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The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals Author(s): Marcelo D. Boeri Reviewed work(s): Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.

54, No. 4 (Jun., 2001), pp. 723-752 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20131617 . Accessed: 15/04/2012 09:20
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It WAS A WIDESPREAD theses view IN LATE ANTIQUITY that the Stoics main

contrary conceptions?absurd, incompre or simply false. ac In other words, the Stoics were hensible, generally cused of having of incongruity, been and guilty self-contradiction, some must Indeed Stoic claims2 have been partic absurdity.1 specific for authors from the Platonic and Aristotelian ularly baffling coming tradition, mostly some basic with disias, because these sorts of tenets of such suggests a tradition. that in disagreement Alexander of Aphro the tensional movement, were


to common

assumptions for example, correctly

to: Campos Salles 1853, Dto. 2, (1492) Cuidad Buenos Correspondence Aires, Argentina. On common 1073D-1074C. See Herman von Plutarch, conceptions Veterum Fragmenta Arnim, Stoicorum (hereafter, "SVF"), 3 vols. (Leipzig: 1081C (SVF 2:519; An Teubner, 1903-5), 2:525. On common conceptions A. N. and David The Hellenistic thony Sedley, Philosophers [hereafter, Long 2 vols. "LS," followed by the section and text number], [Cambridge: Cam of Aphrodisias, On Press, 1987], 51C). See also Alexander bridge University mixture, 223, 18-20, from Alexandri praeter Commentaria Aprodisiensis in Commentaria ed. Iva Bruns, in Aristotelem Scripta Minora, Graeca, the Stoic doctrine of KVEv\ia is said suppl. 2.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), where to be absurd and false. On this topic see the remarks by Robert B. Tood, Al on Stoic Physics: exander of Aphrodisias A Study of the De mixtione with Translation and Commentary Preliminary Text, Essays, (Leiden: E. J. See also Plotinus, Ennead Brill, 1976), 29-49. 6.1, 25 {SVF 2:316), who calls the Stoic thesis of supreme genus "incomprehensible and absurd" ( aovvexov xai or mean I "Stoics" "Stoicism" the early Sto atJTo?? especially aXoyov). By to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. icism, namely the doctrines attributed 2See those topics related to (a) the "tensional" movement of especially that "one body is place for another and one body jtveD^a; (b) the assertion On common 1077E (this passes conceptions through another"; Plutarch, ismy own and is based on Harold Cherniss's translation text, Plutarch's Mor alia, Part II [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976]; translations are my own, unless otherwise of Aphrodisias, On mix stated); Alexander on the issue, Alexander ture, 223, 18 (with Todd's comments of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics, distinction between 81-8) and (c) the basic ontological body or existent (o?>u.a-T? ?v) and incorporeal or nonexistent (aoob^axov-x? ^ifi?v). For this last topic see the further evidence quoted below in note 10.
The Review Metaphysics of Metaphysics 54 (June 2001): 723-752. Copyright ? 2001 by The Review of

attributed by the Stoics

to Jtve?3?ia, does not fall into the Aristotelian No doubt Alexander is right in noting this to Aristotle's because, according view, jrvei3?ia's movement be neither substantial quantitative (generation/destruction), of xlvti?lc.3 qualitative Alexander's on nor locative (alteration), (locomo to the Stoic thesis of attempt reject this ground is misleading. The fact that the included in Aristotle's does use scheme does not not exist or that it is not pos of an explanatory mechanism is crucial. It only indicates the im with criteria an entity that as moving "simulta jtbqL x? remark is repre

classification point would

(increase/diminution), Nonetheless tion). tensional tensional show sible movement movement

is not

that such a type of movement to explain phenomena making in which the tensional movement

of trying to grasp possibility turn out to be useless which is for neously the most inwards part and described

Jtveu^ia and its properties for the assessment of such in our sources


8l? to e?oco ?|ia o(b[iaxa I have cited and against sentative the Stoics of what because we

Tiva eivai (xovixf|v x?vr|Gtv to xai ei? e^oo xivou?i?vriv).4 on Alexander's commented briefly I think find that this type of criticism in the testimonies

can sources


in those and


utarch, Galen, to be ple, seems says teristics that

of course


to the Stoics, himself.

for early Stoicism, such as Plotinus, Pl Plotinus, for exam

the Stoic doctrine of principles when he attacking if something is active and involves in some sense the charac of a form (or of an energeia), this something cannot be bodily In other words, principles5 Plotinus cannot it, accept the Stoic thesis of for, as he puts

or material. the material

3Alexander seems to suggest this when "xai nax? xi ei?o? saying ? vivrai [that is, the JtveD^ia]; xaT3 ov??v y?g otov t3 ?oTi vofjoai tl xivr|0? xa?' aire?"; On mixture, a^ia etc x? evavTia xivo?^ievov 224, 25-7. On Aris totle's distinction of the different kinds of xivr|Oi?, see Categories 14.15al3

On the nature Emeseni De Nemesius, 18, 5-8, in Nemesi of man, ed. Moreno Morani hominis, (Leipzig: Teubner, 1987), {SVF 2:451; On Aristotle's LS, 47J); Simplicius, 269, 14, from In Aristotelis Categories, ed. Karl Kalbfleisch, in Commentatia in Aris Categorias Commentarium, totelem Graeca, vol. 2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1907), (SVF, 2.452). For Alexander's " version of the issue see On mixture, 224, 24-5 (SVF 2:442; LS, 471): Jtve?3?ia XLvoi)ji8vov ?c^ia eS;ai5Toi3 xe xai etc aire?"; and Todd's remarks in Alexander on Stoic Physics, 219. of Aphrodisias natura



to matter as well, for it god for them [namely for the Stoics] is posterior is <conceived of as> a body composed of matter and form. And where did it get its form from? But if he does not have matter, because of hav that is to say, because of being reason ing the nature of a principle, and (aQxoeibri? oov xai X?yoc), then god would have to be incorporeal, o the active would have to be incorporeal ?v xai t? (?oobjiaTo? e?r\ 6e?c, if it is a then, how could matter be a principle jroLT]TLX?v aoob^iaTov).... body?6 greater value,7 this is directly to the material related and imply passivity things is in the same line of thought when lack of form. Plutarch that arguing if the Stoic god is neither but pure nor something something simple on must he be else composed, dependent something something (for the corporeal, that, as material, since the Stoics, ple).8 By matter, contrast, in being simple, the Stoics held involves that only the features of a princi things have a In fact, for Plotinus not pertain to the to tl^ilov, of sphere that which involves



5t? Jtoio?jv are as 9e?c; t? Jt?o/ov ?jcoio? ovo?a, vXr\. Both principles see Diogenes to be bodies. For evidence Laertius 7.134-5 (SVF 1:85, Laertius 7.134.17 (H. S. Long's 2:299, 2:300; LS, 44B, 45E, 50E). In Diogenes Laertii Vitae Philosophorvm Classi text, Diogenis [Oxonii: Scriptorum corum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, 1964]), I read o(b\iaxa, following MSS. Both von Arnim (SVF 2:299) and H. S. Long read aocojiorcouc following the Suda as well as philosophical lexicon. This reading puts forward philological prob on a lems. As noted by Jaap Mansfeld, "Zeno of Citium: Critical Observations Recent Study," Mnemosyne 31, no. 2 (1978): 162-3 and 169, it is likely that as of ?[iOQ(j)ou?;, which is said of the principles ?ocDiicrcou? is an anticipation von Arnim's reading (followed by Robert B. Todd, "Monism and Imma well, nence: The Foundations of Stoic Physics," in The Stoics, ed. John M. Rist of California [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University Press, 1978], 139-43) to the Sto goes against a number of testimonies maintaining that, according ics, a real cause is what is bodily. Indeed, god is a cause. The new edition of the Diogenes text by Miroslav Marcovich, Laertius Vitae Laertii Diogenis Philosophorvm (Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner, 1999) gives o(b\iaxa follow ing the MSS. On this point, see LS 1:273-4, who argue in favor of the reading reasons. oobfiaTa on the ground of strong philosophical 6 See Plotinus, Ennead 6.1, 26, 11-17 (SVF 3:315; the same remark oc curs at Ennead is quoted following the text established 2.9, 1). The passage Plotini by Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolph Schwyzer, Opera (Leiden: E. J. sumed Brill, 6.1, 27; SVF 2:314. to Plutarch assertion conceptions (On common 1085B-D, partially quoted by LS, 47G; see also SVF 2:444). On the Stoic prin Laertius 7.134 (SVF 1:85; LS, 44B) and Michael ciples see Diogenes Lapidge, in Stoic Cosmology," Phronesis and 18 (1973): es OTOi/eta: A Problem "aQxai pecially 244-53. 1973). 7 Plotinus, Ennead 8An unbelievable

real causal power with


to other to me It seems that respect things. an on this thesis contains attack the Platonic and implicit and serious to which view according forms and ends are not only the Aristotelian to be real causal factors but also the items that especially deserve called whose causes, causal at least if they is primarily are compared restricted to the material to the domain things of neces


sary conditions.9 authors there was a wide the ancient that the acceptance the champions of the idea that the corporeal is the essen to the Stoic tial hallmark of the existent.10 orthodoxy, According if is real it is the Stoic actually corporeal. Thus, philoso something did leave aside the Platonic and Aristotelian which phers ontology Among Stoics were

gave the intelligible the highest place in the hierarchy of beings, and
they acting oped which, did so by maintaining that only what or of being acted upon.11 The Stoics a complex of incorporeals theory in a strict sense, nonexistent albeit is corporeal are also said is capable of to have devel

