Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 19

Husserl Studies 21: 3553, 2005. DOI: 10.

1007/s10743-005-6242-1

c Springer 2005

Manifestation and the Paradox of Subjectivity


JAMES MENSCH
Department of Philosophy, Saint Francis Xavier University, P.O. Box 5000, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada B2G 2W5

The question of who we are is a perennial one in philosophy. It is particularly acute in transcendental philosophy with its focus on the subject. In its attempt to see in the subject the structures and activities that determine experience, such philosophy confronts what Husserl called the paradox of human subjectivity. This is the paradox of its two-fold being. It has both the being of a subject for the world and the being of an object in the world.1 As the rst, it appears as the subject whose constitutive syntheses result in the presence of the world. Possessing an absolute being,2 it is uniquely singular.3 As the second, it is itself but one object among many in the world. It appears as a particular human subject with all the vulnerabilities and limitations that we all too readily recognize in ourselves. Reecting on this duality, Husserl asks: How can human subjectivity, which is a part of the world, constitute the whole world, i.e., constitute it as its intentional product . . .? The subjective part of the world swallows up, so to speak, the whole world including itself. What an absurdity!4 The absurdity arises when we identify the two subjectivities, that is, when we say that the absolutely constituting subjectivity is, in fact, our own limited empirical subjectivity. It is at this point that we say that a part of the world constitutes the whole of the world and hence itself as a part of this whole. In his remarkable book, The Paradox of Subjectivity, David Carr argues that the conict between the two conceptions of subjectivity is fatal to transcendental philosophy. In his words, the practice of transcendental philosophy results in the recognition that the two views of the subject, transcendental and empirical, can be neither avoided nor reconciled. Thus, in my view it concludes in paradox.5 In what follows, after outlining David Carrs position, I propose to show how the inability to reconcile the two views of the subject results in the innite regresses that so trouble Husserls accounts of time consciousness. I shall conclude by examining a suggestion for overcoming the paradox, one based on the Czech philosopher, Jan Pato ckas account of manifestation. The suggestion, while open to criticism, leads to a fresh view of constitution.

36 1. The Two Subjects Transcendental philosophy embraces more than Husserls phenomenology. Its most famous exponent is, arguably, not Husserl, but Kant. Accordingly, Carr begins his analysis of the two views of the subject by examining Kants distinction between empirical and transcendental consciousness. He writes: In the one case (empirical self-consciousness) I am conscious of myself as an object with certain mental properties; in the other case (transcendental self-consciousness), I am conscious of myself as thinking. . . . In thinking of myself as thinking, I am of course attributing to myself what thinking is, namely the spontaneous activity of combining.6 As Carr observes, there are good reasons for saying that the two descriptions are incompatible. Empirically regarded, the subject is causally determined. Transcendentally regarded, it is free. It is represented as a spontaneous self-active being.7 Considered empirically, the subject is taken as part of the sensible world, an object amongst its objects. Considered transcendentally, the subject is not part of the world.8 Its relation to the world is that of proscribing, through its categories, the laws constitutive of the experience of objects. The difculty, here, is not merely that the subject whose syntheses result in the presence of objects must be distinguished from the subject taken as an object. The paradox arises because, as Carr writes, the two subjects are obviously the same self.9 The syntheses I engage in as a transcendental subject are as obviously mine as are the mental properties revealed by my empirical selfconsciousness. Carr makes essentially the same points with regard to Husserl. Here, the two views of the subject are represented by the natural and the transcendental attitudes. The natural attitude is our normal, everyday way of taking ourselves as empirical subjects in the world. Here, as Carr states, the self is apprehended as relating in both causal and intentional ways to other things. But it is above all within the world, situated among the independently existing things of the world. As such, it can be characterized as an object for reection. This means that when we turn our attention to it, we can describe the properties and states that distinguish it as a thing from other things of the world.10 The transcendental attitude arises when we suspend this natural attitude. Engaging in it, we bracket our belief in the world. Instead of taking the world as an existing totality that includes ourselves, we inquire into the grounds for our positing it. What evidence do we have for our belief that its various objects exist? What are the experiences and syntheses that result in the presence of such objects? The subject responsible for such presence is termed the transcendental subject. For it, all real objects are unities of sense.11 An object is present insofar as the transcendental subject makes sense of its experiences. It does this when it relates them intentionally to some object, i.e., takes them as experiences of this object. This means that in contrast

37 to the empirical subject, who is in the world among things and has thing-like relations to them, the transcendental subject, as Carr writes, is characterized exclusively in terms of intentionality. Thus, its relation to things and states of affairs is a meaning-giving relation, which is independent of the existence of those things.12 This meaning-giving relation is simply that of making sense by grasping a unity in a temporally dispersed multiplicity. Thus, for Husserl, I make sense of a pattern of perspectivally arranged appearances by seeing them as the appearances of some given spatial-temporal object. Doing so, I take the object both as existing and as having a given meaning in this case, the meaning of a spatial-temporal object.13 Broadly speaking, what we confront here is Kants synthesizing subject.14 Once again, we have to say that the subject, whose synthetic activities result in the givenness of objects, cannot itself be given as an object. As Carr puts this, Rather than being an object, it is the condition of the possibility of their being objects at all, and indeed, of their being a world.15 In other words, were this constituting subject an object, another subject would have to be assumed, one responsible through its constitutive syntheses for the rst subjects presence as an object. Once again, then, we are faced with two different descriptions of the subject. We cannot, however, maintain that what they describe are distinct subjects since the selfhood upon which both descriptions rest is assumed to be our own.

