SC Oral Arguments

Guingona III v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
203359
FACTS: Petitioner Teofisto DL Guingona III is a duly-elected Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and the lone Senator who voted against RA 10175, otherwise known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. He files this petition a Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court as a legislator (who) has a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office remain inviolate so he is allowed to question the validity of any of ficial action which, to his mind, infringes on his prerogatives as legislator. Petitioner seeks to nullify Sections 4 (c) (1) (4), 6, 7, and 19 of RA 10175 for being unconstitutional and/or prohibit respondent government bodies from implementing it. Named as respondents are the Executive Secretary as the alter ego of the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of the Department of Justice, the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. ISSUES/GROUNDS: 1. 2. 3. Section 4 (c) (4) in relation to Section 6 of The Cybercrime Act violates the constitutional guarantees on equal protection and due process of law; Section 7 of The Cybercrime Act is contrary to the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy; and, Section 19 of The Cybercrime Act is violative of the constitutional prohibition against unlawful searches and seizure and the due process clause of the Constitution.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS: 1. Section 4 (c) (4) in relation to Section 6 of The Cybercrime Act violates the constitutional guarantees on equal protection and due process of law: o Libel under the Revised Penal Code is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, or imprisonment for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years, or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both. BUT libel under the Cybercrime Act is punishable by a penalty of prision mayor or an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, the penalty one (1) degree higher than prision correccional or an imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day for four (4) years. As such, a clear violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; o Very clear that those liable for libel under the RPC would suffer a lesser penalty than cyber libel under RA 10175 which is clearly a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; o A law, to be valid, must apply to all members of the sa me class. Persons committing libel are similarly situated, whether using a computer system or not. There is no justification for the difference in the imposition of penalties under the two statutes. Section 7 of The Cybercrime Act is contrary to the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy: o The assailed Section 7 makes a person liable not only under the Cybercrime Act, abut also under the RPC in violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy; o Blatantly violates an individuals constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure; o The act of libel punishable under the Cybercrime Act is identical to that punished under the RPC; the elements constituting both offenses are definitely identical so conviction and punishment under these two laws for the same offense is definitely unconstitutional; Section 19 of The Cybercrime Act is violative of the constitutional prohibition against unlawful searches and seizure and the due process clause of the law: o The assailed Section 19 grants the DOJ unbridled authority to restrict or block access to ones computer data once it is a prima facie found to be in violation of the Cybercrime Act which is a blatant violation of the constitutional right of an individual against unreasonable searches and seizure;
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The DOJs extraordinary power to issue an order restricting or blocking access to ones computer based merely on prima facie evidence will render nugatory the constitutional provision that search warrants shall be issued only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge; o The assailed proviso effectively deprives a person of access to his own computer data without first being given an opportunity to be notified as to crime purportedly violated; Section 4 (c) (1) of the Cybercrime Act violates the constitutional right to due process: o Definition of the crime of cybersex is too broad as it fails to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid. As such, an individual is now in danger of being prosecuted for crimes without knowing what was specifically violated, for as long as he used a computer; o Due to over extensive definition of cybersex, an individual is in effected restricted from exploring ones creativity and expressing it on the internet for fear of being prosecuted for a crime which lacks a sufficient standard; o The assailed proviso does not only constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression but also legislates morality; The implementation of these highly questionable provisions would create a chilling effect tantamount to prior restraint on the freedom of speech and expression: o This proviso would in effect curtail the peoples right to freedom of expression. Any computer user will now live in fear knowing that ones critical comments, when published on -line, might expose one to criminal charges.
PRAYER: 1. 2. 3. Issue a TRO to immediately enjoin the respondents from implementing Sections 4 (c) (1) (4), 6, 7, and 19 of RA 10175; Set the case for oral argument; After due proceedings, the Court to render judgment: a. Declaring Sections 4 (c) (1) (4), 6, 7, and 19 of RA 10175 null and void for being unconstitutional; and b. Permanently prohibiting all respondents from implementing Sections 4 (c) (1) (4), 6, 7, and 19 of RA 10175; Issue other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable.
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http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/features/oral_arguments/cybercrime/203359.php
Adonis, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 203378

Nature of the Action: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with a prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), asking the Court to declare that Republic Act 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, is unconstitutional. Statement of Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. On 23 October 1986, the Philippines ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On 02 February 1987, the 1987 Philippine Constitution was ratified. The Philippines ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR on August 22, 1989, which meant its acceptance of the individual complaints mechanism provided for by the Optional Protocol. In a communication dated 03 July 2008 the Petitioner Alexander Adonis filed against the Philippines before the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), he alleged that the Philippines violated Article 19 of the ICCPR. He also alleged, inter alia, that his conviction and imprisonment for libel under Article 355 of the Philippine Revised Penal Code constitutes an unlawful restriction of his right to freedom of expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR. The communication is entitled Alexander Adonis v. the Philippines and designated as Communication No. 1815/2008. On 26 October 2011, the UNHRC expressed its View on Alexander Adonis v. the Philippines. In its View, the UNHRC declared that the imprisonment imposed on Mr. Adonis for libel under the Philippine Revised Penal Code is incompatible with Article 19, paragraph three of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or freedom of expression. Further, the UNRHC View expressed that Philippines is also under an obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations occurring in the future, including by reviewing the relevant libel legislation. On 04 June 2012 and 05 June 2012, and despite the UNHRC View on Alexander Adonis v. the Philippines,the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively passed Republic Act No. 10175, or otherwise known as Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. On 12 September 2012, despite the UNHRC View on Alexander Adonis v. the Philippines, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III signed into law R.A. 10175.
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Discussion: A. Procedural Matters o Petitioners have standing to file the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. o The controversy is sufficiently ripe for the High Courts adjudication. o The filing of the instant petition does not violate the hierarchy of courts, given the urgency and the nature of the issues involved. o The petition involves matters of public interest and transcendental importance such as would justify a relaxation of any procedural requirement for constitutional adjudication. Substantive Matters (Grounds for the Petition): o In the very first place, any prosecution for criminal libel is a continuing violation of Philippine state obligations under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as the UN Human Rights Committee has so held in its view on Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines, where the Committee stated that criminal libel in the Revised Penal Code is incompatible with freedom of expression. o Section 4(c)4 and Section 5 of R.A. 10175 violate the constitutional right to freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press enshrined in Article III, Section 4, of the Constitution as said sections of the law are vague and overbroad. o Section 6 of R.A. 10175 violates the Equal Protection Clause enshrined in Article III, Section I, of the Constitution - since it arbitrarily increases the penalty imposed on Cyber Libel as compared to the penalty for ordinary libel - without any valid legal basis for such a higher penalty. o Section 7 of R.A. 10175 violates the constitutional right against double jeopardy enshrined in Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution as it places an accused in double jeopardy. o Section 19 of R.A. 10175 violates the constitutional princ iple of separation of powers as it delegates to the DOJ is properly a judicial function. o The presumption of constitutionality does not apply to R.A. 10175 since it violates constitutionally protected fundamental rights.
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Prayer: 1. Pending the resolution of this Petition, A Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction be immediately issued, prohibiting Public Respondents from implementing R.A. 10175, and the Respondent Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management from releasing public funds for its implementation; Upon due hearing, the instant Petition be granted, (a) declaring R.A. 10175, otherwise known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, to be unconstitutional for infringing against Constitutionally protected fundamental rights of citizens- that is, of journalists and their audience alike and (b) permanently prohibiting Respondents Executive Secretary, the Department of Budget and Management, the Department of Justice, the Department of Interior and Local Government, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Philippine National Police, and the Information and Communications Technology OfficeDepartment of Science and Technology from implementing the same law. Other reliefs that are just and equitable.
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G.R. No. 203391 HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA. KATHERINE ELONA OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN, ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. Petitioners, -versus- PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, LEILA DE LIMA in his (sic) capacity as Secretary of the (sic) Justice, Respondents.
