G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985 ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

, as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition,Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August declared national policy; that the acts and 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if respondent Judge, which denied her Motion tothe same is contrary to public policy, divest Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,matters within its jurisdiction. respectively. For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary The basic background facts are that petitioner is a to determine whether the property relations citizen of the Philippines while private respondent between petitioner and private respondent, after is a citizen of the United States; that they were their marriage, were upon absolute or relative married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the community property, upon complete separation of marriage, they established their residence in the property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal Philippines; that they begot two children born onfact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,parties. respectively; that the parties were divorced inThe Nevada District Court, which decreed the Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to who appeared in person before the Court during Theodore Van Dorn. the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit over private respondent who, giving his address as against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City,authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of incompatibility in the understanding that there community property nor community of the parties, and asking that petitioner be were neither 3 obligations. As explicitly stated in the Power of ordered to render an accounting of that business, Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of and that private respondent be declared with right KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to represent him in the divorce proceedings: to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the xxx xxx xxx divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court You are hereby authorized to accept service wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on petitioner had "no community property" as of June my behalf and do an things necessary and 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to proper to represent me, without further Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that contesting, subject to the following: the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the 1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari ground of incompatibility. proceeding. 2. That there is no community of property Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a to be adjudicated by the Court. civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to 3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the to be adjudicated by the court. remedies to question the propriety of an xxx xxx xxx 4 interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently There can be no question as to the validity of that committed, or the lower Court acted capriciouslyNevada divorce in any of the States of the United and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court States. The decree is binding on private in a certiorari proceeding to exercise itsrespondent as an American citizen. For instance, supervisory authority and to correct the errorprivate respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to husband, in any State of the Union. What he is lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then liecontending in this case is that the divorce is not since it would be useless and a waste of time to go valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider thebeing contrary to local law and public policy. petition filed in this case within the exception, and It is true that owing to the nationality principle we have given it due course. embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on Philippine nationals are covered by the policy the parties and their alleged conjugal property in against absolute divorces the same being the Philippines. considered contrary to our concept of public police

and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces vs. abroad, which may be recognized in theHON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity Philippines, provided they are valid according toas Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce inof Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, Nevada released private respondent from thein his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; marriage from the standards of American law, and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents. under which divorce dissolves the marriage. AsREGALADO, J.: stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799: An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to The purpose and effect of a decree ofbe followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter divorce from the bond of matrimony by a against the former, provides Us the opportunity to court of competent jurisdiction are to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto change the existing status or domesticappears to be an unresolved jurisdictional relation of husband and wife, and to free question. them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceasesOn September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda to bind either. A husband without a wife, or Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private a wife without a husband, is unknown to therespondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German law. When the law provides, in the nature ofnational, were married before the Registrar of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in marry again, that party, as well as the the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage other, is still absolutely freed from the bondstarted auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where of the former marriage. their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on Thus, pursuant to his national law, privateApril 20, 1980. 1 respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the caseThereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise recriminations between the spouses, followed by a control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the separation de facto between them. Decision of his own country's Court, which validlyAfter about three and a half years of marriage, exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decisionsuch connubial disharmony eventuated in private he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against representation before said Court from asserting his petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local right over the alleged conjugal property. Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was To maintain, as private respondent does, that, failure of their marriage and that they had been 2 under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still living apart since April, 1982. married to private respondent and still subject to a Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of thelegal separation, support and separation of Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not beproperty before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, obliged to live together with, observe respect and Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same fidelity, and render support to private respondent.is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3 The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the should not be discriminated against in her own Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the country if the ends of justice are to be served. ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, andcustody of the child was granted to petitioner. The respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the records show that under German law said court Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his was locally and internationally competent for the Court. divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by Without costs. the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4 SO ORDERED. On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

"People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of 52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the complaints against the petitioner. 16 the respondent judge; while the other case,We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and for shall accordingly issue. James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 8717 the 52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 7 crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes Branch XXV, of the same court. against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with upon a sworn written complaint filed by the the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaidoffended spouse. It has long since been resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the established, with unwavering consistency, that cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petitioncompliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the due course to both petitions and directed the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of jurisdiction to try the case. both cases to his office for review. 9 Now, the law specifically provides that in Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend person who can legally file the complaint should be further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence,the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings inoffenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, lasciviousness, no provision is made for the respondent judge merely reset the date of the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April concubinage by the parents, grandparents or 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitionerguardian of the offended party. The so-called moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminalthe first four offenses above mentioned do not Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant petition for review then pending before the that while the State, as parens patriae, was added Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was alsoand vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal filed in the same case on the ground of lack of Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the respondent judge in an order dated September 8,aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape 1987. The same order also directed the and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her arraignment of both accused therein, that is,parents, grandparents or guardian, such petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered aamendment did not include the crimes of adultery plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be and concubinage. In other words, only the offended arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner beingspouse, and no other, is authorized by law to considered by respondent judge as directinitiate the action therefor. contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the herself for arraignment. 13 Later, privateoffended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14 the status, capacity or legal representation to do On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with aThis is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a the annulment of the order of the lower courtmotion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of denying her motion to quash. The petition is the filing of the complaint or petition. anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purportedthe same requirement and rationale would not complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an apply. Understandably, it may not have been found offended spouse having obtained a final divorcenecessary since criminal actions are generally and decree under his national law prior to his filing the fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party criminal complaint." 15 being merely the complaining witness therein. On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those temporary restraining order enjoining the which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the respondents from implementing the aforesaidpresent prosecution for adultery is of such genre, order of September 8, 1987 and from further the offended spouse assumes a more predominant proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. role since the right to commence the action, or to Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid power and option. petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's

This policy was adopted out of consideration for provision in the statute; and we are of the the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the opinion that the unoffending spouse must outrage in silence rather than go through the be such when the prosecution is scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently commenced. (Emphasis supplied.) argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule Penal Code thus presupposes that the maritalshould not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, relationship is still subsisting at the time of the considering our statutory law and jural policy on institution of the criminal action for, adultery. Thisthe matter. We are convinced that in cases of such is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre ofnature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the said provision of law would be absent where the accused must be determined as of the time the supposed offended party had ceased to be the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and filing of the criminal case. 21 by this is meant that he is still married to the In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable thataccused spouse, at the time of the filing of the the status and capacity of the complainant to complaint. commence the action be definitely established In the present case, the fact that private and, as already demonstrated, such status orrespondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said initiates the action. It would be absurd if his divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in capacity to bring the action would be determined the Philippines insofar as private respondent is by his status before or subsequent to theconcerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in commencement thereof, where such capacity or our civil law on the matter of status of persons. status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at theThus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, 24 time of, the institution of the case. We would Jr., et al., after a divorce was granted by a United thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a partyStates court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and bringing suit at the very time when he is without her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business the legal capacity to do so. concern was conjugal property and praying that To repeat, there does not appear to be any local she be ordered to render an accounting and that precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the to when precisely the status of a complainant as anbusiness. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court offended spouse must exist where a criminal perspicuously demonstrated the error of such prosecution can be commenced only by one who instance, thus: law can be categorized as possessed of such There can be no question as to the validity status. Stated differently and with reference to the of that Nevada divorce in any of the States present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is of the United States. The decree is binding necessary in the commencement of a criminal on private respondent as an American action for adultery that the marital bonds between citizen. For instance, private respondent the complainant and the accused be unsevered cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in and existing at the time of the institution of the any State of the Union. ... action by the former against the latter. It is true that owing to the nationality American jurisprudence, on cases involving principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari Code, only Philippine nationals are covered materia with ours, yields the rule that after a by the policy against absolute divorces the divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no same being considered contrary to our longer has the right to institute proceedings concept of public policy and morality. against the offenders where the statute provides However, aliens may obtain divorces that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive abroad, which may be recognized in the right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, Philippines, provided they are valid however, proceedings have been properly according to their national law. ... commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the Thus, pursuant to his national law, private criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22 respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa sue in the case below as petitioner's held that husband entitled to exercise control over 'No prosecution for adultery can be conjugal assets. ... 25 commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code.Under the same considerations and rationale, Though Loftus was husband of defendant private respondent, being no longer the husband of when the offense is said to have been petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the committed, he had ceased to be such when adultery case under the imposture that he was the the prosecution was begun; and appellantoffended spouse at the time he filed suit. insists that his status was not such as to The allegation of private respondent that he could entitle him to make the complaint. We have not have brought this case before the decree of repeatedly said that the offense is againstdivorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no the unoffending spouse, as well as the legal significance or consequence in this case. state, in explaining the reason for this When said respondent initiated the divorce

proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect decree is valid according to the national law of the once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the Neither would there be a danger of introducinggoverning personal law of the alien spouse who spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts one of the reasons for the particular formulation of do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and our law on adultery, 26 since there wouldjudgment; hence, like any other facts, both the thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of.divorce decree and the national law of the alien The severance of the marital bond had the effectmust be alleged and proven according to our law of dissociating the former spouses from each other, on evidence. hence the actuations of one would not affect or The Case cast obloquy on the other. Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of The aforecited case of United States vs. Matathe Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, cannot be successfully relied upon by private 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision Revised Penal Code, which punished adulterydisposed as follows: "although the marriage be afterwards declared "WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan married woman to her marital vows, even though it City as dissolved and both parties can now should be made to appear that she is entitled to remarry under existing and applicable laws to have her marriage contract declared null and void, any and/or both parties."3 until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, itThe assailed Order denied reconsideration of the cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the above-quoted Decision. complaint can still be filed after the declaration of The Facts nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha never existed. There being no marriage from theSamson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband said declaration of nullity would no longer have a and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequentlyof divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, contemplated and within the purview of thewas issued by an Australian family court. decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before theOn June 26, 1992, respondent became an termination of the marriage by a judicial Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of issued by the Australian declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same ruleAustralian Citizenship" 6 government. Petitioner a Filipina and and requisite would necessarily apply where the respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in termination of the marriage was effected, as in this Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan case, by a valid foreign divorce. City.7 In their application for a marriage license, Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8 al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory readingStarting October 22, 1995, petitioner and of said case reveals that the offended spouserespondent lived separately without prior judicial therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaintdissolution of their marriage. While the two were for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided their sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the on May 16, 1996, in accordance with 9 Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for determinative of the controversy herein. Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a WHEREFORE, the questioned order denyingquo, on the ground of bigamy respondent petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE andallegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the another one entered DISMISSING the complaint intime he married her on January 12, 1994. She Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage The temporary restraining order issued in this case to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back SO ORDERED. as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 decree obtained in Australian in 1989; 12 thus, he GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIAwas legally capacitated to marry petitioner in RECIO, petitioner, 1994.1wphi1.nt vs. On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents. couple's wedding and while the suit for the PANGANIBAN, J.: declaration of nullity was pending respondent A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be was able to secure a divorce decree from a family

court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13 two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest. Respondent prayed in his Answer that the The Court's Ruling Complained be dismissed on the ground that it The Petition is partly meritorious. stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the First Issue: Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary Proving the Divorce Between Respondent evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted and Editha Samson their respective memoranda, the case was Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the submitted for resolution.17 divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailedCiting Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner Decision and Order. argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this Ruling of the Trial Court jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) The trial court declared the marriage dissolved onthe foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed respondent miserably failed to establish these the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any elements. defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages divorce decree obtained by respondent. Thesolemnized abroad are governed by the law of the Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus,place where they were celebrated (the lex loci there was no more martial union to nullify or celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the annual. conformity of the marriage in question to the legal Hence, this Petition.18 requirements of the place where the marriage was Issues performed. Petitioner submits the following issues for our At the outset, we lay the following basic legal consideration: principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute "I divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A The trial court gravely erred in finding that the marriage between two Filipinos cannot be divorce decree obtained in Australia by the dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, respondent ipso facto terminated his firstbecause of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil marriage to Editha Samson therebyCode.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and capacitating him to contract a second marriage a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows with the petitioner. the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the "2 alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." 26 The failure of the respondent, who is now a A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are naturalized Australian, to present a certificateboth aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, of legal capacity to marry constitutes absenceprovided it is consistent with their respective of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner'national laws.27 marriage to the respondent. A comparison between marriage and divorce, as "3 far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be The trial court seriously erred in the application made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case. recognized in the Philippines, provided they are "4 valid according to their national law."28 Therefore, The trial court patently and grievously erred in before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the of the Family Code as the applicable provisions divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to in this case. the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. "5 Divorce as a Question of Fact The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncingPetitioner insists that before a divorce decree can that the divorce decree obtained by thebe admitted in evidence, it must first comply with respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitatedthe registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 the parties to remarry, without first securing aand 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as recognition of the judgment granting thefollows: divorce decree before our courts."19 "ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and "(5) If previously married, how, when and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; where the previous marriage was dissolved or respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian annulled; citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act xxxxxxxxx of adopting an alien and clothing him with the 40 "ART. 13. In case either of the contractingpolitical and civil rights belonging to a citizen. parties has been previously married, theNaturalized citizens, freed from the protective applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of cloak of their former states, don the attires of their the birth of baptismal certificate required in the adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, last preceding article, the death certificate ofrespondent severed his allegiance to the the deceased spouse or the judicial decree ofPhilippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him annulment or declaration of nullity of his or herto Philippine personal laws. previous marriage. x x x. Burden of Proving Australian Law "ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of Respondent contends that the burden to prove absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, and distribution of the properties of thebecause she is the party challenging the validity of spouses, and the delivery of the children's a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in thewas satisfied with the original of the divorce decree appropriate civil registry and registries ofand was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, property; otherwise, the same shall not affect because she had lived and worked in that country their persons." for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: Australian divorce decree is a public document a thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign written official act of an Australian family court.laws in the exercise of sound discretion. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies authenticity and due execution. with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact in the prosecution or defense of Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a or thing necessary 41 an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary burden of proving the material allegations of the value, the document must first be presented and 30 complaint when those are denied by the answer; admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed theand defendants have the burden of proving the best evidence of a judgment is the judgmentmaterial allegations in42their answer when they itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act orintroduce new matters. Since the divorce was a record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it foreign country.32 falls squarely upon him. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other courts hand, a writing or document may be proven as a It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our 43 cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like public or official record of a foreign country by any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal Australian marital laws are not among those to know by custody of the document. If the record is not kept matters that judges are supposed 44 reason of their judicial function. The power of in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in resolved in the negative. which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by Second Issue: the seal of his office.34 Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic onePetitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient issued by an Australian family court. 35 However,proof of the divorce, respondent was legally appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the incapacitated to marry her in 1994. aforemetioned rules on evidence must be Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void demonstrated. ab initio. Fortunately for respondent's cause, when theRespondent replies that the Australian divorce divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to itsadequately established his legal capacity to marry admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not under Australian law. been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it waslegal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. 37a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded But divorces are of different types. The two basic weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo object properly rendered the divorce decreematrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et admissible as a written act of the Family Court ofthoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while Sydney, Australia.38 the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full

xxxxxxxxx

force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on which type of divorce was procured by respondent. January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva 52 Respondent presented a decree nisi or anEcija; (c) Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a Samson (Australian) 53 Metro Manila; (d) Exhibit "D" Office of the City separation from bed and board, although an Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the information of annulment between Rederick A. prescribed period during which no reconciliation is Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records; 54 46 effected. and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the courtCitizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 55 (2) for may under some foreign statutes and practices,respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;56 (b) still restrict remarriage. Under some otherExhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian granted on the ground of adultery may be Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" prohibited from remarrying again. The court may Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family allow a remarriage only after proof of goodCourt of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" behavior.47 Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation and Grace J. Garcia On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree Between Rederick A. Recto 60 Recio since October 22, 1995. contains a restriction that reads: "1. A party to a marriage who marries again Based on the above records, we cannot conclude before this decree becomes absolute (unless that respondent, who was then a naturalized the other party has died) commits the offence Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with of bigamy."48 petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in This quotation bolsters our contention that the finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed divorce obtained by respondent may have beenrespondent with the legal capacity to remarry restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence capacity to remarry according to his national law. to show the Australian personal law governing his Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial status; or at the very least, to prove his legal court, which erroneously assumed that thecapacity to contract the second marriage. Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity ofNeither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the evidence on this matter. ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that We also reject the claim of respondent that the under Australian law, he was really capacitated to divorce decree raises a disputable presumption ormarry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce presumptive evidence as to his civil status based decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, forcourse is to remand this case to the trial court to the simple reason that no proof has been receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's presented on the legal effects of the divorcelegal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, decree obtained under Australian laws. then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the Significance of the Certificate of Legal parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage Capacity certificates, which were both obtained in the Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City was not submitted together with the application fordated January 12, 1994. a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to to remarry. the court a quo for the purpose of receiving We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract evidence which conclusively show respondent's marriage is determined by the national law of the legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in party concerned. The certificate mentioned inthat, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the Article 21 of the Family Code would have been ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs. sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. ASO ORDERED. duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50 As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto

existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan FE D. QUITA, petitioner, children had been acknowledged by the deceased vs. as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 * respondents. November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, BELLOSILLO, J.: equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5 were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Somewhere along the way their relationshipPadlan children were allowed to present proofs that soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce inthe recognition of the children by the deceased as San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted inhis legitimate children, except Alexis who was the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made records of birth. Thus on 15 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live in their respective 6 partial reconsideration was separately from each other and a settlement of February 1988 granted declaring the Padlan children, with the their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz 7 petitioner to the other half. Private respondent in the same locality but their relationship also was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married the aforementioned records of birth that she and for the third time, to a certain Wernimont. Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with during the existence of his previous marriage to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance petitioner. of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as and her children assigned as one of the errors Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the survivingallegedly committed by the trial court the spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,circumstance that the case was decided without a Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan of Court, which provides that if there is a opposed the petition and prayed for thecontroversy before the court as to who are the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon distributive shares to which each person is entitled motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasalunder the law, the controversy shall be heard and was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April decided as in ordinary cases. 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) Respondent appellate court found this ground submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 private writing and the final judgment of divorceSeptember 1995 it declared null and void the 27 between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the deceased Arturo, intervened. the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 9 On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and Should this case be remanded to the lower court the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as there is no need because, first, no legal or factual well as the six (6) Padlan children and Rupertoissue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship failed to appear despite due notice. On the same of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, day, the trial court required the submission of the second, the issue as to who between petitioner and records of birth of the Padlan children within ten private respondent is the proper hier of the (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or decedent is one of law which can be resolved in without the documents, the issue on the the present petition based on establish facts and declaration of heirs would be considered submittedadmissions of the parties. for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted. We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao 1controversy before the court as to who are the which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipinolawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity ofdistributive shares to which each person is entitled the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not under the law, the controversy shall be heard and entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," decided as in ordinary cases. 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view thatWe agree with petitioner that no dispute exists their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children 1972. Neither did it consider valid theirto inherit from the decedent because there are extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by even recognizes them as to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, ithim and petitioner herself 10 heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective opined that there was no showing that marriage G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

hereditary shares. But controversy remains as tostenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of The trial court, after the parties other than a certain transfer certificate title as well as the petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for before another trial court. When asked whether immediate declaration of heirs and distribution ofshe was an American citizen petitioner answered estate, simply issued an order requiring the that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did after which, with or without the documents, the not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase issue on declaration of heirs would be deemedthe uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of submitted for resolution. their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, private respondent raised, among others, the issue respondent appellate court did not err in ordering as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit the case returned to the trial court for further from the decedent considering that she hadproceedings.

secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact hadWe emphasize however that the question to be twice remarried. She also invoked the abovedetermined by the trial court should be limited only quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner repliedto the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to legally married to her in spite of the divorce they heirship was already resolved by the trial court. obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, theShe and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 implication is that petitioner was no longer a while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to marriage considered void from the beginning under conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. TheArts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from matters in issue with the aid of documentary and him as this status presupposes a legitimate testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of relationship. 20 the parties either supporting or opposing the As regards the motion of private respondent for evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorilypetitioner and a her counsel to be declared in settled her claim in her favor by merely applying contempt of court and that the present petition be the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao. dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks Then in private respondent's motion to set aside merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must and/or reconsider the lower court's decision sheinvolve the same transactions and same essential stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was facts and circumstances. There must also be relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. identical causes of action, subject matter and Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration abroad, which may be recognized in theof heirship while the subsequent petitions filed Philippines, provided they are valid according tobefore the three (3) trial courts concern the their national law. She prayed therefore that theissuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed theof certain properties belonging to the estate of motion but failed to squarely address the issue on Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grantexistence of forum shopping. private respondent's prayer for a hearing but WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision proceeded to resolve her motion with the findingof respondent Court of Appeals ordering the that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino remand of the case to the court of origin for further citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 Itproceedings and declaring null and void its maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 indecision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the findingof the appellate court modifying its previous on their citizenship pertained solely to the time ofdecision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net their marriage as the trial court was not suppliedhereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship atClaro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, whether she was still a Filipino citizen when theirinstead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is divorce was decreed. The trial court must have likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Oncethat the reception of evidence by the trial court proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at should he limited to the hereditary rights of the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would becomepetitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan. applicable and petitioner could very well lose her The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in right to inherit from Arturo. contempt of court and to dismiss the present Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petition for forum shopping is DENIED. petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In theSO ORDERED. present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of

10

G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006 ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG, Respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention10 claiming that she has a legal interest in the matter in litigation because she knows certain information which might aid the trial court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the annulment case, which the trial court granted on September 30, 2002. Petitioners complaint-inintervention was also ordered admitted.

Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the This petition for certiorari and prohibition underorder dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25, The Court of Appeals granted the petition and 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. declared as null and void the September 30, 2002 SP No. 74456 which set aside and declared as nullOrder of the trial court granting the motion for and void the September 30, 2002 Order 2 of theleave to file intervention and admitting the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, complaint-in-intervention. granting petitioners motion for leave to file intervention and admitting the Complaint-in-Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, Intervention3 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44847; and its hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition January 23, 2004 Resolution4 denying the motionfiled under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals gravely abused for reconsideration. its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily the annulment case between Tristan and Lily. Gomez Catindig5 twice on May 16, 1968. The first marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central The petition lacks merit. Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved Manila while the second took place at the Lourdes party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of marriage produced four children. the Rules of Court. However, if the error subject of Several years later, the couple encountered maritalthe recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act problems that they decided to separate from each complained of was granted by a court with grave other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. jurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the proper for certiorari under Rule 65 of Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a remedy is a petition 11 the said Rules. This is based on the premise that Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican in issuing the assailed decision and resolution, the Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of lack of a divorce action under its laws.6 jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy and Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the privateadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of remedy is considered plain, speedy, and adequate conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Courtif it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the injurious effect of the judgment and the acts of the Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual lower court.12 consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to Branch 133, ordered the complete separation ofestablish that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or properties between Tristan and Lily. lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated the On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar assailed decision and resolution. O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States7 and both lived as husband and wife until We have previously ruled that grave abuse of October 2001. Their union produced one offspring.8 discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of the divorce decree issued by the court in the discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriageexercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or deemed void under Philippine law. When she despotic manner by reason of passion or personal confronted Tristan about this, the latter assured herhostility and must be so patent and gross as to that he would legalize their union after he obtains amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a an annulment of his marriage with Lily. Tristanvirtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to further promised the petitioner that he wouldact at all in contemplation of law. 13 The word adopt their son so that he would be entitled to an "capricious," usually used in tandem with the term equal share in his estate as that of each of his "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and children with Lily.9 unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of 14 the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed discretion is imperative. as Case No. Q-01-44847. The Rules of Court laid down the parameters

11

before a person, not a party to a case can added) intervene, thus: Thus, petitioners claim that she is the wife of Who may intervene. A person who has a legal Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired of either of the parties, or an interest against both, the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a for intervention is based. distribution or other disposition of property in the Since petitioners motion for leave to file custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, intervention was bereft of the indispensable with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the requirement of legal interest, the issuance by the action. The court shall consider whether or not the trial court of the order granting the same and intervention will unduly delay or prejudice theadmitting the complaint-in-intervention was adjudication of the rights of the original parties, attended with grave abuse of discretion. and whether or not the intervenors rights may be Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly set fully protected in a separate proceeding.15 aside and declared as null and void the said order.

The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The interest in the matter in litigation; and [b] assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003 and consideration must be given as to whether theResolution dated January 23, 2004 of the Court of adjudication of the original parties may be delayed Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 are AFFIRMED. or prejudiced, or whether the intervenors rights may be protected in a separate proceeding orNo pronouncement as to costs. not.16 SO ORDERED. Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, effect of the judgment. 17 Such interest must bevs. actual, direct and material, and not simplyFELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. contingent and expectant.18 x ---------------------------------------------------- x Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007 the requisite legal interest required of a would-be RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, intervenor under the Rules of Court. vs. Petitioners claim lacks merit. Under the law, FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, SAN LUIS, Respondent. hence her claim of legal interest has no basis. DECISION When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained fromBefore us are consolidated petitions for1 review of the the Dominican Republic never dissolved theassailing the February 4, 1998 Decision Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws 2 reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 relating to family rights and duties, or to the 3 status, condition and legal capacity of persons are and January 31, 1996 Resolutions of the Regional binding upon citizens of the Philippines, evenTrial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. 4 though living abroad.19 Regardless of where aNo. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or The instant case involves the settlement of the her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. regardless of whether he or she was married here During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit absolute divorce from spouse and eventuallyon March 17, 1942 out of which were born six becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, decree, the Philippines will not recognize such Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia absolute divorce.20 predeceased Felicisimo. When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married their marriage was governed by the provisions ofMerry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. the Civil Code21 which took effect on August 30,However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano22 we held: American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of sought and decreed after the effectivity of the Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and 6 entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. and neither is the marriage contracted with On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent another party by the divorced consort,Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los

12

Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children withOn April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of respondent but lived with her for 18 years from theFelicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to time of their marriage up to his death on disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos December 18, 1992. from hearing the case. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution ofOn October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an their conjugal partnership assets and the Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of possessed the legal standing to file the petition administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708motion for disqualification was deemed moot and which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof. academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, theTensuan pending the resolution of said motion. decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, the decedents surviving heirs are respondent asEdgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, from the Order denying their motion for and son by his second marriage; that the decedentreconsideration arguing that it does not state the left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,facts and law on which it was based. valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that theOn November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an decedent does not have any unpaid debts.Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnershipcase was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by assets be liquidated and that letters ofJudge Paul T. Arcangel. administration be issued to her. On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, parties to submit their respective position papers one of the children of Felicisimo by his first on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on therespondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, grounds of improper venue and failure to state a Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition arguments and evidence set forth in his previous for letters of administration should have been filedmotion for reconsideration as his position paper. in the Province of Laguna because this was Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death.on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she wasOn September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at thethe petition for letters of administration. It held time of his death, was still legally married to Merry that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Lee. Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, without legal capacity to file the petition for letters 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying theof administration because her marriage with two motions to dismiss. Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,found that the decree of absolute divorce respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was thereto. She submitted documentary evidencenot valid in the Philippines and did not bind showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code home to their house in New Alabang Village, cannot be retroactively applied because it would Alabang, Metro Manila which they boughtimpair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the children. decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had motions were denied. 28 already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her byRespondent appealed to the Court of Appeals virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Familywhich reversed and set aside the orders of the trial Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states: Romillo, Jr. 14 Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitionerWHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED reconsideration from the Order denying their and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted thatOctober 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for 29 be given retroactive effect to validate respondents further proceedings. bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because thisThe appellante court ruled that under Section 1, would impair vested rights in derogation of Article Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of 256 16 of the Family Code. residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing

13

the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively the personal, actual or physical habitation, orapplied because it would impair vested rights and actual residence or place of abode of a person asratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It respondent cannot be considered the surviving noted that although Felicisimo discharged his wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity functions as governor in Laguna, he actuallyto file the petition for letters of administration. resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petitionThe issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was for letters of administration was properly filed in properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal Makati City. capacity to file the subject petition for letters of The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had administration. legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue ofThe petition lacks merit. paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v.Under Section 1, 31 the petition for letters of administration of the Ibay-Somera. It found that the marriage between estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the Family Court of the First Circuit, State ofthe time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. 40 Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule determining the residence as Felicisimo was capacitated to contract afor contradistinguished from domicile of the subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the With the well-known rule express mandate ofsettlement of his estate: paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and [T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual the reason and philosophy behind the enactment residence" as distinguished from "legal residence of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms sustain the individual view sweeping statement "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the our state against divorce in any form whatsoever."application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. AllRule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such that the courts should do is to give force and effectnature residence rather than domicile is the to the express mandate of the law. The foreignsignificant factor. Even where the statute uses the divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner onword "domicile" still it is construed as meaning December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shallresidence and not domicile in the technical sense. x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine Some cases make a distinction between the terms laws". For this reason, the marriage between the"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in deceased and petitioner should not be statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term denominated as "a bigamous marriage. "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, viewed or understood in its popular sense, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute meaning, the personal, actual or physical the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the habitation of a person, actual residence or place of estate of the deceased. x x x 33 abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term for reconsideration 34 which were denied by themeans merely residence, that is, personal Court of Appeals. residence, not legal residence or domicile. On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via Residence simply requires bodily presence as an the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion tobodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of adopt the said petition which was granted. 36 time of residence is required though; however, the In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar andresidence must be more than temporary. 41 Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition (Emphasis supplied) for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 andsettlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case denotes a fixed permanent residence to whichbecause they involve election cases. Needless to when absent, one intends to return. They claim say, there is a distinction between "residence" for that a person can only have one domicile at anypurposes of election laws and "residence" for given time. Since Felicisimo never changed hispurposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election domicile, the petition for letters of administration cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. residence to which when absent, one has the Petitioners also contend that respondents intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamousfixing venue under the Rules of Court, the because it was performed during the subsistence "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue

14

physical habitation, or actual residence or place of In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private abode, which may not necessarily be his legal respondent from the marriage from the standards residence or domicile provided he resides therein of American law, under which divorce dissolves the with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it ismarriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court possible that a person may have his residence in of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. one place and domicile in another. Ed. 794, 799: In the instant case, while petitioners established "The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, from the bond of matrimony by a competent respondent proved that he also maintained ajurisdiction are to change the existing status or residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free the time of his death. Respondent submitted in them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 datedthus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased A husband without a wife, or a wife without a purchased the aforesaid property. She alsohusband, is unknown to the law. When the law presented billing statements 45 from the Philippineprovides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for theparty shall not marry again, that party, as well as period August to December 1992 indicating the the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala the former marriage." Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented Thus, pursuant to his national law, private proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala CountryHe would have no standing to sue in the case Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise sent by the deceaseds children to him at his control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" whilehe does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own his office/provincial address is in "Provincialrepresentation before said Court from asserting his Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna." right over the alleged conjugal property. 53

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was aAs to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of the Court ruled that she should no longer be fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. considered married to the alien spouse. Further, Consequently, the subject petition for letters of she should not be required to perform her marital administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial duties and obligations. It held: Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filedTo maintain, as private respondent does, on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa that, under our laws, petitioner has to be still married to private was still a municipality and the branches of theconsidered respondent and still subject to a wife's Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per 51 be obliged to live together with, observe respect Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be Regional Trial Court of Makati City. one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legalproperty. She should not be discriminated personality to file the petition for letters ofagainst in her own country if the ends of administration, we must first resolve the issue of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added) whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. 55 where the Court recognized the Code, considering that Felicidads marriage toIbay-Somera Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said before the Family Code took effect on August 3, case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a 1988. In resolving this issue, we need notproper party in filing the adultery suit against his retroactively apply the provisions of the FamilyFilipino wife. The Court stated that " the severance Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy to rule in the affirmative. on the other." 56 The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a 57 the Court marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals , which marriage was subsequently dissolvedstated that where a Filipino is divorced by his through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn 58 Although decided on December 22, Claiming that the divorce was not valid under applies. Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in interest in the properties from their conjugal1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in partnership should be protected. The Court, effect. however, recognized the validity of the divorce andThe significance of the Van Dorn case to the held that the alien spouse had no interest in the development of limited recognition of divorce in properties acquired by the Filipino wife after thethe Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has divorce. Thus: long been interpreted as severing marital ties

15

between parties in a mixed marriage and enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law necessary consequence of upholding the validity of already established through judicial a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. Inprecedent.1awphi1.net his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to the parties and productive of no possible good to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio,the community, relief in some way should be 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared in relation to Article 26. 61 commitment between two parties, cannot possibly

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 thebe productive of any good to the society where one historical background and legislative intent behindis considered released from the marital bond while paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of discussed, to wit: affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in Brief Historical Background this case. On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino 65 and 17 66 of the Civil signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Petitioners cite Articles 15 known as the "Family Code," which took effect on Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states: However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be accordance with the laws in force in the country discriminated against in his own country if the where they were solemnized, and valid there as ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. such, shall also be valid in this country, except Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated: those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38. But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraphshould be to discover in its provisions the intent of was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should provides: never be interpreted in such a way as to cause ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside theinjustice as this is never within the legislative Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, the country where they were solemnized, and validfor we presume the good motives of the there as such, shall also be valid in this country, legislature, is to render justice. except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),Thus, we interpret and apply the law not (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. independently of but in consonance with justice. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the applied in a particular case because of its peculiar Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience x x x xto their language. What we do instead is find a Legislative Intent balance between the word and the will, that justice Records of the proceedings of the Family Code may be done even as the law is obeyed. deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is yielding like robots to the literal command without to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married tolaw," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, the Filipino spouse. "where these words import a policy that goes Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26beyond them." traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn x x x x v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and aMore than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined foreigner. The Court held therein that a justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to divorce decree validly obtained by the alien render every one his due." That wish continues to spouse is valid in the Philippines, and motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and consequently, the Filipino spouse isthe law in every case brought to it for decision. capacitated to remarry under Philippine law .Justice is always an essential ingredient of its 63 decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we (Emphasis added) interpret the law in a way that will render justice, As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis inpresuming that it was the intention of the resolving a situation where a divorce is validlylawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With thewith justice. 69