"somethings" (?o(b\iaxa), are subsistent.12 But if the

9 See and Aristotle, 48a-c, Plato, Phaedo 99b, Timaeus Physics For Aristotle a principle must be something primary, namely it 2.9.200a5-15. must not come from another He considers thing (Physics 1.5.188a26-30). is the terminus that form (eldos) as a principle ad quern of generation (see tries to show that 1.9.192al6-30 and especially 193a30-bl2, where Aristotle in the matter/form form is prior to and determinant of matter. relationship, matter in of its On the is in determines virtue active fact, Form, character). sue that the real cause of something is a body acting upon another body see Michael "The Original Notion of Cause," in Doubt and Dogmatism: Frede, ed. Malcolm Studies in Hellenistic Schofield, Myles Burn Epistemology, 221 yeat, and Jonathan Barnes Press, 1980), especially (Oxford: Clarendon in Michael Frede, Essays in Ancient 34. Reprinted Philosophy (Minneapo of Minnesota lis: University Press, 1987), 125-50; in what follows I cite from the 1980 edition. Anna Maria Ioppolo, "II concetto di causa nella filosof?a el der r?mischen und Niedergang lenistica e romana," in Aufstieg Welt, ed. Wolfgang Haase (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 4494-505. 10 see especially Plutarch, On common 1073E For evidence conceptions Ta "ovto in naXovoiv SVF y?Q M^?va 2:525): (included o(b\iaxa ?jtei?ri ovto? t? Jtoie?v Ti xai Jt?o/eiv." As indicated above (note 2), in the citations of Plu tarch I follow Cherniss's text, Plutarch's Moralia. Plotinus, Ennead 6.1, 28 in SVF 2:319): "to yag oob^iaTa vo?i?oavT?c dvai Ta ?vTa." Alex (included On Aristotle's ander of Aphrodisias, Topics, 301, 22-3, from In Aristotelis in Commen ed. Maximilianus libros octo Commentaria, Wallies, Topicorum in SVF 2.2 (Berlin: Reimer, taria in Aristotelem Graeca 1891), (included " exetvoi (that is, the Stoics) vo|io6eTr|oavT?? 2:329 and in LS, 27B): a?TO?? t? ?v xaT? o(x)\i?x(x)v ^t?voov ?iyeoGai."



are bodies, in what role do incorporeals truly existent play things did Stoic ontology? consider it the Stoic necessary Why philosophers a strict distinction to put forward between the corporeal and the in an explanation so strongly in their world's corporeal explanation, dominated are some by the thesis of the questions first part, of are that only the bodily beings to answer. this paper intends the begin Stoic real? These

In the cient point

I shall

interpretations I hope to show

that some

to some reference by making doctrine of incorporeals. At on Stoicism views held by authors mostly because

An this like

the pri (bodies being to start their Stoic claims mary ones) they objections scheme. the view that conceptual ing from quite a different Although are seem to inferior realities would be incorporeals plausible (and in fact this view has been accepted schol by conspicuous contemporary or because raise to demonstrate ars), I shall endeavor not consistent with Stoic philosophy that this sort of and interpretation that, accordingly, is as a whole

Proclus, Plutarch, they take incorporeals

or Alexander

are misleading, to be secondary realities


11 As David Hahm points out, the characterization of body as what is ca pable of acting or of being acted upon does not appear in our sources as a theoretical in a number of arguments definition but it is always presupposed as a distinctive a is his of what See The aspect body. Origins of Stoic Cos mology (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 3. See also Cicero, Acad?mica 1.39 (SVF 1:90; LS, 45A); Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathemat icos 8.263 (SVF 2.363; LS, 45B); Tertulian, On the Soul, chapter 5; Nemesius, On the nature Laertius 7.5 (SVF 2:40), 7.55 (SVF of man 21, 6-9; Diogenes 2:40; LS, 33H); Seneca, Letters 106, 2-7 (SVF 3:84). 12 See Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 9.212. For the distinc tion "existent" (?v)?"subsistent" (?)(|)iOT?^?vov) in connection with the issue of time see Stobaeus, Excerpts Stobaci Anthologii 1.106, 5-23, from Joannis libri duo miores et ethicae, ed. Curtius qui inscrib? soient eclogae physicae Wachsmuth On (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884), (SVF 2:509; LS, 51B); Alexander, Aristotle's 19-25 Victor and Topics, 301, (SVF 2:329; LS, 27B) Goldschmidt, dans la philosophie sto?cienne," Revue des ?tudes "vn?QXEiv et vfyzox?va? on ^exTci, one of the in Grecques 85 (1972): 331-444. A thoughtful discussion can be found in Anthony A. Long, "Language and Thought in Sto corporeals, ed. Anthony A. Long (London: The Athlone in Stoicism, icism," in Problems Press, 1971), especially 88-90, and most recently LS 1:163-76 and Michael to Ancient Frede, "The Stoic Notion of a lekton," in Companions Thought 3. ed. Stephen Everson Language, University (Cambridge: Press, Cambridge "On a Stoic Way of 1994), 109-28. See also the essay by Jacques Brunschwig, Not Being," in his Papers in Hellenistic trans. Janet Lloyd (Cam Philosophy, Press, 1994), 158-69, who also deals with the bridge: Cambridge University some topics con Stoic notion of incorporeals and interestingly discusses nected with the Stoic psychology of action and lekta.

can plausibly be thought incorporeals in accounting turn out to be essential and

to be of such for bodily a kind that they Sec


as well.

ond, and following this line of thought, itwill be suggested that bodies
are complementary terms. At this point my argu incorporeals serve to complement ment will be that bodies and incorporeals each in the sense that one cannot exist without the other. other Thus, be tween dence. ethics 0(b\iaxa Finally, and a?co^iaTa in the last part the mentioned I shall in Stoic provide philosophy. there some a reciprocal depen of Stoic and key passages physics can be corroborated) will dependence to be arguments to clarify the corporeal/in seems

(in which be examined and corporeal issue

II of incorporeals species (A,exT?v, xev?v, t?jtoc, xq?voc) As due to their Sextus by already indicated, Empiricus.13 the Stoics made the essential clue of the corporeality "physicalism,"14 The four listed of the real. one can Yet if the existent doubts of in the strict about sense consists of raise legitimately in the Stoic account that reason incorporeals they were and very the role Some (if any) incor ancient authors


existent, bodies,

poreals play have assumed and for this

Proclus's thought, Proclus


He maintained

reality. have a dependent way of being, to be This was "subsistent." thought that the Stoics made time a mere must close to the nonexistent. This is so,


time is one of the incorporeals, because goes on to argue, as are and Stoics which inactive, nonexistent, despised by being in mind subsistent merely (?v ?mvoiai? ipi?m?).15 ?(j)ioT?[i?va re In spite of what Proclus says, I do not think that the Stoics garded incorporeals as secondary or dependent "somethings."16

13 10.218. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos from Julia Annas, Hellenistic 141am taking this terminology Philosophy of California Press, 1992), 37 ofMind (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 8. 15See I agree with LS 2:304, that 271D. Timaeus Proclus, On Plato's re of Stoic philosophers justifies Proclus's "nothing in reported statements to Long and Sedley, Proclus duction of time to a mere thought." According as Sextus, formulations may have been influenced by some doxographical tl xa65 a?T? 10.277: Adversus Mathematicos voo?jievov "aoob^iaTov occurs at Adversus A very similar formulation i)jt?OTT|oavTO Tov xq?vov." Mathematicos 10.218 (SVF 2:331; LS, 27D).


Neither spised raised do they because seem of to have being assumed and that inactive incorporeals nonexistent. should The

be de

by Stoic are sayables17 tute tive: the realm


incorporeal, of the existent. an

is that, even they turn out The case time

difficulty time, void, and though place, to be fundamental to consti of time

despite incorporeal, being the constitution of objective reality realm of the corporeal the things,

There of Alexandria, "objective experience"). a in to be Stoic in character, context where that is supposed time is to be a cause in the sense shown of a necessary In this condition.18 text Clement says that time is that which offers the notion of the con

(by set of objects that in Clement is a passage

is especially sugges is a necessary condition for Imean the reality" "objective constitute our

ditions without which

(bv oux aveu ^?yov the father

the effect cannot be produced

(? ?? XQOvo?tc?v

This is specially to the case of applied eji?/ei).19 a cause is preliminary learning: a?xiov) of (jiQoxaTaQXTix?v cause the teacher the synectic learning, (?uvexTix?v a?/ciov), the natu cause to learning ral disposition is the auxiliary a?/ciov), (ouvepyov 16 this is what Andreas Graeser seems to think when point Nonetheless, to our 'subsist' ing out that "in Stoic usage the Greek language equivalent or rather dependent mode clearly signifies what may be called a subordinate one that is distinct from being real in the sense of being tangible of existence, and thus capable of acting and being acted upon." See Graeser, "The Stoic in The Stoics, ed. John M. Rist (Berkeley and Los Ange Theory of Meaning," les: University of California Press, 1978), 89. Long ("Language and Thought " in Stoicism," 90) seems to imply the same thing in saying that hyphestanai a state subordinate to that denoted by hyparchein expresses hyphistasthai or einai." It is true, as Graeser observes, that an incorporeal like a lekton is not real in the sense of being tangible. As I hope to show, however, it does not follow from this that "the lekta are not something in the world"; Long, "Language and Thought in Stoicism," 89. In analyzing the Stoic theory of cat egories or genera of being, Graeser appears to imply the same thing. See An dreas Graeser, Zenon von Kition. Positionen und Probleme (Berlin and New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1975), 18^23. 171 follow LS (section 33) in rendering lekta as "sayables." For recent on the difficulties discussion involved in translating the term lekton and its see Frede, "The Stoic Notion in Stoic philosophy, philosophical implications of a lekton," especially 110-19. 18 Stromata. Clement, Stromateis 8.9.25, from Clemens Alexandrinus. VII und VIII, ed. Otto St?hlin and Ludwig Fr?chtel (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, to speak of time as a spe 1970), (SVF 2:346). Indeed itwould be inconsistent as suggested above, if a factor is a cause of another cies of causality because, evidence that time is a cause one, such a factor must be corporeal. Actually, is scanty and Clement's is, as far as I know, the only source which example takes time to be a kind of causality. 19 Clement, Stromateis 8.89, 24, 4.