The petition seeks to assail the constitutionality and enjoin the implementation of R.A. No. 10175 on the following grounds: I. All the requisites for the exercise of judicial review are present a. There must be an actual case or controversy b. Petitioners must possess locus standi The petitioners are all Internet users, who either participate, write, comment or post in blogs, websites and pages, social networks or publish articles online in different websites and pages for public viewing. Clearly, the petitioners' direct and personal interest in the outcome of the challenge of constitutionality against R.A. No. 10175 is most apparent, as they are in immediate danger of sustaining the direct injury of criminal prosecution as a result of the law's enforcement due to continuing existence of their online articles, comments, posts and other similar writings in the Internet upon effectivity of the Act. c. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity d. The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case As the petition delves not merely in questioning the constitutionality of penal statute but defending the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression, a facial challenge of the statute is justified. The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. Sections 4(c)4, 5, 6, and 7 of R.A. No. 10175 relative to libel are unconstitutional due to vagueness. A statute or act which suffers from vagueness is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: a. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid. - No penalty is mentioned or prescribed for libel committed through a computer system or any other similar means, which is stated in Sec. 4(c)4. Neither does the law make any reference to the penalties for libel prescribed under Art. 355, as it merely adopts its elements and not its penalties. b. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. - In the absence of a prescription of a penalty of this form of libel under R.A. No. 10175, and without reference to the penalties prescribed under the Revised Penal Code, men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. As a result, persons engaged in acts or activities through a computer system are left with no certainty whether their acts constitute punishable conduct under this form of libel under R.A. No. 10175, and what type of penalty shall be imposed upon them upon commission of such acts. Particular sections of Chapter IV of R.A. No. 10175 are unconstitutional for violating constitutional due process, among other rights.
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Sec. 12 violates the constitutional right to privacy of communications because actual traffic data also includes content and identities, not only communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service as defined in the law. Sec. 13 and Sec. 17 violate the constitutional right to constitutional due process. Under Sec.13, the order of preservation of computer data is given by law enforcement authorities including the further extension of such preservation. However, it must be noted that such preservation is akin to the garnishment of personal property or an asset preservation order in civil forfeiture proceedings. Also, the preservation of computer data order, including its extension does not provide the owner or possessor of computer data even the minimum requirements of due process, particularly notice and the opportunity to be heard as to why the computer is being preserved and his use and disposition restricted. Under Sec. 17, all computer data subject to a preservation or examination order shall be subject to destruction, without any qualification whether
such computer data were indeed objects, proceeds or instruments of a criminal offense.Moreover, the destructions constitutes unlawful deprivation of property by the state as no proceedings are conducted to determine whether such property subject to destruction were indeed objects, proceeds or instruments of a criminal offense which would validly justify such destruction. Sec. 19 or the provision on restricting or blocking access to computer data is unconstitutional for being void and overbroad relative to the exercise of constitutionally protected speech and expression. The prospect of news websites, political blogs, online commentaries summarily taken down on a prima facie finding of a violation of a computer data is all too real under this provision.
GR No. 203407, Reyes, et al. v. Aquino III, et al.

Nature: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition for the nullification of, and for enjoining the respondents from the implementation of various provisions of the RA 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. Facts: This petition was filed on October 1, 2012 by (1) Renato M. Reyes, Secretary-General, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) and political blogger, (2) Bienvenido L. Lumbera, National Artist and Chairperson, Concerned Artists of the Philippines and internet user, (3) Elmer C. Labog, Chairperson, Kilusang Mayo Uno and internet user, (4)Cristina E. Palabay, Secretary General, Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of Peoples Rights) and internet user; (5) Ferdinand R. Gaite, Chairperson, Confederation for Unity, Recognition, and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE) and internet user; (6) Lana R. Linaban, Secretary General of Gabriela Womens Party and internet user; (7) Adolfo Ares P. Gutierrez, netizen, multimedia journalist, and copy editor for print and web media; and (8) Julius Garcia Matibag, netizen and human rights lawyer. Petitioners are suing in their capacity as concerned citizens and taxpayers, and as users of information and communication technologies including computers, internet, mobile phones, and social media. Issue: Whether the following provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 violate the Constitution: (1) Sec. 4 (a) (3) - referring to the cybercrime offense of Data Interference, defined as the intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses; (2) Sec. 4 (b) (3) - referring to the cybercrime offense of Computer-related Identity Theft, defined as the intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right; (3) Sec. 4 (c) (4) referring to the unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future; (4) Sec. 5 referring to other offenses, i.e., willfully abetting or aiding in commission of any of the offenses enumerated under the law (a); and the attempt to commit any of the said offenses (b); (5) Sec. 6 referring to crimes defined crimes defined and penalized by the RPC, as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies where the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the RPC, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be; (6) Sec. 7 referring to the prosecution of offenses under the law without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the RPC, as amended, or special laws; (7) Sec. 12 referring to the authorization given to law enforcement authorities, with due cause, to collect and/or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time without prior judicial warrant, sanction and/or approval; (8) Sec. 17 providing that upon expiration of the periods as provided in secs. 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and examination;
(9) Sec. 19 referring to the restricting or blocking access by the Department of Justice (DOJ) upon finding that a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of the law; and (10) Sec. 20 providing that failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV of RA 10175 specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities. Arguments 1. Sec. 4 (a) (3) suffers from overbreadth as the means employed in the said provisions sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected speech in relation to the supposed purposes of RA 10175 and constitutes prior restraint and content based restrictions. N.B.: Petitioners read this provision in conjunction with secs. 3 (e) and 3 (g) of RA 10175. Sec. 3 (e) provides Computer data refers to any representation of facts, information, or concepts in a form suitable for processing in a computer system including a program suitable to cause a computer system to perform a function and includes electronic documents and/or electronic data messages whether stored in local computer systems or online, while sec. 3 (g) provides Computer system refers to any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automated processing of data. It covers any type of device with data processing capabilities including, but not limited to, computers and mobile phones. The device consisting of hardware and software may include input, output and storage components which may stand alone or be connected in a network or other similar devices. It also includes computer data storage devices or media. Prior restraint has been defined as an official governmental restriction on any form of expression in advance of actual dissemination. Content based restrictions refer to restrictions on the exercise of free speech based upon the subject matter or type of speech. (a) The provision does not even consider the output/content of the alteration, etc. so long as the same is made without right which is defined in sec. 3 (h) as either: (i) conduct und ertaken without or in excess of authority; or (ii) conduct not covered by established legal defenses, excuses, court orders, justifications, or relevant principles under the law. Such definition however lacks comprehensible standards in relation to the complex and infinite universe of cyberspace. (b) The assailed provision also constitutes content -based restrictions as it constitutes any and all acts of alteration, etc. without right as prohibited and punishable that sweep unnecessarily broadly and invade the area of protected speech so that such area is already barred and considered an offense. (c) In cyberspace, under the assailed provision, one cannot actually exercise the freedom of expression without the act of alteration, etc. as such act is already prohibited and punishable. Sec. 4 (b) (3) suffers from overbreadth as the means employed in the said provisions sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected speech in relation to the supposed purposes of RA 10175 and constitutes prior restraint. (a) The assailed provision does not provide a nexus between the mere intentional acquisition, etc. of identifying information without right and how such act becomes a prohibited act when the information is openly and publicly available in cyberspace. Sec. 4 (c) (4) suffers from vagueness as it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application and that infringes on protected speech. (a) It does not sufficiently constitute the new offense of cybercrime of libel as it does not have any reference to Art. 353 (RPC) which defines the crime of libel a; and does not provide an imposable penalty, sec. 6 of RA 10175 being inapplicable as the alleged new offense is not defined and penalized under the RPC. (b) The assailed provision violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of the conduct to avoid and for leaving law enforces unbridled discretion in carrying it out. Sec. 4 (c) (4) suffers from overbreadth as the means employed sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected speech in relation to the supposed purposes of RA 10175. Sec. 5 (a) (b) in relation to the offenses that includes speech related matters under the said law, suffers from overbreadth as the means employed sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected speech in relation to the supposed purposes of RA 10175. Secs. 6 and 7 constitute a violation of the right not to be subjected to double jeopardy and sec. 6 suffers from overbreadth. N.B.: The right against double jeopardy protects against a second or later prosecution for the same
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offense. (a) Under sec. 6, a person may be held liable first, for the cybercrime of libel under sec. 4 (c) (4); second, for the felony of libel under Art. 355 in relation to Art. 353 of the RPC; and third, if the alleged online defamatory is likewise printed in a newspaper under Art. 355 in relation to Art. 353 of the RPC and sec. 7 of RA 10175. 7. Sec. 12 (1) constitutes a patent violation of the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to privacy. 8. Sec. 17 constitutes deprivation of property without due process of law.. (a) Destruction of data is made even if the alleged offender has not been convicted in court. 9. Sec. 19 is a patent infringement of the freedom of speech clause and a grant of unbridled power to the Secretary of Justice. 10. Sec. 20 constitutes a violation of procedural and substantive due process as it prohibits and punishes mere failure to comply. Prayer 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. the petition be given due course; a TRO/writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain implementation of the assailed provisions; and after notice and hearing, a final order be issued declaring the assailed provisions null and void for being unconstitutional; permanently enjoining implementation of assailed provisions; and other just and equitable relief.
