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Greece (prehistory and history)

Stone Age Bronze age Archaic, Classical, Hellenistic Roman Greece (prehistory and history) Stone Age

Stone Age The stone age is divided into the palaeolithic (to c.9000 BC), mesolithic (c.90007000 BC) and neolithic (7th4th millennia BC); metallurgy began during the neolithic, before the conventional neolithic bronze age transition. Classical Greece was an essentially agricultural society and as such can trace its origins back to the first farming communities in Greece in the early neolithic (7th millennium BC). Some at least of the domestic livestock and crop species were introduced from the near east, but Greece had long been occupied by palaeolithic and mesolithic gatherer-hunters (e.g. at Franchthi cave, Argolid). It is unclear whether the first farmers were of indigenous, immigrant or mixed stock. Known early farming settlements (e.g. Argissa) are heavily concentrated in the fertile lowlands of the eastern mainland, particularly in Thessaly. The southern mainland and smaller Aegean islands, the heartland of both bronze age palatial civilization and the Classical polis, were not widely colonized by farmers until the later neolithic and early bronze age (5th3rd millennia BC). The earliest farmers laid the biological foundations of Classical agriculture, growing a range of cereal and pulse crops and keeping sheep, goats, cattle and pigs. The vine was a significant resource (possibly cultivated) by c.5000 BC, but systematic use of the olive and the introduction of the horse and donkey are not attested until the bronze age. There is no evidence for the plough in neolithic Greece, and early farming may have resembled the intensive 'horticulture' and small-scale stock-rearing still practised in some hill-villages, rather than the extensive agriculture and specialized pastoralism which dominate the present landscape and, to some extent, the ancient sources. Neolithic subsistence was probably based on grain crops, with livestock most important as an alternative food source after crop failure. Farmers introduced fallow deer to many islands, making hunting a viable option, but the principal mechanisms for coping with the risk of crop failure in the arid south-east of Greece were social. Field surveys indicate that early farmers lived in small village communities. Excavations at sites such as Sesklo and Nea Nikomedeia have shown that the basic residential and economic unit was a family household, but houses were crowded close together and cooking facilities were located outdoors, ensuring social pressure to share cooked food. In the colonization of agriculturally marginal regions, sharing with close neighbours will have been less effective as a defence against local crop failure. Here a dispersed pattern of 'hamlet' settlements developed, with greater emphasis on distant social ties. Distant social contacts are more difficult to cultivate than close neighbours but are potentially more effective as a source of hospitality in the event of local crop failure. Early neolithic communities were probably egalitarian in the sense that there was no inequality independent of age, gender, and ability. Villages rarely grew to a size demanding institutionalized authority to maintain order. In some late neolithic (6th-millennium BC) villages (e.g. Dimini), however, a central house was segregated within a large courtyard and probably housed some sort of community leader. From the final neolithic (5th millennium BC) onwards, settlements frequently exceeded the organizational limits of egalitarian society. The economic isolation of the family household was now reinforced by moving

cooking facilities into an internal 'kitchen' (as at Sitagroi) or walled yard (as at Pevkakia), suggesting that sharing between neighbours had given way to centrally controlled redistribution. By the end of the neolithic, with consolidation of the domestic mode of production and the attendant struggle between household selfsufficiency and indebted dependence on a wider community, the most basic elements of Classical rural society may already have been in place. D. R. Theochares, Neolithic Greece (1973). P. H.