and time, finally, it is suggested to imply a certain has not is the necessary that condition

of the learning process. a it is is process, supposed learning, In other words, if learning is understood duration. a before it requires and an after: a before in which the in because yet learned seeks and an after in which a coherent the individual account has of this If one to establish


as a process, dividual already


one has to take into account in phenomenon, time, because learning a process in time which, volves that is only understandable despite measures or motions shifts of in incorporeal, corporeal being things orderly tioned cause sequences.20 inconsistency, in the strict However, this does not resolve the aforemen a be to which time cannot be considered according sense of being because It could incorporeal. that Clement one is making reference uses to a very of the Stoic of the term.21

suggested, though, use of the word "cause," Clement's cause line of of which'


to which according thought, it is not in all cases also (?i'o?) of time a result

Following "if something is a 'be a cause" ("in the strict just time in is

Iwould sense," add),22 one could think of which." As the sense of a "because an indispensable in the material gives strict assistance sense, Therefore, other All existent

as being a cause of the fact that

for the explanation requirement it is a "because of which" world, to the constitution of the existent, that time

of any phenomenon cause as inasmuch that which,


in the

is a cause. it is, like the is incorporeal, for the existence of bodies. in addition to this it is im

the fact despite a necessary incorporeals,


possible that is to say

if there is no time, things of the before and the capable setting so that combinations the existent after of the possible among things, to determine, for example, that A in tx is a cause of B it can be possible if there is no factor

exist in a place; but things must to establish causal relations among

20 the basic distinction time is said to have posited between Chrysippus to which the measure of speed and as the dimension of motion, according the world's is spoken of, and time as the dimension slowness "accompanying see SVF 1:304. LS 1.106, 5-9; 2:509; motion"; Stobaeus, Excerpts 21See Frede, "The Origina 1 Notion of Cause," 220-1 and Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.138, 14-23, who As this wide sense of cause both to Zeno and Chrysippus. clearly attributes to of which' means Ioppolo puts it, "to say that the cause is 'that because its essential but without know what the thing is in its generality capturing feature"; "II concetto di causa," 4526. ^Stromateis, 1-3 (SVF2:347).



in t2. Although time does not seem to fit into the more orthodox char a not is it of cause is it the factor which acterization allows (for body), a relation us to establish a relation of causality, for which the temporal cause is for what the essential and the ef component distinguishing fect are. Time, as incorporeal, appears to have an intermediate posi

tion between

that which

is absolutely

(body) and that which

is nothing

from nothing). for it is different (time being a something Regardless we as not of time being should Proclus incorporeal, conclude, does, and only subsistent in the mind.23 that time is something purely mental The there" Stoics also introduced the notion insofar as of "being present" it is an "being is something, or

subsistent; ture only

(ujtaQX?LV): time, but according subsist I suggest,

to a subtler while


distinction, the present

incorporeal the past and the fu is there, that is, exists is no existent

in some way.24 in order which, The same

then, that, in Stoic terms, there to be what it is, can exist without time. can be cannot said exist about unless void and they are


jects (the existents) defined cifically spatial-temporal relationships. at least partially, my hypothesis Sextus that Empiricus confirm, might that there must be a relationship of complementarity between bodies

ob sayables: singular in the domain of spe is a passage There in

23 The expression should be understood in two senses: (a) "nonexistent" in the technical Stoic sense that something (as time or void) does not exist sense that something but subsist, and (b) in the common does not exist in any way. The confusion between (a) and (b) is probably the one that Proclus I am indebted to Ricardo has in mind when the Stoic position. attacking Salles for urging me to clarify this point. 24See ac Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.106, 5-23 (SVF 2:509; LS, 51B). However, no to no is time There is present cording Chrysippus, wholly (enistatai). in the strict sense, although broadly it can be called such. The ex present can be properly applied "to be present," "to be there" (hyparchein) pression to the present; by contrast, the past and the future merely subsist (hyphe see For a very clear and persuasive discussion of this passage, stanai). "The Stoic Notion of a lekton," 117-18, whose translation of hy Frede, as "being present," "being there" I am following. Itwould be conve parchein as "to be real" (as David nient, it seems to me, to avoid rendering hyparchein ed. Ke Sedley does in The Cambridge of Hellenistic History Philosophy, and Malcolm Schofield impe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, [Cam to Sedley, the bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 398). According remark with regard to the present is "to make it a spe point of Chrysippus's cial kind of incorporeal." true but the present That is probably is already an incorporeal and, as such, it is not "real," at least in the sense of something existent. Whatever the case may be, the language in the case of the in fully time is very misleading and extremely hard to render. corporeal

and ?^ov world incorporeals. and jt?v, is a whole with In effect, notes

he quotes25 the Stoic distinction between in accordance with the the that, Stoics, to whereas the external void surrounding (jt?v). Clearly does what not is involved subsist does not here is the with without exist


gether that the void world, out void. are which

(o?,ov) the world is an all (one of the is of course

for one of corporeal world, in establishing the logical-linguistic rela their basic functions consists so we can us to it. the that know tions which object, permit categorize a there is crucial difference between To be sure, for the Stoics saying are it: and sounds uttered uttering something (jCQO^?peoBat) (?iyeiv) of affairs but things or the states (or "pronounced") (x? 7iQ?y\iaxa), are said (X?yeTai).26 It is obvious from this which indeed are sayables, are not only that for the Stoics sounds uttered and meaning passage ful things also that (or simply "meanings") if a corporeal thing X they are lekta) (because to a human, is something it must of are said but be

Therefore, in close connection. except of the role in the constitution

incorporeals) a body. Yet neither the world

the world nor

the void (^exT?i)

can be what also play

Sayables real and

they a crucial

logos.27 material

and X is significant if and only if it is analyzed through the

the inten or a of

are clearly in the constitution So sayables important as the significant A for a human world sayable, being. this is a true or false proposition, tion of the discourse (whether plays argument), to the evidence, too. According the structure as having the following of action is described a relevant role in the Stoic psychology of the Stoic

complex action,

steps: chology case one is the presentation in the of the human which (fyavxaoia), The is is articulated presentation expressed language. being through is the act of accepting which followed by an assent (ouyxaTa08oL?) such a presentation one gives assent to the when Finally, of a presentation, the assent be the content expressing This accounts for fact the that, impulse (?Q|if|) for action. true.28 as

psy the first

proposition an comes as Stobaeus sayables

are assents."29 of The relevance "all the impulses reports, can be seen more into the Stoic thesis clearly when looking

25Sextus 9.332. Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 26 Laertius 7.57 (LS, 33A; compare SVF 2:149 ). Diogenes 27For a clear discussion of the Stoic distinction between "uttering" Cambridge see Catherine University The Stoics Atherton, Press, 1993), 283-4. on Ambiguity

"saying" and (Cambridge:


that there is no rational action in the strict sense unless there termediate

is an in

and between evaluation" of "rational process presentation contents of in the words of The action itself. pre capacity expressing as Laertius feature is a typically human sentations says for, Diogenes in reporting Stoic doctrine,30 the human thought is capable of

28 is reported by Cicero, Aca The sequence presentation-assent-impulse is confirmed by Plutarch, On Stoic self-contra d?mica 2.24-5; this testimony Laertius 7.49 . 1057A (SVF 3:177; LS, 53S) and partially by Diogenes dictions for his part, offers the sequence (Let presentation-impulse-assent Seneca, is isolated and does not fit into the orthodox ters, 113, 18) but his evidence Seneca ap how anger is produced However, when explaining explanation. account. In fact, he says that orthodox pears to go back to the supposedly received of a wrongful anger (ira) is set inmotion by a presentation (species) that anger does not follow immediately without act (iniuria), and suggests of mind giving assent to the presentation the involvement (On anger 2.1.3). Seneca is probably rendering the Greek synkatathesis ("assent") with the ex
pressions uaccedents animus" or ''animus adprobans" and uphantasia" with