G.R. No. 203440, Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Amparita Sta. Maria, Ray Paolo J. Santiago. Gilbert V. Sembrano, and Ryan Jeremiah D. Quan (all of Ateneo Human Rights Center) v. Honorable Paquito Ochoa in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Honorable Leila De Lima in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, Honorable Manuel Roxas in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of the Department of Interior and Local Government, The Chief of the Philippine National Police, The Director of the National Bureu of Investigation (all of the Executive Department of Government)
G.R. No. 203440 Petitioners: Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Amparita Sta. Maria, Ray Paolo J. Santiago, Gilbert V. Sembrano, and Ryan Jeremiah D. Quan (all of the Ateneo Human Rights Center)
They teach at the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law and are members of the Ateneo Human Rights Center. Petitioner Melencio Sta. Maria further writes for Interaksyon.com, an internet news portal of TV5 and has a daily show at Aksyon TV and RADYO 5. They are filing this suit as taxpayers, internet users, journalist, broadcaster, professors of law and, most importantly, as CITIZENS of the Republic of the Philippines.
Respondents: Hon. Paquito Ochoa, in his capacity as Executive Secretary (He is the alter ego of the President who is charged with the implementation of all laws in the country, particularly RA 10175); Hon. Leila De Lima, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice (She is impleaded in her capacity as the government official who is charged with the supervision and control of the national Bureau of Investigation. She is alter ego of the President charged with the enforcement and prosecution of crimes and the duty of restricting and blocking access to computer data in accordance with RA 10175); Hon. Manuel Roxas, in his capacity as Secretary of the DILG (He is impleaded in his capacityas the government official who is charged with the supervision and control of the Philippine National Police), the Chief of the PNP (He is charged with the implementation of RA 10175) ; the Director of the NBI(He is charged with the implementation of RA 10175) Nature of the Petition: Special Civil Action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for Certiorari to declare unconstitutional Sections 4 (c) (4), 5, 6, 7, and 19 of RA 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012)
Grounds for the Petition: A. Section 19 of RA 10175 violates Section 1 of Article 3 of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Philippine Constitution Section 19 has become notoriously known as the takedown clause. It grants the power on the part of the Department of Justice (DOJ) not only to determine a prima facie case, but, like a judge, subsequently to issue our ORDERS of restriction or blocking. The Section itself does not provide any requirement for notice and hearing. Section 19 of RA 10175 violates Section 4 of Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution The extraordinary power of the Department of Justice to issue an order to restrict or block access to computer data is a form of prior restraint. First, the power is clearly illegal as it is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause. Second, the blocking and the restricting immediately snuff even the opportunity to manifest expression through the computer and cyberspace. There is total abatement by coercive means on the part of the government for one to produce speech by way of
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messages and other forms of communications through the computer. Third, it prevents expression even before a court of law decides on any legitimate limitation on the victims constitutional right. C. Section 19 of RA 10175 violates Section 3(1) of Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution The threshold question is how does one know what is to be blocked and/or restricted from the computer data of the victim. There is no way but to cull and read all the data-innards of the computer file. Over-reaching is inevitable. Data which should not be opened will be opened. Those which should not be read will be read and those which should not be examined will be examinedIn the process, the constitutional right of privacy of communication and correspondence of the victim will be intruded, interfered with, and clearly violated. D. Section 19 of RA 10175 violates Section 21 of Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution o Blocking of computer data under Section 19 constitutes seizure that should first comply with the requirement of a judicial warrant upon the finding of a probable cause. It should not be effected upon prima facie determination by the DOJ. o Section 19 constitutes unreasonable seizure because it is primarily through judicial intervention that the seizure of such effects becomes reasonable as clearly seen from the Constitutional mandate that any search and/or seizure must be accomplished through probable cause. E. Section 5 of RA 10175 violates Section 1 of Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution Given the nature of how communications are made in the computer especially the most popular sites such as Facebook and Twitter, the application of Section 5 becomes unconstitutionally overbroad. Citing the analysis of petitioner Melencio Sta. Maria at Int eraksyon.com, petitioners argue that (i)n the context of specific provisions of the Cybercrime Law, therefore, sharers and retweeters, or even just likers, are abettors regardless of intent. F. Section 6 of RA 10175 violates Sections 1 on equal protection and 21 on double jeopardy of Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution Section 6increases the penalty to one degree provided under the Revised Penal Code and other special laws if committed through a computer. This is unconstitutional. It violates the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution. G. Section 7 of RA 10175 violates Sections 1 on equal protection and 21 on double jeopardy of Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution H. Section 4 (4) on libel of RA 10175 violates Section 1 and 4 of Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution While appearing to be a simple adoption of our 80-year-old law on libel under the Revised Penal Code into this new cyberspace law, its application indeed is unconstitutionally overbroad affecting as it does even publications previously made but still presently in cyberspace. Prayer: Petitioners pray that A. upon filing of their petition: 1. a Temporary Restraining Order be issued ordering the respondents, their representatives, and the government employees over whom they have control/supervision to desist from the implementation of RA 10175; and 2. a Resolution be issued setting Oral Arguments before the SC after due hearing and deliberation 1. Sections 4 (4), 5, 6, 7 and 19 of RA 10175 be declared null and void other reliefs as the Court may find equitable and proper
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G.R. No. 203453, National Union of Journalistsj of the Philippines (NUJP), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, Rowena Carranza Paraan, Melinda Quintos-De Jesus, Joseph Alwyn Alburo, Ariel Sebellino and The Petitioners in The e-Petition http://www.nupj.org/no-tora10175/ v. The Executive Secretary, The Secretary of Justice, The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, The Secretary of Budget and Management, The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, The Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center, and all Agencies and Instrumentalities of Government and All Persons Acting Under Their Instructions, Orders, Direction in Relation to the Implementationof Republic Act No. 10175
G.R. No. 203453 Petitioners:
National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP) a lateral guild committed to securing the interests of the Filipino working press Philippine Press Institute (PPI) a non-stock, non-profit private organization whose principal mandate is to defend press freedom and promote ethical standards for the professional development of the Filipino journalist Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) media advocacy group organized in 1989 by journalists and media practitioners for the purpose of defending and enhancing press freedom and free expression through the responsible and ethical practice of journalism Melinda Quintos-De Jesus taxpayer, citizen, journalist; Executive Director of the CMFR; contributor to a three-person blog, In Media Res Rowena Carranza Paraan citizen, taxpayer, journalist; Secretary General of the NUJP; netizen who stands to suffer immediate injury by reason of the operation of RA 10175 Ariel Sebellino citizen and taxpayer; Executive Director of PPI Alwyn Alburo citizen and taxpayer; program manager at GMA Network Inc.; vice chair of the NUJP Co-petitioners are those who have signed the e-Petition (collectively e-Petitioners), accessible athttp://www.nujp.org/no-to-ra10175
Respondents:
Executive Secretary cabinet secretary in charge of the Office of the President (OP), which has general power of supervision over all agencies and instrumentalities of the executive branch of the government Secretary of Justice tasked with enforcement of RA 10175; public office who has supervision and control over the National Prosecution Service and, in that capacity, has authority over the conduct of the criminal prosecutions mandated under the pertinent challenged section of the statute Secretary of the Interior and Local Government tasked with enforcing RA 10175; vested with power and authority to formulate implementing rules and regulations to effectively implement RA 10175, together with co-respondent Secretary of Justice Secretary of Budget and Management tasked with funding and disbursing the amount of PhP50M allocated by RA 10175 for the implementation of the statute Director General, Philippine National Police (PNP) tasked with enforcing RA 10175, particularly section 12 thereof on the real time collection of traffic data Director, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) - tasked with enforcing RA 10175, particularly section 12 thereof on the real time collection of traffic data Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center, through the Executive Director of the Information tasked with enforcing RA 10175, particularly the formulation of the national cybersecurity plan under sec. 26(a)
For purposes of this petition, all other agencies, instrumentalities and persons acting under instructions, directives and orders of respondents in relation to the enforcement and implementation of RA 10175 are also impleaded.
