1952년 CIA 한국전 일일보고서 1 안치용

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6. KQRgA. Clandestine Communist organization in South Korea revealed by
reoent message%:
whiah wer e f!rmthe 526th Army unit to the "Eastern"
and 'Western"
-
Recently available North Xorean messages, some of
units, give an insight into the organization of Communist aotivities
in the ROK.
status of oomunioations and operations of the "3rd and 4th directions"
(sub-units.).
28 Deo; 64758, 29 Dec; 64062, 26 Deo 51)
These December messages inquire as to the establishment,
(SUEDE AS CM IB 64761, 29 Deo; 62760, 25 Deo; 64527,
5 3 Jan 52
HR70-14
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Commentr Another s our c e i ndi cates that the North Korean 526th
Army -,organized i nto two regimental-strength units designated the
"Eastern and Western" l i ason sections, i s oharged with sabotage, sub-
version, and guerri l l a acti vi ti es i n the ROK.
suggests that the "Western" secti on is concerned with propaganda
and organi zati onal acti vi ti es, while the "Eastern" secti on i s charged
wi th guerrilla operations.
Available evidenoe
North Korean 17th Mechanized Division to mom to the Kaesong are&:
Two North Korean messams from the 82nd Reaiment i n the Kaesonz area
i ndi oate the expeoted Govement of the 17th-Meohaniced Division-into
that area. A 27 December message states that "the comander of the
,17th (Brigade) came to Kaeaong and he is i nvesti gati ng the si tuati on.
I suppose that they wi l l be here during the period of the prisoner
exchange . . ." A l ater message of 30 December noted i n regard to
the 17th Division that ". . . it seems that the di vi si on wi l l be
moved from Pyongyang to Kaeeong."
66441, 31 Dee 51)
(SUEDE AS CM I N 64752, 29 Dec and
Commentt The texts of these messages suggest that the movement
of t h m h Korean uni t is i n some way connected with the expeoted
transfer of prisoners of war to take place i n thi s area.
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6 3 J an 52
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A T T E N T I O N : T M s fo r m w i l l b e p l a c e d o n t o p o f
a nd a t t a c he d t o e a c h T o p S e c r e t d o c um e nt r e c e i v e d
b y t he C e nt r a l I nt e l l i ge nc e A ge nc y
o r c l a s s i fi e d T o y S e c r e t w i t hi n t he C I A a nd w i l l r e m a i n
a t t a c he d t o t he d o c um e nt unt i l s uc h t i m e a s i t i s d o w ngr a d e d ,
d e s t r o y e d . O r t r a ns m i t t e d o ut s i d e o f C I A .
A c c e s s t o T o p S e c r e t m a t t e r i s l i m i t e d t o T o p S e c r e t
C o nt r o l p e r s o nne l a nd t ho s e i nd i v i d ua l s w ho s e o ffi c i a l
d ut i e s r e l a t e t o t he m a t t e r . T o p S e c r e
C o nt r o l O ffi c e r s w ho r e c e i v e a nd / o r r e l e a s e t he
a t t a c he d T o p S e c r e t m a t e r i a l w i l l s i gn t hi s fo r m
a nd i nd i c a t e p e r i o d o f c us t o d y i n t he l e ft - ha nd c o l um ns
p r o v i d e d .
E a c h i nd i v i d ua l w ho s e e s t he T o p S e c r e t d o c um e nt
w i l l s i gn a nd
i nd i c a t e t he d a t e o f ha nd l i ng i n t he r i ght - ha nd c o l um ns .

N O T I C E O F D E T A C H M E N T : W he n t hi s fo r m i s d e t a c he d fr o m
T o p S e c e t m a t e M I i t s ha l l b e c o m p l e t e d I n t he a p p r o p r i a t e
s p a c e
a nd t r a ns m i t t e d t o C e nt r a l T o p S e c r e t C o nt r o
fo r r e c o r d .
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KO=. Chinese Communist uni t requires rations for "obsemer8"r *A ,
mo e mb e r message from one unidentified Chinese Communist unit t o
another reports that "four observers are here.
f or the New Year?
food else there won't be anything for them to eat.* ."
CM IN 69, 1 Jan 52)
Are they going back
If not, better rush some rati ons and New Year's
(SUEDE AS
Comment: Although there is no indication of the nati onal i ty of
these-em," the 'hxi ety displayed by the requesting uni t over
its rati ons 'might indioate ei ther high-level Chinese Comunist offi cers
or Russians.
C o m~s t s suffer non-oombat ai r losses8 A 24 Deoember message
from the North Korean A i r Division at Sinuifu to the A i r School at
Yenohi reported that an ai roraf t bossibly a j et) was "foroed to make
an emergenoy landing i n a-oorn field."
North Korean mechanics wer e responsible i n that "they di d not perform
their duti es properly. . ."
24 De0 51)
The message conoluded that two
(SUEDE AS CM IN 63612, Sinuiju-Yenohi,
Comment: L i ttl e is known of the extent of non-oombat losses suffered
by Communist sir uni ts i n trai ni ng i n Manchuria. An arbi trary rule-of-
thumb ebtimate has plaoed auoh Communist losses i n the vi ci ni ty of 10
peroent, or 150 airorart
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6 4 Jan 52
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12. Conepiracy within North Korean uni t revealedt moo 28 Deoember
North Korean meaeages--both from the 8th RR Regiment i n northeastern
%rea to Che Railroad Security Division-recount agi tati on within the
former unit's raok8.
"the report ooncerning the surrender conspiraoy on 27 December."
Another message i ndi cates that a f ai rl y high of f i ci al %nt t o Chuul
i n the ar ea of the 8th Regiment oh mission and i nvesti gati on of the
uprising."
I n one message, the ori gi nator states he sent
(SUEDE AS CM I1 64723, 29 Deo 51)
Comm&.tk ?ha 8th-Begiment, i n addi ti on t o i ts securi ty mission, has
mo t i o n r The higp peroentage of ex-ROK and di saffected
Parlonilel undergcliag trai ni ng may tend t o make thi s uni t susoeptible
to unrest. Such di6quiet has been noted before.
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11.
~ R U L Coxmumist polioy canoerning Duth Korean prisonersr- ho
arii.t;horitativr ~omrmaurist spokesmen reaently. expralnea w1e ' @e& disorepanoy
between the 11,000 2153uth Korean soldier6 l i sted by the Communists as
prieoners of war and the g0,OOO Chat the m lists as miaeing in aotion.
MWred Burohett, oorrespondent for a Frenoh Communist newspaper,stated
that t he ~ommuniats released "almost al l South Koreans when captured,
l al l dng them to return to thei r homes or follow thei r own inolintations."
The Conammist oease-fire delegete, General frse Sang Cho, elaborated
this theme by noting? %ere is not a single r mn to be found on our
sxda who has been foroed into;the war. Wue, i n o y ranks there are
thobe personnel from your ai de who. revolted iwd o*, o+err to OIW
h.de.! . lb have never olasliified them IU prisoners of war kid wb
wi l l a v e r turn over t hese patri ots of Korea to you, 6 (U BRIS
Peiping, 3 Jan 52)
Comuentt These statements 4re di reotl y oontradiotory to thoe, of
manyXlK7ETitary personnel who mnaged to escape or were recapked
from the enemy. T h e m returnees stated that most of the South Korean
prisoners were foroi bl y induoted i nto the North Korean Army, retrai ned
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7 Jan 52
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and reindootrinated, and used as i sfantry replaoemsnts f or oombat units.
12. Oolnnrunirt l i ght bombor attaoks UN-front l i nes for fi rst timer On
2 January an unidentified ai roraf t dropped one.bomb on.positlons of a
6#)K di doi on on t he Korean east ooaet . I. htsr report indicates that the
attaoking ai roraf t wag a Communist TU-2 light bomber snd that four bombs,
not of br i oan manufacture, were dropped. I
- 1 .>_
1 1 3 and 4 Jan 52)
, I I ' )
Comrrerrtr This is the f i ret reeorded instanoe of an enemy bomber
a i r o r mo k i n g i nstal l ati ons in the forward areas. A.eviouely,
euoh attaoka have been made by oonventional type fi ghter and ground
attaok ai roraft a d i n at least one instanoe by j et ai roraft.
of thie bombing euggeet a that the enemy aircraft m y have approaohed from
the Boao I t is believed that all TU-2 bombers avai l abl e f or oombat are
subordinate t o the CC&F rather than to the NKAF.
n e looation
n
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U. 7 Jan 52
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9. KOREA. Kaesong guard unit 8ees long negotiationst The North Korean 82nd
-nt in the Haesong area, in a 5 January message, reports the apparent
impasas oier the'oonstruotion of Communist ai rfi el ds and the exchkge o f
prisoners. Although the message states that "I suppose the aonference
TOP
5 9 Jan 52
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10.
will take a long time," it notes that the "General Staff has been planning
the prisoner treatment and they obtained the buildings for prisoners in
Kaesong already. .) ." (SUEDE AS CY IN 1311, 6 Jan 52)
Comment: The 82nd Regiment i s a l ooal securi ty uni t and presumably
does -e access to high-level Communist deoisions rel ati ng to the
oease-fire tal ks.
acti vi ti es i n Haesong rel ated to preparations for an eventual prisoner-
of-war exohange.
This uni t would, however, be i n a posi ti on to observe
/
Communists oontinue i sl end campaign in west central Korea: In addi ti on
to the reported 2 J anuary oapture of Sunwi and Wi i sl ands
t l i e Ongjin peninsula by the North Korean 23rd Brigade, recent messages of
4 and .7 J anuary detai l plans for operations against Yuk and Wollae i sl ands
to the west of the Ongjin peninsula and against Ohwa i sl and to the south. '
The l atter operation is to be oonduoted by the 26th battal i on of the 23rd
Brigade and i B ' t o begin at 0300 hours on 8 J anuary,
soutih of
,
(SUEDE AS CM IN
1032 and 1669, 5 J an-and 7 Jan 52)
. Commentt Elements of the Chinese 'Conrmunist 40th A m y and the North
Kore+n.'23rd. Brigade have been engaged i n eliminating UN guerrilla and
espionage bases i n the western ooastal waters si nce November.
I
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Soviet representative a,yain Gnes Securitrp Council tal ks on Korea:
In conversation with the US delegation Soviet u# delegate Malik asserted
that It was necessary to "raise the Ievel" of Korean discussions i n view
of the attitude of.the US negotiators; -The'Soviet delegate alleged that
the USSR's proposal for a Security Council meetlng attended by *responsible
pol i ti cal leaders" was intended to help the negotiations i n Korea and not
to terminate them. Malik argued that consultation with numerous UIJ del-
deal of intareat" i n the Soviet proposal.
- _
Comments The Soviet cal l for a Security Council meeting is apparently
another attempt to force UN di abadcmof - a KoD'eaa pol i ti cal settlement
while the mi l i t ar y armistice negotiations ar e being held.
. . -
The Soviet package proposal pzovidad.for discarding the year-old
lWestern blueprints for l ncreasm the UN's capabi l i ty to meet new ag-
gressions.
of immediate big Wer tal ks on the prolonged Korean negotiations i n the
hope of drawing support away from the Western comleotive seauri ty project.
The USSR was apljarenly dangl i ng before the UN t he prospect
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trooa i n - r e b o r t e d r /-- - 1
during November and December some 120,000 orth&rYCC ~
troops were i n training i n Manchuria. In mid-December an additional 50,000
troops "were in training i n this area." Reportedly the Chinese Communists
and the Russians intend t o bui l d a force of 4O0,OOO North Koreans by the
end of January 1952. I 1
returned t o Manahmiti t o orgadze and trai n new u n i t s .
treme manpower shortage in North Korea1
Xor ean troops in Manchuria i a unl i kel y.
In d e n of the ex-
1 the training of this number of North
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f&G-15 uni t transfers from Korean border to East China: Several
messages of 0 J anuary dealt wi t h the move of the si xth Chinese Communist
A i r Regiment' from T&ushan near the Korean border to Shanghai.
message from Nanking asked whether the Si xth Regiment had l ef t Takushan,
from Takushan t o Shanghai.
One
and- another mssage-mentioned the departure i n sweral f l i
(SUEDE AS CM IN 1964, 9 Jan 62
- Comment: The Sixth Regiment, equipped with about 25 MIG-15's, moved
Several other Chinese ai r units moved
t o T m i n earl y November. 'This i s the fi rst known transfer of a
j et fi ghter unit from Manchuria.
&om Manbhuria to East China i n Deoember and earl y J anuary, but these
moves involved only conventional ai rcraft.
The purpose of transferri ng a MI G-15 combat-tested uni t from the
Korean theater to East China 16ay be to strengthen the inadequate ai r
defenses of the Shanghai area,
KOREA. Subordination of North Korean Kaesong guard force increasingly
-art A 6 J anuary massage from the North Korean 82nd Regiment, the
Eaesong seourity force, t o i ts parent 8th Division on the east coast
complained that ". .we are oompelled t o submit al l repbrts, including
the ourrent information, to the General Department (General Headquarters? )
and we expedf to reoeive the pol i ti cal orders from them. The division
i e' sti l l requesting us t o Bend the dai l y report.
do." (SUEDE AS CM I N 1726, 8 J an 52)
I don't know what t o
Cokmt: It i s becoming increasingly evident that the North Korean
82nd 'Regiment i s losing i ts i denti ty as a tacti cal unit and i s becoming,
possibly by default, the vi si bl e symbol of the North Korean regime i n
thi s predominantly Chinese Communist sector of the front.
reoalled that when the 82nd Regiment was apparently brdered away from
Kaesong by the Chinese Communist Command in the area, North Korean Chief
of Staff Bahn 11 personally intervened with General Peng Te-huai to ensure
i ts stay i n KBesong.
It may be
10 52
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I P T I

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A T T E N T I O N : T h i s
wi l l be p l a c e d o n t o p o f a n d a t t a c h e d t o e a c h T o p S e c r e t
d o c u me n t r e e d i t , d by t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i ge n c e A ge n c y
o r c l a s s i f i e d T o p S e c r e t wi t h i n t h e C A a n d wi l l r e n t a l n
a t t a c h e d t o t h e d o c u me n t u n t i l s u c h t i me a s i t i s d o wn gr a d e d ,
d e s t r o y e d . O r t r a n s mi t t e d o u t s i d e o f C I A .
A c c e s s t o T o p S e c r e t ma t t e r i s l i mi t e d t o T o y S e c r e t
C o n t r o l p e r s o n n e l a n d t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s wh o s e o f f i c i a l
d u t i e s r e l a t e t o t h e ma t t e r .
T o p S e c r e
C o n t r o l O f f i c e r s wh o r e c e i v e a n d / o r r e l e a s e t h e
a t t a c h e d T o p S e c r e t ma t e r i a l wi l l s i gn t h i s f o r m
a n d i n d i c a t e p e r i o d o f c u s t o d y i n t h e l e f t - h a n d c o l u mn s
p r o v i d e d .
E a c h i n d i v i d u a l wh o s e e s t h e T o p S e c r e t d o c u me n t
wi l l s i gn a n d
i n d i c a t e t h e d a t e o f h a n d l i n g i n t h e r i gh t - h a n d c o l u mn s .

B Y

N O T I C E O F D E T A C H M E N T : W h e n t h i s f o r m i s d e t a c h e d f r o m
T o p S e c r e t ma t e r i a l i t s h a l l be c o mp l e t e d I n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
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D A T E : 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
3
T C 3 P S E C R E T S U E D E

6. Another EO-15 division possibly moves f r o m Manchuriat A message on
1 January referred t o the move of the Yourteenth Air Division. This
11 Jan 52
3 -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE. 18-Mar-201 0
division is equipped wieh MIG15's and has'been based at Takushan near the
Korean border. (SUEDE Air Force Roundup 7, 21152, 9 Jan 52)
Comment: No subsequent messages about the move of thi s uni t have been
reoeived.
transferri ng t o the Shanghai area.
bother MIG15unit at Takushan, the Sixth Regiment, is currentl y
3 -
DATE. 18-Mar-201 0
11 Jan 52
5s
-3
F or info on P D F Compr ession a nd O CR go to our website
& 11 Jan 52
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2 5 X 1 A 1

2 5 X 1

I 2 5 X 1
2 5 X 1 C I


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5


A p p r o v e d F o r R ip s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 7 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 1 - 7

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ha v e

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1
2 5 X 1 C


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2 5 X 1

F o r

2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6

7 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 1 - 7

A p p r o v e d F o r R a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 .7 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 1 - 7

A p p r o v e d F o r 1 I l is e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 .7 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 1 - 7

5 2
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H R 7 0 - 1 4

1 0 .

O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
- r a i o - s i m m u m r - i m m m -

9.
. .
lo.
-
:OVE
Russian bomber pi l ots return from China: The return t o the USSR,
of Russian pi l ot s who ferried TU-2 l i gh t bombers to China i s indioated
i n' two mebsages of 11 January. Ac c ompy i ed possibly by Chinese Communist
personnel, the Soviet pi l ots traveled i n three I-2 traneports which re-
traoe& the route followed by the TU-2ls.
21202, 22 Jan 62)
(SUEDE Air Force Roundup 9,
Colirment; Russian TU-2 flights t o China have been a prominent feature
of the growing bomber strength in China, now i n excess of one hundred and
f i f t y.
suggeet that the Russians are turning over t h e TU-2's to Chinese Comunist
Air Force unite.
The return of the Soviet pi l ots t o t h e USSR in transports would
-
:ELE
-
.AS
-
E
1
.
30-Mar-201 0 I
5
-
14 J an 52
b3
SS
I
To lea r n ho w to u s e O CR a nd PD F Co m pr es s i o n vi s i t o u r webs i te
A P S E C R E T S U E D !
- T O P - s E e R E T - N E D E -

11. North Korean Amy Bees disoharge of disabled troops as aource of
disoontentr A 6 J aauary message from the North Korean 8th Infantry
nvi s i on to i ts nolninally subordinate 82nd Regiment i n the Kaesong area
states that discharge procedure has been set up for %en wounded i p
aotion (over 32 years of age) and unqualified men (under 17 years of age)."
The ' addkssee ia vrarkd, however, that this disoharge "must be performed
seoretl y eo as n6t t o foment di6GOEtent among your soldiers." (SUEDE AS
Korea CM I N 1762, 8 &n 52)
Coment: This message i ndi rectl y supports the many reports reaeived
of 10- in the North Korean Armye
that the North Korean Amy i q discharging any men at' al l r
aoospted i ntel l i gence confirms the North Korean i nabi l i ty fully to re-
plaoe battle basual ths.
of i ts speoi al posi ti on at Kaesong, i s being made a model North Korean
unit for presti ge purposes.
Of equal importanoe ie the f aot
Currently
I t i s poealble that the 82nd Regiment, i h view
'6 14 Jan 52
To lea r n ho w to u s e O CR a nd PD F Co m pr es s i o n vi s i t o u r webs i te

H R 7 0 - 1 4

D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

1
FAR-EAST
2. Communists accumulate, considerable food stockpile in eastern North Korea:
US Army A 7 J anuary message from one unknown North
12 J an 52 Korean station to another reported the receipt of
SUEDE 39,490 tons of rice, millet, and beans at one of
Id. 3 79/ the principal east coast supply depots. These
supplies, transported by truck, were accumulated during one weeks ,time.
supply all the Communist troo-rea for almost two months, or troops
in the eastern sector alone for six months.
Comment: This quantity of food is sufficient to
A very short truck haul is indicated by the
quantity of material moved during this period, possibly indicating movement
from an eastern or central Korean railhead to the supply depot.
- 3 -
IDATE. 20-Mar-201 0 I TOP cSECRlZT SUEI3E
T o lea r n how to use O CR a nd P D F Compr ession visit T heP a per lessO ffice.or g

H R 7 0 - 1 4

R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
8

I -7
16. KOREA. Communiets col l ect i ntel l i gence on UN ai r i nstal l ati onst A
GEXer meek ge,
~ u r i ~ ~ e ~ r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ o ~ , f rc
Ycng (dungp'o) ai rport (a UN ai rf i el d near Seoul), the tabl e of organiga-
ti ons and other important (matter)."
i nstructi on i s being sent t o South Korea,
2668, 11Jan 52)
e NO " qtp%x rean t Ai r "I have Porae the t o
The message adds that a l etter of
(SUEDE US Army Korea, CM I N
Comentt The sender of thi a message has been tentati vel y i denti f i ed
as a reports col l eoti on offi cer.
net shoul d'exi st, thi s is the fi rst message received i ndi cati ng such
aati vi ti es.
while l ogi cal that an ai r i ntel l i genae
17. Communists accumulate considerable food stockpile i n eastern North
Korea:
reported the reoei pt of 39,490 tons of ri ce, mi l l et, and beans at one of
the pri nci pal east coast supply depots.
truok, were accumulated during one week's time.
CM I N 2901, 12 Jan 52)
C o nnnm~o o ps in Korea for almost two months, or trcops i n the eastern
seotor alone f or si x months.
A 7 J anuary message from one unlcnom North Korean stati on to another
-
These 'suppl i es , transported by
(SUEDE US Army Korea,
I
This quanti ty of food i e suffi oi ent to supply a11 the Comment:
A, very short truck haul is i ndi cated by the quanti ty of materi al
moved during thi s period, possibly i ndi cati ng movement from an eastemor
central Korean railhead to the supply depot.
8
15 Jan 52
m
55
F or mor e infor ma tion on PD F Compr ession a nd O CR go to our website
. H R 7 0 - 1 4

HR70-14
DATE: 23-Mar-201 0
2.
c rB
FAR EAST
Communists issue new regulation for handltng prtsoners of war:
US A i r Force An order on treatment of prisoners of war from
13 J an 62 the Korean Commander in Chief, dated 7
SUEDE December, provtded that no prisoners of war
W - l r u - 3331' were to be released, that proper records on
prisoners should be kept, and that currently held prisoners, "not as yet
registered, should be reported to headquarters. The order further out-
lined the administrative procedures for handling of prisoners.
Comment: The issuance of this order eighteen
months after the outbreak of war strongly suggests that Communist unit
commanders have enjoyed a wide latitude in their handling of UN prisoners.
It is also apparent from the order that the Communists have no record of
some of the prisoners captured tq date.
To learn more about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website
1 = 1 -
H R 7
5 .

