IV. TERMINATION OF RELATIONS a. Modes of Termination in General CELSO A. FERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. CECILIO LEDESMA, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

F: Celso A. Fernandez was appointed ad interim chief of police of Basilan City on January 7, 1954, took his oath of office on the same date, and his appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on April 21, 1954. On June 8, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia, in an administrative order, suspended Fernandez for one month for having been found guilty of gross negligence, violation of law, and dereliction of duty. Fernandez was later charged before the Court of First Instance of Basilan City with two offenses, one for disobedience of an order of his superior officer (Criminal Case No. 368) and another for oral defamation (Criminal Case No. 438), for which he was suspended from office by the then Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon. He asked that his order of suspension be lifted but it was denied. After the prosecution had rested its case and without requiring the accused to submit his defense, the latter was acquitted in the two criminal cases abovementioned. Nevertheless, Fernandez continued suspended even if no formal administrative charges were instituted against him, or any administrative investigation conducted of said charges. On April 28, 1959, the then Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo wrote Fernandez informing him that the President has terminated his services as chief of police of Basilan City and has designated Cecilio Ledesma in his place requesting him at the same time to turn over his office to Ledesma. The nomination of Ledesma having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, he took his oath of office as new chief of police of Basilan City on May 26, 1959. Whereupon, Fernandez instituted an action for quo warranto with mandamus against Ledesma before the Court of First Instance of Basilan City seeking his reinstatement on the ground that his removal from office without cause as provided by law was in violation of our Constitution. The court a quo, after hearing, dismissed the complaint holding that the removal of petitioner from office by the President was made in accordance with Section 17 of Republic Act 288 known as the Charter of the City of Basilan, whereupon Fernandez appealed to this Court on purely questions of law.

Under Section 17 of Republic Act 288, known as the Charter of the City of Basilan, the President is vested with authority to appoint, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, among others, the chief of police, and in connection with such power the same section says "the President may remove at his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal judge, who may be removed only according to law." The legislative intent is to make the continuance in office of any of said appointive officers, except the municipal judge, dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Otherwise, it would not have made a distinction in point of removal between appointive officers in general and the municipal judge. The fact that no term of office is fixed for the position of chief of police under the said Act is indicative of an intention to make it dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the appointing power, and Congress is not wanting in power to do so, for the duration of an individual's incumbency in a public office is either fixed by law or at the pleasure of the creating power. The ruling of this Court in the cases of De Los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289; 48 Off. Gaz., 1791 and Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz., 93, cannot be invoked, because those cases, unlike the present, relate to positions for which the law fixes a definite term of office.

JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, ELEUTERIO CAPAPAS, Commissioner of Customs, JAMES H. KEEFE, Acting Director of Security, and JUAN C. PAJO, Executive Secretary,petitioners, vs. EPIFANIO T. VILLEGAS and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs, with compensation at P6,000, effective November 1, 1955. In 1956, he was sent to the United States to study enforcement techniques and customs practices under the technical assistance program of the National Economic Council and the International Cooperation Administration. Villegas returned to the Philippines in June, 1957. Shortly thereafter, he was temporarily detailed to the Arrastre Service vice Eleazar Manikan and, in his