Nature of the Petition: Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction with an application for urgent relief by way of an Immediate Restraining Order filed with the Supreme Court to annul and/or restrain the implementation of specific portions of RA 10175 for being unconstitutional Grounds for the Petition: A. Sections 4 (c) (4), 5 (a), 6, and 7 violate freedom of expression o By punishing libel as a cybercrime simply because it is committed through a computer system, the clear intent of section 4 (c)(4) is to single out netizens in their chosen medium of expression. It is clearly a prior restraint that infringes on the freedom of expression guaranteed under Article III, section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. o Read together with section 4(c)(4), section 5(a) fails to define exactl y what acts are punished within the scope of the words abets or aids and, in the distinct context of social media and online journalism, operates as a chilling factor that undermines, restricts and abridges freedom of expression. o Re: section 6 - There is no rational basis for concluding that the use of information and communication technologies in relation to all felonies and crimes would constitute a circumstance so perverse as to convert an existing felony or crime into a separate offense altogether. o Section 7 allows a separate prosecution for cybercrime notwithstanding any prosecution for the same act punished under the Revised Penal Code or special penal laws o Respondent Secretary of Justice may, on the basis of a prima facie finding, order the take down of supposedly libelous computer data without benefit of a judicial determination or even a formal charge. Sections 4(c)(4), 5(a), and 6, which criminalize use of information and communications technologies (ICT), render RA 10175 a bill of attainder; further, sec. 20, which makes non compliance with orders of law enforcement authorities punishable criminally also renders the law a bill of attainder. o The practical effect is to render the use of ICT as an indefeasible special circumstan ce that not only converts a conventional offense into a cybercrime but also increases the penalty by a hundred percent. o Section 6 also fails to require mens rea when it considers the use of ICT as a special qualifying circumstance. Thus, the mere use -- even if innocent of ICT would suffice to make the offense a cybercrime. Section 7 violates the constitutional guarantee of protection against double jeopardy . o In providing for a prosecution for cybercrime without prejudice to any liability for violation of the Revised Penal Code or special laws, sections 7 and 6 violate the prohibition against double jeopardy Sections 6, 7 and 19 violate due process and equal protection o Sections 6 and 7 create a class of persons who: (a) are considered to have c ommitted criminal acts simply because they use ICT and are punished with a penalty double that of the same felony or crime committed without use of ICT, and (b) are not entitled to invoke the constitutional guarantee of double jeopardy. o The take down clause under section 19 violates equal protection because if treats persons who should be similarly situated differently; it also gives respondent Secretary of Justice the power to take down based simply on a prima facie finding and without benefit of a warrant. Sections 14, 15, 19, 24, and 26(a) violate separation of powers as judicial and legislative powers are unduly delegated to the Secretary of Justice, the PNP, and the NBI. o Congress, in enacting the Cybercrime Law, delegates substantial power to r espondents Secretary of Justice, PNP, and the NBI. The delegation is, however, unconstitutional as Congress has delegated powers that it itself does not possess. Section 12 violates the right of privacy of communication and correspondence as it allows the real-time collections of traffic data and effectively surveillance without a warrant. o The Cybercrime Law fails to provide for any indication that there is a compelling state interest in real time collection of data.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
The grant of power to law enforcement authorities under section 12 is also excessive and capricious. No parameters or boundaries are set, no durations prescribed nor standards given. It is a roving license given to PNP and NBI to intrude into a fundamental right that the Constitution guarantees and protects. G. The Cybercrime Law is effective even without the implementing rules and regulations; unless the implementation of the law is restrained, petitioners stand to suffer grave and irreparable injury with no speedy or adequate remedy at law.
Reliefs: Petitioners pray that judgment be rendered, thus: 1. 2. Declaring RA 10175 in its entirety null and void, for being unconstitutional; or o In the alternative, declaring sections 4(c)(4), 5, 6, 7, 12, 19, 21, 24, and 26(a) null and void, for being unconstitutional; Prohibiting all respondents and those who act under their instructions, orders and/or directives from implementing RA 10175 in its entirety, to include the formulation of Implementing Rules and Regulations under section 28; or o in the alternative, prohibiting all respondents and those who act under their instructions, orders and/or directives from implementing sections 4(c)(4), 5, 6, 7, 12, 19, 21, 24 and 26(a) and all provisions in RA 10175 that are inherently related to these sections; and All other just and equitable interim or permanent reliefs, as may be warranted
3.
GR. No. 203454, Castillo & Andres vs. Sec. of Justice

Petitioners institute the petition as taxpayers, stating that the Cybercrime act appropriates PhP 50M per year for the implementation of the law, securing funds from the national security, certainly affecting the Petitioners as taxpayers. They also file this petition as concerned citizens and regular internet and telecommunications end users. ISSUES 1. That section 4(c)(4), providing unconstitutional for the crime of Libel committed through computer system, is
The petitioners provide that the section is void for being vague, thus going against the due process clause. They reason out that the facial challenge should be allowed considering the transcendental importance of determining the Constitutionality of its provisions. The section provides that the unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, however, the petitioners argue that Article 355 only provides for an enumeration of ways through which libel can be committed, and does not contain any definition. Petitioners submit that the Act fails to define with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. 2. That Section 6, providing that crimes under the Revised Penal Code and special laws if committed by, through, and with the use of information and communication technologies are covered under the act, with a penalty one degree higher than that provided under the Penal Code or special law, is unconstitutional.
Petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between violators of the RPC and Special Laws that used ICTs and those that did not. Thus they conclude that the classification made by the law in increasing the penalty cannot be considered reasonable and state that the classification is invalid and in contravention with the Equal Protection Clause. 3. That section 12 of the Cybercrime act, authorizing enforcement authorities, with due cause, to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system, is unconstitutional for being violative of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure; right to freedom of speech; and the right to privacy.
Petitioners argue that the above provision is unconstitutional for being vague as it grants any and all law enforcement authorities unbridled power to collect or record data in real-time at any time and for any reason without the necessity or securing a court order or any other order for that matter. Petitioners state that all such law enforcement authorities would need is due cause not probable cause nor prima facie evidence. Even the term due cause is likewise vague, petitioners submit. The grant of unbridled discretion to law enforcement authorities to conduct real -time recording and monitoring of private data is an arbitrary flexing of government muscle, which, then creates a chilling effect on freedom of speech since communications, which are expected to be private, can now be subject to surveillance without the benefit of a court order, petitioners provide. The petitioners also argue that the provision goes against the right to privacy, and since the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, it is the burden of government to show that regulation is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. The above section also violates both Sec. 2 and 3, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution since (1) it gives the law enforcement authorities the power to search privately owned computer data and computer systems without any court order or warrant, and (2) it gives law enforcement authorities the power to intrude into a
persons privacy without any court order or any compelling state interest narrowly drawn by the said law, the petitioners argue. 4. That section 19, authorizing DOJ to issue an order to restrict or block access to computer data when there is a prima facie finding of a violation of the Act, is unconstitutional for being violative of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and right to free speech.
Petitioners submit that the DOJ can exercise its power under section 19 based merely on its own prima facie finding and such an exercise is already constitutive of subsequent punishment of speech with the benefit of a court judgment or conviction. Furthermore, under Sec. 19, the DOJ can issue such orders which will be effective for an indefinite period of time. Petitioners also state that computer data is property both in the hands of the service providers and the end users and the taking away or restriction to any access to such property without any warrant constitutes unreasonable deprivation or seizure of property. Petitioners submit that, using the balancing of interest test, the subsequent punishment of speech cannot be countenanced. In this case, clashing are the right to speech on one hand and the regulation of a particular conduct in the interest of public order. It is submitted that the freedom of speech cannot be trampled upon by Sec. 19 of the Cybercrime Act. The evils sought to be addressed by Sectiona 19, namely the taking down of seemingly illegal and/or libelous data, are already addressed by existing laws on libel and other crimes, and the remedy of injunctive relief. Hence, the subsequent punishment of speech as condoned under Sec. 19 of the Cybercrime Act is unnecessary piece of legislation, and makes a mockery of the constitutionally protected right to free speech. PRAYER Declare as VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 4(c)4, 6, 12, and 19 of Republic Act No. 1017 5.
Cruz, et al. v. Aquino, et al. G.R. No. 203469

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction Statement of Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. On June 04 2012, respondent House of Representatives passed the Cybercrime Prevention Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2796 and Hose Bill No. 5808. On 05 June 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines passed the Cybercrime Prevention Act, which is, as previously stated, a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2796 and House Bill No. 5808. On 12 September 2012, respondent Aquino signed the Cybercrime Prevention Act into law. On 18 September 2012, the Cybercrime Prevention Act was published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. o Section 31 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provides that said law shall take effect (15) days after the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in last two (2) newspapers of general circulation. o Therefore, the Cybercrime Prevention Act took effect on 03 October 2012. Considering that the foregoing facts are matters of public knowledge, as well as official acts, petitioners submit that the same should be given judicial notice by the Honorable Court, pursuant to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
5.