2. Time-Consciousness the Problem of Innite Regress Husserls response to the paradox of human subjectivity is simply to deny that human subjectivity functions at all in the constitution of the world. He asserts that the I that I reach through the epoch e . . . i.e., the subjectivity that is ultimately constituting is actually called I only by equivocation.16 What is exhibited in the epoch e . . . is nothing human, neither soul nor psychic life nor real psycho-physical human beings. The latter pertain to the phenomenon, to the world as a constituted pole.17 Human beings, in other words, are not constituting, but rather constituted entities. They are appearing object-poles and, as such, subject to a regressive inquiry into the experiences and connections of experiences that bring about their constitution.18 The subjectivity that is ultimately constituting is made up of these experiences and connections. Given that every constitution of every type and level of entity is a temporalization, such experiences and connections are actually those of an ultimate time-constituting consciousness.19 This response brings about a certain shift in the division of subjectivity. In place of the split between the subject taken as a subject for the world and the subject understood as an object in the world, we have the division between the subject taken as the ultimately time-constituting consciousness (everything in time being its object) and the subject as a temporal object of this same

38 consciousness. This ultimately constituting consciousness consists of the constituting stream of experiences through which every temporal object appears. The individual subject is this same consciousness regarded as an appearing object in time. It is the self-objectication of the ultimate consciousness.20 Has this shift resolved the paradox or has it merely moved it to another level? If we turn to the innite regresses that constantly bedevil Husserls attempts in the Bernau Manuscripts to analyze time-constitution, there is good reason to say that the result is simply a variation of the paradox. In its new version, the attempt to relate the constituting and the appearing subjectivity results in the paradox of an innite regress of constituting subjectivities. The basic structure of this regress is quite simple. It follows from the fact that every temporal object has its modes of givenness. It appears (or is given) as temporal through a synthesis of retained and present data. Such modes, insofar as they are themselves temporal objects, also have their modes of givenness, which modes, as temporal objects, have their modes of givenness, and so on ad innitum. A typical expression of this regress occurs when Husserl asks, Is the stream of experiences that constitutes phenomenological temporality (the stream that brings temporalities to appearance through changing modes of givenness) not itself in phenomenological time? It seems it must be. As the passage continues: A tone sense-datum occurs and endures. It appears temporally because retentions continually attach themselves to every new occurring phase [of the tone] . . . . Such retentions form a succession of modes of givenness of the same tone-point and the same tone-stretch. They are the means through which the tone appears temporally. The regress occurs because each such mode is itself something that is given in distinct modes, given as now present in a new occurring and then continually sinking back into the [retained] past.21 In other words, the stream of appearances, in which the tonal event is given, is also an individual object and has its temporal stretch and temporal position. As such, it has, as a stream, its own modes of givenness. We thus come to a new stream [of these modes of givenness], which is itself a temporal object and has its modes of givenness. This, it seems, unavoidably leads to an innite regress [of modes of givenness, which are objects, which have their modes of givenness, which are objects and so on], and this is absurd.22 Given that this stream of constituting appearances forms the content of constituting consciousness, what we have here is a chain of constituting consciousnesses, each one constituting the next as a temporal object. We may, of course, ask why we have to continue this chain. Can we not speak of the modes of givenness that present the temporal object as not having their own modes of givenness? Is it not possible to imagine the stream of such modes as not being itself constituted as a temporal object? What stands in the way of this supposition is the assumption that dominates Husserls treatment of the regress. This is that all appearing is appearing through time. To

39 think of something as appearing without its temporally dispersed modes of givenness is to think of it as being-given and vanishing without a trace in the same instant. The assumed impossibility of such a conception implies that the stream of such modes must, as experienced, be in time. It cannot be apprehended and not be temporally constituted. What about the supposition that the ultimate hyletic data forming the stream are not temporally constituted and, hence, are not apprehended? The supposition is that the ultimate process of time-constitution is not itself a constituted process. Considering this alternative, Husserl asks, Are we actually protected from the dangers of innite regresses by the assumption of a nonapprehended, nonintentional, nonconstituted process? Is this assumption even thinkable? Does it not lead to the grossest absurdities?23 The greatest of these in a procedural sense is that, in making this assumption, we are no longer doing phenomenology. To the point that we engage in phenomenological analysis, the ultimately time-constituting process that we are describing must appear. Insofar as this process is our own, the necessity is that of its self-appearing. This means, in Husserls words, that a primal process that does not constitute itself for itself and, hence, consciously apprehends (bewusst) itself is unthinkable. This necessity, however, returns us to the regress. As Husserl adds, If every phase of the process is consciously apprehended, we would have to see every phase as a consciousness of the phase. Doesnt this consciousness of the phase itself have to be originally grasped in the same sense and so on ad innitum? This is the difculty.24 The difculty is that every consciousness of a temporal phase, if it is to appear, must itself be temporal and must presuppose a prior time-constituting consciousness whose own temporal appearing requires a prior time-constituting consciousness and so on. In general terms, the regress arises because the grasp of each consciousness is through its modes of givenness. The being-given of these modes requires new modes of givenness and hence the consciousness consisting of such modes and so on indenitely. As a result, we, the phenomenological self-observers, are pushed further and further back. Each attempt to conceive how we grasp ourselves seems to add but one more link to the chain of the regress.

3. Being and Appearing Husserl, in the Crisis, attempted to resolve the paradox of human subjectivity by situating human subjectivity as an object, thus distinguishing it from the ultimately constituting subjectivity (or consciousness) that the epoch e uncovers. According to the above analyses, this ultimately constituting consciousness, if it is to be apprehended, must also be an object. It must be a being that shows itself across the moments of time. To make it such, however, is to face the difculty of the regress.

40 How can transcendental phenomenology resolve this difculty? Isnt it the case, as we cited Carr, that its two views of the subject, transcendental and empirical, can be neither avoided nor reconciled? Dont we have to admit that it necessarily concludes in paradox? Expressed in terms of the regresses that bedevil the notion of an ultimately constituting time-consciousness, the paradox seems the inevitable result of understanding appearing in terms of being and understanding being in terms of appearing. Both conceptions are implicit in Husserls denition of a being (Seiendes) as that which appears or is present in extended time. As Husserl denes it: A being [is] a present being with the past of the same being, with the future coming to be of the same. Thus, in an original sense, a being = original, concrete presence. It is persisting presence which includes, as non-independent components in the stream of presences, both past and future.25 This means, as he elsewhere writes, Every concrete individual persists in time and is what it is because, constantly becoming, it passes from presence to presence.26 At least in the case of an immanent object, this equation of a being with a persisting presence implies that this objects being is one with its being-given i.e., its appearing. This follows because the immanent object exists (that is, has a being that endures through time) through the same constitutive process that makes it appear i.e., be perceptually present to consciousness.27 Both presuppose the process of its temporal constitution. Thus, when Husserl asks, Isnt the tone an immanent object, whose esse = percipi? he answers in the afrmative: The tone is thinkable only as presently existing or having just existed, etc.; it is, thus, unthinkable without a perceiving, constituting consciousness that gives it sense and unity.28 Husserl makes the same point when he asks with regard to immanent objects as such (immanente Gegenst ande u berhaupt): Is not their esse the same as their percipi . . .? Is their being not inseparably one with the being of their constitutive process? If, however, we grant this, we fall once again into the regress. If the being of an immanent object is one with the process that constituted it, this constituting process, insofar as it exists and is given as an immanent object, would also be one with the lower level process that constituted it, and so on.29 The general form of all regresses we have considered should now be clear. It is that every appearing, taken as an existing appearing, points back to a further appearing, which insofar as it exists, has its modes of givenness or appearing, and thus points back to a further appearing, and so on ad innitum. The hyletic datum, for example, has, as existent, its modes of appearing, which, as existent, have their own modes of appearing. Given this relation between being and appearing, we have to say with Husserl: Excluding their apprehension,30 the being of these data is included in their being immanently perceived. What about the perception of these data themselves? If [these perceptions] are also immanent objects, then their being (Sein) consists in their being immanently perceived (Wahrgenommensein). But if this is true,