Le of the topic see Janine Fillion-Lahille, For a detailed discussion species. des passions et la philosophie sto?cienne De ira de S?n?que (Paris: Klincks in Early Sto and Human Action iek, 1984), 164-6; Brad Inwood, Ethics icism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 42-101, and "Seneca and Psychologi in Hellenistic Studies in Passions cal Dualism," & Perceptions: Philosophy ed. Jacques the Mind. Hellenisticum, Fifth Symposium Proceedings of of and Martha Nussbaum Press, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Brunschwig and Assent: A "Presentation 164-80; Ana Maria Ioppolo, 1993), especially 40 in Early Stoicism," Classical Problem and Cognitive Quarterly Physical (1990): 444, and more recently, "L'?Q^if] jtXeovoi^ouoa nella dottrina stoica the 1 (1995): especially 49-54, where she examines Elenchos, dellapassione," assent in the case of the passionate person; Annas, Hellenistic of Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, Mind, 75-85; A. W. Price, Mental Conflict 1995), 146-7, 153. I agree with Richard Bett that "it is hard to accept that assent." See his review of An there is any sense in which impulse precedes 14 (1994): 195? nas's Hellenistic of Mind, m. Ancient Philosophy Philosophy that the Stoics where he Annas's 97-8) argues 6, (Mind, suggestion against use the word impulse in both a broad and a narrow sense. I do not intend is simplified. 29Excerpts 2.88, 1. Indeed this explanation involve that impulses here to engage in the complex debate of the doctrine treatment of the issue see Inwood, Ethics and assent. For an illuminating and As "Presentation Action in Early Stoicism, Human 53-66; Ioppolo, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis. Moral sent," 441-9; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, in Early Stoic Philosophy and Social Interaction Development (Aarhus: Aarhus University Philosophy of Press, 1990), 172-86; Annas, Hellenistic Mind, 91-102, and Pierluigi Donini, "Struttura delle passioni e del vizio e loro cura in Crisippo," Elenchos 2 (1995): 305-29 (on assent and impulse see par ticularly 319-25). 30 Laertius Diogenes 7.49.

expressing that which


and communicates with (?ioivoia ?xXa^r]TLxr|), language it experiences due to the agency of presentation.31 In all these cases the core function seems of a sayable to be both to articulate and to give meaning to the reality through the discourses in which existents cannot are expressed be despised or accounted (pace for. since In other words, in are neces they To between that be sure, it is and

corporeals sary conditions through reality, us. The only

for understanding involves language, which that we articulate reality fact is that the

Proclus) the existents.

a connection in such a way


(incorporeal) meaning are by words (which corporeal); a proposition for the expression of a sayable or dispensable (namely an argument). never Thus words and meanings appear separately. are that enable us to Sayables, despite being incorporeals, somethings conveyed establish the connections between we ourselves and the universe, utiliz

to it is significant can be of something are in indeed, words

articulate ing the logos through which reality.32 Incorporeals, then, are not placed on a level lower than bodies we cannot because fail to as part of what include and accounts constitutes for the incorporeals that the The Stoic objective is, reality, corporeal reality. standpoint are inexistent to be that although incorporeals (and therefore are are conditions that make they yet indispensable they "unreal"), up the reality of the corporeal. an in In this sense occupy incorporeals in Stoic ontology: termediate because position they lack body, which at gives an objective reality to beings, they are incorporeal. However, seems

31 At this point I am assuming the orthodox position (without argument) to which the Stoics distinguished the psychological states of non according rational animals from those of rational animals. Salient holders of this thesis are Michael Frede, "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions," in Frede, Essays in Ancient 151-76 (especially Philosophy, 152-70); In and Human in Early Stoicism, Action and LS 1:239-41. wood, Ethics 73-5, For the other interpretation (that is, that the Stoics are not taken to hold that see of animals are completely devoid of propositional perceptions contents) Richard Sorabji, in Content the Phronesis 35 "Perceptual Stoics," (1990): and Human Morals: The Origins 307-14, and more recently, Animal Minds of the Western Debate (London: Duckworth, 1993), 20-8. 32See Gerard The Stoic Theory of Knowledge Watson, (Belfast: Vincent Baxter Press, 1966), 42-3; for the Stoic account of the process of acquiring see Michael Frede, "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Im knowledge in The Cam "Stoic Epistemology," 157-70, and more pressions," recently, ed. Keipe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, bridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, and Malcom Schofield Jaap Mansfeld, University (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1999), 295-322.


the same different It has the Stoic ment their malikos and time from been they have the status absolute nothing. in recent term of "somethings" that because they


suggested the philosophy that further


perplexity."33 says that

analysis The same

"for Origen realities, this scholar with

Incorporeal' of time might increase of the question Tza is repeated later when suggestion are not incom and reality incorporeality for the Stoics."34 to prove As the alleged far as

"it is apparent that of embarrass is a cause


patible ontological far as I can see, Stoic know, poreals

are as they virtually gives no arguments to


opinion that lieves

I and, incorporeals regard their incor have regarded that the Stoics there is no evidence as embarrassing to their ontological Tzamalikos's scheme. one realizes once be that this scholar be understood may for the Stoics statuses.35 incorporeality If Tzamalikos's (quod become and and reality are incompatible the in the


ontological term incorporeal

is correct would a?/riov

and ethics physics between distinction in -Tov and -Teov

assumption concerning role of the incorporeals non), from However, inexplicable. and between the

ahta adjectives and ethics the of both respec spheres physics (in a not relevant role it becomes only play plain that incorporeals tively) to that is but also they are not incompatible say, realities, ontological as I not at is the "real" things. have odds with their status incorporeal quoted this of explanation trying to account interpretation is paradigmatic because this incorporeals I take to be misleading of what between for the relation ?v and ?ir)?v within of Stoic view I have on Stoic said incorporeals I cannot above, of Stoic dialec to that the that,

briefly type when

Tzamalikos's the sphere of Stoic ontology. to that of Proclus is very similar and, as find evidence There is another

for this sort of interpretation. of evidence piece (in the domain on for it might Sextus

should be briefly commented tic) which In a well known throw light on the issue. the Stoics discussion seem of to have made the problem of an

be useful

passage suggests connection between interesting truth and ethics.36 Sextus says

Tzamalikos, "Origen and the Stoic View of Time," Journal Ideas 52, no. 4 (1991): 540. "Origen and the Stoic View of Time," 553. of Stoic "embarrassment" is repeated again later (see "Ori View of Time," 554). 2.81-3 (SVF 2:132; LS, 33P); see also Sextus MPyrrhoneae Hypotyposes 7.38-45. Mathematicos Adversus Empiricus,

33 Panayiotis of theHistory of ^Tzamalikos, 35The issue gen and the Stoic

according maintain ferent

to the Dogmatists (that is to say, those who systematically on theses different the true (akr\Q??;) is dif positive topics),37 from the truth (??T|6?ia) in three ways: in substance in (ouoia),


con and in function The Stoics (ovox?oei), (ouv??iei). sidered that the true in substance is an incorporeal (ovoia ?lev, eitei t? a it is predicate ?oTiv) because ?lev cd?iG?? ?o(b[iaxov taking part in a (it is a sayable). The


in terms of a prop true, understood an turns out to be erty of the proposition, "incorporeal quality" per to a the some of but the truth is genus taining lekta, body (namely, since it is knowledge of all true things,38 thing corporeal) declaratory part of the soul in a body (for it is the true differs

and knowledge is conceived of as the commanding a certain the commanding condition, part being a in In certain constitution breath, pne?ma, state). from and the truth the truth since the true consists

in function within virtuous such mental sition part also

is something simple (like "I am talking"), of the knowledge true things. of many Finally, the true differs from the truth since the latter always exists of knowledge The true can say proper and, also it just belongs therefore, in the base person, exist true but the truth is related person and such of a mental the to the since to the dispo

the sphere person. a person can disposition

something of the wise

(that is, knowledge commanding of the soul disposed in a certain way) is a body. In this case it is clear enough that for the Stoics the true/truth distinction involves which is not only distinction but epistemological crucial connotations also ethical. The of eth in the field


in terms

a concern mentioned

implies the base person

ics and it is helpful to understand

tween proper base the wise and person: to the wise or "inferior"

the rigid Stoic differentiation

to account for the epistemic and that episteme) once more,



to the to pre

somethings.39 in order to speak of a body or of a series of above, we must bodies related certain by order of occurrence, always posit and in general determinations temporal, locative, and, linguistic a number of factors connected with what the to Stoics used terms, As indicated


person ("opinion"; doxa) as as well incorporeals corporeal

one has,

37In this the Dogmatists Sextus is referring to are the Stoics. passage 2.81: "x\ ?? ??,f|6eia o(b\ia eoxi yap Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes ^Sextus, 8JtLOTf||ir] jt?vTcov ??,r|0u)v ?jto(j)avTLxr|." 39For a discussion of the distinction at issue see Long, "Lan complete in Stoicism," 98-104. guage and Thought


call tween dence. points: "the


to argue it is possible On this ground that be incorporeal." and incorporeals there is a relation of reciprocal bodies depen to me, helps to clarify This proposal, it seems at least two first, the reason things to include the Stoics think it is necessary why in a strongly this corporealistic Second, ontology. the Stoics did not talk help us to understand why


may interpretation about incorporeals tarch misleadingly and at odds with is non-existent"?* It is obvious tonic doctrine of of

in an absolute of not being sense," as Plu In fact, in Plutarch's "it is absurd suggests. opinion, to the common that is but say conception something here \ir\ ?v that Plutarch in the sense on the Pla is putting emphasis of "an absolute But non-being."41

as "ways

this way cepted stance)

by would

the issue, interpreting the Stoics. The absolute be a nothing,

not have been ac I contend, would not being for in (like evvor|?iaTa, an not incorporeal.42 Concepts