Assailed provisions of the Republic Act No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. SECTION 4(c)(4) separately criminalizing acts of libel, as defined under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, that are committed through a computer system or any other similar means that may be devised in the future (Cyber Libel); SECTION 5 criminalizing acts that aid or abet the commission of any offense punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, as well as the attempt to commit the same, including Section 4(c)(4) on Cyber Libel; SECTION 6 imposing a higher penalty for the commission of any offense punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, i.e., one (1) degree higher than that provided under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws; SECTION 7 providing that a prosecution under the Cybercrime Prevention Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws; SECTION 12 authorizing any and all law enforcement authorities, with due cause, to collect and/or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time without prior judicial warrant, sanction and/or approval; and SECTION 19 authorizing the Department of Justice (DOJ) to restrict and/or block access to c omputer data that are prima facie found to be violative of the provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act. The other provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act that flow from the above assailed provisions that authorize the disbursement of public funds for the implementation of the law.
Discussion: Section 12 I. Section 12 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act is patently unconstitutional considering that it violates an individuals right to privacy and the privacy of communication and correspondence. o There is search and seizure before a determination of probable cause o Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a persons right to be let alone or the right to determine what, how much, to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed. (Miguel v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704 (2006)) C. An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy of personal electronic data, as well as communications and correspondence.
Courts considering the issue have attempted to analogize computers to other items more commonly seen in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Individuals expectations of privacy in computers have been likened to their expectations of privacy i n a suitcase or briefcase. (United States v. Aaron, 33 Fed. Appx. 180, 184 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished). Password-protected files have been compared to a locked footlocker inside the bedroom. (Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F3d 391, 403 (4th Cir.2001). The Act allows law enforcement authorities to monitor and record traffic data associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system. Traffic Data is defined under Section 12 as supposedly limiting itself to non -content information yet it does not limit the same to the enumeration contained therein. An individual loses his reasonable expectation of privacy only when there is a voluntary act of disclosing the same. Under the Act, even in the event that no such voluntary act exists, law enforcement authorities are granted unbridled discretion to monitor and record traffic data despite the lack relinquishment of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy over the same. Section 12 states that the content and identity of the pa rticipants to the intercepted traffic data shall neither be monitored nor recorded. Nevertheless, traffic data encompasses the origin, destination route, time, date, size, duration, or type of data. Once such data is acquired, it becomes easy for law enforcement authorities to verify identities through other methods. The acquisition of such other data is the critical jump-off point for violations of an individuals right to privacy. Section 12 of the Act allows the collection or recording of traffic data connected to specified communications. No definition is provided with respect to the scope of specified communications or the identity of the parties which they cannot substantiate, then the gathering of data relating to the origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of such data would be in the nature of a fishing expedition which cannot be countenanced by the Honorable Court. (Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211(2010))
II.
Majority of the users of electronic media, such as internet, are unaware that their messages or transactions contain traffic data, which under the Section 12, may be monitored by law enforcement authorities under convenient justification of due cause... There being no relinquishment of the reasonable exp ectation of privacy over the same, traffic data cannot be subjected to seizure by law enforcement authorities under the flimsy excuse of due cause as an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy over the same. D. Section 12 constitutes an unreasonable government intrusion as it lacks safeguards against possible abuses by possessors of acquired data. Under Section 12, law enforcement authorities are given the unrestrained power to secure data for whatever purpose they may deem fit. The Act is bereft of safeguards to control the access and handling of such data, nor does it provide measures against possible leakage of information. E. Section 12 constitutes an unreasonable government intrusion as it renders existing safeguards against invasion of privacy, as well as communications and correspondence, nugatory. Zones of privacy are recognized and protrected in our laws. ( Marquez v. Desierto, 359 SCRA 772 (2001)) The Act renders the remedy of the Writ of Habeas Data nugatory and irrelevant. The writ seeks to prevent the unwarranted intrusion of public officials, such as law enforcement authorities, into ones private information, yet Section 12 allows law enforcement authorities to collect and monitor traffic data on the flimsy justification of due cause. Section 12 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act is patently unconstitutional considering that it violates an individuals right to unreasonable searches and seizures. 0. Section 12 allows law enforcement authorities to collect or record an individuals traf fic data upon the existence of due cause. However, the terms collect and record are, in reality, euphemisms for seizure without due process of law. 1. Neither the Act nor other pertinent laws define due cause. Thus, the absence of standard of due cause allows law enforcement authorities to determine for themselves whether or not the recording or collecting of data is necessary or lawful. Moreover, the possibility exists that the law enforcement authorities may set a standard far below the standard of probable cause for the seizure of data under Section 12.
2.
Section 12 allows the real-time monitoring and seizure of traffic data. In light of the unchecked discretion granted to law enforcement authorities to determine for themselves whether there exists a justification for resort to Section 12, it opens the possibility to 24/7 surveillance by law enforcement authorities without probable cause as justification for the same.
Section 19 I. Section 19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act is null and void for being unconstitutional considering that: A. Section 19 is violative of the due process clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution for failing to provide any procedural safeguards in its implementation and/or enforcement. The Act does not provide any procedural rules and standards on how Section 19 shall be enforced, much less any procedure as to how persons affected or aggrieved by the implementation and/or enforcement may be heard in their defense. This will simply leave DOJ with unbridled discretion to issue orders restricting and/or blocking access to computer data that allegedly are prima facie violation of the Act, without, however, giving the owners of said targeted computer data should not be restricted and/or blocked. The quantum of evidence required under Section 19 to set into motion the authority given to DOJ to issue restricting and/or blocking access to computer data is only the very low standard of prima facie evidence...Hence, with such low degree of evidence required, coupled with the obvious dearth of procedures in the Act on how persons affected or aggrieved by its implementation could contest or contradict such prima facie evidence, there is clearly no doubt that the DOJ has now been given omnipotent power in issuing orders restricting and/or blocking access to computer data. In this regard, the DOJ can virtually bring down any website it deems unacceptable under allencompassing pretense of prima facie evidence, without regard as to whether the aggrieved party has been able, much less given a real opportunity, to present his side and defend himself. B. Section 19 is violative of the right of citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures, as provided under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. Search and seizure warrants may only be issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 19 authorizes the DOJ to issue an order to restrict and/or block access to computer data that are prima facie in violation of the same law. C. Section 19 is violative of the right of the people to freedom of speech, as provided under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. Section 19 is a prior restraint, in the form of subsequent punishment, i.e., the DOJs issuance of orders restricting or blocking access to computer data. Sec. 19 is a Cyber Gag Rule that cuts off individuals from one another. It silences the originator of the communication and prevents the intended recipients from hearing the message, without regard for its legitimacy and protected nature under the Constitution.
Sections 4(c)4, 5, 6 and 7 I. Sections 4(c)4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act are null and void for being unconstitutional considering that said provisions are violative of the due process clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution and of the free speech clause under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. A. Section 4(c)4 broadens the definition of libel provided in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Section4(c)4 adds the use of computer system or any other similar means that may be devised in the future as means of committing the crime of libel. The elements of libel cannot find application in the computer realm in the absence of specific definitions to govern the same. Section 4(c)4 fails to mention how the person committing Cyber Libel can be identified... Article 60 of the Revised Penal Code provides who are the persons liable for libel but the same definition cannot be simply adopted and applied to the cyber world for the obvious reason that people can simply use fake names or access computers in common libraries or computer shops. Simply tracing the IP address and imputing the crime to the owner of the computer system used will not suffice. It is elementary that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed.
B.
C.
Section 5 suffers from defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Section 5 is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. ( Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371 (2004)) Double jeopardy is evident in Sections 6 and 7. A crime as defined by the Revised Penal Code can be prosecuted separately under Section 6. A prosecution under the Act is without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal code. What is being punished under Section 7, in relation to Section 6, of the Act is the exact act punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The Act merely adopts and incorporates all elements of the felonies under the Revised Penal Code and other special laws and sanctions, encourages even, a separate and distinct prosecution under the Act for the same offense.
Section 6 I. Section 6 is null and void for being unconstitutional considering that it is violative of the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. o The import of Section 6 is that all the crimes punishable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, such as libel, if committed through the use of a computer system or other similar means, the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher. Otherwise stated, by committing the same crime, but using a different means specifically, computer systems, the penalty is harsher.
