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Fuentes v. Roca G.R. No.

178902, April 21, 2010 Facts: -Sabina Tarrozza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Zamboanga City. Later on, she sold the same to her son Tarciano Roca under a deed of absolute sale, meanwhile, the latter has failed to register the same. After 6 years, Tarciano offered the lot to the petitioners (Fuentes spouses). An agreement to sell prepared by Atty. Plagata, among others was thereafter signed by the parties, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months. -Several conditions were required by such agreement, among others was that within 6 months Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Roca to the sale. -As soon as Tarciano has met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga, thereafter, a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of the Fuentes spouses. A new title was issued in favor of the spouses who constructed a building on the lot. -In 1997, 8 years after Tarciano and Rosario passed away, their children, together with Tarcianos sister who was represented by her son, filed an action for the annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC of Zamboanga on the ground that the sale was void for Rosarios consent was not secured and her signature on the affidavit was forged. -However the Fuentes spouses argued that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it and that the 4 year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed. -RTC- dismissed the case on the ground of prescription CA- reversed the RTCs decision and found sufficient evidence of forgery and that since Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since 1958, it also reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been forged. Issue: Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of th at sale to the spouses already prescribed? Held: Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wifes consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wifes consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. However, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code. In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without his wifes written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

Petition is denied and the CA decision is affirmed with modification directing respondents Roca to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the P200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989 until fully paid, chargeable against his estate and to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is made. Commissioner vs Hypermix 2012 On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued Memorandum CMO 27-2003. Wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%. Respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the (RTC) of Las Pias City. Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center. Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper. TC = ruled in favor of respondent. Trial court found that petitioners had not followed the basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. The appellate court, dismissed the appeal. W/N the basic requirements of hearing & publication was observed? SC = NO. Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit: Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons. xxx xxx xxx

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

Later, the Commissioner filed in the probate proceedings a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of P96,509.35 (the first assessment), stating that this liability had not yet been paid although the assessment had long become final and executory. Elegado regarded this motion as an implied denial of the protest filed against the second assessment, and actig on this belief, he filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals challenging the said assessment. The Commissioner in the end instead cancelled the second protested assessment in a letter to the decedent's estate, which was notified to the Court of Tax Appeals in a motion to dismiss on the ground that the protest had become moot and academic. The motion was granted and the petition dismissed, hence this petition.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down. In summary, petitioners violated respondents right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27 -2003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petition is DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether the appeal filed with the respondent court should be allowed on the ground that the first assessment is not final and executory because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who had no knowledge of our tax laws

HELD: Hells NO. Petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

RATIO: Since no appeal was made within the regulatory period, the same has become final. The petitioner no longer has a cause of action as can be seen from the express cancellation of the second assessment as it was precisely from this assessment that he was appealing.

ELEGADO vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Warren Taylor Graham, an American national formerly resident in the Philippines, died in Oregon, his son, Ward Graham, filed an estate tax return with the Philippine Revenue Representative in U.S.A. Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the decedent's estate an estate tax in the amount of P96,509.35 which was protested by the law firm of Bump, Young and Walker, a foreign law firm, on behalf of the estate. The protest was denied and no further action was taken by the estate in pursuit of that protest. Meanwhile, the decedent's will had been admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Oregon. Ward Graham, the designated executor, then appointed Ildefonso Elegado as his attorney-in-fact for the allowance of the will in the Philippines, which was eventually allowed with the petitioner as ancillary administrator. As such, he filed a second estate tax return with the BIR. The Commissioner imposed an assessment on the estate in a lower amount of P72,948.87, which was also protested to by the Agrava, Lucero and Gineta Law Office, This time a domestic law firm, on behalf of the estate.

The said assessment had been cancelled by virtue of the letter. The respondent court was on surer ground when it followed with the finding that the said cancellation had rendered the petition moot and academic. There was really no more assessment to review. The petitioner argues that the first assessment is not binding on him because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who had no knowledge of our tax laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals. The petitioner is clutching at straws. The petitioner cannot be serious when he argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting that they are excused from compliance therewith because of their ignorance? If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less bound by our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find. As no further action was taken thereon by the decedent's estate, there is no question that the assessment has become final and executory.

In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner cannot now raise the question of its validity before this Court any more than he could have done so before the Court of Tax Appeals. What the estate of the decedent should have done earlier, following the denial of its protest on July 7, 1978, was to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within the reglementary period of 30 days after it received notice of said denial. It was in such appeal that the petitioner could then have raised the first two issues he now raises without basis in the present petition. The assessment being no longer controversial or renewable, there was no justification for the respondent court to rule on the petition except to dismiss it. Fuentes v. Roca G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010 Facts: -Sabina Tarrozza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Zamboanga City. Later on, she sold the same to her son Tarciano Roca under a deed of absolute sale, meanwhile, the latter has failed to register the same. After 6 years, Tarciano offered the lot to the petitioners (Fuentes spouses). An agreement to sell prepared by Atty. Plagata, among others was thereafter signed by the parties, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months. -Several conditions were required by such agreement, among others was that within 6 months Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Roca to the sale. -As soon as Tarciano has met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affi davit in Zamboanga, thereafter, a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of the Fuentes spouses. A new title was issued in favor of the spouses who constructed a building on the lot. -In 1997, 8 years after Tarciano and Rosario passed away, their ch ildren, together with Tarcianos sister who was represented by her son, filed an action for the annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC of Zamboanga on the ground that the sale was void for Rosarios consen t was not secured and her signature on the affidavit was forged. -However the Fuentes spouses argued that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it and that the 4 year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed. -RTC- dismissed the case on the ground of prescription CA- reversed the RTCs decision and found sufficient evidence of forgery and that since Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since 1958, it also reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been forged. Issue: Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribe d? Held: Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wifes consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wifes consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. However, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code. In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real

property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without his wifes written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action. Petition is denied and the CA decision is affirmed with modification directing respondents Roca to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the P200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989 until fully paid, chargeable against his estate and to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is made. NCC 4 RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS REPUBLIC v. GRANADA Yolanda Cadacio Granada and Cyrus Granada got married in 1993. In 1994 Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time she had not received any communication from her husband notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked Cyrus relatives regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail. 9 years later, Yolanda filed a petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. RTC rendered a decision declaring him presumptively dead. The OSG filed an MR that Yolanda failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her wellfounded belief that he was already dead. RTC denied MR. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to elevate the case to the CA. Yolanda filed an MTD for lack of jurisdiction declaration of presumptive death under rule 41 of the FC is a summary proceeding thus the judgment thereon is immediately final and executor. CA granted the MTD. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in granting the MTD on the ground that the decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory hence not subject to appeal. NO. In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[6] the Republic likewise appealed the CAs affirmation of the RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was an error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA.

In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc,[7] issued a few months later.

In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent hus band for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under

the Rules of Court,[8] a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioners action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.

failed to discharge the burden of proving the allegation that its clients were foreign-based. Accenture filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc, but it only further affirmed the Divisions Decision and Resolution. Issue: Whether or not the CTA can apply the Burmeister case, even when petitioner had filed before the aforementioned case was even promulgated. Held: The Court stated that even though Accentures Petition was filed before Burmeister was promulgated, the pronouncements made in the said case may be applied to the case at bar without violating the rule against retroactive application. When the Court decides a case, it does not pass a new law, but merely interprets a pre-existing one. When the Court interpreted Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code in Burmeister, the interpretation became part of the law from the moment it became effective. The Court also stated that an interpretation of Section 102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code is an interpretation of Section 108 of the 1997 Tax Code, the latter being a mere reproduction of the former. The Court upheld the Decision of the CTA En Banc, concluding that petitioner failed to prove that its clients were doing business outside the Philippines, and merely presented evidence that its clients were foreign entities. U.P. vs DIZON Facts: On August 30, 1990, the UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baos (UPLB). In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three progress billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The third billing was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders to sue the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages. After trial, on November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Following the RTCs denial of its motion for reconsideration on May 7, 2002, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. Stern Builders opposed the notice of appeal on the ground of its filing being belated, and moved for the execution of the decision. The UP countered that the notice of appeal was filed within the regl ementary period because the UPs Office of Legal Affairs (OLS) in Diliman, Quezon City received the order of denial only on May 31, 2002. On September 26, 2002, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time and granted the private respondents motion for execution. The RTC issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002, and the sheriff of the RTC served the writ of execution and notice of demand upon the UP, through its counsel, on October 9, 2002. The UP filed an urgent motion to reconsider the order dated September 26, 2002, to quash the writ of execution dated October 4, 2002, and to restrain the proceedings. However, the RTC denied the urgent motion on April 1, 2003. On June 24, 2003, the UP assailed the denial of due course to its appeal through a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 24, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that the UPs notice of appeal had been filed late. The UP sought a reconsideration, b ut the CA denied the UPs motion for reconsideration on April 19, 2004. On May 11, 2004, the UP appealed to the Court by petition for review on certiorari. On June 23, 2004, the Court denied the petition for review. The UP moved for the reconsideration of the denial of its petition for review on August 29, 2004, but the Court denied the motion on October 6, 2004. The denial became final and executory on November 12, 2004. Issue:

We do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our ruling in Republic v. BermudezLorino. As observed by the CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar. At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled Republic v. Tango: In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. NOTE: Sorry ang gulo. I think it is about RoC v. FC regarding presumptive death.