(?vvor|(iaTa) and ideas (i??ai) are figments ((j)avT?o^iaTa) of the soul

nor are feature of the incorporeal) (a distinctive as as can Plutarch's and far I see, there is Despite view, somethings.43 no evidence to suggest that the early Stoics have maintained that in are to an not "not that is of in abso say ways corporeals beings," being seems to be suggested in Stoic sources lute manner. What is that in that neither subsist "are not" or they "are nonexistent" corporeals are not bodies. the fact of not being However, not being absolutely. in the a body sense does that not they imply

40See On common 1073D (Harold Cherniss's conceptions translation, Plutarch's Moralia). remark is in agreement with the con Indeed Plutarch's fusion (noted above, note 23) on the two senses of "nonexistent." 41See 258d-259b. Plato, Sophist 42See Alexander Stoic doctrine), On Aristotle's (reporting Topics 359, " ei ye to ^l?v ev xai xaTa toD ?wor|^aTo?14-16 (SVF2:329; LS, 30D: to ?? t? xai xar? xb ?? (i?vcov ooo^i?tcov ?acDji?TO?v evv?rjjua jurj??regov rovr v nax? xov? Ta?Ta X?yovTa?)." 43 the Stoics are assumed to have said that concepts are "quasi Actually, Tiva; Stobaeus, Excerpts somethings" 1.136, 2-23 ( SVF 1:65). See (oboavei also Simplicius, On Aristotle's 105, 8-21 (compare SVF 2:278) and Categories in The Stoics, ed. John M. Rist (Berke Frede, "Principles of Stoic Grammar," of California Press, 1978), 32. Certainly the ley and Los Angeles: University in Stoic philosophy issue of concepts is highly controversial. For a compre hensive discussion of the topic see Brunschwig, in Hellenistic Phi Papers and on Victor and The Stoics losophy, 99-104, Caston, "Something Nothing: and Universals," in Ancient Philosophy 17 (1999): Concepts Oxford Studies 145-213 (especially 150-71).

738 III
This show section will concentrate


the way and

cal discourse. bodies terms. by

incorporeals I shall Thus incorporeals my discussion

texts Stoic that specific in the different work parts of philosophi some key passages be examining in which



First, the considering or in the "cause ("cause"

the character of complementary display will focus on Stoic physics. I shall begin Stoic distinction between a?/riov presumably44 strict and ama sense") that makes consistent to which the bodies ("causal account") that distinction with alone are capable Sec thing.45

and offer a theory of bringing

an interpretation of causality, according about

or other on another bodily something to the of two important distinctions in ond, explore meaning and "happi the domain of Stoic ethics: (an incorporeal) "being happy" on one the and the with the verbal ness" hand, adjectives (a body), I intend suffix The -tov and issue those with the verbal suffix and -Teov, on the other hand. on the do not agree on this point passages in the summary of Stoic ethics by Stobaeus, who is gen to In this Arius ethical be doctrines.47 erally thought Didymus' quoting we will also refer to the topic of impulse context and assent and will has been debated scholars of these The main see how incorporeals that which being work in the Stoic account the im impulse, each one takes what of at length distinctions.46

true meaning are collected

toward goes intentionally pulse to be good. line for each of the the intended of argument, Following I shall endeavor to show the relevance under consideration passages distinction of the corporeal/incorporeal and offer some brief conclusions. in the explanation as a whole,

44 The sense of the adverb "presumably" is explained below in note 53. 45 In on the Stoic notion of cau my judgment, by far the best discussion to be Frede's; see "The Original Notion of Cause." A good sality continues sto?cienne abstract of the topic can be found in Jean J. Duhot, La conception J. 87-100. See also Libraire de la causalit? Philosophique Brin, 1989), (Paris: remarks by Maximilian and more philosophical the penetrating Forschner, von Natur-, und Die stoische Ethik. ?ber den Zusammenhang SprachKlett im altstoischen (Die stoische) (Darmstadt: Moralphilosophie System Cotta Verlag, 1995), 85-97, and Ioppolo, "II concetto di causa," 4494-523. 46See LS 25 The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis, 1:400; Engberg-Pedersen, Oxford The and University Press, (Oxford: Morality of Happiness Annas, 35; 1993), 34, 396-7, and 401.


The Stoics, issue that is not under the truly existent things and in saying of all things are the active and the passive, principles is either active or passive. This he implies that all that is existent


in our sources is that, for the dispute are bodies.48 Zeno maintained that the this also

47The extract of Stoic ethics has been widely of Stobaeus' authorship to the first century Stoic philosopher itwas attributed Arius Didy discussed; mus by August Meineke, "Zu Stobaeus," Sokrates: Zeitschrift f?r das Gym nasialwesen, 13, ed. Julius M?tzell, Band 1 (Berlin, 1859), 563-65, and Her man Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1879), 69 and 78-88. One some assumptions in the last decades in questioning of the first scholars of / the Meineke-Diels thesis was Michelangelo di Giusta, etica, 2 dossografi vols. (Turin: G. Giappichelli Editore, 1964-7), 1:140-7, and "Ario Didimo e la in Atti delta Accademia diairesis dell'etica di Eudoro di Alessandria," delle e filologiche scienze di Torino. di scienze morali, storiche Classe 120 that one author was respon (1986): 102-3, although he keeps the hypothesis sible for the three doxographies di etica 1:39). In recent times (I dossografi was accepted the Meineke-Diels hypothesis by (with some reservations) Charles Kahn, "Arius as a Doxographer," and Anthony A. Long, "Arius Didy mus and the Exposition of Stoic Ethics," both papers included in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus, ed. William W. Forten and London: Transaction Books, baugh (New Brunswick 1983), 3-13 and 41 David E. Hahm, on his part, after a detailed examination of 65, respectively. the works by Meineke, Diels, Giusta, and other scholars has also concluded that the author is the court philosopher Arius Didymus. See his "The Ethical in Arius und Niedergang der r?mischen of Didymus," Aufstieg Doxography Welt, ed. Wolfgang Haase (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), es has challenged the orthodox pecially 3047-9. however, Tryggve G?ransson, and has the identification of the au interpretation against argued vigorously thor in Stobaeus with the Alexandrian Arius Didymus. See Albi philosopher Arius Didymus nus, Alcinous, (G?teborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgen sis, 1995), 203-4, 209-10, 212-13, 216, 225-6, and 230-1. For a well-balanced defense of the orthodox view see Brad Inwood, review of G?ransson, Bryn a brief review of Mawr Classical 7 (1996): 25-30. I have presented Review the status quaestionis in the introduction to my concerning Arius Didymus see of the extract of Stoic ethics included in Stobaeus; Spanish translation Victoria Julia, Marcelo D. Boeri, and Laura Corso, Las exposiciones antiguas de ?tica estoica de Buenos Aires, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria the author of the extract is Arius Didy 1998), 149-67. At any rate, whether mus or another person, what is beyond discussion is the fact that the content of the second extract of ethical doxographies in Stobaeus 2.7 is genuinely can be confirmed in Stobaeus Stoic doctrine. The crucial passages in Dio looks naive genes Laertius 7.84-131 and Cicero, On Ends 3. This conclusion in and, in a certain sense, it is. Yet it also allows us to regard the doxography cluded in Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.7 as a serious Stoic piece of evidence which informs us about details that are not developed in the other sources. Such details are crucial for the reconstruction of the early Stoic ethics. Ennead of Aphrodi 6.1, 28; 2.4, 1 (SVF 2:319-20); Alexander ^Plotinus, On Aristotle's 19-21 sias, Topics 301, (SVF 2:329).

appears existent where "cause" a to be that suggesting must necessarily can be which anything be nonexistent.49 seen in the of

does not The have these


existent/non causality, meaning ama and

difference strict is noted. used

clearly distinction terminological In Plato and Aristotle

of theory the words terms

the Greek

a?TLOv were

to Stobaeus' tes However, indistinctly.50 according an asserted that aitia is the enunciation timony, Chrysippus formula, a or account cause we are told of In other words, (a?/ciov).51 (k?yoc) to that which, that an arr?a is a propositional item which is related a body. is a cause: An a?Tta is not a cause in the strictly speaking, a strict sense because of being a propositional if and it is propo item; item it will be an incorporeal. In fact, a proposition sitional is an in to the orthodox in doctrine However, corporeal. according nothing can be a cause. corporeal It is true that Stobaeus' of what rejects the aitia/aition the relevance aitia of is quite brief and no details

passage distinction this


probably on the distinction

is given as one of the names passages52 In a pas fate (8L|iaQ|i?vTi), others being a^f|6eia, cleric, and av?yxr].53 where Galen is doctrines Mansfeld sage supposedly Stoic,54 reporting are used promiscuously and aition and in a goes on to argue, aitia passage of Plutarch's,55 of Chrysippus, quotation an alleged not necessarily) verbatim (although the term aitia twice appears (and not mean to Mansfeld, the words To sum up, according remarks glance Mansfeld's should be noted. the rate, following where he is trying to show passage At first a?/tiov; is saying in the Ga

Jaap Mansfeld that in some ground used by Chrysippus for


ing ?xSyo? Tfj? aiTia?). are indistinctly used. aitia/aition seem to be persuasive; but at any text is a very hostile First, Galen's the absurdity of the Stoic if this thesis