stead, James Keefe was designated Acting Director for Security. While he was acting Arrastre Superintendent, however, Villegas continued receiving his salary as Director for Security and, when the salary was increased from P6,000 to P7,017.60, he also received the corresponding salary adjustment. On January 9, 1958, Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the President the permanent appointment of Villegas as Arrastre Superintendent, stating in his letter that "this (the proposed appointment) involves a change of designation and status from Director for Security which is confidential in nature to Arrastre Superintendent, a classified position." A few days later, the appointment of James Keefe to the position of Director for Security was likewise proposed. On January 14, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo advised Secretary Hernandez that the President had approved the proposed appointments of Villegas and Keefe. Accordingly, Villegas and Keefe's appointments, effective January 1, 1958, were prepared and later signed by Secretary Hernandez. As the Court of Appeals observed in its decision, "In one of the appointments, defendant Keefe was promoted to the position of Director for Security . . . and in the other plaintiff wasdemoted to the rank of arrastre superintendent." (Emphasis supplied) It appears that Villegas did not know of his appointment and that of Keefe until February 28, 1958. On this day, he learned that Keefe was being paid the salary for Director for Security and, on further inquiry, found that he had been appointed Arrastre Superintendent. On March 3, 1958, therefore, he served notice on Customs Commissioner Eleuterio Capapas that he was resuming the duties and functions of his office as Director for Security. He also wrote the Auditor General, Secretary Hernandez and Commissioner Capapas, the Budget Commissioner and the Civil Service Commissioner, asking them to disapprove the promotional appointment of Keefe to the post of Director for Security. When all else failed, Villegas filed this action for quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court gave judgment for Villegas with right to collect back pay as Director for Security from January 1, 1958. Its decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Secretary of Finance, the Customs Commissioner, the incumbent Director for Customs Security and the Executive Secretary have appealed to this Court raising the following issues: (1) Whether the office of Director for Security in the Bureau of Customs is a primarily confidential position, and (2) whether the Director for

Security can be transferred to another position without cause. Their theory is that since the work of the Director which has been delegated to him by the Customs Commissioner is to coordinate the functions of security, patrol and investigation divisions in the Customs Bureau, all of which positions have been declared by Executive Order to be primarily confidential, then the Office of Director for Security must itself be considered primarily confidential. They then justify the transfer of Villegas to the Arrastre Service on the basis of the statement in De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 287, to the effect that positions which are primarily confidential, policy determining and highly technical "are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution."

Even officers and employees of the civil service occupying primarily confidential positions are subject to the constitutional safeguard against removal or suspension except for cause. The statement in the case of De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, to the effect that appointments to positions which are primarily confidential, policy determining and highly technical are terminable at the will of the appointing power, must be deemed a mere obiter. Officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office. c. Retirement HILARION BERONILLA, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, its BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET AL., respondents. A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the Board of Trustee of the respondent Government Service Insurance System of August 9, 1963 to the effect that petitioner "Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be considered compulsorily retired from the service (as Auditor of the Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and void for having been issued, in the words of the petition, "in excess of the powers granted to it by law,

a wanton abuse of discretion, violation of contracts, removal or forced retirement without due process of law and to declare all acts heretofore taken in implementation thereof also void, and to prohibit said respondent and its representatives from carrying out or implementing the aforesaid resolution." Acting on petitioner's prayer for preliminary injunction, on August 26, 1963, this Court issued the writ prayed for upon petitioner's filing an injunction bond in the amount of P1,000.00. At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was acting as and performing the duties of Auditor of the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had occupied many other positions in the government and had been a member of the GSIS during all times required by law. In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement insurance as well as his application to be allowed to take civil service examinations, ten times from 1917 to 1925, petitioner uniformly indicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also indicated the same date of birth in his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660. On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor General, that his date of birth indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900. According to the petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise of his mother that petitioner discovered that his true date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in 1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he was already 18 years old for the reason that his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he would be already twentyone years of age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the municipality; that since then he had been looking for people who could attest to his true date of birth and it was only in September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons of their town, Felix Alberne and Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former had been a member of the provincial board and the latter is a retired justice of the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service Commissioner was supported by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was endorsed by the Commission to the GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil Service Commission." In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who, on October 22, 1959, denied the same since "all official records point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of Mr. Hilarion Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial, petitioner submitted additional evidence to support his request. This evidence

consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the Philippine Institute of Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as January 14, 1900. This additional evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal Counsel reiterated his former denial. Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to the General Manager of the System who at that time was Mr. Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General Manager, Mr. F. G. Araa, in a memorandum dated May 30, 1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the foot thereof over his initials, thus indicating approval of the requested change. Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the date of birth of petitioner to January 14, 1900 were sent to the Auditor General and the Commissioner of Civil Service and the proceeds of petitioner's policy was recomputed The Legal Counsel whose title and rank had been meanwhile changed to Assistant General Manager for Legal Affairs later communicated the aforesaid decision of the General Manager to the Philippine National Bank on November 2, 1962 and the Deputy Auditor General on November 12, 1962, by letter and indorsement, respectively. As emphasized by petitioner, in the letter to the Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth has been adjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand, in the 2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made clear that relative to petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on November 30, 1957, corresponding adjustment or recomputation of the maturity value had been effected on the basis of his changed date of birth. In the meantime, upon application of petitioner, on October 1, 1960, he was issued a new life policy No. 335778 indicating his date of birth as January 14, 1900. Regarding his abovementioned policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960, demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of P131.09, due to the adjustment of his date of birth, which demand, petitioner promptly complied with. Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of birth, more specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to the Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of petitioner and stated that "in the course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine National Bank, it was found that Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since January 15, 1963, his salary allowances and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory retirement from the government service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved June 16, 1961." Acting on this letter, the Board referred the same to

Assistant General Manager and Actuary, Dr. Manuel Bizon, then in charge of the Claims Department. The latter submitted a memorandum on August 6, 1963 stating the facts and evidence in the GSIS records concerning the determination of the date of birth of petitioner, including the actions aforementioned taken thereon by Mr. Andal and the Legal Counsel. On August 9, 1963, the Board adopted the disputed resolution without even notifying petitioner of Mr. Mathay's letter and without giving him any opportunity to be heard regarding the same. Upon these facts, it is the theory of petitioner that the approval by General Manager Andal of his request for the change of the date of his birth in the official records of the GSIS from January 14, 1898 to January 14, 1900, after the same had been previously denied by the Legal Counsel, could not be legally altered or modified by the Board of Trustees, not only because the power to decide such matter finally is legally lodged in the General Manager and not in the Legal Counsel, nor in the Board, but also because even if the Board were assumed to have authority to review the acts of the General Manager, it was either guilty of laches or estopped from revising the same; and, furthermore, in approving the resolution in dispute, the Board of Trustees had denied due process to petitioner and impaired the obligations of the contract between petitioner and the GSIS regarding his retirement. In other words, the main issue before Us in this case is one of power and does not call for Our determination of whether petitioner's real date of birth is January 14, 1898 or January 14, 1900. Accordingly, all We have to decide is whether or not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its powers when it reversed the approval by General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the change of his date of birth, taking all circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of res adjudicata, laches, estoppel, denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations. After carefully going over the facts on record and considering all pertinent legal principles and statutory provisions, particularly Commonwealth Act 186, the Charter of the GSIS, as amended, together with the relevant resolutions of the Board of Trustees, We have decided to uphold the superior authority of the Board over the General Manager and to dismiss this petition. We do not deem it necessary to pass upon petitioner's initial proposition, pressed vigorously, to be sure, to the effect that as between the previous denial by the Legal Counsel and the subsequent approval by General Manager Andal of his request for the change of his date of birth in the records, the latter, which was precisely the action on his appeal from the Legal Counsel's denial, should prevail. Even granting it to be true that, pursuant to what is generally the practice and the rule, applications for retirement annuities in the GSIS are subject to final approval by the General Manager after its being approved by one of the

Assistant General Managers and/or one or two Department Managers, 1 it is clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General Manager's approval is not beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must be borne in mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by the Board of Trustees . . ." and Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the following powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business." On the other hand, the extent of the functions and powers of the General Manager are defined in Section 18 as follows:

"SEC. 18.Personnel. The Board shall have the power to appoint a general manager, who shall be a person of recognized experience and capacity in the subject of life and social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive officer of the System, one or more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a medical director, and an actuary, and fix their compensation. The general manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint additional personnel whenever and wherever they may be necessary to the effective execution of the provisions of this Act, fix their compensation, remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause. He shall have the power to prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain qualifications to the end that only competent persons may be employed, and appoint committees: Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.