16

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case,performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the would have vested Felicidad with the legal property relations between parties who live personality to file the present petition as together as husband and wife without the benefit Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the recordsof marriage, or their marriage is void from the show that there is insufficient evidence to prove beginning. It provides that the property acquired the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as by either or both of them through their work or well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimoindustry or their wages and salaries shall be under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a cothe Court laid down the specific guidelines for ownership, it is not necessary that the property be pleading and proving foreign law and divorceacquired through their joint labor, efforts and judgments. It held that presentation solely of the industry. Any property acquired during the union is divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its prima facie presumed to have been obtained authenticity and due execution must be presented. through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed document may be proven as a public or official equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77 record of a foreign country by either (1) an official Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the of both the divorce and the marriage, the officer having legal custody of the document. If the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the the proper diplomatic or consular officer in theproperty relations of couples living together as Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 country in which the record is kept and (b) In Saguid v. Court of Appeals , 79 we held that even authenticated by the seal of his office. 71 if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificateregime under this provision as follows: and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of The regime of limited co-ownership of property California which purportedly show that theirgoverning the union of parties who are not legally marriage was done in accordance with the said capacitated to marry each other, but who law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannotnonetheless live together as husband and wife, take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be applies to properties acquired during said alleged and proved. 73 cohabitation in proportion to their respective Therefore, this case should be remanded to thecontributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and theproperty or industry. Absent proof of the extent marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. thereof, their contributions and corresponding Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitatedshares shall be presumed to be equal.

to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find x x x x that the latter has the legal personality to file the In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. subject petition for letters of administration, as she Fernandez, which involved the issue of comay be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as ownership of properties acquired by the parties to regards the properties that were acquired througha bigamous marriage and an adulterous their joint efforts during their cohabitation. relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states actual contribution in the acquisition of the that letters of administration may be granted to property is essential. x x x the surviving spouse of the decedent. However,As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: upon the party who, as determined by the

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters ofpleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an administration. A petition for letters ofaffirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by administration must be filed by an interestedcompetent evidence and reliance must be had on person and must show, as far as known to the the strength of the partys own evidence and not petitioner: x x x. upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x 81 An "interested person" has been defined as onex

who would be benefited by the estate, such as an In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters such as a creditor. The interest must be material of administration may arise from her status as the and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75 surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of interested person who has a direct interest in the the Family Code. estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision the existence of which was not denied by of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss prove that her marriage with him was validly and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed

17

petitioners motion for reconsideration isFurnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trialArenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista. court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.10 SO ORDERED. Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC, thus: G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner, GRANT the appeal and consequently REVERSE and vs. SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. DISMISS Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch 44, CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Dagupan City. No costs. Respondents. SO ORDERED.11 DECISION After the motion for reconsideration was denied, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: petitioner filed the instant petition for review This petition for review assails the Decision 1 of theraising the following issues: Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated I. August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision 2 of WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan RESPONDENTS; and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution3 dated January II. 27, 2005, which denied the motion for WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF reconsideration. APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, ERROR.12 Pangasinan.4 Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years ofthe respondents, which brought embarrassment to marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances 1988.5 and to protect her family from further Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage wasnot declaring the marriage void despite bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting overwhelming evidence and the state policy marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed adiscouraging illegal and immoral marriages.13 petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7 againstThe main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the Orlando and Merope. declaration of nullity of marriage of the Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on therespondents on the ground of bigamy. However, ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was this issue may not be resolved without first allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was determining the corollary factual issues of whether denied.9 Trial on the merits ensued. the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment become naturalized American citizens and whether in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree. which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and against of facts and does not normally undertake the redefendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E.examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case,14 Braganza, as follows: there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like 1) The subsequent marriage of Merope when the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is declared of Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are null and void ab initio; conclusions without citation of specific evidence on 2) The defendants are ordered jointly and which they are based.15 severally to pay plaintiff by way of moralBoth the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that damages the amount of P300,000.00,petitioner and respondent Orlando were exemplary damages in the amount ofnaturalized American citizens and that they P200,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However, of P50,000.00, including costs of this suit; and after a careful review of the records, we note that 3) The donation in consideration of marriage is other than the allegations in the complaint and the ordered revoked and the property donated is testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of ordered awarded to the heirs of Julianacompetent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce. Braganza. The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when

18

it held:

former spouses no longer has any interest nor In light of the allegations of Felicitas complaint should each have the personality to inquire into and the documentary and testimonial evidence shethe marriage that the other might subsequently presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, and Felicitas are American citizens and had this Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlandos citizenship status when they secured their divorce subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealingany defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage the divorced status of Orlando and in this case with Filipino citizens whose marital will not affect26 Felicitas. x x x status is governed by the Family Code and our Civil Code, but with American citizens who secured theirTrue, under the New Civil Code which is the law in divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by their force at the time the respondents were married, or national law to be free to contract another even in the Family Code, there is no specific marriage. x x x16 provision as to who can file a petition to declare Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenlythe nullity of marriage; however, only a party who considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the contest the allegation in respondents brief, that same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, she and respondent Orlando were Americanlike any other actions, must be prosecuted or interest27 citizens at the time they secured their divorce in defended in the name of the real party in28 on a cause of action. Thus, in April 1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of and must be based 29 Nial v. Bayadog , the Court held that the children 17 naturalization and divorce. We note that it was have the personality to file the petition to declare the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father they acquired American citizenship and that to their stepmother as it affects their successional respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce rights. 1awphi1.net 18 decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mereSignificantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on allegation is not evidence.19 Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took union for a cause arising after marriage. But effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically divorces are of different types. The two basic ones provides:

are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimoniiSECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. Thenullity of void marriages. first kind terminates the marriage, while the(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of second suspends it and leaves the bond in full absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed force.20 A divorce obtained abroad by an alien maysolely by the husband or the wife. be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the x x x x foreigner.21 However, before it can be recognizedIn fine, petitioners personality to file the petition by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to ascertained because of the absence of the divorce the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a considering that our courts cannot take judicial remand of the case to the trial court for reception notice of foreign laws.22 of additional evidence is necessary to determine Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue ofdecree and whether the foreign law which granted whether petitioner has the personality to file the the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Afterproved that a valid divorce decree was obtained all, she may have the personality to file the and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos petition if the divorce decree obtained was a remarriage, then the trial court should declare limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreignrespondents marriage as bigamous and void ab law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce initio but reduce the amount of moral damages decree becomes absolute.23 In such case, the RTCfrom P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary would be correct to declare the marriage of the damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the respondents void for being bigamous, there beingcontrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree already in evidence two existing marriagewas obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, certificates, which were both obtained in the then the trial court must dismiss the instant Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated petition to declare nullity of marriage on the December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks respondent Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao,legal personality to file the same. Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between theWHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case respondents.25 be REMANDED to the trial court for its proper However, if there was indeed a divorce decree disposition. No costs. SO ORDERED. obtained and which, following the national law of G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965 Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, has no legal personality to file a petition to declare vs. VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendantsthe nullity of marriage, thus: appellees. Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the

19

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant. Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that REYES, J.B.L., J.: day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, forsolicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as legal separation and one million pesos in damages endearing as her previous letters when their love against his wife and parents-in-law, thewas aflame. defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a Mena,1 all surnamed "Escao," respectively.2 changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She the following: was not prevented by her parents from Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, her letters became less frequent as the days where she was then enrolled as a second yearpassed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-armydrafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to officer and of undistinguished stock, without the annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one prejudice because of her non-appearance at the Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the hearing (Exh. "B-4"). culmination of a previous love affair and was duly On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, registered with the local civil register. she applied for a passport, indicating in her Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, beforeapplication that she was single, that her purpose the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their and that she intended to return after two years. matchmaker and go-between, they had planned The application was approved, and she left for the out their marital future whereby Pacita would be United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a the governess of their first-born; they startedverified complaint for divorce against the herein saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the their secret marriage, their engagement wasState of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring andon the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open they reconciled. This time they planned to getcourt by the said tribunal. married and then elope. To facilitate theIn 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition elopement, Vicenta had brought some of herwith the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 Hall, which was their usual trysting place. September 1954, Vicenta sought papal Although planned for the midnight following theirdispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2). marriage, the elopement did not, however,On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an materialize because when Vicente went back to American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now her classes after the marriage, her mother, wholives with him in California, and, by him, has got wind of the intended nuptials, was already begotten children. She acquired American waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken citizenship on 8 August 1958. home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao wereBut on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the surprised, because Pastor never asked for the handproceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of of Vicente, and were disgusted because of theFirst Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May great scandal that the clandestine marriage would 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The followingMamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with morning, the Escao spouses sought priestlyhaving dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to joining her husband, and alienating her affections, validate what he believed to be an invalid and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, duethrough its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or theannulment of the marriage, and asked for legal parish priest for the officiating chaplain to separation and one million pesos in damages. celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Escao was handed by a maid, whose name heRussell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly they had in any way influenced their daughter's coming from San Carlos college students andacts, and counterclaimed for moral damages. disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor The appealed judgment did not decree a legal

20

separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion ofof Vicenta in abandoning her original action for his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamertoannulment and subsequently suing for divorce Escao and Mena Escao for moral and exemplary implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff- was valid and binding. appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she resorted directly to this Court. contracted the marriage she was under the undue The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court,influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have the following: been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even 1. In not declaring legal separation; in not granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such damages and in dismissing the complaint;. vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but 2. In not holding the defendant parents merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena until annulled by a competent civil court. This was Escao liable for damages;. never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for 3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiringannulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis him to pay the damages to the defendantwas dismissed for non-prosecution. parents on their counterclaims; and. It is equally clear from the record that the valid 4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under the relief sought by the plaintiff. Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial Vicenta Escao, were validly married to each other, District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearlyon grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in established by the record before us. Both parties character." At the time the divorce decree was were then above the age of majority, andissued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still otherwise qualified; and both consented to thea Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to marriage, which was performed by a Catholic Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown thatat the time, expressly provided: said priest was not duly authorized under civil law Laws relating to family rights and duties or to to solemnize marriages. the status, condition and legal capacity of The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical persons are binding upon the citizens of the authorization from the parish priest and the Philippines, even though living abroad. Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation ofThe Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage lawmatrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on in force at the time) expressly provided that the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisitesthat admitted absolute divorce on grounds of for marriage are the legal capacity of the adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil supplied) Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, The actual authority of the solemnizing officer wasBook 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, notexpressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 andnot be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1). this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage For the Philippine courts to recognize and give act, which provided the following: recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent requirements. No marriage shall be declaredviolation of the declared public policy of the state, invalid because of the absence of one orspecially in view of the third paragraph of Article several of the formal requirements of this Act if,17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following: when it was performed, the spouses or one of Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts them believed in good faith that the person or property, and those which have for their who solemnized the marriage was actually object public order, policy and good customs, empowered to do so, and that the marriage shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or was perfectly legal. judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign The good faith of all the parties to the marriage country. (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively provedEven more, the grant of effectivity in this (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, detriment of those members of our polity whose when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynesmeans do not permit them to sojourn abroad and

21

obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to From this point of view, it is irrelevant that Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appearedinvolved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the authority for the proposition that such union is policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and justifies an action for legal separation on the part additionally, because the mere appearance of a of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so where the court originally had none (Area vs. declaring, the trial court committed error. Javier, 95 Phil. 579). True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous From the preceding facts and considerations, theresituations where the status of a person (whether flows as a necessary consequence that in this divorced or not) would depend on the territory jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid;are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. be declared to be existent and undissolved. It 667: follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her Philippine Islands are well known to the desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the caused through her fault, for which the husband is Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated have no right to say that such laws are too charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging strict or too liberal. (p. 72) immorality against the husband constitute,The appellant's first assignment of error is, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, therefore, sustained. her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the decree of "legal separation under our law, on the affections of their daughter and influenced her basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333). conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor The foregoing conclusions as to the untowardTenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in him strikes us to be merely conjecture and accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own this court on the subject, particularly those thatletters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2were rendered under our laws prior to the approval Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the In these letters he expressly apologized to the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, defendants for "misjudging them" and for the our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo"great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing shows nothing to prove that he would not have before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under thebeen accepted to marry Vicente had he openly Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of marriage, and despite their shock at such particular interest. Said this Court in that case: unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion As the divorce granted by the French Court upon advice that the previous one was canonically must be ignored, it results that the marriage of defective. If no recelebration of the marriage Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated inceremony was had it was not due to defendants London in 1905, could not legalize theirMamerto Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of relations; and the circumstance that theyVicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses afterwards passed for husband and wife inEscao did not seek to compel or induce their Switzerland until her death is wholly without daughter to assent to the recelebration but legal significance. The claims of the veryrespected her decision, or that they abided by her children to participate in the estate of Samuel resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right toaffections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated andparents sent her money while she was in the acknowledged natural children. The children ofUnited States; for it was natural that they should adulterous relations are wholly excluded. Thenot wish their daughter to live in penury even if word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of they did not concur in her decision to divorce the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132). illegitimates born of adulterous relations. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, (Emphasis supplied) out of improper motives, aided and abetted her Except for the fact that the successional rights of

22

original suit for annulment, or her subsequent promise was legally invalid, being against public divorce; she appears to have acted independently,policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is and being of age, she was entitled to judge what unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a was best for her and ask that her decisions be consequence of the indissoluble character of the respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly union that appellant entered into voluntarily and cannot be charged with alienation of affections inwith open eyes rather than of her divorce and her the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion have not been shown, good faith being always that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way presumed until the contrary is proved. of moral damages and attorney's fees. SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin.With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to The law distinguishes between the right of a the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena parent to interest himself in the marital affairs Escao, by the court below, we opine that the of his child and the absence of rights in a same are excessive. While the filing of this stranger to intermeddle in such affairs.unfounded suit must have wounded said However, such distinction between the liabilitydefendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the of parents and that of strangers is only insame could in no way have seriously injured their regard to what will justify interference. A parentreputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits isliable for alienation of affections resulting having become a common occurrence in present from his own malicious conduct, as where he society. What is important, and has been correctly wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave established in the decision of the court below, is his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he that said defendants were not guilty of any acts maliciously, without justification and from improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. unworthy motives. He is not liable where he This Court, therefore, reduces the damages acts and advises his child in good faith with awarded to P5,000 only. respect to his child's marital relations in theSumming up, the Court rules: interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, to interest himself in, and be extremelysought and decreed after the effectivity of the solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to even where his conduct and advice suggest or recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither result in the separation of the spouses or the is the marriage contracted with another party by obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign he acts under mistake or misinformation, or decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the where his advice or interference are indiscreetcountry; or unfortunate, although it has been held that (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her the parent is liable for consequences resulting co-habitation with a person other than the lawful from recklessness. He may in good faith take husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal his child into his home and afford him or her separation conformably to Philippine law; protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to away, from his or her spouse. This rule has recover damages; more frequently been applied in the case of(4) That an action for alienation of affections advice given to a married daughter, but it isagainst the parents of one consort does not lie in equally applicable in the case of advice given the absence of proof of malice or unworthy to a son. motives on their part. Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta'sWHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby aged parents with racial or social discrimination modified as follows; and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them toentitled to a decree of legal separation from recover damages. While this suit may not havedefendant Vicenta F. Escao; been impelled by actual malice, the charges were (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao certainly reckless in the face of the proven factsto pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of and circumstances. Court actions are notP25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; established for parties to give vent to their (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay prejudices or spleen. the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his In the assessment of the moral damages wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from damages and attorneys' fees. defendant Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into Neither party to recover costs. account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a

23

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

yielded negative results.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners, report of the private investigator, was, by its own vs. terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents. falsification of commercial documents, later Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners. amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent. of which were for estafa through Falsification of CORTES, J.: commercial document while the fifth was for of Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias wasArticle 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Through Seizure of employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Secrets Two of these Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual Correspondence).lwph1.t capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate assistant to the engineering operations manager.General's Office, which however, remanded them In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal purchases and other fraudulent transactions forcomplaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing which it lost several thousands of pesos. the criminal complaints with the Secretary of According to private respondent it was he whoJustice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal. actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediateIn the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitionerreceived a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executivehis employment has been terminated effective Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter MACKAY. dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National On November 11, 1972, one day after private Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the respondent Tobias made the report, petitionerlabor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC number one suspect, and ordered him to take a ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. one week forced leave, not to communicate with Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and tothe Office of the President. During the pendency of leave the office keys. the appeal with said office, petitioners and private On November 20, 1972, when private respondent respondent Tobias entered into a compromise Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, agreement regarding the latter's complaint for petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a illegal dismissal. "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature,petitioner Hendry, without being asked by and initials for examination by the police RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that investigators to determine his complicity in theTobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to anomalies. dishonesty. On December 6,1972, the Manila policePrivate respondent Tobias filed a civil case for investigators submitted a laboratory crime reportdamages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, (Exh. "A") clearing private respondent ofoppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. participation in the anomalies. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify Not satisfied with the police report, petitionersduring the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him however expressly stated that further investigationeighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos was still to be conducted. (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to charges against him. the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metroappealed as to the amount of damages. However, Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, afterthe Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August investigating other documents pertaining to the 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. alleged anomalous transactions, submitted aPetitioners' motion for reconsideration having been second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B")denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari reiterating his previous finding that thewas filed. handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in The main issue in this case is whether or not the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also

24

Petitioners contend that they could not be made private respondent with no relief because Article liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their21 of the Civil Code provides that: right to dismiss private respondent. Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss On the other hand, private respondent contends or injury to another in a manner that is that because of petitioners' abusive manner in contrary to morals, good customs or public dismissing him as well as for the inhuman policy shall compensate the latter for the treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must damage. indemnify him for the damage that he had This article, adopted to remedy the "countless suffered. gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims One of the more notable innovations of the New of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have Civil Code is the codification of "some basic actually suffered material and moral injury" [ Id.] principles that are to be observed for the rightful should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that relationship between human beings and for the untold number of moral wrongs which it is stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THEimpossible for human foresight to provide for CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODEspecifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of thePNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old SCRA 237, 247]. Code which merely stated the effects of the law, In determining whether or not the principle of but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid certain fundamental precepts which weretest which can be applied. While the Court has not "designed to indicate certain norms that springhesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and from the fountain of good conscience" and which factual circumstances called for its application were also meant to serve as "guides for human[See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., conduct [that] should run as golden threads 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand through society, to the end that law may approach Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. Lits supreme ideal, which is the sway and 48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among theseCA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; principles is that pronounced in Article 19 whichUnited General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. Lprovides: 30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, Art. 19. Every person must, in the exerciseG.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] of his rights and in the performance of histhe question of whether or not the principle of duties, act with justice, give everyone hisabuse of rights has been violated resulting in due, and observe honesty and good faith. damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other This article, known to contain what is commonly applicable provision of law, depends on the referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets circumstances of each case. And in the instant certain standards which must be observed not onlycase, the Court, after examining the record and in the exercise of one's rights but also in the considering certain significant circumstances, finds performance of one's duties. These standards are that all petitioners have indeed abused the right the following: to act with justice; to give everyone that they invoke, causing damage to private his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.respondent and for which the latter must now be The law, therefore, recognizes a primordialindemnified. limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, theThe trial court made a finding that notwithstanding norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who must be observed. A right, though by itself legalreported the possible existence of anomalous because recognized or granted by law as such,transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed may nevertheless become the source of some belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner herein) that he was the number one suspect and to which does not conform with the norms enshrined take a one week vacation leave, not to in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a communicate with the office, to leave his table legal wrong is thereby committed for which the drawers open, and to leave his keys to said wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But government of human relations and for theregardless of whether or not it was private maintenance of social order, it does not provide a respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. would be proper. An employer who harbors suspicions that an Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as violation of law, provides that: ordering an investigation and directing the Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the wilfully or negligently causes damage toresolve to uncover the truth would also be another, shall indemnify the latter for theexpected from such employer. But the high-handed same. treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible they did not violate any provision of law since they attitude of petitioners was to continue when were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent returned to work on November private respondent. This does not, however, leave20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon

25

reporting for work, Tobias was confronted bydismissed. Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and Finally, there is the matter of the filing by swindler in this company." Considering that the petitioners of six criminal complaints against first report made by the police investigators wasTobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A]against them for malicious prosecution and that the statement made by petitioner Hendry was they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal the pattern of harassment during thecomplaints against an employee who was their investigations of Tobias transgress the standards ofprincipal suspect in the commission of forgeries human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of which defrauded them of substantial sums of the employer to dismiss an employee should not money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11]. be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If theWhile sound principles of justice and public policy dismissal is done abusively, then the employer isdictate that persons shall have free resort to the liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v.courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See alsoPhil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L- prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and 21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, the circumstances of the instant case, theApril 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimateManila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to latter the right to recover damages under Article file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code. indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion But petitioners were not content with justof the function of the criminal processes and of the dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. Lcommitted by petitioners against Tobias after the20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court latter's termination from work. Towards the latterupheld the judgment against the petitioner for part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latterafter making a finding that petitioner, with talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' against respondent, all of which were dismissed. protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added proof that the prosecution was prompted by a that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threatdesign to vex and humiliate a person and that it unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various was initiated deliberately by the defendant actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand,knowing that the charges were false and the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations ofConcededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May Code]. 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the The next tortious act committed by petitioners was fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in an award of damages for malicious prosecution if October 1974, stating that Tobias had been there is no competent evidence to show that the dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60]. employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer In the instant case, however, the trial court made a period of time. For this further damage suffered byfinding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for the criminal complaints against Tobias, observing damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil that: Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have x x x a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6) (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; criminal cases, five (5) of which were for Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the estafa thru falsification of commercial accepted moral and societal obligation of every document and one for violation of Art. 290 man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat of the Revised Penal Code "discovering or danger to the latter's life, honor or property. And secrets thru seizure of correspondence," this includes warning one's brethren of the possible and all were dismissed for insufficiency or dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify Justice, but said Ministry invariably petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to sustained the dismissal of the cases. As prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after above adverted to, two of these cases were almost two years from the time Tobias was

26

refiled with the Judge Advocate General's against Tobias. Office of the Armed Forces of the PhilippinesPetitioners next contend that the award of to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in damages was excessive. In the complaint filed the military stockade, but this wasagainst petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: frustrated by a presidential decreeone hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as transferring criminal cases involvingactual damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) civilians to the civil courts. as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand xxx pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty To be sure, when despite the two (2) police thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; reports embodying the findings of Lt.and costs. The trial court, after making a Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document Examiner ofcomputation of the damages incurred by Tobias the Manila Police Department, clearing[See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, plaintiff of participation or involvement in awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos the fraudulent transactions complained of,(P80,000.00) as actual damages; two hundred despite the negative results of the lie thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; detector tests which defendants compelledtwenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary plaintiff to undergo, and although the policedamages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as investigation was "still under follow-up and attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be underscored a supplementary report will be submitted that petitioners have been guilty of committing after all the evidence has been gathered,"several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive defendants hastily filed six (6) criminalmanner in which they dismissed Tobias from work cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, including the baseless imputation of guilt and the during the investigations; the five (5) for estafa thru falsification ofharassment defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well as commercial document and one (1) for the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to besent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, possible employment; and, the malicious filing of with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst.the criminal complaints. Considering the extent of Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this casethat, contrary to petitioners' contention, the was investigated is evident. Evidentamount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances. likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias,"Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of there can be no mistaking that defendantsdamages was improper, invoking the principle of would not but be motivated by maliciousdamnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private cause damage to plaintiff. respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his xxx employment, which was a valid and legal act of the [RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236]. defendants-appellants (petitioners In addition to the observations made by the trial herein).lwph1.t " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18]. court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal According to the principle of damnum absque complaints were filed during the pendency of the injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias againstviolation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong petitioners. This explains the haste in which the is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith,Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of point to the fact that only six complaints were filed Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no one hundred cases, considering the number of application in this case. It bears repeating that anomalous transactions committed against GLOBEeven granting that petitioners might have had the MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is belied right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the manner in which that right was exercised first complaint that one hundred more cases would amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filingmust now be held liable. Moreover, the damage of one hundred more cases was made to hang like incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but fine, considering the haste in which the criminal was also the result of several other quasi-delictual complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed acts committed by petitioners. during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, Petitioners next question the award of moral the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding damages. However, the Court has already ruled in the two police reports exculpating Tobias fromWassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, involvement in the anomalies committed against1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil of all the cases, the Court is led into no otherCode, moral damages are recoverable in the cases conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.

27

Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is was closed on the ground that it was "improperly impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of handled." The records of petitioner bank disclosed the Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts,that between the period of March 30, exemplary damages may be granted if the1988 and April 5, 1988, the respondent issued four defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court, checks, to wit: Check No. 2480416 for P6,000.00; in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc .,Check No. 2480419 for P50.00; Check No. 2434880 G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1,for P680.00 and; Check No. 2434886 for P680.00, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the awardor a total amount of P7,410.00. At the time, of exemplary damages, with more reason is itshowever, the respondents current account with imposition justified when the act performed ispetitioner bank only had a deposit of P6,981.43. deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As Thus, the total amount of the checks presented for in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful actspayment on April 4, 1988 exceeded the balance of shown to have been committed by petitioners the respondents deposit in his account. For this against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of reason, petitioner bank, through its branch exemplary damages to the latter. accountant, Villadelgado, closed the respondents WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED andcurrent account effective the evening of April 4, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 1988 as it then had an overdraft of P428.57. As a consequence of the overdraft, Check No. 2434886 No. 09055 is AFFIRMED. was dishonored. SO ORDERED. On April 18, 1988, the respondent wrote to G.R. No. 157314 July 29, 2005 petitioner bank complaining that the closure of his FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, NOW account was unjustified. When he did not receive a BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioners,reply from petitioner bank, the respondent filed with the RTC of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54, a complaint for damages against vs. petitioner bank and Villadelgado. The case was THEMISTOCLES PACILAN, JR., Respondent. docketed as Civil Case No. 4908. The respondent, DECISION as complainant therein, alleged that the closure of his current account by petitioner bank was CALLEJO, SR., J.: unjustified because on the first banking hour of Before the Court is the petition for review onApril 5, 1988, he already deposited an amount certiorari filed by Far East Bank and Trust Company sufficient to fund his checks. The respondent (now Bank of the Philippines Islands) seeking the pointed out that Check No. 2434886, in particular, reversal of the Decision1 dated August 30, 2002 of was delivered to petitioner bank at the close of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 36627 banking hours on April 4, 1988 and, following which ordered it, together with its branchnormal banking procedure, it accountant, Roger Villadelgado, to pay respondent(petitioner bank) had until the last clearing hour of 2 Themistocles Pacilan, Jr. the total sum ofthe following day, or on April 5, 1988, to honor the P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.check or return it, if not funded. In disregard of this The assailed decision affirmed with modification banking procedure and practice, however, that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros petitioner bank hastily closed the respondents Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54, in Civil Case current account and dishonored his Check No. No. 4908. Likewise sought to be reversed and set 2434886. aside is the Resolution dated January 17, 2003 of the appellate court, denying petitioner banksThe respondent further alleged that prior to the closure of his current account, he had issued motion for reconsideration. several other postdated checks. The petitioner The case stemmed from the following undisputed banks act of closing his current account allegedly facts: preempted the deposits that he intended to make Respondent Pacilan opened a current account withto fund those checks. Further, the petitioner banks petitioner banks Bacolod Branch on May 23, 1980. act exposed him to criminal prosecution for His account was denominated as Current Account violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. No. 53208 (0052-00407-4). The respondent had According to the respondent, the indecent haste since then issued several postdated checks tothat attended the closure of his account was different payees drawn against the said account.patently malicious and intended to embarrass him. Sometime in March 1988, the respondent issued He claimed that he is a Cashier of Prudential Bank Check No. 2434886 in the amount of P680.00 andand Trust Company, whose branch office is located the same was presented for payment to petitionerjust across that of petitioner bank, and a prominent bank on April 4, 1988. and respected leader both in the civic and banking Upon its presentment on the said date, Check No.communities. The alleged malicious acts of 2434886 was dishonored by petitioner bank. Thepetitioner bank besmirched the respondents next day, or on April 5, 1988, the respondentreputation and caused him "social humiliation, deposited to his current account the amount of wounded feelings, insurmountable worries and P800.00. The said amount was accepted bysleepless nights" entitling him to an award of petitioner bank; hence, increasing the balance of damages. the respondents deposit to P1,051.43. In their answer, petitioner bank and Villadelgado

Subsequently, when the respondent verified withmaintained that the respondents current account petitioner bank about the dishonor of Check No. was subject to petitioner banks Rules and 2434866, he discovered that his current accountRegulations Governing the Establishment and

28

Operation of Regular Demand said right. Citing Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Deposits which provide that "the Bank reserves the Philippines which states that "[e]very person must, right to close an account if the depositor frequently in the exercise of his rights and in the performance draws checks against insufficient funds and/orof his duties, act with justice, give everyone his uncollected deposits" and that "the Bank reservesdue, and observe honesty and good faith" and the right at any time to return checks of the Article 20 thereof which states that "[e]very person depositor which are drawn against insufficient who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes funds or for any reason."3 damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for They showed that the respondent had improperlythe same," the court a quo adjudged petitioner and irregularly handled his current account. Forbank of acting in bad faith. It held that, under the example, in 1986, the respondents account wasforegoing circumstances, the respondent is entitled overdrawn 156 times, in 1987, 117 times and into an award of moral and exemplary damages.

