LEUNG BEN VS. P. J. O'BRIEN G.R. No.

L-13602 April 6, 1918

FACTS: P. J. O'Brien instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover the sum of P15,000 alleged to have been lost by Leung Ben to P.J. OBrien in a series of gambling, banking and percentage games. In Leung Bens verified complaint, OBrien asked for an attachment against the property of Leung Ben on the ground that the latter was about to depart from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud his creditors. This attachment was issued, and acting under that authority thereof, the sheriff attached the sum of P15,000 which had been deposited by OBrien with the International Banking Corporation. Leung Bien filed a motion to quash the attachment, which was dismissed by the court. Hence this application for a writ of certiorari, the purpose of which was to quash an attachment issued from the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila. ISSUE:
(1) Supposing that the Court of First Instance has granted an attachment for which there is no statutory authority, can the SC entertain the present petition and grant the desired relief? (2) Is the statutory obligation to restore money won at gaming an obligation arising from "contract, express or implied?" HELD:

On the first issue, Yes; under section 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction by the writ of certiorari over the proceedings of Courts of First Instance, whenever said courts have exceeded their jurisdiction and there is no plaint, speedy, and adequate remedy. When a court issues a writ of attachment for which there is no statutory authority, it is acting irregularly and in excess of its jurisdiction, that sense justifies the Supreme Court in granting relief by the writ of certiorari. On the second issue, Where Act 1757 of the Philippine Commission recognizing the right to recover money lost in gambling, arises the cause of action for recovery of money lost. In this case, the remedy was resorted from historical antecedents and juris prudential sources of the common law as basis of Code of Civil Procedure on determining sources of obligation. And the court came up with the recognition of this remedy at one logical proper. That the duty of the defendant to refund the money which he won from the plaintiff at gaming is a duty imposed by statute. It therefore arises ex lege (by virtue of law). By all the criteria which the common law supplies, this a duty in the nature of debt and is properly classified as an implied contract. The law adopted the fiction of promise in order to bring the obligation within the scope of the action of assumpsit. The cause of action stated in the complaints in the lower court is based on a contract, express or implied and is therefore of such nature that the court had authority to issue writ of attachment.

The application for the writ of certiorari must therefore be denied and the proceedings dismissed.

*SERRANO V CBP et al G.R. No. L-30511 February 14, 1980 Facts: Petitioner Serrano and Conception Maneja whom later on get married to each other, have made a time deposit with the Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM). P 150K was of Serrano and P 200K by Maneja a total of P 350K. When the petitioner demanded for the encashment of the aforementioned time deposit, all time deposit certificates were not honored by the OBM. The petitioner contented that the Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP) is in charge with the duty of administering the banking system of the Republic, and guarantor of permanent solvency of any banking institutions in the Philippines. Thereby, Serrano filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking a joint and solidary liability to the amount of Php350,000 with interest against CBP and OBM, on the ground that OBP failed to return the time deposit, and CBP failed its duty to exercise strict supervision over respondent OBM to protect the interest of its depositors. With petitioners prayer, that all assets assigned or mortgaged by OBM in favour of CBP be declared as trust funds for the benefit of petitioner and other depositors.

Issue: Whether petitioners claims can obtain relief through action for mandamus and prohibition. Held: The nature of petitioners claims are not proper in actions for mandamus and prohibition as there is no shown clear abuse of discretion by the Central Bank in its exercise of supervision over the other respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Supposing there was, petitioner here is not the proper party to raise that question, but rather the Overseas Bank of Manila. Neither is there anything to prohibit, since the questioned acts of the respondent Central Bank (the acts of dissolving and liquidating the Overseas Bank of Manila), which petitioner use as basis for claims of damages against respondent Central Bank, had been accomplished a long time ago. When time deposits were made by the petitioner that earned interests with respondent Overseas Bank, he is in reality deemed to be the creditor and not a depositor. The respondent Bank was in turn a debtor of petitioner. Failure of the respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay its obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from depositary's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit, with cost against petitioner.

NAVALES VS. RIAS et al G.R. No. L-3489 September 7, 1907 Facts: Navales constructed a house in the land owned by Rias. By virtue of the decision of justice of the peace for the action instituted by Rias against the plaintiff herein, the constructed house of Navales was ejected by mere execution of the Sheriff to the rendered decision. So Navales filed a complaint claiming for damages against defendants for destroying his house with the Court of First Instance. The Court favoured Navales declaring decision of justice of the peace was illegal as well as the execution of said order by the Sheriff, making defendants liable for damages. Issue: Whether a not appeled res adjudicata (an issue already decided by court) be deemed final and executory Held: Since the judgement rendered by the justice of the peace for the ejectment of Navales house, has not been appealed, the decision is deemed final. By virtue of the final decision against Vicente Navales, the deputy sheriff have just carried out the judgment into execution thus obliged to destroy the said house and removed it from the land, in accordance to the usual procedure in the action for ejectment. Section 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: Execution. If no appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace shall be perfected as herein provided, the justice of the peace shall, at the request of the successful party, issue execution for the enforcement of the judgment, and the expiration of the time limited by law for the perfection of an appeal. There was no shown of illegality of the judgment of the justice of the peace, on the writ of execution or of the acts performed by the sheriff for the enforcement of the judgment. Wherefore the judgment appealed was reversed in favor of defendants, and the complaint for damages filed by Vicente Navales against Eulogia Rias and Maximo Requiroso is dismissed without special ruling as to costs.

SANTOS VS. CA GR. NO. 120820

FACTS: Santos spouses owned a house and lot in Better Living Subdivision, Paranaque which was mortgage in Rural Bank of Salinas Inc. for a loan of P150k. The spouses offer to sell the property to Carmen Caseda for P350K of P54k as downpayment. Parties agreed with condition

that Caseda will pay the balance of the mortgage, the real state taxes, and the electric water bills. Casedas complied with the conditions but when Santoses seeing that Casedas lack the means to pay the remaining installment and amortization of loan, they repossessed the house and lot and so collected rentals. Casedas offered to pay remaining balance but was not push through because Santoses wanted a higher price. Hence, Casedas praying Santoses to execute final deed of conveyance over the property. ISSUE: Whether there was a perfected contract of sale. HELD: No, in the absence of the transfer of ownership of the property when it was not executed by the vendor in exchange of the price paid, a contract of sale was not perfected as expressly provided under Article 1458. Transfer of ownership is essential element in the contract of sale, in its absence what transpired was contract to sell where in Ownership is reserved by the vendor until full payment of the purchased price be made. When the petitioner repossessed the disputed property for failure of private respondent to pay in full the purchased price they were merely enforcing the contract not rescinding it. The SC granted the petition. Summary: Casedas v santos was dismissed on RTC, CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision 1.granting plaintiff appellant 90 days to pay the balance and obligations 2, ordering appeallee to restore possession of property to appelant