xxx xxx xxx" It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages the System and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business, the Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to act on any matter the Board may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of authority be considered as a full and complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-based prerogative and responsibility to manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide with finality any matter affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board may entrust to the General Manager the power to give final approval to applications for retirement annuities, the finality of such approval

cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General Manager's action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which flows naturally from the ultimate and final responsibility for the proper management of the System imposed upon it by the charter. Incidentally, it may be added that the force of this principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is concerned, for the fiduciary character of the management of the System is rendered more strict by the fact that the funds under its administration are partly contributed by the thousands upon thousands of employees and workers in all the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeed well to remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong to the government, much less to any administration which may happen to be temporarily on the saddle, and that the interests of the mass of its members can only be duly safeguarded if the administrators of the System act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its controlling and managing board called the Board of Trustees. It results, therefore, that the first contention of petitioner cannot be sustained and We hold that any authority conferred upon the General Manager by the Board of Trustees notwithstanding, the said Board may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own sound discretion review the actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the resolution granting the authority expressly gives the character of finality to the General Manager's acts does not constitute such a representation to third persons dealing with the System that such finality is definite even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is not legally possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the System places under its direct responsibility. From another point of view, since the law clearly vests the management in the Board and makes the General Manager only its chief executive officer, all parties dealing with the System must be deemed to be on guard regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to modify or reverse any action of the General Manager and they cannot complain should the Board exercise its powers in the premises. Petitioner posits, however, that even assuming that the Board may have the power to reverse or modify any action of the General Manager in the exercise of his authority, because of the failure of the Board to act from June 2, 1960, when General Manager Andal acted favorably on his request to August 9, 1963, when the Board approved the herein impugned Resolution No. 1497, or for more than three years, during which time corresponding adjustments were made in his GSIS records, payment and life insurance policies and due notices were served by the GSIS itself on all parties concerned on the basis of his changed date of birth, respondent should be considered as guilty of laches or held in estoppel to

change or alter the action of Mr. Andal. While petitioner's posture is not entirely without logic, it falls short of the requirements for the successful invocation of the pleas of laches and estoppel. We have carefully considered the lengthy and rather impressive discussion by petitioner of these points in his petition, memorandum and reply to respondent's memorandum as well as the equally detailed and authority-supported contrary arguments in the answer and memorandum of respondent, and We have arrived at the conclusion that petitioner's position cannot be sustained. It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel actually boil down in this particular case to nothing more than estoppel by silence. With this clarification, it is meet to recall that "mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There must also be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and that " the doctrine of estoppel having its origin in equity and therefore being based on moral and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to a very large extent, upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v. Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610, 614.) Important also it is not to overlook that as regards the actuations of government officials, the general rule is that their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel. (Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., L-18841, January 27, 1969, citing Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; and Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724. See also: Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., L-26862, March 30, 1970, and the cases therein cited.) Moreover, in computing the period of alleged silence or inaction of the Board, what is relevant is not the actual or, what petitioner calls, imputable knowledge of said Board of the favorable action of Mr. Andal. Even if such knowledge had come earlier than May 6, 1963, the date of Mr. Mathay's letter, what is decisive is that it was only thru Mr. Mathay's letter that the Board got notice of the error in Mr. Andal's action. Precisely because it was not incumbent upon the Board, as petitioner himself alleges, to spontaneously or in the ordinary course review the action of the General Manager, any knowledge thereof by the Board, whether actual or imputable, could not, in logic and conscience, have placed the Board on notice of any error or irregularity therein. Consequently, the immediate steps taken by the Board to have the facts alleged in Mr. Mathay's letter verified are inconsistent with the charge of unreasonable delay, much more of laches. The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the age of 65 years is founded on public policy which aims by it to