I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 1 9 - F e b - 2 0 1 0

Comment: The most serious charge t o date was leveled on 13 Januaty,
when m m u n i a t negotiators and propaganda broadoasts saored the
"deliberate provocation" of a seri es of over-flights as far weat as
Wden on that day.
mile the preoise signifiaanoe of them oharges i s not yet. known,
-6B33m-
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 4 16 Jan 52
DATE: 19-Feb-2010
F or a compre he nsive guide on P D F Compre ssion and O CR visit T he P ape rle ssO ffice . org
ft
ri

similar protests over an alleged UN bombing of Kaeeong were followed
by a break i n oease-fire talke in l ate August.
--sEeREIp
5 .16 Jan 52

- 0 1 7 ; 7 -

E l 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

KOREA. Communists iesue new regulation f or handling prisoners of war: An
on treatment of prisoners of war from the Korean Gonrmander i n Chief,
dabd.7 Deaember, provided that no prisoners of'war were to be released,
that proper records on prisoners should be kept, and that ourrentl y held
prisoners, "not a8 yet registered," should be reported to headquarters.'
The order further outlined the administrative prooedures f or handling of
prisoners. (SUEDE US Air Foroe CM IN 3334, 13 Jan 52)
Comment: The issuance of thi s order eighteen months af ter the out-
break of war strongl y suggests that Communist unit commanders'have
enjoyed a wide l ati tude in thei r handling of UN prisonera.
apparent from the order that .the Communists have no reaord of some of the
pri soners captured t o date.
I t is al so
5 16 Jan 52
F or info on PD F Compr ession a nd O CR visit ThePa per l essO ffice.or g
H R 7 0 - 1 4

m o i r e d

t R e

R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E I
E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
6
- T O P - S E G R E T S U E D E

S T t
t
L
11.
12.
-
MlG15di vi si on at Korean border moves t o Mukden: Two "transfer
f l i ghb" total i ng SO MI(E.16' 8 , O f the chin ese Communist Third A i r Division
moved &om Antung t o Mukden on 15 J anuary.
3703, 15 Jan 52)
(SUEDE UB A i r Force CM IN
Cannnent: The Third Division, equipped with about 50 rnG-15'~ haa had
more o4mbatexperienoe than any other Chinese Oomunist unit.
This deorease i n AEG-U strength at the border may be termporary,
sime the MIQ-16-equipped Fourth Division, now at Mukden, oould be
soheduled to replaoe t h e' Third.
when t h e Fourth Mviaion, then at Antung, wa8 replaced by the Third.
Such a rotati on ooourred i n mid-Ootober
C6mmmist ai roraf t strength in Chirur-M+nchuria-Korea inoreased
t o 178- Ai r Boroe estimate states that there i s suffioient evidenoe
- ! f y the upward revieion of Cammunist military ai roraf t strength
in the China-Mbohuria-Korea area to 1700.
8inoe November. The new figure inaludes 900 j et fighters and 240 TU02
l i ght ljbmbers end-represents an inarease of 100 J et fi ghters, 80 light
bombers, and 50 tr-port ai roraft.
is estimated at 1000, inoluding 600 j e t s end 160 l i ght bombera.
US Air Foroe I ndioations Review, 16 Jan 52)
Comentr This inorease ooourred enti rel y i n China proper.
ai r o r men g t h i n Manohuria hat3 actual l y declined sl i ghtl y si nce
November, beoause of the movement of several units from South Menchuria
to the Nanking-Shanghai area.
I t had been carri ed at 1450
Communiet ai r strength i n Manchuria
(SUEDE
Combat
6 17 Jan 52
T o lea r n how t o use PD F Compr ession a nd O CR go t o our websit e
- - - A P - S E C - R E T - - S U E D P

.J
wb
14.
1s.
(4
The inorease of l i ght bombers and transports i n China is due to the
transfer, si noe'the last estimate, of TU-2's and transports fromthe USSR
t o China proper.
for by the' i denti fi oati on i n Deoember of two addi ti onal j et fi ghter di d-
riona at Hankow and Peiping.
The upward revi ei on of j et fi ghter strength I s aooounted
Borth Korean A i r Foroe soen a8 strengthenedc A "maJor development
mr en g t h potential" of the North Korean A i r Foroe i e iiidioated by
reoent anal ysi s of enemy ai r messages by the U8 Air Forbe,
'sions 0- one of whioh i s jet-equipped -.I Pave been mentioned, and three
air stati ons -- two in Korea and one i n Manohuria -- are again aoti ve i n
message transmiss5oo.
Three air-divi-
(SUEDE A i r Foroe Roundup 11, 21352, 16 Jan 52)
Comentr The expansion during the l atter half of 1951 from a si ngl e
oonve- ai roraft fi ghter and ground attaok di vi si on t o a three divi-
sion- foroe, inoluding j ets, represent8 a si gni fi oant augmentation of North
Scorean foroea. ,
North Korean Navy oomrmander may have been rephoed:
North Korean meesage from Naval Headquarters i n F'pngyang t o the Naval
Aoadw i n Chongjin fel i oi tated aoademy personnel on the new year.
The message Was ligned by "Kim Won Mu, Naval Commander."
Tokyo CM I N 5769, 16 Jan 62)
of No-ean naval foroes and signed messages i n suoh a capaoity during
1961.
A 30 Deoember
(SUEDE W A C
Comments Vioe Admiral Hen I1 Mu has long been accepted as oommander
Kim Won Mu was ohief of staff of the North Korean Navy.
Table of' organization of North Korean meohanized arti l l ery brigade
reporfed: A retransl ati on of a 28 D eosrmber North KO rean meseam f rom an
-tied oorps (probably t he VII) to t h e 24th Brigade stati s that
a tab1e"of organikation providing fi ve meohanieed arti l l ery battal i ons and
two i nfantry battal i ons ha6 been drawn up for the 24th Meohanized Brigade.
(SUEDE ASAPAC Tokyo CY IN 3769, 16 Jan 62)
Comment t Meohanized arti l l ery battal i ons (probably equipped with the
Sovie-propelled 76mmgun) have been previously i dehti fi ed i n the 24th
BrSga'de.
ooastal seouri ty duty i n the Wonsan-Hamhung area, wi l l be meohanized.
This message indioates that the enti re. brigade, ourrentl y on
17 Jan 62
T o lea r n how t o use PD F Compr ession a nd O CR go t o our websit e

A P S E C R E T
S U E D !

H R 7 0 - 1
E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0 T O P S E C R E T S U E D E

11. KOREA.' Mongolien unit mentioned i n North Korean message: . A [ 1
Porth K orean o mesa age of 16 J anuary mentioned "the Mongolian
kple'sit." Plaoe names referred t o were i n west central &rea,
southwest of Chinnampo. (SUEDE AB CM IN 3839, 16 Jaa 52)
Colmnentt A delegation from'the Mongol i e People's Republio was i n
Pyongyang on 9 Jernuary'bbserving the trying wartime life of the Korean
peopleon It is entirely possible that the "unit" referred.to i n the above
message is this same delegation.
Frequent unomfirmed reports have speoulated on the presence of
Mon&oliea mi l i tary personnel i n the Korean oonfliot serving as oavalry-
mep, tank drivers and ai rcraft pilots. Mongolia's contribution to the
Commnrnist oause in Korea t o date has consisted of some small shipments
of clothing
I
4 18 Jan 62:
F or info on O CR a nd PD F Compr ession visit our website
A p p r o v e d F o r F a e k a r f 0 P 9 S E E R E N 0 9 7 5 A 1 1 0 0 5 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 - 0

N O C H A N G E I N C L A M
D E C L A S S I F I E D
C L A S S . C H A N G E D T O :
T S 3
N E U r i E V I E W D A T E :
_
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4 / 1 . r _ l r . Y . V : : V C R :
I
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2 5 X 1
2 5 X 1
2 5 X 1
2 5 X 1
2 5 X 1
2 5 X 1
T o l e a r n a b o u t O C R a n d P D F C o mp r e s s i o n go to T he P a p e r l e s s O f f i c e . o r g
F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 / 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0

A p p r o v e d


A me v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 1 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 - 0

F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 1 0 9 / 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 5 A i gy e r e d

A r v e
F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 / 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 " 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 - 0

6 .



2 R p r o v e d I : o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 1 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 / 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 1 - 0

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1.
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
.. .
m. Soviet Union seeks concessions through UN discussion of Korean
w ~ t ' The American Embassy i n Moscow states that'sovi et proposal8 for
UN discuseion df the Korean problem represent tacti cal stal l i ng to gain
further UN conceaaione or a better logietibal position i n Korea. The
Embassy suggests that the USSR I s attempting to put UN negotiators under .
added pressure from those members anxious for an early peace.
I n a similar comment, the British'miaaion i n Peiping add6 its bel i ef
that both the USSR and China wan t an annilatibe on "reasonable" terms and
that the Central People's Goverrnnent was probably consulted on the Sovlet
maneuvers III the IN. I
1
Comnent; There is evidence that, despite nnnors of disunity, there
will be continuing coordination of SinoSoviet strategy with respect to
the Korean war . ___ ~~
APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE:
16-Dec-2009
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1

oonfiiot: r-- -1
15 Pe i Ph g allegedly resents Sovi et taction la
Chinere eonmamirt
Y a t t he Korean ooaPliot wi l l be lOader8 are demersed by th e DOSeibiut
oontinued. [
r eg h favor ending the oonfliot, but that the WSS diriros t o inlrolw
the US I n hort i l i t i es in Kanohuria.
ro~enmbpt" of 8ovlet t ao t i o r , Chinese C omi st propaganda media are
publinh'lng only one-tenth of the material provided by the USSR.
1 al l parties at.taohed to the Peipiag
I l l ustrati ng Peipingts "bi tter
___ ~ ~ I
Cormrosntr j l S o d e t advisers i n China
are "dirmayed" by current trends i n China and XWep, that Peiping Wish08
to end t he Koreab oonfliot, and that "intenre friokion and ,dSaunity" ex l r t
S n g Chinese Comma\ni st leaderr. Rumors of thir the have been ourrent
for month. While the Korean oonfliot hrr rained potenti al l y di dr i m _.
i ssuer among Chinese leaders an between Peiping md Moroow, there i r SI
yet no rel i abl e evldenae of nu01 di EWiky.
.
-tnc?mL
8 ' 21 J an 52
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4 7 . . 1 0 . . ,
T e M P S E C R E T S U E D P
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2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
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9. KOREIL. North Korean A i r Force plan t o use Korean ai rfi el ds: A North
=an AirJ ?orce intention to i ni ti ate f l i ght trai ni ng from ai rfi el ds i n
Korea i s revealed i n an 11J anuary message f rom an ai r uni t at Sariwon t o
wongyang and Sinuiju.
1, 2, and 3'are sui tabl e for . .
that if "(training planes ?)' I are ferri ed in, they would be stored i n
operating condition and l ater dismantled.
action will destroy'tho trai n
t o "countermeasures,'~ (smEBpILB1; 48, Sariwon-Pyongyang, 21 Jan 62)
avail- the North Korean A i r Force i n Manahuria, thi s move t o begin
trai ni ng on UN-interdicted Korean ai rfi el ds i s incomprehensible under
The message states that "practice fi el ds Number
(trai ni ng ?)." The message continues
Fear is expressed that UN ai r
d the sender asks f or suggestions as
Comentt I n v i ew of the consiaerable trai ni ng f aci l i ti es previously
4 22 Jan 52
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ourrent oonditions.
early oeeaation of hosti l i ti es, or that the Chinese require Manchurian
ai rfi el ds now available to the Koreans.
message refere not t o "training planes" but t o operakional oombat
ai rcraft.
I t is possible that the North Koreans expeot ari
It is also possi bl e that the
5 22 Jan 52
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H R 7 0 -

I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 1 9 - F e b - 2 0 1 0

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3. KOREA. Chlneee Communists reportedly rotating troops i n Korea: I n anti-
- i o n 7 l l ~ ~ o o e s s f ul completion of the truce t al k s," the Chinese Cm-
munista are rotating their seasoned troops from Korea end replaoing them
with new ooasoripta, 1
I Far Eaet Command (3-2 regards this
'
'reported plan ae "improbable." fl
I 18 Jan 52)
,DATE: 19-Feb-2010
22 Jan 52
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I
t
. Connaenta
Korea occurred ' last spring, when certai n armies apparehtly l eft Korea f or
rehabi l i tati on. With on? exception, al l these armi es have returned to Korea.
mi l e it i s probable that some battle-trained individuals are being returned
as cadres, available intelligence indicates that no large-scale rotati on has
been or is being effeated.
The laat large-scale movement of , Chinese Coamnml st troops i n
9.
ROpl offi ci al aoutely alarmed over inareasing i nfl ati on in South Korea:
Aatlng Prime'Minister Io, in a l etter to US Ambaasador Mueaio, stated that
the highly indiaative priae of ri ce in Seoul is "ri si ng alarraingly' and that
he fears that "hyper-inflation has started to sef in.11 Ho oontinued that ROX
aurrenay advanaes t o UN forces, approaching 354 bi l l i on won, must be settl ed .
immediately and new agreements between the BOK and t he UN muat be i ni ti ated to
atop the areation of new money 'which 1s deteriorating Korean economy."
expansion, an arbi trary oeiling would be enforced by the BOK.
The
ROK offi ai al further stated that if something was not done
19 J- 52)
Commsntr The current worsening of the fi nanci al si tuati on i s due i n
part to a seasonal'up-swing i n currency ci rcul ati on folltjw-ing ri ce oollection.
The principal faatora, however, are UN Command and ROK I nabi l i ty to reaoh
agreement on control of the ROK's foreign exahange, aa well as t o the 'very
real and'continuing i nfl ati onary effect of the DN Command's demand f or l oaal
curreno y .
-
\
22 J= 52
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S E C R E T S U E T "
H R 7 0 - 1 4

A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E 1 ,
0 / 3 C . C O W . . C O W

I
11.
12 .
K O m .
'pfi ori ty assi med to the pol i ti oal aeouri ty of North Korean Mr Force
North Korean Air Foroe sti l l ooncerned with seouri tyr The high
personnel i s r eveal ad in a 17 January message from'the A i r Aoademy at
Yenohi to a sub-unit at Tungwha, both i n Manahuria.
that "the puri fi oati on of your bffi cers, NCO's and pri vates w i l l be
st,arted."
Comments A high degree of conoern f or pol i ti cal seouri ty has been
apparent in the North Korean Air Fbroe f or some time. While this newest
npuri fi oati on" may be only routine, it may foreoast a future move of the
NKAF trai ni ng program into North Korea-and thus i nto deserting rage.
The message st at ed
(SUEDE AS CM IN 4364, 18 Jan 52)
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1 .
S E C T I O N 2 ( E A S T E R N )
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
1
DATE: 19-Feb-2010
-
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a z r

8. Ea0 Tse-tuna al l emdl v re tu r ns f r olqManohuria, depar-ts f or Mosomr
/Ma0 Tse-tung returned to s i n g
aboyt 2 J anuary from conferences i n Manohuria wi th Chinese, So v i et and
Korean leaders.
would "oompromise somewhat" i n the Korean truce tal ks and meanwhile i nci te
diseension i n the UN. IXao l ef t Peiping
f or Moscow by ai r on d January, followed by 10 Chimp-. Comunist leaders,
f or talks wi th Stal i n on the Korean war , aid to the Vi e t Mi&, and a Sovi et
loan . - I22 Jan, 52 [
The conferees al l egedl y decided that the Comuniste
" - "_
Comments I nformation on t he movements of Communist leaders, and on
the p mn g s . o f thei r confbrences, is conti nyal l y supplied by such
aourooe but has never been confirmed and i e general l y regarded 68 doubtful.
9.
KO&. Communi8t correspondent at Panmunjom sees UN delaying unti l Bdarohr
A m, i nni ngton, Communist correspondent at Panmunj om, advanced the theory
on 19 January that lJM negoMat6ra.were under orders tb "stal l t e talk@
unti l Maroh."
more PavoraLAe mi l i tari l y fqr the mJ or f or President Truman's peraonal
i nterventi on designed t o rai se hi e re-election chances.
Peiping, 19 Jan 52)
P
The reason, according t o him, i s that copditions Wi l l then be
I 1
Conuuent: Winnington's connnents have often presaged 'sends i n the
truoe-atjons.
it is mssi bl e that thi s charge i s the beginning of the build-up to j usti f y
renewed hosti l i ti es by the
ni l e it is probable that L S l ateot is propaganda,
Communists
5 23 Jan 52
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H R 7 0 - 1 4

D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
HR70-14
9. Soviet long-range f i ghters noted at Dairen: Sixbeen IB-9 long-range
oonventional fi gh ters wre to leave Ddren on 20 J anuary f or Vorushilov.
The l ead pi l ot had a Bussian name.
that LA-9 ai roraf t have not been previously noted at ei ther Dairen or
Voroahilov. (SUEDE US A i r Foroe CY IN 4908, 20 Jan 52)
The US A i r Force f i e l d agenoy ooments
Comment: Some aoti vi ty by l i ght bombers and j et fi ghters was observed
i n t h z n area i n the past yearn
craf t is astimated t o be i n that area.
A total of 320 S ovi et mi l i tary ai r-
10. KOREA. Communist guard unit at Kaesong bel i eves oease-fire tal ks deter-
m n : Truoe tal ks are proceeding " so& mavor abl y, " amordi ngto
n - k a r y . North Korean message from a unit charged with the securi ty of
Kaesong.
oombat" and that elements of the 17th Division--assooiated i n previous
messages with arrangments a% Kaesong f or prisoner of war exchange--had not
arrived i n the area.
Oommentx Previous messages from thi s uni t have i ndi cated that the
The message stated further that the uni t was "preparing f or
(SUEDE CINCFE Tokyo, S1B 426, 23 Jan 52)
opinions eXpreS8ad by it do not ref l eot high Communist poliay, but rather
6 24 J an 52
>
~P P ROVE D FOR RELEASE 1
IDATE: 20-Mar-201 0 I
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' i r k ) S E C R E T S U E D e

a h F L I l k I I

are observations by the regiment Is personnel.
f or oombat" has buen noted previously.
i n the Kaesong area both a seouri ty mission and mi l i tary and pol i ti oal
trai ni ng
The reference to npreparing
This unit is ourrentl y oarrying out
11 *
Another "important" North ,Korean A i r Foroe meeting held:, A
No&h Korean A i r Force unit at SaPiwon was infonned by A nadquar ter s
at Pyongyang on 22 J anuary that "the important meeting w i l l be starti ng
the 24th so you must oome."
23 J an 62)
(SUEDE AS CM I N 5750, Sariwon-Pyongyang,
Comment: This message may have some oonneotion with tha Ui J anuary
message oonoerning the introduction of "trai ni ng planes" onto "praotice
ai rf i el ds " i n North Korea.
Communist message o f 21 J anuary whioh disoussed the departure of fi ve
YAK-18 trai ners, probably subordinate t o the North Korean Air Form, from
Yenohi ai rf i el d i n northwestern hnahuria fdr an unidentified si rf i el d.
The airoraft were'to proceed by way of Changchun and Mukden en route to
thei r destination.
Of a possibly paral l el nature i a a Chinese
NR
24 Jan 52
.I
i
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' A P S E C R E T S U E D !
H R 7 0 - 1 4

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F O R R E L E A S
A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

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10, KOREA. North ,Korean anti ai roraf t regiment locate8 on east coast;
3 T i e hcompany art i l l ery pieces at the i ron bridge at Xowon, a
ori ti cal transportati on center north of Woman on the eas t ooast, was
reported to the commanding offi oer of the 23rd North Korean Independent
Anti ai rcraft Regiment.
subordinate MA uni t f rom the Pyongyang area (probably eastward) and the
l ocati on of still another AAA unit of oompany si ze twenty miles from Kowon.
(SUEDE AS Korea CM IN 5537, 22 Jan 5 2 )
The arri val
The message al so revealed the movement of another
.
5 25 Jan 52
L~PPROVED FOR RELEASE!

Comment: This may represent a shi f t of anti ai rcraf t strength from
w e l l - m e d Pyongyang t o vi tal eas t coast transportati on centers.
Anti ai roraft arti l l ery protection on the east coast had previously been
furnished by AA units organic t o coastal def ense and tacti cal d t s i n
the area.
J
t
6
25 Jan 52
T d 1 1 " S E C R E T S U E D E .
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equally acti ve in prepara$ions f or small-soale amphibioud actions agai nst
i sl ands eti l l i n UN hands. (SUEDE AS CM I N 6259, 24 Jan 62)
7 28 Jan 52
r m o
-9 3.
m
4PPROVED FOR RELEASE 1 ' - 1 5s
3ATE: 20-Mar-201 0
KO=. Soviet transport ai rcraf t may have landed i n North Korea:
toprel i mi nary field analysis of reoent So v i et transmissions on the ground
Aocording
-.
oontrol i ntercept net in North Korea, a trimaport airoraft, eubordinate to
mi Gi denti fi ed- Soviet troop
Korea on 21 J anuary.
ved on 21 J anuary at hntung and may be rel ated t o the ai rcraf t at Sinanju.
(SUEDB US A i r Foroe CM I N 5984, 23 J an 52)
oarri er unit, landed at Sl n an j u in northwestern
The US A i r Force adds thatasi mi l ardroraf t was obser-
Comment: Similar tranmort ai rcraf t movements t o Sinanlu are believed
" ~ - - - ~
.~-.. c ~ - ._ . ~. .~~ ~ ~ . . .. _._. ~
to h a m n pl aoe on 2 and 8 J uly, 1951. The Sinanju area i s known to
be a.center of-the Soviet ai r dsf&e system i n North-Korea.
u66ble r od f i el d at Sinanju which conceivably could support a transport
airarm.
There i s a
Comunishe plari recapture of major UN-held island: A reonntly trans-
l ated North Korean messam reveals that a batt- Drobablv the 5th --
of t he 23rd Brigade i s tg have preparations for the "Chi-do ati aok . .
oompleted by'2400 hours 28 J anuary."
attaok Ho-do, supported by four 120 mm howitzers.
mdssages'indioate that the 6th and 9th battal i ons of the 23rd Brigade are
The same battal i on was ordered to
Other North Korean

6 .
T R D - S E e R E - T - - s D L o o

T O P S E C R 2 T S U E D E

Comment: Cho-do i s one of two pri nci pal UM-held islands of f 'the
ooas t x t - oent r al Korea.
it more suitable as a guerri l l a and espionage base than Pasngyong-do,
the other important island.
I t s l ocati on, southwest of chi&po, d e s
18. New Orbit- language heard i n Korean i ntercept: A United Nations
The i ntercept operator
i ntercept'operator i n Korea monitored a ten-minute enemy transmission in
a previously unheard language on 22 J anuary.
stated that the new language was possibly one of the many used by Soviet
minority groups i n the Cauousus mountain region of the USSR. Voioe
oharabteri ati os of the transmission were not ori ental . (SUEDE USA-251,
08152, 23 Jan 52)
Comment: No immediate si gni fi cance can be attached .bo the appearanoe
o f thi s new 'language i n Korea.
gent bf mi l i tary personnel serving i n various oapaoitiee wi thi n North
Korea, and it i s possible that the use of thi s comparatively obsoure mino-
ri ty group tongue was an attempt at securi ty on the part of some of these
foroes.
The USSR is known to have a sizable contin-
8 28 Jan 52

T O P S E
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KOREA. 'North Korean brigade al erted against UlJ attempt t o recapture
m d s r ' A seri es of 24 J anuary messages to and from the North Korean
23rd Brigade in west central Kor ea ref'lect a fear that the UN is planning
to retake aome minor islands l ost 'to the C O ~ ~ i E t S ~
bombing of the brigade CP and increased UN naval. reconnaissmce, the 23rd
Following a UN
. 29 Jan 52
4
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. 4 %
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5

N R
L.
Brigade reported that "it i s expeoted that the enemy w i l l i ntend to land
on the i sl ands which (have been al ready?) l i berated.
are seen in the capture by the 5th Battal i on of ". enemy spi es . .
dispatched from Cho-do, along with radi o sets." An attempt to develop
i ntenti ons by uti l i zi ng these agents i n a turnaround capacity is revealed
by an order from the 23rd Brigade to the capturing battal i on to "make
use of the spy teohnioally,"
his pri nci pal s and i n ui re "about what we should d o . . .'I
CM I N 6439, 25-J an 521
. ." Other po&ents
UN
The captured agent was t o aomuni cate with
(SUEDE AS
5
29 Jan 52

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9. KOREAo pew Chinese Comn&x&t armies reborted I n Koregs The commander of
the Chinese Communist 2nd A ~ m y Group, 1st Fi el d Army, was appointed to
cornand the weetern eeetor o f the Korean battl e front i n early January.
Two of the 2nd A m y GroupDs wmiee--the 4th and 8th--moved i nto thi s seotor '
. during thi s period. 124 Jan 52)
- s There I s no eonfirmation of this moves However, such a
rotati on of 1st Field Amy mf ts and command would be feasible. The western
Kaesong seotor is now held by the 19th Army Group--63rd, 64th and 65th
Rrmies--subordinate to the 1st Field Army and active i n Korea since early
epring of 1951,
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O r 1 1 r l

9. BOFtEk. Wr t E Korean j ets fly. oombat missions:
-io%, equipped with MI G- 1 5 j et fi ghters. i s fl yi ng combat missions
over Korea, aocording to preliminary f i el d analysis of a reoent North
Korean air massage.
stati oned a t Antung, and the other is possibly at Anshan i n the Mukden
area.
The North Korean 1st Air
One of the North Korean di vi si on's regiments i s
(SUEDE CINCFE SIB 431, 28 Jan 52)
HR70-14
F
- .
Comientr The entry of thi s North Korean j et ai r di vi si on i nto oombat
follows a recentl y observed expansion o f North Korean air acti vi ty.
Uti l i zati on of ai rf i el ds deeper i n Menohuria f or combat jet ai rcraf t
has been suggested on at l east two recent encounters by the al ti tude and
di reoti on of f l i ght of the enemy j ets leaving Korea aaros~ the Yalu River.
'
While no defi ni te connection can be established, it i s worth noting
that the North Korean A i r Force radio ci rcui t between Pyongyang and
Si nui j u was exceptionally acti ve during the period 25-27 J anuary.
10. . North Korean f ear of Chinese Communist i nterfereme i ndi oatedt A
North Korean message between two unidentified u n i t s , instructinp. the
reoi pi ent on the handling of a captured pi l ot, oautioned that tge pi l ot
"should not be snktched from you by Chinese comrades."
Recon Group Korea, CM IN 7625, 29 J an 52)
'
(SUEDE 5Olst Comm
4 31 J an 52
SS
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4 6

D I A , D O S D e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n / R e l e a s e I n s t r u c t i o n s o n F i l e

T o l e a r n a bo u t P D F C o mp r e s s i o n a n d O C R go t o T he P a p e r l e s s O f f i c e . o r g
1 .
A p p r o v e d F o r F l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 - 0 1 1 4 6
T O P

7 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 - 1

3 1 A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R 0 P 7 9 1 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 - 1
A p p r o v e d F o r l i p a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R 0 P 7 9 1 0 1 1 4 6 / 4 0 7 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 - 1

T O P S E C R E T
U N C L A S S I F I E D w he A P P R Q U A K i F F S C I R L e l l e X A 4 4 9 4 0 0 / 4 6 T O F
' . : t . ' t ' s r , : s n ' gr a e d o r d e c l a s s i -
f i e d w he n V e d i n f o r m i s d e t a c he d f r o m c o n t r o l l e d
d o C u me n t .