Bronze age

Bronze age Viewed at its broadest, the history of bronze age Greece seems a cyclical alternation between periods of expansion, fuelled by increasingly intensive exploitation of the land and involvement in overseas exchange, and contraction to a more nearly self-sufficient 'village' level. While warfare and population movement may have been additional contributory factors in periods of decline, they are unlikely to have played a very significant role; in particular, there is no good evidence that a 'coming of the Greeks' (at whatever date this is placed) had a very marked impact. Rather, the most significant development was the establishment of the Minoan civilization of Crete, which evidently did not use the Greek language, but had an essential formative influence on the Mycenaean civilization, which evidently did, at least in its core region, the southern mainland. The effective domination of the Aegean by Mycenaean civilization from the 14th cent. BC onwards marks a step towards the creation of 'Greece'; but the development of many characteristic features of later Greek civilization was a very complex process, much of which took place after the bronze age (cf., for the most typical form of religious sacrifice, N. Marinatos and B. Bergquist, in R. Hgg, N. Marinatos, and G. Nordquist, Early Greek Cult Practice (1988) ). Obviously this is very different from the picture of early Greece that Thucydides (2) built up (1. 120) from analysis of his only available source, the legendary traditions; these gave no suggestion of the length of that past, the long-term stability of the agricultural economy, the importance of exchange, the high level of social organization in the palace societies, or the very existence of 'pre-Greek' civilizations. This is hardly surprising, for to judge from other cultures the primary purpose of such traditions is not the transmission of factual information but the validation of claims to territory and status (see ORALITY), and they can only too readily be tampered with, as in the historical period in Greece. The most vivid elements in the traditional material, the Homeric epics, belong to a genre that cannot be expected to offer a wholly realistic picture of life; but where their setting is realistic, it is becoming increasingly apparent that, while incorporating late bronze age details, it has much more to do with the Dark Age.
E. Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age, 2nd edn. (1972); C. Renfrew, The Emergence of Civilisation (1972); P. M. Warren, The Aegean Civilisations, 2nd edn. (1989); R. Treuil, P. Darcque, J.-C. Poursat, and G. Touchais, Les Civilisations gennes (1989); O. Dickinson, The Aegean Bronze Age (1994). On the Homeric tradition see most recently O. Dickinson, G & R 1986, 20 ff., E. S. Sherratt, Antiquity 1990, 807 ff., and J. Whitley, BSA 1991, 341 ff.; E. J. Forsdyke, Greece Before Homer (1956) is a usefully critical analysis of other 'traditional' material.

O. T. P. K. D.

Archaic, Classical, Hellenistic

'Dark Ages' Archaic age The pentekontaetia The Peloponnesian War The Fourth Century Hellenistic period Archaic, Classical, Hellenistic

'Dark Ages' (c.1100776 BC). The period after the Mycenaean collapse and before the 8th-cent. BC renaissance is traditionally regarded and described as the Dark Age of Greece. For several centuries after the disappearance of Linear B, writing ceases to be a category of evidence, and the only other source of information, archaeology, shows that contact even between closely neighbouring communities sank (e.g. in Attica) to low levels. But this picture has been modified by brilliant 10th-cent. finds at Lefkandi on Euboea, attesting eastern connections and memories of a Mycenaean past. The Dark Age of Greece should not, in fact, be seen entirely negatively, but as an exploratory period in which Greece itself was gradually resettled by pioneers (the prime instance is Attica, see ATHENS, history), and in which Greeks settled areas like Ionia (see IONIANS) for the first time. But the word colonization, which implies a central organizing authority, is not yet appropriate for this sort of tentative internal expansion and haphazard overseas movement. And the absence of writing had its positive side, the creation in an originally oral mode of the great epics of Homer, the Iliad and Odyssey.

Archaic age (776479 BC). The conventional date for the beginning of the historical period of Greece is 776 BC, the date of the first Olympian Games on the reckoning of Hippias (2) of Elis. This is probably not too far out for the event in question; but the early 8th cent. was a turning of the page in several other ways as well. Iron began to be worked with new sophistication; the alphabet was taken over from the east; and colonies began to be sent out in a more organized way (see COLONIZATION, GREEK), above all from Euboea, which between 750 and 730 colonized Cumae and Pithecusae in the west and was involved in Al Mina in the east. The 8th cent. was also the age of polis formation and political synoecism, perhaps themselves a result, in part, of the colonizing movement, but also of the rise of religious leagues or amphictionies. (Religious factors have certainly been urged in recent years by students of the emergent polis: it has been remarked that polis formation was marked by the placing of sanctuaries, often and for no obvious reason dedicated to Hera, at the edge of polis territory.) Some of all this, not just writing, but perhaps even the idea of the self-determining polis community, may actually be Phoenician not Greek in inspiration, and there was a famous and perhaps influential early firstmillennium amphictiony of Israel. But whatever the truth about Semitic primacy, early Greek society soon acquired distinctive features and institutions, most of which continued to be important in Classical times and later. Among these were athletics and religiously based athletic events like the Olympian Games, already mentioned; the gymnasium which provided training for both athletics and its elder brother, warfare; the symposium, at which aristocratic values were inculcated; and homosexuality, which was related to all the other