Retroactivity of Laws Accenture v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (GR 190102, July 11, 2011)

Facts: On July 2004, petitioner Accenture filed with the Department of Finance (DoF) an administrative claim for refund or issuance of a Tax Credit Certificate (in the amount of P35,178,844.21) for having excess or unutilized input VAT credits earned from its zero-rated transactions. DoF did not act on the claim. On August 2004, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals. CIR argued that (1) Sale by Accenture of goods and services to its clients are not zero-rated transactions, (2) Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant and petitioner has failed to prove that it is entitled to a refund, because its claim has not been fully substantiated or documented. On November 2008, Division denied the petition. It ruled that petitioner failed to present evidence to prove that its foreign clients did business outside the Philippines. It fur ther ruled that petitioners services would qualify for zero-rating under the 1997 NIRC only if recipient of the services was doing business outside the Philippines. Division cited the January 2007 case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Burmeister as basis. On Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner argued, among others, that Burmeister, having been promulgated on January 22, 2007 (after petitioner filed with the division) cannot be made to apply to its case, MR was denied. On appeal, CTA En Banc concluded that petitioner

Whether or not the fresh period rule announced in Neypes v. CA can be given retroactive application? Held: Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. The rule is that it is on the counsel and not the client that the service should be made. That counsel was the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City, which was served with the denial only on May 31, 2002. As such, the running of the remaining period of six days resumed only on June 1, 2002, rendering the filing of the UPs notice of appeal on June 3, 2002 timely and well within the remaining days of the UPs period to appeal. Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing. However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution," is impervious to any serious challenge. This is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. xxx We have further said that a procedural rule that is amended for the benefit of litigants in furtherance of the administration of justice shall be retroactively applied to likewise favor actions then pending, as equity delights in equality. xxx It is cogent to add in this regard that to deny the benefit of the fresh-period rule to the UP would amount to injustice and absurdity injustice, because the judgment in question was issued on November 28, 2001 as compared to the judgment in Neypes that was rendered in 1998; absurdity, because parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 would enjoy the benefit of the fresh-period rule but the later rulings of the lower courts like that herein would not. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 167057. April 11, 2012.] NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and ESTER R. GUERZON, Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, respondents. FACTS: 1. In 1999, the National Electrification Administration ("NEA") published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, (IPB No. 80), for the supply and delivery of about 60,000 pieces of woodpoles and 20,000 pieces of crossarms needed in the country's Rural Electrification Project. The said contract consisted of four components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEA's projected allocation for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders, such as private respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their application for eligibility together with their technical proposals. At the same time, they were informed that only those who would pass the standard pre-qualification would be invited to submit their financial bids. Only four bidders, including private respondent Nerwin, qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80 contract. Qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of private respondent's [Nerwin's] manufacturing plants and facilities, including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEA's requirements. In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms, the NEA administrator recommended to NEA's Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP No. 80 However, NEA's Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 "given the time limitations for the delivery of the materials. Private respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder. On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to have filed a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted during the pre-qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent [Nerwin]. Finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and qualification of private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an injunction, which injunctive application was granted. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the Department of Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project (O-ILAW PROJECT) Upon learning of the issuance of requistion for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC against PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that requisition was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents' proposed bidding for the wooden poles. Respondents sought the dismissal of the case, stating that the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint.

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15. RTC granted a TRO 16. Respondent filed appeal with CA. CA granted petition and annulled and set aside the TRO. ISSUES: I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on government projects. HELD: The petition fails. The CA explained why it annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC: It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent Judge's issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter. Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining petitioners' sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7, 2000, thus, already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Order. Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus: Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: xxx (b) aSCHcA xxx xxx xxx

Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the case, that would justify respondent Judge's blatant disregard of a "simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects." Respondent Judge did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in the first place, he should not have given due course to private respondent's complaint for injunction. Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA's decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws. Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect. The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government.

Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;

Consunji v. CA, GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001 Facts: -Jose Juego, a construction worker of DM Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City which resulted to his instant death. Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. -RTC- rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff for the death of Jose, actual, compensatory and moral damages, Joses loss of earning capacity, attorneys fees and the costs of suit. -CA- reversed RTCs decision in toto Issue: Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions. Held:

xxx

xxx

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. . . . The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge. Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court had the same embodied in its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in cases involving Government Infrastructure Projects.

As a general rule, the claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had. Waiver of rights The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Florescathat a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the partys rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca. Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer; otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court. There is no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. Ignorance of the Law Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Courts ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies. The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefit from the State Insurance Fund. -RTC- rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff for the death of Jose, actual, compensatory and moral damages, Joses loss of earning capacity, attorneys fees and the costs of suit. -CA- reversed RTCs decision in toto Issue: Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions. Held: As a general rule, the claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had. Waiver of rights The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Florescathat a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the partys rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca. Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer; otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.

Consunji v. CA, GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001

Facts: -Jose Juego, a construction worker of DM Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City which resulted to his instant death. Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the

There is no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. Ignorance of the Law Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Courts ruling inFloresca allowing a choice of remedies. The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her. FF CRUZ vs HR INDUSTRIES FACTS: F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. (FFCCI) entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct. FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor, equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project. Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which the latter would then pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days from receipt thereof. The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress accomplishment of its completed works as approved by FFCCI. Additionally, they agreed to conduct a joint measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the representative of DPWH and consultants to arrive at a common quantity. HRCC submitted to FFCCI its first progress billing covering the construction works it completed from August 16 to September 15, 2004. However, FFCCI asserted that the DPWH was then able to evaluate the completed works of HRCC only until July 25, 2004. Thus, FFCCI only approved the gross amount assessed by the DPWH during said period, which was far less than that billed by HRCC. FFCCI and the DPWH then jointly evaluated the completed works of HRCC for the period of July 26 to September 25, 2004 as the approved net payment for the said period. FFCCI paid this amount HRCC submitted to FFCCI its second progress billing covering its completed works from September 18 to 25, 2004. FFCCI did not pay the amount stated in the second progress billing, claiming that it had already paid HRCC for the completed works for the period stated therein. HRCC submitted its third progress billing for its completed works from September 26 to October 25, 2004. FFCCI did not immediately pay the amount stated in the third progress billing, claiming that it still had to evaluate the works accomplished by HRCC. HRCC submitted to FFCCI its fourth progress billing for the works it had completed from October 26 to November 25, 2004. Subsequently, FFCCI, after it had evaluated the completed works approved the payment of a gross amount far less from what HRCC billed (around 6 Million worth of difference) which amount was paid to HRCC. Meanwhile, HRCC sent FFCCI a letter demanding the payment of its progress billings within three days from receipt thereof. Subsequently, HRCC completely halted the construction of the subcontracted project. HRCC, pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Subcontract Agreement, filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Complaint against FFCCI praying for the payment of the overdue obligation and attorney's fees. FFCCI claimed that it no longer has any liability on the Subcontract Agreement as the three payments it made to HRCC already represented the amount due to the latter in view of the works actually completed by HRCC as shown by the survey it conducted jointly with the DPWH. Likewise, FFCCI maintained that HRCC failed to comply with the condition stated under the Subcontract Agreement for the payment of the latter's progress billings, i.e., joint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was justified in not paying the amount stated in HRCC's progress billings. The CIAC rendered a Decision in favor of HRCC, holding that the payment method adopted by FFCCI is actually what is known as the "back-to-back payment scheme" which was not agreed upon under the Subcontract Agreement. As such, the CIAC ruled that FFCCI could not impose upon HRCC its valuation of the works completed by the latter.

FFCCI then filed a petition for review with CA assailing the foregoing disposition by the CIAC. On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision denying the petition for review filed by FFCCI. FFCCI sought for reconsideration but it was denied. ISSUES: 1.) Whether FFCCI's non-compliance with the stipulation in the Subcontract Agreement requiring a joint quantification of the works completed by HRCC on the payment of the progress billings submitted by the latter constitutes as a waiver of its right to question HRCCs billings? 2.) Whether there was a valid rescission of the Subcontract Agreement by HRCC? HELD: 1.) YES 2.) NO Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the arbitration costs shall be shared equally by the parties herein. RATIO: 1.) First Issue: Effect of Non-compliance with the Joint Quantification Requirement on the Progress Billings of HRCC (IMPLIED WAIVER) The petition by FFCCI is not meritorious. The main question advanced by FFCCI is this: in the absence of the joint measurement agreed upon in the Subcontract Agreement, how will the completed works of HRCC be verified and the amount due thereon be computed? The determination of the foregoing question entails an interpretation of the terms of the Subcontract Agreement vis--vis the respective rights of the parties herein. Basically, the instant issue calls for a determination as to which of the parties' respective valuation of accomplished works should be given credence. The terms of the Subcontract Agreement should prevail. It is the responsibility of FFCCI to call for the joint measurement of HRCC's completed works. The joint measurement contemplated under the Subcontract Agreement should be conducted by the parties herein together with the representative of the DPWH and the consultants. FFCCI, on account of its failure to demand the joint measurement of HRCC's completed works, had effectively waived its right to ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to HRCC's submission of its monthly progress billings. In People of the Philippines v. Donato Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it." As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: . . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large. . . . Here, it is undisputed that the joint measurement of HRCC's completed works contemplated by the parties in the Subcontract Agreement never materialized. FFCCI did not contest the said progress billings submitted by HRCC despite the lack of a joint measurement of the latter's completed works as required under the Subcontract Agreement. Instead, FFCCI proceeded to conduct its own verification of the works actually completed by HRCC and, on separate dates, made the said payments to HRCC. FFCCI's voluntary payment in favor of HRCC, albeit in amounts substantially different from those claimed by the latter, is a glaring indication that it had effectively waived its right to demand for the joint measurement of the completed works. FFCCI's failure to demand a joint measurement of HRCC's completed works reasonably justified the inference that it had already relinquished its right to do so. FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCC's valuation of the completed works having waived its right to demand the joint measurement requirement.