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A T T E N T I O N : T hi s f o r m w i l l be p l a c e d
O n t o p o f a n d a t t a c he d t o e a c h T o p S e c r e t
d o c u me n t r e c e i v e d by t he C e n t r a l I n t e l l i ge n c e
A ge n c y o r c l a s s i f i e d T o p S e c r e t w i t hi n t he C I A a n d
w i l l r e ma i n a t t a c he d t o t he d o c u me n t
u n t i l s u c h t i me a s i t
I s d o w n gr a d e d , d e s t r o y e d , o r t r a n s mi t t e d o u t s i d e o f C I A .
A c c e s s t o T o p S e c r e t ma t t e r i s l i mi t e d
t o T o p S e c r e t C o n t r o l p e r s o n n e l a n d t ho s e
i n d i v i d u a l , w ho s e o f f i c i a l
d u t i e s r e l a t e t o t he ma t t e r .
T o p S e c r e t C o n t r o l O f f i c e r s w ho r e c e i v e
a n d / o r r e l e a s e t he a t t a c he d T o p S e c r e t
ma t e r i a l w i l t s i gn t hi s f o r m a n d i n d i c a t e p e r i o d O f c u s t o d y i n t he l e f t - ha n d
c o l u mn s p r o v i d e d .
E a c h i n d i v i d u a l w ho s e e s t he T o p S e c r e t
d o c u me n t t o i l l s i gn a n d i n d i c a t e t he d a t e o f ha n d l i n g i n
t he r i ght - ha n d c o l u mn s .

N O T I C E O F D E T A C H M E N T : W he n t hi s f o r m i s
d e t e c t e d f r o m T o p S e c e t ma t e i a t i t s ha l l be
c o mp l e t e d I n t he a p p r o p r i a t e s p a c e s be l o w a n d t r a n s mi t t e d
C e n t r a l T o p S e c r e t C o n t r o f o r r e c o r d .

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G o v e r n me n t


A p p r o v e d F o r R s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 , 7 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 - 1


A p p r o v e d F o r R e e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 1 . 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 - 1

r .
A p p r o v e d F o r R a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 4 , 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 - 1

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5 2
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4 6

S t a t e D e p t . d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n & r e l e a s e i n s t r u c t i o n s
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T o l e a r n mo r e a bo u t OC R a n d P D F C o mp r e s s i o n v i s i t o u r we bs i t e
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U B E R OF P A G E S
L OG G E D B Y
N U M B E R OF A T T A C H A I E N T S
A T T E N T I ON :
T h i s f o r m wi l l be p l a c e d o n t o p o f a n d
a t t a c h e d t o e a c h T o p S e c r e t d o c u me n t r e c e i v e d
by t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y
o r c l a s s i f i e d T o p S e c r e t wi t h i n t h e C I A a n d
wi l l r e ma i n a t t a c h e d t o t h e d o c u me n t
u n t i l s u c h t i me a s I t i s d o wn g r a d e d , d e s t r o y e d ,
o r
t r a n s mi t t e d o u t s i d e o l C I A .
A c c e s s t o T o p S e c r e t ma t t e r I s l i mi t e d
t o T o p S e c r e t C o n t r o l p e r s o n n e l a n d t h o s e
i n d i v i d u a l s wh o s e o f f i c i a l d u t i e s r e l a t e t o t h e ma t t e r .
T o p S e c r e t C o n t r o l Of f i c e r s wh o r e c e i v e
a n d / o r r e l e a s e t h e a t t a c h e d T o p S e c r e t
ma t e r i a l wi l l s i g n t h i s f o r m a n d i n d i c a t e p e r i o d o f c u s t o d y i n t h e l e f t - h a n d
c o l u mn s p r o v i d e d . E a c h i n d i v i d u a l wh o
s e e s t h e T o p S e c r e t d o c u me n t wi l l S i g n a n d I n d i c a t e t h e d a t e o f h a n d l i n g i n t h e r i g h t - h a n d
c o l u mn s .

Or r i C E
a I a u o r u p D
D OT E 7 1 E D A T E n a y
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OF F I C E / D I V . D A T E
N OT I C E OF D E T A C H M E N T : W h e n t h i s f o r m
I s d e t a c h e d f r o m T o p S e c e t ma l t i a l i t s h a l t be
c o mp l e t e d I n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s p a c e , be l o w a n d t r a n t r n i t t e d t o C e n t r a l T o p S e c r e t C o n t r a ,
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1 1 .
A P - S E C R E T - S U E D !

H R 7 0 - 1

5 5
11. Heavy aoti vi ty at ai rf i el d near Koresn border reported: Fl i ghts
totalTng poksibly 7pChi nese"' and "All ied" M I E 1 5 ' s from Tatungkou,
near Antung, Were revealed i n a 30 J anuary message.
Roundup 23, 20502, 31 Jan 52)
(SUEDE A i r Force
'
Commentr Although communioations intelI3.gence on the aoti vi ty of
t a c t i m units i n Manchuria was considerably reduced in l ate December
by Communist securi ty measures, messages reporting heavy acti vi ty at
Tatungkou continue to be received.
13, KOREA.
m i r t y - f o u r t h Regiment" is mentioned in a 28 January Chinese Com-
Arri val ,of new Chinese ConrmunieC army g roup i n Korea suggeet edr
munist measage as being i n a defensive posi ti on on t h e Korean western
front. (SUEDE 501st Corn Reoon &-rea, CM IN 7955, 30 Jan 52)
Commenta There have been no indioations of major changes i n the
w e s t e x o r of the Korean ba$tle front--the ar ea f rom which the UI?
Command expeots any future C o d s t offensive wi l l be launched.
Chinese Nati onal i st i ntel l i gence'reports have stated, h6wever, that the
CIiineae Communist 2nd Army Group, oonaiating of %he lit, 4th and 8th
Armie8,'had moved i nto western Korea i n earl y J anuary.
Regiment would normally be subordinate to the 4th Army of this army group.
Recent
The 34th Infantry
\
While the introduction of thi e fresh army group i nto western Korea,
i f'confi med, might i ndi oate a rotati on of troops long engaged i n thi s
sector, it might on the other hand represept a significant increase i n
the enemy's offensive potenti al i n thi s strategi c area.
14 9 I
F or info on P D F Compression and O CR visit TheP aperlessO ffice. org
' 0 1

*
I
15. ' Outbreak of smallpox i n North Korean Army t A 20 January message from
a Nodh K oreen naval uni t at the northeastern Korean ci ty of Chongjin
states that "due' to the outbreak of d l p o x ailments. ..(we) have oompleted
the
CM IN 7354, 28 Jas 52)
inoculation, today, at the Chongjin stati on area." -(S&E ASA T&m
Comment: Northeastern Korea suffered heavily from epi ddos of typhus
&d s= during the winter of 1950-51.
olimpaign was'oarried out by North Koreafl authori ti es during the summer and
f al l of 1961.
aholera i n vi l l ages i n the Wonsan area on the east coast .
An i ntensi ve anti-epidemia
Reoent report8 have ai ted the outbreak of typhoid and
6 4 Feb 52
F or info on P D F Compression and O CR visit TheP aperlessO ffice. org
A p p r o v e d F o r e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 1 . 0 0 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 - 9

4 6

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A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 1 1 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 - 9
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, / U N C L A S S I F I E D w he A D R I 4 V E 4 F F S E d i l f r i e n a
Z D A 1 1 4 9 / 0 r 4 1 : 4 4 3 5 4 1 3 1 % 1 4 1 1 - 4 C A P A I R O4 2 4 # 9 4 4 e d
,
f i e d w he o f i l l e d i n f o r m i s d e t a c he d f r o m c o n t r o l l e d d o c u me n t .


V l 9 c . i z
e

3 C Z

( 1 6 '

A T T E N T I ON : T hi s f o r m w i l l be p l a c e d
o n t o p o f a n d a t t a c he d t o e a c h T o y S e c r e t d o c u me n t
r e c e i v e d by t he C e n t r a l I n t e l l i ge n c e A ge n c y
o r c l a s s i f i e d T a p S e c r e t w i t hi n t he C A a n d w i l t r e ma i n
a t t a c he d t o t he d o c u me n t u n t i l s u c h t i me
a s I t i s d o w n gr a d e d , d e s t r o y e d , Or
t r a n s mi t t e d o u t s i d e o f C I A .
A c c e s s t o T o p S e c r e t ma t t e r i s l i mi t e d t o T o p
S e c r e t C o n t r o l p e r s o n n e l a n d t ho s e i n d i v i d u a l , w ho s e
o f f i c i a l d u t i e s r e l a t e t o t he ma t t e r . T o p S e c r e
C o n t r o l Of f i c e r s w ho r e c e i v e a n d / o r r e l e a s e t he
a t t a c he d T o y S e c r e t ma t e r i a l w i l l s i gn t Oi s f o r m
a n d I n d i c a t e p e r i o d o f c u s t o d y i n t he l e f t - ha n d
E a c h i n d i v i d u a l w ho s e e s t he T o p S e c r e t d o c u me n t
w i l l s i gn a n d I n d i c a t e t he d a t e o i ha n d l i n g i n t he r i ght - ha n d
c o l u mn s .

N OT I C E OF D E T A C H M E N T : W he n t hi s f o r n i i s d e t a c he d
f r o m T o p S e c r e t ma t e r i a l I t s ha l l be c o mp l e t e d t n t he
a p p r o p r i a t e s p a c e
a n d t r a n s mi t t e d t O C e n t r a l T o p S e c r e t C o n t r o f o r r e c o r d .
be l o w

( OU T S I D E C I A )
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A p p r o v e d F o r R i t e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A . 0 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 - 9
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a p p a r e n t l y

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a p p a r e n t l y

F e b 5 2
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A p p r o v e d F o r R i n s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 1 0 6 . : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A . 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 - 9
S E C R E T

A p p r o v e d F o r R i n s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 0 1 1 4 6 A . 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 - 9

r e p a i r e d

a d d i t i o n

S E C R E T
6
4 F e b 5 2
A p p r o v e d F o r R W a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 - 9
S E C R E T

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I X - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 4 0 hi n 5 2
A p p r o v e d F o r R Oa s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 - 9

A p p r o v e d F o r R a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A . 0 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 - 9

A p p r o v e d F o r R a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 , 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 - 9

f k p p r o v e d F o r R i t t s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 1 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 - 9


A p p r o v e d F o r R a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 - 9
S E C R E T

c a mp a i gn

S E C R E T
1 3 F e b 5 2
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.

6
I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

D R
)
HR70-14
13 e
14. KOBEA. New North Korean A i r Foroe orgmi zqti on indiaatedr A North Korean
m o r o e officer was instruo-n M 8 J anuary message -from Sinui ju to
Pyongyang t o "j oi n the fi ghter Wing wi th'the fi ghter group which is in
the 10th Division." (SUEDE AS CM I N 7633, Binuiju-Pyongyang, 29 Jan 52)
I denti fi ed North Korean A i r Foroe Divisions are the l at,
2ad, U-Divisionsj no "10th Division" i s known. A.possi bi l i ty
exists that the 1Wh Division mentioned is the 10th Infantry Division.
looated i n the Chongohon ri ver area i n northwestern Korea.
area has been the si te of oonsiderable Communist Air Force aoti vl ty i n
ai rf i el d oonstruction, earl y warning, end ground-oontrolled i nterospt
radar mrk.
' Cbrmhentr
Thia general
~
DATE. 20-Mar-2010
6 Feb 62:
, : NR
F or a compr ehensive guide on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession go to T heP a per lessO ffice.or g
' A P S E C R E T S U E D #

16. " North X0re-m "bomber regiment" addressed at Pyongyang: A 21 J anuary
moorage M e frim Nor Supreme
C6&d A i r .De
Reg/mqnt .* (8 26 Binuiju-wongyang, 21 J an 52)
n Pyoqgyang addresee8 the "Eomander, 3;d Bomber
- - _
Commen%t 'Despite previous mention of a "bomber unit' i n the North
lC6rernlCi?l;-Foroa, there i s no evidenoe of t he exirrtenoe of suoh a uni t
equipped wi th bombemtype airoraft. It is enti rel y possi bl e that the
&it referred to i s the one whioh uti l i zes obsolescent Pp-2 bi pl anes to
make sporadio harassi ng rai d8 on UN installations.
Desertions oontinue to s or r North Korean trai ni n uaitr Desertions
irrhong new trafneea in the North &rean 7th Railroad + Beg men are to be
Comm Reoon Group Korea, CM IN 8540, 1 Fob 52)
Is. -
prevented by enl i sti ng "many an informer" and making the
oloser," rooording to b 29 January' br t h krean message.
Oommentt The 7th and 8th Regiment6 of the North Korean Railroad
B e o u r ~ s i o n have been plagued with a high desertion rate.
17. Communists "re-eduo,ate' South Korean oi ti eene: Approximately a00
teaohdrb and edubational admi ni ~trato~rs from Uomuni st-l i berated areas
.
gathered,on 31 J anuary in Kaesong for a rei ndoatri nati on trai ni ng oourse,
aooordihg to a pl ai n-text Communiet news message of 2 February.
progr&, to teaoh 'bemooratio eduoation and procedures of advanoed teaching,"
was i nsti tuted i n anti oi pati on of the renewal of the eduaati onkl system on
28 February i n thi s arear (SUEDE 50L t Corn boon Group Korea, CM IN 9163,
3 Feb 52)
Co mmmmd e r the current cease-fi re line agreement. The setti ng up of
a Communist-type eduoational system in thi s area may provide sbme indica-
tion of the permanenoe wi th whioh the enemy seem8 to regard i ts possession
of this territory.
The
Comments Sout h Korea west of the Imjin ri ver is to be hel d by the
7
5 Feb 52
F or a compr ehensive guide on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession go to T heP a per lessO ffice.or g

H R 7 0 - 1 4

A P P R O V E D F O R
R E L E A S E D A T E :
2 2 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

b
c
s
HR70-14
mentioned i n Korean messages: Korean A i r Force
that the Chinese Communist 14th Division
10
is at i l l at Takushan (near Antung) and that the two ai r forces are cooper-
ati ng more olosely.
88 t e z l y indioated by a message of 1 J anuary.
(SUEDE Ai r Force Roundup 25, 22382, 4 Feb 52)
. ' Comment8 The 14th Division is apparently not moving t o China proper,
Greaterecti vi ty by Korean air units based in Manchuria WFLS noted
recently, and thi s inorease probably requires more Sino-Korean coordination.
~P P ROVE D FOR I
6 Feb 52
1R
T o lea r n a bout O CR a nd P D F Compr ession visit T heP a per lessO ffice.or g

M I L P .

\
. b
b P
11. KOREA. "New Chinese Communist Fit" proves t o be an ol d onet A second
version of a 27 J ahuary Chinese Communist message refers to the "5th
Company of our 345th Regiment" i n rel ati on t o a Communist defensive
position. (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Group Korea CM I N 9357, 4 Feb 52)
Comment: The earl i er version of thi s message l i sted the Chinese
Communist unit as the 54th Regiment" subordinate to the 4th Army, nei ther
preiriotmly i denti fi ed i n Korea.
4 Feb 52)
llSth'Diwision, 39th'-Afiy, long i n Korea and currentl y i n contact with UN
foroes i n western' Korea.
(See Deilv Dinest Swci al Supplement,
The'Chinese Coinmunist 345th regiment is subordinate to the
12 . North Korean annored di vi si on may be on the movet The North Korean
commander of the "13lst Division" was requested by a subordinate uni t to
provide nine vehicles t o move arti l l ery. ~ FECOM believes that "131" i s the
ood6 designation 'of the North Korean 105th Armored Division, currentl y
located some 30 miles north of Pyongyang.
Another North Korean mewage, possibly from the 105th Annored Division
states a need for 1,320 replacements , including "automatio arti l l ery
<car?) men'' (self-propelled arti l l ery?).
are to come'from the "10th Division" and 1,120 from the mechanized "17th
Mvi$ion" east" of Pyongyang. (SUBDE CI NCFE Tokyo CM IN 8861, 2 Feb;
Two hundred of these new troops
r p 0 4 6 , 30 Jan 52)
'Cornenti The Morth Korean 105th Armored Division, wi t h 120 T-34
t a n k s mi e v e d to be completely rehabi l i tated and combat ready.
the past few month6 it has Peen on seouri ty duty along the main supply
route and the ooast north of Pyongyang. The providing'of replacements
for the armored di vi si on by the 10th and 17th Mviaion8,also i n this
general area, would seem to i ndi cate that the three divisions are subordi-
nate t o the seme corps,possibly the IV.
may foreoasf a more aotive role f or the 106th Armored Division i n the
near future.
For
The'movement of artillery and the f i l l i ng out of divisional etrength
. .
13 North hrean A i r Force trai ni ng command cal l s seouri ty conference:
A oonf'erence at the North Korean ai r school i n Yenohi. Manchuria. has '
been cal l ed f or an unidentified date i n February.
auoh as "the aocident of #2 ai rcraft," are to be presented, and the
"other eecuri
ence. (SWDEm240, Yenohi-!hughwa, 4 Feb 52)
"&ergency problems,"
o fi oer" i s menfiioned as soheduled to attend'the confer-
7
6 Feb 52

Cornenti
K o r e k m r a e . M l e no speci fi o reasonefor such extrame precautions
Li e apparent, it is possible that, the Communists seriously fear the
defeotion of one of thei r pilots t o the UN.
The problem of seourity is a continuing one in the North
8
6 Feb 52
NF
C O 2 8 8 8 7 5 4
A
A p p r o v e d F o r e a s e 2 0 0 5 1 0 1 1 2 6 :


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ind ica tio n

imp o r ta nt

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5

11. KOREA. USSR provides some cbnsumer goods t b North Korea:
mtin the aniount of 250,000 rubles (62,500 dol l ars) was to be opened
on 12 J anuary i n favor of a Soviet export trust f or "yarn, ootton cl oth,
and medicines" shipped to North Korea, according to a banking message
from Pyongyang to A~J SOOW.
A l etter of
(SUEDE FT-4170, Pyongyang-Mosoow, 12 Jan 52)
Commentt Pri noi pal S ovi et exports to Nortb Korea i n 1961were
i n d u e mmd mi l i tary materiel.
shortage of al l oonsumer goods i n North Korea.
All i ndi cati ons point t o a severe
12 .
'North Korean A i r headquarters evinces i nterest i n downed UN planet
The pi l ot of "one F-86 enemy plane" downed on 26 J anuary near Chinnampo
was to be seized and the ai rcraf t taken t o Pyongyang, atloording to a
message from the North Korean A i r headquarters i n Si nui j u to Pyongyang.
( S U E D E l / 2 4 2 , Si nui ju-Pyongyang, 26 J an 52 )
d u r i h mer i o d 24 through 31 J anuary.
jets, however, were l ost on 26 J anuary.
Comentr No F-86 j et f i ghter was l ost over Communist terri tory
'
Two F-80 and three F-84
H R70-14
It 3.8 known that the Communiata go to coneiderable troubl e t o salvage
downed UN ai roraft. Furthermore, there i s a probabi l i ty that some l ost
F-80 j et fi ghtera, and possibly one F-86, have been made operati onal by
the eneny.
5
7 Feb 52
>%
5
PIPPROVED FOR RELEASE 1
To learn how to use O CR and P D F Compression visit our website
A p p r o v e d F o r R o s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 9 1 1 1 7 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 1 - 6


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d ut i e s r e l a t e t a t he - M a t t e r . T o y S e c r e t C o nt r o l Offi c e r s w ho r e c e i v e a nd / o r r e l e a s e t he a t t a c he d T o p
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a hd t r a ns m i t t d t o C e nt r a l T o p S e c r e t C o nt r a fo r r e c o r d .

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A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 1 _ 6
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A p p r o v e d F o r R o s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 , 7 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 1 - 6

1 .
A p p r o v e d F o r R o s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 e 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 1 - 6
4 k

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 1 _ 6
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A p p r o v e d F o r R e s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 1 1 , 7 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 1 - 6



H R 7 0 - 1

6
L P i P R T p
7 .
O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
- )

Ir
10 .
11.
12 .
I
KOREA. 'North Korean j et fi ghter uni t may be moving i nto Manohurian
i nteri or: A t ransfer order f rom the "Chinese A i r Force Headquarters"
was receiveil"at No2cw1 Korean Air Headquarters authorizing a move f r o m
either Anshan or Antun$ to the Manchurian i nteri or town of Tungfeng.
The 29 J anuary message, from Si nui j u to a North Korean of mi ni steri al
rank in Pyongyang, mentioned that "P'aeng Tok Hi"--possibly Chinese
Commkist Volunteer commander Peng Teh-huai--had been informed of this
move . (SUEDE 249, Sinui ju-Pyongyang, 29 J an 52 )
-
6
~P,PPROVED FOR RELEASE I
0 Feb 52
DD
-%
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T O P S E C R E T - S U E D E -
Commentt Although this message gives no i ndi cati on of who was
to move to kgf eng, the f act that the transfer required coordination
wi th a North Korean cabinet mi ni ster and with Peng Teh-huai suggests a
movement of some si gni fi cance. It is possible that a North Korean j et
fi ghter unit stati oned ei ther at Anshan or Antung may be involved. The
ai rf i el d at Tungfeng was reported i n use by j et ai rcraf t i n 1951; reoent
si ghfi ngs by ON pi l ots of enemy MIG15j ets leaving North Korea i n the
di recti on of Tunghua - Tungfeng lends credence t o the possible l ooati on of
enemy uni ts i n thi s area.
I A further decl i ne of known Communist offensi ve and defensive ai r
capabi l i ti es over North Korea would resul t, if such a move occurred.
13. ' North Korean uni ts withdraw from captured islands: North Korean'
am~hi bi ous units who cawtured an uni denti fi ed i sl and were ordered bu'a
Brigade commander on 4 February to wipe out or capture al l the "eneky" .
troops on the i sl and and then t o set "anti-personnel mines and evacuate.
at onoe.. . ."
Additional evidence that such withdrawals are standard operating
prooedure is seen i n a 1Pebruarymessage from an uni denti fi ed battal i on
t o the 23rd Brigade reporti ng that "our troops at Yukto have thoroughly
withdrawn." (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon ,Group Korea, CM: I N 9974 and 10051,
6 Feb 52)
Comments American naval shore i ntel l i geqce i n western ooastal Korea
r e p o ~ n enemy',a evacuation of Sunwi , Changnin, and Yongwi i sl ands
af ter thei r capture.
oounterattaoks and of rocket attacks from UN vessel s were l i sted as the
pri nci pal reasons f or these withdrawals.
Lack of transportati on and fear of ROK marine
I
7
a
0 Feb 52
T o learn how to use P D F Comp ressi on and O CR go to T heP ap erlessO ffi ce. org

S E C R E T - S U E D P

D A T E : 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
P S E C R E T S U E D E
7

1 ) 1 )
14.
15
KOREA-. Inirideaoe of malaria i n a Chinese Communist unit i n Korea deoreasbst
-a1 Chinese Communist messages i ndi cate that the percentage of malaria
vi cti ms in an uni denti fi ed Chinese unit in Korea has' greatl y deoreased
over the past three year&.
had the disease; i n 1950, f i f ty peroent; and i n 1951, ten peroent.
Aocording to one message, i n 1949 ni nety percent
A second message states that "i n the years 1949, 1950 and 1951 ((there
was i ssued))qui ni ne and ((4 a nati ve drug 7 ) ) as mal ari a preventatives."
(SUEDE 501st Coma Reoon. Group Korea, CM I N 9620, 2 Feb and 29 Jan 52)
Commentr Reoent POW i nterrogati on reports i ndi cate that the Communists
in Korea have' adequate supplies bf atabri ne t o treat mal ari a oases.
general medical supply situation, however, is reported t o be cri ti cal .
The
.
North Korean combat di vi si on may withdraw t o rear area: A seri es of
three messages on the'i nterdi vi sLona1 net o f the North Korean 13th Division,
IT Corps, currentl y i n combat with UN forces i n east-central Korea, suggests
that th'i s'di vi si on may be preparing to withdraw t o the Won8en:area. One
6' February message noted that the "Corps chi ef si gnal offi cer" requi red a
report on whether the 13th. Division communications ohief could oarry his
radio' t o Anbyon, j ust south of Wonsan. Another 6 February message i ndi cated
that a "medical treatment ohief" had been dispatched to a tow$ north of
Wonsan to "i nvesti gate the veteri nary situation."
detai l ed the avai l abi l i ty of horses t o move the 13th Division's arti l l ery.
( Su EI 3 Em2 3 9 6 , 2397, and 2398, 6 Feb 52)
The f i nal message
11 Feb 52
7
DATE: 18-Mar-201 0
-m
L
55
I'
S E C R E T - S U E D P -