?uvexTLxri ama); is what the Stoics lenic passage len uses both does cause not he take does

cause of synectic (ouvexTixov assume is so, we cannot that what he

to say. To be sure, intended effectively between aitia and aition, and Ga there is no difference same as but the fact that he terms the thing, meaning the distinction not accept is not very significant for granted he is criticizing the sort of causation be (the

49 Laertius 7.134 ( SVF 1:85); Aetius 1.3, 25 ( SVF 1:85). Diogenes 50 see Physics 2.3. Timaeus 28a4-5; Philebus 26e; for Aristotle, 51See Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.138, 23-139, 4 ( SVF 2:336; compare LS, 55A). 52 Stobaeus, Excerpts 1.79, 1-20 ( SVF 2:913; see LS, 55M).


synectic tells us "cause" Galen Stoics clear either. Second, cause), no is clearly that there either implies use them reasons in feminine is that he uses in this way. or both Whatever the distinction the distinction the words there difference in masculine terms is another between gender.56 place where



the word

what Actually, not that the interchangeably, the case may be, Galen gives no is pointless. is explicitly are In Stobaeus' made and text the fact in the

for proving

then, and pace Mansfeld, that in other passages



53See "Zeno of Citium," 157. Frede ("The Original Notion of Mansfeld, as Stoic and holds that although the dif the distinction Cause," 223) accepts ference between aition and aitia (that is to say, causes, on the one hand, and on the other hand) was not generally accepted, reasons and accounts, the dis causes and reasons or explanations was accepted. tinction itself between on his part, does find this distinction Forschner, "interesting" and he thinks it is valid More presumably recently, and following Mans (Die stoische, 87). that Chrysippus does not have a rigorous techni feld, Ioppolo has maintained cal use of both terms ("II concetto di causa," 4497-8). it This suggestion, seems to me, is conjectural, and as far as I can see has no textual support. On the other hand, we have a passage where the distinction is explicitly attrib on the uted to Chrysippus Excerpts 1.139, 3-4). (see Stobaeus, Bobzein, 1.11.5 (SVF 2:340; LS, 55G), asserts that "the aitia of any in ground of Aetius dividual cause (aition) is the portion of rational pneuma which permeates that cause," and so she also appears to dismiss the distinction aitia between seems lost in this pas In fact, she notes that such a distinction and aition. and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy sage. See Susanne Bobzein, Determinism Press, 1998), 53 n. 96. In her translation of the (New York: Oxford University Stobaeus passage at issue (Excerpts 1.139, 3-4) she renders the word A,?yoc as "reason" and in doing so, the distinction vanishes (see 53 n. 97). Certainly "reason" is a possible is also adopted by rendering of logos; this translation Roberto Radice in his recent Italian translation of the Stoic texts (compiled Tutti I Frammenti by von Arnim in SVF), Stoici Antichi. (Milano: Rusconi, In in for order the to make 513. Stobaeus my sense, 1998), passage view, See LS, 55A (who logos is to be taken as meaning "formula," "enunciation." zur Dialektik der give "judgement") and Karlheinz H?lser, Die Fragmente Stoiker. Neue Sammlung der Texte mit deutscher Kom und ?bersetzung Bans 2 (Stuttgart: Bad Cannstatt, mentaren, 1987), 899, text 762 (who renders I try to offer an explanation "die Rede"). In what follows for why the evi the interpretation accu that Chrysippus did not distinguish dence, on which is based, is not absolutely reliable. rately between aitia and aition 54 Galeni Opera Omnia, ed. Galen, On bodily mass 7:26-8, in Claudii Gottlob K?hn (Berlin: Gnobloch, 1964 1821-33; reprint, Olms: Heldesheim,

5), (SVF 2:440).

1055F-1056A 55Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions (SVF2:994). 56 Galeni Opera Om Synopsis of the books on pulse 9:458, in Claudii nia, ed. Gottlob K?hn (Berlin: Gnobloch, 1821-33; reprint, Olms: Heldesheim, ?' ?tl ?ia(|)?Qei 1964-5): ^ir|??v f] Or^ux??c eijre?v atTia?, "Ei?r]^ov f\
oi)?8T8QO)? ama."

same way the context, Perhaps does not account for the distinction

which Stobaeus explic terms.

itly attributes to Chrysippus.

Chrysippus this distinction would might

It is not impossible that, depending on

have made wider use of the two

be a peculiar technical al usage which, it could be acknowledged like Plutarch and Galen by authors though not I should be admitted. would necessarily sug (cited by Mansfeld),

gest that while making

something like this: when the "causal uttering caused fact or event proposition describe upon

this distinction
you say

Chrysippus was

thinking of

"the sun warms

the the propositional account," the aition the truth of the by and, eventually, such fact or event. Such a causal account does describing acts of temperature's the phenomenon which increasing as a result (ot?/riov) is The cause

the stone," you item describing

the stone, and the increased is produced temperature cause in of the sun's caloric but the the strict sense energy, the stone the sun (a body) acting upon body).57 (another effect is, as the orthodox ("being hot") an incorporeal. Thus the sun Stoic (a body) doctrine becomes

(the sun) and the caused object (the stone) are bodies; on its part the
quires, the stone But the on causality the cause re to

if this effect

processes cate

of the incorporeal predicate (another body) "being hot."58 an incorporeal. If is a predicate, is so (as it is), the effect to analyze the difficulty the causal is a predicate, of how new the whose result is of entities arises. Such production as an entire such as "a ship is built." Such a

a difficulty probably led some Stoics to think that the effect is a predi
as well becomes proposition One could wonder causal account (an proposition true as a result why of the shipbuilder's cause between be put forward activity.59 (a body) and in a strongly

a distinction



of the sun is taken from Sextus, Pyrrhoneae Hypoty example in writing: "the sun or the poses 3.14, who probably has the Stoics in mind or of the melting of the wax"; heat of the sun is cause of the wax melting Outlines translation by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, Sextus Empiricus: Press, 1994). of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 58 is that of the scalpel: a The other example, also collected by Sextus, a a cause to the is flesh is scalpel (which body) (another body) of the incor 9.207-11 poreal predicate "being cut." See Sextus, Adversus Mathematicos in his remarks and Pyrrhoneae 3.14, with Jonathan Barnes's Hypotyposes, in der r?mis und Belief and Causation," Aufstieg Niedergang "Pyrrhonism, chen Welt (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), 2671-2. 59 See Stromateis 8.9, 26, 3-4, and the commentary by LS Clement, 1:340.




Iwould like the Stoic one. offer for consider corporealistic ontology to the basic ation the following Stoic ontologi conjecture: according the first and highest is "the cal classification, genus (to t?), something" are included.60 in which If my approach? bodies and incorporeals that bodies that between the other?is als should and are necessary components incorporeals more them there is no one component one might play a role draw even the conclusion of reality and than important that incorpore

correct, somehow The sense,

causation. the strict the means

in the sphere of the doctrine of a cause account not being causal in (ama), despite for the whole is relevant causal account insofar as it is

a determined event can be expressed causal through which can be grasped. and thus through which the object On by language, the other hand, it should be noted that the cause/effect is relationship to of related the For the human the process closely knowledge. being first contact rial aspect ing part with the world of knowledge. of the soul"; t? there is through the senses; they offer the mate the soul rather "the command Although (or is like a sheet or of paper ready for

f|y8^iovix?v) are "ingrained writing upon,61 (jtQO^f|^8L? 8?ii(J)UTOi) as well,62 which whose function is to determine and by the senses. preconception simply

implanted preconceptions" are natural rational components

to help interpret the stuff provided to Diogenes Laertius' report, for the Stoics a According is a "natural of the universal conception (or things" of The function cj)U?ixfi x(hv xaB?Axnj).63 seems to have been theory of knowledge out a new knowledge.64 Possessing the

evvoia "universals"; in the Stoic preconceptions searching for and finding

60 On Aristotle's Compare Alexander, Topics 301, 19-25 ( SVF 2:329; LS, Adversus Mathematicos 10.218 (SVF 2:331; LS, 27B) and Sextus Empiricus, 27D). 61 Aetius 4.11 (SVF2:83; LS, 39E). 62 1041E ( SVF 3:69; compare LS, Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions 60B). 63See Laertius 7.54. Sometimes is said to have Diogenes Chrysippus held that prolepsis the criterion of truth. The issue is is, along with aisthesis, and I do not intend to discuss it here. For a very detailed quite complicated see Gisela Striker, Essays and clarifying account in Hellenistic Epistemol ogy and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22-76 (see especially 57-68). Stromateis ^Clement, 2.26 (SVF 2:103); Plutarch, LS, 31P). 6.15, 121, 4-5 (SVF 2:102); Cicero, Acad?mica, On Stoic self-contradictions 1037B (SVF 2:129;

notion of the distinctive general to search for a more accurate reason years is completed of life. With from characteristics

us of an object allows of such an object. Human

knowledge our preconceptions our first seven during to dis the full development of reason65 the ability terms can and be the relation among things

criminate stressed, cause/effect have

in conceptual and this relation


relationship a full understanding the aition/aitia distinction, tinguished from the causal

is not

more The expressed accurately. to if we want left out of this process: we are to make of the causal relationship, so that the true causal agent can be dis a particular formula that makes


as of the articulated Moreover, by the agency phenomenon language. in the Stoic account of causality the effect is a predi indicated above, ex are a in the causal Thus predicates involved cate, closely sayable. in this sense, we should that say of a bodily accept entity; planation ables not (one depend the of the canonical on the human incorporeals) for their mind are quite "real" and they do In sum, both subsistence.66 causal one, are indis strictly

aspects, pensable such as

and the logical/linguistic can be explained in terms which for anything for accounting re to B" or "between A and B there is a causal "A is the cause

lationship." As we


as well. In this context thesis that the truly the Stoic a distinctive In the Stoic sources we role. is corporeal also played in a certain if quality is "matter disposed find the following argument: if to substance of a thing the it and the Stoics, is)67 way" (as, according can be compared to the material of an object constituent (and the real states the different of things must be themselves corporeal), qualities and so forth) of the soul (namely assents, virtues, impulses, passions, are to be corporeal, its is the soul (or, more too.68 Virtue accurately, in a certain way. the material Once char part) disposed commanding

real/incorporeal relevant highly

said, already discrimination

in the sphere the corpo of Stoic ethics and in this domain also appears, it is

is fourteen; see Diogenes Laertius 7.55-6 (LS, 33H); the person 1.48.8, p. 317, 21-4 (SVF 1:149). Stobaeus, Excerpts 66See Dorothea of Frede, "Fatalism and Future Truth," in Proceedings ed. John J. Cleary and in Ancient the Boston Area Colloquium Philosophy, Press of America, Daniel C Shartin, vol. 6 (Lanham, Md.: University 1990),

