THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW (CASES) I.

DEFINITION, DISTINCTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS SEGOVIA v NOEL (1925): Act No. 3107 changes the tenure of offices of justices and auxiliary justices of the peace. According to said law, justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they reach the age of 65. Law should be given prospective effect only. A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Intention to disturb right to office should be clear. Though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If the right is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated. CHANCO v IMPERIAL (1916): The intention of the Legislature to vacate the office was clearly expressed. Judges of the CFI shall serve until they reach 65 years The present judges of the CFI shall vacate their positions n the taking effect of this act. IGNACIO v BANATE (1987): An unqualified person cannot be appointed as member even in an acting capacity. Incumbent continues in office in hold-over capacity. PRECLARO v SANDIGANBAYAN (1995): Grease money, entrapment plan, contractual (PUBLIC OFFICER) Petitioner miscontrues the definition of "public officer" in R.A. No. 3019 which, according to Sec. 2(b) thereof "includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. . . ." The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The terms "classified, unclassified or exemption service" were the old categories of positions in the civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service by PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission and by the Administrative Code of 1987. o Non-career service in particular is characterized by (4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency. The fact that petitioner is not required to record his working hours by means of a bundy clock or did not take an oath of office became unessential considerations in view of the above-mentioned provision of law clearly including petitioner within the definition of a public officer. JAVIER v SANDIGANBAYAN (2009): National Book Development Board, Private Sector Representative, Travelling expenses (PUBLIC OFFICER) (1) A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development. (2) The Anti-Graft Law provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not make her private person exercising a public

function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment. (3) The RPC defines a public officer as any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer. Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the country in the canceled book fair in Spain.

PEOPLE v MORALES (2011): Centennial Celebration Expocorp PRIVATE, Mercedes Benz w/o bidding (LEAD MODEST LIVES), SEE ART IX B (2) (1) Definition of Civil Service what are the repercussions? (1) NLRC / CSC (2) Collective Bargaining --- labor Expocorp is a private corporation as found by the Sandiganbayan. It was not created by a special law but was incorporated under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is also not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Although BCDA, which owned 999,991 shares of its shares, was one of Expocorps original incorporators, the Board of Directors of Expocorp allowed Global to buy 1,229,998 of its unused and unsubscribed shares two months after its incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp cannot be characterized as a government-owned or controlled corporation. See LIBAN v GORDON. LAUREL v DESIERTO (2002): National Centennial Commission (NCC), LAUREL A PUBLIC OFFICER The characteristics of a public office include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office. The NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of policies as set forth by law. The fact that Laurel did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. II. ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATIONS VARGAS v RILLAROZA (1948): Section 14 of the Peoples Court Act is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The subject Act added grounds of disqualification of a SC Justice such that it prohibits certain Justices from fulfilling the power and duty given by the Constitution (i.e. hampered in their functions). The Act disqualified a majority of the constitutional component members of the Supreme Court. It deprives the SC of its judicial power. It violates the separation of powers. Appointment would not comply with the constitution. Since the qualifications of the inferior judges are different from a justice of the Supreme Court, it is possible that the substitute, who would act as a regular justice, will not have the qualifications required by the Constitution. The temporary composition of the SC is not authorized by the Constitution since the SC is one of the permanent institutions of the government. The method of appointment of a SC Justice provided by the Constitution is mandatory and binding upon all departments of government. CASTAEDA v YAP (1923): Elected mayor was less than the minimum age requirement of 23 when proclaimed elected. Candidates ineligibility always subject to question. FRIVALDO v COMELEC

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. (1989) The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. (1989) The issue of citizenship must be reckoned from the DATE OF PROCLAMATION, not necessarily the election date or the date the COC was filed. The repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994. (1996)