A b
Comment: Although thi s message does not conclusively i ndi cate a ,
If the I1 Corps, long
movement of the 13th Division, much l ess the I1 Corps, it strongl y
suggests that some such move-may be contemplated.
engaged i n combat, is withdrawn, it wl11 probably be replaced i n the kine
6y ei ther the restad V Corps' f'rom the Wonsan area or a reserve di vi si on
of the f ul l strengbh I Corps, from the eastern coastal area.
18. North Korean Premier prai ses armed force8 on A m y Day: On the oocasion
Army, of the Fourth Anniversary on 8 February of the North Korean People's
P r aer Kim I1 Sung delivered hi s tmnual exhortation t o al l segments of
Korean'society and to armed foroes, urging than to "prepare to achieve
deci si ve vi ctory i n the approaching e" a d oongratul ati n them on
thei r achievements thus far. ( S U E D E ~ 3 9 9 , Korea 6 Feb 527
Commentr The publ i ci ty broadcast version of K i m's speeoh condensed
perti-rtions but neglected to mention "the approaching battle."
Btoept f or thi s omission, the broadcaat version i s no less bel l i cose
than the message sent over the mi l i tary network.
f dr the passage of t i me and events, is nearl y i denti cal with Kim's speech
on the Third Anniversary of the People's Army l ast year.
The address, allowing
\
8 U Feb 52
H R 7 0 - 1 4

E : 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

I ?
L
14.
156
I '
16
u s e unexplained tactics: On 5 February US F-86'8
s in the ai r, i n formations of 12 to 40 ai rcraf t. The
On the same date US j et f i ghters al so si ghted
l oaati ons and headings of these formations i ndi oatsd an 'ori gi n in Manchuria
other than the Antung area.
50 t b 60 MIG's at Antung arid 30 at nearby Tatungkou.
2121, 7 Feb 52)
(S FEAF Tokyo AX
Comment8 I ntercepts show that nearl y 100 "al l i ed" and Chinese MIG's
continue t o fly to oombat from Tatungkou and the FEAF si ghti ng of 50 t o
60 UG's at Antung suggests that j et strength there is al so bei ng main-
tai ned at the l evel reached i n l ate 1951, when 100 MIG's were bel i eved
based at eaoh of the two f i el ds. There is no di rect evidence of th'e use
of j et bases other than i n the Antung area f or operati ons over Korea.
KOFtEA. North Korean VI 1 Corps will continue to defend i n Woman areat
the bccasion of the fourth anni versary df' the founding of the People's
On
-
Army, the North Korean commander of the 7th Division f el i ci tated the
commander of hi s parent corps, the VII, and assured him that "we are firmly
prepari ng the l i ne of defense." (SUEDE 501 Corn Reoon Group Korea,
SK-G153, 9 Feb 5 2 )
\
Comment: The North Korean VI 1 Corps has been assi gned to defend the
Won&- @; area agai nst UN mphibioua attacks since earl y spri ng of
1951.
one of the f ront l i ne combat corps; however, thi s message i ndi cates a
continued defensi ve rol e f or at least on0 di vi si on of the VI1Corps.
I t has been frequentl y specul ated that thi s corps would relieve
Sovi et advi ser f el i ci tates North Koreari armored di vi si on: Asserti ng
that the "105th (Armored) Division's f i ghti ng tradi ti on must be nurtured,"
I
HR70-14
NF
I
a Sovi et "techni cal advi ser of the tank-headquartersa on 7 February con-
gratul ated the di vi si on's personnel on the occasion of the fourth anniver-
sary of the Korean People's Army.
9 Feb 52) ,
( S WE 330 Corn Recon Co Korea, A n 989,
'E: 18-Mar-201 0 I
ROVED FOR RELEASE 1 8 12 Feb 52
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A P S E C R E T S U E D #

- T O P . S E C R E T S U E D E
Commentt
a d v i k m%h e Communist forces di rectl y address the uni ts to which they
are assigned,
armor has' addressed a message 'of congratul ati ons to the commanding of f i oer
of the 105th Armored Division.
T h i s message is unusual i n that rarel y do the So v i e t
I n thi s case, apparentl y the senior Sovi et advi ser on
North Korean regiment forced to recrui t l ocal 1 a The North Korean
82ndd'Regirnent, on Kaesong guard duty, i s &vantage" a with i ts
di vi si on personnel of f i ce presumably owing to the di stanoo separati ng
the two uni ts -- and has requested permission to accept recrui ts from
Kaesotlg ci ty, according to an 8 February message.
Korea, ALT 991, 8 Feb 52)
(SUEDE 330 Comm Recon CO
. .
Comentr The pl i ght of the 82nd Regiment, wi th i ts parent uni t
across the peninsula, i s obvious.
l ogi s t i c s , personnel, and chai n of command have been previ ousl y noted i n
thi e regiment's messages,
Problems rel ati ng to communicatione,
North Koreans continue to produce dry cel l batteri es: An of f i cer at
the gorth Korean Communications Supply Headquarters advised an unknown
stati on on 9 February that over 700,000 dry cel l batteri es were t o be
produaed i n February 1952.
output. (SUEDE 330 Comm Recon Co Korea, ALT 016, 9 Feb 52)
One factory was to produce almost the enti re
Comment: Shortages of al l types of oommunioations equipment, parti -
odar-eries for portabl e transmi tters , has been evidenced for a
long t i me i n Communist messages.
scheduled to produce the bul k of thi s materi al is looated i n Manchuria and
that the others, wi th i nf i ni tel y smaller quotas, are i n Korea.
I t i s probable that the faotory
,
9
12 Feb 52
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H R 7 0 - 1 4

D A T E : 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
7
DATE: 18-Mar-201 0
....
HR70-14
W. KOREA. Communists again demonstrate considerable l ogi sti cal abi l i ty8
1C5ro';iireions "to Last unti l the middle of April" are reported by an
uni denti fi ed Chinese Communist arti l l ery regimental o o d e r on
3 February. -This food stockpi l e included 234 000 pounds-of
16,666 pounds of other foodstuffs. ( S U E D E a 5 4 3 , 3 Feb 52cj'
Comment: Although the proximity of this regiment to the front lime
i s unknown, the aocumulation of over a two-month food supply by a
regimental-size unit demonstrates a oonsiderable degree of Communist
l ogi sti oal suocess.
ai n and
-
This l evel of supply i s somewha% unusual i n any oombat unit other
than one engaged i n a stati o rear area defensive role.
7
13 Feb 52
BD
ss
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A P * ,
l i i p p r o v e d
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C E N T R A L D T T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
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o r i n t h e O f f i c e o f C u r r e n t I n t e l l i g e n c e .
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T o p S e c r e t ma te r i a l wi l l s i gn th i s fo r m
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f o r t h e i n t e r n a l u s e o f t h e O f f i c e o f C u r r e n t I n t e l l i g e n c e . I t d o e s
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H R 7 0 - 1 4
6 .

D A T E : 1 9 - F e b - 2 0 1 0

' N R
V
DATE: 19-Feb-2010
6 . pelping fLg ai n olaima Sino-Soviet allianoe prevente expansion of
Korean confliots An hnonymoue oonunentator over the P eiping raaio asserted
think %doe bef ore enlarging the war of aggression.
g e n e r n t o the Sino-Soviet treaty i n parkioular, as a bulwark against
US "aggression" in Asia.
for the f i rst time expl i ci tl y oredi ted t,he Sine-Suviet treaty with prevent-
.iw, ,an ekparisfon of' the Korean oonfl Sot t o the'China mainlande Thie l atest
hat "the SinomSoviet allianoe has forqed the Amerioan im eri al i sts to
=.'
C m e A Peiping frequently refers t o t he Si no- SAt al l i ai oe i n
Kowever, PeipiagDs propaganda i n l ate J anuary
braadoast'is another implied warning that the USSR 'i s oonanitted t o China's'
defense under the terns of the Sino-Soviet treaty.
-63WREw
4
14 Feb 52
T b P S E C R E T S U E D e

D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
- T
HR70-14
Commentt The deployment of anti ai rcraf t gun8 north of Hamhung,
al o ngmer nat e supply route from Manchurh, may i ndi cate proteotion of
l i nes of communioations or supply dumps..
I Ml e no 2lst anti ai roraf t arti l l ery regiment i s I denti fi ed in
I
North Korean order of battl e, the 19th, ZOth, and 23rd Independent AAA
Regiments have been accepted.
Y
f
9.
10.
11.
DATE: 20-Mar-2010 6
KOREA. North Korean VI11 Corps possibly sti l l i n existenoe: North
Kbrean messagq states; 'I. . . aoknowledged that
(the uni ts under the command dour?)'8th Corps have been (arranged?). . . e"
(SUEDE DCM-2661, 8 Feb 52)
Uomentr
ao u n d x s i o n ,
existence of the North Korean VI 11 Corps. This command lost Its uni ts by
deactivation or by transfers to combat corpe or4o the V I 1 Corps auring early
spri ng, 1951, Unoonfinned ool l ateral reports have stated that the V l l i
Corps m s enroute t o or i n Manohuria organizing end trai ni ng new North
Korean units.
wile the fragnentary nature of thi s message precludes a
thi s i s the fi rst recent i ndi cnti on of the continued
Unu8ual acti vi ty i n Wonsan area seen: Unusually detai l ed reporti ng
of UN naval aoti vi tv i n the vi ai ni tv of UN-held islands i n the Wonsan
area was given in a-10 February meaeage from an uni denti fi ed rai l road
seouri ty battal i on to i ts parent regiment, the 7th.
Another uni denti fi ed battal i on farther north i n the Hamhung area
reported on 10 February the recei pt of 100 "ships" with another 50 sti l l
expeoted.
Reaon Group Korea, SK-6-258, 12 Feb 62)
(SUEDE Det 161 15th RSM Korea, GS 072, 11 Feb; 501st Corn
Comment: I t may be aperxlated that thi s detai l ed repxti ng and the
me n t i mh e recei pt of "ships" possibly i ndi cates a future Communiat
attempt to oapture UN-held i sl ands i n Wonaan bay.
months only one successful enemy landing has been made on these islands,
although several small attacks have been made.
During the past si x
North Korean anti ai rcraf t proteote unknown i nstal l ati one north of
Hamhungr- Two North Roreah pl ai n language messages i ndi cate the deploy-
ment -of anti ai rcraf t mns, possibly subordinate to the North Korean 21st
A M Regiment, to protect oertai n uni denti fi ed i nstal l ati ons north of
Hamhung*
corn Recon Co Korea, AD-110, 11 Fab 52)
(SUEDE 501st Oomm Reoon Group Korea, SK-0-313, 11Feb; 330th
14 Feb 62
>=D
SS
F or info on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession go to T heP a per lessO ffice.or g
H R 7 0 - 1 4

1 P P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
[ - . ) A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

N R
c
r
APPeOVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 20-Mar-201 0
. ..
HR70-14
9. Air acti vi ty notod at Antung i n first i ntercept since Decemberr
Communist air message from Antung to Mukden on 13 February
lef't Antune; for oombfit in Korea,
A
Chinese
reported that 16 "al l i ed" KLdIa-16'~
(SUEDE 6920 Security Group Johnson AB J apan, SG 319, 13 Feb 52)
5
T o lea r n a bout P D F Compr ession a nd O CR visit T heP a per lessO ffice. or g

Cornenti The disappearance on 25 Dec 1961 of the radio whioh
repor-tioal air acti vi ty i n southern Manchuria sharply reduoed US
knowledge of suoh aoti vi ty.
near Antung hb8
operate from th3m, although thi s messap ia the f i r at communicRtions
Sntell.igence reference thi s yenr to M I G f l i ghts from Antung.
Recent FE4F observation o f the two f i el ds
confirmed that l arce nwnbera of MIG's oontinue to
10. KORFA. &-South Korean pri soners serving w i t h Communist army segregatedr
E i d e m e d liorth Korean aecuri ts of f i cer on 11F ebruarv ordared
complete hi stori es on "the l i berated" enl l sted men who have been assembled
from every division." The ex-prisoners wore to be assembled i n "particu-
l ar seorecy" and a repo,rt submitted by 15 February.
Reaon Co Koroa, ALT-132, 13 Feb 52)
(SUEDE 330th Corn
Comment; The term "l i berated" sol di ers is applied by the Communist8
t o oa-South Korean troops who have been impressed i nto Communist;
Foraes.
l i st turned over during noeoti ati ons a t Panmunjom.
of these pri soners suggests that the
ti ate further on the questi on of thei r repatri ati on.
The Communists f ai l ed t o l i st thi s category of pri soners i n the
Communists nay be wi l l i n(; to nego-
Tho seoret assembling
Communist plans t o uti l i ze cl ose su or t ai rcraf t suggested1 Possi bl e
enemy planes f or cl ose ai r support + o eround troops mre i ndi cated by a
13 February Chinese Communist voice transmission. The text revealed that
the uni denti fi ed sender hRd studi ed "the plan of repul si ng l i ttl e wolves"
and had conoludod that si nce the "ground of the front area . I . is
real l y unsuited f or combat . . . the maximum 400 plane plan is wrong . .
(and) 80 are requirnd to have more than 700 planes f or that p~rpoae.~'
(SlJEDE AFSA-251, CS 112, 14 Feb 52)
a C hi mmmuni st tacti cal uni t using the term "planes" as a oover name
f or troops.
sent by V Oi OQ transmission i n view of Chinese Communist awareness of UN
i nteroepti on.
11 0
Comment; There is a further possi bi l i ty thnt thi s message i s from
I t i s improbable that a message of thi s importance would be
12
6
15 Feb 52
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H R 7 0 - 1 4

2 3 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

V
HR70-14
APPROVED FOR RELEASE -
DATE: 23-Mar-201 0 -
! FAR EAST
n v -
3. US mission concerned over South Korean anti-cease fire campaign:
I I
Ambassador Muccio reports that official
South Korean hysteria against a cease fire
is "sparked by President Rhee" and wi l l
reach a crescendo as the wssibilities of
' a successful armistice 'grow. If the Rhee government boycotts the
armistice talks and the ensuing political discussions, Muccio ob-
serves, "our faces wi l l be very red." However, he does not think
that South Korean forces wi l l continue the fight after an armistice,
Comment: This is the first time that
Muccio has expressed any suspicion that Rhee might refuse to
accept the outcome of the truce talks. Preside$ Rhee's public
statements that he could not accept an armistice and that South
Korean troops should ignore the negotiations and fight on lrto the
Yalu" presage a more extreme line in this crusade against the Pan-
munjom talks. '
0
4. Ex-South Korean soldiers serving wtth Communist army segregated:
US Army Korea An unidentified North Korean security
13 Feb 52 officer on 11February ordered complete
SUEDE histories on "the liberated enlisted men
who have been assembled from every
division." The ex-pr tsoners were to be assembled in "particular
secrecy" and a report submitted by 15 February.
Comment: The term "liberated" soldiers
is applied by the Communists to captured South Korean troops who
have been impressed into the Communist forces, The Communists
failed to list this category of prisoners in the list turned over during
negotiations at Panmunjom. The secret assembling of these prisoners
suggests that the Communists, may be willing to newtiate further on
the question of their repatriation.
.
.
- 4 -
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2 3 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

HR70-14
DATE: 23-Mar-201 0
FAR EAST
1. Soviet air defense unit probably participating in Korean war:
US A i r Force
15 Feb 52
SUEDE
controls C
Traffic analysis strongly indicates that about
mid-November 1951 an air defense commander
spbordinate to the Soviet 5th Fleet moved from
the Port Arthur Naval Base to Antung, which
&- 9 9
munist jet combat operations in northwestern Korea,
A t the same time, aircraft of a 5th Fleet fighter
division appear to have moved from Port Arthur into the combat area and
to have begun to communicate on the GCI net centered at Antung. Begin-
ning shortly thereafter, there were frequent Chinese Communist references
to flights of "Soviet" MIG-15's in the combat area.
Comment: This is the first indication of the
direct participation of ,an air defense organization of the Soviet Armed
Forces in Korean air operations.
The 5th Fleet air defense officer in question
apparently continues to communicate with his Soviet superiors. It is
probable that hls presence in the Antung area represents either an attempt
togive him and hi s personnel combat experience, or a measure to estab-
lish closer Soviet control over that prti on of the combat operations which
are considered a Soviet responslbillity.
.2. ,
I
- 3 -
,," N R
7DPSKRW SUEDE
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' 1 ) 6 P S E C R E T S U E D t

D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

) P

HR70-I 4
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE 20-Mar-201 0
:II NR
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f l ~
6. Bombers of Chinese 8th Bir Division leavlnp, Manchuria8 Eleven TU-2
l i aht bombere of the Chinese 8th'Ai r Divieion were scheduled to make a
'tknsfer move" from bkden to Pangfou, 100 milee northwest of Nanking,
on 14 February. The 8th Di vi ei on, equipped wi th at l east 34 TU-2'e, haa
baen based st the Mukden Wes t ai rfi el d.
34, 22192 ahd 21132, 14 and 15 Feb 62)
(SUEDE A i r Foroe Roundups 33 and
aomentt During November, 8th Division bombers made one costl y
a t % mmo mb a Urn-held i sl and of f northweetern Korea, but i n general
TU-2's have aeldom appeared i n combat. Aside from thie di vi si on, there
i a only one operati onal l i ght bomber regiment i n Manohuria.
7.' XOR?%k. Sovi et ai r defense uni t probably parti ci pati ng in Korean war 8
-io ,analysis strongl y i ndi cates that about mid-November 1951 an ai r
defense oommander subordinate t o the Soviet 5th Fl eet moved from the Port
Arthur Naval Base to Antung, whioh oontrol s Communist j et oombat opera-
ti one i n northwestern Korea.
4 18 Feb 62
NR
T o lea r n mor e a bout O CR a nd P D F Compr ession visit T heP a per lessO ffice.or g


L b ' L
A t the same time, ai raraf t of a 5th Fl eet f i ghter di vi si on appear
to have moved from Port Arthur i nto the combat area and to have begun to
oommwoate on the GCI net centered at Antung. Beginning shortl y there-
af ter, there were frequent Chinese Comuniet referenoes to f l i ghts of
'Soviet" MIG-15's i n the oombat area.
2113Z. 16 Feb 62)
Comentr This i s the f i rat i ndi cati on of %he direot partiolpation
of an-fenss orgmi zati on of the Soviet Armed Foroes i n the Korean
ai r operations.
The 6th Fl eet ai r defense offi oer i n questi on apparentl y continues
to oomunioate wi th hi s Sovi et superiora.
a the Antung area represent8 ei ther an attempt to give hi m and his
personnel oombat experienoa, or a me~sure to establ i sh cl oser Soviet oontrol
over that porti on of the oombat operatione which are conaidered a S ovi et
responei bi l i ty.
I t is probably that hi s presence
8, Ney Chinese Communist army may be i n Koreaa The prese'noe i n Korea
The measage tends t o bear
o f 8 new Ch$neao Communiet army wa8 indioated ih an 8 February measage
wfsioh mentioned the 10th Amy, previouely i n southweat China, and i ts
subordinate 28th, 30th, and 184th Divieiona.
Conunentt Thie new i denti fi oati on, in oonjunction with other recgnt
i n t e l w that the 16th Amy i s i n the Korea-Manohuria theater, suggeeta
a si gni fi oant reinforoement of the Communist force8 i n North Korea.
s,* KOREA. North Korean ai r regiment used Anrhan ai rf i el dr An uni denti fi ed
"Minister of Defensen i n Pyongyang that the "Ai r Foroe Headquartera
Commander" had ordered
30 J anuary.'
i n 'wh-unidentifLed North Korean "Minister" wae informed that the
Chinebe A i r Foroe Headqdarters had ordered the tranafsr of a Korean uni t
from Anahan t o Tungfengr
equipped) hi r Di vi si on was still operating i n mid-February from Antung,
it ie enti rel y possi bl e that these messages are rel ated t o trai ni ng f l i ghts
involving both Anshan and Tungfeng.
previ ousl y been noted i n the Anshan-Mukden area.
Korean A i r Force "regimantal commander" reporbed from Si nui j u to the
uni t aommander to use the Anshan ai rf i el d on
(SUEDE 1 2 6 0 , Sinuiju-Pyongyang, 30 J an 52 )
Oommentt Thie message probably i s rel ated to one on tho previous day
*
Inasmuoh as the North Korean 1st (MIG-15
North Korean ai r aoti vi ty has not
. E
18 Feb 62

I
.
I
10. Communist mesaage i ndi oates possession of UN F-861 During the course
of a b J anuarv Chinese Comuniat GCf net transmiasion. one stati on reported
" 0 . . . F-86"pPlanes."
ai roraft."
12 Feb 62)
Conunentx
oonsi-.
least'one UN F-86 fi ghter engaging i n operati onal Pl i ghts over North
Korea.
The other stati on repl i ed, "those are fri endl y
(SUEDE 6920 Seourity Group, J ohnson AB, J apan, SG 294,
The missed groups i n thi s mesaage oould al ter the meanini
There is, however, evidence that Communist forces have at
I
11.
.
(3uerrllla uni t i n Sputh Korea establ i shes radio contact with North
Koreai
between Kaesong and nthe 'Parti san Supreme Headquarters through di reoti on
number 4" haa been effected, I t was al so disolosed that oontact will be
oontinued "without any intermission." ( S U E D E 0 6 8 1 , 21 J an, 62) '
This is the f i rst i ndi cati on since J uly 1961 that rqdio
c o n t a me e n North Korea and thi s branch uni t has been effected.
4th "direotion" (branoh uni t ), looated i n the Chirl-san areti and oomprising
the vast maj ori ty of partl eans i n South KoreR, has at times been roporked
ae exeroising oontrol over the ,remaining five units.
h N orth Korean mesaage' of 21 J anuary indioated that oomuniofition
Commsntr
The
6 18 Feb 52

f r o n t

D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
5
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H R 7 0 - 1 4
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HR70-14
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I ---
8. KORU. Soviet-piloted night f i ghter aati vi ty i ncreases in the Korgsn area;
Wt r aZ ar i g ' is being emphasized among So v i et pi l ots engaged in the
Korean ai r w&, aooording t o 'an anal ysi s of J anuary voice-transmissions
made by a USAX' unit i n J apan.
ni ght fi ghtere prediously baaed i n the Anshm-Wden area hme been moved
to Antung ai rf i el d.
I n thi s oonneotion, dome of the Eloviet
The reporti ng agency oonoludes that thi s acti vi ty w i l l inorease
Soviet night i nterceptor oapabi l i ti es in Korea.
Group, Johnson AB, J apan, SO 317, 13 Feb 52)
(SUEDE 6920 Securi ty
Conrmentr Sinae earl y Ootober 1961, between 20 and 25 Soviet-
pilot- psrformanoe conventional fi ghters, based at Anshan, have
been fl yi ng oombat missions over North Korea with only sl i ght suoceas.
I
9. New North Korean brigade i denti fi edt A 13 February message f rom
an unid enti f i ed North Korean unit i nstructs a i ubordi nate to "rret the
Vehicle froh the 22nd Brigade."
16 RSM/6470, 17 Feb 52)
or 00- i ntol l i genae, of a North Korean 22nd Brigade. Whi l e it is
possi bl e that, the i denti fi cati on l a an operator's error f or "23rd
Brigade," al ready wel l i denti fi ed, it would be feasi bl e for the North
Eorean amy to form addi ti onal brigade si ze uni ts to fulfill the heavy
aeouri ty mission of defense. of the coastal areas,
(SUEDE 501st CommReoon C)roup"Korea,
Comentr This i S the fi rst mention, oi ther in communications
10. North Korean A i r Force operates radar stati on at Pyongyang ai rf i el d;
The motor' of the "radar abt" at Mi ri m, rm ai rf i el d on the outski rks o f
Pyongyang, i s t o be sent'f'or repai rs, according t o a 14 February North
Korean A i r Foroe message.
al so i ndi cate the arri val of new radio equipment at this looation.
(SUEDE 6018t Comm Reoon Group Korea; 15 RSq6373, 16 RSM/6374, and
16 R9M/6379, 14 Feb 62)
This message md two others of the seine date
Comentr This i s the second reference in communioations i ntel l i -
It had pre-
g e n o e n t h Korean operati on OS a radar i nstal l ati on.
vi ousl y been thought that moat radar i nstal l ati ons i n North Korea
were Chinese or Soviet-operated.
(APPROVED FOR RELEASE I
5 19 Feb 52
b2,
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1 -
[DATE: 20-Mar-201 0
F o r a co mpr ehen sive guide o n P D F Co mpr essio n a n d O CR visit o ur websit e
" .