The joint measurement requirement is a mechanism essentially granting FFCCI the opportunity to verify and, if necessary, contest HRCC's valuation of its completed works prior to the submission of the latter's monthly progress billings. Thus, having relinquished its right to ask for a joint measurement of HRCC's completed works, FFCCI had necessarily waived its right to dispute HRCC's valuation of the works it had accomplished. 2.) Second Issue: Validity of HRCC's Rescission of the Subcontract Agreement (EXPRESS WAIVER) The determination of the validity of HRCC's work stoppage depends on a determination of the following: first, whether HRCC has the right to extrajudicially rescind the Subcontract Agreement; and second, whether FFCCI is already barred from disputing the work stoppage of HRCC. HRCC had waived its right to rescind the Subcontract Agreement. The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal obligations as stated in Article 1191 of the Civil Code. However, while the right to rescind reciprocal obligations is implied, that is, that such right need not be expressly provided in the contract, nevertheless the contracting parties may waive the same. HRCC had no right to rescind the Subcontract Agreement in the guise of a work stoppage, the latter having waived such right, the Subcontract Agreement reads: Notwithstanding any dispute, controversy, differences or arbitration proceedings relating directly or indirectly to this SUBCONTRACT Agreement and without prejudice to the eventual outcome thereof, HRCC shall at all times proceed with the prompt performance of the Works in accordance with the directives of FFCCI and this SUBCONTRACT Agreement. In spite of the existence of dispute or controversy between the parties during the course of the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC had agreed to continue the performance of its obligations pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. The costs of arbitration should, therefore, be shared by the parties equally, applying Section 1, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court.

G.R. No. 154598

August 16, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON PR (R:45) CAs resolution which dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. FACTS: Petitioner (American) and respondent were married on August 28, 1998. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl, Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton. After 3 years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a guest relations officer in a nightclub. Whenever the petitioner was out of the country, respondent was often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp. Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Lamitan, Basilan Province. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner went to Basilan, but did not find them there and the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. However, CA denied the petition on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. 5(b) provides that Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide petition cases for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.

SUPREME COURT: CAs contention cannot be upheld because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Parents would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. The petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy and this lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. In allowing the CA to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the childs welfare and wellbeing will be prejudiced. REGARDING IMPLIED REPEALS: RULE in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored: The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws. RA 8369: The provisions of RA 8369 did not revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and SC to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are not absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the CA and the SC from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 family courts have CONCURRENT jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC 20.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.

REPEAL OF LAWS NCC 7 KIDA v. SENATE This is a resolution to resolve various motions for reconsideration that assails the SCs decision dated October 18, 2011 where the SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 10513 which postponed the regional elections in the ARMM (which were to be held on the 2nd Monday of August 2011) to the 2nd Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint OICs to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials. ISSUE: Does RA 10513 amend RA 9054? (basta is about irrepealable laws) NO. RA 9054 fixes the schedule of the first ARMM elections and it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. RA 9333 and RA 10513 merely filled the gap left in RA 9054. RA 10513 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The other laws only also fixed the date of the elections for the ARMM but did not change or modify any part or provision of RA 6734 (sorry ang gulo kasi nung case so Im guessing ito yung original?) Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands. (I got this part from the first case)

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129, divesting the Court of Appeals to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors? RULING: The petition is granted. CA should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. SGs COMMENT: A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC 20 (5/15/2003) of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors has rendered the issue moot. 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the SC, CA, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction was to avoid clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the RTC issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. CAS CONTENTION: RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word exclusive apparently cannot be construed any other way.

The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade:[16] A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes . [emphasis ours]

maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute was enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favour of the parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith (lex prospicit, non respicit). Petitioner utterly failed, both in her allegations and in her evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent. DE CASTRO v. JBC Facts: On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council: (a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010; (b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; (c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and (d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision. Motions for reconsideration were filed by several groups and individuals arguing among others that:

Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum.[17] In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.[18]

Judicial Decisions Lorna Pesca v. Zosimo Pesca (GR 136921, April 17, 2001)

Facts: Petitioner Lorna Pesca, then a student, and respondent Zosimo Pesca, a seaman, got married March 1975 after a whirlwind courtship. Their union begot 4 children. However, in 1988, petitioner noticed that her husband was emotionally immature and irresponsible. Respondent became violent. On March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner. Petitioner filed a complaint and respondent was convicted by the MTC of Caloocan for slight physical injuries and sentenced to 11 days of imprisonment. Petitioner filed before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. On November 1995, RTC decided in favour of the petitioner. CA reversed the decision of the trial court, stating that petitioner had failed to establish that (1) respondent showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be incognitive of the basic marital covenant as provided in Article 68 of the Family Code (2) that incapacity is grave, (3) preceded the marriage and (4) is incurable (5) that such incapacity is psychological (6) that the root cause has been identified medically/clinically (7) that it has been proven by an expert (8) that such incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner argued that the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. CA (promulgated on January 1995), as well as the guidelines set out in Republic v. CA and Molina (February 1997) should have no retroactive application. Petitioner further argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should at least only warrant a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine enunciated in the Santos and Molina cases apply to the case at bar. Held: The Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the legal

1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication, considering that the office of the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to submit a list of nominees to the President. 2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of Justice Regalado. (In Valenzuela - A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408. This A.M. involves the constitutional validity of the appointment of two (2) RTC Judges on March 30, 1998 a date that falls within the supposed ban under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. We nullified the appointments.) Held: First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela. The contention has no basis. Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The

decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability. For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division. Judicial Decisions G.R. No. 188302 June 27, 2012 NANCY L. TY, Petitioner, vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent. Facts: Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (respondent) wanted to purchase real properties as new branch sites for its expansion program. Since the General Banking Act4 limits a banks real estate holdings to no more than 50% of its capital assets, the respondents Board of Directors decided to warehouse some of its existing properties and branch sites to allow more flexibility in the opening of branches, and to enable it to acquire new branch sites.5 The petitioner, a major stockholder and a director of the respondent, persuaded two other major stockholders, Pedro Aguirre and his brother Tomas Aguirre, to organize and incorporate Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala Realty) to hold and purchase real properties in trust for the respondent. 6 In implementing their trust agreement, the respondent sold to Tala Realty some of its properties. Tala Realty simultaneously leased to the respondent the properties for 20 years, renewable for another 20 years at the respondents option with a right of first refusal in the event Tala Realty decides to sell them. 9 Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for itself, and demanded payment of rentals, deposits, and goodwill, with a threat to eject the respondent.10 Respondent filed 17 complaints against Tala Realty, the petitioner, Pedro, Remedios, and their respective nominees for reconveyance of different properties with 17 Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) nationwide, including Civil Case No. 2506-MN before Branch 170 of the RTC of Malabon (Malabon case), subject of the present case. 11 The petitioner and her co-defendants moved to dismiss the Malabon case for forum shopping and litis pendentia, citing the 16 other civil cases filed in various courts12 involving the same facts, issues, parties, and reliefs pleaded in the respondents complaint.13 Malabon RTC denied the motion to dismiss,14 finding no commonality in the 16 other civil cases

The petitioner filed a motion to hold proceedings in abeyance, 18 citing the pendency with this Court of G.R. No. 12761119 that assailed the denial of their motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 4521 before the Batangas City RTC (Branch 84), and also prayed for a writ of prohibition to order the 17 RTC branches and the three CA divisions, where the same cases were pending, to desist from further proceeding with the trial of the cases. The Malabon RTC granted to hold proceedings in abeyance.20 Respondent elevated its case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.22 The CA initially dismissed the petition,23 but on motion for reconsideration, it modified its ruling, setting aside the RTCs order to hold proceedings in abeyance for mootness, due to this Courts dismissal of G.R. No. 127611 for late filing. 24 Subsequently, the respondent moved for pre-trial.25 Tala Realty opposed the motion and filed again a motion to suspend proceedings,26 citing the pendency with this Court of G.R. No. 132703,27 a petition for certiorari that assailed the CAs affirmance28 of the dismissal order of the Iloilo City RTC (Branch 28) in Civil Case No. 22493. 29 The petitioner filed her separate opposition to the respondents motion for pre -trial and a motion to hold proceedings in abeyance, stating that after the dismissal of G.R. No. 127611, two other similar petitions have been elevated to this Court: (1) G.R. No. 130184,30 involving the CAs reversal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-95-24830 in the Quezon City RTC (Branch 91), and (2) G.R. No. 132703.31 The Malabon RTC granted the motion, and again ordered to hold proceedings in abeyance.32 Six years later, the Malabon RTC directed the parties counsels to inform it of the status of the pending cases. 33 In her compliance,34 the petitioner summarized this Courts rulings in the consolidated cases of G .R. Nos. 130184 and 139166,35 and in G.R. No. 132703,36 and reported on the other cases involving the same parties decided by this Court, such as G.R. Nos. 129887,37 137980,38 132051,39 137533,40 143263,41 and 142672,42 as well as the other related cases decided by this Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 144700,43 147997,44 167255,45 and 144705.46 On the other hand, the respondent filed its compliance with motion to revive proceedings,47 citing the Courts consolidated decision in G.R. Nos. 130184 and 139166,48 and the decisions in G.R. Nos. 144700,49 167255,50and 144705,51 commonly holding that there existed no forum shopping, litis pendentia and res judicata among the respondents reconveyance cases pending in the other courts of justice. In her comment to the respondents motion to revive proceedings, 52 the petitioner argued that the proceedings should not be revived since all the reconveyance cases are grounded on the same theory of implied trust which this Court in G.R. No. 13753353 found void for being illegal as it was a scheme to circumvent the 50% limitation on real estate holdings under the General Banking Act. Tala Realty, on the other hand, pointed out that it was the courts prerogative to suspend or not its proceedings pending the resolution of issues by another court, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations. 54 RTC granted the respondents motion to revive proceedings, noting that res judicata is not applicable since there are independent causes of action for each of the properties sought to be recovered.55 CA affirmed the RTCs orders.59 It noted that res judicata does not apply since the issue of validity or enforceability of the trust agreement was raised in an ejectment case Issue: The core issues boil down to whether the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 137533 applies as stare decisis to the present case. Held: The case at bar presents the same issue that the Court already resolved on April 7, 2009 in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608, wherein we applied the Courts November 22, 2002 decision in G.R. No. 137533, one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against the respondent arising from the same trust agreement in the reconveyance case subject of the present petition, that the trust agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced.