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (1991): The Court ruled that EO 282 is unconstitutional. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other officers or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. Although Sec. 7, Art. IX-B [GR] already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Art. VII [EXCEPTION], specifically prohibiting the President, VP, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure unless other provided in the Constitution itself. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple officers or employment under Sec. 13, Art. VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means from office, by virtue of office. FUMA v ERMITA (2010): DOTC, MARINA, moot and academic / JUDICIAL REVIEW (Capable of repetition), stricter prohibition While the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words hold the office were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible officers, refers to the holding of the office, and not the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Sec. 13, Art. VII nor in Sec. 7 (2), Art. IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition of the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. CARPIO-MORALES (CONCURRING): o I submit that the two cases provide sound formulations for two distinct situations. The Civil Liberties Union rule applies to cases involving dual or multiple positions under Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution while the Public Interest Center rule covers those under Section 7 of Article IX-B of the Constitution. o The Civil Liberties Union formulation rendering the public officer ineligible for the second position comes into play, since Bautista was a department undersecretary, a position covered by the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. This principle underscores the primacy of the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants as a class by itself, necessitating the disallowance of any implied vacancy in such offices. o The Pubic Interest Center rule of implied resignation does not apply since it speaks of incompatibility of office which is irrelevant in determining a violation of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. o It has also been observed that the rule of ipso facto vacancy of a public office by acceptance of a second public office does not apply where, under applicable constitutional or statutory provisions, the holder of a public office is rendered ineligible for a specified time for a second public office; under such circumstances it is the second office which is considered vacant rather than the first office.

PAMIL v TELERON (1978): Priest cannot be elected as a municipal mayor. *** LIBAN v GORDON (2009): Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) PRIVATE! The PNRC Chairman is not an official or EE of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Art. VII, Sec. 16 (Const). Not being a government official or EE, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment. PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. o A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. NACHURA (DISSENTING): PNRC is a GOCC with an original charter under RA 95. A position held in an ex officio capacity does not violate the constitutional proscription on the holding of multiple offices. The Chairmanship of the PNRC Board is not held in an ex officio capacity by a member of Congress. The fact that the PNRC Chariman of the Board is not appointed by the President and the fact that the former does not receive any compensation do not at all give the said position an ex officio character. III. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT TO TITLE OR OFFICE CONCEPCION v PAREDES (1921): Law provides for drawing lots by district judges as means of determining the districts to which they may be assigned. UNCONSTITUTIONAL Appointment to an office is intrinsically an EXECUTIVE act involving the exercise of discretion. Appointed to definite districts Law diminishes appointing authority Subject law makes appointing power perform a ministerial act (x exercise judgment) REYES v ABELADA (1968): Not accurate to demand a higher position (i.e. promotion) because you are next in rank! What you demand is PREFERENTIAL CONSIDERATION! Being next in rank does not give you the right to be appointed! Should there be two or more persons under equal circumstances, seniority must be given preference. CUYEGKENG v CRUZ (1960): Sir: NOT A MODEL CASE so huwag na aralin! :P TOMALI v CSC (1994): Administrative Code of 1987: Sec. 11 An appointment not submitted to the Commission within 30 days from the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing on the face of appointment, shall be ineffective. Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service position is essential in order to make it fully effective. Without the favorable certification or approval of the Commission, in cases when such approval is required, no title to the office can yet be deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment can still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Until an appointment has become a completed act, it would likewise be precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure. Tomali NOT BLAMELESS. She assumed the position 4 months after her appointment was issued or months after that appointment had already lapsed or had become ineffective by operation of law. Appointment discretionary NO GAOD OBIASCA v BASALLOTE (2010): Sir: SUBMIT TO CSC WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME | Failure to submit within a particular timeframe such as 30 days would not make it ineffective (ex. office politics) | (1) Satisfy eligibility; (2) Assume Office (3) Do duties | Submission to CSC For CSC to exercise APPROVAL AMENDMENT BY DELETION. No requirement in EO 292 that appointments should be submitted to the CSC for attestation within 30 days from issuance. Basallotes appointment took effect immediately and remained effective until disapproved by the CSC. o Office politics o Position Description Form (PDF) not even a requirement. Lack of CSC approval not due to the negligence of Basallote.

Obiascas appointment is void. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or her appointment validly terminated, before another can be appointed to succeed her. BERSAMIN (DISSENT): Submit with 30 days!!!

DE CASTRO v JBC (2010):