1988, 26 times. In all these instances, the account The decretal portion of the court a quos decision was overdrawn due to the issuance of checksreads: against insufficient funds. The respondent had alsoWHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is signed several checks with a different signature hereby rendered: from the specimen on file for dubious reasons. 1. Ordering the defendants [petitioner bank and When the respondent made the deposit on April 5, Villadelgado], jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff 1988, it was obviously to cover for issuances made [the respondent] the sum of P100,000.00 as moral the previous day against an insufficiently fundeddamages; account. When his Check No. 2434886 was presented for payment on April 4, 1988, he had 2. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, already incurred an overdraft; hence, petitioner to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as bank rightfully dishonored the same forexemplary damages plus costs and expenses of the suit; and insufficiency of funds. After due proceedings, the court a quo rendered3. Dismissing [the] defendants counterclaim for judgment in favor of the respondent as it ordered lack of merit. the petitioner bank and Villadelgado, jointly and SO ORDERED.4 severally, to pay the respondent the amounts of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 asOn appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated exemplary damages and costs of suit. In so ruling, August 30, 2002, affirming with modification the the court a quo also cited petitioner banks rules decision of the court a quo. and regulations which state that "a charge of The appellate court substantially affirmed the P10.00 shall be levied against the depositor for anyfactual findings of the court a quo as it held that check that is taken up as a returned item due to petitioner bank unjustifiably closed the insufficiency of funds on the date of receipt fromrespondents account notwithstanding that its own the clearing office even if said check is honored rules and regulations and/or covered by sufficient deposit the following banking day." The same rules and regulations also allow that a check returned for insufficiency of provide that "a check returned for insufficiency of funds or any reason of similar import, may be funds for any reason of similar import may besubsequently recleared for one more time, subject subsequently recleared for one more time only,to standard charges. Like the court a quo, the appellate court observed that in several instances subject to the same charges." in previous years, petitioner bank would inform the According to the court a quo, following these rulesrespondent when he incurred an overdraft and and regulations, the respondent, as depositor, had allowed him to make a timely deposit to fund the the right to put up sufficient funds for a check that checks that were initially dishonored for was taken as a returned item for insufficient funds insufficiency of funds. However, on April 4, 1988, the day following the receipt of said check from the petitioner bank immediately closed the clearing office. In fact, the said check could still be respondents account without even notifying him recleared for one more time. In previous instances,that he had incurred an overdraft. Even when they petitioner bank notified the respondent when he had already closed his account on April 4, 1988, incurred an overdraft and he would then deposit petitioner bank still accepted the deposit that the sufficient funds the following day to cover the respondent made on April 5, 1988, supposedly to overdraft. Petitioner bank thus acted unjustifiably cover his checks. when it immediately closed the respondents account on April 4, 1988 and deprived him of the Echoing the reasoning of the court a quo, the CA opportunity to reclear his check or depositdeclared that even as it may be conceded that petitioner bank had reserved the right to close an sufficient funds therefor the following day. account for repeated overdrafts by the respondent, As a result of the closure of his current account, the exercise of that right must never be despotic or several of the respondents checks werearbitrary. That petitioner bank chose to close the subsequently dishonored and because of this, theaccount outright and return the check, even after respondent was humiliated, embarrassed and lostaccepting a deposit sufficient to cover the said his credit standing in the business community. The check, is contrary to its duty to handle the court a quo further ratiocinated that even grantingrespondents account with utmost fidelity. The arguendo that petitioner bank had the right to exercise of the right is not absolute and good faith, close the respondents account, the manner whichat least, is required. The manner by which attended the closure constituted an abuse of the petitioner bank closed the account of the

29

respondent runs afoul of Article 19 of the Civilinsufficient funds. It vigorously denies having Code which enjoins every person, in the exercise ofviolated Article 19 of the Civil Code as it insists his rights, "to give every one his due, and observe that it acted in good faith and in accordance with honesty and good faith." the pertinent banking rules and regulations. The CA concluded that petitioner banks precipitate The petition is impressed with merit. and imprudent closure of the respondents account A perusal of the respective decisions of the court a had caused him, a respected officer of several civic quo and the appellate court show that the award of and banking associations, serious anxiety anddamages in the respondents favor was anchored humiliation. It had, likewise, tainted his credit mainly on Article 19 of the Civil Code which, standing. Consequently, the award of damages is quoted anew below, reads: warranted. The CA, however, reduced the amount of damages awarded by the court a quo as it foundArt. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act the same to be excessive: with justice, give everyone his due, and observe We, however, find excessive the amount ofhonesty and good faith. damages awarded by the RTC. In our view the reduced amount of P75,000.00 as moral damagesThe elements of abuse of rights are the following: and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages are in (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which order. Awards for damages are not meant to enrichis exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent 7 the plaintiff-appellee [the respondent] at the of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad 8 expense of defendants-appellants [the petitioners],faith is at the core of the said provision. The law but to obviate the moral suffering he hasalways presumes good faith and any person who undergone. The award is aimed at the restoration,seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of within limits possible, of the status quo ante, andanother has the burden of proving that the latter 9 should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 5 acted in bad faith or with ill-motive. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decisionby the acts of the individual concerned. It consists reads: of the intention to abstain from taking an WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the another.10 Bad faith does not simply connote bad award of moral damages is reduced to P75,000.00judgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose and the award of exemplary damages reduced to or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a P25,000.00. wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the 6 SO ORDERED. nature of fraud.11 Malice connotes ill-will or spite Petitioner bank sought the reconsideration of the and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an said decision but in the assailed Resolution dated intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. January 17, 2003, the appellate court denied its Malice is bad faith or bad motive.12 motion. Hence, the recourse to this Court. Undoubtedly, petitioner bank has the right to close Petitioner bank maintains that, in closing thethe account of the respondent based on the account of the respondent in the evening of April 4, following provisions of its Rules and Regulations 1988, it acted in good faith and in accordance with Governing the Establishment and Operation of the rules and regulations governing the operation Regular Demand Deposits: of a 10) The Bank reserves the right to close an regular demand deposit which reserves to the bankaccount if the depositor frequently draws checks "the right to close an account if the depositor against insufficient funds and/or uncollected frequently draws checks against insufficient fundsdeposits. and/or uncollected deposits." The same rules and regulations also provide that "the depositor is not entitled, as a matter of right, to overdraw on this 12) deposit and the bank reserves the right at any time However, it is clearly understood that the depositor to return checks of the depositor which are drawnis not entitled, as a matter of right, to overdraw on against insufficient funds or for any reason." this deposit and the bank reserves the right at any It cites the numerous instances that thetime to return checks of the depositor which are respondent had overdrawn his account and thosedrawn against insufficient funds or for any other instances where he deliberately signed checks reason. using a signature different from the specimen on The facts, as found by the court a quo and the file. Based on these facts, petitioner bank was appellate court, do not establish that, in the constrained to close the respondents account forexercise of this right, petitioner bank committed an improper and irregular handling and returned hisabuse thereof. Specifically, the second and third Check No. 2434886 which was presented to the elements for abuse of rights are not attendant in bank for payment on April 4, 1988. the present case. The evidence presented by Petitioner bank further posits that there is no law petitioner bank negates the existence of bad faith or rule which gives the respondent a legal right to or malice on its part in closing the respondents make good his check or to deposit the account on April 4, 1988 because on the said date corresponding amount to cover said check within the same was already overdrawn. The respondent 24 hours after the same is dishonored or returnedissued four checks, all due on April 4, 1988, by the bank for having been drawn againstamounting to P7,410.00 when the balance of his

30

current account deposit was only P6,981.43. Thus,maintain an action for the injuries of which he he incurred an overdraft of P428.57 which resultedcomplains, he must establish that such injuries in the dishonor of his Check No. 2434886. Further, resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant petitioner bank showed that in 1986, the current owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to account of the respondent was overdrawn 156 the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person times due to his issuance of checks against causing it. The underlying basis for the award of insufficient funds.13 In 1987, the said account was tort damages is the premise that the individual was overdrawn 117 times for the same injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must 14 15 reason. Again, in 1988, 26 times. There werefirst be a breach of some duty and the imposition also several instances when the respondent issued of liability for that breach before damages may be duty should be checks deliberately using a signature different awarded; and the breach of such 17 the proximate cause of the injury. from his specimen signature on file with petitioner

bank.16 All these circumstances taken togetherWhatever damages the respondent may have justified the petitioner banks closure of the suffered as a consequence, e.g., dishonor of his respondents account on April 4, 1988 for other insufficiently funded checks, would have to "improper handling." be borne by him alone. It was the respondents It is observed that nowhere under its rules and repeated improper regulations is petitioner bank required to notify the and irregular handling of his account which respondent, or any depositor for that matter, of theconstrained petitioner bank to close the same in closure of the account for frequently drawingaccordance with the rules and regulations checks against insufficient funds. No malice or badgoverning its depositors current accounts. The faith could be imputed on petitioner bank for sorespondents case is clearly one of damnum acting since the records bear out that the absque injuria. respondent had indeed been improperly andWHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The irregularly handling his account not just a few Decision dated August 30, 2002 and Resolution times but hundreds of times. Under thedated January 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in circumstances, petitioner bank could not be faulted CA-G.R. CV No. 36627 are REVERSED AND SET for exercising its right in accordance with theASIDE. SO ORDERED. express rules and regulations governing the current accounts of its depositors. Upon the G.R. No. 146322 December 6, 2006 opening of his account, the respondent had agreed ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS to be bound by these terms and conditions. UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners, Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the vs. deposit made by the respondent the day following ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent. the closure of his account constitutes bad faith or DECISION malice on the part of petitioner bank. The same could be characterized as simple negligence by itsCORONA, J.: personnel. Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum bad faith. cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure The respondent had thus failed to discharge his others and to give everyone his due. These burden of proving bad faith on the part ofsupreme norms of justice are the underlying petitioner bank or that it was motivated by ill-will principles of law and order in society. We reaffirm or spite in closing his account on April 4, 1988 and them in this petition for review 1 on certiorari in inadvertently accepting his deposit on April 5, assailing the July 26, 2000 decision and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in 1988. CA-G.R. CV No. 47571. Further, it has not been shown that these acts were done by petitioner bank with the sole intention ofIn 1982, respondent Ernesto2 C. Quiamco was prejudicing and injuring the respondent. It isapproached by Juan Davalan, Josefino Gabutero conceded that the respondent may have suffered and Raul Generoso to amicably settle3 the civil damages as a result of the closure of his current aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by account. However, there is a material distinction Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a between damages and injury. The Court had thered Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of occasion to explain the distinction between its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three damages and injury in this wise: accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside damage is the loss, hurt or harm which resultsrespondents business establishment, Avesco-AVNE from the injury; and damages are the recompenseEnterprises, where it was visible and accessible to or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. the public. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by the consequences must be borne by the injured petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a familyperson alone, the law affords no remedy for owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. damages resulting from an act which does notErnesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, was mortgaged to petitioner amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations the motorcycle corporation.4 are often called damnum absque injuria. In other words, in order that a plaintiff mayWhen Gabutero could no longer pay the

31

installments, Davalan assumed the obligation andwarranted the award of moral damages, exemplary continued the payments. In September 1982,damages, attorneys fees and costs in favor of however, Davalan stopped paying the remainingrespondent. installments and told petitioner corporationsPetitioners suggestion is misleading. They were collector, Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had held liable for damages not only for instituting a allegedly been "taken by respondents men." groundless complaint against respondent but also

Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner for making a slanderous remark and for taking the Uypitching, accompanied by policemen,5 went tomotorcycle from respondents establishment in an Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover theabusive manner. motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt.Correctness of the Findings of the RTC and Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge andCA asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching pacedAs they never questioned the findings of the RTC back and forth inside the establishment utteringand CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to respondent 14 "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle." but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners On learning that respondent was not in Avesco- were deemed to have accepted the correctness of AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for such findings. This alone was sufficient to hold respondent in his residence while petitionerpetitioners liable for damages to respondent. Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to findNevertheless, to address petitioners concern, we respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco- also find that the trial and appellate courts AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitchings correctly ruled that the filing of the complaint was instruction and over the clerks objection, took the tainted with malice and bad faith. Petitioners themselves in fact described their action as a motorcycle. "precipitate act."15 Petitioners were bent on On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a portraying respondent as a thief. In this criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or connection, we quote with approval the following violation of the Anti-Fencing Law6 againstfindings of the RTC, as adopted by the CA: respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the Dumaguete City.7 Respondent moved for dismissal complaint before the City Prosecutors Office] because the complaint did not charge an offense because Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching knew as he had neither stolen nor bought the or ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor there was no probable cause at all for filing a dismissed the complaint8 and denied petitioner criminal complaint for qualified theft and Uypitchings subsequent motion for fencing activity against [respondent]. Atty. reconsideration. Uypitching had no personal knowledge that Respondent filed an action for damages against [respondent] stole the motorcycle in question. petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros He was merely told by his bill collector ([i.e.] 9 Oriental, Branch 37. He sought to hold the the bill collector of Ramas Uypitching Sons, petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Verao[,] that Juan Dabalan will taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a [no longer] pay the remaining installment(s) for defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) the motorcycle because the motorcycle was and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and taken by the men of [respondent]. It must be malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and noted that the term used by Wilfredo Verao in embarrassed the respondent and injured his informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the reputation and integrity. refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay for the On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a remaining installment was []taken[], not decision10 finding that petitioner Uypitching was []unlawfully taken[] or stolen. Yet, despite motivated with malice and ill will when he called the double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an Uypitching not only executed the [complaintabusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for affidavit] wherein he named [respondent] as qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing the suspect of the stolen motorcycle but also Law. Petitioners acts were found to be contrary to charged [respondent] of qualified theft and Articles 1911 and 2012 of the Civil Code. Hence, the fencing activity before the City [Prosecutors] trial court held petitioners liable to respondent for Office of Dumaguete. The absence of probable P500,000 moral damages, P200,000 exemplary cause necessarily signifies the presence of damages and P50,000 attorneys fees plus costs. malice. What is deplorable in all these is that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle, did Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA not accuse [respondent] or the latters men of affirmed the trial courts decision with stealing the motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed] modification, reducing the award of moral and to file a case for qualified theft before the exemplary damages to P300,000 and P100,000, authorities. That Atty. Uypitchings act in 13 respectively. Petitioners sought reconsideration charging [respondent] with qualified theft and but it was denied. Thus, this petition. fencing activity is tainted with malice is also In their petition and memorandum, petitioners shown by his answer to the question of Cupid submit that the sole (allegedly) issue to be Gonzaga16 [during one of their conversations] resolved here is whether the filing of a complaint "why should you still file a complaint? You have for qualified theft and/or violation of the Antialready recovered the motorcycle"[:] "Aron Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor

32

motagam ang kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a conjunction with the defamatory statement, lesson to the thief of motorcycle.")17 petitioners exercise of the right to recover the Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellateprecipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no could not in any way be considered to be in compelling reason to reverse the findings of theaccordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the RTC and the CA. totality of petitioners actions showed a calculated Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recoverydesign to embarrass, humiliate and publicly as Mortgagee(s) ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of for petitioner corporations exercise of its right as respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully to respondent. Hence, they should seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehiclecaused damage 22 indemnify him. preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. TheyWHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The are clearly mistaken. July 26, 2000 decision and October 18, 2000 True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or47571 are AFFIRMED. protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, Triple costs against petitioners, considering that however, a well-defined procedure for the recoverypetitioner Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer of possession of mortgaged property: if aand an officer of the court, for his improper mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a behavior. mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such SO ORDERED. possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.18 Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of G.R. No. 160273 January 18, 2008 the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner UypitchingCEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT, descended on respondents establishment with hisRUBEN D. ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z. NERI, policemen and ordered the seizure of theDOUGLAS L. LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI, motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE B. SALA, Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the petitioners, motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a vs. slanderous statement. RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE, respondent. No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its DECISION co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners acts For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review violated the law as well as public morals, and on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of transgressed the proper norms of human relations. Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the 1 The basic principle of human relations, embodied Decision dated January 31, 2003 and Resolution dated October 2, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides: CA-G.R. CV No. 71506. Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act The facts are: with justice, give every one his due, and Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a observe honesty and good faith. domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of non-stock private membership club, having its right," prescribes that a person should not use his principal place of business in Banilad, Cebu City. right unjustly or contrary to honesty and goodPetitioners herein are members of its Board of faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. 19 ItDirectors. seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust special company proprietary member of CCCI, ends. designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its There is an abuse of right when it is exercised Senior Vice President and Operations Manager for solely to prejudice or injure another.20 The exercisethe Visayas and Mindanao, as a special nonmember. The designation was of a right must be in accordance with the purpose proprietary thereafter approved by the CCCIs Board of for which it was established and must not be Directors. excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.21 Otherwise, liability forIn 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application damages to the injured party will attach. for proprietary membership. The application was In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle indorsed by CCCIs two (2) proprietary members, was taken at petitioners instance was not onlynamely: Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano Ludo. attended by bad faith but also contrary to theAs the price of a proprietary share was around the procedure laid down by law. Considered inP5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then president

33

of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however, purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.

damages; 3. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the mount of P500,000.00 as attorneys fees and P50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and

4. Costs of the suit. During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May The counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action on merit. respondents application for proprietary membership was deferred. In another Board SO ORDERED.3 meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondents application was voted upon. Subsequently, or onOn March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a motion for the August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter fromreconsideration and motion for leave to set 4 motion for oral arguments. In its Resolution dated Julius Z. Neri, CCCIs corporate secretary, informing him that the Board disapproved his application for October 2, 2003, the appellate court denied the motions for lack of merit. proprietary membership. On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of Hence, the present petition. respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration.The issue for our resolution is whether in As CCCI did not answer, respondent, on October 7, disapproving respondents application for 1997, wrote another letter of reconsideration. Still, proprietary membership with CCCI, petitioners are CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997,liable to respondent for damages, and if so, respondent again sent CCCI a letter inquiring whether their liability is joint and several. whether any member of the Board objected to his Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of application. Again, CCCI did not reply. Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant damages to Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent respondent despite the lack of evidence that they filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, acted in bad faith in disapproving the latters Pasig City a complaint for damages againstapplication; and in disregarding their defense of petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 67190. damnum absque injuria. After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated For his part, respondent maintains that the petition February 14, 2001 in favor of respondent, thus: lacks merit, hence, should be denied. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in CCCIs Articles of Incorporation provide in part: favor of plaintiff: SEVENTH: That this is a non-stock corporation 1. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and and membership therein as well as the right of severally, plaintiff the amount of P2,340,000.00 participation in its assets shall be limited to as actual or compensatory damages. qualified persons who are duly accredited owners of Proprietary Ownership Certificates 2. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and issued by the corporation in accordance with its severally, plaintiff the amount of P5,000,000.00 By-Laws. as moral damages. 3. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly andCorollary, Section 3, Article 1 of CCCIs Amended severally, plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00By-Laws provides: as exemplary damages. SECTION 3. HOW MEMBERS ARE ELECTED The procedure for the admission of new members of 4. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and the Club shall be as follows: severally, plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees and (a) Any proprietary member, seconded by P80,000.00 as litigation expenses. another voting proprietary member, shall submit to the Secretary a written proposal for 5. Costs of suit. the admission of a candidate to the "EligibleCounterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of for-Membership List"; merit. (b) Such proposal shall be posted by the SO ORDERED.2 Secretary for a period of thirty (30) days on the Club bulletin board during which time any On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in member may interpose objections to the its Decision dated January 31, 2003, affirmed the admission of the applicant by communicating trial courts Decision with modification, thus: the same to the Board of Directors; WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed (c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty Decision dated February 14, 2001 of the (30) days, if no objections have been filed or if Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City in there are, the Board considers the objections Civil Case No. 67190 is hereby AFFIRMED with unmeritorious, the candidate shall be qualified MODIFICATION as follows: for inclusion in the "Eligible-for-Membership 1. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, List"; jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the (d) Once included in the "Eligible-foramount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages; Membership List" and after the candidate shall 2. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, have acquired in his name a valid POC duly jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the recorded in the books of the corporation as his amount of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary

34

On March 1, 1978, Section 3(c) was amended to rules governing human relations, the basic read as follows: principles to be observed for the rightful (c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty relationship between human beings and for the (30) days, the Board may, by unanimous votestability of social order. The trial court and the of all directors present at a regular orCourt of Appeals aptly held that petitioners special meeting, approve the inclusion of thecommitted fraud and evident bad faith in candidate in the "Eligible-for-Membership List". disapproving respondents applications. This is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy. As shown by the records, the Board adopted a Hence, petitioners are liable for damages pursuant secret balloting known as the "black ball system"to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same of voting wherein each member will drop a ball in Code. the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a black ball It bears stressing that the amendment to Section means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as3(c) of CCCIs Amended By-Laws requiring the amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the unanimous vote of the directors present at a directors is required. When respondents special or regular meeting was not printed on the application for proprietary membership was votedapplication form respondent filled and submitted to upon during the Board meeting on July 30, 1997, CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original the ballot box contained one (1) black ball. Thus,provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the for lack of unanimity, his application was required number of votes needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member. disapproved. Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under itsPetitioners explained that the amendment was not Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve printed on the application form due to economic or disapprove an application for proprietaryreasons. We find this excuse flimsy and membership. But such right should not beunconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil extremely significant, was introduced way back in Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide1978 or almost twenty (20) years before respondent filed his application. We cannot fathom restrictions, thus: why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise ofclub, like the CCCI, whose members are all his rights and in the performance of his duties, affluent, did not have enough money to cause the act with justice, give everyone his due, and printing of an updated application form. observe honesty and good faith. It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss the dark wondering why his application was or injury to another in a manner that is contrarydisapproved. He was not even informed that a to morals, good customs or public policy shall unanimous vote of the Board members was compensate the latter for the damage. required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration 5 In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona , we expoundedand an inquiry whether there was an objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him. Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21, thus: Certainly, respondent did not deserve this kind of This article, known to contain what is treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel commonly referred to as the principle of abuse Corporation as a special non-proprietary member of rights, sets certain standards which must beof CCCI, he should have been treated by observed not only in the exercise of one's rights petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the very but also in the performance of one's duties.least, they should have informed him why his These standards are the following: to act with application was disapproved. justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on nonetheless be in accordance with the proper all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be unjustly or excessively and results in damage to observed. A right, though by itself legal another, a legal wrong is committed for6 which the because recognized or granted by law aswrongdoer must be held responsible. It bears such, may nevertheless become thereiterating that the trial court and the Court of source of some illegality. When a right is Appeals held that petitioners disapproval of exercised in a manner which does notrespondents application is characterized by bad conform with the norms enshrined in faith. Article 19 and results in damage to As to petitioners reliance on the principle of another, a legal wrong is therebydamnum absque injuria or damage without injury, committed for which the wrongdoer mustsuffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays Amonoy v. Gutierrez,7 we held that this principle down a rule of conduct for the government of does not apply when there is an abuse of a human relations and for the maintenance ofpersons right, as in this case. social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damagesAs to the appellate courts award to respondent of moral damages, we find the same in order. Under

own, he shall become a Proprietary Member, under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be upon a non-refundable admission fee of proper. (Emphasis in the original) P1,000.00, provided that admission fees willIn rejecting respondents application for proprietary only be collected once from any person. membership, we find that petitioners violated the

35

Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, moral damages Costs against petitioners. may be recovered, among others, in acts and SO ORDERED. actions referred to in Article 21. We believe respondents testimony that he suffered mental anguish, social humiliation and wounded feelings G.R. No. 165443 April 16, 2009 as a result of the arbitrary denial of his application. However, the amount of P2,000,000.00 isCALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. Petitioner, excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule invs. determining what would be a fair and reasonable SIXTO CLEMENTE, JR., Respondent. amount of moral damages, the same should not be DECISION palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to TINGA, J.: the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at Seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated 1 June the expense of the defendant.8 Taking into2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. consideration the attending circumstances here,62331 and the reinstatement of the Decision dated we hold that an award to respondent of 15 November 2000 of the Securities and Exchange P50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as moralCommission (SEC) in SEC Case No. 04-98-5954, damages is reasonable. petitioner Calatagan Golf Club, Inc. (Calatagan) Anent the award of exemplary damages, Articlefiled this Rule 45 petition against respondent Sixto 2229 allows it by way of example or correction for Clemente, Jr. (Clemente). the public good. Nonetheless, since exemplaryThe key facts are undisputed. damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of against or as a negative incentive to curb socially Calatagan, indicating in his application for deleterious actions,9 we reduce the amount frommembership his mailing address at "Phimco Industries, Inc. P.O. Box 240, MCC," complete P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00 only. residential address, office and residence telephone On the matter of attorneys fees and litigation numbers, as well as the company (Phimco) with expenses, Article 2208 of the same Code provides,which he was connected, Calatagan issued to him among others, that attorneys fees and expenses Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2 May 1990 of litigation may be recovered in cases when after paying P120,000.00 for the share.2 exemplary damages are awarded and where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members fees and expenses of litigation should be to meet expenses for general operations, as well recovered, as in this case. In any event, however, as costs for upkeep and improvement of the such award must be reasonable, just andgrounds and facilities. The provision on monthly equitable. Thus, we reduce the amount ofdues is incorporated in Calatagans Articles of at attorneys fees (P500,000.00) and litigationIncorporation and By-Laws. It is also reproduced 3 the back of each certificate of stock. As expenses (P50,000.00) to P50,000.00 and reproduced in the dorsal side of Certificate of Stock P25,000.00, respectively. No. A-01295, the provision reads: Lastly, petitioners argument that they could not be held jointly and severally liable for damages 5. The owners of shares of stock shall be subject to because only one (1) voted for the disapproval of the payment of monthly dues in an amount as may be prescribed in the by-laws or by the Board of respondents application lacks merit. Directors which shall in no case be less that [sic] Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides: P50.00 to meet the expenses for the general SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or operations of the club, and the maintenance and officers. Directors or trustees who willfully improvement of its premises and facilities, in and knowingly vote for or assent to patently addition to such fees as may be charged for the unlawful acts of the corporation or who areactual use of the facilities x x x guilty of gross negligence or bad faith inWhen Clemente became a member the monthly directing the affairs of the corporation orcharge stood at P400.00. He paid P3,000.00 for his acquire any personal or pecuniary interest inmonthly dues on 21 March 1991 and another conflict with their duty as such directors, or P5,400.00 on 9 December 1991. Then he ceased trustees shall be liable jointly and severallypaying the dues. At that point, his balance for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by amounted to P400.00.4 the corporation, its stockholders or members Ten (10) months later, Calatagan made the initial and other persons. (Emphasis ours) step to collect Clementes back accounts by WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. Thesending a demand letter dated 21 September challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of 1992. It was followed by a second letter dated 22 Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506 are AFFIRMEDOctober 1992. Both letters were sent to Clementes with modification in the sense that (a) the award ofmailing address as indicated in his membership moral damages is reduced from P2,000,000.00 toapplication but were sent back to sender with the P50,000.00; (b) the award of exemplary damagespostal note that the address had been closed.5 is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00; and (c) the award of attorneys fees and litigation Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for expenses is reduced from P500,000.00 andhaving failed to pay his monthly dues for more P50,000.00 to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,than sixty (60) days, specifically P5,600.00 as of 31 October 1992. Calatagan also included Clementes respectively.

36

name in the list of delinquent members posted on at eight (8) years. the clubs bulletin board. On 1 December 1992, The Court of Appeals also pointed out that since Calatagans board of directors adopted a resolutionthat Calatagans first two demand letters had been authorizing the foreclosure of shares of delinquentreturned to it as sender with the notation about the members, including Clementes; and the public closure of the mailing address, it very well knew auction of these shares. that its third and final demand letter also sent to

On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third andthe same mailing address would not be received by final letter to Clemente, this time signed by itsClemente. It noted the by-law requirement that Corporate Secretary, Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr. Thewithin ten (10) days after the Board has ordered letter contains a warning that unless Clemente the sale at auction of a members share of stock settles his outstanding dues, his share would be for indebtedness, the Corporate Secretary shall included among the delinquent shares to be sold at notify the owner thereof and advise the public auction on 15 January 1993. Again, this Membership Committee of such fact. Finally, the letter was sent to Clementes mailing address that Court of Appeals ratiocinated that "a person who is had already been closed.6 in danger of the imminent loss of his property has and be given the chance to On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale was the right to be notified 12 prevent the loss." posted on the Clubs bulletin board, as well as on the clubs premises. The auction sale took place asHence, the present appeal. scheduled on 15 January 1993, and ClementesCalatagan maintains that the action of Clemente share sold for P64,000.7 According to thehad prescribed pursuant to Section 69 of the Certificate of Sale issued by Calatagan after the Corporation Code, and that the requisite notices sale, Clementes share was purchased by a Nestor under both the law and the by-laws had been A. Virata.8 At the time of the sale, Clementes rendered to Clemente. accrued monthly dues amounted to P5,200.00.9 A notice of foreclosure of Clementes share wasSection 69 of the Code provides that an action to published in the 26 May 1993 issue of the Business recover delinquent stock sold must be commenced by the filing of a complaint within six (6) months World.10 from the date of sale. As correctly pointed out by Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in the Court of Appeals, Section 69 is part of Title VIII November of 1997.11 He filed a claim with the of the Code entitled "Stocks and Stockholders" and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) refers specifically to unpaid subscriptions to capital seeking the restoration of his shareholding instock, the sale of which is governed by the Calatagan with damages. immediately preceding Section 68. On 15 November 2000, the SEC rendered aThe Court of Appeals debunked both Calatagans decision dismissing Clementes complaint. Citingand the SECs reliance on Section 69 by citing Section 69 of the Corporation Code which providesanother SEC ruling in the case of Caram v. Valley that the sale of shares at an auction sale can only Golf. In connection with Section 69, Calatagan be questioned within six (6) months from the date raises a peripheral point made in the SECs Caram of sale, the SEC concluded that Clementes claim,ruling. In Caram, the SEC, using as take-off Section filed four (4) years after the sale, had already 6 of the Corporation Code which refers to "such prescribed. The SEC further held that Calataganrights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated in had complied with all the requirements for a validthe articles of incorporation," pointed out that the sale of the subject share, Clemente having failed to Articles of Incorporation of Valley Golf does not inform Calatagan that the address he had earlier "impose any lien, liability or restriction on the Golf supplied was no longer his address. Clemente, theShare [of Caram]," but only its (Valley Golfs) BySEC ruled, had acted in bad faith in assuming as he Laws does. Here, Calatagan stresses that its own claimed that his non-payment of monthly duesArticles of Incorporation does provide that the would merely render his share "inactive." monthly dues assessed on owners of shares of the Clemente filed a petition for review with the Courtcorporation, along with all other obligations of the of Appeals. On 1 June 2004, the Court of Appeals shareholders to the club, "shall constitute a first promulgated a decision reversing the SEC. Thelien on the shares and in the event of appellate court restored Clementes one share with delinquency such shares may be ordered sold by a directive to Calatagan to issue in his a new share, the Board of Directors in the manner provided in and awarded to Clemente a total of P400,000.00 inthe By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other damages, less the unpaid monthly dues ofobligations of the shareholders."13 With its illative P5,200.00. but incomprehensible logic, Calatagan concludes In rejecting the SECs finding that the action had that the prescriptive period under Section 69 prescribed, the Court of Appeals cited the SECsshould also apply to the sale of Clementes share own ruling in SEC Case No. 4160, Caram v. Valleyas the lien that Calatagan perceives to be a Golf Country Club, Inc., that Section 69 of the restriction is stated in the articles of incorporation Corporation Code specifically refers to unpaidand not only in the by-laws. subscriptions to capital stock, and not to any otherWe remain unconvinced. debt of stockholders. With the insinuation that There are fundamental differences that defy Section 69 does not apply to unpaid membership equivalence or even analogy between the sale of dues in non-stock corporations, the appellate courtdelinquent stock under Section 68 and the sale employed Article 1140 of the Civil Code as the that occurred in this case. At the root of the sale of proper rule of prescription. The provision sets the delinquent stock is the non-payment of the prescription period of actions to recover movablessubscription price for the share of stock itself. The

37

stockholder or subscriber has yet to fully pay for the claims of the Club as provided for in Section the value of the share or shares subscribed. In this 32 hereon. A member may pay his overdue case, Clemente had already fully paid for the share account at any time before the auction sale. in Calatagan and no longer had any outstandingSec. 32. Lien on Shares; Sale of Share at Auctionobligation to deprive him of full title to his share. The club shall have a first lien on every share of Perhaps the analogy could have been made ifstock to secure debts of the members to the Club. Clemente had not yet fully paid for his share and This lien shall be annotated on the certificates of the non-stock corporation, pursuant to an article or stock and may be enforced by the Club in the by-law provision designed to address thatfollowing manner: situation, decided to sell such share as a (a) Within ten (10) days after the Board has consequence. But that is not the case here, and ordered the sale at auction of a members there is no purpose for us to apply Section 69 to share of stock for indebtedness under Section the case at bar. 31(b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify the Calatagan argues in the alternative that owner thereof, and shall advise the Clementes suit is barred by Article 1146 of the Membership Committee of such fact. Civil Code which establishes four (4) years as the (b) The Membership Committee shall then prescriptive period for actions based upon injury to notify all applicants on the Waiting List and all the rights of the plaintiff on the hypothesis that the registered stockholders of the availability of a suit is purely for damages. As a second alternative share of stock for sale at auction at a specified still, Calatagan posits that Clementes action is date, time and place, and shall post a notice to governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code which that effect in the Club bulletin board for at least sets five (5) years as the period of prescription for ten (10) days prior to the auction sale. all other actions whose prescriptive periods are not fixed in the Civil Code or in any other law. Neither (c) On the date and hour fixed, the Membership article is applicable but Article 1140 of the Civil Committee shall proceed with the auction by Code which provides that an action to recover viva voce bidding and award the sale of the movables shall prescribe in eight (8) years. share of stock to the highest bidder. Calatagans action is for the recovery of a share of (d) The purchase price shall be paid by the stock, plus damages. winning bidder to the Club within twenty-four Calatagans advertence to the fact that the (24) hours after the bidding. The winning bidder constitution of a lien on the members share by or the representative in the case of a juridical virtue of the explicit provisions in its Articles of entity shall become a Regular Member upon Incorporation and By-Laws is relevant but payment of the purchase price and issuance of ultimately of no help to its cause. Calatagans a new stock certificate in his name or in the Articles of Incorporation states that the "dues, name of the juridical entity he represents. The together with all other obligations of members to proceeds of the sale shall be paid by the Club the club, shall constitute a first lien on the shares, to the selling stockholder after deducting his second only to any lien in favor of the national or obligations to the Club. local government, and in the event of delinquency (e) If no bids be received or if the winning such shares may be ordered sold by the Board of bidder fails to pay the amount of this bid within Directors in the manner provided in the By-Laws to twenty-four (24) hours after the bidding, the satisfy said dues or other obligations of the auction procedures may be repeated from time stockholders."14 In turn, there are several to time at the discretion of the Membership provisions in the By-laws that govern the payment Committee until the share of stock be sold. of dues, the lapse into delinquency of the member, and the constitution and execution on the lien. We (f) If the proceeds from the sale of the share of quote these provisions: stock are not sufficient to pay in full the indebtedness of the member, the member shall ARTICLE XII MEMBERS ACCOUNT continue to be obligated to the Club for the SEC. 31. (a) Billing Members, Posting of Delinquent unpaid balance. If the member whose share of Members The Treasurer shall bill al members stock is sold fails or refuse to surrender the monthly. As soon as possible after the end of every stock certificate for cancellation, cancellation month, a statement showing the account of bill of shall be effected in the books of the Club based a member for said month will be prepared and sent on a record of the proceedings. Such to him. If the bill of any member remains unpaid by cancellation shall render the unsurrendered the 20th of the month following that in which the stock certificate null and void and notice to this bill was incurred, the Treasurer shall notify him that effect shall be duly published. if his bill is not paid in full by the end of the succeeding month his name will be posted as It is plain that Calatagan had endeavored to install delinquent the following day at the Clubhouse a clear and comprehensive procedure to govern bulletin board. While posted, a member, thethe payment of monthly dues, the declaration of a immediate members of his family, and his guests, member as delinquent, and the constitution of a lien on the shares and its eventual public sale to may not avail of the facilities of the Club. answer for the members debts. Under Section 91 (b) Members on the delinquent list for more of the Corporation Code, membership in a nonthan 60 days shall be reported to the Board and stock corporation "shall be terminated in the their shares or the shares of the juridical manner and for the causes provided in the articles entities they represent shall thereafter be of incorporation or the by-laws." The By-law ordered sold by the Board at auction to satisfy provisions are elaborate in explaining the manner

38

and the causes for the termination of membership diligence or good faith imposes upon the Corporate in Calatagan, through the execution on the lien ofSecretary the chief repository of all corporate the share. The Court is satisfied that the By-Laws,records the obligation to check Clementes other as written, affords due protection to the memberaddress which, under the By-Laws, have to be kept by assuring that the member should be notified by on file and are in fact on file. One obvious purpose the Secretary of the looming execution sale that of giving the Corporate Secretary the duty to keep would terminate membership in the club. In the addresses of members on file is specifically for addition, the By-Laws guarantees that after the matters of this kind, when the member cannot be execution sale, the proceeds of the sale would be reached through his or her mailing address. returned to the former member after deducting theSignificantly, the Corporate Secretary does not outstanding obligations. If followed to the letter, have to do the actual verification of other the termination of membership under this addressees on record; a mere clerk can do the very procedure outlined in the By-Laws would accord simple task of checking the files as in fact clerks with substantial justice. actually undertake these tasks. In fact, one Yet, did Calatagan actually comply with the by-law telephone call to Clementes phone numbers on provisions when it sold Clementes share? The file would have alerted him of his impending loss.