maintain efficiency in the government service and at the same time give to the retiring public servants the opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate perhaps for their long service and devotion to the government, in the form of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service discipline and the exacting demands that the nature of their work and their relations with their superiors as well as the public would impose upon them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the duty of implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all that the Board has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision of the General Manager in approving the change of date of petitioner's birth, because from the evidence before it, the Board was convinced that the originally recorded date of birth should not be disturbed. We cannot see where the charged inequity of such action of the Board could lie. Above all, it is a must consideration whenever principles of equity are invoked that for such invocation to succeed, it must appear that if the plea is not heeded, the party making the plea will suffer, in truth and in fact, inequity and injury, whether pecuniary or moral or, at least, in a juridical sense. Such is not the case with petitioner. Examining the circumstances of this case, We see nothing inequitous to petitioner in the questioned resolution of the Board of Trustees. For decades back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner made it appear in all material government and public records and in all his representations to respondent System that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated request for a change of said date to January 14, 1900 which would unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise, and correspondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its members, was duly investigated and found not to be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action by the Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority to evaluate such request. True this negative action was reversed by the General Manager, albeit by virtue of a procedure not strictly in accordance with the established one as outlined in footnote 1 of this opinion, but on the other hand, the favorable action of the General Manager was in turn reversed by the Board of Trustees, the final legal authority in the System, upon its being informed of the error thereof. It is to be noted that, after all, it was always the petitioner who made representations to the respondent System as to his date of birth, and not the other way around. All that the System did was to take his representations for what they were worth. He was not believed by the Legal Counsel, but the General Manager did; on the other hand, the authority higher than the General Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous. Under these circumstances, how could the System be in estoppel

where the conflicting representations are of the petitioner rather than of the System?

Anent petitioner's contention that he was denied due process when the Board of Trustees acted on the letter of Mr. Mathay without notifying him thereof or hearing him thereon, suffice it to say that since there is no showing that under the procedure established in the GSIS, such notice and hearing are required, considering that the System operates as a business corporation and generally notice and hearing are not indispensable for due process in corporations, and in any event, inasmuch as what was considered by the Board was nothing more than petitioner's own conflicting representations, and if petitioner really believed he should have been heard, he could have filed a motion for reconsideration or reopening, it cannot be said that indeed he had not had due opportunity to present his side. Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question constitutes an impairment of the obligations of his contract of insurance, it is obvious that the constitutional injunction that is evidently the basis of such argument refers to the legislature and not to resolutions even of government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance policy, apart from not having any real relevance in this case, what is involved being his retirement, contains specific provisions contemplating the correction of any error or mistake in the date of birth of the insured. On the other hand, the retirement of government employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any contractual stipulation. WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against petitioner, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby dissolved.
d. Abolition of Office MARCELINO A. BUSACAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ANTONIO F. BUENAVENTURA, Provincial Treasurer of Pangasinan, The plaintiff was a duly appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector in the office of the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan with station at the Bued toll bridge in Sison, Pangasinan. His appointment was classified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as permanent. after liberation, he was reappointed to that position. In 1946, he resigned but he was reappointed, and had continuously served until 1947. The bridge was destroyed by flood, they were not paid salaries for they have not worked but when the bridge was repaired they continued to work without new appointments until the bridge was washed off by flood in 1947. It was reconstructed and reopened to traffic about

the end of November, 1950. The plaintiff notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his duties as toll collector but said respondent refused to reinstate or reappoint him. Murao, also a civil service eligible, was appointed instead of him. ISSUE: whether or not by the total destruction of the bridge in 1947 the positions of toll collectors provided therefor were abolished. To consider an office abolished there must have been an intention to do away with it wholly and permanently, as the word "abolish" denotes. Here there was never any thought, avowed or apparent, of not rebuilding the aforementioned bridge. The collapse of said bridge did not work to destroy but only to suspend the plaintiff's position, and that upon the bridge's rehabilitation and its reoperation as a toll bridge, his right to the position was similarly and automatically restored. This position is temporary, transitory or precarious only in the sense that its life is coextensive with that of the bridge as a toll bridge. For that matter, all offices created by statute are more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the power of the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except for cause. that the appellant should be reinstated to the position he held before the destruction of the Bued river bridge. Decision of the trial court is reversed in so far as it denies the petitioner's reinstatement, which is hereby decreed, and affirmed with respect to the suit for back salary and damages

