account using fake credentials. Terrorists can create these websites or fora with impunity because of the current lack of regulations over how internet can be used.34 It is then quite evident that media plays a central role in the terrorist strategy of achieving its aims to be in the limelight while committing acts of violence. With media providing a venue for the terrorists to air their agenda or publicise their threats, they inadvertently bestow legitimacy to these terror groups.35 During the 70s, the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat were prominently covered by the media and this exposure has significantly contributed to increasing the PLOs respectability and legitimacy in Washington and other countries of the Western world.36 Another significant aspect of media exposure is that it tends to inflame public sentiment to be critical of their governments initiatives against acts of terror, making the latter feel helpless or perceived to be incompetent. This is evident in the case of the TWA flight hijacking last June 14 - 30, 1985 during the presidency of Reagan wherein the US government, seeking to end the crisis without bloodshed, entered into a secret deal called the Iran-Contra deals in which hostages were ransomed in exchange for arms.37 The US government compromised their own national interest in order to save the lives of American citizens. According to Nacos, these situations often happen when media coverage portrays the victims plight as more important than national interest as it transforms political problems into personal dramas or tragedies which demand compassionate reactions.38
Share the Terror. Despite being branded a terrorist group, Hezbollah is active on social media platforms (Photo and caption by forward.com)
63
V. Dilemmas
There are many arguments in this stage on how to lessen the terrorists impact on audience sentiments. Do you censor or regulate the messenger? This is what the Prevention of Terrorism Act in UK is about when their former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wanted to deprive the IRA of the oxygen of publicity.39 It may be true that imposing this law has significantly decreased the media exposure of terrorists like the IRA in UK as it consequently takes them away from the public eye.
Tweeting for Terror. Twitter, the online social networking and microblogging service, is just one of the platforms exploited by terrorist groups. (Photo and caption by GABRIEL BOUYS, AFP, and Getty Images)
There are many who oppose censorship as it is said to limit one of the foundations upon which democracy was built upon the freedom of the press. The public has the right to know the news, information, and other details about these terror groups. Another argument is that censorship will not work in this age especially with the proliferation of cable TV and the internet where news from over the world can be watched in real-time.40 Unless the government shuts down these companies, censorship cannot succeed. Others advocate the idea of self-regulation within the media organizations. They can publish and abide by certain codes of conduct with special attention given to covering terrorists. If members violate them, sanctions can be brought upon the offender, i.e., suspension or revocation of their licenses to operate as a reporter or a media entity. On the other hand, self-regulation has not always resulted [in] responsible and transformative outputs41 since, as previously mentioned, profitability and its appeal to the widest segment of the viewing and reading public has become the basis on which news and other programs are produced. However, there is one example in Germany where the government and the media had mutual agreements on how they would cover terrorist events. During the 70s, bloody attacks perpetuated by the Red Army Faction had urged government and media to agree on a policy of denying terrorists media access and to work closely in managing the news.42 But, Nacos further argued,
this model cannot be implemented in certain cultures like the US.43 Taking another view, some authors look at the role of the audience in this triangle of actors. Luis Teodoro, former dean of the College of Mass Communication of the University of the Philippines Diliman, was quoted by Somera in her report. He said that a media-literate public would constitute a countervailing force powerful enough to compel the mass media to comply with their own standards and aspire for levels of excellence commensurate to their responsibility to provide the public reliable and complete information,[for it to] act intelligently in complex social, political, and cultural environments. Mahan and Griset (2008) also suggested that the audience must prefer reasoned discourse44 over sensationalized news reporting. With this prevalently negative views about the medias culture and tendencies toward profitability, hope is not yet lost. The society can impose certain standards that the media must comply with especially when reporting news about terrorist acts. According to a report from the Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, media indeed should not be restricted in informing the public about these matters but, in turn, they should exercise responsibility and sensitivity, bearing in mind the effect these reports have on the public. They must also achieve the right balance in disseminating policy and information about terrorist actions while not offering
64
them a platform for their agenda. Likewise, they should temper the emotional content of the news and stick to professional and unbiased reporting.45 Taking the example of the CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System) network, they have adopted certain guidelines for their staff in order to avoid being manipulated and exploited by terror groups. They are mandated to give thoughtful, conscientious care and restraint in covering terror events, avoid interfering with authorities actions, use experts in hostage situations, obey all police instructions, and attempt to achieve balance so as not to overshadow other important news of the day. 46
a vital instrument of the terrorist as the acts of violence being reported become, more often than not, sensationalized with special focus on the emotional aspect of the event, inciting compassionate sentiment among its target audience. Some governments try to control the problem by regulating the medium that transmits the terrorists agenda. This has not totally eradicated the problem altogether. However, instilling professional and ethical standards among media business owners and media practitioners is important. Likewise, the audience themselves must demand programs that provide unbiased and balanced news. Upholding the freedom of the press then is still paramount for democratic societies to prevail. Terrorists may take advantage of the media and vice versa but at the end of the day, it would be up to the public to discern and decide for themselves which is the truth or which is myth, or whether the threat is real or not.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has discussed the prevailing culture of the media and how terrorists try to use the different forms of mass media like print, broadcast, and internet in promoting their agenda to the largest audience possible. Inadvertently or not, the media becomes
About the AUTHOR