phenomena just mentioned. Some other characteristic features of Greek society are more easily paralleled elsewhere, e.g. ritualized friendship; but institutionalized proxeny, which developed out of this, was specifically Greek. All this contributed to such shared Greek consciousness as there was (see ETHNICITY; NATIONALISM), but the chief way in which early Greek states interacted was through warfare, a paradoxical activity in that in Greece at most periods it was a ritualized, i.e. shared, activity (see WAR, RULES OF) but at the same time war is, obviously, an assertion of separateness. Equally the four great Panhellenic ('all-Greek', see PANHELLENISM) sanctuaries, Olympia, Delphi, Isthmia, Nemea (1), were a symbol of what Greeks had in common, but they were also a focus for interstate competition exercised in various ways (see DELPHI), and constituting an alternative to war; indeed struggles for influence at sanctuaries sometimes developed into wars proper, see SACRED WARS. And sanctuaries were the repositories of tithes or tenth-fractions of the booty which was a reason for and result of warfare; this booty was often turned into dedications, producing a connection between great art and great suffering which was noticed by Jacob Burckhardt. The first war which can be called in any sense general was the Lelantine War fought by Chalcis and Eretria for control of the plain between them; but each side had allies from further away and links with rival colonial networks have been suspected. But exaggeration on the part of ancient, and anachronism on the part of modern, writers make the truth about this early conflict hard to establish. If there were networks at this time they are less likely to have been firm interstate groupings for purposes of trade or politics than informal systems of aristocratic friendships between entrepreneurial individuals like Sostratus (1) of Aegina, whose prosperous commercial activities in Italy were interestingly illuminated by archaeology and epigraphy in the 1970s (see AEGINA). Commercial and economic prosperity on the one hand, and individual dynamism on the other, combined on Thucydides' view to produce tyranny. There is much to be said for this: colonization and trade were connected, and the combination meant that Greece was exposed to luxuries on a new scale. But the chief modern explanation for tyranny is military, in terms of hoplite warfare, a partial repudiation of individual aristocratic fighting methods, corresponding to that political repudiation of control by hereditary aristocracies which was the essence of tyranny. A main attraction of this theory is coincidence of time: the first tyrannies, of Pheidon at Argos and Cypselus at Corinth, are best put at mid-7th cent., when hoplites appear. Two states which did not have tyrannies in this first phase are Sparta and Athens, indeed Sparta famously avoided tyranny until Hellenistic times (see NABIS). Sparta was remarkable in other ways also, for instance by not sending out many colonies in the historical period (with the important exception of Tarentum, Greek Taras, in south Italy) but above all in having annexed its next-door neighbour Messenia in the later 8th cent. The inhabitants were turned into state slaves or helots. Other neighbours of Sparta became perioikoi, a subordinate status to which some communities of Laconia also belonged. Sparta later became a tight and repressive place, but Archaic Sparta guaranteed political power to the damos or peoplemeaning perhaps only the class of hoplite fightersat an impressively early date (?7th cent.) when democracy elsewhere was still in the future. But the political momentum at Sparta was lost, partly through the need to hold down Messenia and the helots; this in turn called for the strict agoge. Simple infantry strength enabled Sparta to coerce much of the Peloponnese by the later 6th cent., though propaganda also helped, the deliberate muting of Sparta's unpopular Dorian aspect. Athens was also unusual among Greek states, above all in the size of its directly controlled territory, Attica, its natural assets (including a supply of silver) and its physical suitability for a naval role (see ATHENS, history).