G.R. No. 137533, as reiterated in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608, is binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means "to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established."70 Under the doctrine, when this Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same.71 The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment, which results therefrom. In this particular sense, stare decisis differs from res judicata, which is based upon the judgment.72 The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus: Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same [issue].73 (italics supplied) It bears stressing that the basic facts of the present case and those of G.R. No. 137533 and G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608 are the same. Clearly, in light of G.R. No. 137533 and G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608, which the Court follows as precedents, the present action for reconveyance cannot prosper. It is the Court's duty to apply the previous rulings in G.R. No. 137533 and in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608 to the present case. Once a case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the present case, should be decided in the same manner .74 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107104 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2506-MN before Branch 170 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila is hereby DISMISSED. c[G.R. No. 187451. August 29, 2012.] JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, petitioner, vs. JOSE ALEGARBES, respondent. FACTS: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. Virtucio then filed a complaint for "Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction" before the RTC. 11. In his Answer, Alegarbes claimed that the decision of the Bureau of Lands was void ab initio considering that the Acting Director of Lands acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the provisions of the Public Land Act. He further alleged that the patent issued in favor of Virtucio was procured through fraud and deceit, thus, void ab initio. He further argued, by way of special and/or affirmative defenses, that the approval of his homestead application on by the Bureau of Lands had already attained finality and could not be reversed, modified or set aside. His possession of Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140 had been open, continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years and had acquired such lots by acquisitive prescription. 12. In his Amended and Supplemental Answer, Alegarbes also averred that his now deceased brother, Alejandro Alegarbes, and the latter's family helped him develop Lot 140 in 1955. Alejandro and his family, as well as Alegarbes' wife and children, had been permanently occupying the said lot and, introducing permanent improvements thereon since 1960. 13. The RTC rendered its decision favoring Virtucio. 14. Alegarbes appealed his case before the CA. 15. CA promulgated its decision declaring Alegarbes as the owner of Lot No. 140, Pls-19, thereby reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 and, therefore, entitled to retain possession of it. 16. In so ruling, the CA explained that even if the decision to approve Virtucio's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final, Alegarbes could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription. The decisions on the issues of the approval of Virtucio's homestead application and its validity were impertinent as Alegarbes had earlier put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot 140 which he claimed by virtue of adverse possession. The CA also found reversible error on the part of the RTC in disregarding the evidence before it and relying entirely upon the decisions of the administrative bodies, none of which touched upon the issue of Alegarbes' open, continuous and exclusive possession of over thirty (30) years of an alienable land. 17. Virtucio filed this petition. ISSUES: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the decision in the CA for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Custodio vs. Alegarbes which contains same factual circumstances as in this case and ruled against JOSE ALEGARBES. 14 No. The petition must fail. Here, the main issue is the alleged acquisition of ownership by Alegarbes through acquisitive prescription and the character and length of possession of a party over a parcel of land subject of controversy is a factual issue. In the case at bench, the findings and conclusions of the CA are apparently contrary to those of the RTC, hence, the need to review the facts in order to arrive at the proper conclusion. Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal and, in fact, are accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the record. It appears, however, that the conclusion made by the RTC was not substantially supported. Even the RTC itself noted in its decision: The approval of a Homestead Application merely authorizes the applicant to take possession of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law before a final patent could be issued in his favor what divests the government of title to the land is the issuance of a patent and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds. A perusal of the records would reveal that there was no issuance of any patent in favor of either parties. This simply means that the land subject of the controversy remains to be in the name of the State. Hence, neither Virtucio nor Alegarbes can claim ownership. There was, therefore, no substantial and legal basis for the RTC to declare that Virtucio was entitled to possession and ownership of Lot 140.

Respondent Jose Alegarbes filed a Homestead Application for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land situated in Baas, Lantawan, Basilan in 1949. His application was approved on January 23, 1952. However, the land was later on subdivided into three (3) lots as a consequence of a public land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio). Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Jesus Virtucio (Virtucio). Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140. The Director of Lands denied Alegarbes' protest and amending the latter's application to exclude Lots 139 and 140. Only Lot 138 was given due course. The applications of Custodio and Virtucio for Lots 139 and 140, respectively, were likewise given due course. Alegarbes appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who dismissed his appeal. He then sought relief from the Office of the President (OP), which, however, affirmed the dismissal order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Alegarbes filed an MR but MR was denied. An order of execution was issued by the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to enforce the decision of the OP. It ordered Alegarbes to vacate the subject lot, but he refused.

The CA correctly observed that the RTC erred in disregarding the evidence before it and relying entirely upon the decisions of the Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the OP, which never touched the issue of whether Alegarbes' open, continuous and exclusive possession of over thirty (30) years of alienable land had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the mass of public land and beyond the jurisdiction of these agencies. When the CA ruled that the RTC was correct in relying on the abovementioned decisions, it merely recognized the primary jurisdiction of these administrative agencies. It was of the view that the RTC was not correct in the other aspects of the case. Thus, it declared Alegarbes as owner ipso jure of Lot 140 and entitled to retain possession of it. There is no reason for the Court to disturb these findings of the CA as they were supported by substantial evidence, hence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court. On the CA Decision involving a similar case Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision in Custodio v. Alegarbes, CA-G.R. CV 26286, for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, which involved the same factual circumstances and ruled against Alegarbes. It must be noted that the subject property in the said case was Lot 139 allocated to Custodio and that Virtucio was not a party to that case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever benefits said favorable judgment may have had just because it involved similar factual circumstances. The Court also found from the records that the period of acquisitive prescription in that case was effectively interrupted by Custodio's filing of a complaint, which is wanting in this case. Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent. "The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument." The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's insistence that it was erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier decision, he, in effect, calls upon this Court to adhere to that decision by invoking the stare decisis principle, which is not legally possible because only final decisions of this Court are considered precedents. People v. Ritter GR. 88582, March 5, 1991 Facts: Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide involving a young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal. When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits. The trial court rendered a decision convicting the appellant of such crime. Issue: Whether or not this Court should affirm the conviction of the accused rendered by the lower court? Held: Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act Before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs.Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit: xxxThe rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.xxx

We cannot convict on anything less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people. The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that the accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied. The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra) The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). The appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. The Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them. Something must be done about it.

UP vs Judge DIZON

UP entered into a construction agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corp. for the construction and extension of a building in UPLB. There were 3 billings sent to UP, but UP only paid 2. The third billing was not paid due to the disallowance of the COA. Stern Builders sued UP to collect the unpaid billing and recover damages. The sheriff served notices of garnishment to UPs depository banks (Land Bank & DBP). W/N the funds of UP are subject to garnishment? SC = NO. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTCs writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability. *This case did not mention anything about NCC 9 & 10. I think this is the closest thing to our topic, pero malabo parin pucha. Sorry guys COA must adjudicate private respondents claim before execution should proceed. The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. As such, Stern Builders and dela Cruz as the claimants had no alternative except to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim. On its part, the RTC should have exercised utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in dealing with the motions for execution against the UP and the garnishment of the UPs funds. The RTC had no authority to direct the immediate withdrawal of any portion of the garnished funds from the depository banks of the UP. By eschewing utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in dealing with the execution and garnishment, and by authorizing the withdrawal of the garnished funds of the UP, the RTC acted beyond its jurisdiction, and all its orders and issuances thereon were void and of no legal effect, specifically: (a) the order Judge Yadao issued on January 3, 2007 allowing Stern Builders and dela Cruz to withdraw the deposited garnished amount; (b) the order Judge Yadao issued on January 16, 2007 directing DBP to forthwith release the garnish amount to Stern Builders and dela Cruz; (c) the sheriffs report of January 17, 2007 manifesting the full satisfaction of the writ of execution; and (d) the order of April 10, 2007

deying the UPs motion for the redeposit of the withdrawn amount. Hence, such orders and issuances should be struck down without exception. Nothing extenuated Judge Yadaos successive violations of Presidential Decree No. 144 5. She was aware of Presidential Decree No. 1445, considering that the Court circulated to all judges its Administrative Circular No. 102000,86 issued on October 25, 2000, enjoining them "to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and local government units" precisely in order to prevent the circumvention of Presidential Decree No. 1445, as well as of the rules and procedures of the COA, to wit: In order to prevent possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit, judges are hereby enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and local government units.

xxx Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers. He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every person who suffered a cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another to look after the horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on. A coachman or driver, who had driven the horses composing his team for a considerable time, during which the animals has shown no disposition to become unruly, left his team as usual and was assisting in unloading the wagon when the horses bolted and running into the plaintiffs' carriage caused personal injuries to the plaintiff and damage to the vehicle. It was further shown that, to leave teams under like circumstances and to assist in unloading the wagon, is the custom of drivers in the city and that the custom is sanctioned by employers. Held: That acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time as to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon.

MARTINEZ vs VAN BURSKIRK FACTS: Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on a district of Ermita, city of Manila, along the left-hand side of the street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. the defendant, who was himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question, presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding. The trial court found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him. ISSUE: Whether the employer-defendant, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver HELD: NO. The judgment is reversed, without special finding as to costs. RATIO: There is no general law of negligence in the Philippines except that embodied in the Civil Code. The provisions of that code pertinent to this case are Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. xxx Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by the employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.

G.R. No. 162155

August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO PARCERCO vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC. (PPGI) FACTS: On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap (vice chair of PPGI) applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to revenue district officer Parcero, he explained that while PPGIs business was doing good the first quarter, respondent suffered losses that year and so it was entitled to a tax refund. PPGI was required by revenue officer Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim and PPGI complied but its claim was not acted upon. PPGI filed a petition for review in the CTA. However, it was dismissed as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. CTA invoked 229 of the NIRC1.