appellate courts finding on this point warrants our Ultimately, the petition must fail because approving citation, thus: Calatagan had failed to duly observe both the spirit In accordance with this provision, Calatagan sentand letter of its own by-laws. The by-law provisions the third and final demand letter to Clemente on was clearly conceived to afford due notice to the December 7, 1992. The letter states that if the delinquent member of the impending sale, and not amount of delinquency is not paid, the share will just to provide an intricate faade that would be included among the delinquent shares to be facilitate Calatagans sale of the share. But then, sold at public auction. This letter was signed by the bad faith on Calatagans part is palpable. As Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr., Calatagan Golfs found by the Court of Appeals, Calatagan very well Corporate Secretary. It was again sent toknew that Clementes postal box to which it sent Clementes mailing address Phimcoits previous letters had already been closed, yet it Industries Inc., P.O. Box 240, MCC Makati. Aspersisted in sending that final letter to the same expected, it was returned because the post office postal box. What for? Just for the exercise, it appears, as it had known very well that the letter box had been closed. would never actually reach Clemente.1avvphi1 Under the By-Laws, the Corporate Secretary is tasked to "give or cause to be given, all noticesIt is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership required by law or by these By-Laws. .. and keep application had provided his residential address a record of the addresses of all stockholders. As along with his residence and office telephone quoted above, Sec. 32 (a) of the By-Laws further numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagans Byprovides that "within ten (10) days after the Board Laws requires that the final notice prior to the sale has ordered the sale at auction of a members be made solely through the members mailing Clemente cites our aphorism-like share of stock for indebtedness under Section 31 address. pronouncement in Rizal Commercial Banking (b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner 15 Corporation v. Court of Appeals that "[a] simple thereof and shall advise the Membership telephone call and an ounce of good faith x x x Committee of such fact.," The records do not could have prevented this present controversy." disclose what report the Corporate Secretary transmitted to the Membership Committee toThat memorable observation is quite apt in this comply with Section 32(a). Obviously, the reasoncase. for this mandatory requirement is to give the Calatagans bad faith and failure to observe its own Membership Committee the opportunity to findBy-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss of out, before the share is sold, if proper notice has Clementes privilege to play golf at its golf course been made to the shareholder member. and avail of its amenities, but also in significant We presume that the Corporate Secretary, as a pecuniary damage to him. For that loss, the only lawyer is knowledgeable on the law and on the blame that could be thrown Clementes way was standards of good faith and fairness that the law his failure to notify Calatagan of the closure of the requires. As custodian of corporate records, heP.O. Box. That lapse, if we uphold Calatagan would should also have known that the first two letterscost Clemente a lot. But, in the first place, does he sent to Clemente were returned because the P.O. deserve answerability for failing to notify the club Box had been closed. Thus, we are surprised of the closure of the postal box? Indeed, knowing given his knowledge of the law and of corporate as he did that Calatagan was in possession of his records that he would send the third and final home address as well as residence and office letter Clementes last chance before his share is telephone numbers, he had every reason to sold and his membership lost to the same P.O. assume that the club would not be at a loss should it need to contact him. In addition, according to Box that had been closed. Clemente, he was not even aware of the closure of Calatagan argues that it "exercised due diligencethe postal box, the maintenance of which was not before the foreclosure sale" and "sent several his responsibility but his employer Phimcos. notices to Clementes specified mailing address." We do not agree; we cannot label as due diligence The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Calatagans act of sending the December 7, 1992into operation 16 Code, under the Chapter on Human Relations. letter to Clementes mailing address knowing fully These provisions, which the Court of Appeals did well that the P.O. Box had been closed. Due apply, enunciate a general obligation under law for

39

every person to act fairly and in good faith towards decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at one another. A non-stock corporation like Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its resolution of September 3, 1991 2 denying treatment of its members. The obligation of a petitioner's motion for reconsideration. corporation to treat every person honestly and in Respondent court having assiduously discussed the good faith extends even to its shareholders orsalient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the members, even if the latter find themselvesfactual findings of the court below, the evidence of contractually bound to perform certain obligations record and the contentions of the parties, it is to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be appropriate that its findings, which we approve and a charter of dehumanization. adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder: We turn to the matter of damages. The award of actual damages is of course warranted since Clemente has sustained pecuniary injury by reason of Calatagans wrongful violation of its own ByLaws. It would not be feasible to deliver Clementes original Certificate of Stock because it had already been cancelled and a new one issued in its place in the name of the purchases at the auction who was not impleaded in this case. However, the Court of Appeals instead directed that Calatagan to issue to Clemente a new certificate of stock. That sufficiently redresses the actual damages sustained by Clemente. After all, the certificate of stock is simply the evidence of the share. Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license. Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendantappellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted her evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as follows: Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and had finished a college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male companion. Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973, they had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974). Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right

The Court of Appeals also awarded Clemente P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. We agree that the award of such damages is warranted. The Court of Appeals cited Calatagan for violation of Article 32 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of damages from any private individual "who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs" the right "against deprivation of property without due process of laws." The plain letter of the provision squarely entitles Clemente to damages from Calatagan. Even without Article 32 itself, Calatagan will still be bound to pay moral and exemplary damages to Clemente. The latter was able to duly prove that he had sustained mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings by reason of Calatagans acts, thereby entitling him to moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. Moreover, it is evident that Calatagans bad faith as exhibited in the course of its corporate actions warrants correction for the public good, thereby justifying exemplary damages under Article 2229 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992 CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents. REGALADO, J.: Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in toto the

40

side. The car travelled north on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and instead threatened her not to make any noise as they were ready to die and would bump the car against the post if she persisted. Frightened and silenced, the car travelled its course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the car against her will, and amidst her cries and pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint strength of the two male combatants because of her natural weakness being a woman and her small stature. Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against her will and consent. She could not fight back and repel the attack because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced her, his companion held her two feet, removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would ask his companion to come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender her womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came out of her private parts after her vagina was penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974). After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go home but the latter would not consent and stated that he would only let her go after they were married as he intended to marry her, so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together after the car that they used had already gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a Monday, she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license, which they did. They filed their applications for marriage license (Exhibits "A" and "C") and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of Juana de Leon and lived there as

husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to September 29, 1973. On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974). The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who declared that on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his sister who is the mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but his efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff might have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next day (Sunday), his sister told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare, the children are here already. Let us settle the matter and have them married." He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor, she would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they would be married. Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiffappellant on September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendantappellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latter's father to their relationship. Defendant-appellants claim that defendantappellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get married, and this fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, when defendantappellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiffappellant and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo

41

Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to Quirino Avenueawarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the where she could get a ride home, therebybreach of defendants-appellants' promise of leaving the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.marriage. 5 and plaintiff-appellant alone. According toAs stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., afterrespondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he anddismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the plaintiff-appellant took a taxi to the Golden decision of the trial court. His motion for Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried reconsideration having been denied, petitioner to get a room, but these were full. They Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review, finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel,contending that (1) respondent court failed to where defendant-appellant registered usingconsider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents his real name and residence certificate for petitioner's defense, resulting in the number. Three hours later, the couple checkmisapprehensions of facts and violative of the law out of the hotel and proceeded to the houseon preparation of judgment; and (2) it erred in the of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Pias,application of the proper law and jurisprudence by where they stayed until September 19,holding that there was forcible abduction with 1873. Defendant-appellant claims thatrape, not just a simple elopement and an bitter disagreements with the plaintiff- agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive appellant over money and the threats madedamages. 6 to his life prompted him to break off their Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the plan to get married. trial and appellate courts failed to take into During this period, defendant-appellantconsideration the alleged fact that he and private Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the houserespondent had agreed to marry, and that there of Juan de Leon and telling plaintiff- was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but appellant that she would be wed toone of simple elopement and agreement to marry. defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, heIt is averred that the agreement to marry has been phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda, member ofsufficiently proven by the testimonies of the the board of directors of Mandalawitnesses for both parties and the exhibits Corporation, defendant-appellant Bunag,presented in court. Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973 andThis submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented whereabouts of his son. He came to know by the parties and the weight accorded thereto in about his son's whereabouts when he was the factual findings of the trial court and the Court told of the couple's elopement late in the of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew mother Candida Gawaran. He likewisethe evidence, both testimonial and documentary, denied having met relatives and emissaries presented before and calibrated by the trial court, of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to herand as further meticulously reviewed and discussed by respondent court. marriage to his son. 3 A complaint for damages for alleged breach ofThe issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves promise to marry was filed by herein private questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitionerconstrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner hadforth, may be raised in a petition for review on forcibly abducted and raped private respondent, certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the trial court rendered a decision 4 orderingsubject to clearly settled exceptions in case law. petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondentOur jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 asCourt of Appeals is limited to reviewing and exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way ofrevising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit.emphatically declared that it is not its function to Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its any and all liability. jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law Private respondent appealed that portion of the that might have been committed by the lower lower court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag,court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the otherfindings complained of are totally devoid of support hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants,in the record, or that they are so glaringly assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of committed by trial court, which were summarized discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court by respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that is not expected or required to examine or contrast defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forciblythe oral and documentary evidence submitted by 7 abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in the parties. Neither does the instant case reveal finding that defendants-appellants promisedany feature falling within, any of the exceptions plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed towhich under our decisional rules may warrant a defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) inreview of the factual findings of the Court of

42

Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and ourresolution of the fiscal at the preliminary review of the records, we sustain the holding of investigation stage. There is no declaration in a respondent court in favor of private respondent. final judgment that the fact from which the civil Petitioner likewise asserts that since actioncase might arise did not exist. Consequently, the involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action court erred in awarding damages. arising from the offense because such preliminary It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it time-honored rule that an action for breach of the extinction of the civil action. promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or propertyThe reason most often given for this holding is that advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such the two proceedings involved are not between the promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach ofsame parties. Furthermore, it has long been promise to marry per se is not actionable, exceptemphasized, with continuing validity up to now, where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses that there are different rules as to the competency for the wedding and the necessary incidents of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, thereof. the State must prove its case by evidence which However, the award of moral damages is allowedshows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable in cases specified in or analogous to those doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, inevidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any we stressed that it is not now necessary that a person who wilfully causes loss or injury to anothercriminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and in a manner that is contrary to morals, good prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action customs or public policy shall compensate the based on said offense in favor of the offended latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adoptedwoman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which to final judgment. leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and adequate legal remedy for that untold number of resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. moral wrongs which is impossible for humanSO ORDERED. foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes.
10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966 bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, private respondent and having carnal knowledgevs. with her against her will, and thereafter promising HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, SANTOS, respondents. only to thereafter renege on such promise after REYES, J.B.L., J.: cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals andAppeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in good customs. These are grossly insensate andits Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the reprehensible transgressions which indisputablyCourt of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Qwarrant and abundantly justify the award of moral 4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in damages. relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and The essential allegations of the complaint are to Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code. the effect that, from December, 1957, the

Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, said damages were awarded by the trial court on courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible adult age; that "defendant expressed and abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of professed his undying love and affection for the complaint therefor filed by private respondent plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office. defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for the fundamental postulate of our law that every carnal knowledge; that regularly until December person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly 1959, through his protestations of love and liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of act or omission results in damage or injury to which the latter conceived a child; that due to her another and is the direct and proximate cause pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff in a final judgment that the fact from which the became unable to support herself and her baby; 12 civil might arise did not exist. that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, for forcible abduction with rape was by mere

43

besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.

civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked first instance dismissed the complaint for failure tothat the example set forth in the Code state a cause of action. Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of minor who has been seduced. The essential Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided thefeature is seduction, that in law is more than mere case, holding with the lower court that no cause of sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of action was shown to compel recognition of a child marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence the complaint did state a cause of action for on the part of the seducer to which the woman has damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). of the Philippines, prescribing as follows: ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss orIt has been ruled in the Buenaventura case ( supra) injury to another in a manner that is contrary to that morals, good customs or public policy shall To constitute seduction there must in all cases compensate the latter for the damage. be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment or other inducement. If she consents merely setting aside the dismissal and directing the court from carnal lust and the intercourse is from of origin to proceed with the case. mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be pleading that actions for breach of a promise to induced to depart from the path of virtue by marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and the use of some species of arts, persuasions invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. and wiles, which are calculated to have and do Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960; have that effect, and which result in her Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, ultimately submitting her person to the sexual January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123). 886. And in American Jurisprudence we find: We find this appeal meritorious. On the other hand, in an action by the woman, In holding that the complaint stated a cause of the enticement, persuasion or deception is the action for damages, under Article 21 above essence of the injury; and a mere proof of mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Accordingly it is not seduction where the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to willingness arises out of sexual desire or support the original draft of the Civil Code. curiosity of the female, and the defendant Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 merely affords her the needed opportunity for of the Code), the Commission stated: the commission of the act. It has been But the Code Commission has gone farther emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such than the sphere of wrongs defined or cases would tend to the demoralization of the determined by positive law. Fully sensible that female sex, and would be a reward for there are countless gaps in the statutes, which unchastity by which a class of adventuresses leave so many victims of moral wrongs would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662) helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, theBearing these principles in mind, let us examine Commission has deemed it necessary, in thethe complaint. The material allegations there are interest of justice, to incorporate in the as follows: proposed Civil Code the following rule: I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, "ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes while defendant is also of legal age, single and loss or injury to another in a manner that is residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he contrary to morals, good customs or public may be served with summons; policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff; III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and

44

affection for the plaintiff who also in due time COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH reciprocated the tender feelings; BUENAVENTURA, respondents. IV. That in the course of their engagement, the x-------------------x plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005 young people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner, other and sometime in July, 1958, in vs. consideration of the defendant's promises of COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded BUENAVENTURA, Respondents. to the former's earnest and repeated pleas to DECISION have carnal knowledge with him; AZCUNA, J.: V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in These cases involve a petition for the declaration December, 1958 when the defendant was outof nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner of the country, the defendant through his Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground protestations of love and promises of marriageof the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with plaintiff; leave of court, amended his petition by stating that VI. That as a result of their intimateboth he and his wife were psychologically relationship, the plaintiff started conceivingincapacitated to comply with the essential which was confirmed by a doctor sometime inobligations of marriage. In response, respondent July, 1959; filed an amended answer denying the allegation 1 VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant that she was psychologically incapacitated. condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court and pleaded with him to make good hispromulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of promises of marriage, but instead of honoring which reads: his promises and righting his wrong, the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as defendant stopped and refrained from seeing follows: the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and 1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage purposes has broken their engagement and his entered into between plaintiff Noel A. promises. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts initio; stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral maintained intimate sexual relations with damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. 6% interest from the date of this decision plus Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual attorneys fees of P100,000.00; passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had 3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs; artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, 4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the much less for one year, without exacting early conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits would have cut chart all sexual relations upon received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with other cause of action being alleged, no error was 12% interest per annum from the date of this committed by the Court of First Instance in decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding dismissing the complaint. shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies; Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs. G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005 NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner, vs. 5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises; 6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant; and 7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh. Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.

45

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances appellate court, respondent filed a motion to the following contentions: increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED it be denied or that such incident be set for oral SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR 3 argument. HEARING.12 On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to P20,000.4 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.5 On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial courts decision.6 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the son.7 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.13 IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."14 LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT.15

BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.11

On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari8 and the Petition for Certiorari9 wereWith regard to the first issue in the main case, the ordered consolidated by this Court.10 Court of Appeals articulated: In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus: 1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS; 2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANTAPPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS; 3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND 4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM,

On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Thus, the lower court found that plaintiffappellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendantappellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation. Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason of the performance

46

or non-performance of marital obligations wereThe Court of Appeals and the trial court considered awarded, it does not follow that no such award the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as for damages may be made. proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, a product of his incapacity or inability to comply specifically prayed for moral and exemplary with the essential obligations of marriage. damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos.Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, willful and hence as grounds for granting moral found full justification of awarding at least halfdamages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as of what was originally prayed for. We find no a product of psychological incapacity, and hence reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.16 beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering The award by the trial court of moral damages isthe same set of acts as willful. By declaring the based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the which read as follows: possibility of awarding moral damages on the ART. 2217. Moral damages include physicalsame set of facts was negated. The award of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright, seriousdamages should be predicated, not on the mere anxiety, besmirched reputation, woundedact of entering into the marriage, but on specific feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, andevidence that it was done deliberately and with similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniarymalice by a party who had knowledge of his or her computation, moral damages may bedisability and yet willfully concealed the same. No recovered if they are the proximate result of such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. the defendants wrongful act or omission. ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss orFor the same reason, since psychological injury to another in a manner that is contrary to incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of morals, good customs or public policy shallthe basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it compensate the latter for the damage. removes the basis for the contention that the The trial court referred to Article 21 because Articlepetitioner purposely deceived the private 221917 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in respondent. If the private respondent was which moral damages may be recovered and it deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It mustof the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral be noted that Article 21 states that the individual damages was without basis in law and in fact. must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, complete freedom. In granting moral damages,it follows that the grant of exemplary damages therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that could not but have assumed that the acts on whichexemplary damages are imposed in addition to liquidated or compensatory the moral damages were based were done willfully moral, temperate, 19 damages. and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on. With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and On the other hand, the trial court declared theexpenses of litigation the trial court explained, marriage of the parties null and void based on thus: Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees Article 36 of the Family Code states: and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or A marriage contracted by any party who, at the omission has compelled the defendant to time of the celebration, was psychologically litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to incapacitated to comply with the essential protect her interest (par. 2), and where the marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise Court deems it just and equitable that be void even if such incapacity becomes attorneys fees and expenses of litigation manifest only after its solemnization. should be recovered. (par. 11)20 Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus: The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: . . . no less than a mental (not physical) On Assignment of Error D, as the award of incapacity that causes a party to be truly moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, incognitive of the basic marital covenants the award of attorneys fees and costs of that concomitantly must be assumed and litigation by the trial court is likewise fully discharged by the parties to the marriage justified.21 which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations toThe acts or omissions of petitioner which led the live together, observe love, respect and fidelity lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and render help and support. There is hardlyand his act in filing the complaint for the any doubt that the intendment of the law hasannulment of his marriage cannot be considered as been to confine the meaning of "psychologicalunduly compelling the private respondent to incapacity" to the most serious cases oflitigate, since both are grounded on petitioners personality disorders clearly demonstrative ofpsychological incapacity, which as explained above an utter insensitivity or inability to giveis a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to meaning and significance to the marriage. comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, . . .18 neither can be a ground for attorneys fees and

47

litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis. Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said: The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case: When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings. The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the following: 1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; 2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses; 3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. ...

those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In this particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime. Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies.22

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as Applying the foregoing legal provisions, andfollows: without prejudice to requiring an inventory of On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant what are the parties conjugal properties and assails the order of the trial court for him to what are the exclusive properties of each give one-half of his separation/retirement spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company in this case that the plaintiff who worked first and half of his outstanding shares in Manila as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President Memorial Park and Provident Group of of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received Companies to the defendant-appellee as the separation/retirement package from the said latters share in the conjugal partnership. bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions amounting to On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a P26,164.21 gave him a net amount of Partial Decision approving the Compromise P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on Agreement entered into by the parties. In the January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not same Compromise Agreement, the parties had having shown debts or obligations other than agreed that henceforth, their conjugal

48

partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiff appellants service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.23 Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,24 this Court expounded on the consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable provisions of law: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides: ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership. Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that (a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in coownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and (b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the coownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage. In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common

49

property, the trial court acted neitherThe liquidation, partition and distribution of the imprudently nor precipitately; a court whichproperties owned in common by the parties herein had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and authority to resolve incidental andnot of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. consequential matters. Nor did it commit a As to the issue on custody of the parties over their reversible error in ruling that petitioner and only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot private respondent own the "family home" andsince he is about to turn twenty-five years of age all their common property in equal shares, ason May 27, 200526 and has, therefore, attained the well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and age of majority. partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under theWith regard to the issues on support raised in the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Familymoot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained govern the liquidation of either the absolutethe age of majority. community or the conjugal partnership ofWHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals gains, the property regimes recognized for validdated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated and voidable marriages (in the latter case until December 10, 1996 which are contested in the the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby liquidation of the co-ownership that exists MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and between common-law spouses. The firstexemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code,litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to voidone-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriageCompanies is sustained but on the basis of the contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage liquidation, partition and distribution of the before the latter is judicially declared void. The co-ownership and not of the regime of latter is a special rule that somehow recognizesconjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said the philosophy and an old doctrine that voidDecision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. to establish their nullity. In now requiring for 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals purposes of remarriage, the declaration ofResolutions of September 2, 1996 and November nullity by final judgment of the previously13, 1996 which increased the support pendente contracted void marriage, the present law aims lite in favor of the parties son, Javy Singh to do away with any continuing uncertainty on Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, the status of the second marriage. It is not then accordingly, DISMISSED. illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in No costs. relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a SO ORDERED. subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on coownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It mustG.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007 be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions ofREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the HIGHWAYS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE Family Code, remain in force and effect NATIONAL TREASURER, Petitioner, regardless of the property regime of the vs. CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the spouses.25 name and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND Since the properties ordered to be distributed by CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, Respondent. the court a quo were found, both by the trial court DECISION and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to Before the Court is a Petition for Review on have been included or involved in said distribution. Certiorari under Rule 45 of1 the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision dated April 28, 2003

50

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department, 56345 which affirmed with modification the recommended that payment should be made to Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,Carwin Construction, reiterating his earlier legal San Fernando, Pampanga (RTC) in Civil Case No. opinion.13 Despite such recommendation for 10538, granting the complaint for Specificpayment, no payment was made to respondent. Performance and Damages filed by Carlito Lacap Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the (respondent) against the Republic of the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages Philippines (petitioner). against petitioner before the RTC.14 The factual background of the case is as follows: On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion published an "Invitation To Bid" dated January 27, to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the 1992. Respondent, doing business under the namecomplaint states no cause of action and that the and style Carwin Construction and ConstructionRTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the Supply (Carwin Construction), was pre-qualifiedaction since respondent did not appeal to the COA together with two other contractors. Since the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove respondent submitted the lowest bid, he was the claim.15 awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5Following the submission of respondents Bahay Pare.3 On November 4, 1992, a ContractOpposition to Motion to Dismiss,16 the RTC issued Agreement was executed by respondent andan Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion petitioner.4 On September 25, 1992, Districtto Dismiss.17 The OSG filed a Motion for Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the with the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.5RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.19 Accordingly, respondent undertook the works, made advances for the purchase of the materialsOn August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of and payment for labor costs.6 administrative remedies and the doctrine of nonOn October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the suability of the State.20 District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project and Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, found it 100% completed in accordance with the 1997 its Decision, the dispositive portion of which approved plans and specifications. Accordingly, thereads as follows: Office of the District Engineer issued Certificates of WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing Final Inspection and Final Acceptance.7 consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, for the completed project.8 The DPWH prepared theordering the latter, thru its District Engineer at Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner. 9Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, to pay the However, the DPWH withheld payment fromfollowing: respondent after the District Auditor of the a) P457,000.00 representing the contract for the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final concreting project of Sitio 5 road, Bahay Pare, release of funds on the ground that the Candaba, Pampanga plus interest at 12% from contractors license of respondent had expired at demand until fully paid; and the time of the execution of the contract. The District Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH b) The costs of suit. Legal Department on whether the contracts ofSO ORDERED.21 Carwin Construction for various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation projects were valid and effective The RTC held that petitioner must be required to although its contractors license had already pay the contract price since it has accepted the completed project and enjoyed the benefits expired when the projects were contracted.10 thereof; to hold otherwise would be to overrun the In a Letter-Reply dated September 1, 1993, Cesar long standing and consistent pronouncement D. Mejia, Director III of the DPWH Legal against enriching oneself at the expense of Department opined that since Republic Act No. another.22 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as the petitioner filed an appeal with the Contractors License Law, does not provide that a Dissatisfied, 23 CA. On April 28, 2003, the CA rendered its contract entered into after the license has expired Decision sustaining the Decision of the RTC. It held is void and there is no law which expressly that since the case involves the application of the prohibits or declares void such contract, the principle of estoppel against the government which contract is enforceable and payment may be paid, is a purely legal question, then the principle of without prejudice to any appropriate administrative exhaustion of administrative remedies does not liability action that may be imposed on the apply; that by its actions the government is contractor and the government officials or estopped from questioning the validity and binding employees concerned.11 effect of the Contract Agreement with the In a Letter dated July 4, 1994, the District Engineer respondent; that denial of payment to respondent requested clarification from the DPWH Legal on purely technical grounds after successful Department on whether Carwin Constructioncompletion of the project is not countenanced should be paid for works accomplished despite an either by justice or equity. expired contractors license at the time the The CA rendered herein the assailed Decision contracts were executed.12 dated April 28, 2003, the dispositive portion of In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar

51

which reads:

of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is public policy and practical considerations, are not hereby AFFIRMED with modification in that the inflexible rules. There are many accepted interest shall be six percent (6%) per annum exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) computed from June 21, 1995. where the challenged administrative act is patently SO ORDERED.24 illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where Hence, the present petition on the followingthere is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) ground: where the amount involved is relatively small so as THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) THAT RESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION where the question involved is purely legal and will AGAINST PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT: ultimately have to be decided by the courts of 32 (a) RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUSTjustice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; AND irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted (b) IT IS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH HAS acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of nonTHE PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO RESOLVEexhaustion of administrative remedies has been RESPONDENTS MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE rendered moot;33 (j) when there is no other plain, GOVERNMENT.25 speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong Petitioner contends that respondents recourse to public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto judicial action was premature since the proper proceedings.34 Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable remedy was to appeal the District Auditorsto the present case. disapproval of payment to the COA, pursuant toNotwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No. Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that 1445), otherwise known as the Governmentpayment to a contractor with an expired Auditing Code of the Philippines; that the COA has contractors license is proper, respondent primary jurisdiction to resolve respondents moneyremained unpaid for the completed work despite 26 claim against the government under Section 2(1), repeated demands. Clearly, there was Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 26 27unreasonable delay and official inaction to the of P.D. No. 1445; that non-observance of the great prejudice of respondent. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the principle of primary jurisdiction results in a Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of its contract lack of cause of action. is entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly Respondent, on the other hand, in hisis a pure question of law. It does not involve an Memorandum28 limited his discussion to Civil Code examination of the probative value of the evidence provisions relating to human relations. He submits presented by the parties. There is a question of law that equity demands that he be paid for the workwhen the doubt or difference arises as to what the performed; otherwise, the mandate of the Civil law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the Code provisions relating to human relations wouldtruth or the falsehood of alleged facts. 35 Said be rendered nugatory if the State itself is allowedquestion at best could be resolved only tentatively to ignore and circumvent the standard of behavior by the administrative authorities. The final decision it sets for its inhabitants. on the matter rests not with them but with the The present petition is bereft of merit. courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an The general rule is that before a party may seek 36 the intervention of the court, he should first availadministrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and of all the means afforded him by administrative 29 processes. The issues which administrative experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law. agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a Thus, while it is undisputed that the District Auditor court without first giving such administrativeof the COA disapproved respondents claim against agency the opportunity to dispose of the samethe Government, and, under Section 4837 of P.D. No. 1445, the administrative remedy available to after due deliberation.30 Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of respondent is an appeal of the denial of his claim by the District Auditor to the COA itself, the Court administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will notholds that, in view of exceptions (c) and (e) narrated above, the complaint for specific determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of theperformance and damages was not prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of despite the failure to exhaust that question by the administrative tribunal, where resolve, administrative remedies. As the Court aptly stated the question demands the exercise of sound 38 administrative discretion requiring the specialin Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu (Branch VIII): knowledge, experience and services of the The plaintiffs were not supposed to hold their administrative tribunal to determine technical and breath and wait until the Commission on Audit and the Ministry of Public Highways had acted on the intricate matters of fact.31 Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion ofclaims for compensation for the lands appropriated by the government. The road had been completed; administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine the Pope had come and gone; but the plaintiffs had

52

yet to be paid for the properties taken from them. human conduct [that] should run as golden threads Given this official indifference, which apparently through society to the end that law may approach would continue indefinitely, the private its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance respondents had to act to assert and protect their of justice."43 The rules thereon apply equally well to interests.39 the Government.44 Since respondent had rendered On the question of whether a contractor with anservices to the full satisfaction and acceptance by expired license is entitled to be paid for completed petitioner, then the former should be compensated projects, Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitlyfor them. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute provides: unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, prejudice of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to not allowed by law. submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in aWHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for supervisory capacity of a construction work within lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of the purview of this Act, without first securing aAppeals dated April 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. license to engage in the business of contracting in 56345 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to this country; or who shall present or file the license costs. certificate of another, give false evidence of any SO ORDERED. kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate orG.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994 license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a vs. fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accusedmore than five thousand pesos. (Emphasis appellant. supplied) The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. free from ambiguity, it must be given its literalROMERO, J.: meaning and applied without interpretation. 40 This rule derived from the maxim Index animi sermo In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was valid presumption that the words employed by the charged with Rape and eventually convicted legislature in a statute correctly express its thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by intention or will and preclude the court from Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his construing it differently. The legislature isconviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at presumed to know the meaning of the words, to the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio arrest secondary to hepatic have used words advisedly, and to have expressed respiratory encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.41 Verba legis non est recedendum, or fromgastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme the words of a statute there should be no Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it departure.42 required the Solicitor General to file its comment The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contractshis commission of the offense charged. entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor isIn his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. view that the death of accused-appellant did not Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects extinguish his civil liability as a result of his he completed. Such payment, however, is withoutcommission of the offense charged. The Solicitor on the case of People v. prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribedGeneral, relying Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still under the law. be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code whichconviction by the lower court on which the civil embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommodeliability is based. debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other out of anothers injury) states: hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General Art. 22. Every person who through an act ofarguing that the death of the accused while performance by another, or any other means, judgment of conviction is pending appeal acquires or comes into possession of something atextinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. the expense of the latter without just or legalIn support of his position, said counsel invoked the ground, shall return the same to him. ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation on Human Relations, the provisions of which werein a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability formulated as "basic principles to be observed for and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if the rightful relationship between human beingsaccused should die before final judgment is and for the stability of the social order, x x x rendered. designed to indicate certain norms that spring fromWe are thus confronted with a single issue: Does the fountain of good conscience, x x x guides

53

death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability? In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime? It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition: Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished. The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory? We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites: La responsabilidad extingue. penal se

or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859860) The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal." By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him. Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra. Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated in

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme. xxx xxx xxx The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute? XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says: SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto. "Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed "en condena determinada;"

54

Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding." This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v . Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases. As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case: The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.

final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately. In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that: xxx xxx xxx It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours) xxx xxx xxx In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains."

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect against his estate. It was the contention of the to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding administrator-appellant therein that the death ofthe extinction of his criminal liability due to his the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all death pending appeal of his conviction. criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the To further justify its decision to allow the civil offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the liability to survive, the court relied on the following Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules therein: of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money We see no merit in the plea that the civil claims against the defendant whose death liability has been extinguished, in view ofoccurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of the provisions of the Civil Code of theFirst Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that actions for recovery of money may continue to be became operative eighteen years after theheard on appeal, when the death of the defendant revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the supervenes after the CFI had rendered its Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, establishes a civil action for damages on "the name of the offended party shall be included account of physical injuries, entirelyin the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the separate and distinct from the criminal legal representative or the heirs of the deceasedaccused should be substituted as defendantsaction. appellants." Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved action for damages, entirelyfrom Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was separate and distinct from thethat the survival of the civil liability depends on criminal action, may be brought bywhether the same can be predicated on sources of the injured party. Such civil actionobligations other than delict. Stated differently, the shall proceed independently of theclaim for civil liability is also extinguished together criminal prosecution, and shallwith the criminal action if it were solely based require only a preponderance ofthereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto. evidence. However, the Supreme Court in People v. 10 departed from this longAssuming that for lack of expressSendaydiego, et al. established principle of law. In this case, accused reservation, Belamala's civil action for Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by damages was to be considered instituted the lower court of malversation thru falsification of together with the criminal action still, since public documents. Sendaydiego's death both proceedings were terminated without

55

supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.