6

11.
The esttbliahment of a North Korean A i r Foroe comkl i cati ons and
radar stati on at Mi ri m adds t o the growlng aapabi l i ty of that force.
North Ko,rean coastal uni t reports UN bacteri ol ogi cal warfare8
spies are putti ng poison i nto the dri nki ng water" and are di etri buti hg
l'paper" that oauses death t o anyone "using those papers f or the nose,"
ia battal i on of' the 7th Railroad Seouri ty Regiment reported on 16 February.
This battal i on, stati oned somewhere i n the Wonsan-Hamhung area, also noted
that ''Chine8e uni tan captured a domed US pilot aortheast of Hamhung;.
(SUEDE 501at Corn Recon Group Korea, 16 R8d8456, 16 Feb 52)
"The
.
Comheatt Communist messages such as this, acauaing the UN of
empl o' $~pmese and Chinese Nati ohal i st troops and of engaging i n
baoteri ol ogi oal and chemical warfare, have frequenlily forecast a new
propaganda outburst of charges o f TJN atroci ti es i n Korea.
The Chinese Communist uni ts i n northeastern Korea tire probably
elements of the 3rd Mvi si on mentioned i n earl i er messages as being
i n that area on a railway seduri ty and constructi on mission.
6 19 Feb 62
F o r a co mpr ehen sive guide o n P D F Co mpr essio n a n d O CR visit o ur websit e
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A T T E N T I O N : T h i s f o r m wi l t be p l a c e d o n t o p o / a n d a t t a c h e d t o e a c h T o y S e c r e t d o c u me n t + we i r d by t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e
A g e n c y
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i t i s d o wn g r a d e d , d e s t r o y e d , o r
t r a n s mi t t e d O u t s i d e o f C I A . A c c e s s t o T o p S e c r e t ma t t e r i s
l i mi t e d t o T o p S e c r e t C o n t r o l p e r s o n n 1 a n d t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s wh o s e o f f i c i a l
d u t i e s r e l a t e t o t h e ma t t e r . T o p S e c r e
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a n d I n d i c a t e p e r i o d o f c u s t o d y I n t h e l e f t - h a n d c o l u mn s p r o v i d e d . E a c h i n d i v i d u a l wh o s e e s t h e
S e c r e t d o c u me n t wi l l s i g n a n d
i n d i c a t e t h e d a t e o f h a n d l i n g i n t h e r i g h t - h a n d c o l u mn s .

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N O T I C E O F D E T A C H M E N T : W h e n t h i s f o r m I s d e t a c h e d f r o m T o p S e c r e t
ma t e t a t i t s h a l l be c o mp l e t e d f n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s p a c e be l o w
a n d t r a n s mi t t e d t o C e n t r a l T o p S e c r e t C o n t r a
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D y ( S i g n a t u r e )
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0
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I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
3

1 3 1 . 5 s
H R 7 0 - 1 4 HR70-14
12th Di vi si on i s MIG-equipped and movin north: A message of
-57
4.
17 J anuary from Peiping to Nanking askqd about t e test f l i ght of the
12th Di vi si on MIG15tsi" Only a f ew transports and trai ners have been
associ ated with this di vi si on i n previous i nteroepts, according t o the
reporti ng agonoy. (SUEDE A i r Force Roundup 36, 22382, 18 Feb 52)
Commentt Subsequent messages scheduled the transf er on 19 February
of two transports and el even MIct-15's of the 12th Di vi ai bn from Shwghmi
to Tnngshm i n North China.
made, a "test the route" f l i ght to Takushan near the Korean border, possi bl y
the ul ti mate destint4tion of thi s at.
Another 12th Division transport recentl y
5. CHINA KOREA. Reoord number of j ot sorti e8 from Yalu River base: An esti mated
A 9 MIG-15 sorti os on 16 February was reveal ed i n messages from
the ICoraan border town of Tatungkou, Mmohuria.
the hi ghest reaorded number of combat f l i ghts from that f i el d.
A i r Foroe Roundup 35, 22382, 10 Fob 52)
This f i gure represents
(SUEDE
Commentt During Deoember and J anuary, UN ai rcraf t encountered
about 200 enomy J et f i ghters m day.
Si nce onl y 100 Sovi et and Chinese plRnes are esti mated to be based
at Tatungkou, thi s reoord number of sorti es suggests that thi s f i el d is
a stagi ng poi nt f or jet ai rcraf t i n Korean combat. Thia possi bi l i ty i s
n l a o suggested by UN observati on during the past month,
6. KOREA.
on the Sovi et GCI net i n northwestern Korea, acoording to a f i el d anal ysi s
of i nteroepted voioe traf f i c.
Sovi et i nterceptor teohnique i n Korean ai r war i m roveer A hi gh
o-fioiency has been developed by SovieC __pr_ personne operati ng
The ground control l ers, tracki ng l arge UN ai r f orma-tions , now wai t
f or elements of two or four UN aircraft t o break of f from the major group
before orderi ng the Sovi et-pi l oted MI GI S1s t o at-taok the smaller element 8.
(SUEDE A i r Foroe Roundup 35, 22382, 18 Feb 52)
Commentt This improvemont i n taoti cs, i n addi ti on to demonstrating
tho good qual i ty of Sovi et radar equipmont, i ndi cates that tho l esson8
of oombat have proved val uabl e to Sovi et radar operators AS wel l a8 t o
Russian pi l ots.
\
7 r North Korean GCI system has oporati onal characteri sti cs of Sovi et
netst The North Korean adj unct of the tri -l l nguaf GCI net oporates i n
northweetern Korea but may have a stati on south of the 38th paral l el ,
the US A i r Force reports. I - 1
3 20 Feb 52
3
DATE: 20-Mar-201 0
F or a compr ehensive guide on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession visit our website

L- -
on the Korean net, to date, have been largely occupied wi th trai ni ng,
patrol l i ng and obeervation, on two occasions contaot wi th UN ai roraf l
may have been made.
Comment; It has been spoculnted that the appearances of a North
(SUEDE USAFSS Brooks AFB, ODD 2-20473, 17 Fee 62)
K o r e mme t und R MIG-15 equipped fi ghter di vi si on i ndi aated p1m.s
t o l eave in oporati onal nir forco i n North Korea at the t i me of any
armi sti oe. Most evidence to date, both i n ground control and i n f i ghter
operati ons, oontinues to suggest a Soviet-organized and commanded ai r
defenso system.
8 a North Korean IV Corps may hnve coastal defonse Rs8ignmen-b; The
North Korean I V C orps commander on 16 Februmy sent congratul ati ons t o
an uni denti fi ed uni t for the si nki ng of "six warships of vari ous typos."
(SUEDE 330th Corn Recon Co Korea, A m 256, 18 Feb 52)
Comment; This message suggests that the I V Corps oocupies a si mi l nr
posit-the wost coas-t to that of the VI1 Corps on the east coast.
The rel ati onshi p of these t wo corps to the two defense commands known t o
exi st on both coasts i s unknown.
90 Communists may have emergency ai rf i el d i n Suiho reservoi r areat A
Sovie%-piloted ai rcraft was i nstructed by the Soviot GCI net i n north-
western Korea to cross the river and land i n the regi on of "Sapga"
US A i r Force bel i eves that Sapog may be a oover-ward for the Suiho
reservoi r on the Yalu ri ver.
The
(SUEDE A i r Foroe Roundup 35, 22382, 18 Feb 52)
Comments This i s the f i rst i ndi cfi ti on of an ai rf i el d i n thi s
mount z t er r f i i n.
thi s ai rf i el d i s l ocated, the terrni n on the Korean si de seems sl i ghtl y
more sui tabl e.
While it i s not known on whioh si de of thb river
Evidence of Comuni st use of I FF in Korean ai r war re orted: A
31 J anuary message on the Soviet-operated GCI net i n nor hwestern Korea
mentioned that a. "transponder" snd spare parts should be sent t o an
unlooated desti nnti on.
f i oati on Friend or Foe, an el ectronfc device). (SUEDE A i r Foroe
Roundup 36 22382, 18 Feb 52)
-+
10 a
This type of equipment is used i n IFF (I denti -
4
20 Feb, 62
. /

Comment: This i s the f i rst suggesti on that IFF i s ompbyod by
enemy-ft i n the Korean ai r War.' The Sovi ets are known t o have
possessed o n IFF set of nnti ve design, SaH-3, si nce 1948.
11. I nternal supply transportati on st- POL su-r An uni denti fi ed
regiment i n woetern Korea near Pyongyang, reporti ng th& it had two tons
of "fuel oi l " (gasol i ne), stated that i f the movement of vegetabl es from
north of Pyongyang, coal f rom south of Pyongyang and wood fromwest of
Pyongyang were to'be made, the POLWuld be exhausted"
Reoon Croup Korea, SK-G536, 19 Feb; 15 RSma/SCQO, 19 Feb 52)
(SUEDE 601 Comm
Comment; The text suggests that thi s uni t i s l ooated i n Pyongyang
and i s ongaged i n moving suppl i es i nto Pyongyang for an uni denti fi ed
auperi or uni t or organization.
No seri ous shortage of f wl in the Communist armies has been i ndi cated
si nce tho earl y days of tho war.
North Korean battal i on l i sts i ts food su as of 17 Februar I The
ri ty Regimen +! reported 3rd Battal i on i n ti message to the 7th Railway
the quanti ty of foodstuffs "on hand' as of 17 February."
ki l ogrms were l i sted, i ncl udi ng 46,219 ki l ogrms of Gleaned ri oe and
15,342 lcilograms of vegetables. (SUEDE 6Olat Corn Reoon Co Korea,
SK-G-539, 18 Feb 52)
12.
Over 90,000
Cornenti This unit i s bel i eved to be based between Wonsan and Hamhung
It i s possi bl e, however,
on t h x c o a a t . The amount of suppl i es i ndi cated would be suf f i ai ent
to support the battal i on f or about three months.
that the uni t i s onl y aervlng a l i ne of oommunioations functi on and that
these suppl i es are not intended f or that uni t's oonsumption.
,:' N R
-
5 20 Feb 52

H R 7 0 - 1 4

D A T E : 2 3 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
- 3

1 N R
-
I C HR70-14
' ,
FAR EAST
1. Soviet interceptor technique in Korean air war improves:
US A i r Force 3 a,
18 Feb 52
SUEDE
A high degree of proficiency has been developed
by Soviet personnel operating on the Soviet GCI
net tn northwestern Korea, according to afleld
analysis of intercepted voice traffic.
The ground controllers, tracking large UN air
formations, now wait for elements of two or four UN aircraft to break off
from the major group before ordering the Sovlet-piloted MIG-15's to attack
the smaller elements.
Comment: This improvement in tactics, In
addition to demonstrating thenqual i ty of Soviet radar equipment, indi-
cates that the lessons of combat have proved valuable to Soviet radar oper -
ators as well as to Russian pilots.
2.
- 3 -
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE: 23-Mar-201 0
NR
T o lea r n a bout P D F Compr ession a nd O CR visit T heP a per lessO ffice.or g
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f o r t h e i n t e r n a l u s e
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A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R 0 P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9
A p p r o v e d F O O k e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 * ! k 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9

A p p r o v e d F o n a e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 4 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9
S E C R E T

L a t t r e

S E C R E T
4
2 0
2 5 X 1 A
2 5 X 1 A

2 5 X 1 C
A p p r o v e V j r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 C I A - R D P 7 9 T 6 W 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9

5

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D 1 2 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9

. A p p r o v e d i s r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T O W 4 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9

A p p r o v e d k a p R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 4 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9

A p p r o v e d C o / R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 N 1 l 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9

A p p r o v e d f o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 1 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 / 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9

2 5 X 1 C

2 5 X 1 C

A p p r o v e d F i t s R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 S 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9


A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 t 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9
s p e

A p p r o v e d I mo ; R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D 1 3 7 9 T O 1 V 1 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9
T O P S E C R E T
,
S E C U R I T Y
I N F O R M A T I O N
O N L Y
T O P S E C R E T
S U P P L E M E N T
T O T H E
( i n c l u d i n g S / S
C a b l e s )
2 0 F e b r u a r y
1 9 5 2
C I A N o .
4 9 5 4 4
C o p y N o .
4 6
N o t f o r
d i s s e m i n a t i o n
o u t s i d e 0 / C I
a n d 0 / N E .
O f f i c e o f
C u r r e n t
C E N T R A L
A G E N C Y
r e p o r t s h a s
b e e n p r e p a r e d
p r i m a r i l y
f o r t h e
i n t e r n a l u s e
o f C u r r e n t
I t d o e s
n o t r e p r e s e n t
a c o m p l e t e
c o v e r a g e
r e p o r t s i n
C I A
o r i n t h e
O f f i c e o f
C u r r e n t
C o m m e n t s
r e p r e s e n t t h e
o f
C u r r e n i I n t e l l i g e n c e .
T O P
S E C R E T
S E C U R P I T
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 ' 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9
e
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 t A 0 0 0 m0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9
y e a r v


- - - .
L A C L A S S I F I E D whe n A k k i go
i s t p A r t o s , gga r i i , e r A r s i f t s i z e n t t p r o t t e mi e s t o t s o u t d o o r d e c l a s s i -
-
- f l e d whe n f i l l e d i n f o r mr f f t i e a c e d r o m c o l t gi r V a d i J me n t .

C - - - _ _ _ D

k

T hi s f o r m wi l l be p l a c e d o n t o p o f a n d a t t a c he d t o
e a c h T o p S e c r e t d o c u me n t r e c e i v e d by t he C e n t r a l I n t e l l i ge n c e
A ge n c y
o r c l a s s i f i e d T o p S e c r e t wi t hi n t he C A a n d wi l l r e ma i n
a t t a c he d t o t he d o c u me n t U n t i l s u c h t i me a s i t i s d o wn gr a d e d ,
d e s t r o y e d , O r
A c c e s s t o T o p S e c r e t ma t t e r i s l i mi t e d t o T O p S e c r e t
C o n t r o l p e r s o n n e l a n d t ho s e i n d i v i d u a l s who s e o f f i c i a l
d u t i e s r e l a t e t o t he ma t t e r .
T o p S c o r e
C o n t r o l O f f i c e r s who r e c e i v e a n d / O r r e l e a s e t he a t t a c he d
T o p S e c r e t ma t e r i a l wi l l s i gn : hi s f o r m
a n d i n d i c a t e p e r i o d o f c u s t o d y i n t he l e f t - ha n d c o l u mn s
p r o v i d e d . E a c h i n d i v i d u a l who s e e s t he T o y S e c r e t d o c u me n t
wi l l s i gn a n d
i n d i c a t e t he d a t e o f ha n d l i n g i n t he r i ght - ha n d c o l u mn s .
T O

B Y

D E T A C H M E N T : W he n t hi s f o r m i s d e t a c l e d f r o m T o p S e c r e t ma t e M t
I t s ha l l be c o mp l e t e d i n t he a p p r o p r i a t e s p a c e
be l o w
a n d t r a n s n l i t t d t o C e n t r a l T o p S e c r e t C e n t r o
f o r r e c o r d .

T O
o r ( S i gn a t u r e )
T o
( S i gn e t a r o )

O F F I C E
. ^ . . a -

A p p r o v e d F o r

R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R 0 P 7 9 T 0 ' 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 - 9

P r i t Y l O u s ! E D I T I O N S .
T O P S E C R E T
( 4 0 )
0
-
1 .
S E C T I O N 1 ( S O V I E T )
1
D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
2 1 F e b 5 2
1 ) D
SECTION 1 (SOVlET)
1.
1 21 'Feb 52
*e
~P P ROVED FOR RELEASE I

N E I

/ N R
10.
11.
12. Sovi et MIG's fly from Tatungkou t o Mukdan:
Ei ght "a3.liod'' M1G-15'~
f l e w from Tatungkou on the Korenn border t o Mukden on 16 February, and
a si mi l nr flight was noted in the late Rfternoon of the J 9th.
The
reporti ng agency comments that these f l i ghts are not designated as
moves, and Sovi ot M1E.15'~ are known to be based at Tatungkou.
6920th Seourity Group,, Johnson AB J apan, SG 429, 19 Feb 52)
(SUZDE
6 21 Feb 52

1 W S E C R E T S U E D 2 r

Commonti A reoentl y observed shi ft i n the flight pattern of BIIIG's
over Rorea'sug ;est8 that some enemy plaries are now flying t o combat
from f i el ds i n the i nteri or of Manohuria and are stagi ng through Tatungkou
or Antung. Flights of Soviet MIG's from Tatungkou t o Mukden, never
previ ousl y noted, may be part of this new flight pattorn.
7 21 Feb 52

L O p y N O .

N O C H A N G E I N
C L A S S .
I D E C L A S S I F I E D
C L A S S . C H A N G E D
T O : T S S
N E X T R E V I E W D A T E :
A U T H H R
D A T E
1 1 4
r t s i q
R E V I E W E R :

I t
R e T v a N

T o l e a r n ho w t o us e P D F C o mp r e s s i o n a nd O C R go t o T he P a p e r l e s s O ffi ce . o r g
) 5 9 0 0 0 1 - 1

A p p r a W F l e fi c R l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 1 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 5 0
S U M M A R Y
F A R E A S T

N E A R E A S T - A F R I C A

0 5 9 0 0 0 1 - 1

A p t r 6 x 1 5 1 / 4 F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 / 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 5 0

F A R E A S T

2 5 X 1
A p a e X E K 4 F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 / 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 5 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 1

A M N A I
F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 1 0 9 1 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 9 0 0 0 1 - 1
4 P a r t s



5 9 0 0 0 1 - 1

- 7 -

A p p r 2 v ) d i r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 1 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 5 0 5 9 0 0 0 1 - 1


V P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
) A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
7

12. KOREA. North Korea oontinues munitions production: A badly garbled
Korean mebsagd of 16 F ebruary mentioned uaraenal" at Sinuiju
Two thousand armor-piercing and another at an Wdenti f i ed location.
sh6Ils were on hand at the Binuiju arsenal on thi s dat e. (SUEDE
330th Corn Reoon Co gore&, Am-274, 19 Feb 5 2 )
Comment; In J une 1950 North Korea had seven inatal,lations menufso-kur-
i ng h-nades, mortar shells , sub-machine guns, amall-ame anrunition,
mortars, gunpowder, and part6 f or small arms, all in limited quantifiae.
Deepito the nearly total defttruotion of four of these i nstal l ati ons and
severe damage t o the othera, the Communists were able to move much of thei r
equipment i nto underground f aci l i ti es prior t o the retreat of Ootober 1960.
CommuniQationa i ntel l i gence and other source8 havo confirmud the oontinued
small-eoah manufaoture of munitiona during 1951.
7
~P P ROVE D FOR RELEASE 1 :
25 Feb 52
I 99
5s
(DATE: 20-Mar-201 0 I
F or mor e infor ma tion on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession visit T heP a per lessO ffice.or g
A p p r o v e d R W R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 C 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
S E C R E T

2 5 F e b r u a r y 1 9 5 2
O C I N o . 3 8 7 9
C o p y N o . 2 5 1
D I A , D O S D e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n / R e l e a s e I n s t r u c t i o n s o n F i l e
T h i s s u m m a r y o f s i g n i f i c a n t r e p o r t s h a s
f o r t h e i n t e r n a l u s e o f t h e O f f i c e o f C u r r e n t
I t d o e s
n o t r e p r e s e n t a c o m p l e t e c o v e r a g e o f a l l
c u r r e n t r e p o r t s i n C I A
S E C R E T

T o l e a r n mo r e a bo u t P D F C o mp r e s s i o n a n d O C R v i s i t o u r we bs i t e
A p p r o v e c c 9 r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T O * 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 4 : C W R D P 7 9 7 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 1 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T O
N e l l e
S E C R E T
4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7

2 5 X 1 X
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R o p T 9 T O W 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
' q u e ,

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 4 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
2 5 X 1 X

A p p r o v e 4 r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 4 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
S E C R E T

o I m n u l f l s t

l .
2 5 5 2
2 5 X 1 A
A p p r o v e d % c p r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T O W 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 5 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
A p p r o v e d i y R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T a 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
A p p r o v e c k r y R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T O P r a 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
S E C R E I

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 7 C l A : R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
A p p r o v e d r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7

A p p r o v e d R i o R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 4 : C I A - R 0 P 7 9 1 0 1 1 4 8 4 2 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7

A p p r o v e d F o r l i e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 1 9 4 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C 1 2 - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
A p p r o v e d k a p R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C l A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 f 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
T O P S E C R E T

O N L Y
T O T H E D A I L Y
D I G E S T
C a b l e s )
2 5 F e b r u a r y
1 9 5 2
C I A N o . 4 9 5 4 6
C o p y N o . 4 6
a n d 0 / N E .
C E N T R A L
A G E N C Y
p r e p a r e d p r i m a r i l y
o f t h e O f f i c e o f
C u r r e n t I n t e l l i g e n c e .
I t d o e s
o r i n t h e
t h e
C u r r e n i I n t e l l i g e n c e .
T O P S E C R E T

t
A p p r o v e t r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D F 7 9 T 0 W 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7

S h i s h a k l i

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 4 : C I A - R D P 7 9 - 1 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 - 7
T O P S E C R E T
L A C L A S S I F I E D wh e n
bl a W 1 9 . 5 1 e g E E l t r f R e l e a s t e c 2 1 3 8 1 1 0 8 1 0 4
c L e i g - W i s i s s i - - c A g u r a f i c *
d o wn g r a d e d o r d e c l a s s i -
f i e d wh e n f i l l e d i n f o r m
i s d e t a c h e d f r o m
c o n t r o l l e d d o c u me n t .

A T T E N T I O N :
T h i s f o r m w i l l
be p l a c e d o n t o p o f
a n d a t t a c h e d t o e a c h
T o p S e c r e t d o c u me n t
r e c e i v e d by t h e C e n t r a l
I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y
o r c l a s s i f i e d T o p
S e c r e t wi t h i n t h e C I A
a n d wi l l r e ma i n
a t t a c h e d t o t h e d o c u me n t
u n t i l s u c h t i me a s i t i s
d o wn g r a d e d , d e s t r o y e d , o r
A c c e s s t o T o p S e c r e t
ma t t e r i s l i mi t e d t o T o p
S e c r e t C o n t r o l p e r s o n n e l
a n d t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s
U O L O S C o f f i c i a l
d u t i e s r e l a t e t o t h e ma t t e r .
T o p S e c r e t C o n t r o l O f f i c e r s
wh o r e c e i v e a n d / o r r e l e a s e
t h e a t t a c h e d T o p S e c r e t
ma t e r i a l wi l l s i g n t h i s f o r t h
a n d i n d i c a t e p e r i o d o f
c u s t o d y i n t h e l e f t - h a n d
E a c / t i n d i v i d u a l wh o s e e s
t h e T O P S e c r e t d o c u me n t
wi l l s i g n a n d
i n d i c a t e t h e d a t e o r
h a n d l i n g i n t h e r i g h t - h a n d
c o l u m n s .
N O T I C E O F D E T A C H M E N T
W h e n t h i s f o r m i s
d e t a c h e d f r o m T o p
S e c r e t ma t e r i a l i t s h a l l
be c o mp l e t e d i n t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e s p a c e s be l o w
a n d t r a n s mi t t e d t o
C e n t r a l T o p S e c r e t
C o n t r o l f o r r e c o r d .
F O R 9 R
W i t P R E V I O U S s o T T T T T T
T O P S E C R E T
( 4 1 0 )
0
D e l ' S E C R E T S U E D &

I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

- T O P - S E C R E T - S U E D E - b . ) ,
5 - 5
HR70-14
4 . KOREA. North Korean guard uni t conti nues to report progress
n u c e tal ks; I t ' ems three, f our and r3 ve in the truce
negoti ati on6 have been progressi ng wi t h "great effect" a8 of
20-February accordi ng t o a staf f - of f icer-of the North Korean
regi ment guardi ng the truce tal ks area. Another message of
22 February, probabl y from the same sourcel reported that
v?havi ng seen thei r (the UN's) great enthusi asm today, it l ooks
as i f there w i l l be an agreement i n the truce rp8ul ts.s'
(SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Co,Korea, SK-G-725, 23 Feb; 330th Comm
Recon Co Korea, ALT-408, 23 Feb 52)
Comment: The i mpressi on6 of the North Korean guard
force in the neutral zone do not represent hi gh-l evel Com-
muni st thi nki ng. They do, however, represent a rel ati vel y
i nformed opi ni on from enemy sources.
5 . North Koreans-reporb: on thei r east c w t i sl and l andi ng:
A successf ul l andi ng Qn Yangdo i sl and on 20 F - ebrmary, ' resul ti ng
I n the "anni hi l ati on'of the enemy," was reported by an uni den-
ti f i ed North Korean naval uni t. The sender admi tted, however,
that on another nearby i sl and the enemy (ROK mari nes) were
"still f i ghti ng . . . usi ng heavy f i r e power.q' A l ater message
stated that '?our ei ght wooden boats struck a mine and were
unexpectedl y attacked by two enemy destrbyers. 63 men Were
lost." (SUEDE 5 O b d Corn Recon Co Korea, 15RSM/6837 and
15RSMl6831, 24 Feb 52)
i n northeastern Korea, is the second attempt on the part of
the North Koreans to el i mi nate UN guerri l l a and esp$onage
Comment: The attack agai nst Yangdo, north of Songj i n
3 26 Feb 52
bb
SS
3
~P P ROVE D FOR RELEASE I
F or info on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession go to our website

... .. .
... .-
bases on t he east coast. Unl i ke thei r hi ghl y auccerasful
campaign on ,the west coast, both Communist effort8 have me t
wi t h Failure. According to presls accounts, t he enemy land-
ing force of bat t al l on si ze was repul sed with heavy losses
and t he battalion commander was taken pri soner.
-
4 26 Feb 52
F or info on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession go to our website

A p p r o v e c e o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C l A - R D P 7 9 T C P . 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e - 2 0 6 5 / 0 1 1 4 6 - : - e A = R 1 3 1 ; 6 7 9 - T 1 3 1 - 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5

F o r mo r e info r ma tio n o n P D F C o mp r e s s io n a nd OC R v is it T he P a p e r l e s s Offic e . o r g

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 6 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5
N e s "

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 1 3 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5

A p p r o v e d F e e R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 1 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 4 4 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5

5 2
A p p r o v e d r y R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 1 0 1 / 2 6 : C l A - R D P 7 9 T 0 * 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5

2 5 X 1
A p p r o v e d , , r o p r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T OM 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R 0 P 7 9 1 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5
A p p r o v e W r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 6 , 1 # 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5


2 5 X 1

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 C I A - R D P 7 9 - 1 * ( 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5

F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A 4 6 7 9 7 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5


A p p r o v e c k p ir R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 1 0 1 1 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T C S M 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5
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S E C R E T
8
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S E C R E T
7
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 1 9 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 a 0 0 0 1 - 5
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2 5 X 1
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T OP S E C R E T
S E C T I ON 2 ( E A S T E R N )



.
V is I C L A S S I F I E D w he n l a T hp l a ntic l e ifir e gk e l te ia - e t-
d ie d o r d e c l a s s i-
5
' fl e d w he n fil l e d in fo r m is d e ta c he d fr o m c o ntr o e
o c u me nt.