Reliefs sought: 1. 2. The instant petition be given due course. Upon the filing of the instant petition, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction beissued restraining/enjoining respondents, and/or anybody acting in their behalf and/or under their direction, from implementing and/or enforcing the Assailed Provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Acti.e., Sections 4(c)4, 5, 6, 7, 12 and 19, as well as all other provisions that flow therefrom, including the provisions that authorize the disbursement of public funds for the implementation of the law- including any and all actions undertaken under authority of or pursuant thereto. The instant petition be set for Oral Arguments as the Honorable Court may deem proper. Upon due consideration on the merits ,that: a. The assailed provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act be declared null and void for being unconstitutional; and b. The respondents, and/or anybody acting in their behalf and/or under their direction, be permanently enjoined from implementing the assailed provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act, including any and all actions undertaken under authority of or pursuant thereto. Other reliefs just and equitable.
3. 4.
5.
GR No. 203501, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. Aquino III, et al.

Nature: Petition for Prohibition to prohibit and enjoin respondent members of the Executive Department from implementing various provisions of RA 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. Facts: This petition was filed on October 5, 2012 by the Philippine Bar Association, Inc. (PBA), the oldest voluntary organization of lawyers in the country, represented by its immediate past President, Ronald Oliver Solis, and its Trustee and Chairperson of its Committee on Public Issues, Rodel A. Cruz, in defense of the Rule of Law and the rights of individuals against the excesses of State Power. PBA claims it has a legal interest in filing the petition as its membership is made up of lawyers who rely on information and communication technology (ICT) in their privileged communication with their clients as well as with each other through the PBA website and thus are in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the implementation of the assailed provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. Further, PBA grounds its legal standing on its members being taxpayers and concerned citizens and the transcendental and serious constitutional issues raised in its petition. Issues: Whether the following provisions of RA 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, violate the Constitution a. b. c. Sec. 4 (c) (4) referring to the unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future; the Sec. 5 referring to other offenses, i.e., willfully abetting or aiding in commission of any of the offenses enumerated under the law (a) and/or the attempt to commit any of the said offenses (b); Sec. 6 referring to crimes defined crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies where the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be; Sec. 7 referring to the prosecution of offenses under the law without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws; Sec. 12 referring to the authorization given to law enforcement authorities, with due cause, to collect and/or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time without prior judicial warrant, sanction and/or approval; and Sec. 19 referring to the restricting or blocking access by the Department of Justice (DOJ) upon finding that a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of the law
d. e. f.
Arguments: A. Secs. 4 (c) 4 and 5 violate the constitutional rights to due process as well as freedom of speech and of expression and of the press. 1. The inclusion in sec. 4 (c) 4 of the phrase use of computer systems as a means of committing libel is vague, overbroad, and lacks the necessary standards for obedience by the citizenry and enforcement by the State. This clearly results in a chilling effect on netizens and amounts to prior restraint of protected speech. o N.B.: Chilling effect in constitutional law refers to the inhibition or discouragement of the legitimate exercise of a constitutional right by the potential or threatened prosecution under, or application of, a law or sanction. Prior restraint has been defined as an official governmental restriction on any form of expression in advance of actual dissemination. 2. Further, the continuation in sec. 4 (c) 4 of the phrase or any other similar means which may be devised in the future is also vague.
3.
The which may be devised in the future virtually makes the provision an ex post facto law. N.B.: An ex post facto law makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal and punishes such an action.
o
4.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
[A]iding or abetting in sec. 5(a) is nothing more than a legal conclusion of the acts of aiding or abetting and does not offer a definition of the same. 5. Sec. 5 (b) also fails to define what constitutes an attempt to commit a cybercrime. 6. Even using definitions under existing laws of aiding or abetting or attempt, the very nature of the online environment requires a reasonable technical definition. 7. Vagueness caused by lack of concrete definitions under sec. 5 and constitutional defects of other questionable provisions of the Cybercrime Law discussed in the petition cannot simply be cured by mere issuances of implementing rules and regulations that follow no express standards set in the statute itself. Sec. 6 violates the Equal Protection Clause guaranteed in Art. III, sec. 1 of the Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike. 4. Sec. 6, amounting to a highly aggravating circumstance, inexplicably discriminates against netizens, a class of citizens who inhabit cyberspace. 5. This classification is not germane to the purpose of the law which is to protect and safeguard the integrity of the computer and communications system and to allow free, easy, and intelligible access to information through information communication technology (ICT). Sec. 7, together with sec. 6, violates the rule on double jeopardy guaranteed in Art. III, sec. 21 of the Constitution. Such right protects against a second or later prosecution for the same offense. 0. Either an individual suffers an aggravating circumstance due to the use of ICT in the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws OR is prosecuted for a crime clearly defined under the Cybercrime Law. Sec. 12 violates an individuals right to privacy of communication. 0. It allows a warrantless search and seizure of data involved in the transmission of information 1. Traffic data to be gathered under sec. 12 is not innocent or harmless information. 2. Sec. 12 lacks adequate standards for law enforcement agencies with respect to the gathering and collection of data. Due cause that would justify the seizure of traffic data by law enforcement agencies is not defined. 3. There is a dearth of safeguards against potential abuse by law enforcement agencies. 4. Where fundamental right to privacy is in danger of being violated, government must show a compelling state interest. In this case, sec. 12 is at odds with sec. 2 which spoke of the need to protect and safeguard the integrity of the integrity of computer, computer and communications systems, networks, and databases, and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and data stored therein, from all forms of misuse, abuse, and illegal access by making punishable under the law such conduct or conducts. Sec. 12 violates an individuals right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 0. It replaces the requirement of judicial probable cause determination with a unilateral executive determination of due cause. 1. It allows the abhorrent situation of search and seizure first; judicial warrant to follow. 2. It amounts to a general warrant in favor of law enforcement agencies. 3. Whatever consent may be given to the service provider cannot be construed as a waiver against obtrusive searches. 4. It contains no procedure to ensure effective separation of traffic from non-traffic data. Sec. 19 violates the right to due process, against unlawful search and seizure, freedom of speech and of expression. 0. It does not afford a citizen opportunity to rebut the DOJs finding, giving the latter sole and unfettered discretion. 1. It amounts to a warrantless seizure of private property.
Prayer 1. 2. 3. Giving of due course to the petition, TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents from implementing /enforcing sec. 4 (c) (4), 5, 6, 7,12, and 19, after due consideration on the merits, questioned provisions be declared null and void for being unconstitutional,
4. 5.
respondents be permanently enjoined from implementing /enforcing sec. 4 (c) (4), 5, 6, 7,12, and 19, and other just and equitable relief.
Colmenares v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 203509

FACTS: Neri Colmenares, the petitioner, is a member of the House of Representatives representing the partylist Bayan Muna. He files this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (RA 10175) as a citizen, taxpayer, and Member of the House of Representatives since Section 27 of the law provides that P50,000,000.00 shall be appropriated annually for the implementation of this Act. Moreover, Colmenares avers that the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 is a matter of transcendental importance and paramount interest. Respondent is Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, the alter ego of the President of the Philippines and a public officer tasked with the enforcement and implementation of this Act. Colmenares attacks Sections 4(C)(4), 5(a), 5(b), 6, 7, 8 par. 7, 11-13, 15, 17, and 19-22 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as unconstitutional alleging they violate freedom of expression, due process, equal protection, the right to privacy and correspondence, and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. ARGUMENTS: A. A facial reading of the statute will lead the Honorable Court to conclude that the statute does not incorporate proportionality analysis and probability analysis that should be deployed in free speech. o As such, the law will reduce the sum total of internet speech and opinion among internet users. o RA 10175 does not incorporate possible defenses to the charge of e-libel as part of the statutory text, effectively reversing the presumption of innocence to a presumption of guilt. o On the face of the Cybercrime Statute, no special conditions or danger exists, which requires a protective measure or restriction on electronic speech. o The Cybercrime Statute fails the sufficiency of standards test and the completeness test as it gives undue delegation of too wide a legislative and policy making function to both the trier of fact and the law enforcer. o The Cybercrime Statute fails to incorporate reasonably sufficient standards that would aid the trier of fact to distinguish between e-speech in ordinary times and places and e-speech made in extraordinary times and places. o Without manageable standards set forth in the Cybercrime Law in the name of proportionality and probability analysis, provisions on e-libel will operate as essentially open-ended restrictions of expression. Since the interpretation of e-libel provisions is in danger of open-ended interpretation by the trier of fact or law enforcer, there can be no avoidance to the result that e-libel will allow for roving commissions if not roving warrants in implementation. o No sufficient standard on whether trier of fact should consider joint, cumulative action among netizens in dynamic social media, particularly the communicative impact of the speakers message. Statute is contrary to equal protection, unduly delegates legislative and policy making functions, violates the right of privacy of communication and correspondence, is void for being vague and overbreadth thereby violating the basic constitutional requirements for a valid law. o RA 10175 inserts a proviso under Section 6, providing that the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code and special laws, that was not contained in the bills approved on this reading by both Houses of Congress. o This proviso violates the equal protection doctrine as it unjustly discriminates against cyberspace users by providing a penalty higher for acts committed thru the internet compared to acts committed without the use of internet. o RA 10175 also inserted Section 19 a proviso, providing that when computer data is prima faciefound to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data, that was not contained in the bills approved on this reading by both Houses of Congress. o This proviso violates due process and the equal protection doctrine as there is no requirement that an appropriate information be filed in court from such prima facie finding, this the governments restriction of access has no limitation in scope and duration.