This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue entire appeal, passing upon the correctness ofhave maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of theSendaydiego; in other words, they were a criminal action, for the purpose of determining ifreaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus: criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished The claim of complainant Province ofupon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the Pangasinan for the civil liability survived demise of the accused. Sendaydiego because his death occurredBut was it judicious to have abandoned this old after final judgment was rendered by the ruling? A re-examination of our decision in Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, whichSendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling. convicted him of three complex crimes of To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in malversation through falsification andSendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action ordered him to indemnify the Province in impliedly instituted in the criminal action can the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due P57,048.23). to death of the accused pending appeal of his The civil action for the civil liability isconviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code deemed impliedly instituted with theand Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of criminal action in the absence of express Court. waiver or its reservation in a separateArticle 30 of the Civil Code provides: action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of When a separate civil action is brought to Court). The civil action for the civil liability is demand civil liability arising from a criminal separate and distinct from the criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 instituted during the pendency of the civil Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8). case, a preponderance of evidence shall When the action is for the recovery of likewise be sufficient to prove the act money and the defendant dies before final complained of. judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly manner especially provided in Rule 87 of lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's Rules of Court). civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes The implication is that, if the defendant dies during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an after a money judgment had been renderedalternative and separate civil action which may be against him by the Court of First Instance, brought to demand civil liability arising from a the action survives him. It may becriminal offense independently of any criminal continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court ofaction. In the event that no criminal proceedings Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67are instituted during the pendency of said civil SCRA 394). case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove The accountable public officer may still bethe criminal act will have to be that which is civilly liable for the funds improperlycompatible with civil liability and that is, disbursed although he has no criminal preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite 583). extinction of the criminal would in effect merely In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased survives upon extinction of the criminal action due Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability to death of the accused during appeal of his is concerned, the Court Resolved toconviction. This is because whether asserted in continue exercising appellate jurisdictionthe criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil over his possible civil liability for the money liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising the accused while his conviction is on appeal. from the alleged criminal acts complainedArticle 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this of, as if no criminal case had been instituted matter: against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

56

1. By the death of the convict, as to the determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the personal penalties; and as to pecuniarybasis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty penalties, liability therefor is extinguished beyond reasonable doubt of committing the only when the death of the offender occurs offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's before final judgment; conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article xxx xxx xxx 30 was not applied in the final determination of However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated fromSendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims of the criminal action already extinguished which for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We treating the civil action impliedly instituted withreiterate: Upon death of the accused pending the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, asappeal of his conviction, the criminal action is though no criminal proceedings had been filed but extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a merely a separate civil action. This had the effectdefendant to stand as the accused; the civil action of converting such claims from one which is instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex dependent on the outcome of the criminal action delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is to an entirely new and separate one, the on the criminal. prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hardSection 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a invoked to serve as another basis for the transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same hasSec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court perforce to be determined in the criminal action, made the inference that civil actions of the type rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but tothe recovery of which may be continued on appeal render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction the Revised Penal Code which provides that "everyby holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly Court's conclusion: liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal "When the action is for the recovery of action due to death of the accused pending appeal money" "and the defendant dies before final inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of judgment in the court of First Instance, it the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the all things. manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising Rules of Court). from crime, the final determination of the criminal

liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution The implication is that, if the defendant dies of the civil action, such that when the criminal after a money judgment had been rendered action is extinguished by the demise of accusedagainst him by the Court of First Instance, appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action the action survives him. It may be cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs continued on appeal. out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be is to be declared and enforced in the criminal sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice proceeding. This is to be distinguished from thatRegalado: which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil xxx xxx xxx Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a I do not, however, agree with the criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of justification advanced in both Torrijos and July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this Sendaydiego which, relying on the fundamental distinction when it allowed the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil of Court, drew the strained implication liability ex delicto by treating the same as a therefrom that where the civil liability separate civil action referred to under Article 30. instituted together with the criminal Surely, it will take more than just a summary liabilities had already passed beyond the judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion judgment of the then Court of First Instance of said civil action to an independent one such as (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of that contemplated under Article 30. Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the Ironically however, the main decision in extinguishment of the component criminal Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the liability of the deceased. This resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it pronouncement, which has been followed in was held in the main decision: the Court's judgments subsequent and Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, for the purpose of showing his criminal should be set aside and abandoned as liability which is the basis of the civil liability being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable. 13 for which his estate would be liable. Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is his civil liability, concomitantly made a neither authority nor justification for its

57

application in criminal procedure to civil This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 actions instituted together with and as part where we held that, in recovering damages for of criminal actions. Nor is there anyinjury to persons thru an independent civil action authority in law for the summary conversion based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same from the latter category of an ordinary civilmust be filed against the executor or administrator action upon the death of the offender. . . . of the estate of deceased accused and not against Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in athe estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinaryexpenses, expenses for the last sickness of the money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, decedent, judgment for money and claims arising Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely deceased accused. personal obligations other than those which have Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, their source in delict or tort. Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the Conversely, if the same act or omission estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable forcomplained of also arises from contract, the Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What areseparate civil action must be filed against the contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual moneyof the Rules of Court. claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our delicto may include even the restitution of personal ruling herein: or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined expenses for the last illness, judgments for moneyby Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of and claim arising from contracts, expressed orthe accused prior to final judgment terminates his implied. It is clear that money claims arising from criminal liability and only the civil liability directly delict do not form part of this exclusive arising from and based solely on the offense enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as anstrictiore." ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefornotwithstanding the death of accused, if the same before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, may also be predicated on a source of obligation 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code it should be extinguished upon extinction of the other than delict. criminal action engendered by the death of the enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the accused pending finality of his conviction. same act or omission: Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, a) Law 20 upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or b) Contracts omission complained of, he must subject to Section c) Quasi-contracts 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time d) . . . predicated not on the felony previously charged e) Quasi-delicts but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in premised determines against whom the same shallNumber 2 above, an action for recovery therefor be enforced. may be pursued but only by way of filing a If the same act or omission complained of alsoseparate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as result in an injury to person or property (real oramended. This separate civil action may be personal), the separate civil action must be filed enforced either against the executor/administrator against the executor or administrator 17 of theor the estate of the accused, depending on the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. of the Rules of Court: Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear not be brought against executor or a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil administrator. No action upon a claim foraction by prescription, in cases where during the the recovery of money or debt or interest prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its thereon shall be commenced against theextinction, the private-offended party instituted executor or administrator; but actions totogether therewith the civil action. In such case, recover real or personal property, or anthe statute of limitations on the civil liability is interest therein, from the estate, or todeemed interrupted during the pendency of the conformably with provisions of enforce a lien thereon, and actions to criminal case, 21 Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should recover damages for an injury to person or thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible property, real or personal, may be 22 privation of right by prescription. commenced against him.

58

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending hold that the death of appellant Bayotasthat petitioners action is barred by the doctrine of extinguished his criminal liability and the civil res judicata. Respondent further prayed that liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,petitioner should be held in contempt of court for rape. Consequently, the appeal is herebyforum-shopping.7 dismissed without qualification. On March 20, 1998, the trial court found in favor of

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio respondent and dismissed the complaint. The court Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio. SOheld that the dismissal of the criminal cases ORDERED. against respondent on the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the merits which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection. It further held that the G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002 filing of said civil case amounted to forumJOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by shopping. ROBERTO L. CANCIO, petitioner, On June 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners vs. motion for reconsideration.8 Hence, the instant EMERENCIANA ISIP, respondent. petition. DECISION The legal issues for resolution in the case at bar YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: are: 1) whether the dismissal of the estafa cases The instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the against respondent bars the institution of a civil Rules of Court raises pure questions of lawaction for collection of the value of the checks involving the March 20, 19981 and June 1, 19982subject of the estafa cases; and 2) whether the Orders3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of filing of said civil action violated the anti-forumPampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272. shopping rule. The undisputed facts are as follows: An act or omission causing damage to another may Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filedgive rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part three cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22 and three of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, 9 cases of Estafa, against respondent for allegedly under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and issuing the following checks without sufficient (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) funds, to wit: 1) Interbank Check No. 25001151 in not arising from an act or omission complained of or obligations the amount of P80,000.00; 2) Interbank Check No. as felony [e.g. culpa contractual 10 arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil 25001152 in the amount of P 80,000.00; and 3) 11 Code, intentional torts under Articles 3212 and Interbank Check No. 25001157 in the amount of 13 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 217614 of P30,000.00.4 the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissedgranted a right to file an action independent and Criminal Case No. 13356, for Violation of B.P. No. distinct from the criminal action [Article 33,15 Civil 22 covering check no. 25001151 on the ground Code].16 Either of these two possible liabilities may that the check was deposited with the drawee be enforced against the offender subject, however, bank after 90 days from the date of the check. The to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code two other cases for Violation of B.P. No. 22that the offended party "cannot recover damages (Criminal Case No. 13359 and 13360) were filedtwice for the same act or omission" or under both with and subsequently dismissed by the Municipal causes.17 Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1, on the The modes of enforcement of the foregoing civil ground of "failure to prosecute."5 liabilities are provided for in the Revised Rules of Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed Criminal Procedure. Though the assailed order of with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch the trial court was issued on March 20, 1998, the 49, and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. G-3611 to said Rules, which took effect on December 1, 2000, G-3613. On October 21, 1997, after failing tomust be given retroactive effect in the instant case present its second witness, the prosecution movedconsidering that statutes regulating the procedure to dismiss the estafa cases against respondent.of the court are construed as applicable to actions The prosecution likewise reserved its right to file a pending and undetermined at the time of their separate civil action arising from the said criminalpassage.18 cases. On the same date, the trial court granted Section 1, Rule 111, of the Revised Rules of the motions of the prosecution. ThusCriminal Procedure provides: Upon motion of the prosecution for the dismissal of these cases without prejudice to the refiling of the SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. civil aspect thereof and there being no comment (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil from the defense, let these cases be dismissed action for the recovery of civil liability arising from without prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party of the cases. waives the civil action, reserves the right to SO ORDER[ED].6 institute it separately or institutes the civil action On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant prior to the criminal action. case for collection of sum of money, seeking to The reservation of the right to institute separately recover the amount of the checks subject of the the civil action shall be made before the estafa cases. On February 18, 1998, respondent prosecution starts presenting its evidence and

59

under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. xxxxxxxxx

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon 7. That for failure of the defendant without any application with the court trying the latter case. If justifiable reason to pay plaintiff and forcing the the application is granted, the trial of both actions plaintiff to litigate, the latter will incur litigation shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this expenses in the amount of P20,000.00. Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is prayed of this Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as Court that after due notice and hearing a judgment amended in 1988 and under the present Rules, the be rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff as civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with follows: the criminal action, but the offended party is given the option to file a separate civil action before the prosecution starts to present evidence.19 a. the principal sum of P190,000.00 plus the legal interest;

6. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay plaintiff the value of the checks, the latter was forced to hire the services of undersigned counsel and agreed to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and P1,000.00 per appearance in court;

b. attorneys fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 Anent the independent civil actions under Articles per court appearance; 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the old c. litigation expenses in the amount of rules considered them impliedly instituted with the P20,000.00 civil liability ex-delicto in the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reservesPLAINTIFF prays for other reliefs just and equitable his right to institute it separately, or institutes the under the premises. civil action prior to the criminal action. Under the x x x x x x x x x.21 present Rules, however, the independent civil petitioner sought to enforce actions may be filed separately and prosecutedEvidently, independently even without any reservation in the respondents obligation to make good the value of criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the checks in exchange for the cash he delivered the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to to respondent. In other words, petitioners cause of file a separate and independent civil action basedaction is the respondents breach of the contractual obligation. It matters not that on these articles of the Civil Code.20 petitioner claims his cause of action to be one In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed based on delict.22 The nature of a cause of action is by petitioner show that his cause of action is baseddetermined by the facts alleged in the complaint on culpa contractual, an independent civil action. as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of Pertinent portion of the complaint reads: an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the xxxxxxxxx action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by 2. That plaintiff is the owner/proprietor to the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for CANCIOS MONEY EXCHANGE with office relief.23 address at Guagua, Pampanga; Neither does it matter that the civil action reserved 3. That on several occasions, particularly on in the October 21, 1997 order of the trial court was February 27, 1993 to April 17 1993, inclusive, the civil action ex delicto. To reiterate, an defendant drew, issued and made in favor ofindependent civil action arising from contracts, as the plaintiff the following checks: in the instant case, may be filed separately and CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT prosecuted independently even without any 1. Interbank Check No. 25001151 March 10, reservation in the criminal action. Under Article 31 of the Civil Code "[w]hen the civil action is based 1993 P80,000.00 on an obligation not arising from the act or 2. Interbank Check No. 25001152 March 27, omission complained of as a felony, [e.g. culpa 1993 P80,000.00 contractual] such civil action may proceed 3. Interbank Check No. 25001157 May 17, 1993 independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." Thus, in P30,000.00 Vitola, et al. v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, 24 in exchange of cash with the assurance that the Court, applying Article 31 of the Civil Code, the said checks will be honored for paymentheld that a civil case seeking to recover the value on their maturity dates, copy of theof the goods subject of a Letter of Credit-Trust aforementioned checks are hereto attachedReceipt is a civil action ex contractu and not ex and marked. delicto. As such, it is distinct and independent from 4. That when the said checks were presented to the estafa case filed against the offender and may the drawee bank for encashment, the same proceed regardless of the result of the criminal were all dishonored for reason of DRAWNproceedings. AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS (DAIF); One of the elements of res judicata is identity of 25 5. That several demands were made upon the causes of action. In the instant case, it must be defendant to make good the checks but she stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an failed and refused and still fails and refuses independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based without justifiable reason to pay plaintiff;

60

on the same act.26 Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual. In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forumshopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.27 Clearly, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for collection of the value of the checks issued by respondent. Being an independent civil action which is separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution and which require no prior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of res judicata and forum-shopping will not operate to bar the same. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The March 20, 1998 and June 1, 1998 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

61

already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C.petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDAyears from the accrual of the cause of action. LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOSHence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners and LEONARDO FERRER, Petitioners, reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the vs. complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presidingprescription.5 Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRONImproper service of summons was likewise cited as TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.,a ground for dismissal of the complaint as represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS,summons was served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal department without mentioning President/Chairman, Respondent. her designation or position. DECISION Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration TINGA, J.: pointing out yet again that the complaint is not 1 In this Petition for Review on Certiorari datedbased on quasi delict but on the final judgment of March 1, 2002, petitioners assail the Resolutions ofconviction in the criminal case which prescribes 6 the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment. The trial court denied petitioners motion for and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari and denying their motion forreconsideration reiterating that petitioners cause reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of theirof action was based on quasi delict and had complaint to recover civil indemnity for the death prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed more than four (4) and physical injuries of their kin. years after the vehicular accident.7 As regards the The following facts are matters of record. improper service of summons, the trial court In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. reconsidered its ruling that the complaint ought to Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Recklessbe dismissed on this ground. Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide andPetitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with aCourt of Appeals which dismissed the same for vehicle collision between a southbound Viron error in the choice or mode of appeal. 8 The Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound appellate court also denied petitioners motion for Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the vans reconsideration reasoning that even if the driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a respondent trial court judge committed grave two-month old baby, and caused physical injuriesabuse of discretion in issuing the order of to five (5) of the vans passengers. After trial,dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the remedy as appeal was available to petitioners and penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4)they failed to allege that the petition was brought months and one (1) day to four (4) years and twowithin the recognized exceptions for the allowance (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to of certiorari in lieu of appeal.9 file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid court in its decision promulgated on December 17, application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a judicial 1998.2 rejection of an existing obligation arising from the On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint criminal liability of private respondents. Petitioners for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with thecomplaint arose ex delicto and is not based on Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant toquasi delict. The trial court allegedly committed their reservation to file a separate civil action. 3grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the They cited therein the judgment convicting cause of action invoked by petitioners is based on Sibayan. quasi delict and concluded that the action had Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on prescribed. Since the action is based on the the grounds of improper service of summons, criminal liability of private respondents, the cause prescription and laches, and defective certificationof action accrued from the finality of the judgment of non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of conviction. of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant in view of the Assuming that their petition with the appellate separate personality of Viron Transit from itscourt was procedurally flawed, petitioners implore officers.4 the Court to exempt this case from the rigid Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss operation of the rules as they allegedly have a contending, among others, that the right to file a legitimate grievance to vindicate, i.e., damages for separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) the deaths and physical injuries caused by private years reckoned from the finality of the judgment in respondents for which no civil liability had been the criminal action. As there was no appeal of the adjudged by reason of their reservation of the right decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint whichto file a separate civil action. was filed barely two (2) years thence was clearlyIn their Comment10 dated June 13, 2002, private filed within the prescriptive period. respondents insist that the dismissal of the The trial court dismissed the complaint on thecomplaint on the ground of prescription was in principal ground that the cause of action hadorder. They point out that the averments in the G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005

62

complaint make out a cause of action for quasi others. The institution of, or the reservation of the delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civilright to file, any of said civil actions separately Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4)waives the others. years should be reckoned from the time theThe reservation of the right to institute the accident took place. separate civil actions shall be made before the Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liabilityprosecution starts to present its evidence and cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered under circumstances affording the offended party a to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. Transits contention that the subsidiary liability ofIn no case may the offended party recover the employer contemplated in Article 103 of the damages twice for the same act or omission of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation whereaccused. the civil aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separateWhen the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, civil case was made. nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the Private respondents likewise allege that thefiling fees for such action as provided in these recourse to the Court of Appeals via certiorari wasRules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment improper as petitioners should have appealed theexcept in an award for actual damages. adverse order of the trial court. Moreover, they point out several other procedural lapses allegedly In cases wherein the amount of damages, other committed by petitioners, such as lack of than actual, is alleged in the complaint or certification against forum-shopping; lack ofinformation, the corresponding filing fees shall be duplicate original or certified true copy of the paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in assailed order of the trial court; and non-indication court for trial. of the full names and addresses of petitioners inPetitioners expressly made a reservation of their the petition. right to file a separate civil action as a result of the Petitioners filed a Reply11 dated September 14,crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this 2002, while private respondents filed a Rejoinder12reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its dated October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of their decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability. arguments. Predicating their claim on the judgment of We grant the petition. conviction and their reservation to file a separate Our Revised Penal Code provides that every personcivil action made in the criminal case, petitioners 13 criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Such civil liability may consist of restitution,Viron Transit and its President/Chairman. reparation of the damage caused andPetitioners assert that by the institution of the indemnification of consequential damages. 14 Whencomplaint, they seek to recover private a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability respondents civil liability arising from crime. arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the the criminal action, subject to three notable allegations in the complaint, the trial court exceptions: first, when the injured party expresslydismissed the same, declaring that petitioners waives the right to recover damages from thecause of action was based on quasi delict and accused; second, when the offended partyshould have been brought within four (4) years reserves his right to have the civil damagesfrom the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., determined in a separate action in order to take from the time of the accident. full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured party actuallyA reading of the complaint reveals that the exercises the right to maintain a private suit allegations therein are consistent with petitioners against the offender by instituting a civil action claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are prior to the filing of the criminal case. allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action the institution of the criminal action, as well as the based on quasi delict, considering that at the time reservation of the right to file a separate civil of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action action. Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states: ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.cases of negligence, the offended party has the When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action choice between an action to enforce civil liability for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code instituted with the criminal action, unless the and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code. offended party waives the civil action, reserves hisAn act or omission causing damage to another may right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part action prior to the criminal action. of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of not arising from an act or omission complained of the Philippines arising from the same act or as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations omission of the accused. arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and

63

culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civilthe offender.19 However, since the stale action for Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a damages based on quasi delict should be right to file an action independent and distinct considered waived, there is no more occasion for from the criminal action under Article 33 of the petitioners to file multiple suits against private Civil Code.15 Either of these liabilities may be respondents as the only recourse available to them enforced against the offender subject to the caveatis to pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the is also consistent with the bar against double plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the recovery for obvious reasons. same act or omission of the defendant and theNow the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners similar proscription against double recovery under should have appealed the order of dismissal of the the Rules above-quoted. trial court instead of filing a petition for certiorari At the time of the filing of the complaint for with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi misstep, however, should be exempted from the delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless,strict application of the rules in order to promote petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue their fundamental objective of securing substantial opened for them by their reservation, i.e., thejustice.20 We are loathe to deprive petitioners of surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is sothe indemnity to which they are entitled by law because the prescription of the action ex quasi and by a final judgment of conviction based solely delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an enforce the civil liability arising from crime injustice.21 especially as the latter action had been expresslyWHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reserved. SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of

The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company16Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, was decided upon a similar set of facts. Therein, 2002, respectively dismissing the present action the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company wasand denying petitioners motion for charged with reckless imprudence resulting to reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower damage to property. The plaintiff made an expresscourt dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. reservation for the filing of a separate civil action. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for The driver was convicted which conviction was further proceedings. affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff filed aSO ORDERED. separate civil action for damages based on quasi delict which was ordered dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was instituted G.R. No. 155223 April 4, 2007 more than six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had already prescribed.BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, represented by her Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another action,Attorney-in-fact, MARIE F. FUJITA, Petitioner, this time based on the subsidiary liability of the vs. bus company. The trial court dismissed the action FLORA SAN DIEGO-SISON, Respondent. holding that the dismissal of the earlier civil case DECISION operated as a bar to the filing of the action to AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: enforce the bus companys subsidiary liability. We held that the dismissal of the action based on Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement ofby Bobie Rose V. Frias represented by her AttorneyF. Fujita (petitioner) seeking to the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there in-fact, Marie Regine 1 is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the annul the 2Decision dated June 18, 2002 and the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if theResolution dated September 11, 2002 of the Court commission of the crime was in the discharge of of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52839. the duties of the employees. This is so because Petitioner is the owner of a house and lot located Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates at No. 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang, with controlling force to obviate the possibility of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, which she acquired from the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnityIsland Masters Realty and Development even after the rendition of a final judgment Corporation (IMRDC) by virtue of a Deed of Sale convicting the employee. dated Nov. 16, 1990.3 The property is covered by Seen in this light, the trial court should not have TCT No. 168173 of the4 Register of Deeds of Makati dismissed the complaint on the ground ofin the name of IMRDC. prescription, but instead allowed the complaint forOn December 7, 1990, petitioner, as the FIRST damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on thePARTY, and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison merits, considering petitioners allegations in their (respondent), as the SECOND PARTY, entered into a complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss 17Memorandum of Agreement5 over the property and motion for reconsideration18 of the order ofwith the following terms: dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the civil liability arising from crime. sum of THREE MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00) This does not offend the policy that the reservation receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the or institution of a separate civil action waives theFIRST PARTY from the SECOND PARTY, the parties other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is have agreed as follows: the avoidance of multiple suits between the same 1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period of Six litigants arising out of the same act or omission of (6) months from the date of the execution of

64

this contract within which to notify the FIRST1991, executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a PARTY of her intention to purchase the petition12 for the issuance of a new owners aforementioned parcel of land together withinduplicate copy of said title with the RTC of Makati, (sic) the improvements thereon at the price ofBranch 142; that the petition was granted in an SIX MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSANDOrder13 dated August 31, 1991; that said Order was PESOS (P6,400,000.00). Upon notice to thesubsequently set aside in an Order dated April 10, FIRST PARTY of the SECOND PARTYs intention199214 where the RTC Makati granted respondents to purchase the same, the latter has a period of petition for relief from judgment due to the fact another six months within which to pay the that respondent is in possession of the owners remaining balance of P3.4 million. duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173, and ordered the 2. That prior to the six months period given to provincial public prosecutor to conduct an the SECOND PARTY within which to decide investigation of petitioner for perjury and false whether or not to purchase the above-testimony. Respondent prayed for the ex-parte mentioned property, the FIRST PARTY may stillissuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and offer the said property to other persons who payment of two million pesos with interest at 36% may be interested to buy the same provided per annum from December 7, 1991, P100,000.00 that the amount of P3,000,000.00 given to themoral, corrective and exemplary damages and FIRST PARTY BY THE SECOND PARTY shall be P200,000.00 for attorneys fees.

paid to the latter including interest based on In an Order dated April 6, 1993, the Executive prevailing compounded bank interest plus theJudge of the RTC of Manila issued a writ of amount of the sale in excess of P7,000,000.00preliminary attachment upon the filing of a bond in should the property be sold at a price morethe amount of two million pesos.15 than P7 million. Petitioner filed an Amended Answer 16 alleging that 3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other the Memorandum of Agreement was conceived buyer within the first six months from theand arranged by her lawyer, Atty. Carmelita execution of this contract, no interest shall be Lozada, who is also respondents lawyer; that she charged by the SECOND PARTY on the P3 was asked to sign the agreement without being million however, in the event that on the sixth given the chance to read the same; that the title to month the SECOND PARTY would decide not to the property and the Deed of Sale between her and purchase the aforementioned property, thethe IMRDC were entrusted to Atty. Lozada for FIRST PARTY has a period of another six months safekeeping and were never turned over to within which to pay the sum of P3 million pesosrespondent as there was no consummated sale provided that the said amount shall earnyet; that out of the two million pesos cash paid, compounded bank interest for the last six Atty. Lozada took the one million pesos which has months only. Under this circumstance, the not been returned, thus petitioner had filed a civil amount of P3 million given by the SECOND case against her; that she was never informed of PARTY shall be treated as [a] loan and the respondents decision not to purchase the property property shall be considered as the security forwithin the six month period fixed in the agreement; the mortgage which can be enforced inthat when she demanded the return of TCT No. accordance with law. 168173 and the Deed of Sale between her and the IMRDC from Atty. Lozada, the latter gave her these 6 x x x x. documents in a brown envelope on May 5, 1991 Petitioner received from respondent two million which her secretary placed in her attache case; pesos in cash and one million pesos in a post-dated that the envelope together with her other personal check dated February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, things were lost when her car was forcibly opened which rendered said check stale. 7 Petitioner thenthe following day; that she sought the help of Atty. gave respondent TCT No. 168173 in the name ofLozada who advised her to secure a police report, IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over theto execute an affidavit of loss and to get the property between petitioner and IMRDC. services of another lawyer to file a petition for the Respondent decided not to purchase the propertyissuance of an owners duplicate copy; that the and notified petitioner through a letter8 datedpetition for the issuance of a new owners March 20, 1991, which petitioner received only on duplicate copy was filed on her behalf without her June 11, 1991,9 reminding petitioner of theirknowledge and neither did she sign the petition agreement that the amount of two million pesos nor testify in court as falsely claimed for she was which petitioner received from respondent shouldabroad; that she was a victim of the manipulations be considered as a loan payable within six months. of Atty. Lozada and respondent as shown by the Petitioner subsequently failed to pay respondent filing of criminal charges for perjury and false testimony against her; that no interest could be the amount of two million pesos. due as there was no valid mortgage over the On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the property as the principal obligation is vitiated with Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a complaint 10fraud and deception. She prayed for the dismissal for sum of money with preliminary attachmentof the complaint, counter-claim for damages and against petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil attorneys fees. Case No. 93-65367 and raffled to Branch 30. On January 31, 1996, Respondent alleged the foregoing facts and in Trial on the merits ensued. 17 the RTC issued a decision, the dispositive portion addition thereto averred that petitioner tried to deprive her of the security for the loan by making aof which reads: false report11 of the loss of her owners copy of TCT WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby RENDERED: No. 168173 to the Tagig Police Station on June 3,

65

2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum charged for six months only and no more; that a of P70,000.00 representing premiums paid byloan always bears interest otherwise it is not a plaintiff on the attachment bond with legal loan; that interest should commence on June 7, interest thereon counted from the date of this199120 with compounded bank interest prevailing decision until fully paid. at the time the two million was considered as a 3) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum loan which was in June 1991; that the bank interest of P100,000.00 by way of moral, corrective andrate for loans secured by a real estate mortgage in 1991 ranged from 25% to 32% per annum as exemplary damages. certified to by Prudential Bank, 21 that in fairness to 4) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff petitioner, the rate to be charged should be 25% attorneys fees of P100,000.00 plus cost ofonly. litigation.18 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied The RTC found that petitioner was under obligation by the CA in a Resolution dated September 11, to pay respondent the amount of two million pesos 2002. with compounded interest pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement; that the fraudulentHence the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari scheme employed by petitioner to deprivefiled by petitioner raising the following issues: respondent of her only security to her loaned (A) WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPOUNDED money when petitioner executed an affidavit of BANK INTEREST SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SIX (6) loss and instituted a petition for the issuance of an MONTHS AS CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM owners duplicate title knowing the same was in OF AGREEMENT. respondents possession, entitled respondent to (B) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS moral damages; and that petitioners bare denial ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES. cannot be accorded credence because her (C) WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF testimony and that of her witness did not appear to CORRECTIVE AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND be credible. ATTORNEYS FEES IS PROPER EVEN IF NOT The RTC further found that petitioner admitted that MENTIONED IN THE TEXT OF THE DECISION.22 she received from respondent the two million pesos in cash but the fact that petitioner gave the Petitioner contends that the interest, whether at one million pesos to Atty. Lozada was without 32% per annum awarded by the trial court or at respondents knowledge thus it is not binding on 25% per annum as modified by the CA which respondent; that respondent had also proven thatshould run from June 7, 1991 until fully paid, is in 1993, she initially paid the sum of P30,000.00 ascontrary to the parties Memorandum of premium for the issuance of the attachment bond, Agreement; that the agreement provides that if P20,000.00 for its renewal in 1994, and P20,000.00respondent would decide not to purchase the for the renewal in 1995, thus plaintiff should beproperty, petitioner has the period of another six reimbursed considering that she was compelled to months to pay the loan with compounded bank go to court and ask for a writ of preliminary interest for the last six months only; that the CAs attachment to protect her rights under the ruling that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan is contrary to Art. 1956 of the New agreement. Civil Code which provides that no interest shall be Petitioner filed her appeal with the CA. In adue unless it has been expressly stipulated in Decision dated June 18, 2002, the CA affirmed the writing. RTC decision with modification, the dispositive We are not persuaded. portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision While the CAs conclusion, that a loan always bears appealed from is MODIFIED in the sense that the interest otherwise it is not a loan, is flawed since a rate of interest is reduced from 32% to 25% per simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest,23 we find no error committed by the annum, effective June 7, 1991 until fully paid.19 CA in awarding a 25% interest per annum on the The CA found that: petitioner gave the one milliontwo-million peso loan even beyond the second six pesos to Atty. Lozada partly as her commission and months stipulated period. partly as a loan; respondent did not replace the mistakenly dated check of one million pesos The Memorandum of Agreement executed between because she had decided not to buy the propertythe petitioner and respondent on December 7, and petitioner knew of her decision as early as 1990 is the law between the parties. In resolving April 1991; the award of moral damages was an issue based upon a contract, we must first warranted since even granting petitioner had noexamine the contract itself, especially the hand in the filing of the petition for the issuance of provisions thereof which are relevant to the 24 an owners copy, she executed an affidavit of loss controversy. The general rule is that if the terms of TCT No. 168173 when she knew all along that of an agreement are clear and leave no doubt as to said title was in respondents possession;the intention of the contracting parties, the literal 25 It is petitioners claim that she thought the title was meaning of its stipulations shall prevail. lost when the brown envelope given to her by Atty. further required that the various stipulations of a Lozada was stolen from her car was hollow; that contract shall be interpreted together, attributing

1) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum such deceitful conduct caused respondent serious of P2 Million plus interest thereon at the rate ofanxiety and emotional distress. thirty two (32%) per cent per annum beginning The CA concluded that there was no basis for December 7, 1991 until fully paid. petitioner to say that the interest should be

66

to the doubtful ones that sense which may resultawarded on the erroneous finding that she used a from all of them taken jointly.26 fraudulent scheme to deprive respondent of her In this case, the phrase "for the last six months security for the loan; that such finding is baseless only" should be taken in the context of the entire since petitioner was acquitted in the case for agreement. We agree with and adopt the CAsperjury and false testimony filed by respondent against her. interpretation of the phrase in this wise:

Their agreement speaks of two (2) periods of sixWe are not persuaded. months each. The first six-month period was given Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the to plaintiff-appellee (respondent) to make up hercivil action is based on an obligation not arising mind whether or not to purchase defendant- from the act or omission complained of as a felony, appellants (petitioner's) property. The second six- such civil action may proceed independently of the month period was given to defendant-appellant tocriminal proceedings and regardless of the result of pay the P2 million loan in the event that plaintiff- the latter.32 appellee decided not to buy the subject property in While petitioner was acquitted in the false which case interest will be charged "for the last six testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent months only", referring to the second six-monthagainst her, those actions are entirely distinct from period. This means that no interest will be charged the collection of sum of money with damages filed for the first six-month period while appellee was by respondent against petitioner. making up her mind whether to buy the property, but only for the second period of six months afterWe agree with the findings of the trial court and appellee had decided not to buy the property. This the CA that petitioners act of trying to deprive is the meaning of the phrase "for the last six respondent of the security of her loan by executing months only". Certainly, there is nothing in their an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a agreement that suggests that interest will be petition for the issuance of a new owners charged for six months only even if it takes duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles defendant-appellant an eternity to pay the loan.27 respondent to moral damages.1a\^/phi1.net Moral damages may be awarded in culpa contractual or The agreement that the amount given shall bearbreach of contract cases when the defendant acted compounded bank interest for the last six months fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not only, i.e., referring to the second six-month period,simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it does not mean that interest will no longer be imports a dishonest purpose or some moral charged after the second six-month period sinceobliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes such stipulation was made on the logical and of the nature of fraud.33 reasonable expectation that such amount would be paid within the date stipulated. Considering that The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in petitioner failed to pay the amount given which the event that respondent opts not to buy the under the Memorandum of Agreement shall be property, the money given by respondent to considered as a loan, the monetary interest for the petitioner shall be treated as a loan and the last six months continued to accrue until actual property shall be considered as the security for the mortgage. It was testified to by respondent that payment of the loaned amount. after they executed the agreement on December The payment of regular interest constitutes the 7, 1990, petitioner gave her the owners copy of price or cost of the use of money and thus, untilthe title to the property, the Deed of Sale between the principal sum due is returned to the creditor, petitioner and IMRDC, the certificate of occupancy, regular interest continues to accrue since the and the certificate of the Secretary of the IMRDC debtor continues to use such principal amount. 28 Itwho signed the Deed of Sale.34 However, has been held that for a debtor to continue in notwithstanding that all those documents were in possession of the principal of the loan and to respondents possession, petitioner executed an continue to use the same after maturity of the loan affidavit of loss that the owners copy of the title without payment of the monetary interest, would and the Deed of Sale were lost. constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the Although petitioner testified that her execution of debtor at the expense of the creditor.29 the affidavit of loss was due to the fact that she Petitioner and respondent stipulated that the was of the belief that since she had demanded loaned amount shall earn compounded bank from Atty. Lozada the return of the title, she interests, and per the certification issued by thought that the brown envelope with markings Prudential Bank, the interest rate for loans in 1991 which Atty. Lozada gave her on May 5, 1991 ranged from 25% to 32% per annum. The CAalready contained the title and the Deed of Sale as reduced the interest rate to 25% instead of the those documents were in the same brown 32% awarded by the trial court which petitioner no envelope which she gave to Atty. Lozada prior to longer assailed.1awphi1.nt the transaction with respondent.35 Such statement 30 In Bautista v. Pilar Development Corp ., we upheldremained a bare statement. It was not proven at all the validity of a 21% per annum interest on a since Atty. Lozada had not taken the stand to P142,326.43 loan. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,31corroborate her claim. In fact, even petitioners we sustained the agreement of the parties to a own witness, Benilda Ynfante (Ynfante), was not 24% per annum interest on an P8,649,250.00 loan.able to establish petitioner's claim that the title Thus, the interest rate of 25% per annum awarded was returned by Atty. Lozada in view of Ynfante's by the CA to a P2 million loan is fair and testimony that after the brown envelope was given reasonable. to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her and she 36 Petitioner next claims that moral damages were placed it in petitioners attach case and did not

67

bother to look at the envelope.37

vs. It is clear therefrom that petitioners execution of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES the affidavit of loss became the basis of the filing VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL LUGATIMAN, and of the petition with the RTC for the issuance of new GERTRUDES GONZALES, respondents.

owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173. Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioners. Petitioners actuation would have deprivedEmmanuel O. Tansingco for private respondents. respondent of the security for her loan were it not for respondents timely filing of a petition for relief PUNO, J.: whereby the RTC set aside its previous orderThe constitutional protection of our people against granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award unreasonable search and seizure is not merely a of moral damages is in order. pleasing platitude. It vouchsafes our right to The entitlement to moral damages having beenprivacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions established, the award of exemplary damages is committed by any public officer or private proper.38 Exemplary damages may be imposedindividual. An infringement of this right justifies an upon petitioner by way of example or correction for award for damages. the public good.39 The RTC awarded the amount of On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the While the award of moral and exemplary damages Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and in an aggregate amount may not be the usual waydistribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, of awarding said damages,40 no error has beenbadges, and insignias. In their Memorandum committed by CA. There is no question that Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken damages. the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of 1 Petitioner argues that the CA erred in awarding scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." attorneys fees because the trial courts decision Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation did not explain the findings of facts and law to received information that private respondents justify the award of attorneys fees as the sameAgnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes was mentioned only in the dispositive portion of Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and the RTC decision. paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, We agree. was tasked to undertake the necessary 41 Article 2208 of the New Civil Code enumeratessurveillance and to make a report to the Philippine the instances where such may be awarded and, in Constabulary (PC). all cases, it must be reasonable, just and equitable if the same were to be granted.42 Attorney's fees asOn October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., part of damages are not meant to enrich the petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peafiel, winning party at the expense of the losing litigant.and two (2) other constabulary men of the They are not awarded every time a party prevails Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, in a suit because of the policy that no premiumQuezon City went to the stores of respondents at should be placed on the right to litigate. 43 Thethe Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant, award of attorney's fees is the exception rather they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, than the general rule. As such, it is necessary for and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The the trial court to make findings of facts and lawseizure caused a commotion and embarrassed that would bring the case within the exception andprivate respondents. Receipts were issued for the justify the grant of such award. The matter ofseized items. The items were then turned over by attorney's fees cannot be mentioned only in theCaptain Peafiel to petitioner corporation for dispositive portion of the decision. 44 They must besafekeeping. clearly explained and justified by the trial court inA criminal complaint for unfair competition was the body of its decision. On appeal, the CA is then filed against private respondents. 2 During its precluded from supplementing the bases forpendency, petitioner de Guzman exacted from awarding attorneys fees when the trial court failed private respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE to discuss in its Decision the reasons for awarding THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,100.00) in the same. Consequently, the award of attorney'sorder to be dropped from the complaint. On fees should be deleted. December 6, 1983, after a preliminary WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal Decision dated June 18, 2002 and the Resolution dismissed the complaint against all the private dated September 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals respondents. On February 6, 1984, he also ordered in CA-G.R. CV No. 52839 are AFFIRMED withthe return of the seized items. The seized items 3 MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys feeswere not immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents had to go personally to is DELETED. petitioners' place of business to recover their No pronouncement as to costs. goods. Even then, not all the seized items were SO ORDERED. returned. The other items returned were of inferior quality. G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994 MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money and damages. 4 In its Decision dated January 9, 1987, the trial court ruled for the private respondents,

68

thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants, ordering the latter jointly and severally: 1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman with interest at 12% per annum from January 12, 1984, the date of the last receipt issued, until fully paid;

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT THE MANNER WITH WHICH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WAS TORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF CONFISCATION. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.