Athens, like Sparta, avoided tyranny in the 7th cent., but unlike Sparta, Athens did experience an attempt at one at this time, the failed coup of Cylon c.630. But a generation later Solon's reforms (594) both resembled and circumventedfor the momenttyrannical, anti-aristocratic solutions carried out elsewhere. His creation of a new boule of 400 members was an important move towards democracy, as was the opening of high political office on criteria of wealth not birth; but even more crucial was abolition of the demeaning if not always economically crippling status of hectemorage (see HEKTEMOROI). Indirect but important consequences of this abolition were the development of a self-conscious citizen lite (see CITIZENSHIP, GREEK) and the related rise of chattel-slavery. Solon also permitted appeal to the dikasterion (see DEMOCRACY, ATHENIAN; LAW AND PROCEDURE, ATHENIAN), and legislated in the social sphere; but some of the detailed traditions about his economic reforms are suspect because they imply the existence of coinage, which in fact begins in the middle of the 6th cent., too late to be relevant to developments at the beginning of it (though accumulation of gold and silver may well be relevant, cf. above on the effects of colonization). Solon's reforms were critical for the longer-term development of Athens and indeed Greece, but in the short term they were a failure because Athens did after all succumb, for much of the second half of the 6th cent., to a tyranny, that of Pisistratus and his sons Hippias (1) and Hipparchus (1). Under these rulers, Athenian naval power was built up, a vigorous foreign policy pursued, splendid buildings erected, and roads built. But the tyrants were driven out in 510 and Cleisthenes (2) reformed the Athenian constitution in a democratic direction in 508/7. Meanwhile Achaemenid Persia had been expanding since Cyrus (1) overthrew Croesus in 546, and the new power had begun to encroach on the freedom of the East Greeks in Ionia (see IONIANS) and even islands like Samos. The Athenians, like other mainland Greeks, were insulated from immediate danger by their distance from geographical Ionia, but they were in the racial and religious senses Ionians too, and when in 499 the Ionian Revolt broke out, itself perhaps the result of restlessness induced by awareness of Cleisthenes' democratic reforms, Athens sent help to the rebels, who, however, were defeated at Lade (494). How far this help provoked the Persian Wars, by drawing Darius I's vengeful attention to Athens, and how far they were simply an inevitable consequence of Persian dynamism, is not clear from the account of our main source Herodotus (1). A first expedition led by Datis and Mardonius failed at the battle of Marathon, in Attica (490); then at the battles of Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis (all 480), and Plataea (479) a far larger Persian invasion by Xerxes was beaten back. The Greek successes of the Persian Wars were of enormous importance in conditioning Greek attitudes to themselves, to each other (see MEDISM; THEBES (1) ), and to the 'barbarian' (as Persians were now more aggressively defined), for centuries to come: see PERSIAN-WARS TRADITION. The victories were immediately commemorated by state dedications in the great sanctuaries (see DELPHI; OLYMPIA), except that Nemea got no big dedication. Poetry by Aeschylus and Simonides, and the prose of Herodotus, signalled the Great Event in literature, as did buildings on the Athenian acropolis; only Thucydides (2) and his speakers show some impatience with the theme (see EPITAPHIOS).

The pentekontaetia (c.50-year period 480430 BC). In the west (Italy and Sicily), the Greek states shared the culture of their metropoleis in Greece itself (see esp. OLYMPIA), but there were differences. Here Greeks (like North African Cyrene with its Berber neighbours) always had to live alongside non-Greeks, both relatively small-scale but vigorous indigenous groups like Messapians (see MESSAPII) in the hinterland of Taras (Tarentum), and great powers like Etruscans in central Italy, or Carthage whose base was in North Africa but which had outposts in

Sicily. Herodotus reports a huge massacre of Tarentines by Messapians c.470 and this threat conditioned much of Tarentine history for centuries. And at Himera and Cumae the western Greeks under their tyrants Gelon and Hieron (1) defeated Carthage and the Etruscans in battles which contemporaries compared to the high points of the Persian Wars. But inter-Greek tensions were no less acute: Croton and Locri (Epizephyrii) fought a great Archaic battle at the Sagra river, and when Thurii in the mid-5th cent. replaced Archaic Sybaris, destroyed in 508, it soon found itself at war with neighbouring Taras. But more peaceful developments were possible, as at Elea, where a medical school connected with the cult of Apollo 'Ouliades' flourished from the 5th cent. BC to Roman times; Parmenides was involved with it. Athenian and Peloponnesian interest in the west was always lively, partly for grain and partly for shipbuilding timber from south Italy; but partly also because ties of kinship (succmeia) between colonies and metropoleis were taken seriously. The great struggle of the 5th cent. was between Athenians and the Peloponnesians led by Sparta. The germs of this are detectable even in the Persian Wars, and when the Athenians took over the leadership of Greece in 487 (see DELIAN LEAGUE), Sparta's response was mixed. But Sparta, despite having crushed for the moment the perennially ambitious rival Argos (2) in 494, had internal problems in the Peloponnese and, for several years from the mid-460s, difficulties with the helots to cope with. So stretched were the Spartans that they invited the Athenians in to help them against the helots, but the Athenian democracy moved on a step in just this period (see EPHIALTES (4) ) and the Athenians under Cimon were dismissed from Sparta. Sparta's troubles meant that the Athenian empire was able to expand without check from the Greek side until the end of the 460s and the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War (460446), when Sparta did, as often in its history, take some action to protect or further its interests (including religious) in central Greece. So far from curbing Athenian expansion, that war saw Athenian influence rise to its maximum extent: for over ten years after the battle of Tanagra Athens even controlled Boeotia (457446). It may be that the take-over was possible because Athens capitalized on stasis inside the cities of Boeotia. (Throughout Classical Greek history there was a risk that stasis would open the door to outside interference. But Thucydides may be right to link it particularly with the period introduced by the main Peloponnesian War: in the pentekontaetia a degree of stability was guaranteed by the existence of two power blocs: contrast the post-431 period and the 4th cent.) Democratic Athens did not however insist on democracy in Boeotia, allegedly permitting oligarchies instead; nor is it certain that the Boeotian Confederacy ceased to exist in the Athenian period, although Athens' departure in 446 may have led to a federal reorganization. Despite preoccupations in Greece, Athens in this period continued the struggle against Persia which was the ostensible purpose of the Delian League; but after the Eurymedon victory of 466 a preliminary peace may have been made, see CALLIAS, PEACE OF. A great Athenian expedition against Persia in Egypt in the 450s failed utterly, and in 450 the main Callias peace was made, though this is controversial. Thereafter, until 413, Athens and Persia were in a state of uneasy peace.