41 as Husserl immediately asks, then dont we arrive at the innite regresses?31 The same point, we noted, holds for constituting subjectivity understood as a being, i.e., as something that appears through modes of givenness. Taking such modes as a more ultimate time-constituting consciousness, and taking this consciousness as a being that has to be given through its own modes of givenness simply drives the regress further. To avoid this, we would have to say that appearing should not be ontologized. It is not to be taken as a being that has its own modes of appearing. Appearing or manifestation, in other words, is to be taken as its own category. It is not to be understood in terms of being. The philosopher who most forcefully expressed this view was the Czech phenomenologist, Jan Pato cka. His basic claim is that manifesting is, in itself, something completely original. This means that manifesting in itself, in that which makes it manifesting, is not reducible, cannot be converted into anything that manifests itself in manifesting.32 It is not some objective material structure. It is also not the structure of mind. Both exist and both can manifest themselves. But showing itself is not any of these things that show themselves, whether it is a psychic or physical object.33 Thus, we cannot say that showing is some physical process. It is also, however, not some mental, psychological process, both taken as existing realities. Not only is it not these, it cannot be deduced from them.34 It cannot be because such a deduction would already assume, in the content of its terms, the very showing that it was trying to deduce.35 According to Pato cka, this point is continually ignored in the history of 36 philosophy. Again and again, we nd that peculiar slide from the problem of manifesting to the problem of existence. This is particularly evident in Platos account of the divided line. Each section of the line marks a distinct mode of appearing. But, as Pato cka remarks, instead of a completely autonomous problematic of manifesting, the problematic of a determined ladder of existents is introduced. Thus, Plato, in Pato ckas reading, saw this fundamental difference [in manifesting], except he constantly interprets it as if it were a difference between various degrees of existents and not a difference between stages and aspects of manifesting as such.37 A similar claim is made regarding Husserl. The tendency to ontologize the process of appearing occurs when Husserl interprets his description of the how of appearing as a description of transcendental subjectivity. The description of the phenomena thus becomes a description of a subject whose accomplishment are phenomena.38 Modes of givenness become ontologized as modes of transcendental subjectivity.39 For both Pato cka and Carr, there is a fundamental difculty in this procedure. It can be put in terms of the givenness of transcendental versus empirical subjectivity. The features of the latter can be described. In David Carrs words, the empirical subject has a personal history; it has properties and states that distinguish it as a thing from other things of the world. The same point, however, does not hold for the transcendental subject the subject that is

42 assumed to accomplish the phenomena. As a subject for the world, the transcendental subject, Carr writes, is empty or undetermined. He explains this by noting that as consciousness of, it derives its sense from what it is of. It is nothing but its intentional relation to the world; its only content is the intentional content of its objects. But these are not properties or determinations of the transcendental subject; whether they exist or not, they transcend the subject and its intentions; they are in no way to be considered really inherent parts of it.40 Carrs claim is that transcendental subjectivity does not, as such, appear. What appears are its objects. Pato cka radicalizes this claim by noting its implication for phenomenological reection. Husserl, he says, thought that such subjectivity had to be posited because, in order that something manifest itself, it has to manifest itself to someone. From this, Husserl drew the conclusion that manifesting is always mediated by some kind of subjectivity.41 To capture this subjective being in the original, we need only the act of turning inward to reect on it. This act, however, does not exist. It cannot, since the mediating subjectivity the act aims at does not show itself. What we nd instead, as Pato cka says, is that mediating by the subject shows itself . . . directly in [the] things showing themselves to us. . . . for example, that we have a cup in its original which is always in radii of givenness, and nally crosses into decient modes of givenness and then the surroundings and so on . . .. These are what show themselves. In other words, the supposed turn to constituting subjectivity is a turn to such elements. As Pato cka adds, only these indications, references, and this whole system of indicators is subjectivity, is us.42 Implicit in this last conclusion is that what we are calling transcendental subjectivity is nothing but this whole system of adequate and inadequate modes of givenness. Transcendental subjectivity, in other words, is simply the process of manifestation. In seeing modes of givenness as modes of an existing transcendental subject, Husserl, in Pato ckas view, reverses their true relationship: the modes of what we have been calling transcendental subjectivity are actually modes of givenness. If we accept this, then we cannot say that there are two subjectivities, empirical and transcendental. Only the rst, the human subjectivity that is an appearing object in the world, exists. In place of transcendental subjectivity, considered as a being, there is only the process of manifestation as such. This process can be opposed to empirical self-consciousness only when we ontologize it into a transcendental selfconsciousness, i.e., a consciousness of transcendental subjectivity taken as a being. It is at this point that we have two opposing concepts of subjectivity with the resulting paradox of incompatible descriptions of our selfhood. The paradox disappears when we admit that we are, as beings, empirical subjects. We then say that empirical self-consciousness is the manifesting of a particular subject, while manifestation as such is simply the structured process, the how of appearing, that any manifestation of an object be it a person or

43 a thing follows. The same point holds with regard to the paradox of the innite regress of time-constituting consciousnesses. If we follow Pato ckas insight, we have to say that the structures and processes that Husserl describes under the rubric of time-consciousness are not those of subjectivity, but rather those of manifesting as such. The regress, as we saw, only follows when we attempt to ontologize these and take them as descriptions of an ultimate consciousness. It is then that we face the question of the modes of givenness (the manifestation) of this consciousness and continue the regress by taking such modes as pertaining to a prior consciousness, one which has to be constituted through its own modes of givenness. Such a regress is cut off from the beginning when we assert with Pato cka that manifesting is, in itself, something completely original, i.e., something that cannot be derived from anything other than itself.