B.
C.
PRAYER:
1. 2. 3.
4.
Issue a TRO to enjoin Respondent from implementing the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 pending resolution of this case; Set the case for oral argument; Declare certain provision of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, particularly Sections 4(C)(4), 5(a), 5(b), 6, 7, 8 par. 7, 11-13, 15, 17, and 19-22, null and void for being unconstitutional as they violate freedom of expression, due process, equal protection, the right to privacy and correspondence, and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and Issue other reliefs deemed just and equitable.
NPC v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203515

FACTS: The National Press Club (NPC), as represented by Benny D. Antiporda, in his capacity as President of NPC and in his personal capacity as a taxpayer, journalist, and publisher of Remate, Ang Diaryo ng Masa tabloid and online newspaper, files a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure against the Office of the President, as represented by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, alongside government agencies tasked with the implementation of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (RA 10175), namely, the Department of Justice (DOJ), The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). This petition seeks to declare Sections 4 (c) 4, 5 (a), 6, and 7 of RA 10175 unconstitutional on the basis of transcendental importance for being antithetical, inimical, irreconcilable, and violative of the peoples constitutionally enshrined rights to freedom of expression, freedom of speech, press freedom, due process, and equal protection of the law and against double jeopardy. ARGUMENTS: 1. Sections 4 (c) 4 and Section 5 (a) are unconstitutional for being vague and objectionably broad. o It fails to define, describe, and enumerate with specificity the persons who will be held criminally responsible for the commission of the cyber offense and how and when these persons become liable. o It fails to give a specific standard as well as define who, when and how a particula r cyberspace participant will be liable for online libel. o Reference is made only to Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and does not make reference to Article 354 and 361 which provides for the defenses and exceptions of libel. o Making e-libel mala prohibita is offensive to equal protection because there is no valid and substantial distinction between the written publication and online publication that would justify such a distinction more particularly as to the nature of the crime. o Individuals will suppress their expressions and statements through cyberspace pursuant to the free exercise of their right to freedom of speech, of expression and of the press lest they run the risk of being prosecuted for violations of RA 10175 and RPC. o There is no way libel can be committed online because everybody has the readily available right and opportunity to reply when a person is affected by a particular issue or criticism. Section 6 is unconstitutional because it imposes a higher penalty (one degree) than that provided in the RPC and special laws. o The attempt of the legislature to distinguish online libel from traditional libel in the RPC for the purpose of imposing a much higher penalty on online publications/blogs cannot be considered as a substantial distinction. o The distinction is likewise not germane to the purpose of the law, which is to safeguard the integrity of computers, computer and communication system, networks and database, and the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and data stored therein from all forms of misuse, abuse, and illegal access by making punishable under the law such conduct/s. Section 7 is unconstitutional since it states that a prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision in the RPC, as amended, or special law, which is contrary to the rule against double jeopardy. o Artcila III, Section 21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
2.
3.
PRAYER: 1. 2. 3. Declare Sections 4 (c) 4, 5 (a), 6, and 7 of RA 10175 unconstitutional as they offend the fundamental freedoms of speech, expression, the press, right to due process of law and equal protection of the law and the right against double jeopardy; Prevent respondents and all other government agencies with power to implement the law from implementing the unconstitutional provisions of the law; Issue a TRO and/or prohibitory injunction prohibiting respondents from implementing the questioned provisions of the law; and
4.
Issue other reliefs deemed just and equitable under the premises.
PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, ET AL. vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL., G.R. No. 203518
FACTS: Petitioners are members of an alliance composed of users of the internet. They allege standing based on direct interest in the case, being directly affected by the provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act (Act) or Republic Act No. 10175, filing suit in their individual capacities and as members of the Philippine Internet Freedom Alliance. Petitioners also claim taxpayer standing in relation to the annual appropriation of Fifty Million Pesos authorized under the law for the operation of the Cybercrime Prevention Act. They also claim that the issues presented are of transcendental importance and represent matters of paramount public interest because they affect fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically: the abridgment of the freedom of speech, expression and of the press; the conduct of unreasonable searches and seizures; the violation of the right to privacy and the right to privacy of communication and correspondence; the violation of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws and the guarantee against the passage of ex post facto laws. Petitioners finally claim that the Act violates public international law. ISSUES/ARGUMENTS PRESENTED I. The Act 1. 2. 3. is an undue abridgment of the freedom of speech, expression and of the press. It infringes on freedom of speech. It is constitutionally infirm on its face for being vague and overbroad. It contradicts the constitutional mandate for balanced flow of information under the policy respecting freedom of speech and of the press.
o
Primary arguments presented: While the Act is a penal statute, it purports to regulate expression and speech and is thus susceptible to a facial challenge. o The provisions of the Act that define the penal offenses (such as those pertaining to cybersex and cyberlibel) are vague and overbroad; they include legitimate exercise of free speech and expression. o The upgrading of the penalty for all crimes is an omnibus amendment not covered by the title and scope of the bill and was not covered by the plenary debates in Congress, much less discussed in public hearings. Sec. 6 of the Act, which upgrades the penalty for all crimes committed by the use of information and communication technologies, is not a definition of a cybercrime, which takes it out of the title of the bill, but the creation of an aggravating circumstance. The Act authorizes government to conduct unreasonable searches and seizures. 0. Sec. 12 grants government the power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance. 1. Sec. 19 authorizes government to make an invalid seizure of ones data.
II.
o
Primary arguments presented: Section 12, which uses the standard of due cause for law enforcement au thorities to conduct real-time collection of traffic data, reduces the standard required by the Constitution, which is probable cause; moreover, under the Act, it is law enforcement officers, not the courts, who will determine due cause. o Section 19 is invalid because it authorizes the Department of Justice, by mere prima facieevidence, to issue an order to restrict or block access to computer data without a court order. The Act further authorizes the gathering, mining and harvesting of online data, and continuous electronic surveillance without the prior determination of probable cause or the use of a search warrant or court order. The Act violates the constitutional right to privacy and the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. 0. Sec. 12 negates the reasonable expectation of privacy that internet users rely on by authorizing law enforcement authorities to collect traffic data based on their own determination of just cause. 1. Secs. 12 and 19 violate the right to privacy of communication and correspondence, as both are impermissible intrusions into the exercise of the right.
III.
o
Primary arguments presented: Petitioners, as citizens, have a reasonable expectation of privacy while using their computers and mobile devices and navigating on the internet in their private homes; they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy when accessing web sites that limit entry through the use of coded passwords. The collection of traffic data in real time by law enforcement authorities cannot be allowed because personal data cannot simply be recorded or collected by the authorities at their whim without proper authorization or permission from the court or internet user. o Section 12, which allows the government to obtain the non-content data of any person online, and section 19, which allows the government to shut down any communications device, both without prior notice and upon a showing only of due cause, constitute impermissible intrusions into the right of privacy of communication and correspondence. The Act is contrary to the guarantee of equal protection under the law.
IV.
o
Primary arguments presented: There are no substantial distinctions between classes made by the Act; there is no substantial distinction between speech made with the use of a computer and other forms of communications media, especially mass media. o The Act fails to distinguish between the victim and the human trafficker; between indecent and obscene content in a medium, regardless of its accessibility to children; it does not recognize the protection for consensual activities in the bedroom between adults. o The Act does not distinguish between unsolicited commercial communication and that done with other communication systems; it does not distinguish between defamatory statements made with adequate defenses under the Revised Penal Code and defamatory statements per se, treating all defamatory statements as penal, leaving no defense therefor, as all that is incorporated is the definition of libel. o There is no substantial distinction between a crime punishable by special laws committed through the use of computers and a crime that is committed without computers. o The Act does not apply equally to all members of the same class. The Act violates the countrys obligations under public international law.