The Peloponnesian War The First Peloponnesian War ended with the Thirty Years Peace of 446, and this instrument regulated AthenianSpartan relations until the great Peloponnesian War of 431404. The Archidamian War, ended by the Peace of Nicias (1), failed to achieve the Peloponnesian objective of 'liberating' Greece, i.e. breaking up the Athenian empire. Propaganda, such as the exploiting of sanctuaries like Delphi and Ionian Delos, was as much a weapon as open fighting. Athenian exuberance climbed to its highest level in 415, when the Sicilian expedition was launched, to end in catastrophe two years later. Persia re-entered the picture in 413, an important moment

because it introduced a long phase of Greek history, ending only with Alexander (3) the Great, in which Persia's voice would often be decisive. As Athens and Sparta wore each other down, other emergent powers like Macedonia, itself destined to overthrow Persia eventually, grew in resources and self-confidence, especially under the strong rule of Archelaus (2); and Thebes (1), another 4th-cent. giant, profited from the war, notably by annexing Plataea in 427. Small states tried to protect their territorial integrity by aligning with the strongest and closest power of the moment. The Fourth Century The end of the war in 404 coincided with another equally momentous event, the establishment in power of Dionysius (1) I in Sicily, the prototype for many a 4th-cent. and Hellenistic strong man: tyranny, in fact, revives. Even in conservative Sparta there are traces of personality cult, detectable in Lysander's victory monument at Delphi for the final victory at Aegospotami. And he got cult at Samos. See RULER-CULT (1), GREEK. Lysander's methods were harsh, and Spartan aggression in this period led, startlingly soon after the end of the Peloponnesian War, to the outbreak of the anti-Spartan Corinthian War, ended by the King's Peace. This curtailed Sparta's activities in Asia Minor (of which the most famous episode was the Anabasis or Persian expedition of Xenophon (1) and the Ten Thousand, in its initial phase a covertly Spartan operation to replace Artaxerxes II by his brother Cyrus (2) ). But the price of eliminating Sparta was surrender of the region to Persia, and a general Greek political retreat east of the Aegean. However over the next 50 years cultural Hellenism advanced, alongside Persian and indigenous culture, through activity by e.g. Mausolus. Much strengthened in Greece by the King's Peace, Sparta proceeded to fresh aggressions in north and central Greece, always a tendency when domestic or other preoccupations permitted. Sparta's coercion of Olynthus aroused no general protest but the occupation of the Cadmea (acropolis) of Thebes in 382 shocked and alarmed Greek opinion, and in 379 Thebes was liberated with Athenian help. Thebes and other places now joined a Second Athenian Confederacy (378). But as Thebes' power itself grew, especially after it defeated Sparta at Leuctra (371), Athens and Sparta found themselves driven together in the 360s when Thebes tried to usurp Athens' position at sea and (with more success) to weaken Sparta in the Peloponnese by founding Arcadian Megalopolis and reconstituting Messenia after centuries and equipping it with a new physical centre, the city of Messene. Philip (1) II of Macedon succeeded to a politically weak but economically strong Macedon in 359, which he rapidly strengthened further at the expense of all his neighbours, Greeks included. The story of Athens' diplomatic relations with him is intricate (see DEMOSTHENES (2) ); features of the Peace of Philocrates may indicate that he planned a Persian invasion as early as 346, but he was obliged to defeat the Greeks at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 before the expedition could start. In the event he was assassinated in 336. Alexander, his son, carried the project through (334323) in a whirlwind campaign which took him to Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan, India, and the Persian Gulf. For the campaigns see ALEXANDER (3). The city-foundations of Alexander (see ALEXANDRIA (17) ) are the most important part of his legacy but hard to estimate in detail: archaeological evidence is spectacular (see AI KHANOUM) but patchy, and the literary record is contaminated by rivalries between Seleucids and Ptolemies (see below).