4. Reection and Constitution This insistence on manifestation, while resolving the paradox of the two subjectivities, has a singular drawback. It succeeds by denying transcendental subjectivity and, hence, the possibility of transcendental reection. For Pato cka, the empirical subject that remains is simply one more worldly entity among others. In his words, The subject to whom everything shows itself [i.e., the subject for the world] is empty, while the subject that has content (das erf ullte Subjekt) exhibits neither advantage nor precedence over other worldly realties . . ..43 Thus, when we reect on the transcendental subject, we come up empty-handed. Reecting on the empirical subject, however, gives us only worldly (i.e., causal) rather than transcendental processes. For Pato cka this signies that we have no phenomenological justication for speaking of the intentionality of consciousness. This is because what makes possible such intentionality intentions, hyletic data, and, in general, constitution is not present in the worldly subject.44 From the phenomenological perspective, the drawback, then, is the implicit elimination of the very possibility of its reective methodology. Is there a way to embrace the originary nature of manifestation and avoid this implication? Is there a solution to the paradox of subjectivity that can be formulated in Husserlian terms without abandoning Husserls account of subjectivity or Pato ckas insistence on manifestation? An answer, I believe, can be found by noting Husserls views on causality, constitution, and the possibility of reecting on subjective performances. To speak rst of causality, we need only mention that Husserls position on its universal applicability underwent a radical development. In the Logical Investigations, he accepted Kants view that all real relations including the real relation between the

44 act of judgment and its law-bound conditions were causally determined. As a consequence, he could assert, My act of judging 2 2 = 4 is no doubt causally determined. . ..45 The difculties associated with such a view, however, caused him to modify it.46 He later came to see that the conception of a universal causality was an idealization assumed by the natural sciences.47 As such, it cannot be phenomenologically justied. In particular, we cannot phenomenologically assert that the experiences of the actual, empirical subject are causally determined and, hence, offer only worldly (causal) processes for reection.48 What about Pato ckas insistence that when I do reect on my experience, what appears to me are not my acts or the material they animate, but rather the appearing-characters (Erscheinungscharaktere) of what is appearing?49 This conclusion follows from the assumption that the subject to whom the world is given is empty or undetermined. Its only content is the intentional content of its objects. As intentional, this content transcends the subject. The subject, then, is empty insofar as this transcendent content is not really an inherent part of the subject. Before giving Husserls response to this argument, we have to recast it in his terms which are those of constitution. Limiting ourselves to the perceptual realm, we can say that, for Husserl, a constituted object is per se intentional. This is because, as constituted, it is a one-in-many with regard to the experiences out of which it is constituted. This means that the constituted object expresses the identical sense of such experiences. Each is an experience of it; hence, the object is the one thing that the many experiences intend. Its transcendence comes from the fact that, as a one-inmany, i.e., as an identical sense, it is on a different level than these multiple experiences. As Husserl expresses this in the Bernau Manuscripts, As for the identical sense, it is no real, inherent part of the experiences.50 Given this, how can Husserl continually assert the possibility of reection? Isnt it the case that for something to appear, it must be constituted? As constituted, however, doesnt it have to transcend the constituting subject? To answer these questions, we must rst observe that constitution, for Husserl, is a multi-layered process. Correspondingly, the experience that functions in constitution is itself multi-layered. Thus, for Husserl, my experience of a state of affairs is constituted out of and transcends my experiences of the things composing it. It is no real inherent part (reeles St uck) of the latter. Similarly, my experience of each of these things is itself something constituted. The particular perspectival views through which I perceive a physical thing, for example, are not this thing. The thing presents itself through perspectives; but such perspectives do not exhibit themselves perspectivally in the same manner as a spatial-temporal thing does. This, however, does not mean that they do not have their own ways of exhibiting themselves. Each perspectival view, considered as a momentary experience of the object, is a hyletic datum. It is a content-lled moment that, after its initial givenness,

45 is experienced as receding in time i.e., as a moment that has been but is no longer now. This content-lled moment is itself constituted. We experience it as given in a denite moment in our experience of the object because we constitute it through rst protending and then retaining the primary impression that gives us its content. Thus, it can itself be seen as an identical sense. As such, it can be said to transcend the hyletic material the primary impression, retentions and protentions through which we experience it. Now, given this multi-layered structure, we cannot say that the fact that an object necessarily transcends the experience that constitutes it makes it unavailable to reection. To assert this is to forget that what counts as a constituted object on one level can, on a higher level, also count as a constituting experience. My point is that what we call consciousness or subjectivity embraces multiple layers of constituted experiences. What is considered as transcendent on one layer can, on the next, be considered as immanent. What about the assertion that for something to appear, it must be constituted? Does this force us to admit that consciousness is empty on the lowest, non-constituted level? The argument here is that on the lowest level, nothing appears. Everything appearing, everything that could give consciousness some content, transcends the ultimate, non-constituting consciousness. With this argument, we return to the problem of the regress. To avoid the notion of an empty consciousness, we have to give it some content, i.e., make it appear. But if everything appearing is constituted, we must posit a lower level consciousness, one composed of the constituting experiences through which the supposed ultimate consciousness is able to appear. The same holds for this lower level consciousness, and so on ad innitum. Husserls solution for this difculty can be drawn from his remarks in the appendices to the 1905 Lectures on Time Consciousness as well as several of the Bernau manuscripts. It consists in breaking the tie between appearing and constitution. As Husserl came to realize, the schema that denes constitution, that of taking individual contents as experiences of some higher level objectivity, no longer applies on the basic level. The primary hyletic materials are not the result of a lower level apperception (Auffassung) of even more primary contents (Inhalte).51 Such hyletic materials are non-constituted and, hence, really immanent in the ultimate consciousness.52 Their non-constituted status, however, does not prevent them from appearing.53 In fact, such materials form the basic elements of appearing as such. Thus, the primary impressions are the constantly new appearing of, say, a tone as it continually lls the now of our experience with fresh content. The series of primary retentions are the appearing of the dying away (Abklang) of this content; while the primary protentions are the appearing of the approaching (i.e., the experiences of empty expectation) of fresh content. In this description of the primary, nonconstituted level, experience and appearing are used as synonymous terms. This is unavoidable, given that we