C 2 : J D

tI C P

A T T E N T I ON : T his fo r m w il l b e p l a c e d o n to p o f a nd a tta c he d to e a c h T o p S e c r e t d o c u me nt
r e c e iv e d b y the C e ntr a l I nte l l ige nc e A ge nc y
o r c l a s s ifie d T o p S e c r e t w ithin the C A a nd w il l r e ma in a tta c he d to
the d o c u me nt u ntil s u c h time a s it is d o w ngr a d e d , d e s tr o y e d , o r
tr a ns mitte d o u ts id e o f
A c c e s s to T o p S e c r e t ma tte r is l imite d to T o p S e c r e t C o ntr o l p e r s o nne l a nd tho s e
ind iv id u a l s w ho s e o ffic ia l
d u tie s r e l a te to the ma tte r .
T Op S e c r e t C o ntr o l Offic e r s w ho r e c e iv e a nd / o r r e l e a s e the a tta c he d T o p S e c r e t
ma te r ia l w il l s ign this fo r m
a nd ind ic a te p e r io d o / c u s to d y in the l e ft- ha nd c o l u mns p r o v id e d . E a c h
ind iv id u a l w ho s e e s the T o p S e c r e t d o c u me nt w il l s ign a nd
ind ic a te the d a te o f ha nd l ing in the r ight- ha nd c o l u mns .

o r r ic e

N OT I C E OF D E T A C H M E N T :
a nd tr a ns mit(
W he n this fo r m I s d e ta c he d fr o m T o p S e c e t ma te ta t it
s ha l l b e c o mp l e te d tn the a p p r o p r ia te s p a c e
b e l o w
d to C e ntr a l T o p S e c r e t C o ntr o fo r r e c o r d .

T O
o y ( S igna tu r e )

( S igna tu r e )
( S igna tu r e )

A p p r o v e d

F o r R e l e a s e

2 0 0 5 / 0 1 1 2 6 : C I A - R 0 P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5

i
2 6 u t P E v I o u s

T OP S E C R E T

7
0

R E L E A S E
D A T E : 2 2 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

_ -
0
HR70-14
- 3 -
NR
FAR EAST
2. Communists in Korean theater step up combat pilot training:
7 1 The record total of 1,387 MIG-15's sighted
26 Feb 62 over North Korea last week, coupled with
increased aggressiveness of enemy
indicated
enemy is taking advantage of the stalemated armistice talks to provide
training for as large a number of pilots as possible. By basing combat
aircraft on fields deeper in Manchuria and shuttling them into the Antung
complex, the enemy can commit larger numbers of pilots in training
flights over the combat area.
5
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ATE: 22-Mar-201 0
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1 bhe possibiltty
that the Communists, after a two-month lull, may be planning to exploit
their capability for expanding air operations into UN-held territory,
The current move fron) Shanghai
to the Korean border area of MIG-lS's of the 12th Chinese Cammunist
Division, not previously committed to com5at, is further evidence of
Communist emphasis on combat training.
Comment:
- 4 -
T o lea r n how to use OCR a nd PD F Compr ession visit T hePa per lessOffice.or g
T & P S E C R E T S U E D h . d

' A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

9. Activity of Mukden-based 3rd AQP Dl vi si on reveal ed: A
23 February message from Hukdeln t o Liaoyana referred to aTl i ght
-
of Y AK-11 trai ners of the Chinese Cormnuhist 3rd A i r Di vi si on.
According to the reporti ng agency, this is the f i r at reference
to thi s di vi si on since 15 J anuary, when it moved to Mukden
from Antung. While this di vi si on is equipped wi th at l east 30
MIG-15vs, a few YAK-11's are usual l y attached t o Chinese j et
uni ts. (SUEDE 6920 S@c?.urity Group, J ohnson AB Tokyo, SG 494
25 Feb 52)
ai rcraft f l ew many combat missions over Korea. Although
s~@tiwt~ by 3rd Di vi si on aircraft si nce mid-J anuary has not
been-aekected, thi s message suggests that they are still i n
the Mukden area.
Comment: When this di vi si on w a a based at Antung its
10. l ~#l l l ed A i r ForcevY pl aqes at Manchurian combat f i el d:
A Chinese Communiet IP8688Ege from TatUAgkOU near the Korean
border to Mukden reportea the arri val on 16 February of
several f l i ght s , of qqAPl i ed Air E'orceyo pl anes and MIG-lSPs
o f the Chinese Communis L 6th Di vi si on. (SUEDE m 5 9 4 ,
Tatungkou-Mukben, 10 Feb 52)
Comment: In t hi s Chinese message l Pal l i edqq probably means
pqSovi etl v rather than vsKoreantv (the most l i kel y al ternati ve
meaning), since onl y Sovi et and Chinese ai rcraf t are bel i eved
based a t Tatunghou, one of Lhe pri nci pal combat f i el ds in
Manchuria. The phrase 'vAl l i ed A i r Force, Q v not previ ousl y
observed in these messages, strengthens the probabi l i ty that
Bone 00 the MI G-15's encount,ered by UN ai rcraf t over Korea
are elements of the Soviet Air Force.
11. KOREA. North Korean of f i cere begln t,ao,monthsq trai ni ng
course: E i ght 11nf+CO~np~%iijr t?Omanders probably from the
Ror'f horsan 82nd Regiment ad. Kaesong, were ordered on
23 February to come to thei r parent divislion f or a trai ni ng
5 27 Feb 52
's3
55
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE 20-Mar-201 0
HR70-14
T h i P S E C R E T S U E D & - -


1 . ' : . . c;
course. The of f i cers were i nstructed to bri ng "two months(?)
of provision^^^ land a field manual. on the attack of f orti f i ed
posi ti ons.
Fi el d anal ysi s notes that ei ght company corn ndamwould
not be released from a l i ne regiment for two mont b a i f any ,
operations were planned duri ng that peri od. The suggestion(
that the course w i l l I ncl ude offensive tacti cs, howevers is
a f urther i ndi cati on of Commuois'k offensive-mlndedness .
(SUEDE CINCFE, SIB 449, 26 Feb 52)
Comment: Thi s is further evi dence that the enemy is not
contempl atl ng an of f ensi ve in the immediats f uture. However,
numerous l.ndiq.ati.ons, both in communications i ntel l i gence and
other reports, have pQi nted up the enemys8 conti nued prepara-
tion for any eventual i ty--i ncl udi ng an offensl ve.
6 27 Feb 52

1

D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

1 HR70-14
I
' I
9. KOREA. bwtb..Kor,aans: order precauti ona against oZXaged
w r i n a i a , a & warfare:
was ordered on 27 'February to take speci al precauti ons to
A N orth K orean battal i on comander
avoi d contami nati on of hi s uni t' s food and water because
"the enemy dropped bacteria" i n central Korea. Covering
wells and di si nf ecti ng United Nati ons l eaf l ets were addi ti onal
recommendations.
These l atter measures were probabl y i nspi red by a
16 February message which stated that "spi eb are putti ng
poi son i nto the dri nki ng water" and di stri buti ng paper
which causes death to'hnyone usi ng these papers for the nose."
(SUEDE AFSA-251, 15472, 28 Feb; 501st Corn Recon Group Korea,
1BRSY/0456, 10 Yeb 52)
problem exi sts i n North Korea. Fol l owi ng recent charges
made by both the North Korean and the Chinese Communist
Forei gn Mi ni sters that the Uni ted Nati ons were usi ng bacteri o-
l ogi cal warfare i n the Korean war, the enti re Sovi et Orbi t
has been gi vi ng great emphasis to thi s subj ect.
Embassy i n Moscow observes that Sovi et press and radi o coverage
l i nks the BW i ssue wi th the Panmunjom truce talks.
Comment: There is no evi dence that a seri ous heal th
The American
10. North Korean major commands ,have l arge pol i ti cal uni t:
A 27 February message to the North K orean "Front Line Head-
quarters" noted that "the tabl e of organi zati on of pol i ti cal
pl atoon was changed. ... it shoul d consi st of 42 persons i n
corps headquarters, whi l e 51 peraons i n di vi si on as before .l f
(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grbuy Korea, SK-G-919, 28 Peb 52)
Comment: Thi s di sproporti onatel y hi gh number of
pol i ti cal personnel assi gned at staf f l evel is f urther evi -
dence of the great emphasis pl aced on i ndoctri nati on i n the
North Korean army.
11. Supply of f oodstuf f s f or three North Korean battal i ons
l i sted* otth Korean mess'age o ebruary -- possTl3y
& kt rear-area uni ts on tfhe2%zt coast -- l i sted the
f oodstuf f s on hand f or three battal i ons and the number of
days the provi si ons are to l aet. Each battal i on had approxi -
matel y 11days suppl y of rice on hand and a ten-day suppl y
on requi si ti on. I n general , the battal i ons had a one to
three week suppl y of mi scel l aneous grai ns and vegetabl es on
hand wi th no addi ti onal s u ~~l i e s on reaui si ti on. (SUEDE
5 O l s t Corn
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE: 20-Mar-201 0
_ _
Recon Co Korea, 15RSM/6760, -22 Feb 52) .
6 29 Feb 52
T o lea r n how to use P D F Compr ession a nd O CR go to our website

I L a 1

12.
Comment: Units In a st at i c defensive role on the east
coast might'be expected to maintain a somewhat higher level
of ratione on hand. This relatively low level may reflect
continued,transportation difficulties.
:"R
7 29 Feb 52

3

, D A T E : 2 4 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
HR7b-14
NR
FAR EAST
DATE: 24-Mar-201 0
1. North Koreans order precautions against alleged bacteriological warfare:
US Army Korea A 6 A ' 2 S/ A North Korean battalion commander wasordered
16, 28 Feb 52
SUEDE
/sV72. on 27 February to take special precautions to
avoid contamination of hi s unit's food andwater
-
/L {Asbecause "the enemy dropped bacteria'' in central
wells and distnfecttng United Nattons leaflets were
addittonal recommendations.
These latter measures were probably inspired
by a 16 February message whtch stated that "sptes are putting poison into
the drinking water" and distributing paper which causes death to "anyone
using these papers for the nose."
Comment: There 1s no evidence that aserious
health problem exists in North Korea. Following recent charges made by
both the North Korean and the Chinese Communist Foreign Ministers that
the United Nations were using bacteriological warfare in the Korean war,
the entire Soviet Orbit has been giving great emphasis to this subject.
The American Embassy in Moscow observes that Soviet press and radio
coverage links the BW issue with the Panmunjom truce talks,
3QHK 3E P SUEDE
F or mor e infor ma tion on P D F Compr ession a nd O CR visit our website

I T I 6 1 - - - - 5 - 1 : E C R E T S U E D t v

H R 7 0 - 1 4
2 -

" 1 - T h - O F S E C R E T S U E D E

R E L E A S E
1 : ) A T E : 2 2 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
SUEDE
D
FAR EAST
DATE: 22-Mar-201 0
I
1. Soviet diplomat predicts early Korean armistice:
In discussing prospects for a Korean armistice,
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin recently
remarked to the Swedish Ambassador that an
armistice agreement is not unlikely and "will
Ambassador remarked that in previous conver-
sations Zorin had depreciated chances of armistice agreement "because
the Americans didn't want it."
2.
prevtously
talks, Zor
Comment: Although Soviet spokesmen have
' expressed optimism regarding the outcome of the cease-fire
in's remark is the only recent expression of such a Soviet
attitude. This sanguine approach might be deemed particularly ap-
propriate in conversations with representatives of neutral nations. On
the other had, Communist statements and propaganda continue to empha-
size obstacles to an agreement, such as the UN's alleged use of bacteri-
ological warfare,
T - S UEDE
HR70-14
5 3
T o lea r n a bout O C R a nd PD F C ompr ession v isit T h ePa per lessO ffice.or g
1 * z ) P S E C R E T S U E D

D t )
5 5
2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
7 .
8 .
z
DATE: 20-Mar-201 0
KOREA. Addi ti onal evi dence of Sovi et rol e i n truce tal ks:
Radio messages from Moscow, addressed to a Sovi et group'
bel i evedto be servi ng as advi sers at the Panmunjom peace tal ks,
are ori gi nated by the Mi ni stry of Forei gn A f f a i r s .
This concl usi on is based on an A rmed Forces Securi ty
Agency anal ysi s which notes a si mi l ar i ty of message character-
i sti cs i n tr af f i c between the Mi ni stry of Foreign Af f ai rs
and vari ous Sovi et consul s, and that addressed to the Sovi et
group in Korea. (SUEDE AFSA RU-TIB 1804, 26 Feb 52)
Comment: Previ ous analysis has shown a correl ati on
b e t w e e n mr devel opments at the truce tal ks and the volume
of messages passed on thi s ci rcui t between Moscow and Korea.
Sovi et advi sers s,till present wi th North Korean A i r
Force: North K orean A i r Headquarters at Si nui j u was queri ed
-February by an ai r uni t near Pyongyang as to whether
"the j ournal i sr; comrade Chayev" had arri ved. (SUEDE 501st
Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15 RSM/7022, 28 Feb 52)
Comment: A si zabl e group of Sovi et ai r advi sory per-
sonnemusual l y i denti f i ed as
wi t h the North Korean A i r Force since its i ncepti on. No
recent ref erences to these Russi ans has been noted i n
communications i ntel l i gence.
has been acti ve
4 3 Mar 52
m

- T O P - S E C R E T S U E D E

9. North Kor,ean anti ai rcraf t arti l l ery dump probably at
n i nti ai rcraf t ar ery battal i on o e Nor
%in k r d I ndependent Aii'iegiment quer iedf it: pare::
uni ts, "Di d you start f or Ui j u to get the ammunition? Unti l
we get i t, we can't prepare f or combat.11 (SUEDE 501st
Corn Recon Grp Korea, 15 RSM/7100, 29 Feb 52)
El ements of the 23rd AAA Regiment are probabl y
located north and east of Pyongyang. Ui j u, one of two opera-
ti onal North Korean ai rf i el ds, is known to have a def ensi ve
AAA uni t and may addi ti onal l y be an anti ai rcraf t ar ti l l er y
suppl y depot.
Comment:
10. Message suggests restri cti on on range of North Korean
pi l ot trai nees: I ntercepted i nstructi ons on 11F ebruary from .
the North Korean A i r School at Yenchi to the I tperson i n charge
04 f i ri ng" at A i r Headquarters i n Si nui j u decl ared: "Oral
orders of the commander offi cer" are that no "acti on (shoul d
be) taken as far as the Pyongyang area." (SUEDE 330th Corn
Becon Co, Korea, ALT-499, 28 Feb 52)
that m o r e a n trai ni ng ai rcraf t are to abide by thi s
reatri cti on, communications i ntel l i gence has reveal ed that
North Korean MIG-15 ai rcraf t are f l yi ng mi ssi ons i n Korea.
The restri ct$on on acti vi ty south of Pyongyang may be i nspi red
by the great securi ty consci ousness of the NKAJ?, and by its
fear that a gi l at w i l l def ect or be captured.
Comment: Nhi l e t hi s message does not cl earl y i ndi cate
5
3. Mar 52

r R
A p p r o v e d F o r R e

A p p r o v e d P e V R e I e a s e 2 ? e e t 0 1 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 W 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 - 1

l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 1 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 - 1
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-
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A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 * A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 - 1

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 6 : C l A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 i0 e 4 P I r 1

A p p r o v e d he r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 * 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 - 1

2 5 X 1
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A p p r o v e d F c- p R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R 0 P 7 9 1 0 1 1 1 W A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 - 1
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A p p r o v e d M iW R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D p 7 9 T 0 1 1 .1 4 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 - 1

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T l ir d

S E C R E T
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A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a

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A T T E N T I ON : T his fo r m w il t b e p l a ce d o n t o p o f a nd a t t a che d t o
e a ch T o y S e cr e t d o cu me nt r e ce iv e d b y t he C e nt r a l I nt e l l ige nce
A ge ncy
o r cl a s s ifie d T o p S e cr e t w it hin t he C I A a nd
w il l r e ma in a t t a che d t o t he d o cu me nt u nt il s u ch t ime a s it
is d o w ngr a d e d , d e s t r o y e d . o r
t r a ns mit t e d o u t s id e o f C I A .
A cce s s t o T o p S e cr e t ma t t e r is l imit e d t o T o p S e cr e t
C o nt r o l p e r s o nne l a nd t ho s e ind iv id u a l s w ho s e o fficia l
d u t ie s r e l a t e t o t he ma t t e r .
T o p S e cr e t C o nt r o l Office r s w ho r e ce iv e a nd / o r r e l e a s e t he
a t t a che d T o p S e cr e t ma t e r ia l w il l s ign t his fo r m
a nd ind ica t e p e r io d o f cu s t o d y in t he l e ft - ha nd co l u mns
p r o v id e d . E a ch ind iv id u a l w ho s e e s t he T Op S e cr e t d o cu me nt
w il l s ign a nd
ind ica t e t he d a t e o f ha nd l ing in t he r ight - ha nd co l u mns .

B Y
OF F I C E S I
T I T I
S 1

N OT I C E OF
a nd t r a ns mit t
D E T A C H M E N T : W he n t his fo r m is d e t a che d fr o m T o p S e c
e t ma t e r ia l it s ha l l b e co mp l e t e d in t he a p p r o p r ia t e
s p a ce s b e l o w
d t o C e nt r a l T o p S e cr e t C o nt r o
fo r r e co r d .

B y ( S igna t u r e )
T O
B Y ( S igna t u r e )
W I B Y ( S igna t u r e )
B Y ( S igna t u r e )

A p K r e d

F o r R e l e a s e

2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 - 1

u
B .7 3
T OP S E C R E T
0
- - - - - - - - - -
H R 7 0 - 1 4

5
D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
HR70-14
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z 4
DATE: 20-Mar-201 0
7 . Message6 suggest transf er of several MIG-equipped
di vi si ons: Messages of 1 and 2 M arch di sc lose It test f l i ghtstt
by seven g1G-1SPs of the Communist 14th and one transport
of the 17th Di vi si on. Similar f l i ghts have preceded uni t
moves i n the past. According to the reporti ng agency, these
meaaages suggest that the 17th Di vi si on, now based at Tangshan
i n North China, may move to Tatungkou near Antung, and that
the 14th which is at Takushan, another Antung area f i el d,
may move to PeiRing. (SUEDE 6920 Securi ty Group J ohnson AB
J apan, SG 593 atld SG 616, 1 and 2 Mar 52)
F or info on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession visit our website
1 1 : ) 1 3 S E C R E T S U E D r *

'Comment: Another Communist di vi si on of MI G-1Sgs--the
Takushan. Assuming that al l these moves occur, Communist
MIG strength near the Korean border w i l l be i ncreased from
the present two di vi si ons of! about 50 MIGPs each to three
di vi si ons.
12th-i s i n the process of transf erri ng from Shanghai to
8 . l l Al l i edvl MLGss f l y to Korean border from Mukden: Si x
a1 1 i ed" -15's f l ew from Mukden to Tatungkou near the
Korean border on 21 February, accordi ng to a Chinese f l i ght
message. (SUEDE ASAPAC SPOT 30961, 29 Feb 52)
I
Comment: Inamid-February , 24 l l al l i ed'l (presumably
S o v i m- 1 5 ' s fl ew from Tatungkou to Mukden. The six men-
ti oned above may be part of that group on a return f l i ght, or
they may have been repl acements. Fl i ghts of Sovi et MIG's
between f i el ds on, the Korean border and ones deeper i n
Manchuria were not noted i n i ntercepts before February.
9. KOREA. Bacteri ol ogi cal warfare i n Korea now major Communist
propaganda theme: A N orth K orean east coast defense uni t was
al erted on 1 March to hol d protest meeti ngs among the troops
-
to i ntensi f y "hosti l e feel i ngs" agai nst al l eged bacteri ol o:
gi cal warfare by the UN f orces. The addressee was admonished
to "make sure they (the troops) are awake at the l ecture."
The seri ousness wi th which the enemy is treati ng the
charges of BW is evi dent from a series of 28 and 29 February
North Korean messages which contai ned such i nstructi ons as
"the contami nated area must be covered wi th snow and spray,..
do not go near the actual pl ace" and which ordered that
"i nj ecti ons wi th number ni ne (uni denti f i ed) vacci ne w i l l be
made." Another message stated that "the surgi cal i nsti tute
members l ef t here to i nvesti gate the bacteri a bombs dropped
on the 29th." (SUEDE U S A 251, 10002, 2 Mar; D et 151, 15RSM
Korea, CS 259, 1 Mar 52)
Comment: The enti re Sovi et Or bi t conti nues to gi ve
unusual prominence to the bacteri ol ogi cal warfare charges,
and Communist China has reportedl y di spatched 'Panti -epi demi c
teams'' to combat the UNPs al l eged BW campaign i n Korea, A
Communist correspondent at the truce tal ks reported that the
charges l end "a mos t si ni ster aspect to the new'American
del ayi ng techni ques i n the conference tent ,(I and predi cted
that the f ul l ef f ects of BW will become evi dent as the
weather get s warmer,
6 4 Mar 52
' M P S E C R E T S U E l D r

T O P S E C R E T - S U E D E
I '
There is st i l l no evi dence o f an epi demi c in North
Korea sufficient to justify t he current all-out propaganda
effort of t he Communist worl d.
4 Mar 52
I
H R 7 0 - 1 4

Q t r f t -

D A T E : 2 4 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

T H R70-14
4WWEEHF SUEDd
FAR EAST
NR
2. Bacteriological warfare in Korea now major Communist propaganda theme:
Armed Forces -
Secur ity Agency
1, 2 Mar 52
SUEDE @/hi- 1'7b'bQ
A North Korean east coast defense unit was
alerted on 1 March to hold protest meetings
among the troops to intensify "hostile feelings"
against alleged bacteriological warfare by the
-1 UN forces, The addressee was admonished to
"make sure they (the troops) are awake at the
lecture, ''
The seriousness with which the enemy is
.. ~-
treating the chargeXBW is evident in a seri es of 28 and 29 February
North Korean 'messages which contained such instructions as "the con-
taminated area must be covered with snow and spray . *. do not go near
the actual place" and which ordered that "injections with number nine
(unidentified) vaccine will be made. I' Another message stated that "the
surgical institute members left here to investigate the bacteria bombs
dropped on the 29th. '?
- 3 -
-SUEDE
DATE: 24-Mar-201 0
F or inf o on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession go t o T heP a per lessO f f ice.or g

SUEDM
I
Comment: The entire Soviet Orbit continues to
give unusual prominence to hebacteriological warfare charges, and Com-
munist China has reportedly dispatched "anti-epidemic teams" to combat
the UN's alleged BW campaign in Korea. A Communist correspondent at
the truce talks reported that the charges lend ''a most sinister aspect to
the new American delaying techniques in the conference tent, "and predicted
that the full effects of BW will'become evident as the weather gets warmer.
There is still no evidence of an epidemic i n
North Korea sufficient to justify the current all-out propaganda effort of
the Communist world.
NR
- 4 -
4WSl EHF SUEDE
F or inf o on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession go t o T heP a per lessO f f ice.or g
2 5 ) 6
2 5 X 1
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S E C R E T
5 M a r c h 1 9 5 2
O C I N o . 3 8 8 6
C o p y N o .
2 5 1
T h i s s u m m a r y o f s i g n i f i c a n t r e p o r t s h a s b e e n p r e p a r e d p r h i l a r i t y
I t d o e s
D I A A N D D O S r e v i e w ( s ) c o m p l e t e d .
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F E T . O t t
s T , 1 1 : : : N E S
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A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C l A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 , 7 0 , 4 0 e p i
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T o l e a r n a bo u t O C R a nd P D F C o mp r e s s i o n go t o o u r we bs i t e
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 8 : C I A - R O P 7 9 T O 4
6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 - 9

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R O P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 4 0 5 0 0 :
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r nmma nt .