65 When

67 See 1085E.



6.1, 29; Plutarch,





acter of the soul has be been the soul must emotions one's or so, too.



it follows that the affective states of shown, to the realm of In fact, the states pertaining as shame in and fear) become evident feelings (such nor change Since there is neither action that can take

as the body, have to states of the soul, as well contact, place without of acting or of being acted upon. be capable its af Soul, then, shares fections with the body. This picture the Stoic corpo largely describes even but in Stoic ethics the relation realism, corporeal/incorporeal was significant. According to Stobaeus' evidence, Chrysippus and his followers

held happiness
the end tually Stoics sire") being

(8i)oai?iov?a) to be a goal or a target (oxojto?), while

ac which happiness (T8?,o?) is attaining (tu)(8lv euoai^ioviac), is the same as being happy Like Aristotle, the (8?oai?iov8?v).70 an was used to hold that there end ("an ultimate of de object the sake As of which a matter the other of fact, things should be done, that is, to the Stoics just being telos and the Stoics



according who to the

happy is the end (telos), for they take happiness and being happy to be
two different interchangeably Unlike Aristotle, things. to make reference had used end,71 skopos distin

guished two kinds of finality.72 Attaining happiness

68For evidence

is the end, the


see Plutarch, On common conceptions 1084A; Seneca, On Stoic self-contradictions 102, 2-7; 113, 7-11. See also Plutarch, the thesis that goods are perceptible is explicitly attrib 1042E-1043A, where uted to Chrysippus. On the nature of man, ^Nemesius, chap. 2, p. 21, 6-9, reporting a Stoic

70 Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 1-5; 25-7 (see LS, 63A); see also Sextus Em Laertius 7.88 (LS, 59J). piricus, Adversus Mathematicos 11.30, and Diogenes 71 Politics 7.13.1331b30-4. Note that in 1331b31 ("For sometimes the goal is rightly proposed [o ji?v oxojz?? exxeirai xa^oo?] but in practice men fail to attain it") the language is the same as we find in the Stobaeus Stoic ex tract (Excerpts as the goal"; is proposed 2.77, 25: "happiness xr\v \itv case there seems to be no oxojt?v ?xxeioOai), but in Aristotle's Evbai\ioviav difference between 1.5.1360b4-7. skopos and telos. See also Rhetoric 72See Studies Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.77, 1-5 and Damianos Tsekourakis, in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag hostile critic of the Stoics, none GMBH, 1974), 107-8. Galen, an extremely theless accepts the Stoic distinction between goal and end. The goal of med icine, Galen says, is health; its end is having health (see De sectis 1, Scripta Minora Studies in the Terminology 3,1, quoted by Tsekourakis, of Early Stoic Ethics, 108).

effective achievement of happiness,

in the sense happiness possessing is the end in terms of our over happiness of which is done but which itself everything

of fully having it. Attaining all telos, "that for the sake is done for

the sake of nothing," "the ultimate of desire object (to to T(bv that which else is referred."73 eoxaTov everything ?Q8XT(ov), as a goal (skopos) not actually with happiness Each one is concerned in the sense but with happiness of the effective achievement (telos). We are happy reached On just when we have effectively happiness. a can in terms of the other hand, happiness understood goal (skopos) as an object external to the virtuous be regarded it is the activity; which the human beings aim to attain, that body set forth or proposed as an agent to be really happy.74 But the end as the virtuous itself is the achievement of the intended activity goal; ac are re to of it is the ultimate which all the others tually object desire, to the Stoics, ferred.75 According then, we aim at being happy, not at I should pursue


which is our immediate happiness, goal.76 As is obvious, the distinction the difference between underlying and end is the distinction between and in corporeal goal ontological a skopos While is a corporeal. (expressed by a noun: "happiness") body, cate: by a verb or, (expressed is an incorporeal. "being happy") used and "being happy" (eu?ai^iove?v) were This considered predicates. los) some Stoic passages,77 and is confirmed a telos in the Stoic The jargon, by a predi "living" (t,f\v) of end (te

expressions in Stoic definitions

can be verified by the Stoic

by considering thesis that the

2.77, 16-17 (SVF3:16; LS, 63A); 76, 22-3. 73Stobaeus, Excerpts 74 2.77, 1-3. Stobaeus, Excerpts 2.76, 22-3. 75Stobaues, Excerpts 76InAdversus Mathematicos 2.61-2 Sextus reports that a certain Alisto, that "persuasion is set up or proposed "friend of Critolaus," maintains as of whereas its end (T8?,o?) is the the rhetoric, (exxeloOca) goal (oxojto?) attainment of persuasion" (t? ruxetv ttj? jt8i6oi5?). See Stobaeus, Excerpts the same language is used in distin 2.77, 25-7 (SVF 3:16; LS, 643A), where of happiness and the attainment between happiness (the goal) (the guishing is end). Certainly this Aristo is not the Stoic Aristo of Chios (the terminology a theory of predication first attested too technical for him and presupposes is not certain enough for assuming that this for Chrysippus). The evidence of Ceos, either. Perhaps the is the Peripatetic Aristo Aristo philosopher of Aristo mentioned by Sextus is a third one, maybe a student or colleague in the Lyceum around 150 B.C. (I am grateful to Stephen A. White Critolaus for this suggestion). Excerpts 2.78, 7-11; 2.86, 5-7; 2.97, 15-98, 6. ^Stobaeus,


end consists In both cases


incorporeal, but in practice he can fail to the agent, goal can be set up before he or really attains achieve the end. it; so the agent is not happy unless one set up before The goal's being does not suffice for being happy. This holds is a good case against the purely nominalist which interpretation are inferior in the Stoic that Stoic since incorporeals realities, the last object of desire is a predicate, here an incorporeal some one. not a corporeal to be discussed second point between the verbal It is true adjectives that in none

to virtue" or in "living consistently."78 in "living according an turns out to be a predicate, the end in the strict sense not the thing itself but the agent's the thing. The attaining

account thing, tinction and have ation contrast


is related

to the Stoic


-tov and of

-T80v (such

alQ8T8ov). come down of leading between

the extant attributed and

as cxIq8T?v which fragments

to us and are commonly Stoics

such However, counts of the psychology of action and is closely connected with between distinction and telos already mentioned skopos (a body) a matter in the As of Stoic canonical definition fact, incorporeal). end attributed is explicitly shall take the mentioned to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, to and sometimes it is taken referred distinction as belonging such

(Zeno, Cleanthes, -tos and -teos explicitly the verbal adjectives occur.79 a contrast in is frequently the Stoic ac presupposed

to the first gener the does Chrysippus)

the (an of

a distinction

for granted. So I to the older Stoics.80

2. 77, 18-19 (SVF3:16; 78Stobaeus, Excerpts LS, 63A). 79See in the Terminology Studies Tsekourakis, of Early 104.