46 can only distinguish them in terms of constitution, i.e., in terms of its one-inmany structure. Thus, it is legitimate to say that the multitude of retentions, impressions, and protentions are experiences constitutive of the appearing hyletic data. They give such data their appearing in immanent time. Each, when taken in connection with the other members of this multitude, can be considered an experience of this temporal appearing. At this point we can use the schema of Auffassung and Inhalte. We can say that we apprehend the data as experiences of an objectivity that transcends such data. The schema, however, cannot apply to a single item of this material.54 We cannot, for example, take an individual retention as an experience of an appearing content that transcends it. The same holds for a primary impression. The latter does not, in itself point to or intend a transcendent hyletic datum. This means that each item composing the primary material can be indifferently described as both an appearing and an experience. Its implicit intentionality, its pointing to an appearing beyond itself, is not yet realized. Each, in other words, is both a content and an intention. Such content, however, is not yet an appearing temporally determinate object; similarly the intention is not yet an otherdirected experience.55 Only when we can make this distinction can we begin to speak about immanent subjective experiences and transcendent intentional objects. In fact, only then can we phenomenologically justify distinguishing subject from object or talk about appearing as requiring mediation by a subject. On the primary level, these terms are not yet applicable. On this level, appearing is unmediated. The above response, thus, in no way implies a rejection of Pato ckas assertion that manifesting is, in itself, something completely original; it does not signify that manifesting can be derived from something other than itself. To assert that primary, non-constituted materials of constitution are the basic elements of appearing as such is to admit in advance the originality of appearing. This, however, does not preclude us from seeing the basic structures of manifestation as those of constitution. If we do, then we can take the structures and processes that Husserl describes under the rubric of time-consciousness as those of manifestation. This implies that manifestation is not a static, but rather a dynamic process, one proceeding constitutively, level by level, with the ow of time. To analyze this process is not to reduce appearing to being and, hence, to fall into the paradox of the two subjectivities. It is rather to grasp the apriori of the ongoing genesis of the appearing of being.56 From a Husserlian perspective, then, the value of Pato cka insistence on manifestation is that of a constant reminder to keep in mind the original meaning of the epoch e. Understood as a restraint from taking a stand on the issue of existence, it can be taken as guarding us against the difculties that follow from our conating the question of appearing with that of being.57 Positively, it can be regarded as a reminder of the original impulse behind the phenomenological project: that of attending to the phenomena themselves.

47 Notes
1. Die Parodoxie der menschlichen Subjektivit at: das Subjektsein f ur die Welt und zugleich Objektsein in der Welt (Die Krisis der Europ aischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Ph anomenologie, 2nd. ed., ed. W. Biemel, Hua VI, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, p. 182). 2. In Husserls words, . . . consciousness, considered in purity, must count as a selfcontained connection of being (Seinszusammenhang), as a connection of absolute being (absoluten Seins) into which nothing can enter and from which nothing can slip away, a connection which has no spatial-temporal outside . . . (Ideen zu einer reinen Ph anomenologie und ph anomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, ed. R. Schuhmann, the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, Hua III, 1, p. 105). See also, ibid., p. 120, and the comments of the Nachwort in Ideen zu einer reinen Ph anomenologie und ph anomenologischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch, ed. M. Biemel, the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, Hua IV, p. 146). A later expression of the same position occurs in the assertion: The absolute has its ground in itself; and, in its non-grounded being (grundlosen Sein), it has its absolute necessity as the single, absolute substance (absolute Substanz).. . . All essential necessities are moments of its fact (Factum), are modes of its functioning in relation to itself its modes of understanding itself or being able to understand itself (Ms. E III 9, Nov. 5, 1931, in Zur Ph anomenologie der Intersubjektivit at, Dritter Teil: 19291935, ed. Iso Kern, the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, Hua XV, p. 386). All translations from Husserl are my own. 3. In Husserls words, I am the only one. Whatever exists for me is my own from the singularity in which I function. In German: Ich bin der Einzige. Was immer f ur mich ist, ist mir eigen aus der Einzigkeit, in der ich fungiere (Ms. C 2 I, p. 2a). A similar sentiment is expressed in Ms. B IV 5 (1932 or 1933), Zur Finks 6 Meditation, where Husserl writes: In an absolute sense, this ego is the only one. It does not allow of being meaningfully multiplied. Put more pointedly: it excludes this as senseless. The implication is: The surpassing being (Ubersein) of an ego is nothing more than a continuous, primordially streaming constituting. It is a constituting of various levels of existents (or worlds) . . . (Zur Ph an. der Intersubj., Hua XV, pp. 589590). I wish to thank the director of the Husserl Archives, Prof. Rudolf Bernet, for permission to cite from the Nachla. 4. Krisis, Hua VI, 183. 5. David Carr, The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 9. 6. Ibid., p. 43. 7. Ibid., p. 44. 8. In Carrs words, Only empirical apperception gives us a description of an object that exists in the world together with other objects. Transcendental apperception, by contrast, represents an I that is not part of the (sensible) world at all, by virtue of standing conceptually (that is, intentionally) over against or distinct from it, and by virtue of possessing a property (spontaneity) that rules out its inclusion in the world (ibid., p. 45). 9. Ibid., p. 96. 10. Ibid., p. 91. 11. Ideen I, Hua III, 1, p. 120. 12. The Paradox of Subjectivity, p. 91. 13. For a more extensive account of why the positing of a being always involves a co-positing of its sense, see James Mensch, Postfoundational Phenomenology: Husserlian Reections on Presence and Embodiment, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001, pp. 132136.