MAJ MARIA VICTORIA B AGONCILLO (CAV) PA is currently taking her masters degree in the University of the Philippines under the AFP 22K Program. This article was written as partial requirement for her Junior Staff Course in Brunei on May 2009.
Bibliography:

CIA Factbook. 2009. Available from: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook> (Accessed on 24 April 2009) Coronel, Shiela S. The Media, The Market and Democracy: The Case of the Philippines The Public, Vol. 8, no. 2, 2001, pp 109-125. Available from: <http://www.javnost-thepublic.org/issue/2001/2> (Accessed on 12 March 2009) Harmon, Christopher C. Terrorism Today. (London : Frank Cass, 2000). Jarab, Josef. Doc 10557: Media and Terrorism, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 20 May 2005. Available from: <http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/EDOC10557.htm> (Accessed on 28 March 2009) Kidder, Rushworth M. Unmasking Terrorism: Manipulation of the Media, in Bernard Schechterman and Martin Slann (eds), Violence and Terrorism 91/92, 2d edn. (Connecticut: Dushlein Publising Group, 1991), pp 117 121. Mahan, Sue and Griset, Pamela L. Terrorism in Perspective. 2d edn. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2008). Nacos, Brigitte L. Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Ponsford, Dominic. Upbeat Report Shows Newspapers Growing Worldwide, Press Gazette, 2 June 2008. Available from: <http://www.pressgazette. co.uk/story.asp?storycode=41292> (Accessed on 24 April 2009) Radio and Television Timeline Greatest Engineering Achievements of the 20th Century. Available from: <http://www.greatachievements.org/?id=3659> (Accessed on 25 April 2009) Ressa, Maria A. Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaedas Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia. (New York: Free Press, 2003).
Rimban, Luz. Thats not News, Thats Entertainment, Media, Vol. 5, no. 4, 1999, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ). Available from: <http://www.pcij.org/imag/Media/pulso.html> (Accessed on 12 March 2009) Sinclair, Andrew. Anatomy of Terror: A History of Terrorism. (London: Macmillan, 2003). Somera, Nina. Women and Philippine Media: At the Fringes of Freedom, genderIT.org, 16 March 2007. Available from: <http://www.genderit.org/en/ index.shtml?w=a&x=95133> (Accessed on 11 March 2009) Terrorist Goals and Motivations, International Terrorism and Security Research. Available from: <http://www.terrorism-research.com/goals> (Accessed on 19 April 2009) Terrorist Groups, International Terrorism and Security Research. Available from: <http://www.terrorism-research.com/groups> (Accessed on 19 April 2009) The History of Writing. Available from: <http://www.historian.net/hxwrite.htm> (Accessed on 24 April 2009) The State of the News Media: An Annual Report on American Journalism, The Pew Project on Excellence in Journalism, 2009. Available from: <http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2009/narrative_cabletv_audience. php?cat=1&media=7> (Accessed on 24 April 2009) Types of Media/Genre and Target Audience, Online Advancement on Student Information Skills (OASIS), Florida International Unversity (FIU) Libraries. Available from:<http://oasis.fiu.edu/Ch8/ch8page3.htm> (Accessed on 19 April 2009) Weimann, Gabriel. Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges. (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2006). Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. 2d edn. (New York: Routledge, 2006).
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endnotes
1 2 3 Types of Media, Genre and Target Audience, OASIS, FIU Libraries, viewed on 19 April 2009, http://oasis.fiu.edu/Ch8/ch8page3.htm The History of Writing, viewed on 24 April 2009, <http://www.historian.net/ hxwrite.htm> Radio and Television Timeline Greatest Engineering Achievements of the 20th Century, viewed on 25 April 2009, <http://www.greatachievements. org/?id=3659> Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, The New Challenges (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 16. Dominic Ponsford, Upbeat Report Shows Newspapers Growing Worldwide, Press Gazette, 2 June 2008, viewed on 24 April 2009, <http://www. pressgazette.