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress. In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment:

Respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998 and its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code2. Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. Respondents MR was denied. It filed an appeal in the CA and reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year. Petitioners MR was denied.

period of 15 days from May 21, 2007 or until June 5, 2007, within which to file his petition. He filed his petition on June 5, 2007. On September 21, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. The CA said: As borne by the records, the petitioner received the copy of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2007, Thus, the 15day reglementary period within which to file a petition for review expired on May 21, 2007 (Monday) considering that the last day fell on a Saturday, May 19, 2007. It appears that petitioner reckoned the extension from May 21, 2007 (Monday) and not from May 19, 2007 (Saturday). Petitioner should have reckoned the 15-day extension from May 19, 2007 and not from May 21, 2007. It is well settled that when the day of the period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, and a party is granted an extension of time, the extension should be counted from the last day which is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. ISSUE: WON THE PETITION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME YES.

ISSUE: Whether or not PPGI filed its claim within the reglementary period? RULING:

YES. CA correctly concluded that respondent filed its petition in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period. However, its basis is not. The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return. APPLICABLE LAWS: Two laws provide for computation of legal periods: (a) Article 13 of the Civil Code and (b) EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 19873. There exists an incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under both laws. However, 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Although 27 (Repealing Clause) of AC1987 did not expressly identify laws to be abolished, the provision impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the AC1987. LEGAL PERIODS: (a) YEAR 12 calendar months; (b) CALENDAR MONTH a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain. Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the CTA.

Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by petitioner provides: Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC dated February 29, 2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension on Next Working Day is Granted) which reads: xxxx Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court] applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the next working day is deemed on time; Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, so that when a motion for extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period. NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the period" so that when a party seeks an extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to be the last day and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.

NCC 13 LEGAL PERIODS MONTAJES v. PEOPLE Montajes was charged for direct assault when he uttered the words YOURE A USELESS CAPTAIN and attacked Rellon with a lagaraw (bolo). When he was arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. On December 29, 2005 MTC found him guilty of direct assault. On appeal to the RTC on January 23, 2007, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. Petitioner filed an MR which the RC denied on May 4, 2007. Petitioner filed with the CA a motion for extension of time to file petition for review under rule 42 of the rules of court praying for an extended

Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
2

Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise. If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included.
3

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. Year shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; month of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; day, to a day of twenty-four hours and; night from sunrise to sunset.

Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, where the last day of the period for doing any act required by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. In this case, the original period for filing the petition for review with the CA was on May 19, 2007, a

Saturday. Petitioner's filing of his motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on May 21, 2007, the next working day which followed the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday, was therefore on time. However, petitioner prayed in his motion for extension that he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5, 2007 within which to file his petition. He then filed his petition for review on June 5, 2007. The CA did not act on the motion for extension, but instead issued a Resolution dated September 21, 2007dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out of time based on our clarification in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day extension period prayed for should be tacked to the original period and commences immediately after the expiration of such period.[14] Thus, counting 15 days from the expiration of the period which was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on June 5, 2007 was already two days late. However, we find the circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play. SC ordered CA to reinstate the PFR.

Facts: Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract. Under the contract, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2. Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period. She returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare. On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal. The Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant respondents dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her contract. Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the present case. Also, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the Ministrys liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it. Held:

Conflict of Laws Rayray v. Chae Kyung Lee (October 26, 1966)

Facts: Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray, a Philippine citizen, sought the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee, who was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea. Summons was served by publication as the latters whereabouts was unknown. Lower Court dismissed the complaint, stating it had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the marriage, as it was solemnized in Seoul, Korea and that the facts proven did not warrant the relief prayed for. Plaintiff appealed to the CA. CA certified the case to the SC, the jurisdiction of the lower court being an issue in the appeal. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant was already married prior to their marriage. Plaintiff presented a purported police clearance from Seoul, Korea and its supposed translation (Exhibits A & B respectively). Issue: Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction over the case. Whether or not the plaintiffs marriage to defendant was valid. Held: The Court held that the lower courts conclusion as to jurisdiction was erroneous. It was an action in rem, as it concerned the status of the parties. Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of the marriage. The Court upheld the findings of the lower court that documents presented were insufficient. Exhibit A was unsigned. Prior marriage was not proven. The presumption is that Korean Law, like Philippine Law, the lex fori , does not permit bigamy, and there being no competent proof that defendant was married to another prior to her marriage with plaintiff, there can be no doubt as to the validity of the marriage between plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiffs action for annulment on the ground of the supposed prior marriage was dismissed ATCI OVERSEAS CORP v. ECHIN

As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated. Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Courts ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC illuminates: In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. Conflicts of Laws G.R. No. 185582 February 29, 2012 TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., Respondent. Facts: Kanemitsu Yamaoka, co-patentee of Yamaoka Patent and five (5) Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as the "sponsors"/"licensees")7 entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees, including respondent Kingford, withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their obligations.12 Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United States and won the case against respondent and ordered that within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this Award to the Parties, pursuant to the terms of this award, the total sum to be paid by RESPONDENT KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI, is the sum of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS ($1,750,846.10) for breach of the MOA. To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007 a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. The first judge inhibited and thus, Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz of Branch 61, to which the case was re-raffled, in turn, granted respondents Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.20 Issue The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a quo was correct in so dismissing the petition on the ground of petitioners lack of legal capacity to sue. Held: The Corporation Code of the Philippines expressly provides: Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004),22 the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law),23 as none of these specifically requires that the party seeking for the enforcement should have legal capacity to sue. Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines on one hand, and theAlternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the New York Convention and the Model Law on the other?

Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization and regulation of private corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special law on agrarian reform. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevailgeneralia specialibus non derogant.28 The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted "to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes."29 It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.30 Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a municipal law, applies in the instant petition, we do not see the need to discuss compliance with international obligations under the New York Convention and theModel Law. After all, both already form part of the law. Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? We answer in the affirmative. Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforecement of a foreign arbitral award , we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the result. Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question. Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the court a quo correctly observed that the Model Law, not the New York Convention, governs the subject arbitral award,39 petitioner may still seek recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes substantially identical exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement.40 Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for that reason alone, precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine court. WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special Proceedings No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.] TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE'S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. FACTS: 1. Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

2.

Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, and Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives. 3. Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 4. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00. 5. The executor then submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of three illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000.00 each. 6. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages. 7. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. 8. Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him. 9. Lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes. 10. MR filed was denied, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law. ISSUE: Whether Phiippine or Texas Law should apply. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflict of law rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that "Art 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." "Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellant. So ordered. Testate Estate of Idonah Slade Perkins, Renato Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Facts: -Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates of appellant, the certificates being in the possession of the County Trust Company of New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary administrator of the estate of the deceased. -Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila; -Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator, and on January 22, 1963, he was substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. -A dispute arose between the domiciary administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in the Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in question. -CFI Manila: ordered the domiciliary administrator, County Trust Company, to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk of Court. -The domiciliary administrator did not comply with the order. -On February 11, 1964, the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring the certificate or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared or considered as lost." -Appellant opposed the petition of the ancillary administrator because the said stock certificates are in existence, they are today in the possession of the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company, in New York, U.S.A...." Its view is that under the circumstances, the stock certificates cannot be declared or considered as lost. Moreover, it would allege that there was a failure to observe certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock certificates could be issued. -LC: rendered an order of this tenor: "After considering the motion of the ancillary administrator, dated February 11, 1964, as well as the opposition filed by the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., the Court hereby (1) considers as lost for all

"However", intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the

purposes in connection with the administration and liquidation of the Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares of stock standing in her name in the books of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., (2) orders said certificates cancelled, and (3) directs said corporation to issue new certificates in lieu thereof, the same to be delivered by said corporation to either the incumbent ancillary administrator or to the Probate Division of this Court." Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York. Issue: Whether or not the lower courts order is proper? Held: The appeal lacks merit. Since there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled. In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower court, thus: "We are of the opinion that the appeal should be rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veterans' Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims property submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions where the Veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That, in effect, would deprive our tribunals of judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the Veterans' Administrator." It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept as final and conclusive, determinations made by foreign governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if through the absence of any coercive power by our courts over juridical persons within our jurisdiction, the force and effectivity of their orders could be made to depend on the whim or caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to imagine of a situation more offensive to the dignity of the bench or the honor of the country. HASEGAWA vs KITAMURA

Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract was entered in Japan hence, applying the principle of lex loci celebracionis, cases arising from the contract should be cognizable only by Japanese courts. The trial court denied the motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time invoking forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese nationals who entered into a contract in Japan. Kitamura on the other hand invokes the trial courts ruling which states that matter s connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, so since the obligations in the ICA are executed in the Philippines, courts here have jurisdiction. W/N the complaint against Nippon should be dismissed? SC = NO. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it. In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific performance and damages. Such case is incapable of pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those provided for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil case. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that Japanese laws should apply is premature. In conflicts cases, there are three phases and each next phase commences when one is settled, to wit: 1. Jurisdiction Where should litigation be initiated? Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, the issues, the property, the res. Also consider, whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. 2. Choice of Law Which law will the court apply? Once a local court takes cognizance, it does not mean that the local laws must automatically apply. The court must determine which substantive law when applied to the merits will be fair to both parties. 3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?

In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a Japanese firm, was contracted by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the construction of the Southern Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon entered into an independent contractor agreement (ICA) with Minoru Kitamura for the latter to head the said project. The ICA was entered into in Japan and is effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In January 2000, DPWH awarded the STAR (Southern Tagalog Access Road) project to Nippon. Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road project. But in February 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general manager of Nippon informed Kitamura that they are pre-terminating his contract. Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider but Nippon refused to negotiate. Kitamura then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.