Hellenistic period

(32331 BC). After Alexander died aged 32 there was never much chance that the unity (t 8ka) of his improvised empire would be perpetuated by any one of his Successors the name given not to an orderly sequence of post-Alexander rulers (they adopted the title 'king' in a rush in 306) but to a whole clutch of his former marshals, controlling different areas but at overlapping times. (See DIADOCHI.) The 'satrapies' were distributed at Babylon in 323 and again at Triparadeisus in 320; another arrangement was reached in 311. The generation after Alexander's death is full of complex military and political history, recorded by Hieronymus (1) of Cardia, who described the Successors' attempts to acquire as much 'spear-won territory' as possible, while mouthing slogans about the 'freedom of the Greeks' (see FREEDOM IN THE ANCIENT WORLD); the closest any of them got to a dominant position was Antigonus (1) One-Eye (helped by his son Demetrius (4) the Besieger), but his desire to reconstruct Alexander's empire is not certain and anyway he was killed at Ipsus in 301. This battle and Corupedion (281), where Seleucus defeated Lysimachus of Thrace, determined that Asia would be Seleucid, though Lysimachus' defeat also led indirectly to the emergence of an important minor kingdom, that of the Pergamene Attalids. See PERGAMUM. The first and longest-lasting Successor empire to establish itself was that of the Ptolemies (see PTOLEMY (1) ) in Egypt, partly because its physical base was self-contained and hard to strike at. But Ptolemaic foreign policy was not insular or pacific; the dynasty had overseas possessions such as Cyprus and Crete, exercised hegemonical policies in Greece (see CHREMONIDES) and the Aegean, and fought six Syrian wars in the Hellenistic age against the Seleucids, the most spectacularly successful of all the Successor rulers. Seleucid methods (see SELEUCUS (14); ANTIOCHUS (18) ) owe much to Achaemenid Persia (cf. e.g. IDRIEUS), but were innovative too; but as with Alexander, the difficulty of assessing Seleucid urbanization is particularly tantalizing (the Ptolemies founded only one Greek city in Egypt, Ptolemais (2) Hermiou). Recent writers urge that Mesopotamia as opposed to Anatolia or Syria was the engine-room of Seleucid power, and claim that Babylonian and other non-Greek elements in Seleucid culture played a prime role. Evidence from epigraphy continues to emerge about these topics; Seleucid history is at the time of writing in a state of exciting flux: new finds, work, and insights can be expected, making confident generalization unusually precarious. Macedon itself was much fought over and partitioned: at different times it was subject not only to Demetrius (4), but to Cassander, Lysimachus, and Pyrrhus of Epirus. Not until after 276 did Demetrius' son Antigonus (2) Gonatas consolidate the kingdom properly. Thereafter under the Antigonid rulers (see ANTIGONUS (3) DOSON; DEMETRIUS (6) II; PHILIP (3) V) Macedon reverted to something like its historical role as it had been before it ballooned under Alexander, though older conceptions of an essentially Macedonian kingdom, supporting its supporters in Greece, have had to be modified in the light of new evidence from Labraunda in Caria for 3rd-cent. Antigonid activity in the area. In Greece itself a major development of the age (already adumbrated in the 4th cent.) was the further development of federations or leagues (see FEDERAL STATES), not just the old-established Boeotian Confederacy, but the Arcadian (with its centre at Megalopolis), the Achaean (see also ARATUS (2) ), and the Aetolian, which controlled Delphi for much of the 3rd cent. Sparta's history continues to be distinctive: it stayed out of the Achaean Confederacy until the 190s. Social problems were more acute here than elsewhere, but not different in kind. Rome made its first decisive eastern intervention in 229, the first Illyrian War; but significant contacts, e.g. with Egypt, antedate this. Philip V's alliance with Hannibal meant that there would certainly be an eventual Roman reckoning with Macedon, and Philip was defeated in 197 at Cynoscephalae and his son Perseus (2) at Pydna in 168, after which Macedon was divided into four republics. Meanwhile the Seleucid Antiochus III had been