By the total destruction of the Bued toll bridge in 1947, were the positions of toll collectors provided therefor abolished? Held: To consider an office abolished there must have been an intention to do away with it wholly and permanently as the word "abolished" denotes. Here there was never any thought, avowed or apparent, of not rebuilding the afore-mentioned bridge. Rather the contrary was taken for granted, so indispensable was that bridge to span vital highways in Northern Luzon and Baguio. This being so, the collapse of said bridge did not work to destroy but only to suspend the position of toll collector thereon, and upon the bridge's rehabilitation and its reoperation as a toll bridge, the toll collector's right to the position was similarly and automatically restored. The toll collector should be reinstated to the position he held before the destruction of the bridge. (Abaya vs. Alvear, 46 Off. Gaz., 962; Garces vs. Bello, 45 Off. Gas., No. 8, p. 3340; Tabora vs. Gavia, 45 Off. Gaz., 1769 and 1776.) The toll collector's claim, however, for back salary and/or damages may not be granted. The respondent Provincial Treasurer is not personally liable therefor nor is he authorized to pay it out of public funds without

proper authorization by the Provincial Board, which is not a party to this suit. Judgments must be responsive to pleadings. (49 C. J. S., 117.) As there can be no issues between plaintiff or defendant and a stranger to the case, no judgment can be rendered for or against one who has not been impleaded. (41 C. J. S. 68.) Not only is there no issue between plaintiff or defendant and a person not a party to an action, but the court has absolutely no jurisdiction of his person. It is an unvarying rule of courts to refrain from making any adjudication the enforcement of which would be left to the discretion or will of the debtor, or any pronouncement which would affect the rights of parties who have not had their day in court. Any declaration holding any officials of the Government liable personally for the payment of the salary of an employee for the time he was kept out of his position, would be unfair as prejudging any suit that might be brought against them in case they refuse. Where there is no proof that a public official acted in bad faith in the performance of his duties, he cannot be condemned to pay from his own private funds any exemplary damages.

Luis Manalang vs Aurelio Quitoriano

Luis Manalang was the Director of the Placement Bureau. However in 1952, a law was passed by Congress abolishing the Placement Bureau (PB). The said bureau was replaced by the National Employment Service (NES). Aurelio Quitoriano, then acting Secretary of Labor, recommended Manalang to be the Commissioner of NES. But then it was Quitoriano who was appointed by the President as the Commissioner of NES. Manalang then filed a quo warranto case against Quitoriano and the two others who succeeded Quitoriano in the said post.

Manalang contended that the law creating the NES provided for the automatic absorption of qualified personnel from the PB to the NES; that as Director of PB, he should automatically be the

Commissioner of NES; that he if he wont be appointed as such, he is in effect being ousted from his position and such violates his security of tenure.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manalang is correct.

HELD: No. The Placement Bureau was duly abolished by a valid law. Consequently, Manalangs former office as Director of PB is likewise abolished. There I no termination to speak of and his right to security of tenure is not violated. He was not removed from office. His office simply ceased to exist.

Even though it appears that the NES and the PB has similar functions, Manalangs argument that based on the law creating NES, he should be automatically absorbed as Commissioner therein is not tenable. The absorption of qualified personnel provided for in the law (RA 761: An Act to Provide for the Organization of a National Employment Service) does not include the Director of PB because if that it does the intention of Congress, then Congress is usurping the power of the president to appoint. Congress cannot appoint a specific person into a public office. The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office.

Facundo vs Pabalan

On July 13, 1960, Valeriano Ulep and Alejandro Facundo jointly filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a petition for mandamus (docketed as Special Civil Case No. T-669) against respondents Leonardo Carbonell (municipal mayor of Asingan, Pangasinan), Tiburcio Layos, Federico Domingo, Roberto Lopez, Mariano de los Trinos, Bartolome Cruz (municipal councilors of Asingan), and Vicente Perez (municipal treasurer) alleging, as first cause of action, that on February 11, 1948, petitioner Ulep was appointed Local Civil Registry Clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer of Asingan, and has held said position and received salary therefor, continuously since his appointment; that because he is a non-civil service eligible, he (Ulep) took the general clerical (qualifying) civil service examination on February 27, 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260, known as the Civil Service Act of 1959; that on June 24, 1960, respondents municipal councilors passed Resolution No. 67, abolishing his position and, on the same day, approved Resolution No. 70, creating 4 positions