This case is not yet reached the second phase because upon the RTCs taking cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he bypassed the proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for certiorari. The question of which law should be applied should have been settled in the trial court had Hasegawa not improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying his MFR.

*Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed. It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

TAMANO vs ORTIZ

FACTS: Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death. Prior to his death Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites. Private respondent Zorayda, joined by her son, filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent. Zorayda alleged that Tamano never divorced her and that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with a certain Llave never became final and executory. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the case. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their marriage. She likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the Shari'a courts pursuant to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. The RTC of Quezon City denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly cognizable by it since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code, and not exclusively in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The MR was likewise denied, hence, Estrellita filed a petition with the SC seeking to set aside RTC denying her motion to dismiss. The case was referred to the CA. Zorayda and Adib however filed a motion to resolve the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other cases, which the CA granted. The CA ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Shari'a courts only when filed in places where there are Shari'a courts. But in places where there are no Shari'a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the RTC. Estrellita is now before the SC reiterating her earlier argument that it is the Shari'a court and not the RTC which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. ISSUE: Whether or not the Code of Muslim Personal Laws divests the RTCs of its jurisdiction to try cases regarding Declaration of Nullity of Marriage where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites such as in the case at bar? HELD: NO. Petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED

RATIO: Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, RTCs have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Zorayda and Adib, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration. Nevertheless, the RTC was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the MR that Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. Estrellita argues that the Shari'a courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title, II, PD No. 1083, which provides Art. 13. Application. (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. (2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply. xxx As alleged in the complaint, Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of Estrellita, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of RTC. Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the Shari'a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the RTCs are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions . . .

G.R. No. 193902

June 1, 2011

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR. FACTS: On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, they wed again in civil rites before Judge Laguio of the RTC, Quezon City. On December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Sharia Circuit District Court which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992. On December 20, 1989, Zamoranos wed Pacasum, her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs, under Islamic rites and in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. The relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the two were de facto separated. Later, it escalated into a battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto. As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed several cases against Zamoranos: 1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage before the RTC of Iligan City. Subsequently, Pacasum amended the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to

Pacasum, was already previously married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982; Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage was bigamous and void ab initio. 2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC. 3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos dismissal from service and disbarment. The administrative cases were dismissed in due course. On the criminal litigation front, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. However, after an MR filed by Zamoranos, the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos was dismissed. Pacasum filed an Petition for Review and the Secretary of Justice granted Pacasums Petition for Review and reversed the resolutions of the City Prosecutor. Zamoranos filed MRs, but they were denied by the Secretary of Justice. On the civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC dismissed the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by P.D. No. 1083 Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the Civil Case by the RTC of Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme Court of Pacasums appeal became final and executory. In the meantime, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion of Pacasum, reinstated the Bigamy case against Zamoranos. Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, but it was denied. Subsequent motions and petition for certiorari filed by Zamoranos were likewise denied by the CA. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information.

Moreover, the two experts unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry. It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested t o by Judge Usman, was valid. Thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No. 194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.

NCC 19-22 HUMAN RELATIONS WASSMER v. VELEZ Francisco Velez and Beatrice Wassmer decided to get married. Two days before their marriage, Francisco wrote Beatrice a letter telling her that their marriage has to be postponed because his mother opposes it. A day before their wedding he sent her a telegram saying that nothing has changed and assured her that he was returning soon. Francisco was never heard from again. Beatrice sued for damages. ISSUE: is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong? NO. It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. Human Relations Tanjanco v. CA (December 17, 1966) Facts: Defendant Apolonio Tanjanco courted plaintiff, Araceli Santos. Both were of adult age. Defendant expressed his undying love and affection for plaintiff, who in time reciprocated the tender feelings. In consideration of defendants promise of marriage, plaintiff consented and acceded to defendants plea for ca rnal knowledge. From 1958 to December 1959, defendant had carnal access to plaintiff. As a result, the latter conceived a child. Plaintiff had to resign to avoid

ISSUES: Whether or not RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City committed an error of jurisdiction when it prosecuted Zamoranos for violations of the RPC? RULING: The RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that the Sharia Circuit Court is no t vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the RPC. The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. However, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved . The RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman. Article 3 (Conflict of Provisions) of P.D. No. 1083 provides that: (1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, the former shall prevail. (2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former. (3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim. In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis Comme ntaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim personal laws expound thereon: The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special law and another special law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.

embarrassment and social humiliation. It was alleged that due to defendants refusal to marry plaintiff, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation. Plaintiff filed with the CFI. It was however dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. CA however decreed that complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not there was a cause of action under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

baby. When she did not agree, the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She became depressed resulting in the loss of her baby. She also stopped schooling because of the humiliation that she suffered. Respondent vehemently denied the complainants allegations and claimed that the charges against him were baseless, false and fabricated, and were intended to harass him and destroy his reputation. He believes that t he complainants lettercomplaint, which was written in the vernacular, was prepared by Tordesillas who is from Manila and fluent in Tagalog; the respondent would have used the "waray" or English language if she had written the letter-complaint. The complainant filed a Reply, insisting that she herself wrote the letter-complaint. She belied the respondents claim that she was being used by Tordesillas who wanted to get even with him. The Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent. It defined what immoral conduct is as as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.4 To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.5 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.6 Issue: Whether the acts of respondent is considered as disgraceful or immoral conduct. Held: We find that the acts complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct. Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior.7 The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action. While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their familys future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or should not marry. 9 However, we take this occasion to remind judiciary employees to be more circumspect in their adherence to their obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with respect to their official duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as private individuals. This is the best way to preserve and protect the integrity and the good name of our courts.10 WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present administrative complaint against Nicolas B. Mabute, Stenographer 1 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Paranas, Samar, for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007.] CORAZON CATALAN, LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM, EULOGIO CATALAN, MILA CATALAN-MILAN, ZENAIDA CATALAN, ALEX CATALAN, DAISY CATALAN, FLORIDA CATALAN and GEMMA CATALAN, Heirs of the late FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs. JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA, LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA, JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES CATALAN, respondents. FACTS: 1. FELICIANO CATALAN was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his "schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and sparce (sic) and pointless speech." On September 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.

Held: The Court held that the facts stand out that for one whole year (1958-59), the plaintiff maintained intimate sexual relations with the defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is voluntariness and mutual passion. There can be no case made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. BAKSH vs CA Facts:

Private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the trial court a complaint against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement of marriage. Respondent alleged that she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. Petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her. She accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. Petitioner then visited the respondents parents in Banaga, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. Sometime on August 20, 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartment. She was a virgin before she began living with him.A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated her and threatened to kill her, and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount not less than P45,000, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600, attorneys fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as maybe just and equitable, which then rendered decision by court in favor of private respondent. Issue: Held: Whether or not damages is recoverable for breach of promise to marry.

The Supreme Court held that when a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in the sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art. 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

Human Relations A.M. No. P-11-2922 April 4, 2011 (formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1778-P) MARY JANE ABANAG, Complainant, vs. NICOLAS B. MABUTE, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Paranas, Samar,Respondent. Facts: The complainant alleged that respondent courted her and professed his undying love for her. Relying on respondents promise that he would marry her, she agreed to live with him. She became pregnant, but after several months into her pregnancy, respondent brought her to a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her

2.

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An "Absolute Deed of Donation", was executed wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN (Mercedes) one-half his the real property located in Binmaley Pangasinan The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax Declaration No. 18080 4 to Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters donated to her. The remaining half of the property remained in Feliciano's name under Tax Declaration No. 18081. 5 HISAET People's Bank and Trust Company filed a special proceeding before the CFI of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent. TC issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. TC appointed People's Bank and Trust Company (now BPI) as Feliciano's guardian. Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property to their son Eulogio Catalan. Mercedes then sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa. DOAS was registered with RD of Pangasinan. Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo then donated Lot 4 Eulogio and Florida Catalan. BPI, acting as Feliciano's guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against the herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone. Feliciano then passed away. TC found that the evidence presented by the complainants was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due execution of the donation in question must be upheld. It dismissed the p laintiffs complaint and declared Delia and Jesus Basa as lawful owners of the land. Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of the the RTC.

property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano's capacity at the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. 32 CaHcET Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. The sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. Mercado v. Espiritu 37 Phil 215, December 1, 1917 Facts: -Counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the CFI of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu who later on died. The complaint was amended against Jose Espiritu as the administrator of the estate of the deceased. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, sister of Luis. The defendant by means of cajolery, induced and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum of P400, notwithstanding the fact that said land was valued at P3,795 -Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land, and that the defendant be ordered among others, to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita Espiritu. -The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs was that during the time they executed and signed the document, they were minors, that is they had not yet attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 189, no evidence appears in the record that the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors neither there was any supplemental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the document. Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that they were of legal age? Held: Yes. The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of law and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. PEOPLE vs BULAGAO FACTS: Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in separate Informations When it was time for the defense to present their evidence it also presented the victim AAA as its witness who recanted her testimony for the prosecution that she was raped by her adoptive brother accused Bulagao. This time, she testified that the sexual encounters between her and the accused-appellant were consensual. She fabricated the charge of rape against the accused-appellant because she was supposedly angry with him for making her do laundry work for him. She purportedly was no longer angry with accused-appellant.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT FELICIANO CARALAN WAS SUFFERING FROM INSANITY AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED. No. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor's capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his

On redirect examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant did not force himself upon her. She affirmed that accusedappellant had a little defect in his mind. On re-cross examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant was not her sweetheart. Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a clinical psychologist. She conducted a mental examination on accused-appellant on September 12, 2002, and found that accused-appellant was suffering from mental retardation as he had an IQ of below 50. Eventually, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of rape committed against AAA. ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of the accused raising mental insanity should be given credence? HELD: NO. The appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS RATIO: The defense of accused-appellant that he was suffering from mental retardation, the RTC noted that the psychological examination of accused-appellant was conducted more than a couple of years after the dates of the complained of incidents. There was no showing from the findings of the psychologist that accused-appellant had the same mental or psychological condition at the time of the said incidents. Even assuming that accused-appellant was of such mental state at the time of the incidents, the psychologist testified that accused-appellant had the capacity to discern right from wrong. Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial court that he was suffering from mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. 32 Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of the accused-appellant proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a complete deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. 33 Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.