2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the 26 pieces of girl scout items not returned; We affirm.

3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects P50,000.00 for and as moral damages andour people from unreasonable search and seizure. P15,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; It provides: and The right of the people to be secure in their 4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Costs against the defendants. SO ORDERED. The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18, 1989, its Fifth Division, 5 affirmed the Decision with modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION; and, as modified, the dispositive portion thereof This provision protects not only those who appear now reads as follows: to be innocent but also those who appear to be Judgment is hereby rendered in favor ofguilty but are nevertheless to be presumed plaintiffs (private respondents) and againstinnocent until the contrary is proved. 6 In the case defendants (petitioners), ordering the latterat bench, the seizure was made without any jointly and severally; warrant. Under the Rules of Court, 7 a warrantless 1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to search can only be undertaken under the following plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol Lugatiman andcircumstance: cancel her application for distributor's Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. license; A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which 2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa may be used as proof of the commission of Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the an offense, without a search warrant. unreturned 26 pieces of girl scouts items with interest at 12% per annum from JuneWe hold that the evidence did not justify the 4, 1984 (date the complaint was filed) until warrantless search and seizure of private it is fully paid; respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation 3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) thereceived information that private respondents were amount of P10,000.00 each, or a total of illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia P30,000.00, for and as moral damages; andin October 1983. The specific date and time are P5,000.00 each, or a total of P15,000.00, for not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made a and as exemplary damages; and surveillance of the stores of private respondents. 4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and for and as attorney's fees and litigationon October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the expenses. stores of private respondents and the supposed Costs of the case a quo and the instant illicit goods were seized. The progression of time appeal are assessed jointly and severally between the receipt of the information and the raid against defendants-appellants (petitioners)of the stores of private respondents shows there MHP Garments, Inc. and Larry de Guzman. was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. SO ORDERED. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend: for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR suit for damages in case the seizure would be THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED INproved to violate the right of private respondents IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO THE against unreasonable search and seizure. In the PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE. illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

69

defined as "such facts and circumstances which in the performance of their duties. Precisely, would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man the object of the Article is to put an end to to believe that an offense has been committed and official abuse by plea of the good faith. In that the objects sought in connection with the the United States this remedy is in the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 8 nature of a tort. (emphasis supplied) These facts and circumstances were not in any way In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, 10 the shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless Court En Banc explained the liability of persons search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary indirectly responsible, viz: investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal [T]he decisive factor in this case, in our dismissed their complaint for unfair competition view, is the language of Article 32. The law and later ordered the return of the seized goods. speaks of an officer or employee or person Petitioners would deflect their liability with the "directly or indirectly" responsible for the argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary violation of the constitutional rights and that conducted the raid and their participation was liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor only to report the alleged illegal activity of private alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who respondents. must answer for damages under Article 32; While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding the person indirectly responsible has also to team should have been included in the complaint answer for the damages or injury caused to for violation of the private respondents' the aggrieved party. constitutional rights, still, the omission will not xxx xxx xxx exculpate petitioners. While it would certainly be too naive to In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9 we ruled for expect that violators of human rights would the recovery of damages for violation of easily be deterred by the prospect of facing constitutional rights and liberties from public damages suits, it should nonetheless be officer or private individual, thus: made clear in no uncertain terms that Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the any private individual, who directly or persons who are directly, as well as indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in indirectly, responsible for the transgression any manner impedes or impairs any of the joint tortfeasors. following rights and liberties of another xxx xxx xxx person shall be liable to the latter for [N]either can it be said that only those damages. shown to have participated "directly" should xxx xxx xxx be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code (9) The rights to be secure in one's person, encompasses within the ambit of its house, papers, and effects against provisions those directly, as well as unreasonable searches and seizures. indirectly, responsible for its violations . (emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx The indemnity shall include moral damages. Applying the aforecited provisions and leading Exemplary damages may also be adjudged. cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were Art. 2219. Moral damages may be indirectly involved in transgressing the right of recovered in the following and analogous private respondents against unreasonable search cases: and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum xxx xxx xxx Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of (6) Illegal search; all illegal sources of scouting supplies. 11 As (1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles correctly observed by respondent court: 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees' Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a (respondents') merchandise and of filing the person whose constitutional rights have criminal complaint for unfair competition been violated or impaired is entitled to against appellees (respondents) were for actual and moral damages from the public the protection and benefit of appellant officer or employee responsible therefor. In (petitioner) corporation. Such being the addition, exemplary damages may also be case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from awarded. those acts that it was upon appellant xxx xxx xxx (petitioner) corporation's instance that the The very nature of Article 32 is that the PC soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be should answer the trial court's query posed in its decision now under malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of consideration as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12 past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faithThe raid was conducted with the active

70

participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman my goods and capital because I am doing did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy business with borrowed money only, there and girl scouts items. By standing by and was commotion created by the raiding team apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the and they even stepped on some of the same extent as the officers themselves. 13 So with pants and dresses on display for sale. All the petitioner corporation which even received for passersby stopped to watch and stared at safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the me with accusing expressions. I was PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to trembling and terribly ashamed, sir. 18 surrender them for quite a time despite theRespondent Lugatiman testified: dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was very much ashamed because many people precisely crafted on March 9, 1983 to safeguard have been watching the PC soldiers hauling not only the privilege of franchise holder of my items, and many/I (sic) heard say scouting items but also the citizen's constitutional "nakaw pala ang mga iyan" for which I am rights, to wit: claiming P25,000.00 for damages. 19 TITLE: APPREHENSION OFWhile respondent Gonzalez stated thus: UNAUTHORIZED I do not like the way the raid was conducted MANUFACTURERS AND by the team sir because it looked like that DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT what I have been selling were stolen items PARAPHERNALIA AND that they should be confiscated by IMPOUNDING OF SAID uniformed soldiers. Many people were PARAPHERNALIA. around and the more the confiscation was ABSTRACT: made in a scandalous manner; every Directs all law enforcement agencies of the clothes, T-shirts, pants and dresses even Republic of the Philippines, to apprehend those not wrapped dropped to the ground. I immediately unauthorized manufacturers was terribly shamed in the presence of and distributors of Scout paraphernalia, market goers that morning. 20 upon proper application by the Boy Scouts Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or 21 It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and search warrant with a judge, or such other sundry that the constitutional protection against responsible officer as may be authorized by unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality law; and to impound the said paraphernaliaand not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all to be used as evidence in court or other encompassing protection extends against appropriate administrative body. Orders theintrusions directly done both by government and immediate and strict compliance with the indirectly by private entities. Instructions. 14 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987 on the peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of theTWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts Private respondents' rights are immutable anditems and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in cannot be sacrificed to transient needs. 15lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon Petitioners did not have the unbridled license tofinality of this Decision until the payment thereof. cause the seizure of respondents' goods without22 Costs against petitioners. any warrant. SO ORDERED. And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992 or any other relief, 16 in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner, vs. Again, they did not. MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, We have consistently ruled that moral damages SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to South Cotabato, respondents. compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. 17 Conformably with our ruling inMariano C. Alegarbes for petitioner. Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages canPublic Attorney's Office for private respondent. be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless CRUZ, J.: nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due This is still another dispute between brother and the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Privatesister over a piece of property they inherited from respondents' avowals of embarrassment andtheir parents. The case is complicated by the humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise circumstance that the private respondent's counsel were supported by their testimonies. Respondent in this petition is the son of the judge, the other Cruz declared: respondent, whose action is being questioned. I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private

71

respondent Martin Paras.*

was issued by his father. He thus impliedly rejects On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold the charge of bias against his father. to her his share in the intestate estate for P300.00. Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona The sale was evidenced by a private document.suggests there may have been a basis for the Nineteen years later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold order in view of the alleged double sale of the the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for property which was being litigated in the regional P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized trial court. He concedes, however, that the order Deed of Absolute Sale. may have been premature and that it could not When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-angdouble jeopardy would not attach because of the with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of lack of arraignment, he asks that his Comment be General Santos City. 1 On the same date, she filed considered a motion for the suspension of the a complaint for the nullification of the said sale criminal action on the ground of prejudicial with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. question.
2

The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutorthat the respondent judge did indeed commit instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio issuing Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan- the order of dismissal. Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. Procedure as amended by this Court on July 7, On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the 1988, provides as follows: accused, the trial judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that:

. . . after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant, Juliana P. Yap and of the respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic) that there is a prejudicial question to a civil action, which must be ventilated in the proper civil court. In the case of Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the Supreme Court had already made a pronouncement that "a Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to criminal action for Estafa for alleged double say the least, in light of the clear provision of the sale of property is a prejudicial question toabove-quoted rule. The rule is not even new, being a civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed only a rewording of the original provision in the of Sale and defense of the alleged vendorsRules of Court before they were amended. It plainly of forgeries of their signatures to the Deed." says that the suspension may be made only upon 3 petition and not at the instance of the judge alone, The Petitioner moved for reconsideration, whichand it also says suspension, and not dismissal. One was denied on April 30, 1990. She then came toalso wonders if the person who notarized the this Court for relief in this special civil action for disputed second sale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might be related to the respondent certiorari. judge. The Court could have referred this petition to the more important than the preceding Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdictionBut considerations is the trial judge's misapprehension under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view of the peculiar circumstancesof the concept of a prejudicial question. involved. Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal The petitioner's contention is that where there is a Procedure as amended provides:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

prejudicial question in a civil case, the criminal Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. action may not be dismissed but only suspended. The two (2) essential elements of a Moreover, this suspension may not be done motu prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action proprio by the judge trying the criminal case but involves an issue similar or intimately only upon petition of the defendant in accordance related to the issue raised in the criminal with the Rules of Court. It is also stressed that a action; and (b) the resolution of such issue reversal of the order of dismissal would not bar the determines whether or not the criminal prosecution of the accused under the double action may proceed. jeopardy rule because he has not yet beenA prejudicial question is defined as that which arraigned. arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical The Court notes that the counsel for privateantecedent of the issue involved therein, and the respondent Paras who filed the comment in hiscongnizance of which pertains to another tribunal. behalf is the son and namesake of Judge The prejudicial question must be determinative of Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. isthe case before the court but the jurisdiction to try employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He hasand resolve the question must be lodged in made it of record that he was not the counsel of another court or tribunal. 4 It is a question based Paras at the time the questioned order of dismissal on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but

72

so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 5 We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused". 6

It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action. In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that the defense in The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his the civil case forgery of his signature in the first Order does not appear anywhere in the decision of deed of sale had to be threshed out first. Ras v. Rasul. 7 Worse, he has not only misquotedResolution of that question would necessarily the decision but also wrongly applied it. The facts resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused in the of that case are not analogous to those in the case criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for at bar. suspension in the case at bar; and no less In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of importantly, the respondent judge had not been land which he later also sold to Martin. Pichelinformed of the defense Paras was raising in the brought a civil action for nullification of the second civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have sale and asked that the sale made by Ras in hisascertained then if the issue raised in the civil favor be declared valid. Ras's defense was that he action would determine the guilt or innocence of never sold the property to Pichel and his purported the accused in the criminal case. signatures appearing in the first deed of sale were It is worth remarking that not every defense raised forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was filed in the civil action will raise a prejudicial question to against Ras based on the same double sale thatjustify suspension of the criminal action. The was the subject of the civil action. Ras filed a defense must involve an issue similar or intimately "Motion for Suspension of Action" (that is, the related to the same issue raised in the criminal criminal case), claiming that the resolution of the action and its resolution should determine whether issues in the civil case would necessarily be or not the latter action may proceed. determinative of his guilt or innocence. The order dismissing the criminal action without a Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee,motion for suspension in accordance with Rule 111, this Court ruled that a suspension of the criminal Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure action was in order because: as amended, and even without the accused On the basis of the issues raised in both the indicating his defense in the civil case for the criminal and civil cases against petitionerannulment of the second sale, suggests not only and in the light of the foregoing concepts of ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of a prejudicial question, there indeed appearsthe respondent judge. to be a prejudicial question in the case atJudge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded bar, considering that petitioner Alejandrothat under the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a judge Ras' defense (as defendant) in Civil Caseshall be faithful to the law and maintain No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the professional competence" and "should administer alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case andhis questionable conduct in the case at bar, with complaining witnesses in the criminal case)the warning that commission of similar acts in the is based on the very same facts whichfuture will be dealt with more severely. would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence asWHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order accused in the criminal case. If the firstissued by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. dated alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void orApril 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902fictitious, then there would be no doubleG, and the Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the sale and petitioner would be innocent of the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET offense charged. A conviction in theASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed REINSTATED for further proceedings, but to be ahead) would be a gross injustice and wouldassigned to a different judge. have to be set aside if it were finallySO ORDERED. decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious. xxx xxx xxx The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 73 that he had never sold the property in

litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in the alleged deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary that the truth or falsity of such claim be first determined because if his claim is true, then he did not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed. The question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate from the crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the criminal action.

73

G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995 REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Mayor of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, HERMINIGILDO FABURADA, (former ViceMayor), SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA, Incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR R. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA MAXIMINO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES, and FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF JIMALALUD, NEGROS ORIENTAL, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD DIVISION), BARTOLOME BINAOHAN and DELIA ESTRELLANES, respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 17 February 1992 and its orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment. The present controversy arose from the following antecedents: On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government. Private respondents Binaohan and Estrellanes took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 February 1989, respectively.

REYNALDO V. TUANDA, HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, committed as follows: That during the period from February 1989 to February 1991 and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused, all public officers, Mayor REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Vice-Mayor HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, Sangguniang Members MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA while in the performance of their official functions and taking advantage of their public positions, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and conspiring and confederating with each other did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully cause undue injury to Sectoral Members Bartolome M. Binaohan and Delia T. Estrellanes by refusing to pay despite demand the amount of NINETY FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P95,350.00) and ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS (P108,900.00) representing respectively their per diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits, and such undue injury continuing to the present to the prejudice and damage of Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes.

Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. The latter, however, in a letter dated 20 March 1989, denied the petition CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives. On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 on the Negros Oriental, Branch 35, docketed as Special ground that a prejudicial question exists in Civil Civil Action No. 9661, for recognition as members Case No. 9955 pending before the Regional Trial 2 of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed on 23 Court of Dumaguete City. July 1991. On 16 January 1992, the Regional Trial Court Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an rendered a decision declaring null and void ab action with the Regional Trial Court of Dumagueteinitio the designations issued by the Department of City to declare null and void the designations of Local Government to the private respondents as private respondents as sectoral representatives,sectoral representatives for having been done in docketed as Civil Case No. 9955 entitled "Reynaldo violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, 3 Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary of the Department otherwise known as the Local Government Code. of Local Government, et al." The trial court expounded thus: On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." charging petitioners thus: INFORMATION The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses

The Supreme Court in the case of Johnny D. Supangan Jr. v. Luis T. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 84663, along with 7 companion cases of similar import, (G.R. Nos. 05012, 87601, 87602, 87792, 87935, 88072, and 90205) all promulgated on August 24, 1990, ruled that: B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that

74

before the President (or the Romeo F. Bularan and Rafael Cortez Secretary of the Department of Local are null and void (Romeo Llanado, et Government) may appoint members al. v. Hon. Luis Santos, et al., G.R. of the local legislative bodies to No. 86394, August 24, 1990). 4 represent the Industrial andPrivate respondents appealed the aforestated Agricultural Labor Sectors, theredecision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAmust be a determination to be madeG.R. CV No. 36769, where the same is currently by the Sanggunian itself that the pending resolution. said sectors are of sufficient number in the city or municipality to warrantMeanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent representation after consultationSandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the with associations and personsmotion for suspension of proceedings filed by belonging to the sector concerned. petitioners. Said respondent Sandiganbayan: The Supreme Court further ruled For that matter, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code even prescribe the time and manner by which such determination is to be conducted by the Sanggunian. Consequently, in cases where the Sanggunian concerned has not yet determined that the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors in their particular city or municipality are of sufficient number to warrant representation, there will absolutely be no basis for the designation/appointments. In the process of such inquiry as to the sufficiency in number of the sector concerned to warrant representation, the Sanggunian is enjoined by law (B.P. Blg. 337) to consult with associations and persons belonging to the sector concerned. Consultation with the sector concerned is made a pre-requisite. This is so considering that those who belong to the said sector are the ones primarily interested in being represented in the Sanggunian. In the same aforecited case, the Supreme Court considers such prior determination by the Sanggunian itself (not by any other person or body) as a condition sine qua non to a valid appointment or designation. Since in the present case, there was total absence of the required prior determination by the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, this Court cannot help but declare the designations of private defendants as sectoral representatives null and void. Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 9955 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, it appears, nevertheless, that the private complainants have been rendering services on the basis of their respective appointments as sectoral members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental; and that their said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity. Having rendered such services, the private complainants are entitled to the salaries attached to their office. Even assuming arguendo that the said Regional Trial Court shall later decide that the said appointments of the private complainants are null and void, still the private complainants are entitled to their salaries and compensation for service they have actually rendered, for the reason that before such judicial declaration of nullity, the private complainants are considered at least de facto public officers acting as such on the basis of apparently valid appointments issued by competent authorities. In other words, regardless of the decision that may be rendered in Civil Case No. 9955, the private complainants are entitled to their withheld salaries for the services they have actually rendered as sectoral representatives of the said Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, the decision that may be rendered by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 9955 would not be determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused. WHEREFORE, the subject Petition for the Suspension of Proceedings in Virtue of Prejudicial Question filed by the accused through counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

This verdict is not without precedence. In SO ORDERED. 5 several similar cases, the Supreme Court invariably nullified the designations where Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the the requirements of Sec. 146 (2), B.P. Blg.aforementioned resolution in view of the decision 337 were not complied with. Just to cite one promulgated by the trial court nullifying the case, the Supreme Court ruled: appointments of private respondents but it was, There is no certification from thelikewise, denied in an order issued by respondent Sangguniang Bayan of ValenzuelaSandiganbayan on 19 August 1992 on the that the sectors concerned are ofjustification that the grounds stated in the said sufficient number to warrantmotion were a mere rehash of petitioners' original 6 The representation and there was nomotion to hold the case in abeyance. dispositive portion of its order reads as follows: consultation whatsoever with the associations and persons belonging to the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors. Therefore, the appointment of private respondents WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the arraignment of the accused which was scheduled today is cancelled. Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda, Hermenegildo Faburada,

75

Nicanor P. Agosto, Erenieta K. Mendoza,whether or not the legality or validity of private Hacubina V. Serillo and Iluminadorespondents' designation as sectoral Estrellanes are, however, hereby ordered torepresentatives which is pending resolution in CAshow cause in writing within ten (10) days G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial question justifying from service hereof why they should not besuspension of the proceedings in the criminal case cited for contempt of court for their failure against petitioners. to appear in court today for arraignment. A prejudicial question is one that must be decided In case of an adverse resolution on thebefore any criminal prosecution may be instituted motion to quash which is to be filed by the or before it may proceed (see Art. 36, Civil Code) counsel for the defense, set this case for because a decision on that point is vital to the arraignment, pre-trial and trial on January 4 eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the & 5, 1993, on all dates the trial to start at resolution of the prejudicial question is a logical 8:30 o'clock in the morning. antecedent of the issues involved in said criminal case. 11 7 SO ORDERED.

On 19 February 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan A prejudicial question is defined as that which issued an order holding consideration of all arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical incidents pending the issuance of an extended antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. resolution. 8 The prejudicial question must be determinative of No such resolution, however, was issued and in its the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try assailed order dated 13 May 1992, respondent and resolve the question must be lodged in Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of petitioners another court or tribunal. 12 It is a question based on 30 June 1993. The dispositive portion of the on a fact distinct and separate from "the crime but order reads: so intimately connected with it that it determines WHEREFORE, considering the absence ofthe guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to the accused from the scheduled hearingsuspend the criminal action, it must appear not today which We deem to be excusable, only that said case involves facts intimately related reset this case for arraignment on June 30, to those upon which the criminal prosecution 1993 and for trial on the merits on June 30 would be based but also that in the resolution of and July 1 and 2, 1993, on all dates the trial the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. determined. It comes into play generally in a Give proper notice to the accused and situation where a civil action and a criminal action principal counsel, Atty. Alfonso Briones.are both pending and there exists in the former an Considering that the accused come all theissue which must be preemptively resolved before way from Himalalud, Negros Oriental, nothe criminal action may proceed, because postponement will be allowed. howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of SO ORDERED. 9 the guilt or innocence of the accused in the Hence, this special civil action for certiorari andcriminal case." 13 prohibition where petitioners attribute to The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors: question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It A. The Respondent Court committed grave has two essential elements: abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' (a) the civil action involves an issue similar motions for the suspension of the or intimately related to the issue raised in proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 in the criminal action; and spite of the pendency of a prejudicial issue before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV (b) the resolution of such issue determines No. 36769; whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15 B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend Applying the foregoing principles to the case at the proceedings that would entail a retrial bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CAand rehearing by it of the basic issue G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial involved, i.e., the validity of thequestion to warrant suspension of the arraignment appointments of private respondents andand further proceedings in the criminal case their entitlement to compensation which isagainst petitioners. already pending resolution by the Court of All the elements of a prejudicial question are Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 36769; and clearly and unmistakably present in this case. C. The Respondent Court committed graveThere is no doubt that the facts and issues abuse of discretion and/or acted without or involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the in excess of jurisdiction in effectively criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The allowing petitioners to be prosecuted underfiling of the criminal case was premised on two alternative theories that private petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith respondents are de jure and/or de facto in not paying private respondents' salaries and per officers in violation of petitioners' right to diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil due process. 10 action was instituted precisely to resolve whether In sum, the only issue in the case at bench is or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance

76

with law.

the arraignment and trial of petitioners in Criminal More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil caseCase No. 16936 pending final resolution of CA-G.R. will certainly determine if there will still be any CV No. 36769. reason to proceed with the criminal action. SO ORDERED. Petitioners were criminally charged under the AntiGraft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, 3[e]) due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000 manifest partiality, to pay private respondents'IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, salaries as sectoral representatives. This refusal, vs. however, was anchored on petitioners' assertion ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent. that said designations were made in violation of YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void. Therefore, should theOn October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without declaring null and void private respondents'said marriage having been annulled, nullified or designations as sectoral representatives for failureterminated, the same respondent contracted a to comply with the provisions of the Local second marriage with petitioner Imelda MarbellaGovernment Code (B.P. Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third charges against petitioners would no longer, so to marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. speak, have a leg to stand on. Petitioners cannotBased on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an be accused of bad faith and partiality there being information for bigamy was filed against in the first place no obligation on their part to pay respondent on February 25, 1998, which was private respondents' claims. Private respondentsdocketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the do not have any legal right to demand salaries, per Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. diems and other benefits. In other words, the Court Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil of Appeals' resolution of the issues raised in the action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity civil action will ultimately determine whether or not of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent there is basis to proceed with the criminal case. then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in Private respondents insist that even if their the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending designations are nullified, they are entitled to civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a compensation for actual services rendered. 16 We prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal out by the records, from the start, private case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. 1 respondents' designations as sectoral Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but representatives have been challenged by the same was denied. petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. received by private respondents on 26 February Petitioner argues that respondent should have first 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first oath of office. 17 Hence, private respondents' claimmarriage before entering into the second marriage, that they have actually rendered services as inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question sectoral representatives has not been established. justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Family Code.2 Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private respondents' designations are finallyThe issue to be resolved in this petition is whether declared invalid, they may still be considered de the subsequent filing of a civil action for facto public officers entitled to compensation for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case services actually rendered. for bigamy. The conditions and elements of de facto officership A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case are the following: the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of 1) There must be a de jure office; the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on 2) There must be color of right or generala fact distinct and separate from the crime but so acquiescence by the public; and intimately connected with it that it determines the 4 3) There must be actual physical possession guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon of the office in good faith. 18 which the criminal action is based, but also that One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all thethe resolution of the issues raised in the civil action aforestated elements are present. There can be no would necessarily be determinative of the criminal de facto officer where there is no de jure office,case.5 Consequently, the defense must involve an although there may be a de facto officer in a de issue similar or intimately related to the same jure office. 19 issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution WHEREFORE, the resolution dated 17 Februarydeterminative6 of whether or not the latter action 7 1992 and orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May may proceed. Its two essential elements are: 1993 of respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or Case No. 16936 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent intimately related to the issue raised in the Sandiganbayan is enjoined from proceeding with criminal action; and

77

(b) the resolution of such issue determines marriage, they had already attained the age of whether or not the criminal action may majority and had been living together as husband proceed. and wife for at least five years.11 The issue in this A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolvecase is limited to the existence of a prejudicial the guilt or innocence of the accused but simplyquestion, and we are not called upon to resolve the tests the sufficiency of the allegations in thevalidity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, information in order to sustain the furthersuffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which prosecution of the criminal case. A party who the first marriage was celebrated, provides that raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have "every intendment of law or fact leans toward the the indissolubility of the hypothetically admitted that all the essentialvalidity of marriage, 12 marriage bonds." [] Hence, parties should not be elements of a crime have been adequately alleged permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of in the information, considering that the prosecution their marriage, for the same must be submitted to has not yet presented a single evidence on the the determination of competent courts. Only when indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be challenge of the allegations in the information on held as void, and so long as there is no such the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a declaration the presumption is that the marriage question on the merits of the criminal charge exists.13 No matter how obvious, manifest or patent through a non-criminal suit. the absence of an element is, the intervention of Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective the courts must always be resorted to. That is why at the time of celebration of the second marriage, Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, previous marriage before a party may remarry. The as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14 he who contracts a clear implication of this is that it is not for the second marriage before the judicial declaration of parties, particularly the accused, to determine the nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of validity or invalidity of the marriage. 8 Whether orbeing prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case not the first marriage was void for lack of a license the criminal case may not be suspended on the is a matter of defense because there is still no ground of the pendency of a civil case for judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the declaration of nullity. In a recent case for second marriage was contracted. It should beconcubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil remembered that bigamy can successfully be case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prosecuted provided all its elements concur two prejudicial question.15 This ruling applies here by of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent analogy since both crimes presuppose the marriage which would have been valid had it not subsistence of a marriage. been for the existence at the material time of the Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the first marriage.9 Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to as an excuse.16 The contracting of a marriage obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first knowing that the requirements of the law have not marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same been complied with or that the marriage is in judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all by the Revised Penal Code.17 The legality of a that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to marriage is a matter of law and every person is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract apresumed to know the law. As respondent did not subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he by simply claiming that the first marriage is void entered into the second marriage, why should he and that the subsequent marriage is equally void be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of declaration in order to delay his criminal the first. A party may even enter into a marriage prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the marriage license - and thereafter contract a nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a subsequent marriage without obtaining amatter of defense when he presents his evidence declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption during the trial proper in the criminal case. that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:10 contracted rests upon the defense,18 but that is a (P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy to judge for themselves its nullity, only case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that competent courts having such authority. Prior not every defense raised in the civil action may be to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the used as a prejudicial question to obtain the first marriage is beyond question. A party who suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, contracts a second marriage then assumes thetherefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two case before us was void for lack of a marriage marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy her marriage to respondent was exempt from thethat he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of requirement of a marriage license. Morenullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, specifically, petitioner claims that prior to theirtherefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question

78

for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his marriage and four children, 2 petitioner filed a criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of this cannot be done.1awphi1 psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code,Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial case was docketed as respondent, without first having obtained theCourt of Quezon City. The 3 Civil Case No. Q-97-30192. judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage,

can not be said to have validly entered into theIn her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who marriage though void still needs a judicial abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a declaration of such fact before any party can marry certain woman named Milagros Salting. 4 again; otherwise the second marriage will also be Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint void.19 The reason is that, without a judicial for concubinage5 under Article 334 of the Revised declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found regarded as a married man at the time he probable cause and ordered the filing of an contracted his second marriage with petitioner. 20Information6 against them. The case, docketed as Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact thatMetropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch respondent entered into a second marriage during 61.1awphi1 the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall decision in the civil case is not essential to the the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a determination of the criminal charge. It is,Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance therefore, not a prejudicial question. As statedof the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. above, respondent cannot be permitted to use hisPetitioner argued that the pendency of the civil own malfeasance to defeat the criminal actioncase for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed against him.21 a prejudicial question to the determination of the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The ordercriminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial denied the foregoing motion in the Order 7 dated Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to reconsideration of the said Order of denial was IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98- likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 75611. 1998. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000 MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents. BUENA, J.: In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. 8 In an Order9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.

This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and review. set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued Petitioner contends that the pendency of the by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden should merit the suspension of the criminal case Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati for concubinage filed against him by his wife. City, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes fromthat two conflicting decisions might result from the proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. civil case for annulment of marriage and the 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the the ground that the pending petition for trial court might declare the marriage as valid by declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitionerdismissing petitioner's complaint but in the against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question. criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed: marriage is void on ground of psychological Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao,marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will Quezon City.1 be suspended, until the court rules on the validity On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is

79

declared void by reason of psychological incapacity defense. then by reason of the arguments submitted in the Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. subject petition, his marriage has never existed; Relova 1 cited in Donato vs. Luna 14 where this and that, accordingly, petitioner could not beCourt held that: convicted in the criminal case because he was . . . Assuming that the first marriage was null never before a married man. and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, Petitioner's contentions are untenable. that fact would not be material to the outcome The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has should not be permitted to judge for two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves themselves its nullity, for the same must be an issue similar or intimately related to the issue submitted to the judgment of the competent raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution courts and only when the nullity of the of such issue determines whether or not the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, criminal action may proceed. 11 and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial before the judicial declaration of nullity of the question to the concubinage case. For a civil case first marriage assumes the risk of being to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as prosecuted for bigamy. to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that not only that the said civil case involves the same parties to the marriage should not be permitted to facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must based, but also that in the resolution of the issue be submitted to the judgment of the competent or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily so declared can it be held as void, and so long as be determined. there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and Art. 40 of the Family Code provides: purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may woman not his wife before the judicial declaration be invoked for purposes of remarriage on theof nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being basis solely of a final judgment declaring such prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court previous marriage void. therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruledthe judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that that the import of said provision is that forpendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute case for concubinage. nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than is DISMISSED. remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The SO ORDERED. pertinent portions of said Decision read: . . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the G.R. No. 134887 July 27, 2006 absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as inPHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE, INC. case of an action for liquidation, partition, represented by MICHAEL C. U. DE GUZMAN, distribution and separation of property between petitioner, the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for vs. the custody and support of their commonSEC. JOSEFINA TRINIDAD LICHAUCO and the children and the delivery of the latters'HON. OMBUDSMAN, respondents. presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence DECISION needs must be adduced, testimonial or CARPIO MORALES, J.: documentary, to prove the existence of 1 grounds rendering such a previous marriage anOn June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of private absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) declaring such previous marriage void. represented by then Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like relative to the launching, ownership, operation and the herein petitioner need not present a final management of a Philippine satellite by a Filipinojudgment declaring his marriage void for he can owned or controlled private consortium or adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity corporation. of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment Pursuant to Article IV of the MOU, the consortium declaring his marriage void. of private telecommunications carriers formed a With regard to petitioner's argument that he could corporation and adopted the corporate name be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI), herein his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to petitioner. state that even a subsequent pronouncement that 2 his marriage is void from the beginning is not a By letter dated June 28, 1996, PASI president

80

Rodrigo A. Silverio (Silverio) requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official government confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites. In response to Silverios letter, Secretary Lagdameo, by letter3 dated July 3, 1996, confirmed the governments assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites. PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans, increasing its capital, conducting negotiations with its business partners, and making an initial payment of US$ 3.5 million to Aerospatiale, a French satellite manufacturer. Michael de Guzman (de Guzman), PASI President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), later informed Jesli Lapuz (Lapuz), President and CEO of the Landbank of the Philippines, by letter4 of December 3, 1996, of the governments assignment to PASI of orbital slots 161E and 153E and requested the banks confirmation of its participation in a club loan in the amount of US$ 11 million, the proceeds of which would be applied to PASIs interim satellite.

this morning, and from the de Guzman letter you sent to me, that the latter are still interested in pursuing their "interim satellite project" and are applying for a loan with your bank. Of course they can always pursue this as a business venture of DHI/PASI which is their own corporate business decision. The DOTC supports this venture but they will be getting only one orbital slot for both the Interim Satellite Project and for the Launch Project. I understand from todays meeting with them that this is technically feasible. 3. As regards the use of the name "Agila", Mr. de Guzmans allegation that DHI/PASI has registered "Agila" as a "corporate alias/trademark" is FALSE. There is no such thing as registration of a "corporate alias". Nor for that matter can the trade name of a satellite be registered for just any satellite, where it was the President who chose the name for the first Philippine satellite in orbit. No one else coined that name but he. He has therefore given the name "Agila I" to the Mabuhay satellite now in orbit at 144E, being the first Philippine satellite in orbit. He made this announcement in the presence of all the APEC Heads of State just before the presentation to him of the Manila Action Plan for APEC. (Underscoring supplied)

It appears that Lapuz sent a copy of De Guzmans letter to then DOTC Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco subsequently issued, in December 1997, Lichauco, (Lichauco) who, by letter5 of Decembera Notice of Offer6 for several orbital slots including 5, 1996, wrote Lapuz as follows: 153E.