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I A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 - 9

A p p r o v i d e F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 6 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 - 9
S E C R E T

6

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* - A p p r o v e d F o r R e M S 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 V 6 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 - 9

M a r 5 2
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S E C R E T
1 0
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A p p r o v e d F o r R e O d e 2 0 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C l A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 * 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 - 9
T O P S E C R E T
5 M a r c h 1 9 5 2
C I A N o . 4 9 5 6 8
C o p y N o .
4 6
I t d o e s
i m m e d i a t e v i e w s o f t h e O f f i c e o f C u r r e n i I n t e l l i g e n c e .
T O P S E C R E T
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 5 7 0 1 7 2 r : 7 T A : R D P 7 U T D T T 4 1 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 - 9
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2 5 X 6
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3
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T O P S E C R E T

T O P S E C R E T

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 5 1 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 7 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 - 9
T O P S E C R E T
U N t L A S S I F I E D wh e n
A P R o z na l d S E O t E R e l ba s e t nt e l : P U I T P : t i f t l bf l i t A u t o ma t i c a l l y
d o wngr a d e d o r d e c l a s s i -
f i e d wh e n f i l l e d i n f o r m i s
d e t a c h e d f r o m c o nt r o l l e d d o c u me nt .
O n4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 - 9

V 9 - 5 - 6 K

R E C E I V E D

A T T E N T I O N :
T h i s f o r nt
w i l l b e p l a c e d
O n t o p O f a nd a t t a c h e d t O
e a c h T o p S e c r e t d o c u m e n t
r e c e i v e d b y t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e
A g e n c y
o r c l a s s i f i e d
T o p
S e c r e t w i t h i n t h e C I A
a nd
w i l l r e m a i n a t t a c h e d t o t h e
d o c u m e n t
u nt i l
s u c h t i m e a s i t
i s d o w n g r a d e d , d e s t r o y e d , o r
t r a n s m i t t e d
o u t s i d e o f C I A . A c c e s s t o
T o p S e c r e t m a t t e r i s l i m i t e d t o
S e c r e t
C o nt r o l p e r s o nne l a nd t h o s e
i nd i v i d u a l . ' wh o s e o f f i c i a l
d u t i e s r e l a t e t o t h e m a t t e r .
T o p S e c r e t
C o nt r o l O f f i c e r s wh o
r e c e i v e a n d / o r r e l e a s e t h e
a t t a c h e d T o p
S e c r e t m a t e r i a l w i l l s i g n t h i s
/ c o r n&
a nd i nd i c a t e
p e r i o d o f c u s t o d y
i n
t h e l e f t - h a n d c o l u m n s p r o v i d e d .
E a c h i n d i v i d u a l w h o s e e s t h e T o p
S e c r e t d o c u m e n t w i l l
s i gn a nd
i nd i c a t e t h e
d a t e o f h a n d l i n g i n t h e
r i g h t - h a n d c o l u m n s .

N O T I C E O F D E T A C H M E N T :
W h e n
t h i s j o r m i s d e t a c h e d f r o m
T O P S e c r e t m a t e r i a l i t s h a l l
be C o mp l e t e d i n
t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e a p no e a be l O w
a nd t r a ns mi t t e d t o C e nt r a l
T o p S e c r e t C o n t r o l f o r
r e c o r d .
D O W N G R A D E D

( S i g n e t U r e )

D E S T R O Y E D

( S i gna t u r e )
D

( S i gna t u r e )

A p p r o V i F o r R e l e a r e Y 6 0 5 / 0 1 / 2 6 : C I A 4 P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 4
V D 4 m 2 6

T O P S E C R E T

0 0 0 9 nO l c i no nl

0

D O S R E V I E W
C O M P L E T E D

A p p r o v e d F o b f t

N o
N O C I L A N C E I N C L A S S .
I D E C L A 7 S I F F 0
C L A S S , C H A N C E D T O : T S : 3
N E X T I I E V I E W C I A T C :
N A M
D A T E a t e R E V E W E R :

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s

T o l e a r n ho w t o us e P D F C o mp r e s s io n a nd O C R v is it T he P a p e r l e s s O f f ice . o r g
R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 / 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 6 0 0
o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 / 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 6
A p p r o v e d F o

A p p r o v e d F

0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5
2 5 X 1 A
: 2 5 X 1
2 5 X 1 A
A p p r o v e d F 6 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 5

2 5 X 1

2 5 X 1 A

- 3 -
2 5 X 1 A
A p p r o v e d
0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5
R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 / 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 6 f

A p p r o v e d F o r I l e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 / 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0

0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5

A p p ? o v e d F o

0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5
( A p p r o v e d
F o R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 / 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 6
5 X 1 A

2 5 X 1 A

2 5 X 1 A
2 5 X 1

2 5 X 1

2 5 X 1 A
A p p r o v e d F
0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5
A p p r o v e d F o

R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 1 0 9 1 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 6

0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5
k a cq ue s

A P p r o v e d

5 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5

A p p r o v e d F a r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 1 0 9 1 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 6 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 - 5

A p p r o v e d F

o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 0 9 1 0 2 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0
A R S E C R E T S U E D i r t

[ D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

T O P S E C R E T S U E D E s i
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. KOREA. Chi nese uni t recei ve8 ai r-ground l i ai son personnel :
m n e s e Communist message of
23 F ebruary? probabl y between
an uni denti f i ed regi ment and its parent di vi si on, l i sted
the number of "thi rd secti on personnel received i n the
February al l otment" (thi rd secti on is probabl y concerned w i t h
communi cati ons). I ncl uded i n thi s list were "ni ne ai r-
ground l i ai son men." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Group Korea,
K-L 190, 29 Feb 52)
Comment: The recei pt of ni ne ai r-ground l i ai son men i n
a si ngl e month at a Chi nese Communist regi mental l evel is
an i ndi cati on that the enemy has not abandoned h i s hope of
employing aircraft over the f ront l i nes.
Thi s message cannot be consi dered a f i r m i ndi cati on of
i ntent to commit ai rpower at the f ront, however, because
numerous previ ous messages, captured documents and POW'S
have mentioned the exi stence of an ai r-ground l i ai son set-up
i n the Communist armies.
2. USSR probabl y control s Korean ai r war from Mukden: The US
A i r Force bel i eves that t h e ~~~m probabl y exerci ses over- al l
command control over enemy ai r combat operati ons i n Korea
from a combined, Soviet-Chinese-Korean ai r headquarters
located i n Mukden. I n addition, exami nati on by the A i r
Force of tr af f i c on the Communist ground-control -i ntercept
radi o net i n Korea and Manchuria now strongl y i ndi cates
parti ci pati on of Russi an, Chi nese and Korean personnel ,
i ncl udi ng pi l ots, i n ai r combat acti vi ti es. (SUEDE A i r Force
Roundup 44, 21392, 3 Mar 52)
This, combined headquarters at Mukdea presumably
commands the j et f i ghter uni ts of the Chi nese, Korean and
Sovi et A i r Forces based at combat ai rf i el ds i n the Antung
Comment:
area,
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE: 20-Mar-201 0
HR70-14

k

v s . ; N g
D A T E : 2 2 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

S s
H R 7 0 - 1 4
N R
,
' I
I
1 '.
.
2.
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HR70-14
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
3, KOREA. Chinese uni t i n Korea reports UN bacteria drop: An
m t i ? i e d Chi ne68 Communist unit on 26 F ebruary report ed that
"yesterday i t was discovered that i n oxr bivouac area there
was a real flood of bacteria and germs scattered from a
3 6 Mar 52
93
\DATE: 22-Mar-201 0 I
F or info on O CR a nd P D F Compr es s ion vis it our webs ite
b i g

I ' k
pl ane by the enemy. Pl ease suppl y us immediately wi th an
i ssue of DDT that we may combat the menace, stop the spread
of thi s pl ague, and el i mi nate al l bacteria." (SUEDE 501st
Comm Recon *Group Korea, K-1221, 3 Mar 52)
Comment: Reports such as thi s from enemy f i el d uni ts
provi de the Communists wi th the t'proof'' which they apparentl y
requi re to support a propaganda campaign. Thi s is the second
i nstance duri ng the current BW scare that a Communist f i el d
uni t has actual l y reported the di scovery of UN bacteri ol ogi cal
agents.
4. Kaesong guard f orce cri ti ci zed: The assi stant regi mental
commander of th e North Korean 82nd Regiment, charged wi th the
*securi ty of Kaesong, was noti f i ed on 29 February by an uni denti -
f i ed seni or that "the spi r i t of your uni t from the hi ghest
rank to the lowest has decayed. I t has been f orgotten that
our comrades st the f ront l i nes are f i ghti ng to the death."
Thi s message was apparentl y i nspi red by a f i nanci al misap-
propri ati on which resul ted i n the 82nd's suppl y of f i cer
bei ng sent to the provost marshal . (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon
Group Korea, 15RSM/7253, 1 Mar 52)
Comment: The North Korean 82nd Regiment has been in
the Kaesong area al most si nce the start of the truce tal ks.
I ts onl y combat duri ng thi s peri od has been l i mi ted to minor
patrol s.
5. North Koreans w i l l hol d cri ti que on aborti ve Yang-do
operati on:
hformed a subordi nate stati on on 29 February that "the
trai ni ng documents pertai ni ng to the operati on at Yang-do
must be brought by you when you come up to Pyongyang for the
i nstructi on,meeti ng." (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Group Korea,.
15RSM/7194, 1 Mar 52)
Comment: The di sastrous North Korean attempt to capture
Yang I sl and off the coast near Chongjin i n northeastern Korea
was conducted by el ements of the newly i denti f i ed 63rd
I ndependent I nf antry Regiment, FECOM reports suggest that
the assaul t uni t which attempted to take the i sl and agai nst
ROK marines suf f ered nearl y 100 percent casual ti es.
A major North K orean coastal securi ty stati on
4
6 Mar 52
F or a compr ehens ive g uide on P D F Compr es s ion a nd O CR vis it our webs ite
T O P S E C R E T S U E D &

J
6. A i r defense communications between Sari won and Pyongyang
bei ng organi zed: A 2 -message from North K or e an
A i r Headquarters i n Si nui j u i nstructed an ai r uni t near
Pyongyang to make a topographi c survey to establ i sh "the
di rect l i ne to connect Pyongyang and the radar stati on ;n
Sar-.?on .'I (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Group Korea, 15RSM/7224,
1 Mar 52)
Comment: Thls i ntel l i gence, i n addi ti on to i ndi cati ng
that 'land l i nes l i nki ng Pyongyang and Sariwon w i l l be l ai d,
suggests that the radar stati on at Sa--.,ii-. is subordi nate to
the North Korean A i r Force.
7 . North Korean A i r Force expands i ts operati ons: Duri ng
a two-week peri od i n mid-February. 142 ai rcraft communicating
-
i n Korean, Russian and Chi nese were acti ve on the Korean-
b+.rated GCI net i n North Korea. Operati ons to date on the
nel; have been mai nl y l i mi ted to trai ni ng and observati on.
However, ai rcraf t control l ea by the Korean ground system
have made one possi bl e contact wi th a UN pl ane, and Korean .
ground operators have tracked UN ai rcraf t on three occasi ons.
ai r cr af t are performi ng reconnabxce mi ssi ons and protecti ng
thei r ai rf i el ds ,
I n addi ti on, there is evi dence that some North Korean
The US A i r Force concl udes that "al l i edf ' ai rcraf t are
probabl y acti ve i n the trai ni ng phaw of the North Korean
GCI net, and that some North Korean ai r uni ts are now
parti ci pati ng i n combat.(SUEDE USAFSS Brooks AFB, ODD-2-
20694, 1 Mar 52)
8 . CHI NA. Poss.La..ly ad more MI G- 15Ps to move from Shanghai to
-border: Possi bl y 58 MI G -15's of the Chi nese Com-
muni st 12th Df vi si on were schedul ed to leave Shanghai on
4 March on a northbound L i a,ht. The US A i r Force poi nts
out that thi s bri ngs the Di vi si on's strength to at l east
49 MIG-l5's, i ncl udi ng 11which l ef t Shanghai f or Takushan,
near the Korean bomdr, i n February. (SUEDE A i r Force
Roundup 45, 21332, 4 Mar 52)
Comment: The strength of Chi nese MI G di vi si ons is
uaual'ly about 50 pl anes. Thi s is the fi rst evi dence that
the 12th Di vi si on has a f ul l complement. The transf er of
5 6 Mar 52
T o lea r n a bout P D F Compr es s ion a nd O CR vis it our webs ite

a

9.
10.
11.
the 12t h Division w i l l raise t he number of Chinese jet
divisions at t he Korean border t o t hree, although one of
them--the 14t h- - i s bel i eved schedul ed to transfer t o China
Proper soon.
6 Mar 52
!
6
T o lea r n how to us e P D F Compr es s ion a nd O CR g o to our webs ite
H R 7 0 - 1 4

A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E D A T E :
1 6 - D e c - 2 0 0 9

6 w A r
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r 1 1 R
N R
SECTI ON 2 ( EASTERN)
16-Dec-2009
I
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2. Four t h Fi el d Ar my admi t s heavy casual t i es as of l ast
Sept ember : Th e Chi nese Four t h Fi el d A r my had 150, 000 men
hos pi mz ed i n Cent r al and Sout h Chi na, accor di ng t o a
document pr oduced l ast Sept ember by i t s Medi cal Depar t ment .
HR70-14
Thi s document was obt ai ned by a Hong Kong newspaper ; subse-
quent l y t he Communi st Publ i c Heal t h Depar t ment of Cent r al
and Sout h Chi na admi t t ed t hat i t had car el essl y al l owed copi es
t o be used as wr appi ng paper .
, and cal l ed f or i mpr oved t r eat ment of t he wounded. r
The document al so r eveal e an al ar mi ng need f or medi - ci ne
- - - I
Comment : The tota? number of casual t i es suf f er ed by t he
Four t h Fi el d Ar my al one i s unknown; k@: u. er, t he Chi nese Com-
muni st Y :. : es have suf f er ed near l y 900, 000 casual t i es i n
the Kor ean war . Onl y 20, 000 have been t aken pr i soner by t he
UN .
Heavy Chi nese i mpor t s of ant i bi ot i cs and ot her phar -
t aceut l Cul s <:zi ng t he past year demonst r at e t hei r ur gent
need of medi ci nes.
NR
T o le ar n mor e ab out P D F Compr e ssion and O CR visit T he P ape r le ssO ffic e .or g
1 .
2 .
M R S E C R E T S U E D *
S E C T I O N 2 ( E A S T E R N )
4
D A T E : 2 2 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
7 M a r 5 2
Y D
HR70-14
DATE: 22-Mar-201 0 -
1.
2.
3
n
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
4 7 Mar 52
- 1 5 t i P - - S E C R E T - S L T E D i g t o -

4 .
5.
,111 NR
No si ckness f r omBWr epor t ed i n Nor t h Kor ean coast al
uni t : A N or t h K or ean uni t on coast al secur i t v i n east er n
Rorsa r epor t ed t o Naval Def ense Headquar t er s near Wonsan on
2 Mar ch t hat al t hough on t he 28t h i nsect s wer e agai n dr opped
at Paekyang, Si npung, and I nnam, "no one has been i nf ect ed
yet . " (SUEDE 501st CommRecon Gr p Kor ea, 15 RSW7413, 3 Mar 5 2 )
Comment : Thi s pr ovi des some i ndi cat i on t hat no act ual
epi demi c i s cur r ent i n t hi s ar ea, i n whi ch t he UN has been
accused of car r yi ng on bact er i ol ogi cal war f ar e. I t i s al so
noteworthy t hat Communi st pr opaganda t o dat e has concent r at ed
on t he act ual dr oppi ng of i nf ect i ng agent s r at her t han on
t he i nci dence of di sease due to t he empl oyment of BW.
Nor t h Korean east coast uni t cl ai ms BWcaused har dshi ps:
A Nor t h K or ean coast al secur i t y uni t i n east er n Kor ea r epor f ed
on 3 Mar ch t hat UN bact er i ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s i n t he
sur r oundi ng ar ea had pr event ed t he movement of t r anspor t at i on
si nce 21 Febr uar y. Lat er i n t he day t he uni t r epor t ed t o
Pyongyang t hat "Pupyong ( j ust sout hwest of Hamhung) . . . i s
the cont ami nat ed ar ea. Accor di ng t o t he cor r ect news, no one
can pass t hr ough i t . I f you do not act qui ckl y, t he 12t h and
13t h guar d st at i ons wi l l have f al l en i nt o st ar vat i on condi -
t i ons. " (SUEDE 501st CommRecon Gr p Kor ea, 15RSM/7459,
5 Mar 52; 501st CommRecon Grp Kor ea, 15RSW7502, 5 Mar 52)
Comment : These messages r ai se t he possi bi l i t y t hat t he
enemy is bl ami ng t he east coast t r anspor t at i on di f f i cul t i es,
caused by UN ai r and naval st r i kes, on t he mor e pr ovocat i ve
BW t heme. ,
7 Mar 52
T e a S E C R E T S U E D 2 r

L
' 1
6 . Nor t h Kor ean uni t has uni dent i f i ed "secr et " weanon: A ._
Marc. . Nor t h K or ean message, possi bl y f r omt he Z3r d Br i gade,
i nf or med a subor di nat e uni t t hat t he i nspect i on whi ch wi l l be
per f or med ver y soon wi l l mai nl y concer n t he "speci al weapons
whi ch ar e bei ng handl ed secr et l y at go: c uni t . " (SUEDE 501st
CommRecon Gr p Kor ea, 15RSM/7524, 5 Mar 52)
Comment : Ther e have been no i ndi cat i ons as to what t hese
new' weapons might be. The Sovi et Uni on has pr evi ousl y sought
t o avoi d compr omi se of new mat er i el , and most weapons and
equi pment encount er ed t o dat e -- wi t h t he not abl e except i on of
t he MI G- 15 -- have been Wor l d War I1 model s.
6 7 Mar 52
:

P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E D A T E :
6 - D e c - 2 0 0 9

b i D /

HR70-1
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. KOREA, Rhee declares he w i l l not run for re- el ecti on: Presi dent
~ ~ w r o t e t o a n ~ ~ ~ c o r x e s n ~ n t that he w i l l not be a
candi date f or re-el ecti on next >;%-,,e, accordi ng to Ambassador
Muccio. Rhee's advi sers had urged the Presi dent to hedge hi s
statement, but he answered that his life expectancy was short
and that the Korean peopl e "may as w e l l f ace up to the problem
(of hi s successor 1 now. ' I
Ambassador Muccio comments that f orecasts of Rhee's f uture
pol i ti cal moves are hi ghl y specul ati ve; the wei ght of evi dence,
however, sti l l poi nts to the concl usi on that he w i l l onl y step
down from the presi dency i f forced to by ci rcumstances beyond
his control . I 7
Comment, Rhee has i ssued si mi l ar statements at t i me s when
a pol -al cri si s was brewing i n order to di scomf i t hi s oppo-
si ti on and to r al l y popul ar support. Probably Rhee will not
consi der hi msel f dsf i ni tel y hound by such a statement i f he
can poi nt to popul ar demand for his re- el ecti on.
2 . North Koreans pl an f or procedures i n case of cease-fire:
The ~-;;incipalZ"Gr33TK~GEriTXflcal and mT T ZF ymer s met
at Gemra1 Headquartemon 12 February to di 6cuss devel opments
1
fol l owi na a c ease-f i re ,I - - ___
+----
Comment: Such a meeti ng, i f i t actual l y occurred, would
i ndi ca-that l eadi ng North Korean of f i ci al s are anti ci pati ng
a concl usi on of the truce tal ks. Previ ous reports have advanced
the thesi s that the North Korean army would withdraw from con-
tact preparatory to a reorga;'zati on fol l owi ng a cease- f i re.
The l evel of recrui tment i n manpower-short North Korea seems
to have long passed the stage where onl y physi cal l y f i t mal es
under 35 years ol d are to be draf ted.
?3Ec%B%
3
16-Dec-2009
7 Mar 52
4b / rsS
-- ..
T o le arn how to use O CR and P D F Compre ssi on vi si t T he P ape rle ssO ffi c e .org

H R 7 0 - 1 4

b e r e -

I f 1 / 4 P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
3 1 A T E : 2 4 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
f N R
f
I
-SUED#
HR70-14
3. Fear of future epidemic suggested in Communist messages:
Army Security Agency
29 Feb, 4 Mar 52
SUEDE
a half-strength shot or may ''temporarily not be inoculated."
A Chinese Communist artillery unit was informed
on 29 February that "all personnel wi l l be re-
inoculated at once" wi th bubonic plague vaccine.
Healthy individuals, however, are to take only
Another message from a Chinese Communist
artillery regiment reported on 27 February that "we have now fullyobtained
the vaccine required for smallpox in the spring time, malaria, and bubonic
plague." The sender notes that the smallpox and malaria shots have al-
ready been given, but queries, "How shall we administer the bubonicplague
shots 'P
Comment: The Communists evidently are
carrying out a large-scale immunization program in Korea, probably
because the threat of epidemics will be heightened in the coming months.
These messages provide further evidence that
there is no serious epidemic within these units. The continued and un-
precedented coverage given the BW theme in Communist broadcasts,
moreover, supports the view that propaganda motives are behind the
charges of UN use of BW i n Korea.
- 4 -
DATE: 24-Mar-201 0
F or inf o on P D F Compr e ssion a nd O CR go to T he P a pe r le ssO f f ice .or g

P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E D A T E :
I i
- D e c - 2 0 0 9

c
.
HR70-14
w
W
-
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. KOREA. Communist truce talks strategy reported: 1
i
2
1 North Korean Vice Premier Ho Ka'i is aiieged
to have requested that the Soviet Union be a member of the
neutral inspection team for the following reasons: to emphasize
the Soviet Union's moral responsibility towards preserving the
rash statements by the UN negotiators; and to regain the ini-
tiative at the conference by diverting UN attention to this
issue while the Communists concentrate on "other basic issues."
. peace in Korea; to test the American reaction and to provoke
notes that th e North K oreans were -!I=- p easan
prised by the UN's agreement on the post-truce political
conference, believing they had won a major point. 7-1
Comment: The points listed by Ho Ka'i, although uncon-
firmea, seem fairly logical. The 10 February speech echoes
the current Communist propaganda line,
NR
c.
J
16-Dec-2009
l0'Mar 52
bb {7-55
F or more information on P D F Compre ssion and O CR go to T he P ape rle ssO ffic e .org
T O P S E C R E T
S U E D E *

D A T E : 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

D A )
.
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
KOREA. BW scare conti nues to occupy Communists i n Korea:
A l o n g detailed 6 M arch message from the North IC orean 23rd
Bri gade to one of its subordi nate battal i ons suggested
preventi ve measures to be used against bacf eri a al l egedl y
dropped by U W ai rcraf t. The report stated that "three
persons. . . became suddenl y f everi sh and thei r nervous I
system have benumbed." After treatment, "two persons al i ve'
and one dead." The report concluded with the astoundi ng
statement that "the government w i l l soon take pi ctures of
speci f i c appearance of the germs col l ecti vel y and correct
photographi c data w i l l be provi ded."
from Pyongyang to a North Korean ai r uni t at Sariwon, i n the
supposedl y contami nated area, "Have you not had an vi cti ms
as a resul t of certai n bacteria yeapons?" ( S UFDEf ~ XM,
1 Mar; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-184, 6 Mar )
condi ti ons i n North Korea. There is no doubt, however, that
the enemy has succeeded i n convi nci ng his troops that BW
agents are bei ng used agai nst hi m.
Another mani festati on of the theme is a 1 March query
Comment: Enemy messages have not yet mentioned epi demi c
2
HR70-14
11Mar 52
' :
IDATE. 18-Mar-201 0
F or a compr ehensive guide on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession visit T heP a per lessO ffice.or g
A p p r o v e c i r o p r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 4 / 0 1 / 0 5 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 4 0 4 6 A 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 1 - 5
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E
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p r i m a r i l y
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1 5
1 1 M a r 5 2
2 5 X 1

D A T E : 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

T O P S E C R E T S U E D E 5 - 5
H R 7 0 - 1 4
/ N I R
HR70-14
i
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
3 . KOREA, Food s i t uat i on of North Korean bat t al i on s t at ed:
m h Rorean bat t al i on commander's message on 8 Y arch
s t a t e s that 34 kilograms of cleaned rice and 30 kilograms
of wheat, "one day' s rat i on of 180 persona, " had been
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE: 18-Mar-201 0
3
12 Mar 52
D3
ss
A K

requested and refused by a suppl y uni t, and I t i t is
di f f i cul t to serve food from 10 March." (SUEDE 501st
Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-301, 10 Mar 52)
Comment: I t has been general l y bel i eved that the
enemy uni ts were suppl i ed wi th about one ki l ogram of food
per day per man. Thi s message, however, i ndi cates that
only one-thi rd of a ki l ogram of grai n--the bul k of the
Communist diet--was to be suppl i ed.
4. Chinese Communist uni t reports shoe shortage: A Chinese
Communist message on 4 Y arch to an uni denti f i ed di vi si on
commander from one of his subordi nate regi ments i ndi cates
that 90 percent of the men i n one of the regi mental uni ts
do not have shoes. The ori gi nator requests that "tbe
commander i ssue .... many shoes to al l evi ate the unprecedented
cri ti cal need." Another Chinese Communist message, possi bl y
from the same organi zati on, however, says that except f or tb
20th arti l l ery regi ment, al l "the others" have recei ved
thei r al l otment of cotton shoes. (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon
Grp Korea, K-1350 and K-1368, 9 Mar 52)
general l y good duri ng the past months. Thi s is probabl y
an i sol ated i nci dent.
Comment: The Communist suppl y si tuati on has been
ghts from
5. CHINA. 1
j Messages of MSG - ' 13 f li
Tatungkou, on the Yalu Ri ver, have not been i ntercepted
si nce 20 February.
The US A i r Force comments that the Russi an operated
ground-controlled-intercept nets i n Korea on which Chinese
uni ts have operated reveal no si gni f i cant decrease i n j e t
sorti es i nto Korea i n recent weeks. (SUEDE A i r Force
Roundup 49 20492, 10 Mar 52)
remained th = e on y coma
from which f 1 ere consi stentl y i ntercepted.
4 12 Mar 52
NR