48
14. Constitution for Husserl is synthesis. In his words, Konstituieren ist kontinuierliche und diskrete Synthesen immer wieder herstellen (Ms. C 3 III, p. 33a). In Husserls eyes at least, there is on this point a close relation between his position and Kants. In his May 1st, 1924 lecture, Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie, Husserl declares that Kants project is his own (Erste Philosophie (1923/1924), Erste Teil, Kritische Ideengeschichte, ed. R. Boehm, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956, Hua VII, p. 240). This project, he writes in 1927, involves . . . die Einsicht, dass die Welt, die f ur uns ist, erst in unserer Erkenntnis f ur uns u berhaupt ist und dass sie f ur uns nichts anderes ist als in unserer Erfahrung und in unserem Denken sich unter dem Titel objektive Erkenntnis gestaltende (Natur und Geist, ed. Michael Weiler, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001, Hua XXXII, p. 98). 15. The Paradox of Subjectivity, p. 91. 16. Krisis, Hua VI, p. 188. 17. Ibid., p. 187. 18. Ibid., p. 186. 19. Ibid., p. 172. 20. See ibid., pp. 115116, 155156. 21. Die Bernauer Manuskripte u ber das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18), ed. R. Bernet and D. Lohmar, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001, Hua XXXIII, 184185. In terms of the time-diagram of the lectures on inner-time consciousness (Hua X), this sinking back can be represented as the downward movement along the vertical line that extends from the now point. 22. Die Bernauer Manuskripte., Hua XXXIII, p. 185. Another expression of the same regress occurs when Husserl writes: The tones have their temporal modes of givenness, which are in a certain sense one dimensional multiplicities, in which the time of the tone presents itself (as objective time). . . . This one-dimensional multiplicity of temporal modes of givenness is also temporally ordered; it also has its time; but this time also has its modes of givenness, its present and past, and once again, these modes of givenness are temporally ordered, etc. . . . And thus the chain reoccurs (ibid., pp. 130131). 23. Sind wir vor Gefahren unendlicher Regresse wirklich durch die Annahme unbewusster, nicht intentionaler, nicht konstituierter Prozesse wohlbeh utet, und ist diese Annahme u berhaupt ausdenkbar? F uhrt sie nicht auf gr obste Verkehrtheiten? (ibid., p. 200). Prominent among the absurdities Husserl mentions are those involving the schema of apperceptions (Auffassungen) and contents (Inhalte). Assuming that the unconscious (unbewusste) process is one where the primal stream lacks the apperceptions that would make it conscious, Husserl notes that such apprehensions could not afterwards gain any footing in an unconscious succession. Suppose that such unconscious contents could be apperceived, how would we explain, for example, the fact that one is apperceived as, say, tonal content while another is taken as, say, a color content. The interpretation of an unconscious content seems to be completely arbitrary (see ibid., p. 202). 24. Ibid., p. 207. 25. (Ms. C 13, III, p. 31b, March 1934). In German: Seiendes, gegenw artig Seiendes mit Vergangenheit desselben Seienden, k unftig Seinwerden desselben. So ist im urspr unglichen Sinne Seiendes eine urspr unglich konkrete Pr asenz, es ist dauernde Pr asenz, die als unselbst andige Komponenten im Str omen der Pr asenz Vergangenheit und Zukunft einschliet. 26. In German: Jeder konkrete Individuum dauert in der Zeit und ist, was es ist, indem es vom Pr asenz zu Pr asenz stetig werden u bergeht. An early expression of this equation occurs in Investigation II, 8 of the Logische Untersuchungen where Husserl writes: What is real is the individual with all its components; it is a here and now. Temporality for us is a sufcient characteristic feature of reality. Real being and temporal being are not identical concepts, but they do have the same range. In German: Real ist das Individuum mit all seinen

49
Bestandst ucken; es ist ein Hier und Jetzt. Als charakteristisches Merkmal der Realit at gen ugt uns die Zeitlichkeit. Reales Sein und zeitliches Sein sind zwar nicht identische, aber umfangsgleiche Begriffe (Logische Untersuchungen, 5th ed., 3 vols., T ubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968, II/1, 123). Thus, for Husserl, the process that constitutes a temporal object (Zeitgegenstandsgegebenheit konstituierender Prozess) necessarily pertains to the essence of every perception (Bernauer Manuskripte, Hua XXXIII, p. 190). The reverse is also the case: Denken wir uns nun immanente Gegenst ande u berhaupt: Was sind die Bedingungen der M oglichkeit ihrer Wahrnehmung? Nat urlich, wenn sie wahrgenommen sind, sind sie es im konstituierenden Prozess, der selbst ihr Wahrnehmen ist . . . (ibid., p. 191). Ibid., p. 159. In German: Aber ist der Ton nicht immanenter Gegenstand, dessen esse = percipi ist? Der Ton ist nur denkbar als jetzt seiend oder soeben gewesen seiend etc. und somit undenkbar ohne ein Bewusstsein, das ihm als wahrnehmendes, konstituierendes Sinn und Einheit gibt. In Husserls words, Von da aus ergibt sich alsbald die n achste Frage: Wie steht es mit den konstitutiven Prozessen, also den Zeitgegenst anden der n achsten ur-ph anomenalen Stufe? Ihre Wahrnehmung setzt wieder die Form des konstituierenden Prozesses voraus. Das scheint auf einen unendlichen Regress zu f uhren, da die Wahrnehmbarkeit dieses Prozesses wieder einen zweiten zu fordern scheint usw (Bernauer Manuskripte, Hua XXXIII, p. 191). Such apprehension (Erfassung) involves not just appearing but also the interpretation (Auffassung) of this appearing. F ur die Wahrnehmung immanenter hyletischer Daten spitzt sich das Problem so zu: Das Sein dieser Daten ist beschlossen in ihrem immanent Wahrgenommensein (Erfassung nat urlich ausgeschlossen). Wie steht es dann mit der Wahrnehmung dieser Daten selbst? Sind sie auch immanente Gegenst ande, so besteht auch ihr Sein in ihrem immanent Wahrgenommensein kommen wir da nicht zu unendlichen Regressen? (Bernauer Manuskripte, Hua XXXIII, p. 107). Jan Pato cka, Plato and Europe, trans. Petr Lom, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 24. Showing is not then, as it may seem, only just an objective structure, because the objective, material structure is that which shows itself. Showing is also not mind and it is not the structure of mind, because that is also just a thing, it is also something that is and that eventually can also manifest itself. . . . showing itself is not any of these things that show themselves, whether it is a psychic or physical object . . . and yet it is still showing of those things (ibid., p. 22). As Pato cka writes: . . . the world of phenomena, the world of phenomenal lawful order, is independent of the world of realities, of the world of actuality. It is never possible to deduce manifesting as such, as we said, either from objective or psychical structures. It cannot be done (ibid., p. 31). The fallacy here is that of the petio principii. As Pato cka also expresses this: Es ist ja von vornherein klar, da die Gesetzm aigkeit des Erscheinens in seinem Erscheinen keineswegs die des Erscheinenden in seinen Eigenstrukturen, besonders in seinen Kausalbeziehungen sein kann. Ich kann nicht auf das Erscheinende rekurrieren, um die Erscheinung in ihrem Erscheinen zu kl aren, denn das Verst andnis des Erscheinens ist bei jeder These u ber das erscheinende Seiende schon vorausgesetzt (Der Subjektivismus der Husserlschen und die M oglichkeit einer asubjektiven Ph anomenologie in Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, ed. K. Nellen, J. Nemic, and I. Srubar, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991, p. 278). All translations from the original German of this text are my own.