1. Kindly be informed that there is simply noPASI, claiming that the offer was without its basis for Michael de Guzman to allege that the knowledge and that it subsequently came to learn DOTC has assigned two (2) slots to PASI. Hethat another company whose identity had not been conveniently neglected to attach as anotherdisclosed had submitted a bid and won the award annex, in addition to Sec. Lagdameos letter of for orbital slot 153E, filed on January 23, 1998 a 3 July 1996 (Annex "A") the letter of 28 June complaint7 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of (Annex "B") in response to which the July 3rd Mandaluyong City against Lichauco and the letter had been sent to PASI. Annex "B" "Unknown Awardee," for injunction to enjoin the precisely provides that one slot (153 E, toaward of orbital slot 153E, declare its nullity, and which the interim satellite was supposed tofor damages. migrate) was to be used for the migration of the Russian satellite in time for the APEC PASI also filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint Leaders Summit. This particular endeavor wasbefore the Office of the Ombudsman against not successful. The interim satellite "Gorizont"Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his never moved from its orbital location of 130E affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged Lichauco Longitude. Annex "C" is a letter from an official with gross violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act of the Subic Bay Satellite Systems Inc., with its No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and attachments, addressed to me stating that asCorrupt Practices Act, as amended, reading: of the 13th of November, no such voyage to (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, 153E orbital slot had been commenced. In fact including the Government, or giving any private DHI hid this fact from me, and in fact stated party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or that Gorizont had already moved and was on preference in the discharge of his official, its way to 153E. administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross Since this timely migration did not happen in inexcusable negligence. This provision shall time for the APEC Leaders Meeting on 24 apply to officers and employees of officers or November, this 153E Longitude slot can no government corporations charged with the longer be assigned to PASI. grant of licenses or permits or other The other slot 161E Longitude is the one that concessions. can be made available for PASIs eventual launch, in 1998 most likely, in exchange for one The complaint was docketed as OMB Case No. 0The Evaluation and Preliminary free satellite transponder unit utilization, for all 98-0416. Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the requirements of Government. These have yet 8 Ombudsman, by Evaluation Report dated April 15, to be embodied in a contract between PASI and 1998, found the existence of a prejudicial question the DOTC. after considering that "the case filed with the RTC 2. I understand from my meeting with DHI/PASI involves facts intimately related to those upon

81

which the criminal prosecution would be based and that the guilt or the innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined in the resolution of the issues raised in the civil case." It thus concluded that the filing of the complaint before the Ombudsman "is premature since the issues involved herein are now subject of litigation in the case filed with the RTC," and accordingly recommended its dismissal. Then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved on April 24, 1998 the recommendation of the EPIB.

2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty or in relation to his public position; 3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable negligence; and 4. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.13

PASI moved to reconsider9 the dismissal of theThe civil case against Lichauco on the other hand complaint, but was denied by Order 10 dated Julyinvolves three causes of action. The first, for injunction, seeks to enjoin the award of orbital slot 17, 1998. 153E, the DOTC having previously assigned the In the meantime, a motion to dismiss the civil case same to PASI; the second, for declaration of nullity against respondent was denied by the trial court. of award, seeks to nullify the award given to the On elevation of the order of denial to the Court ofundisclosed bidder for being beyond Lichaucos Appeals, said court, by Decision dated February 21, authority; and the third, for damages arising from 2000, ordered the dismissal of the case. This Court,Lichaucos questioned acts. by Decision dated May 3, 2006, ordered the If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital reinstatement of the case, however.11 slot 153E is, in the civil case, declared valid for PASI is now before this Court via petition for review being within Lichaucos scope of authority to thus on certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman erred infree her from liability for damages, there would be dismissing the complaint. no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be In issue are 1) whether there exists a prejudicial basis for undue injury claimed to have been question and, if in the affirmative, 2) whether the suffered by petitioner. The finding by the dismissal of the complaint on that account is in Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial order. question is thus well-taken. Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules on CriminalRespecting the propriety of the dismissal by the Procedure provides: Ombudsman of the complaint due to the pendency Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. of a prejudicial question, PASI argues that since the The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman the previously instituted civil action involves anis silent on the matter, the Rules of Court, issue similar or intimately related to the issue specifically Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of raised in the subsequent criminal action, and Court, which now reads: (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. SECTION 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (Underscoring supplied),

The rationale for the principle of prejudicial question is that although it does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused, it tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint or information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. 12 Hence, the need for its prior resolution before further proceedings in the criminal action may be had. applies in a suppletory character.

PASI concedes that the issues in the civil case are The Ombudsman, on the other hand, argues that similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court the criminal case. It contends, however, that the applies to cases which are at the preliminary or resolution of the issues in the civil case is not trial stage and not to those, like the case subject of determinative of the guilt or innocence of the present petition, at the evaluation stage. Lichauco, it arguing that even if she is adjudged The Ombudsman goes on to proffer that at the liable for damages, it does not necessarily follow evaluation stage, the investigating officer may that she would be convicted of the crime charged. recommend any of several causes of action

To determine the existence of a prejudicialincluding dismissal of the complaint for want of question in the case before the Ombudsman, it ispalpable merit or subjecting the complaint to necessary to examine the elements of Section 3(e) preliminary investigation, and the evaluation of the of R.A. 3019 for which Lichauco was charged and complaint involves the discretion of the the causes of action in the civil case. investigating officer which this Court cannot Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which was earlier quotedinterfere with. has the following elements: While the evaluation of a complaint involves the officer, its exercise 1. The accused is a public officer dischargingdiscretion of the investigating 14 should not be abused or wanting in legal basis. administrative or official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; Rule II, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman reads:

82

SECTION 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be: a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; b) referred to respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation; e) referred for administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. (Underscoring supplied) From the above-quoted provision, a complaint at the evaluation stage may be dismissed outright only for want of palpable merit. Want of palpable merit obviously means that there is no basis for the charge or charges. If the complaint has prima facie merit, however, the investigating officer shall recommend the adoption of any of the actions enumerated above from (b) to (f).15

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years. Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months. When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second, and third paragraphs of this article. x x x ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

When, in the course of the actions taken by those to whom the complaint is endorsed or forwarded, a prejudicial question is found to be pending, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court should be applied in a suppletory character.16 As laid down in Yap v. Paras,17 said rule directs that the proceedings may x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) only be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition,and not at theWHEREFORE, the Order dated July 17, 1998 of instance of the judge alone or as in this case, the respondent Ombudsman dismissing OMB Case No. investigating officer. 0-98-0416 against respondent then Secretary To give imprimatur to the Ombudsmans dismissalJosefina Trinidad Lichauco is SET ASIDE.

of petitioners criminal complaint due to prejudicial The Ombudsman is ORDERED to REINSTATE to question would not only run counter to theits docket for further proceedings, in line with the provision of Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of foregoing ratiocination, OMB Case No. 0-98-0416. Court. It would sanction the extinguishment ofSO ORDERED criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article 89 vis a vis Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code which G.R. No. 148072 July 10, 2007 respectively read: FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO, Petitioner, ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally vs. extinguished. Criminal liability is totally PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. extinguished: LIBROJO Respondents. 1. By the death of the convict, as to the DECISION personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguishedCHICO-NAZARIO, J.: only when the death of the offender occurs This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to before final judgment; reverse the (1) Resolution1 dated 5 March 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, "Francisco Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T. 3. By amnesty, which completely Estrada, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of extinguishes the penalty and all its effects; Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 of Quezon City, 4. By absolute pardon; People of the Philippines and Elena M. Librojo," which dismissed petitioner Francisco Magestrados 5. By prescription of the crime; Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy; 6. By prescription of the penalty; and (2) Resolution2 dated 3 May 2001 of the same denying petitioners motion for 7. By the marriage of the offended woman, Court reconsideration. as provided in Article 344 of this Code. (Underscoring supplied) Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal 3 ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. Crimescomplaint for perjury against petitioner with the punishable by death, reclusion perpetua orOffice of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twentywas docketed as I.S. No. 98-3900. years. After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City 2. By service of the sentence;

83

Prosecutor recommended the filing of annot determinative of the guilt or innocence of the information for perjury against petitioner. Thus,accused. Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. FernandezHence, the trial of this case shall proceed as filed an information for perjury against petitionerpreviously scheduled on July 19 and August 2, with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon1993 at 8:30 in the morning. City. Pertinent portions of the information are On 17 August 1999, a motion 7 for reconsideration hereby quoted as follows: was filed by petitioner but was denied by the MeTC That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in an Order8 dated 19 October 1999. in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did 9 then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniouslyAggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and knowingly make an untruthful statement under under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a oath upon a material matter before a competentprayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary officer authorized to receive and administer oath Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch and which the law so require, to wit: the said 83, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, on the accused subscribe and swore to an Affidavit of Lossground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed before Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezongrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or City, per Doc. No. 168, Page No. 35, Book No. excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely alleging thatsuspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. he lost Owners Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N-90721. 173163, which document was used in support of aOn 14 March 2000, RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the Petition For Issuance of New Owners Duplicate petition and denied the prayer for the issuance of a Copy of Certificate of Title and filed with the writ of preliminary injunction, reasoning thus: Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 andScrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil assigned to Branch 99 of the said court, to which cases abovementioned, in relation to the criminal said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado signed and swore action for PERJURY, this Court opines and so holds on its verification, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book No. that there is no prejudicial question involved as to CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B.warrant the suspension of the criminal action to Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused knowing await the outcome of the civil cases. The civil fully well that the allegations in the said affidavit cases are principally for determination whether or and petition are false, the truth of the matter beingnot a loan was obtained by petitioner and whether that the property subject of Transfer Certificate ofor not he executed the deed of real estate Title No. N-173163 was mortgaged to complainantmortgage involving the property covered by TCT Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the No. N-173163, whereas the criminal case is for amount of P 758,134.42 and as a consequence of perjury which imputes upon petitioner the wrongful which said title to the property was surrendered by execution of an affidavit of loss to support his him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan, petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions copy of TCT No. 173163. Whether or not he of falsehoods, to the damage and prejudice of the committed perjury is the issue in the criminal case which may be resolved independently of the civil said Elena M. Librojo.4 cases. Note that the affidavit of loss was executed The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, in support of the petition for issuance of a new Branch 43, where it was docketed as Criminal Case owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 which No. 90721 entitled, "People of the Philippines v.petition was raffled to Branch 99 of the RTC. x x Francisco Magestrado." x.10 5 On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion forAgain, petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial reconsideration11 but this was denied by RTCquestion. Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No. Q- Branch 83 in an Order12 dated 21 December 2000. 98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money the Court of pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with 13 Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98the Revised Rules of Court, which was docketed as 34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, CA-G.R. SP No. 63293. Petitioner alleged that RTC Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, must be resolvedJudge Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed discretion amounting to lack or excess of since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari in intimately related to the issues raised in the Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, and in effect sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43 of petitioners criminal action. motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order6Case No. 90721, as well as his subsequent motion denying petitioners motion for suspension of for reconsideration thereof. proceedings, thus: On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed 14 Acting on the "Motion for Suspension ofthe Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 on the ground Proceedings" filed by the [herein petitioner that petitioners remedy should have been an Magestrado], thru counsel, and the "Comment and appeal from the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Opposition thereto, the Court after an evaluation of Petition for Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The Court of the same, finds the aforesaid motion without merit, Appeals ruled that: hence, is hereby DENIED, it appearing that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the correct and appropriate remedy?

84

We rule negatively.

The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, appeal, not only because RTC-Branch 83 did not as in the instant petition, may be appealed x x xcommit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil petitioners Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Procedure and not by petition for certiorari under Q-99-39358 but also because RTC-Branch 83s Rule 65 of the same rules. Thus, the said rule Order of dismissal was a final order from which petitioners should have appealed in accordance provides: with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special Court. cases. In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties An order or a judgment is deemed final when it shall file in lieu of briefs, their respective finally disposes of a pending action, so that memoranda within a non-extendible period ofnothing more can be done with it in the trial court. thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by In other words, the order or judgment ends the the clerk that all the evidence, oral andlitigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an documentary, is already attached to the record x xinterlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as x. regards the merits of the latter.18 RTC-Branch 83s WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing Order dated 14 March 2001 dismissing petitioners premises, the instant Petition for Certiorari underPetition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is finally disposes of the said case and RTC-Branch 83 hereby DISMISSED.15 can do nothing more with the case. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may Reconsideration16 in a Resolution17 dated 3 Maybe taken from a judgment or final order that 2001. completely disposes of the case, or of a particular Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition formatter therein when declared by the Revised Rules Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revisedof Court to be appealable. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also Rules of Court raising the following issues: provided in Rule 41 as follows: 1. Whether or not the Orders of Judge Estrella T. Estrada dated March 14, 2000 denyingSection 2. Modes of appeal. petitioners Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 (a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of of the Rules of Court, and her subsequent Order Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial dated December 21, 2000, denying the Motion Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall for Reconsideration thereafter filed can only be be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court reviewed by the Court of Appeals thru appealwhich rendered the judgment or final order under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the Civil Procedure. adverse party. No record on appeal shall be 2. Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada ofrequired except in special proceedings and other the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezoncases of multiple or separate appeals where the City, had committed grave abuse of discretion law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the amounting to lack or in excess of herrecord on appeal shall be filed and served in like jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari manner. and petitioners subsequent motion forCertiorari generally lies only when there is no reconsideration on the ground of a prejudicial appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate question pursuant to the Rules on Criminalremedy available to petitioners. Here, appeal was Procedure and the prevailing jurisprudence. available. It was adequate to deal with any After consideration of the procedural and question whether of fact or of law, whether of error substantive issues raised by petitioner, we find the of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of judgment which the trial court might have instant petition to be without merit. committed. But petitioners instead filed a special The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the civil action for certiorari. proper remedy which petitioner should have availed himself of before the Court of Appeals: an We have time and again reminded members of the ordinary appeal or a petition for certiorari.bench and bar that a special civil action for Petitioner claims that he correctly questioned RTC- certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Branch 83s Order of dismissal of his Petition for Court lies only when "there is no appeal nor plain, remedy in the ordinary Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 through a speedy and adequate 19 course of law." Certiorari cannot be allowed when Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite Private respondent and public respondent People 20 the availability of that remedy, certiorari not of the Philippines insist that an ordinary appeal 21 being a substitute for lost appeal. was the proper remedy. We agree with respondents. We hold that the As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we appellate court did not err in dismissing have repeatedly emphasized that the perfection of petitioners Petition for Certiorari, pursuant to Rule appeals in the manner and within the period 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court (andpermitted by law is not only mandatory but not under Rule 44, Section 10, invoked by the jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 5 March appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is founded upon the 2001). principle that the right to appeal is not part of due

85

process of law but is a mere statutory privilege toprivate respondent in her complaint in Civil Case be exercised only in the manner and in accordance No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money). with the provisions of the law. Neither can Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules ofCancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and technicality must yield to the broader interest of Damages filed on 8 May 1988 by petitioner against substantial justice. While every litigant must be private respondent with RTC-Branch 77. Petitioner given the amplest opportunity for the proper andalleges that he purchased a parcel of land covered just determination of his cause, free from by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 thru constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect private respondent, a real estate broker. In the an appeal within the reglementary period is not aprocess of negotiation, petitioner was pressured to mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problemsign a Deed of Sale prepared by private as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction respondent. Upon signing the Deed of Sale, he over the appeal.22 noticed that the Deed was already signed by a The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutuallycertain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-fact of exclusive and not alternative or successive.23 Avendor Spouses Guillermo and Amparo Galvez. party cannot substitute the special civil action of Petitioner demanded from private respondent a certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special power of attorney and authority to sell, but the remedy of appeal. The existence andthe latter failed to present one. Petitioner averred availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to that private respondent refused to deliver the the availability of the special civil action for certificate of title of the land despite execution and certiorari.24 As this Court held in Fajardo v.signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of the Bautista25 : consideration. Petitioner was thus compelled to Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or engage the services of one Modesto Gazmin, Jr. wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject who agreed, for P100,000.00 to facilitate the filing of appeal, not certiorari. The remedies of appealof cases against private respondent; to deliver to and certiorari are mutually exclusive and notpetitioner the certificate of title of the land; and/or alternative or successive. Accordingly, although to cancel the certificate of title in possession of the special civil action of certiorari is not proper private respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be nothing upon receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 granted where it is shown that the appeal would befrom petitioner. In fact, petitioner was even inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will notcharged with perjury before the Office of the City Prosecutor, all because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.s promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal iswrongdoing. Petitioner further alleged that he inadequate and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari discovered the existence of a spurious Real Estate cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed Mortgage which he allegedly signed in favor of remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned private respondent. Petitioner categorically denied by the petitioners own neglect or error in thesigning the mortgage document and it was private respondent who falsified the same in order to choice of remedies. justify her unlawful withholding of TCT No. NOn 21 December 2000, petitioner received a copy173163 from petitioner. Thus, petitioner prayed for: of the Order of the RTC-Branch 83 denying his 1. The cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his dated August 2, 1997 as null and void; Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358; hence, he had until 18 January 2001 within which 2. As well as to order [herein private to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The respondent] to DELIVER the Owners Duplicate Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner on 19 Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. NFebruary 2001 with the Court of Appeals cannot be 173163 to [herein petitioner]; a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. As 3. Condemning [private respondent] to pay petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, RTC-Branch [petitioner] the sums of 83s dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari had long a) P100,000.00 as MORAL DAMAGES; become final and executory. For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly denied outright the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner before it. Moreover, there are even more cogent reasons for denying the instant Petition on the merits. b) P50,000.00 as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; c) P50,000.00 as Attorneys fees and d) Cost of suit. 4. A general relief is likewise prayed for (sic) just and equitable under the premises.

In the Petition at bar, petitioner raises several 26 substantive issues. Petitioner harps on the need for Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, on the other hand, is the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Casea complaint for a sum of money with a motion for No. 90721 for perjury pending before MeTC-Branchissuance of a writ of attachment filed by private 43 based on a prejudicial question still to be respondent against petitioner on 14 May 1988 resolved in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for before RTC-Branch 84. Private respondent alleges cancellation of mortgage) and Civil Case No. Q-98-that petitioner obtained a loan from her in the 34349 (for collection of a sum of money) which are amount of P758,134.42 with a promise to pay on or before 30 August 1997. As security for payment of pending before other trial courts.1avvphi1 the loan, petitioner executed a Deed of Real Estate For clarity, we shall first discuss the allegations of Mortgage covering a parcel of land registered petitioner in his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98- under TCT No. N-173163. Petitioner pleaded for 34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and that of

86

additional time to pay the said obligation, to which A prejudial question is defined as that which arises respondent agreed. But private respondentin a case the resolution of which is a logical discovered sometime in February 1998 thatantecedent of the issue involved therein, and the petitioner executed an affidavit of loss alleging cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. that he lost the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. The prejudicial question must be determinative of N-173163, and succeeded in annotating saidthe case before the court but the jurisdiction to try affidavit on the original copy of TCT No. N-173163 and resolve the question must be lodged in on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. another court or tribunal. It is a question based on Private respondent further alleges that she also a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so discovered that petitioner filed a petition for intimately connected with it that it determines the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCTguilt or innocence of the accused.28 No. N-173163 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend 98, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-10052. Private criminal action, it must appear not only that said respondent demanded that petitioner pay hiscase involves facts intimately related to those obligation, but the latter refused to do so.upon which the criminal prosecution would be Resultantly, private respondent prayed for the based but also that in the resolution of the issue or following: issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or A. That upon filing of this Complaint as well as innocence of the accused would necessarily be the Affidavit of attachment and a preliminarydetermined. hearing thereon, as well as bond filed, a writ of Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial preliminary attachment is (sic) by theto a criminal case as to cause the suspension of Honorable Court ordering the Sheriff to levythe criminal proceedings until the final resolution [herein petitioner] property sufficient to answerof the civil case, the following requisites must be [herein private respondents] claim in thispresent: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately action; related to those upon which the criminal B. That after due notice and hearing, judgment prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of be rendered in [private respondents] favor as the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the against [petitioner], ordering the latter to payguilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily the former the sum of P758,134.42 plusbe determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said interest thereon at 5% per month fromquestion must be lodged in another tribunal.29 September 1997 up to the date of actual If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will payment; actual damages in the sums ofnot determine the criminal responsibility of the P70,000.00 each under paragraphs 11 and 12 accused in the criminal action based on the same of the complaint; P200,000.00 as moralfacts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;be determined first before taking up the criminal twenty (20%) of the principal claim as case," therefore, the civil case does not involve a attorneys fees plus P2,500.00 per appearanceprejudicial question.30 Neither is there a prejudicial honorarium; and P60,000.00 as litigationquestion if the civil and the criminal action can, expense before this Honorable Court. according to law, proceed independently of each [Petitioner] prays for such further relief in law,other.31 justice and equity. However, the court in which an action is pending As to whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and upon No. 90721 for perjury pending final outcome of proper application for a stay of that action, hold Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 and Civil Case No. Q-98- the action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of 34308, we take into consideration Sections 6 andanother case pending in another court, especially 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which where the parties and the issues are the same, for read: there is power inherent in every court to control Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicialthe disposition of cases on its dockets with question. A petition for suspension of the criminal economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the question in a civil action may be filed in the office second action cannot be properly determined until are settled, of the prosecutor or the court conducting thethe questions raised in the first action 32 the second action should be stayed. preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action power inherent in every court to control the at any time before the prosecution rests. disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The its time and effort, those of counsel and the elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it previously instituted civil action involves an issue must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits similar or intimately related to the issue raised in and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting the subsequent criminal action; and (b) thejudgments, confusion between litigants and courts. resolution of such issue determines whether or not It bears stressing that whether or not the trial court would suspend the proceedings in the criminal the criminal action may proceed. case before it is submitted to its sound discretion. 33 The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to the courts discretionary authority is not subject to avoid two conflicting decisions.27 reversal on review unless it constitutes an abuse of

87

discretion. As the United States Supreme Courtis hereby directed to proceed with the hearing and aptly declared in Landis v. North American Co., trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 90721, and "the burden of making out the justice and wisdom to expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice from the departure from the beaten truck layto the right of the accused to due process. Costs heavily on the petitioner, less an unwilling litigant against petitioner. is compelled to wait upon the outcome of aSO ORDERED controversy to which he is a stranger. It is, thus, stated that only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside, while a G.R. No. 159323 July 31, 2008 litigant in another, settling the rule of law that will define the rights of both is, after all, the partiesCOCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILS.), INC. and before the court are entitled to a just, speedy andERIC MONTINOLA, Petitioners, plain determination of their case undetermined by vs. the pendency of the proceedings in another case.SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and DR. After all, procedure was created not to hinder and DEAN CLIMACO, Respondents. delay but to facilitate and promote the DECISION administration of justice."34 REYES, R.T., J.: As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of aWE are confronted with triple remedial issues on prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and prejudicial question, forum shopping, and litis issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are pendentia. so related with the issues raised in the criminal We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court case such that the resolution of the issues in the of Appeals (CA) upholding the order of the Social civil cases would also determine the judgment inSecurity Commission (SSC),2 denying petitioners the criminal case. motion to dismiss respondent Climacos petition for A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show compulsory coverage with the Social Security that Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 pending beforeSystem (SSS). RTC-Branch 77, and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, The Facts pending before RTC-Branch 84, are principally for the determination of whether a loan was obtained Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. is a by petitioner from private respondent and whether corporation engaged in the3 manufacture and sale softdrink beverages. Co-petitioner Eric petitioner executed a real estate mortgageof Montinola was the general manager of its plant in involving the property covered by TCT No. N4 Bacolod City. Respondent Dr. Dean Climaco was a 173163. On the other hand, Criminal Case No. former retainer physician at the companys plant in 90721 before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the 5 determination of whether petitioner committedBacolod City. perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support In 1988, petitioner company and Dr. Climaco his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate entered into a Retainer Agreement6 for one year, copy of TCT No. N-173163. with a monthly compensation of P3,800.00,7 where It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal he "may charge professional fees for hospital 8 case can proceed independently of each other. services rendered in line with his specialization." Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it The agreement further provided that "either party will not establish the innocence or guilt of the may terminate the contract upon 9giving thirty (30)petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The day written notice to the other." In consideration "agrees to purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of the retainers fee, Dr. Climaco 10 perform the duties and obligations" enumerated of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing 11 whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly andin the Comprehensive Medical Plan, which was fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of attached and made an integral part of the agreement. TCT No. N-173163. MeTC-Branch 43, therefore, did not err in ruling Explicit in the contract, however, is the provision that the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 forthat no employee-employer relationship shall exist and Dr. Climaco while the cancellation of mortgage before the RTC-Branchbetween the company 12 contract is in effect. In case of its termination, Dr. 77; and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 for collection of Climaco "shall be entitled only to such retainer fee a sum of money before RTC-Branch 84, do not pose as may be due him at the time of termination."13 a prejudicial question in the determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury in Criminal Dr. Climaco continuously served as the company Case No. 90721. RTC-Branch 83, likewise, did notphysician, performing all the duties stipulated in err in ruling that MeTC-Branch 43 did not commit the Retainer Agreement and the Comprehensive grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Medical Plan. By 1992, his salary was increased to motion for suspension of proceedings in CriminalP7,500.00 per month.14 Case No. 90721. Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailedDepartment of Labor and Employment and the SSS Resolutions dated 5 March 2001 and 3 May 2001of whether he was an employee of the company. Both the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 are agencies replied in the affirmative.15 As a result, Dr. hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is Climaco filed a complaint 16 before the National DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, theLabor Relations Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, In his complaint, he sought recognition as a regular

88

employee of the company and demanded paymentWHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance, respondents Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, Christmas for lack of merit. bonus and all other benefits.17 Accordingly, let this case be remanded to SSS

During the pendency of the complaint, the Bacolod Branch Office for reception of evidence of company terminated its Retainer Agreement with the parties pursuant to the Order dated July 24, Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco filed another1995. complaint18 for illegal dismissal against the SO ORDERED.30 company before the NLRC Bacolod City. He asked 31 that he be reinstated to his former position asPetitioners motion for reconsideration received 32 company physician of its Bacolod Plant, without the same fate. loss of seniority rights, with full payment ofOn April 29, 1997, the company filed a petition for backwages, other unpaid benefits, and for certiorari before the CA. On March 15, 2002, the CA payment of damages.19 dismissed the petition, with a fallo reading: The Labor Arbiter, in each of the complaints, ruled WHEREFORE, under the premises, the Court holds in favor of petitioner company.20 The first complaintthat public respondent Social Security Commission was dismissed after Labor Arbiter Jesus N. did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing Rodriguez, Jr. found that the company did not have the disputed orders, and the herein petition is the power of control over Dr. Climacos therefore DISMISSED for want of merit. performance of his duties and responsibilities. The 33 validity of the Retainer Agreement was alsoSO ORDERED. recognized. Labor Arbiter Benjamin Pelaez likewise Hence, the present recourse. dismissed the second complaint in view of the Issues dismissal of the first complaint.1avvphi1 On appeal, the NLRC, Fourth Division, Cebu City, Petitioners raise the following issues for Our affirmed the Arbiter disposition.21 On petition forconsideration: review before the CA, the NLRC ruling wasWITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT reversed.22 The appellate court ruled that using theOF APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED four-fold test, an employer-employee relationshipRESOLUTIONS, HAVING DECIDED A QUESTION OF existed between the company and Dr. Climaco.SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW Petitioners elevated the case through a petition for AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS review on certiorari23 before this Court. HONORABLE COURT, CONSIDERING THAT: Meantime, on November 9, 1994, while the NLRC cases were pending, Dr. Climaco filed with the SSC in Bacolod City, a petition24 praying, among others, that petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. be ordered to report him for compulsory social security coverage. On April 12, 1995, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that there is no employeremployee relationship between the company and Dr. Climaco; and that his services were engaged by virtue of a Retainer Agreement.25 Dr. Climaco opposed the motion.26 According to Dr. Climaco, "[t]he fact that the petitioner [i.e., respondent Dr. Climaco] does not enjoy the other benefits of the company is a question that is being raised by the petitioner in his cases filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City, against the respondent [i.e., petitioner company]."27 On July 24, 1995, the SSC issued an order stating among others, that the resolution of petitioner companys motion to dismiss is held in abeyance "pending reception of evidence of the parties."28 I. THE PREVIOUS COMPLAINT FOR REGULARIZATION AND/OR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, WHICH IS NOW PENDING RESOLUTION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, POSES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT CASE. II. GIVEN THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES, RESPONDENT CLIMACO IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING, WHICH THEREBY CALLED FOR THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF HIS PETITION BEFORE THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION. III. THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE ALSO BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHT ON THE GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA, AS THERE ARE OTHER ACTIONS PENDING BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES FOR THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION.34 (Underscoring supplied) Our Ruling

In view of the statements of Dr. Climaco in his The petition fails. opposition to the companys motion to dismiss,The Court notes that petitioners, in their petition, petitioners again, on March 1, 1996, moved for theaverred that the appeal from the NLRC and CA dismissal of Dr. Climacos complaint, this time ondispositions on the illegal dismissal of respondent the grounds of forum shopping and litis Climaco is still pending with this Court. Upon pendentia.29 verification, however, it was unveiled that the said SSC and CA Dispositions On January 17, 1997, the SSC denied petitioners motion to dismiss, disposing as follows: case had already been decided by this Courts First Division on February 5, 2007.