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=41292> The State of the News Media: An Annual Report on American Journalism, The Pew Project on Excellence in Journalism, 2009, viewed on 24 April 2009, <http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2009/narrative_cabletv_audience. php?cat=1&media=7> CIA Factbook, April 2009, viewed on 24 April 2009, <https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook> Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis for the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 158. Sue Mahan and Pamela L. Griset, Terrorism in Perspective, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2008), 228. Shiela S. Coronel, The Media, The Market and Democracy: The Case of the Philippines The Public, Vol. 8, no. 2, 2001, p. 119, viewed on 12 March 2009, <http://www.javnost-thepublic.org/issue/2001/2> Luz Rimban, Thats not News, Thats Entertainment, Media, Vol. 5, no. 4, 1999, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), viewed on 12 March 2009, <http://www.pcij.org/imag/Media/pulso.html> Coronel, 117. Nacos, 54. Terrorist Goals and Motivations, International Terrorism and Security Research, viewed on 19 April 2009, <http://www.terrorism-research.com/goals> Terrorist Groups, International Terrorism and Security Research viewed on 19 April 2009, <http://www.terrorism-research.com/groups> Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 2nd Ed. (New York: Routledge, 2006 ), 147. Mahan and Griset, 136. Maria A. Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al Qaedas Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia (New York: Free Press, 2003 ), 48 52. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Mahan and Griset, 137. Nacos, 98. Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 117. Ressa, 112. Ibid., 115-116. Mahan and Griset, 133. Andrew Sinclair, Anatomy of Terror: A History of Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 2003), 17-19. Nacos, 125. Wilkinson, 145. Mahan and Griset, 219. Nacos, 54. Ibid., 69-70. Wilkinson, 149. Weimann, 18-19. Ibid., 24. Ibid., 29. Nacos, 67. Ibid., 73 Ibid., 83 84. Ibid., 126. Rushworth M Kidder, Unmasking Terrorism: Manipulation of the Media, Bernard in Schechterman and Martin Slann (Eds), in Violence and Terrorism 91/92, 2d edn. (Connecticut: Dushleim Publishing Group, 1991), 117. Kidder, 121. Nina Somera, Women and Philippine Media: At the Fringes of Freedom, genderIT.org, 16 March 2007, viewed on 11 March 2009, <http://www.genderit. org/en/index.shtml?w=a&x=95133> Nacos, 154 Ibid., 155. Mahan and Griset, 229. Josef Jarab, Doc 10557: Media and Terrorism, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 20 May 2005, viewed on 28 March 2009, <http://assembly. coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/EDOC10557.htm> Wilkinson, 157.
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Photo Caption
Gearing up. Members of the leftist New Peoples Army (NPA) performing military drills at an unidentified location in the Philippines. Photo by Keith Bacongco
Source
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/HTML-Newsletter/alert/NTS-alert-mar-1102.html
19 20
Perilous. Talks between the government and the NPA have been touch and go. Moment of Peace. The MNLF signed a significant peace agreement with the government in 1996.
Photo by the BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17038024 Photo by the BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17038024 Photo by the BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17038024 Photo by the BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17038024 Photo by philstar.comhttp://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/02/06/905407/militarywont-meddle-sayyaf-mnlf-fightingstop-mutual-annihilation Photo by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) http://opapp.gov.ph/news/child-protection-paramount-armed-conflicts-opapp-afp
21 22 23 24
Home. The MILF is mostly based in remote islands in central Mindanao. Origin. The Abu Sayyaf is a breakaway faction from the MNLF. No finger in the pie. Military wouldnt meddle in Sayyaf-MNLF fighting last February. Childrens rights are also human rights. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continues its mandate to protect childrens rights in conflict areas.
25
Conflict in the South. The southern Philippines has a long history of conflict, with armed groups including Muslim separatists, communists, clan militias and criminal groups all active in the area.
Photo by the BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17038024
27
Considering Aussie participation. CPT FELIPE ESTRADA greets Australian Armys LTC ROD LONG at a school construction site. Long is part of an observation team in the Philippines to help determine whether or not Australia would join the Balikatan Exercises.
Photo by US Marine Lance Cpl Cansin P. Hardyegritag http://dvidshub.net/r/h7q8xd
28
HMAS NEWCASTLE at Pelorius Sound, New Zealand. Ratification of Senate Resolution 788, the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) with Australia, would face the rising challenges in the region and fortify both naval, maritime, and defense forces.