27.

28.

29.

30. 31.

32. 33.

34.

35.

50
36. 37. 38. 39. See ibid., pp. 287296. Plato and Europe, pp. 146147. Ibid., p. 164. As Potocka elsewhere writes: Vielleicht ist die Hauptquelle des Miverst andnisses des Erscheinungsproblems als solchem gerade dies, da man Erscheinungsstruktur mit der Struktur eines Erscheinenden verwechselte oder vermengte. Es gibt eine Erscheinungsstruktur bedeutet nicht es gibt ein Seiendes, ein Dies-da, das man Erscheinung nennen kann. Erscheinen als solches ist kein Seiendes und es kann nicht wie auf Seiendes darauf hingewiesen werden. Weil er diese Unterscheidung (zwar irgendwie im Sinne hat, aber) nicht ausdr ucklich vollzieht, sucht Husserl nach einem absolut gegebenen Seienden, statt nach der Gegebenheit des Seienden, meinetwegen einer absoluten, zu fahnden (Epoch e und Reduktion in den F unf Vorlesungen in Jan Pato ckas Vom Erscheinen als solchem: Texte aus dem Nachla, eds. Helga Blaschek-Hahn and Karel Novotny, Freiburg/M unchen: Verlag Karl Alber, 2000, p. 119; all translations from the original German of this text are my own.). The reference to an absolut gegebenen Seienden is to transcendental subjecitivity in the immanent givenness of its experiences (Erlebnisse). Pato ckas point is that we should neither subjectivize nor ontologize such Erlebnisse. What one actually confronts are appearances and their modes. According to Pato cka, Husserl subjectivizes these by calling them experiences. He ontologizes them by taking them as forming a realm of absolute being this being the realm of absolute consciousness. See above, Note 2. The Paradox of Subjectivity, p. 94. The point holds for its content in general, given that for such content to appear it has to be constituted as appearing in time. Plato and Europe, pp.142143. Ibid., p. 143. Given this, the phenomenological reduction is not a reduction to the sphere of immanent subjective experiences. Rather, it signies a limitation to the sphere of pure self-givenness i.e., that of appearance as such. In Pato ckas words, Die ph anomenologische Reduktion bedeutet nicht die Einschr ankung auf die Sph are der reellen Immanenz, auf die Sph are des im absoluten Dies der cogitatio reell Beschlossenen, sie bedeutet u berhaupt nicht Einschr ankung auf die Sph are der cogitatio, sondern die Beschr ankung auf die Sph are der reinen Selbstgegebenheiten, auf die Sph are dessen, u ber das nicht nur geredet und das nicht nur gemeint wird, . . . Beschr ankung auf die Sph are der reinen Evidenz (Epoch e und Reduktion in den F unf Vorlesungen, ed. cit., p. 136). Das Subjekt, dem das All sich zeigt, ist leer, w ahrend das erf ullte Subjekt weder Vorzug noch Vorrang vor anderen Weltrealit aten aufweist . . . (ibid., p. 123). Dagegen ist es klar, da gerade diejenigen Dinge, welche Husserl z.B. als Selbstgegebenes anspricht, Wahrnehmungen, Denkakte, hyletische Daten, keine Gegebenheiten sind, sondern kausal konstruierte Begriffe, welche aus dem Gedanken der psychophysischen Interaktion entspringen (ibid., p. 122). The psychophysical interaction he refers to is that of real sense data coming from outside and affecting a real empirical subject. Pato ckas point is that these phenomenological concepts are pure constructions arising from an illegitmate mixture of the structures of appearing with those of the empirical subject (see ibid., pp. 122123). The same holds for the phenomenological conception of constitution: Dingkonstitution ist nichts als eine Kontamination der Erscheinungsstruktur mit der empirische Subjekbetrachtung . . . (ibid., pp. 137138). Pato cka, thus, asserts: Aus all diesen Gr unden kann es aber auch keine Intentionalit at des Bewutseins geben. Nicht am Ich und im Ichlichen gibt es Verweisungen, sondern am Erscheinenden selbst (ibid., p. 123). It should be noted that for Husserl this in no way implies that the truth that I utter is itself causally determined. Thus, the full assertion here is: My act of judging 2 2 = 4 is no doubt causally determined, but this is not true of the truth 2 2 = 4 (Logische

40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

45.

51
Untersuchungen, I, 119). This follows because the ideal relation between contents of judgment on which this truth depends is not the real relation between the act of judgment and its law-bound conditions (I, 138). The latter may cause me to judge incorrectly, but this does not undermine the objective validity of the laws I violate in making my incorrect assertion. In fact, as Husserl writes, This ideal impossibility of a negative proposition does not clash with the real possibility of a negative act of judgment. In other words, we are free to say, . . . the proposition is absurd, but the act of judgment is not causally ruled out (I, 141). In fact, the unanswered question of the Logical Investigations is how a causally determined real subject could grasp such an ideal relation. In De Boers words, it is: How can one combine the postulation of eternal norms [accessible to a subject] with a naturalistic interpretation of consciousness? (Zusammenfassung, in De Ontwikkelingsgang in Het Denken van Husserl, Assen, 1966, p. 582). The difculty is: on the one hand, these acts are empirically necessary and determined; on the other hand, an idea realizes itself in them through which they claim apodictic validity. How can both these views be combined? (p. 589). Thus, in the Krisis, Husserl draws a sharp distinction between the causality of a body (K orper) and that of an ego as it interacts with other egos or holds sway over its own body (see Hua VI, pp. 221222). The conation of the two arises when we forget that mathematical-physical nature . . . the nature of the exact natural sciences is not the nature that we actually experience, which is that of the life-world. The former is, rather, eine aus Idealisierung entsprungene, der wirklich angeschauten Natur hypothetisch substituierte Idee (ibid., p. 224). There is here a simple, yet far reaching category mistake. Basing itself on observed relations between experiences, the natural science Husserl is criticising attempts to make its empirically derived concepts explanatory of experience per se. Thus, natural causality, taken as an empirical concept, has its basis in appearing relations of dependency. Granting this, we cannot make it explanatory of that which it presupposes, i.e., appearance per se. Another way of expressing this category mistake is to note with Husserl that an experience does not appear perspectivally the way a thing does (Ideen I, Hua III/1, p. 88). It cannot since a things appearing involves an ordering (Zusammenhang) of experiences and not just an individual experience. By itself, then, the experience does not have the appearing which would allow us to posit it as a spatial-temporal thing. Since causal relations apply to spatial-temporal things, we cannot say that the experience as such is subject to causalty. Es wird n amlich am Beispiel der inneren Erfassung von Wahrnehmung als aktuellem Erlebnis und Wahrnehmung in der Phantasie und Erinnerung zu zeigen versucht, daman auf ein inneres Erlebnis blicken, es gegenw artig wahrnehmen oder in anderen Akten sich vergegenw artigen kann . . . . Doch dies alles erscheint mir gegen uber, nicht auf meiner Ichseite; es sind Erscheinungscharaktere des Erscheinenden, nicht desjenigen, dem solche Dinge erscheinen (Epoch e und Reduktion in den F unf Vorlesungen, ed. cit., p. 118). So weit also der identische Sinn in Frage ist, haben wir kein reelles St uck des Erlebnisses (Die Bernauer Manuskripte, Hua, XXXIII, p. 158). This insight rst appears in a note to the Lectures from the Year 1905. Husserl observes, without further comment: Not every constitution has the schema: apprehension-content apprehension (Auffassungsinhalt Auffassung) (Zur Ph anomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, ed. R. Boehm, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, Hua X, p. 7, n. 1). With regard to retention, this implies that memorial consciousness really contains . . . intuitive, primary memory of the tone, and must not be divided into sensed tone and apprehension as memory (ibid., p. 312). What we have here is a direct appearing that is not the result of a constitutive process. Were we to make appearing dependent on constitution, we would, as