Petitioners MR and Appeal to CA was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is considered an incompetent person as defined under 2, rule 92 of the rules of court who should be placed under guardianship? RULING: The petition is without merit. As per 2, Rule 92 of the ROC4, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence and that evidentiary standard was unchanged. With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action. Even if the petitioners procedural lapse can be overlooked, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co -owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is the Report of Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the report was ambivalent, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent. In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, the Court ruled that where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the persons state of mental sanity will suffice. Thus, it is significant to note that the trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioners own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the other hand, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa: (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the trial Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.

G.R. No. 184528

April 25, 2012

NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA FACTS: Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, Cirilo Oropesa. The petition alleged that the respondent has been sickly for over 10 years already having suffered a stroke and that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend. The presiding judge set the case for hearing and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study. The Court Social Worker conducted her case study and interviewed petitioner and his witnesses. The report was submitted without any finding on the respondent who refused to talk to the social worker. The respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. The petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his testimony and of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the respondents former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya. However, petitioner failed to file his written formal offer of evidence. Thus, the respondent filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence. Subsequently, the trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case. Petitioner filed an MR but was denied due to insufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.

INSANITY CREWLINK v. TERINGTERING

2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

Respondent Editha Teringtering, spouse of the deceased Jacinto Teringtering, and in behalf of her minor child filed a complaint against Crewlink for the payment of death benefits, benefit for minor child, burial assistance, damages and attorneys fees. Editha alleged that her husband entered into an overseas employment contract with Crewlink he took a medical exam and was declared fit to work. On April 9, 2001 Jacinto died due to drowning. Editha claimed for compensation but was denied by Crewlink. She claimed that in order for her to get compensation it is enough that Jacinto died during the term of his contract and while still on board. She asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or mood disorder bipolar type. She further alleged that the death was not deliberate and of his own will but as a result of a mental disorder. Crewlink alleged that Jacinto jumped off the ship twice. He was saved the first time and someone was assigned to watch over him. He jumped off a second time and was no longer saved. Crewlink asserted that Editha was not entitled to the benefits because Jacinto committed suicide. ISSUE: WON Jacinto was insane. In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile, respondent, other than her bare allegation that her husband was suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or any medical report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity. The record does not even show when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start. Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a persons mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the witness own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. No such evidence was presented to support respondent's claim. JALOSJOS vs COMELEC Facts: Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of robbery on January 22, 1969 in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found him and his co-accused guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of prision correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum. Jalosjos appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on August 9, 1973. It was only after a lapse of several years or more specifically on June 17, 1985 that Jalosjos filed a Petition for Probation before the RTC Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by the court. But then, on motion filed by his Probation Officer, Jalosjos probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on March 19, 1987 and the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued. Surprisingly, on December 19, 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation. This Certification was the one used by respondent Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of the disqualification case filed against him by Adasa in 2004. This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration, guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting to the fact that respondent Jalosjos had fully complied with the terms and conditions of his probation. The Comelec ordered the cancellation of Jalosjos certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material representation when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the office he had sought to be elected to when in fact he was not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served. The penalty imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of one year, eight months and twenty days of prisin correccional as minimum, to four years, two months and one day of prisin mayor as maximum. Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification, which isperpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run. The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold or to run for any elective public office from the time his judgment of conviction became final. Absence G.R. No. 158907 February 12, 2007 EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, Petitioner, vs. EMILIO PURUGGANAN, JR. AND RAUL LOCSIN, Respondents. Facts: Olaguer alleges that he was the owner of 60,000 shares of stock of Businessday Corporation (Businessday). Petitioner, together with respondent Raul Locsin (Locsin) and Enrique Joaquin (Joaquin), was active in the political opposition against the Marcos dictatorship.3 Anticipating the possibility that petitioner would be arrested and detained by the Marcos military, Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifea had an unwritten agreement that, in the event that petitioner was arrested, they would support the petitioners family by the continued payment of his salary. 4 Petitioner also executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), on 26 May 1979, appointing as his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and Hofilea for the purpose of selling or transferring petitioners shares of stock with Businessday. Petitioner testified that he agreed to execute the SPA in order to cancel his shares of stock, even before they are sold, for the purpose of concealing that he was a stockholder of Businessday, in the event of a military crackdown against the opposition.5 The parties acknowledged the SPA before respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate Secretary of Businessday, and at the same time, a notary public for Quezon City.6 During the petitioners detention, respondent Locsin ordered fellow respondent Purugganan to cancel the petitioners shares in the books of the corporation and to transfer them to respondent Locsins name.7 As part of his scheme to defraud the petitioner, respondent Locsin sent Rebecca Fernando, an employee of Businessday, to Camp Crame where the petitioner was detained, to pretend to borrow Certificate of Stock No. 100 for the purpose of using it as additional collateral for Businessdays then outstanding loan with the National Investment and Development Corporation. When Fernando returned the borrowed stock certificate, the word "cancelled" was already written therein. When the petitioner became upset, Fernando explained that this was merely a mistake committed by responde nt Locsins secretary.8 On 16 January 1986, petitioner was finally released from detention. He then discovered that he was no longer registered as stockholder of Businessday in its corporate books. He also learned that Purugganan, as the Corporate Secretary of Businessday, had already recorded the transfer of shares in favor of respondent Locsin, while petitioner was detained. When petitioner demanded that respondents restore to him full ownership of his shares of stock, they refused to do so. On 29 July 1986, petitioner filed a Complaint before the trial court against respondents Purugganan and Locsin to declare as illegal the sale of the shares of stock, to restore to the petitioner full ownership of the shares, and payment of damages.12

Respondent Locsin contended that petitioner approached him and requested him to sell, and, if necessary, buy petitioners shares of stock in Businessday, to assure support for petitioners family in the event that something should happen to him, particularly if he was jailed, exiled or forced to go underground.13 At the time petitioner was employed with Businessday, respondent Locsin was unaware that petitioner was part of a group, Light-a-Fire Movement, which actively sought the overthrow of the Marcos government through an armed struggle.14 He denied that he made any arrangements to continue paying the petitioners salary in the event of the latters imprisonment.15 When petitioner was detained, respondent Locsin tried to sell petitioners shares, but nobody wanted to buy them. Petitioners reputation as an oppositionist resulted in the poor financial condition of Businessday and discouraged any buyers for the shares of stock.16 In view of petitioners previous instructions, respondent Locsin decided to buy the shares himself.1aw Trial court in its Decision dismissed the Complaint filed by the petitioner. It ruled that the sale of shares between petitioner and respondent Locsin was valid. The trial court concluded that petitioner had intended to sell the shares of stock to anyone, including respondent Locsin, in order to provide for the needs of his family should he be jailed or forced to go underground; and that the SPA drafted by the petitioner empowered respondent Locsin, and two other agents, to sell the shares for such price and under such terms and conditions that the agents may deem proper. It further found that petitioner consented to have respondent Locsin buy the shares himself. It also ruled that petitioner, through his wife, received from respondent Locsin the amount ofP600,000.00 as payment for the shares of stock.19 Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court that there was a perfected contract of sale. 21 It further ruled that granting that there was no perfected contract of sale, petitioner, nevertheless, ratified the sale to respondent Locsin by his receipt of the purchase price, and his failure to raise any protest over the said sale. 22 Issue: The first issue that the petitioner raised is that there was no valid sale since respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA27 issued in his, Joaquin and Holifenas favor. Held: Petitioner sought to impose a strict construction of the SPA by limiting the definition of the word "absence" to a condition wherein "a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, without leaving an agent to administer his property,"29 citing Article 381 of the Civil Code, the entire provision hereunder quoted: ART 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary. This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has expired. Petitioner also puts forward that the word "incapacity" would be limited to mean "minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction."30 He cites Article 38 of the Civil Code, in support of this definition, which is hereunder quoted: ART. 38 Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person, from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. Petitioner, thus, claims that his arrest and subsequent detention are not among the instances covered by the terms "absence or incapacity," as provided under the SPA he executed in favor of respondent Locsin. Petitioners arguments are unpersuasive. It is a general rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed; the instrument will be held to grant only those powers that are specified, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney. However, the rule is not absolute and should not be applied to the extent of destroying the very purpose of the power. If the language will permit, the construction that should be adopted is that which will carry out instead of defeat the purpose of the appointment. Clauses in a power of attorney that are repugnant to each other should be reconciled so as to give effect to the instrument in accordance with its general intent or predominant purpose. Furthermore, the instrument should always be deemed to give such powers as essential or usual in effectuating the express powers.31