While we deplore the failure of petitioners and

89

counsel in updating the Court on the resolution of Climaco before the NLRC involved different issues. the said related case, We hasten to state that it did In his first complaint,41 Dr. Climaco sought not operate to moot the issues pending before Us. recognition as a regular employee of the company We take this opportunity to address the questions and demanded payment of his 13th month pay, on prejudicial question, forum shopping, and litiscost of living allowance, holiday pay, service pendentia. incentive leave pay, Christmas bonus and all other benefits.42 The second complaint43 was for illegal No prejudicial question exists. dismissal, with prayer for reinstatement to his Petitioners allege that Dr. Climaco previously filedformer position as company physician of the separate complaints before the NLRC seekingcompanys Bacolod Plant, without loss of seniority recognition as a regular employee. Necessarily rights, with full payment of backwages, other then, a just resolution of these cases hinge on a unpaid benefits, and for payment of damages.44 determination of whether or not Dr. Climaco is anThus, the issues in the NLRC cases are not employee of the company.35 The issue of whetherdeterminative of whether or not the SSC should Dr. Climaco is entitled to employee benefits, as proceed. It is settled that the question claimed to prayed for in the NLRC cases, is closely intertwined be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of with the issue of whether Dr. Climaco is an the case before the court.45 employee of the company who is subject to compulsory coverage under the SSS Law. Hence,There is no forum shopping. they argue, said regularization/illegal dismissal Anent the second issue, petitioners posit that since case is a prejudicial question. the issues before the NLRC and the SSC are the same, the SSC cannot make a ruling on the issue The argument is untenable. presented before it without necessarily having a Our concept of prejudicial question was lifted from direct effect on the issue before the NLRC. It was Spain, where civil cases are tried exclusively by patently erroneous, if not malicious, for Dr. Climaco civil courts, while criminal cases are tried to invoke the jurisdiction of the SSC through a exclusively in criminal courts. Each kind of court isseparate petition.46 Thus, petitioners contend, Dr. jurisdictionally distinct from and independent ofClimaco was guilty of forum shopping. the other. In the Philippines, however, courts are invariably tribunals of general jurisdiction. ThisAgain, We turn down the contention. means that courts here exercise jurisdiction over Forum shopping is a prohibited malpractice and both civil and criminal cases. Thus, it is notcondemned as trifling with the courts and their impossible that the criminal case, as well as theprocesses.47 It is proscribed because it civil case in which a prejudicial question may rise, unnecessarily burdens the courts with heavy may be both pending in the same court. For this caseloads. It also unduly taxes the manpower and reason, the elements of prejudicial question havefinancial resources of the judiciary. It mocks the been modified in such a way that the phrasejudicial processes, thus, affecting the efficient "pendency of the civil case in a different tribunal" administration of justice.48 has been eliminated.36 The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule The rule is that there is prejudicial question when against forum shopping is the rendition by two (2) (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an competent tribunals of two (2) separate and issue similar or intimately related to the issue contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous litigants, raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) taking advantage of a variety of competent the resolution of such issue determines whether or tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several not the criminal action may proceed. 37 It comesdifferent fora until a favorable result is reached. 49 into play generally in a situation where a civil It is well to note that forum shopping traces its action and a criminal action both pend and thereorigin in private international law on choice of exists in the former an issue which must be venues, which later developed to a choice of preemptively resolved before the criminal action remedies. In First Philippine International Bank v. may proceed. This is so because howsoever the Court of Appeals,50 the Court had occasion to issue raised in the civil action is resolved would beoutline the origin of the rule on forum shopping. determinative juris et de jure of the guilt orSaid the Court: innocence of the accused in the criminal case.38 x x x forum shopping originated as a concept in Here, no prejudicial question exists becauseprivate international law, where non-resident there is no pending criminal case .39 Thelitigants are given the option to choose the forum consolidated NLRC cases cannot be considered asor place wherein to bring their suit for various "previously instituted civil action." In Berbari v. reasons or excuses, including to secure procedural Concepcion,40 it was held that a prejudicialadvantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to question is understood in law to be that which avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more must precede the criminal action, that which friendly venue. To combat these less than requires a decision with which said question is honorable excuses, the principle of forum non closely related. conveniens was developed whereby a court, in Neither can the doctrine of prejudicial conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on question be applied by analogy. The issue inits jurisdiction where it is not the most the case filed by Dr. Climaco with the SSC involves "convenient" or available forum and the parties are the question of whether or not he is an employee not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. of Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. and subject to xxxx the compulsory coverage of the Social Security System. On the contrary, the cases filed by Dr.In the Philippines, forum shopping has acquired a

90

connotation encompassing not only a choice of undertakings therein shall constitute indirect venues, as it was originally understood in conflictscontempt of court, without prejudice to the of laws, but also to a choice of remedies. As to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. first (choice of venues), the Rules of Court, for If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly example, allow a plaintiff to commence personalconstitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, actions "where the defendant or any of thethe same shall be ground for summary dismissal defendants resides or may be found, or where the with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at theas well as a cause for administrative sanctions."53 election of the plaintiff" (Rule 4, Sec. 2[b]). As to There is forum shopping when one party remedies, aggrieved parties, for example, arerepetitively avails of several judicial remedies in given a choice of pursuing civil liabilities different courts, simultaneously or successively, all independently of the criminal, arising from thesubstantially founded on the same transactions same set of facts. A passenger of a public utility and the same essential facts and circumstances, vehicle involved in a vehicular accident may sue and all raising substantially the same issues either on culpa contractual, culpa aquiliana or culpa pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some criminal each remedy being availableother court.54 In short, forum shopping exists where independently of the others although he cannot the elements of litis pendentia are present or recover more than once. where a final judgment in one case will amount to "In either of these situations (choice of venue or res judicata in the other.55 choice of remedy), the litigant actually shops for a There is res judicata when (1) there is a final forum of his action. This was the original conceptjudgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has of the term forum shopping. jurisdiction over the subject matter and the

"Eventually, however, instead of actually making a parties; (3) the judgment or order is on the merits; choice of the forum of their actions, litigants,and (4) there is between the two cases identity of through the encouragement of their lawyers, fileparties, subject matter and causes of action. 56 their actions in all available courts, or invoke allMeasured by the foregoing yardstick, Dr. Climaco is relevant remedies simultaneously. This practicenot guilty of forum shopping. While it is true that had not only resulted to (sic) conflicting the parties are identical in the NLRC and in the adjudications among different courts andSSC, the reliefs sought and the causes of action are consequent confusion enimical (sic) to an orderly different. administration of justice. It had created extreme inconvenience to some of the parties to the action. Admittedly, Dr. Climacos basis in filing the cases before the NLRC and the SSC is his Retainer "Thus, forum-shopping had acquired a different Agreement with the company. This does not mean, concept which is unethical professional legal however, that his causes of action are the same: practice. And this necessitated or had given rise to the formulation of rules and canons discouragingx x x Some authorities declare the distinction between demands or rights of action which are or altogether prohibiting the practice." single and entire and those which are several and What therefore started both in conflicts of laws and distinct to be that the former arise out of one and in our domestic law as a legitimate device for the same act or contract and the latter out of solving problems has been abused and misused to different acts or contracts. This rule has been assure scheming litigants of dubious reliefs.51 declared to be unsound, however, and as evidence Thus, in order to prevent forum shopping, the 1997 of its unsoundness, reference has been made to Rules of Civil Procedure now provide: the fact that several promissory notes may, and SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. Theoften do, grow out of one and the same plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in transaction, and yet they do not constitute an the complaint or other initiatory pleading assertingentire demand. The better rule is that the bare fact a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification that different demands spring out of the same or annexed thereto and simultaneously filedcontract does not ipso facto render a judgment on therewith: (a) that he has not theretoforeone a bar to a suit on another, however distinct. It commenced any action or filed any claim involvingis clear that the right of a plaintiff to maintain the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-separate actions cannot be determined by the fact judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, that the claims might have been prosecuted in a no such other action or claim is pending therein; single action. A plaintiff having separate demands (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a against a defendant may, at his election, join them complete statement of the present status thereof; in the same action, or he may prosecute them and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same separately, subject of the power of the court to or similar action or claim has been filed or is order their consolidation. There may be only one pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) cause of action although the plaintiff is entitled to days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaidseveral forms and kinds of relief, provided there is not more than one primary right sought to be complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. 52 enforced or one subject of controversy presented Forum shopping is not only strictly prohibited but for adjudication.57 (Underscoring supplied) also condemned. So much so that "[f]ailure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall notAs the SSC and the CA correctly observed, different be curable by mere amendment of the initiatory laws are applicable to the cases before the two pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the tribunals. The Labor Code and pertinent social case without prejudice. The submission of a false legislations would govern the cases before the certification or non-compliance with any of the NLRC, while the Social Security Law would govern

91

the case before the SSC. Clearly, as the issues G.R. No. 159186 June 5, 2009 pending before the NLRC and the SSC are diverse,JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner, a ruling on the NLRC cases would not amount to vs. res judicata in the case before the SSC. HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, The elements of litis pendentia are absent. Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Lastly, petitioners contend that the petition of Dr. Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch Climaco before the SSC is defective because there 1, General Santos City; COURT OF APPEALS, were pending actions between the same parties PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO, and involving the same issues in different fora.58 Respondents. For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) DECISION identity of the parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (2) PERALTA, J.: identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule the relief founded on the same facts; and (3) 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the identity of the two cases such that judgment inissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or one, regardless of which party is successful, wouldissuance of status quo order seeking to annul and amount to res judicata in the other.59 set aside the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals In the case under review, there is no litis pendentia (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's to speak of. As previously explained, although themotion for reconsideration of the Decision2 dated parties in the cases before the NLRC and the SSC April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250. are similar, the nature of the cases filed, the rightsThe facts of the case are as follows: asserted, and reliefs prayed for in each tribunal, Petitioner Jesse Y . Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are different.lawp++il are engaged in the real estate business through As a last attempt, however, petitioners invoke Rule their company Primetown Property Group. 16, Section 1(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners contend that the petition Dr. Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several Climaco lodged with the SSC is "another action" real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases, petitioner issued prohibited by the Rule.60 several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) In Solancio v. Ramos,61 the issue centered onpostdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses whether the pending administrative case before Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie the Bureau of Lands is "another action," whichand Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks would justify the dismissal of the complaint offrom Evelyn. plaintiff against defendants before the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Cagayan. Ruling inIn the beginning, the first few checks were honored the negative, the Court noted that "both parties as by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when well as the trial court have missed the extent orthe remaining checks were deposited with the meaning of the ground of the motion to dismiss as drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason contemplated under the Rules of Court." 62 Mr.that the "Account is Closed." Demands were made Justice Regala, who wrote the opinion of the Court, by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to explained the phrase "another action" in this wise: the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts This is not what is contemplated under the law represented by the said checks. because under Section 1(d), Rule 16 (formerly Rule 8) of the Rules of Court, [now Rule 1, Section 16(e) On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a of the Rules of Court, supra] one of the grounds forcivil action for collection of sum of money, the dismissal of an action is that "there is another damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the action pending between the same parties for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment same cause." Note that the Rule uses the phrase against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court "another action." This phrase should be construed(RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as Civil 3 in line with Section 1 of Rule 2, which defines the Case No. 6231. On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a similar word action, thus action, which was docketed as Civil Case No. "Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, 6238.4 by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or theSubsequently, on various dates, the Office of the prevention or redress of a wrong. Every otherCity Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for violation of Batas Pambansa remedy is a special proceeding."63 Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Evidently, there is no "another action" pending Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General between petitioners and Dr. Climaco at the time Santos City. The criminal complaints were docketed when the latter filed a petition before the SSC. as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the 34869, and Criminal Case No. 35522-I.5 appealed decision AFFIRMED. In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings.6 Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended

92

until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved. The MTCC, in its Orders7 dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration 8 relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I.9 The subsequent motions were denied in the Order10 dated October 18, 2000.

QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME CHECKS). 2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.20

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of The main contention of the petitioner is that a Preliminary Injunction11 before the RTC, docketedprejudicial question, as defined by law and as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is the discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On July 2, petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 2001, the RTC issued an Order 12 denying the6238 for collection of sum of money and damages petition. were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 13of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the which was denied in an Order dated October 18, pending civil cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from the 2001.14 petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petitionissue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus withcases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo Orderrules that there is no valid consideration for the and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 15 docketed ascheck's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it CA-G.R. SP No. 68250. necessarily follows that he could not also be held On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision 16liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CAPetitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not requires, among other elements, that the check pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of should have been issued for account or for value. the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be rightfully The CA ruled: pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involvedbank to stop payment and to close his account in therein is not the validity of the sale as incorrectly order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether ormade this order due to the failure of Evelyn to not the complainants therein are entitled to collect deliver to him the titles to the purchased from the petitioner the sum or the value of the properties to him. checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this Court to state that the sale and On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor the rediscounting of the checks are twoGeneral (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial transactions, separate and distinct from eachquestion in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which other. It so happened that in the subject civil cases would warrant the suspension of the proceedings it is not the sale that is in question, but rather the in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 rediscounting of the checks. Therefore, petitioner'sagainst the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is contention that the main issue involved in said civil not the validity of the sale between the petitioner cases is the validity of the sale stands on hollow and Evelyn, but whether the complainants therein ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of are entitled to damages arising from the checks. the sale that is contested in the subject civil cases,These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor then, We cannot fathom why the petitioner never of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same contested such sale by filing an action for the checks to private complainants. The checks were annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of his answer that the sale be declared null and void. funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 andsuch issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue 6238 are tried and the resolution of the issues of whether petitioner 21 may be held liable for therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom that violation of B.P. Blg. 22. the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore forThe present case hinges on the determination of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.17 whether there exists a prejudicial question that Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 18necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in which was denied in the Order19 dated July 17,the MTCC. 2003. We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to Hence, the petition assigning the following errors: deny the petition. 1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue

93

that must be preemptively resolved before theFurther, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,27 that: latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. raised in the civil action is resolved would be 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, rationale behind the principle of prejudicial we have declared that it is not the non-payment of question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has an obligation which the law punishes. The law is two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay an issue similar or intimately related to the issuehis debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of such issue determines whether or not the of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious criminal action may proceed.22 effects on the public interest, the practice is

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not or the issue in one is intimately related to the as an offense against property, but an offense issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said question would likely exist, provided the other that a check issued as an evidence of debt element or characteristic is satisfied. It mustthough not intended to be presented for payment appear not only that the civil case involves the has the same effect as an ordinary check and same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22. would be based, but also that the resolution of the x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check issues raised in the civil action would be whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence evidence of pre-existing debt - is malum of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the prohibitum. civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action To determine the reason for which checks are based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity issued, or the terms and conditions for their that the civil case be determined first before taking issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public up the criminal case, the civil case does not reposes in the stability and commercial value of involve a prejudicial question.23 Neither is there achecks as currency substitutes, and bring about prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal havoc in trade and in banking communities. So action can, according to law, proceedwhat the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it independently of each other.24 was issued or the terms and conditions relating to The issue in the criminal cases is whether the its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in check is malum prohibitum.28 the civil case, it is whether the private respondents 29 are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint or the value of the checks that they have for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of rediscounted from Evelyn.lavvphil an alleged double sale. While the civil case was The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action pending, an information for estafa was filed against is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising from accused in the criminal cases against him, and the same alleged double sale, subject matter of there is no necessity that the civil case be the civil complaint. The Court ruled that there was determined first before taking up the criminala prejudicial question considering that the defense cases. in the civil case was based on the very same facts In the aforementioned civil actions, even ifthat would be determinative of the guilt or petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of innocence of the accused in the estafa case. the value of the checks and damages, he cannot The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as be adjudged free from criminal liability for violationthe determination of whether the petitioner is of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthlessliable to pay the private respondents the value of checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or to support the checks is in itself an offense.25 innocence of the petitioner because the material In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial question underquestion in the criminal cases is whether petitioner determination was whether the daily interest rate had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose of 5% was void, such that the checks issued by or condition of its issuance. respondents to cover said interest were likewiseGuided by the following legal precepts, it is clear void for being contra bonos mores, and thus thethat the determination of the issues involved in cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum resolving the issue, We ruled that "whether or not of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or the interest rate imposed by petitioners isinnocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for eventually declared void for being contra bonos violation of B.P. Blg. 22. mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the consideration may be raised as a defense during primordial question posed before the court hearingthe trial of the criminal cases against him. The the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been validity and merits of a partys defense and breached; that is, if a bouncing check has beenaccusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought before the issued." court, are better ventilated during trial proper.

94

Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law issues similar or intimately related such that in the is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or to examine and to put to test all their respective innocence of the accused would necessarily be allegations and evidence through a well designed determined. In other words, private respondent machinery termed "trial." Thus, all the defensesclaimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial available to the accused should be invoked in the question as against the criminal cases. trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proper forum that should ascertain the facts and proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to against the petitioner. Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial In fine, the CA committed no reversible error inQuestion7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no affirming the decision of the RTC. prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and thethe contract upon which the bouncing checks were Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution issued is a separate and distinct issue from the dated July 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED. Court states that one of the elements of a SO ORDERED. prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009 subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case. vs. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents. DECISION Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:

Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued VELASCO, JR., J.: as the same are without consideration, then the The Case instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision 1 in SCAcase by the herein accused did not detract from No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),the correctness of her cause, since a motion for Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any the Orders dated October 16, 2007 2 and March 12,time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 8 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by111, Revised Rules of Court). the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las In an Order dated March 12, 2008, 9 the MTC denied Pias City. petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007. The Facts On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through itsPetitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice- Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. issued the assailed decision dated August 26, Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the 20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled: (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola Additionally, it must be stressed that the with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear information for violation of BP 22 against private evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitledare still in their initial stages when the civil action People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joinedwas filed after the criminal action was instituted by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against does not render the issues in the civil action any 10 petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 5less prejudicial in character. for the rescission of an alleged constructionHence, we have this petition under Rule 45. agreement between the parties, as well as for The Issue damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART consideration of the construction agreement. OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 6 BASIS OF "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL 24, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11 that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and

95

The Courts Ruling This petition must be granted. The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case. We cannot agree with private respondent.

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as First off, it is a basic precept in statutory amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June construction that a "change in phraseology by 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a amendment of a provision of law indicates a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. legislative intent to change the meaning of the 5, which states: provision from that it originally had." 14 In the SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. Theinstant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar orinvolved in a prejudicial question in relation to the intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action. This interpretation is further criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" determines whether or not the criminal action may directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments proceed. except to qualify the relationship of the civil and Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases 12 thatcriminal actions, that the civil action must precede the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated inthe criminal action. the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena 15 People,13 are: that: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold an issue similar or intimately related to the issuethat Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in of such issue determines whether or not the denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil criminal action may proceed. Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads: Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal 111, which applies here and now provides: action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.Thequestion in a civil action may be filed in the office elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the of the prosecutor or the court conducting the previously instituted civil action involves an issue preliminary investigation. When the criminal action similar or intimately related to the issue raised in has been filed in court for trial, the petition to the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action resolution of such issue determines whether or not at any time before the prosecution rests. the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The supplied.) elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order previously instituted civil action involves an issue for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, similar or intimately related to the issue raised in thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the established that the civil case was filed previous to resolution of such issue determines whether or not the filing of the criminal case. This, petitionerthe criminal action may proceed. argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is that is related to a pending criminal action in order understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision to delay the proceedings in the latter. before a final judgment can be rendered in the On the other hand, private respondent cites Article criminal action with which said question is closely 36 of the Civil Code which provides: connected. The civil action must be instituted prior Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be to the institution of the criminal action. In this decided before any criminal prosecution may becase, the Information was filed with the instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil rules of court which the Supreme Court shall Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in promulgate and which shall not be in conflict withCivil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.) the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.) Private respondent argues that the phrase "beforeAdditionally, it is a principle in statutory any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may construction that "a statute should be construed proceed" must be interpreted to mean that anot only to be consistent with itself but also to prejudicial question exists when the civil action is harmonize with other laws on the same subject filed either before the institution of the criminal matter, as to form a complete, coherent and 16 action or during the pendency of the criminal intelligible system." This principle is consistent action. Private respondent concludes that there is with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Ruleslegibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every

96

statute must be so construed and harmonized withequipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting other statutes as to form a uniform system of that the civil case was instituted more than two jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l and a half (2 ) years from the time that private In other words, every effort must be made torespondent allegedly stopped construction of the harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only proposed building for no valid reason. More when harmonization is impossible that resort must importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of be made to choosing which law to apply. consideration was filed more than three (3) years In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code andfrom the execution of the construction agreement. Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that wouldEvidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances harmonize both provisions of law. The phrasesurrounding the filing of the cases involved here "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule show that the filing of the civil action was a mere 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of afterthought on the part of private respondent and alternative interpretations. The clause "before any interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by criminal prosecution may be instituted or maypetitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend private respondents positions cannot be left to the criminal action may be filed during thestand. preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not or court conducting the investigation, or during the Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal trial with the court hearing the case. Action This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the In any event, even if the civil case here was Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil no prejudicial question to speak of that would Code, which provides for the situations when the justify the suspension of the proceedings in the motion to suspend the criminal action during thecriminal case. preliminary investigation or during the trial may beTo reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question filed. Sec. 6 provides: under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an question.A petition for suspension of the criminal issue similar or intimately related to the issue action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) question in a civil action may be filed in the office the resolution of such issue determines whether or of the prosecutor or the court conducting thenot the criminal action may proceed. preliminary investigation. When the criminal action Petitioner argues that the second element of a has been filed in court for trial, the petition to prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such at any time before the prosecution rests. rule cannot apply to the present controversy. Thus, under the principles of statutory Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of if the construction agreement between the parties the Civil Code that should govern in order to giveis declared null and void for want of consideration, effect to all the relevant provisions of law. the checks issued in consideration of such contract It bears pointing out that the circumstanceswould become mere scraps of paper and cannot be present in the instant case indicate that the filing the basis of a criminal prosecution. of the civil action and the subsequent move to We find for petitioner. suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere It must be remembered that the elements of the afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows: proceedings. (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; In Sabandal v. Tongco, 18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or performance, overpayment, and damages, and a issuer that at the time of issue there are no criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee the civil action would not determine the guilt or bank for the payment of such check in full upon innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In its presentment; and resolving the case, we said: (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years the bank to stop payment.20 after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for criminal cases.19 valuable consideration does not make up the Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in institution of the criminal complaint and from thea long line of cases21 that the agreement time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its

97

surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks isinsufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled: Therefore, it is clear that the second element It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the required for the existence of a prejudicial question, offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The that the resolution of the issue in the civil action purpose for which the check was issued, the terms would determine whether the criminal action may and conditions relating to its issuance, or any proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no agreement surrounding such issuance areprejudicial question exists and the rules on it are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction ofinapplicable to the case before us. petitioner. To determine the reason for which WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch public reposes in the stability and commercial 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders dated October value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. havoc in trade and in banking communities. The 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch. prohibitum. No costs. Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of SO ORDERED. valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010 for violation of BP 22, to wit: JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued vs. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and on account or for value. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that DECISION upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the CARPIO, J.: same was issued for valuable consideration. The Case Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the party who makes the contract, or some the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility,on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867. to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or The Antecedent Facts undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals the contract, such as the maker or indorser. decision: In this case, petitioner himself testified that he On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y signed several checks in blank, the subject check Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from thefrustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel proceeds of loans that will be made from said (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04account. This is a valuable consideration for which 130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon the check was issued. That there was neither a City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon pre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurredCity). on the part of petitioner when the subject check On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons was given by Bautista to private complainant on to appear before the Regional Trial Court of July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the preconnected with Unlad or Bautista starting July trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 ( Maria 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he has severed his relationship with Bautista under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground or Unlad. of psychological incapacity. At any rate, we have held that what the law On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since This is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the relationship between the offender and the the making of worthless checks and putting them victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of into circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.) Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case criminal case filed against him before the RTC declares that the construction agreement between Quezon City. the parties is void for lack of consideration, this The Decision of the Trial Court would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May matter is that private respondent indeed issued 20053 holding that the pendency of the case before checks which were subsequently dishonored for the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that

98

warrants the suspension of the criminal caseThe rule is clear that the civil action must be before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues instituted first before the filing of the criminal in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries action. In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated sustained by respondent and whether the case Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled could be tried even if the validity of petitionersto RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC stamped date of receipt on the Information. The Quezon City ruled: RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Civil Case No. Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of Petitioner was served summons in 8 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. Respondents the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack 9 petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 of merit, DENIED. November 2004 and was filed on 5 November SO ORDERED.4 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its filed after the filing of the criminal case for 22 August 2005 Order,5 the RTC Quezon Cityfrustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal denied the motion. Procedure was not met since the civil action was Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 in Criminal Case for Parricide August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a The Decision of the Court of Appeals prejudicial question that would warrant the In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals suspension of the criminal action. dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, There is a prejudicial question when a civil action the issue is whether the offender commenced the and a criminal action are both pending, and there commission of the crime of parricide directly by exists in the civil action an issue which must be overt acts and did not perform all the acts of preemptively resolved before the criminal action execution by reason of some cause or accidentmay proceed because howsoever the issue raised other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the in the civil action is resolved would be of the other hand, the issue in the civil action for determinative of the guilt or innocence 10 A prejudicial annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is accused in the criminal case. psychologically incapacitated to comply with the question is defined as: essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved and respondent would be declared void, it wouldtherein, and the cognizance of which pertains to be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts distinct and separate from the crime but so constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had intimately connected with it that it determines the already been committed. The Court of Appealsguilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to ruled that all that is required for the charge of suspend the criminal action, it must appear not frustrated parricide is that at the time of the only that said case involves facts intimately related commission of the crime, the marriage is still to those upon which the criminal prosecution subsisting. would be based but also that in the resolution of Petitioner filed a petition for review before this the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision. determined.11 The Issue The relationship between the offender and the The only issue in this case is whether the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, 12 resolution of the action for annulment of marriage which punishes any person "who shall kill his is a prejudicial question that warrants thefather, mother, or child, whether legitimate or suspension of the criminal case for frustratedillegitimate, or any of his ascendants or parricide against petitioner. descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes The Ruling of this Court the crime of parricide from murder 14 or homicide.15 The petition has no merit. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the Civil Case Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal determinative of the guilt or innocence of the 6 Procedure provides: accused. Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was the criminal action may proceed.

99

charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is damages, and another order denying amendment whether he performed all the acts of execution of the same pleading. which would have killed respondent as aThe events in the court of origin can be consequence but which, nevertheless, did not summarized as follows: produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.16 At the time of the commission ofAppellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her married. The subsequent dissolution of their complaint it was averred that the parties were marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04- neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and 7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged confidential relations; that defendant Icao, crime that was committed at the time of thealthough married, succeeded in having carnal subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and marriage between petitioner and respondent isintimidation, and without her consent; that as a annulled, petitioner could still be held criminallyresult she became pregnant, despite efforts and liable since at the time of the commission of the drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to alleged crime, he was still married to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees. respondent.1avvphi1 We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial declarationfor lack of cause of action since the complaint did of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of not allege that the child had been born; and after psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained the celebration of the marriage insofar as the defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of theto allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff judicial declaration of nullity of a second or had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, subsequent marriage on the ground ofsustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no psychological incapacity on a criminal liability foramendment was allowable, since the original bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial questioncomplaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court. that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab We find the appealed orders of the court below to initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 Inbe untenable. A conceived child, although as yet fact, the Court declared in that case that "a unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly the ground of psychological incapacity is of provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the absolutely no moment insofar as the States penalPhilippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the laws are concerned."19 defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in even if the said child is only " en ventre de sa Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04- unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by 7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored of petitioner in the criminal case. by the parent in his testament may result in WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM preterition of a forced heir that annuls the the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appealsinstitution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867. Article 854, Civil Code). SO ORDERED. ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born. G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970 CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee. Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants. Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee. REYES, J.B.L., J.: ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of 'representation.

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (JudgeArticle 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides

100

imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG prescribing that "the conceived child shall be MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL considered born for all purposes that are favorableCORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN to it" adds further "provided it be born later with THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND the conditions specified in the following article" REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents. (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is DECISION completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, the first part of Article 40 would become entirelyunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the useless and ineffective. Manresa, in hisDecision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the correspondingResolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the this out: Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no sonrespondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting bereavement tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en his unborn child. estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento delThe antecedent facts of the case are as follows: sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento deHortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental aquellos derechos (que ya existian deSteel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental antemano), sino que se trata de un hechoSteel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa,Manggagawa ng Centro Steel CorporationSolidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Op. cit., page 271) Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 A second reason for reversing the orders appealed January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, from is that for a married man to force a woman Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her between Continental and the Union, which reads: to claim compensation for the damage caused. ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes lossx x x x or injury to another in a manner that is Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company contrary to morals, good customs or public agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to policy shall compensate the latter for the any employee in case of death of the employees damage. legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 brothers and sisters) based on the following: of the same Code: 2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 ART 2219. Moral damages may bedays recovered in the following and analogous 2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days cases: xxxx (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS lascivious acts: xxxx xxx xxx xxx (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and accidental 21, 26, 27, 28 .... insurance to the employee or his family in the Thus, independently of the right to Support of the following manner: child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the x x x x complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to 4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred state a cause of action was doubly in error. Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the legitimate dependents (parents, WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversedemployees spouse, and children). In case the employee is and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).4 So ordered. G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009 CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. 5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to

101

fetal Anoxia insufficiency.6

secondary

to

uteroplacentalin favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.

Continental Steel immediately granted HortillanosOn the other hand, Continental Steel posited that claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for the express provision of the CBA did not bereavement leave and other death benefits, contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, consisting of the death and accident insurance.7 without legal personality. It claimed that there are Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continentaltwo elements for the entitlement to the benefits, Steel of Hortillanos claims for bereavement and namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate other death benefits, the Union resorted to thedependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despitecase. Continental 16 and 42 of the Civil Code, contended that only one the series of conferences held, the parties still with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn 8 failed to settle their dispute, prompting the Union child never died because it never acquired juridical to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National personality. Proceeding from the same line of Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), that was dead from the moment of delivery was 9 National Capital Region (NCR). In a Submission not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired Continental Steel submitted for voluntary juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other deathdead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2 the right to be supported. and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, anContinental Steel maintained that the wording of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve saidthe CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, issue.11 the legally accepted definitions thereof were When the preliminary conferences again proveddeemed automatically accepted by both parties. futile in amicably settling the dispute, the partiesThe failure of the Union to have unborn child proceeded to submit their respective Positionincluded in the definition of dependent, as used in Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty.the CBA the death of whom would have qualified Montao. the parent-employee for bereavement leave and The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to other death benefits bound the Union to the bereavement leave and other death benefits legally accepted definition of the latter term. pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of involving the employees of its sister companies, the CBA did not specifically state that the MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the dependent should have first been born alive or Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, must have acquired juridical personality so that given the separate and distinct personalities of the his/her subsequent death could be covered by the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein claim that the grant of bereavement leave and employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) other death benefits to the parent-employee for and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel),the loss of an unborn child constituted "company sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar practice." situations as Hortillano were able to receive death On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs. appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a The Union mentioned in particular the case of Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayerbereavement leave with pay and death benefits. Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery.Atty. Montao identified the elements for Dugan was able to receive paternity leave,entitlement to said benefits, thus: bereavement leave, and voluntary contributionThis Office declares that for the entitlement of the under the CBA between his union and Mayerbenefit of bereavement leave with pay by the Steel.15 Dugans child was only 24 weeks in the covered employees as provided under Article X, womb and died before labor, as opposed toSection 2 of the parties CBA, three (3) Hortillanos child who was already 37-38 weeks in indispensable elements must be present: (1) there the womb and only died during labor. is "death"; (2) such death must be of employees The Union called attention to the fact that MKK "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same "legitimate". compound as Continental Steel; and the On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who death and accident insurance as provided under signed the CBA with their respective employees Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the unions were the same as the representatives ofparties CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA withbe present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death the Union. must be of employees "dependent"; (c) such and (d) proper Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil dependent must be "legitimate"; 18 legal document to be presented. Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that

102

the death of an employees legitimate dependentand grief to the affected employee, with whom the occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. by the parents from the very moment he/she was [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and conceived. The fetus had to rely on another fortechnical significance to the term "death of a support; he/she could not have existed or legitimate dependent" as condition for granting sustained himself/herself without the power or aidbereavement leave and death benefits under the of someone else, specifically, his/her mother.CBA. Following [Continental Steels] theory, there Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The although he/she died during the labor or delivery.Court, however, does not share this view. A dead There was also no question that Hortillano and his fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less wife were lawfully married, making their than "loss of human life", especially for the dependent, unborn child, legitimate. expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the In the end, Atty. Montao decreed: employee and the latters immediate family, WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution isextend to them solace and support, rather than an hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner act conferring legal status or personality upon the Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-the certificate of fetal death is for statistical Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing hispurposes only sadly misses this crucial point.20 bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00)Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 representing death benefits, or a total amount of Decision of the Court of Appeals reads: P16,489.00 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, ispetition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD. Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully With costs against [herein petitioner Continental abide with the herein dispositions. Steel].21 Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 19 underAppeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration 23 of Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed Continental Steel. as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697. Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred persistently argues that the CBA is clear and in granting Hortillanos claims for bereavement unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning leave with pay and other death benefits because of death should be applied. Only one with juridical no death of an employees dependent had personality can die and a dead fetus never occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage acquired a juridical personality. of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA We are not persuaded. was the death of a legal person, and not that of a As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for fetus, which did not acquire any juridicalbereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of personality. Continental Steel pointed out that itsthe CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a contention was bolstered by the fact that the termdependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or death was qualified by the phrase legitimate sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations dependent. It asserted that the status of a child of the dependent to the employee. The requisites could only be determined upon said childs birth, for death and accident insurance under Article otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence,XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the the conditions sine qua non for Hortillanosdeath must be of a dependent, who could be a entitlement to bereavement leave and other deathparent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or benefits under the CBA were lacking. a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 and (4) presentation of the proper legal document February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos Resolution to prove such death, e.g., death certificate. dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court It is worthy to note that despite the repeated interpreted death to mean as follows: assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of [Herein petitioner Continental Steels] expositionthe CBA are clear and unambiguous, its on the legal sense in which the term "death" is fundamental argument for denying Hortillanos used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the claim for bereavement leave and other death same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose,benefits rests on the purportedly proper of the terms "death" and which the grant of bereavement leave and death interpretation "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, the acquisition of civil personality of a child or then there is no need to resort to the interpretation fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental delivery, it does not follow that such event of Steel itself admitted that neither management nor premature delivery of a fetus could never be the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the bereavement leave and other death benefits CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing lossduring the negotiation of the CBA.

103

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz: and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition ofA legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the conceived child acquires personality only when it is element of lawful union and there is strictly no born, and Article 41 defines when a child is legitimate filiation between parents and child. considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more personality is extinguished by death. emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant born during the marriage of the parents are herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on legitimate." (Emphasis ours.) natural persons, must be applied in relation to Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the illegitimate child to be as follows: general provisions on civil personality, which reads: The fine distinctions among the various types of Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be illegitimate children have been eliminated in the the subject of legal relations, is inherent in everyFamily Code. Now, there are only two classes of natural person and is lost only through death. children -- legitimate (and those who, like the Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. children) and illegitimate. All children conceived We need not establish civil personality of the and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It (Emphasis ours.) is not a question before us whether the unborn It is apparent that according to the Family Code child acquired any rights or incurred any and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or obligations prior to his/her death that were passed illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her on to or assumed by the childs parents. The rights conception. In the present case, it was not to bereavement leave and other death benefits indisputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly the instant case pertain directly to the parents of married and that their child was conceived during the unborn child upon the latters death. said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Codeupon her conception.1avvphi1 do not provide at all a definition of death.Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides able to comply with the fourth element entitling that civil personality may be extinguished byhim to death and accident insurance under the death, it does not explicitly state that only those CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of who have acquired juridical personality could die. his unborn child. And third, death has been defined as the cessation Given the existence of all the requisites for of life.24 Life is not synonymous with civilbereavement leave and other death benefits under personality. One need not acquire civil personality the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should first before he/she could die. Even a child inside have been granted by Continental Steel. the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from We emphasize that bereavement leave and other conception,25 that the State must protect equallydeath benefits are granted to an employee to give with the life of the mother. If the unborn already aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief the child being delivered, qualifies as death. and sense of loss arising from the death of their Likewise, the unborn child can be considered aunborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on less than that of parents whose child was born another for support; one not able to exist or alive but died subsequently. sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition, 26Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. provisions on bereavement leave and other death Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life weeks of its gestational life without depending to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in in the interpretation of any law or provision question that the dependent may be the parent,affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor 29 spouse, or child of a married employee; or the of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. CBA did not provide a qualification for the child In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations 30 dependent, such that the child must have been Commission, we pronounced: born or must have acquired civil personality, as Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that then child shall be understood in its more general"when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the and the forces are equal on both sides, the same mothers womb. must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner The term legitimate merely addresses theacknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation dependent childs status in relation to his/her of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we havelabor, it insists that what is involved-here is the

104

amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold. In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that: When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counterbalanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared: Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation. SO ORDERED.

105