46.

47.

48.

49.

50. 51.

52
Husserl notes, fall into a regress: If one says that every content comes to consciousness only by means of an act of apprehension directed towards it, then the question immediately arises about the consciousness in which this act of apprehension, which is surely a content itself, becomes conscious, and an innite regress is unavoidable. But if every content is primally conscious in itself and necessarily, the question about a further giving consciousness becomes meaningless (ibid., p. 119). Thus, the solution to avoiding the regress involves (1) breaking the dependence of appearing on constitution and (2) asserting that the primary hyletic materials are directly apprehended. As Brough puts this in the Translators Introduction: primal impression, retention, and protention do have in common . . . that they intend immanent temporal objects; but they do not do so as forms of perception [which involve the schema]; they are instead modes of impressional consciousness (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time [18931917], trans. John Brough, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, p. xlix). This means, he adds on the next page, Retention just is the direct and immediate consciousness of what is past as it elapses: It really contains consciousness of the past of the tone (324) and nothing else. As pure or, perhaps better, sheer intentionality, the momentary phase is no longer bloated with apprehension- and content-continua (ibid., p. xl). Nur muss dabei scharf im Auge behalten werden, . . . dass damit nicht etwa gesagt ist, dass das jetzt auf der innersten Linie fungierende Reelle ein Empndungsdatum sei wie das in der Linie immanenter Zeitgegebenheiten, also ein seinerseits wieder vor dem auffassenden Bewusstsein schon Konstituiertes. Das Reelle der innersten Sph are ist ein Letztes, nicht mehr Konstituiertes, nicht mehr konkrete Einheit von anderweitig konstituierten Mannigfaltigkeiten, und es ist, was es ist, nur als Inhalt, als reeller Kern des urpr asentierenden Bewusstseins, ohne dieses undenkbar (Die Bernauer Manuskripte, Hua XXXIII, pp. 178179). The assertion that this primary material must appear occurs as early as 1911: It is just nonsense to talk about an unconscious content that would only subsequently become conscious. Consciousness is necessarily consciousness in each of its phases. Just as the retentional phase is conscious of the preceding phase without making it into an object, so too the primal datum is already intended specically, in the original form of the now without its being something objective (Zur Ph anomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Hua X, p. 119). This holds throughout the constitutive process. A single, momentary perspective view, is not of anything transcendent. For the Auffassung that directs itself to a spatial-temporal object to work, it must have a multitude of such views. Without these, it cannot grasp a one-in-many. In the Bernau Manuscripts, this position appears when Husserl asks whether the primary presentation, taken as a punctual phase, is itself intentional: Ist, m ussen wir fragen, Urpr asentation ein Bewusstsein von einem Urpr asenten, also ist diese punktuelle Phase in sich schon charakterisiert als ein intentionales Erlebnis? (Die Bernauer Manuskripte, Hua XXXIII, p. 62). Since intentionality depends on constitution, if this were the case, we would have to apply the schema, i.e., distinguish between apprehension and apprehension content: Danach w are also, wenn dies der Fall ist, in der Urpr asentation zwischen dem Erlebnis selbst und dem in ihm bewussten intentionalen Objekt zu unterscheiden und, da es ein anschauendes sein soll und pr asentierendes, zu scheiden zwischen reellen Daten als Auffassungsdaten und ihrem beseelenden Charakter der Auffassung (ibid.). To avoid this, we have to assert primary experience is not, per se intentional, but achieves this through being mediated by other such experiences. In Husserls words, the assumption is dass die Urpr asentation eine Ur-Erlebnisphase ist, die in sich selbst noch nicht den Charakter eines intentionalen Erlebnisses hat, aber stetig in ein solches, und zwar in ein

52.

53.

54.

55.

53
Bewusstsein von dem Urdatum, u bergeht, das aber in der Weise einer stetigen mittelbaren Intentionalit at (ibid.). 56. This is a genesis that begins with the appearing of what is not yet being. In Husserls words, on the lowest level, we nd das Vor-Sein, das alles Sein tr agt, auch das Sein der Akte und das Sein des Ich, ja auch das Sein der Vor-Zeit und das Sein des Bewutseinsstromes als Sein (Ms. C 17, p. 67b). The term, Vor-Sein, is appropriate since the hyletic materials composing the ultimate consciousness are not yet persisting unities in time and, hence, not yet beings. 57. It is to be noted that Pato cka himself occasionally falls prey to such conation when he talks about the being of appearing. He writes, for example, Es gibt ein ph anomenales Feld, ein Sein des Ph anomens als solchem, welches auf kein in ihm erscheinendes Seiendes zur uckzuf uhren ist, das also nie aus Seiendem, sei es naturhaft objektiver oder ichlich subjektiver Art, zu erkl aren ist. . . . Denn das ph anomenale Feld hat zwar kein autonomes, aber doch eigenes Sein, das eben in Zeigen besteht (Der Subjektivismus der Husserlschen und die M oglichkeit einer asubjektiven Ph anomenologie, pp. 302303).

Оценить