Photo by Australian Defence www.defence.gov.au
29
Airboats from the Land Down Under. Australian handed over 21 airboats to the Philippines on October 2010.
Photo by the Philippine Army Public Affairs Office http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=170145689666038&set=a.150344704979470. 31663.119999698013971 Photo by Pool/Getty Images AsiaPac
31
PH-AU Ties. President Aquino met with Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard on October 2012 for his state visit.
31
Crossed Flags: Australia and the Philippines.
Photo by crossed-flag-pins.com www.crossed-flag-pins.com
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Photo Caption
To join or not to join. The Australian government was gauging the feasibility for Balikatan 2013 participation.
Source
Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chris Fahey of the US Navy http://www.dvidshub.net/image/903869/bk-13-australian-observation-team-considersbalikatan-participation#.UXdXY0pl4ug Photo by The Economist http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21572251-chaotic-south-philippines-muslimslaunch-foreign-policy-sultans-sabah-swing Photo by the British North Borneo Company http://www.interaksyon.com/article/56770/malaysian-perspective--why-the-philippinescannot-claim-sabah Photo by GMA News http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/photo/32570/sulu-sultan-says-sabah-claim-legitimate Photo by The Diplomat http://apac2020.thediplomat.com/feature/the-next-arms-race/ Photo by AP http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/korean_peninsula/AJ201303210118
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A Time to Claim. In the dynamic south of the Philippines, Muslims launched a foreign policy.
37
The Royalty. Archival photo of Sulu Sultan Jamalul Kiram.
42
A Royal Conversation. Sultan of Sulu Jamalul Kiram III talked on a mobile phone to his brother Prince Agbimudin.
46 49
Waves splashing harder. A naval arms race was gathering pace in the Asia-Pacific. We Are One. North Korean army officers and soldiers attended a rally at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, in celebration of the countrys nuclear test.
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Strongman at the Forefront. Kim Jong-un attended a national meeting of chiefs of branch social security stations.
Photo by the International Institute For Strategic Studies http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-18-2012/ december/north-korea-a-year-into-the-reign-of-kim-jong-un/ Photo by Reuters http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/2827473/Chinas-militaryambition-fuels-Asian-arms-race.html Photo by Foreign Policy http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/08/the_asian_arms_race_that_wasnt Photo by AP/MBC http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/cutline/al-qaida-letter-seized-bin-laden-compound-fox154510302.html Photo by forward.com http://forward.com/articles/160852/driving-hezbollah-off-social-media/?p=all Photo by GABRIEL BOUYS/AFP/Getty Images http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/international-extremism-terrorism/
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Its Not about the Figure. Beijings military planners know they cannot rely on Chinas size alone as a deterrent.
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India and Pakistan were firing off missiles left and right. So why werent the Chinese nervous?
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Media icon. Bin Laden in an image broadcast on April 2002.
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Share the Terror. Despite being branded a terrorist group, Hezbollah is active on social media platforms.
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Tweeting for Terror. Twitter, the online social networking and microblogging service, is just one of the platforms exploited by terrorist groups.
* agsmo@army.mil.ph | agsmo.pa@gmail.com facebook.com/atr2028 | twitter.com/ATR_2028 | atr2028.wordpress.com

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The ARMY

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Vice Chairman Secretary

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MAJ RUEL G ROMBAOA (INF) PA

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EDITORs NOTE: A fresh army journal

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3. Mr. Gordon Alan Joseph

4. Asec. Danilo Francia

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