V.
o
Primary arguments presented: The freedom of the internet is a recognized human right encompassing freedom of opinion and expression in relation to the freedom of communication provision in the Constitution. The Act breaches the principles of customary and conventional international law by imposing prior restraint and subsequent punishment in exercising the right of free expression over the internet. o The Human Rights Council of the United Nations General Assembly has passed Resol ution No. A/HRC/20/L.13 recognizing the freedom of expression on the internet as a basic human right. o The same rights that people have offline must also be protected online. The Act operates as an ex post facto law.
VI.
o o
Primary arguments presented: Digital content or stored data uploaded before the effectivity of the Act may be retroactively considered due to its online presence at the time the law took effect. A person who has posted online content before October 3, 2012 may be held criminally liable if he does not remove such data from the internet.
RELIEFS: Petitioners pray for a Status Quo Ante Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the respondents directing the responsible officers of government to refrain from implementing the Act. They further pray that the Petition be given due course and that judgment be rendered commanding that respondents desist from implementing the Act and that, thereafter, judgment be further rendered nullifying the Act in its entirety for being unconstitutional.
GR No. 203306, Alab ng Mamamahayag et. al. vs. Office of the President, Senate of the Philippines, and House of Representatives
Petitioners are composed of the following: 1. 2. 3. Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM), a group which was organized to represent sectors who believe in Genuine Free Press as the only way to make government better and transparent and in Jury System as the only means to attain true justice by the people, for the people, and of the people. Hukuman ng Mamamayan Movement Inc. (HMMI), another group which advocates Jury System as the only means to attain true justice by the people, for the people, and of the people. Journalists, columnists, and lawyers In their individual capacities.
Petitioners believe that the petition is transcendental because subject matterslibel online, unsolicited advertisement and the sweeping provision upgrading the penalties for crimes under the Revised Penal Code and special penal laws committed by the use of internetwill (a)ffect the lives of the Filipinos, young and old, minor and adults, journalists or otherwise, professionals and non-professionals, schoolchildren and out-of-school youths, oversees Filipino and those at home, natural and juridical persons, software developers or just plain hobbyists, the generation today and of the future. ISSUES 1. That RA 10175 is unconstitutional because the law infringes fundamental rights
ALAM submits that the rights involved are fundamental: the right to expression , of speech, and of the press and the right to liberty that is affected when persons are imprisoned for crimes. ALAM explains that the State has the burden that RA 10175 passes the two test under the strict scrutiny rule. No less than the Constitution proscribes the making of any Law abridging the freedom of expression, of speech, and of the press. By shallow analysis and comparison, it is very clear to see that those objectives are NOT compelling to sacrifice the peoples entitlements to freedom of expression, of speech, and of the press and the right to liberty, ALAM concludes. 2. That Section 3(c)(3), which treats as a cybercrime the transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services is unconstitutional.
ALAM claims that unsolicited advertisement is a form of expression, can never cause the efficiency of the computer to diminish. The law would thus be in violation of the due process clause because there is clearly no compelling interest also to regulate unsolicited advertisement, defined as a crime under Section(c)(3) of RA 10175, and even if unsolicited advertisement were to be deemed not a fundamental right, ALAM claims that the law needs to show a rational basis to regulate the same, 3. That section 6, a provision imposing a penalty one degree higher for crimes penalized by the revised penal code and special laws, if committed with the use of information and communication technology, is unconstitutional
ALAM claims that in increasing the penalty for such crimes, strict scrutiny still applies and this requires proof from the State to say there is clear-and-present danger or that it is favored by the balancing of interest to justify it to regulate liberty and other fundamental rights involved. ALAM also claims that there is no lawful end in it to justify regulating all crimes found in RPC and special laws, RA 10175 is very vague yet very sweeping in providing for Section 6. 4. That RA 10175 violates the equal protection clause
ALAM claims that there is no reasonable or valid basis or substantial distinction to classify users posting scathing imputations, opinions or facts, as separate and distinct from those imputations published in newspapers and broadcast on radios and televisions, including those caused by reporters, journalists, editors, publishers, broadcasters. by being sweeping, too general and overreaching, there is also no valid classification of online users for the purpose of applying the laws on crimes listed in RPC and special penal laws, ALAM stated. PRAYER ALAM respectfully prays that the Supreme Court issue a Temporary Restraining Order and writ of prohibition to enjoin the respondents from executing or implementing the assailed Act.
Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335

FACTS: Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 for violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act. Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, the Executive Director of the Information Communications Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. ISSUES/GROUNDS: 1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal protection, privacy of communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative authority and the right against unreasonable searches and seizure; o Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws are in violation of the petitioners right against Double Jeopardy; o Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP with due cause to engage in real time collection of traffic data without the benefit of the intervention of a judge, violates the Petitioners Constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure as well as the right to the privacy of communications; o Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of DOJ to block or restrict access to any content upon a prima facie finding that the same violates the law, contains an undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial power of the judiciary, and violates the Petitioners Constitutionally-protected right to due process and freedom of expression; and o Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law increased the penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years, infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order directed at service providers to block access to the said material without the benefit of a trial or a conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. The increased penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly libelous materials can be removed from access, work together as a chilling effect upon protected speech. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this Petition is therefore cognizable by the SCs judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
2.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS: 1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech: o imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based libel; single act of online libel will result in two convictions penalized separately under the RP and the Cybercrime Act; o online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the imprisonment of the accused and for a much longer period. Such changes will result in a chilling effect upon the freedom of speech; o with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente Sotto IIIs earlier threat to criminally prosecute all bloggers and internet users who were critical of his alleged plagiarism of online materials for use in his speech against the Reproductive Health Bill became real; threat of criminal prosecution under RA 10175 will work to preclude people such as Petitioners from posting social commentaries online, thus creating a chilling effect upon the freedom of expression;
2.
3.
4.
gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and block access to content whether authored by private citizens or the organized press sans any hearing of any kind but merely upon a mere prima facie showing that a particular Internet article constitutes online libel; o respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will fare under strict scrutiny Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution: o Persons who commit crimes using information and communication technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of being imprisoned more than double the imprisonment laid down in the RPC or special law, simply by the passage of the Cybercrime Act; o the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the Act are absolutely identical to the crimes defined in the RPC and special laws which raises the possibility that an accused will be punished twice for the same offense in violation of the Constitution; o Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes by, through or with the use of ICTs in violation of the equal protection clause The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy and the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure: o No compelling state interest that justifies real time collection of data; the authority vested on the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation to collect data is not bounded by any reasonable standard except due cause which presumably, the PNP and NBI will determine for itself; o While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Human Security Act, are protected by the intervention of the Court of Appeals before surveillance operations are conducted, the privacy of all citizens may be infringed without judicial participation in the Cybercrime Act; o Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the incursion into the right to privacy; o No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can lawfully collect traffic data at all times without interruption; o No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited incursion into the privacy of citizens The Respondent DOJ Secretarys Take Down Authority under Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and is an Undue Delegation of Legislative Authority o The DOJ Secretarys overwhelming powers to order the restriction or blocking of access to certain content upon a mere prima facie finding without any need for a judicial determination is in clear violation of petitioners Constitutionally protected right to due process; o The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ Secretary will be judge, jury and executioner of all cybercrime-related complaints; o To consider that all penal provisions in all specials laws are cybercrimes under Section 6, it follows that: 1. Complaints filed by intellectual property rights owners may be acted upon the Respondent DOJ Secretary to block access to websites and content upon a mere prima facie showing of an infringement; 2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com) offering goods on retail to Philippine citizens may be blocked for violating the Retail Trade Law; 3. Foreign service providers such as Skype may be blocked from offering voice services without securing a license from the National Telecommunications Communication; 4. YouTube video may be blocked for presumably violating the IP Code. o The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests laid down by the Court in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (GR No. 166715) to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test 1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Acts declaration of policy does it lay down the legislative policy with respect to the blocking of content. No limits upon the takedown power of the respondent DOJ Secretary; 2. Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent the DOJ Secretary from exercising infinite discretion and becoming the supreme authority in the Philippine Internet landscape.
PRAYER: 1. 2. 3. 4. Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; and Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises.

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