of policemen; and that four days later, respondent Mayor Carbonell wrote a letter to him (Ulep) terminating his services as Local Civil Registry clerk. As second cause of action, the petition alleged that the other petitioner Facundo, a third grade civil service eligible, was appointed as Market Collector in the office of the municipal treasurer of Asingan, on October 15, 1958, and has continuously held and performed the duties of said position and received the emoluments therefor since his appointment; that in said Resolution No. 67, his position was abolished; and that on June 28,1960, respondent mayor Carbonell wrote him a letter terminating his services as Market Collector. The petition further alleged that by the approval and adoption of said resolution and the termination of their services, petitioners have been unlawfully excluded from their positions; that in approving and adopting said resolution and in terminating their services, respondents were impelled by revenge and ulterior motives; that respondents' acts are oppressive, persecutory, and violative of the specific provisions of the cited Republic Act No. 2260; and that due to respondents' acts, petitioners each suffered moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum of P5,000.00, and expended attorney's fees in the sum of P2,000.00. Petitioners, therefore, prayed that a preliminary mandatory order 1 be issued directing respondent mayor Carbonell to reinstate them to their positions; and that judgment be rendered declaring respondents to have acted illegally in passing said resolution, and in terminating petitioner's services, declaring void said resolution for being oppressive, persecutory, and violative of the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260; that respondents municipal mayor and municipal councilors be declared to have acted in bad faith and, therefore, sentenced to pay to each of petitioners, jointly and severally, the sums of P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees. To this petition, respondents timely filed their answer alleging, among others, that the positions abolished under the resolution in question "were unnecessary and useless and carrying duties which could be efficiently performed by other employees in the office of the Municipal Treasurer"; that the appropriation for said positions, "could be applied for more important and useful undertakings of the municipality, particularly, in the implementation and pursuance of its inherent duty, which is the present administration's avowed policy of maintaining peace and order which have been unduly neglected in the past"; and that said resolution "is valid and lawful, enacted and resolved with a view of bringing about a better and more efficient administration and in consonance with the promise and avowed policy of the present administration of maintaining peace

and order" for which it received the confidence of the people of Asingan in the last local elections. Respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed with costs. From this decision, Ulep appealed to this Court (docketed as G. R. No. L-17807), while Facundo did not. Against the judgment in favor of Facundo, respondents sought to appeal, but since the appeal was filed outside the reglementary period, the same was disallowed by the trial court. From this order of disallowance, the respondents did not appeal. The decision having become final and executory insofar as Facundo was concerned, the latter, on October 28, 1960, filed a motion for execution, which was opposed by respondents. While there is no law which expressly authorizes a municipal council to abolish the position it has created, the rule is well-settled that the power to create an office includes the power to abolish it, unless there are constitutional or statutory rules expressly or impliedly providing otherwise (Castillo vs. Pajo, et al., 103 Phil., 515; 54 Off. Gaz., [27] 6738 citing Brillo vs. Enage, 94 Phil., 732; 50 Off. Gaz., 3102 and 67 C.J.S. 121). However, the office must be abolished in good faith; and if immediately after the office is abolished, another office is created with substantially the same duties, and a different individual is appointed, or if it otherwise appears that the office was abolished for personal or political reasons, the courts will intervene (Cacho, et al. vs. Osmea, et al., 103 Phil, 837; 55 Off. Gaz., [48] 1079 citing 37 Am. Jur. 858). In the instant case, the reasons which impelled the municipal council of Asingan in adopting Resolutions No. 67 abolishing the position of the local Civil Registry Clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer of Asingan, are stated therein, to wit: there is an excess of personnel in said office; the position of local civil registry clerk could be undertaken by the internal revenue clerk in said office; and the appropriation for said position could be applied for more important and useful undertakings of the municipality. Moreover, the positions created in the resolution subsequently passed, are those of policemen, the duties of which are entirely different from those of the abolished positions. In the circumstances, the action of the municipal council was not an abuse of power and discretion lodged in it by existing law (Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 94 Phil., 964; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4820).

CRUZ VS PRIMICIAS As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent, is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Where the abolition is made in bad faith, for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees, it is null and void. A review of the record herein satisfies us that the justifications advanced for the abolition of petitioners' offices (economy and efficiency) are but subterfuges resorted to for disguising an illegal removal of permanent civil service employees, in violation of security of tenure guaranteed by the constitution.