defeated at the battle of Magnesia in 190, though the resulting Peace of Apamea was an amputation not a death: Seleucid power in the east was unaffected, nor should the rise of new splinter kingdoms and states in Bactria and Judaea, for example, be straightforwardly taken as indicating terminal Seleucid decline. The Achaean Confederacy rose against Rome in 146 and was smashingly defeated; Corinth was destroyed. Detailed bibliography is not here attempted in view of the completion in 1994 of the second (actually entirely new) edn. of the Greek volumes of the Cambridge Ancient History, where up-to-date treatments of Greek history to Hellenistic times, and full modern bibliographies, can be found; see vols. 22/2 (1975); 32/1 and 3 (1982); 42 (1988); 52 (1992); 62 (1994); 72/1 (1984); 82 (1989). S. H.


Roman After 146 BC Rome supervised Greece through the governors of Macedonia; a separate province called Achaia was first created in 46 BC. Parts of Greece supported Mithradates VI in 88 BC, Athens with enthusiasm, and suffered accordingly in Sulla's campaigns; the earliest evidence for regular Roman taxation follows. Until Actium Greece remained a theatre for Roman warfare, piratical and civil, imposing heavy demands on her cities, sometimes met with difficulty, as at Gytheum in 71 BC (Syll.3 748 = Sherk, Augustus 74). In the early Principate, with Roman philhellenism conferring few tangible benefits, the mainland Greeks at first remained with the notable exception of Spartareluctant subjects; there was unrest at Augustan Athens, and the imperial cult in Greece shows a retarded development, with no supra-city collaboration on record before Nero. Reconciliation was hardly advanced by the colonial foundations of Caesar at Corinth and Augustus at Patrae and Nicopolis (3), the last two accompanied by enforced movements of local populations and cults, or by Rome's proprietary attitude to Greece's heritage, evinced by imperial projects to translate works of art and even a whole cult (Eleusis) to Rome (Suet. Calig. 22; Claud. 25). Nero's short-lived restoration of Greece's autonomy in AD 66 (date: T. Barnes, JRA 1989, 2523), in spite of causing local hardship (IG 42. 801 = Sherk, Hadrian 73), won him some Greek approval. Under Trajan the recruitment of Roman senators from Athens and Sparta advanced Greek political integration; writing at the time, Plutarch (Praec. ger. reip.) counselled resigned acceptance of Roman dominion. Hadrian conferred benefaction throughout the province; his foundation of the Panhellenion (131/2) promoted an influx of easterners to Greece, among them the travel-writer Pausanias (3). In the later 2nd and early 3rd cents. Greece flourished as a cultural centre (see AGONES; SECOND SOPHISTIC). Levels of prosperity varied regionally; ancient writers stress depopulation in Roman Greece, but the archaeological evidence for an emptied countryside down to 200 (Alcock, see bibliog. below), rather than merely confirming this picture, may point as well to greater nucleation (i.e. rural villages and migration to urban centres); certainly some cities now prospered, as could a small place like Aedepsus; tourism was probably a significant source of wealth. The Heruli (267) damaged Athens, prompting Athenian self-defence (see HERENNIUS DEXIPPUS, P.). In the 4th cent. gradual Christianization wound down traditional cults, although the Panathenaea were still being celebrated c.410 (IG 22. 3818 with PLRE 2 'Plutarchus' 2). In 396 Alaric sacked Corinth, Argos (2), and Sparta, prompting a wave of defensive building throughout the province. Recent archaeology shows a previously unsuspected prosperity in the 5th6th cents., down to the Slav invasions (from 582); many basilical churches were built, and the countryside was densely populated.

F. Hertzberg, Die Geschichte Griechenlands unter der Herrschaft der Rmer (186675): Fr. trans. by A. Bouch-Leclercq (188790); S. Alcock, Graecia Capta (1993).

A. J. S. S.