In the present case, limiting the definitions of "absence" to that provided under Article 381 of the Civil Code and of "incapacity" under Article 38 of the same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating absurd, if not impossible, legal situations. Article 381 provides the necessarily stringent standards that would justify the appointment of a representative by a judge. Among the standards the said article enumerates is that no agent has been appointed to administer the property. In the present case, petitioner himself had already authorized agents to do specific acts of administration and thus, no longer necessitated the appointment of one by the court . Likewise, limiting the construction of "incapacity" to "minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction," as provided under Article 38, would render the SPA ineffective. Article 1919(3) of the Civil Code provides that the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent extinguishes the agency. It would be equally incongruous, if not outright impossible, for the petitioner to require himself to qualify as a minor, an imbecile, a deaf-mute, or a prodigal before the SPA becomes operative. In such cases, not only would he be prevented from appointing an agent, he himself would be unable to administer his property. On the other hand, defining the terms "absence" and "incapacity" by their everyday usage makes for a reasonable construction, that is, "the state of not being present" and the "inability to act," given the context that the SPA authorizes the agents to attend stockholders meetings and vote in behalf of petitioner, to sell the shares of stock, and other related acts. This construction covers the situation wherein petitioner was arrested and detained. This much is admitted by petitioner in his testimony.32 Petitioners contention that the shares may only be sold for the sole purpose of applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioners subsisting obligations to the company is far-fetched. The construction, which will carry out the purpose, is that which should be applied. Petitioner had not submitted evidence that he was in debt with Businessday at the time he had executed the SPA. Nor could he have considered incurring any debts since he admitted that, at the time of its execution, he was concerned about his possible arrest, death and disappearance. The language of the SPA clearly enumerates, as among those acts that the agents were authorized to do, the act of applying the proceeds of the sale of the shares to any obligations petitioner might have against the Businessday group of companies . This interpretation is supported by the use of the word "and" in enumerating the authorized acts, instead of phrases such as "only for," "for the purpose of," "in order to" or any similar terms to indicate that the petitioner intended that the SPA be used only for a limited purpose, that of paying any liabilities with the Businessday group of companies. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 30 June 2003, affirming the validity of the sale of the shares of stock in favor of respondent Locsin. No costs. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 181126. June 15, 2011.] LEONARDO S. UMALE, [deceased] represented by CLARISSA VICTORIA, JOHN LEO, GEORGE LEONARD, KRISTINE, MARGUERITA ISABEL, AND MICHELLE ANGELIQUE, ALL SURNAMED UMALE, petitioners, vs. ASB REALTY CORPORATION, respondent. FACTS: 1. This case involves a parcel of land located in Amethyst Street, Ortigas Center, Pasig City which was originally owned by Amethyst Pearl Corporation (Amethyst Pearl), a company that is, in turn, wholly-owned by respondent ASB Realty Corporation (ASB Realty). Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in favor of ASB Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearl's outstanding capital stock from ASB Realty. making ASB Realty the owner of the subject premises Sometime in 2003, ASB Realty commenced an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against petitioner Leonardo S. Umale. ASB Realty alleged that it entered into a lease contract with Umale for the period June 1, 1999-May 31, 2000. Their agreement was for Umale to conduct a pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rent of P60,720.00.

2.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

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11. 12.

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14. 15. 16.

Upon the contract's expiration on continued occupying the premises and paying rentals. On June 2003, ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and Pay. ASB Realty stated that it was terminating the lease effective midnight of June 30, 2003. Umale failed to comply with ASB Realty's demands and continued in possession of the subject premises, even constructing commercial establishments thereon. Umale admitted occupying the property since 1999 by virtue of a verbal lease contract but vehemently denied that ASB Realty was his lessor. He was adamant that his lessor was the original owner, Amethyst Pearl. Since there was no contract between himself and ASB Realty. In asserting his right to remain on the property based on the oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl, Umale interposed that the lease period agreed upon was "for a long period of time." Umale further claimed that when his oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl ended, they both agreed on an oral contract to sell. They agreed that Umale did not have to pay rentals until the sale over the subject property had been perfected between them. Umale also challenged ASB Realty's personality to recover the subject premises considering that ASB Realty had been placed under receivership by SEC and a rehabilitation receiver had been duly appointed. Under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules), it is the rehabilitation receiver that has the power to "take possession, control and custody of the debtor's assets." Since ASB Realty claims that it owns the subject premises, it is its duly-appointed receiver that should sue to recover possession of the same. ASB Realty replied that it was impossible for Umale to have entered into a Contract of Lease with Amethyst Pearl in 1999 because Amethyst Pearl had been liquidated in 1996. MTC dismissed ASB Realty's complaint against Umale without prejudice. It held that ASB Realty had no cause to seek Umale's ouster from the subject property because it was not Umale's lessor. MTC agreed with Umale that only the rehabilitation receiver could file suit to recover ASB Realty's property. Having been placed under receivership, ASB Realty had no more personality to file the complaint for unlawful detainer. RTC reversed decision of the MTC. It found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that it was indeed ASB Realty that entered into a lease contract with Umale. With respect to ASB Realty's personality to file the unlawful detainer suit, the RTC ruled that ASB Realty retained all its corporate powers, including the power to sue, despite the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. Citing the Interim Rules, the RTC noted that the rehabilitation receiver was not granted therein the power to file complaints on behalf of the corporation. Moreover, the retention of its corporate powers by the corporation under rehabilitation will advance the objective of corporate rehabilitation, which is to conserve and administer the assets of the corporation in the hope that it may eventually be able to go from financial distress to solvency. Umale filed MR while ASB Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, the RTC denied reconsideration of its Decision and granted ASB Realty's Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Umale then filed his appeal with the CA insisting that the parties did not enter into a lease contract. Pending the resolution thereof, Umale died and was substituted by his widow and legal heirs. CA affirmed RTC decision in toto.

What petitioners argue is that the corporate officer of ASB Realty is incapacitated to file this suit to recover a corporate property because ASB Realty has a duly-appointed rehabilitation receiver. Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is the only one that can file the instant suit. Corporations, such as ASB Realty, are juridical entities that exist by operation of law. As a creature of law, the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or impliedly, in the law. Among the general powers granted by law to a corporation is the power to sue in its own name. This power is granted to a duly-organized corporation, unless specifically revoked by another law. The question becomes: Do the laws on corporate rehabilitation particularly PD 902-A, as amended and its corresponding rules of procedure forfeit the power to sue from the corporate officers and Board of Directors? Corporate rehabilitation is defined as "the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated." This concept of preserving the corporation's business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place. This means that the debtor corporation (the corporation undergoing rehabilitation), through its Board of Directors and corporate officers, remains in control of its business and properties, subject only to the monitoring of the appointed rehabilitation receiver. The concept of debtor-in-possession, is carried out more particularly in the SEC Rules, the rule that is relevant to the instant case. It states therein that the interim rehabilitation receiver of the debtor corporation "does not take over the control and management of the debtor corporation." Likewise, the rehabilitation receiver that will replace the interim receiver is tasked only to monitor the successful implementation of the rehabilitation plan. There is nothing in the concept of corporate rehabilitation that would ipso facto deprive the Board of Directors and corporate officers of a debtor corporation, such as ASB Realty, of control such that it can no longer enforce its right to recover its property from an errant lessee. To be sure, corporate rehabilitation imposes several restrictions on the debtor corporation. The rules enumerate the prohibited corporate actions and transactions 64 (most of which involve some kind of disposition or encumbrance of the corporation's assets) during the pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings but none of which touch on the debtor corporation's right to sue. While the Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers retain their power to sue to recover its property and the back rentals from Umale, the necessity of keeping the receiver apprised of the proceedings and its results is not lost upon this Court. Tasked to closely monitor the assets of ASB Realty, the rehabilitation receiver has to be notified of the developments in the case, so that these assets would be managed in accordance with the approved rehabilitation plan.

Geluz v. CA, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961 Facts: - This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same. -Nita Villanueva knew defendant Geluz for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. To conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had an abortion which was performed by the defendant. Again, Nita has undergone the same procedure by the defendant in her succeeding pregnancies. -The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion Issue: Whether or not an action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child?

Issues: Can a corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors) file suit to recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the fact that the corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation? The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its officers. There is no denying that ASB Realty, as the owner of the leased premises, is the real party-in-interest in the unlawful detainer suit. Real party-in-interest is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Held: Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mothers womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

Continental Steel v. Montao G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself

The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.

without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother.

Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiters resolution.

Petitioner immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits.

1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die 2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent SC:1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is

It was maintained by Hortillano that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits.

misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case.

Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides:

The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. child inside the womb already has life.

No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension. G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38 -39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE The original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino citizen and before his death, he applied for certificate of public convenience (Case No. 4572) to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. He died while the case is pending, but his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. In view of the evidence that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant, in the Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City. Petitioner contents that it was an error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to the estate the certificate applied for because it is in contravention of law.

DE JESUS vs SYQUIA FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonia and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to priest confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila. After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time. It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned. ISSUES: 1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity. 2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco. HELD: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality? RULING: The right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. It constitutes a part of the assets of his estate. Rule 88, 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased". Rule 82, 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for him. Unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property or rights of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right. It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, CANNOT be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding. The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. The word "person" in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent. The examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person. It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity.

Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated after the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons. It has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased.

The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case. But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant. JOAQUIN vs NAVARRO Facts: Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building. Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didnt want to leave so he left with his son, his sons wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez . As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days. Feb. 10, 1945: on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that son outlived his mother. Issue: Order of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. Held: Reversed. Art. 43 civil code: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or morepersons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges prior death of either must provethe allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place. In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died before his mother. The presumption that AJ died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.

NCC 42 DUMLAO v. QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS (QPP) On February 28 1962, the CFI ordered a judgment against Soliven etc (5 sila) etc to pay QPP a certain amount plus legal interest. They failed to pay so upon motion, the court ordered the foreclosure of the security bond and the sale at public auction of Orias land that was given as surety. Oria died on April 23, 1959 long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. QPP was not aware of Orias death nor were QPPs representative aware of the special proceeding regarding his estate. Summons of the complaint we personally served. The principal of the bond signed and acknowledged the summons for all of them. Dumlao and the other heirs of Oria sued QPP for the annulment of judgment against Oria and and against his land. After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants in Civil Case No. T662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the plaintiffs appealed. ISSUE: Was the judgment valid against Oria? NO. There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).