80 2.77, 16-27 (SVF3:19; LS, 63A). Certainly the evi Stobaeus, Excerpts, to Galen, Chrysippus dence is controversial: thinks that terms such according as "to be chosen" (haireteon), "to be done" (poieteon), "to face with confi dence" (tarreteon), refer to something and "good" (agathon) different (Ga and Plato 7.2. p. 436, 30-3, in Galen on len, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates the Doctrines and Plato, 3 vols., edited, translated, and com of Hippocrates De mentary by Phillip Lacy [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1978-84]). Later (7.2, p. with Chrysippus, 438, 5-6, ed. De Lacy) Galen says that, in accordance only is to be chosen the good itself (to ?yaO?v out?) and done (aiQ8Tsov), (jtOLT]T8ov), and faced with confidence (OaQQryr?ov). Plutarch, on his part, at tributes to Chrysippus the thesis that "the good is choiceworthy" (TayaO?v seems to fit into the doctrine we find in Stobaeus, Excerpts a?QEx?v), which is the fact that for the older Stoics "to 2.97, 15-98, 6. What is uncontroversial be happy" is a predicate in "living according to (not a body) since it consists virtue" or "living consistently," which is the same as "living in accordance with nature" (see the first reference to Stobaeus of this cited at beginning

In what follows some of the most of Stoic to show representative are fully ethics) the body/incorporeal

passages (included then, a brief at work.

in Stobaeus' commentary

excerpt is offered

quoted; thesis

1. They say that what is worth being chosen (a?QST?v) and what should be chosen (aigeTeov) are different. What is worth being chosen is every act what is every while should be chosen beneficial <good>, in relation to having the good. This is is considered ( ^?Xr\\ia), which why we choose what should be chosen; for instance, "acting prudently", in relation to having prudence. which But we do not is considered choose what is worth being chosen, but if in effect <we do it>, we choose to have it.81 some are included in what 2. Among the correct acts (xaTOQ0o)^aTa), <to do>; others are not included.82 Among what is neces is necessary such as "acting pru sary are the beneficial acts, which are predicates, dently and with moderation."83 3. They say that just as what is worth being chosen and what should be is worth being desired and what should be chosen differ, so too what what is worth desired, being wished and what should be wished, what is and what should be accepted differ as well. For worth being accepted desired <and accepted, goods are what is worth being chosen, wished, de benefits are those things which should be chosen, wished, whereas since they are predicates, sired> and accepted, which lie alongside the goods. For we choose things that should be chosen and wish for things that should be wished, and desire things that should be desired. Cer are included among predicates, such tainly, choices, desires and wishes as are impulses, too. By contrast, we choose, wish and similarly desire having goods; this iswhy goods are not only what isworth being chosen is worth being desired. For we choose and wished but also are what and moderation, having prudence (tt]v y?g ?Q?vr\Giv a?Qoi3^i80a ?x?LV and moderation xai xr\v oa)(()Qooi)vr]v) but not acting with prudence which are incorporeal, that is to (ov ?l?A?a t? (|)qov8lv xai OQKJ)QOve?v), say predicates.84 These view. They of these three are closely linked from a thematic passages point of are also a good example of the three parts of philosophi one can assume that the main sub at work. Although texts is ethical an al (due to the fact that they are within are of Stoic physics there crucial elements the Stoic thesis that the truly real are bodies

cal discourse ject

ethical legedly and logic, too.

context), In fact,

81 Stobaeus,
82 tory. That


2.78, 7-11.
acts are mandatory and other acts are not manda

is to say,

^Stobaeus, ^Stobaeus,

Excerpts Excerpts

2.86, 5-7. 2.97, 15-98, 6 (SVF3.19;

LS, 33J).


and the doctrine


of lekta is present here. If one did not take these to inter into this of evidence would be difficult account, points piece is indeed hard and there is no agreement about the pret. The evidence are it The of third should be understood.85 last lines the way passage It is hard to understand is the difference really puzzling. clearly what between and moderation" and pru "having prudence "acting with one might and moderation," since think that you cannot act dence are if you with and moderation not in possession of pru prudence we to dence and moderation. the Stoic choose position, According what The should direct a predicate. "to be happy" chosen, (eudaimone?n), or "set of our choice is the goal which is "proposed" object the ultimate is us, a body. By contrast, object of our choice be that for namely is done in view of should be done,

up before" "to act with the sake nothing.

and moderation" prudence (a predicate), of which is done but which itself everything In other we actually choose words, an incorporeal predicate. on the distinction what

"acting prudently," If one concentrates


-tos and

-teos ad

to realize it is easy once more that it deals with jectives, or between cal difference bodies and predicates things als. The above cited passages show goods and prudence suitable

the ontologi or incorpore

(a virtue) as of which is worth chosen examples something being (goods as any other virtue, are bodies).86 and prudence, is a body inso Virtue a far as it is the commanding of the soul in certain way part disposed as so on. A it is worth and every good, and, chosen, desired, being cent some act, on the other hand, due to its being to the goods, should be chosen. The notion difficulties. a predicate and adja of (bc|)?Xr||xa involves adjacent just "correct on, to the to virtuous act."87 goods peo But act it con in is


to its being In fact, owing are definition and by (which bodies) happening that it is a sort of ple, it sometimes suggests other like the one we are commenting cases, characterized tinues to be as a predicate and, (at this albeit adjacent we can

a beneficial to the goods,

see the incorporeal point clearly again the form of predicates, at work in the explanation of the lekta, under difference between and beneficial While the good act). adjectives with the suffix -tos, then, are used to indicate the thing as something

85For a full discussion The Stoic Theory Pedersen, ^Stobaeus, 87 Stobaeus, Excerpts Excerpts

and philosophical 25-35. ofOikeiosis, 20-2. 2.57, 2.101, 7-9.


see Engberg

desirable, indicate on), What acting cause tion

worth wishing for, and so forth (that is to say, to something or direct object the immediate of desire, wish, and so choice, to the action in -teos will make the adjectives reference itself. should be chosen, desired, or wished courageously, wished, for are and desired which the beneficial This acts: is so be ac

moderately, prudently, be chosen, what should

justly. is what are


in the practical context. Predicates, an actual cases do not express state an cases state do actual express certainly some "to be a prudent it must however, are lekta. Once the domain person" be said more said of the Stoic are that predicates it is clear enough, account of action

in incorporeal, of the world88 but in other instance, In general, because they (for even neither in

of the world wise person).

of the Stoic

incorporeal it seems to me, that we could constitute

nor the objective our personal world without into con world taking and the incorporeals The ac sideration the bodies together. working we evaluate tual world is not real to us unless it with incorporeals and, more accurately, a role central playing formation with since sayables. they are crucial the appear Incorporeals again items for assessing the in our perceptive capacities. to put it in place and time,

by the things affecting given Once we have evaluated this stuff, we have a "real" object. so that it becomes

IV I am aware corporeal difficult. issue My giving definite in Stoic philosophy that and conclusions the corporeal/in at least quite impossible, at best tentative. The on


is, if not are inferences

on ancient of our assertions Stoicism is some character conjectural our at remains. times justified due to the state of the extant Indeed, an accurate account is always to reach of Stoic doctrines tempt thwarted this, issue by the scanty and frequently to me that it is possible it seems concerning the existent/nonexistent confusing to be sure evidence. about In spite of the fact that the appears to be


functioning all the time in Stoic philosophy.

Thus it is necessary


88 In this last sentence I am following line of thought ( The Pedersen's his sugges Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis, 31). However, although provocative, translated tion that "phrone?n will be most appositely (as op 'becoming seems to me an over-interpretation. posed to being) phronimos1"


the ovTa-^ the philosophical a point belonging read that, on the nonexistents derstood ovtcx distinction as a whole in the different and not parts discourse

of as

simply logic, ethics), (physics, sense to I venture to say In this would just physics. and Stoic view, we should consider existents seriously in all the fields of research, and that these must be un

as working Ifmy approach is right, itmight be eas together. so proud the Stoics were of the coherence of ier to understand why system. connection letter They among the whole are said to maintain that there if the parts of philosophy, since fall down.89 system would

philosophical should be a close one changed


a single

Itmay be objected that my general proposal regarding bodies and

is rather incorporeals sembles that of Plato. pear but to be not they need this re if it is true, the Stoic ontology to this bodies ap Thus, objection, according do not exist by themselves substantial entities?they radical since

consequence within Thus

to be what they are. I do not think that this incorporeals are follows because the Stoic necessarily incorporeals are immanent in the corporeal level of reality?they world.

to compare to Platonic there is no room Forms. incorporeals are causes For Plato, Forms of and ultimately for sensible responsible are no I For there real things without in the Stoics, contend, things. nor case not without real things. This is the corporeals incorporeals with and Plato's Forms. sensibles My sions primary regarding purpose the but in this paper was not to reach secure true sense of the bodies/incorporeals to provoke in a number discussion of different it was in a field since conclu issue in

early Stoicism, that has been (which ophers whether


of research antiquity of philos of

interpreted how misleading surely proves and interpreters). I have tried Stoics held

ways for generations to answer the basic


incorporeality ?vxa) and corporeal (?o(b\iaxa-[ir\ to be domains ity (o(b[iaxa-ovx?) incompatible ontological (as both some ancient as is and modern have maintained). authors My answer, as I is to for "no" have the Stoics real obvious, because, hope shown, ity is the result of the combination of bodies and incorporeals. There

is no break between
would without agree that

the two levels of reality.


I think that the Stoics

are empty, and bodies a human in which

without incorporeals are blind. This incorporeals

is the way

89 Cicero, On Ends 3.74. For further evidence see Diogenes and Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.17-19.



being realms is able which, National to know in order and to exist,

to categorize the world: by joining must be linked to each other.90 two








initial work on this paper began while I held a research fellowship from Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cient?ficas y T?cnicas (Argentina) as a visiting researcher at the Department Uni of Philosophy of Georgetown an was to to thanks The final version done appointment versity (1994-95). in the D. C, as a Junior Fellow the Center for Hellenic Studies inWashington, I am grateful to the directors, Deborah Boedeker academic year 1999-2000. I am es and Kurt Raaflaub, for their permanent support and encouragement. detailed and acute remarks helped indebted to Richard Bett, whose pecially me to avoid a mistake. and Iwould also like to thank Maximilian Forschner I read an abridged version of Ricardo Salles for their criticism and concern. de Brasilia, Brazil, in de Filosof?a, Universidade this paper at Departamento in Brazil and es from comments of the audience December 1996. I benefited an from observation Jos? Trindade Santos. Gabriel Responsibil by pecially ity for errors remains my own.

90 The

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