D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
1
I
_,I," HR70-14
* * *
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. USSR. Reappearance of messages to Moscow from Sovi et M i l i -
tary Miaeion in Korea: Messages from a radi o stati on which
'is beli eved to serve the Sovi et mi l i tary advi 6era in Korea
to an of f i ce in Moscow previ ousl y i denti f i ed as the " M i l i -
tary Admi ni strati on of Areas outsi de the USSR" reappeared on
21 J anuary 1952 after a peri od of i nacti vi ty si nce 39 October
1951. The unusual l y hi gh volume of this traffi c to Moscow
on 12, 20, and 24 February may i ndi cate mi l i tary acti vi ty
of ieome sort. The stati on was heard a4 recentl y as 26 Feb-
ruary,
An apparent correl ati on between battle acti vi ty and the
volume of messages, presumably of a mi l i tary nature, f roh
the rdmi ni strati vd of f i ce in Moscow to thi s stati on in Korea
ie auggested by the f l uctuati on of traffi c i n thi s di recti on
duri ng the l ast seven months; traffi c volume was hi gh i n
the peri od from August to October 1951 when f i ghti ng was
comparati vel y heavy. The last t i me the stati on was heard
waa on 28 October, after which date f i ghti ng has been at a
vi rtual standsti l l .
AFSA suggestre that the resumpti on of combat acti vi ty
on a l arge scale might be accompanied by reappearance of
mi l i tary measagee to Korea but cauti ons that such an anal ysi s
ie not def i ni ti ve since the radi o tr af f i c is bel i eved to be
an overfl ow from l andl i ne traffi c, (SUEDE RU-TIS 1667,
6 Mar 52)
M o s c o m in February coi nci des roughl y wi th that .of
"Operation Clam-up", a tactical f ei nt by DN forces t o devel op
i ndi cati ons of enemy i ntenti ons.
Comment: The period of hi gh volume of thi s traf f i c to
..
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
KOREA. Ex-South Korean soldiers i n Communist army agai n
l 3ZGd separatel y:
auardi nn Kaesong, reported on 8 March that "suml emental
Th e North Korean 82nd regimedt,
i nvesti gati on" reveal ed "15 l i berated soldiers;'' i n t h e
organi zati on. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/
7883, 10 Mar 52)
Comment: "Li berated sol di ers" is the term fhe Com-
muni sts general l y apply to the 30,000 to 50,000 ex-South
Korean sol di ers impressed i nto thei r armies. The enemy's
speci al handl i ng of these pri soners suggests that the
issue at the truce tal ks. They have conti nued to deny,
however, the exi stence o f any more pri sonere of war than
those l i sted i n December.
0 Communists, may be prepari ng to negoti ate thi s pressi ng
3. Si ckness due to BW reported by enemy uni t: A North
Korean anti - ai rcraf t uni t i n the Hamhunrr area of ilorth-
eastern Korea reported on 10 March that-"a man who ate
4
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4.
5 .
6
ice usi ng t he hand wi t h which he had touched t he l eaf l et s
of t he enemy forces, f e l l prey t o the si cknees. " (SUEDE
501st Co r n Recon Grp Korea, 15BSM/8108, 11 Mar 52)
al i zat i on for a possible outbreak of disease i n a North
Korean uni t ..
Comment: This would appear t o be a farfetched ration-
6 13 Mar 52
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6
HR70-14
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. KOREA. Reorganization of North Korean Army again reported:
Theeorganizaelod of th e North K orean I, IV J and orps was
completed on 20 February, with the reo anization of the 11-and
ta be mml e t e d in the near future
replace 'the two latter corps on the front.
- - 7
"Mixed North Korean and Chinese Communist units" will
the Chinese Communists, di s -
turbid by the numbers of North K oreans who were "idle," had
without authorization recruited many Koreans for Chinese
units. 7
Comment: It appears obvious from this and many other
previous reports that the North Korean Army has been under-
going some form of reorganization and rehabilitation during
the past six months. There is no evidence, however, of the
reported integration of North Koreans into Chinese Communist
units .
a . Muccio reports possible method of repaying UN won drawings:
The Rm Foreign Minister recommended before the National Assembly
on 8 U r c h that the 28 July 1950 agreement on won advances to
UN forces be amended in such a manner that repayment of the
loans would be made in foreign exchange of materials, providing
the UNC takes the ROK's material mobilization program into
consideration. American Ambassador Muccio states that, from
the ROK point of view, an accelerated aid program providing
greatly increased imports o f saleable goods, and concerted
efforts to promote their resale, would be a satisfactory
settlement of UN won drawings. ( S Pusan 899, 12 Mar 52)
Comment: The ROK and the UN have been at odds on a repay-
ment method which would counteract the inflationary effect of
monthly won advances to UN forces. At present, aid goods
deliverleeare still far from sufficient to cover :he monthly
advancee .
3. Inflation in South Korea threatens government: Ambassador
Muccio beli eves that th e 34 percent increase in rice prices in
South Korea from 1 to 8 March brings runaway inflation closer
and may l ead to the f a l l of the government. Rice has risen' 114
percent in the past t wo months, and other food prices have also
increased.
-
13 Mar 52
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The Ambassador observes that inflationary pressure] char-
acterized by a ri se of a thousand per cent in note issue since
the beginning of the Korean war, is principally due to South
Korea's inability to finance war costs. Hoarding, political
uncertainty, poor publicity about the recent rice harvest and
'
lack of transportation are contributing factors to the inor-
dinate price advances. (C Pusan 887, 11 Mar 52)
Comment: The sharp rise in South Korean food prices
during 1 Y m h as resulted in the resignation of the Minister of
Agriculture, and the press has warned that rice riots are
probable if prices continue to skyrocket.
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f r o P S E C R E T S U E D Y

D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

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Further si ckness blamed on BW: A 6 March Chinese
Communist message states that one of the sol di ers of the
345th regiment pi cked up a UN propaganda l eaf l et and "was
immediately poisoned." The sol di er was admi ni stered
"fever medi ci ne, the fever abated and he is now recovered.1'
All other uni ts are warned not to handl e l eaf l ets. (SUEDE
501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-1421, 11Mar 52)
Comment: Thi s is the second i nstance noted of the
'Communists l'inking si ckness to UN l eaf l ets.
ti on& Aay di scourage the enemy sol di ers from readi ng UN
propaganda.
These al l ega-
3 . CHINA/KOREA. Evidence establ i shes that Chinese and Korean
pilots actual l y engag6 Cn combat: I n l ate February and
ear l y March 'the ground-control l ed i ntercept net di recti ng
enemy j ets i n combat over Korea was heard-gi vi ng speci f i c
combat orders i n the Chinese and Korean languages. Direc-
ti ons i ntercepted i ncl uded: ''Attack," "Guard yoursel ves ,*I
and "The enemy is j ust behind you.11
of organi zed Chinese uni ts i n aeri al combat occurred
27 Sbptember 1951. (SWEDE ki r Force Roundup 50 and 51,
20552 and 21282, 11and 12 Mar 52)
The US Air Force comments that the first evi dence
4 14 Mar 52
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ATE 20-Mar-201 0
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Comment: Russian is t he language us ual l y employed
on t h i s . net . These. meesages e s t a bl i s h t hat Chinese and
Korean, p i l o t s are engaging in act ual combat wi t h UN
pl anes -- not just flying pat r ol s over Korean territory.
The 1st Korean Division and t he 6t h Chinese Division,
wi t h about. 50 WIGS each, were bel i eved based i n t he
Antung area i n February.
14 M a r 52
5
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* A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
I tiations before the UN , the Soviet ' Union instructed Communist
Dection nations1
truce negotiators to propose the USSR as one of the neutral ~~-
1
1s proposal surprised Korean leaders, who felt th at th e
Soviets would now take a more active part in the negotiations.
I
Comment: I 1 the Soviet role in t h e
truce negotiations from their very beginning is generally
believed to have been a major one. Furthermore, the current
heavy propaganda campaign on the BW theme tends to contradict
the theory that t he Soviet Union is trying to localize t he
Korean conflict in the world's eyes,
-f3wRwr
3
14 Mar 52
bb / ' TSS
DATE: 24-Mar-2010
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r a n g

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5. ITALY. Communist press echoes charges that United States is
GZEi@ BW i n Korea: Th e Communiste are gi vi ng great press
publ l ci ty to stori es from Korea al l egi ng that the US is spreadi ng
baci l l i behind the North Korean l i nes. The US Embassy i n Rome
is begi nni ng to recei ve i nspi red from l ocal labor
organi zati ons and believes that despi te of f i ci al deni al s. the
Communists i ntend to push thei r campaign. 7
Comment: The Communists are doubtl ess stri vi ng to f an
anti-American f eel i ng among I tal i an workers in order to di srupt
defense producti on.
-meit53
a 54 Mar 52
NR
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1 4 M a r 5 2 14 Mar 52


D O C U M E N T N O
N O C H A N C E I N C L A S S
I I D E C L A S S I F I E D
C L A S S . C H A N G E D T O : 7 D C
N E X T R E V I E W D A T E :
A U T H : H P I 7 0 3 s
D A T E / 2 . . t t h ! p i a l E m i r d

S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t r e v i e w c o m p l e t e d
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e

2 0 0 3 1 1 0 / 1 5 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 6 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 1 - 4

F o r a c o m p r e h e n s i v e gui d e o n O C R a n d P D F C o m p r e s s i o n v i s i t o ur w e bs i t e

A p p r o v e d F . P 4 A s e 2 0 0 3 / 1 0 1 1 5 C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 6 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 1 - 4

1 1 - A p p r o v e d o r R e l e a s e I U U J / I t l i l b : C A A - 1 4 U P / 9 I U 0 9 M A U 0 6 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 1 - 4
2 5 X 1
2 5 X 1 A
2 5 X 1 A

e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 1 0 / 1 5 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 6 0 1 9 0 0 0 1 - 4

2 5 X 1
2 5 X 1

2 5 X 1 A
A p p r o v e d F o

R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 1 0 / 1 5 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 6 1 9 0 0 0 1 - 4
2 5 X 1
2 5 X 1 A
A p p r o v e d F c r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 1 1 0 1 1 5 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 1 - 4
2 5 X 1 A
r

2 5 X 1

2 5 X 1

2 5 X 1 A

- 4 -
2 5 X 1 A
2 5 X 1

A p p r o v e d f o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 1 0 / 1 5 :


R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 1 0 / 1 5 : C I A - R 0 P 7 9 1 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 6 1 ) 0 1 9 0 0 0 1 - 4
R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 1 0 / 1 5 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0 6 0 A p p r o v e d

0 1 9 0 0 0 1 - 4

I r a q , n o t I n d o n e s i a ,

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 3 / 1 0 / 1 5 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 ( 6 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 1 - 4

c o
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FAR ..EAST
6 . Russi an message suggests typhus epidemic i n Eorea: A
Russian admi ni stratf w- msssage rm )I nriXitarp net i n 'nnrth-
western Korea reported that ''. . . vi l l ages an epidemic of
typhue 8 broken out. Please urgentl y send. . . ass~stance.'v
( SVEDEp81331, 6 Mar 52) I
Comment: The very fragmedtary condi ti on of the message
and t h e t i o n of the mi ssi ng words coul d make it mislead-
i ng. I f it describe8 actual epidemic condi ti ons, it is
the fi rst to reveal an outbreak on such a scal e i n any North
Korean area thi s wi nter. Louse-borne typhus occurred i n
epidemic proporti ons among Communist troops and ci vi l i ans
i n eastern Korea duri ng the wi nter of 1950-51.
The Pei pi ng radi o deni ed on 13 March that epidemic
condi ti ons prevai l ed i n Nor Ch Korea. Poor sari., 'cary con-
di ti ons, the general l y l ow l evel of immuniqation amoqg the
ci vi l i an popul ati on, and the lack of an ef f ecti ve l ousi ci de
makes such an outbreak a constant possi bi l i ty.
7. Campaign agai nst BW conti nues unabated i n North Korea:
A consi derabl e porti 6n of Chi nese and Korean communications
sti l l are concerned wi th reports of BW, wi th preventi ve
measures, and wi th i nci dence of disease,
reported on 11March that "the bacteri a bomb cl assi f i ed
as mosqui to, f l y and fl ea were di spersed" and "an ewmy
plane dropped ants, f l eas, mosquitoes, fl i es and crickets,"
A Chinese Communist uni t commander i n western Korea
demonstrates his convi cti on that BW'isbeing employed agai nst
hi m i n hi 6 order t o a subordi nate unl t who,captured some
UN sol di ers. The spbordi nate uni t is i nstructed to ask the
pri soners what "type Of immunization shots were admi ni stered
recentl y. . . . i n preparati on for defense agai nst what
disease," and "what type of common l i terature (was) made
avai l abl e regardi ng: di sgase immunization and preventi on."
Two 12 March North Korean naval messages to uni t6 i n
Songj i n and Chongj i n, cllties i n coastal northeastern Korea,
ordered the uni ts to cooperate wi th ci ty Qf f i ci al s Lo ''have
a counterpl an which i ncl udes i nj ecti ons, vacci nati ons and
rat poison" and "to prevent an epi demi c the rats. . . must
be hunted . 1r
Two coastal securi ty stati ons i n northeastern Korea
4 17'Mar 53
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8 .
I
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9.
Two 13 March North Korean meLaages, one from n'orth-
eastern Korea, report deaths due to chol era. (SUEDE - Det 151
16th RSM, Korea, CM Ik 20412, 12 Mar 52, 20791, 13 Mar 52,
21099, 14 Mar 52; 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-1395, 11Mar 52)
Comment: The cahpai gn agai ngt rats i n Songj i n and
C h o n g m a sound pkeventi ve measure i nsof ar as these
ani mal s are the pri mary vectors o$ buboni c pl ague. The
reported i nci dence of cholera is hurpri si ng si nce thi s is
normal J y cqnsi dered a summer di s ei s e,
North Korean uni t is stockpi ai ng large quanti ti es of
North Korean suppl y battal i on commander to hi s regi mental
food: An i nventory of food stuf f d submi tted on 9 March
headquarters lists approxi matel y @, OOO metric tons of ri ce
and 3,800 metric tons of wheat, in addi ti on tc) large quanti ti es
of potatoes, meat and vegetabl es on hand.
A 10 March message -- perhaps a repl y to the above
i ntercept -- from a rear regi ment commander to one of hi s
subordi nate battal i one orders that the food si tuati on be
reported on a monthl y'basi s,and that empty bags be
tot the myon organi zati on, (SUEDE j 2 9 5 9 , 9 Mar ; n 2 9 6 0 ,
10 Mar 52)
Comment: Despi te the serioug food shortage among
North Kprean ci vi l i ans, i t appeard that thi s uni t has ac-
cumul ated a consi derabl e quanti ty of food for what, j udged
by the stockpi l e's si ze, is apparentl y a major North Korean
command.
Mention of the myon organi zati on,.a low l evel Korean
pol i ti cal subdi vi si on, suggests that the North Korean armed
forces are permi tted to deal di reotl y wi th l ocal ci vi l i an
components f or f9od wi thout havi ng to channel requests
through hi gher ci vi l i an authori ty.
Addi ti onal f acts, reported on,,iNorth Korean operated
GCI neZt: USAF anal ysi b of communi ati ons tr af f i c on the
horth %orean operated GCI net i n northwestern Korea reveal s
that two ai rf i el ds are associ ated wi th the system and three
other f i el ds may be si mi l ar l y l i nked. One f i el d is probabl y
i n Korea near Sunchon, a ci t y 40 miles south of Sinuiju,
The anal ysi s di'scPosws that m e of the Korean GCI
stati ons is mobi l e and very l i kel y in the Pyongyang area.
The system is now compri sed of at least s i x GCI stati ons.
5 17 Mar 52
6 - 4
V i r
W I

The Kor ean ear l y war ni ng syst em, however , seems t o oper at e
i ndependent l y f r omt he GCI net .
An 11 Mar ch Nor t h Kor ean ai r message ment i oned a
"t r ansmi t t er lokkattor," possi bl y l ocat ed at Sar i won, whi ch
may i ndi cat e a D/ F i nst al l at i on. ( SUEDE USAFSS, ADV SUMhf
RU- AI R- Weekl y Dl gest 46, 8 Mar AF RQundup 52, 13 Mar 52)
Comment : The Kor ean- oper at ed por t i on of t he Communi st
air def ense syst emi n nor t hwest er n Kor ea cont i nues t o
expand i t s f aci l i t i es and t o i mpr ove its oper at i ons. Kor ean
r adar i nst al l at i ons ar e now i dent i f i ed at Sar i won and
Pyongyang
Ther e ar e no known oper at i onal ai r f i el ds i n nor t h-
west er n Korea, sout h of Si nui j u and Uiju al ong t he Kor ean
si de of t he Yal u r i ver , except f or a sod ai r f i el d at
PY9ngY ang *
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NR
4. Soviet plan'for UN or Big Three discussion of Korea and
Formosa reported:
states that S i no-Joviet "negotiations" were under way as o f 1
March regarding policies toward Korea and Formosa. The USSR
is s ai d to desire that the Korean talks be "delayed indefinitely,"
so that India and other Asian states can press for UN or Bi g
Three discussion of the Korean question and "all Asian problems."
3
The Chinese, who consider the conquest of Formosa their
number one objective, reportedly fear that an attempt to invade
Formosa would provoke the United States to extend the war
into China. The USSR prefers that the Formosa operation be
RostPomd Den ding a Big T hr e meeting. 1
~~~~ 1
Comment: Tho USSR has made several attompts to transfer
the Korean t'alks4to the UN Security Council where decisions
would be subject to Soviet veto. The USSR made several feelers
during 1951 regarding a Big Three meeting, but thero have been
no such overtures in recent months.
Peiplng's propaganda.has frequently demanded control of
Formosa as a condition f pr a Korean settlement and has of t e n
called for an international confercnce to settle outstanding
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tuberculosis, I
Asian problems. Many sources have reported that Peiping
hopes to acquire Formosa by political means.
_ _ . -
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4 17 Mar 52
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T o le arn about P D F Compre s s ion and O CR vis it our we bs it e
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Communists mav exDand Drosaaanda to i ncl ude chemi cal
- - I
orean warfare i n Korea: k 1 . 3 - M arch message from a North K
uni t i n a rear area reports: "On 7 March the enemy used
chemical weapons . . .- (they) were whi t e col ored pbwder,
which are sol ubl e i n water. I t is sai d that when one
dri nks the water . . . he w i l l be ki l l ed i nstantaneousl y.
Thi s has been di scovered by the medi cal secti on of the
Vol unteer troops stati oned here." (SUEDE 501st Comm
Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-586, 15 Mar 52)
Comment: Previ oue Communist propaganda charges
agai nst the D" have been preceded by si mi l ar l'reports.''
The alleged di scovery of a toxi c chemi cal by a Chinese
Communist uni t may i ndi cate that China is taki ng the
i ni ti ati ve i n expanding the campaign to i ncl ude chemical
warfare.
North Korean message urges economy i n food consump-
ti on: A N orth K orean message on 1s M arch from an uni denti -
f u n i t C i t e s an order from the supreme commander tel l i ng
government cl erk& to economize in food consumption. Accord-
i ng to the provi si on, al l men "under the armed echel ons"
w i l l be provi ded wi th 509 grams of meat and 800 grams of
rice per month commencing 15 March 1952. (SUEDE 501st
CommRecon Grp Korea, N r 1960, 16 Mar 52)
that r n - the North Korean uni ts are well suppl i ed wi th
food. The above message gi ves the i mpressi on that the
bul k of the North Korean di et is composed of coarse grai ns --
not ri ce -- the f avori te Korean food.
I Comment: Previ ous i ntercepts and reports have i ndi cated
North Koreans remove el ectri cal equipment to border
area: A 13 M arch North K orean message addressed to the
"suppl y Department Chief of the Communications Command
Bureau" reported that "the communications equipment that
started from Aaju on 30 J anuary and t wo frei ght cars . . .
were unloaded at Si nui j u on 13 March.?' The reporti ng uni t
comments that thi s movement may be associ ated wi th a North
Korean battery f actory i n thi s area. (SUEDE 501st Corn
Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/8372, 14 Mar 52)
3
18 Mar 52
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?
Comment: Removal of these f aci l i ti es from i nteri or
North Korea to the rel ati ve safety of the border regi ons
would seemto demonstrate that the North Koreans expect
the conf l i ct to conti nue.
The one-month del ay i n moving the shipment a di 6tance
of onl y 60 mi l es agai n show6 the ef f ecti veness of the USAF's
* rai l cutti ng tacti cs. b
6. North Korean uni t pl ans 19 March operati on: A I3 March
messag's from a regi ment aP th e North K orean 27t5 .Di vi si on,
i n combat i n the east-central sector, i nstructs a subordi -
nate uni t -- probabl y arti l l ery -- to "prepare completely
for f i ri ng at the present l ocati on by 2000 hours on
19 March wi thout f ai l ." A 15 March message, probabl y from
thi s same regi ment, i ndi cated that because "vehi cl es and
arti l l ery1' would ba concentrated, they should be "scattered
and prepared f or acti on."
Commandff I nstructs a subordi nate uni t -- possi bl y anti -
ai rcraf t arti l l ery -- that it "should attack the enemy -
ai rcraft in the ni ght. The begi nni ng of the attack is
1 (?) March gnd report the compl eti on of the preparati on
and the begi nni ng qf the attack on the l (7) and 1(?)."
(SUEDE 501et Corn qecon Grp Korea, SK-H-568, 14 Mar;
15RSM/8514, 16 Nar; SK-H-719, 17 Mar 52)
A 15 March message from the North Korean "Front ti ne
I -
Co ent The fragmentary nature of these messages
thi s operati on. There are no current i ndi cati ons of a
general Communist of f ensi ve i n Korea, but l i mi ted obj ecti ve
operati ons remain a constant possi bi l i ty.
precl u + es anal ysi s of the scal e, l ocati on, or purpose of
7 . Chinese bomber di vi si on to move from Mukden to North
Manchupia: N i nb TU-2 bombers of th e ' Chi nese Communist 8t h
bi vi si bn were t o l eave Mukden on 17 March f or Tsi tsi har
i n North Manchuria on a "test f l i ght." The reporti ng
agency comments that al l previ ous f l i ghts of thi s nature
have been followed by the transf er of the enti re uni t
concerned. A t present 11 TU-2's of the 8th Di vi si on are
i n the Nanking area and 37 are at Wukden, accordi ng to
the reporti ng agency.
AB,, AP 045, '16 Mar 52)
(SUEDE 6920 Securi ty Group J ohnson
4 18 Mar 52


Comment: TU-2 l i ght bombers, the l argest i n the China
area, have not been i n the Korean war si nce November 1951.
The transf er of thi s di vi si on would leave onl y part of one
l i ght bomber regiment i n south ManChuria.
8 . J et di vi si on may trztnsfer from Manchuria to South
Chi na: Fouf. transports of th e Chi nese 4th A i r Di vi si on
were schedulgd to l eave Liaoyang, Manchuria, f or Canton
on 15 March. The f l i ght was an "ai rf i el d transf er." 4
l ater message, however, ref erred to the same ai rcraft ps
transports of the 6th A i r Di vi si on. The reporti ng agency
cauti ons that nei ther desi gnati on is confirmed, but that
the transf er of a Chinese Communist air uni t is i ndi cated
by these messages because si mi l ar transport f l i ghts in
the past have preceded enti re uni t transf ers. (SUEDE
SG 839, J ohnson AB J apan, 16 Mar 52) '
A i r Divisions are equipped wi th MI G-15's and have had
extensi ve combat experi ence over Korea. Si nce the onl y
MI G-15 di vi si on i n South China is not yet f ul l y trai ned,
the transf eb of ei ther of these uni ts to the Canton area
would appreci abl y i ncrease Communist ai r strength there.
Comment: Both the Chi nese Communist 4th and 6th
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1. Communtsts may expand propaganda to include chemtcal warfare in Korea:
US Army Korea A 13 March message from a North Korean
16 Mar 52
sh.~,-SgC unit in a rear area reports: "On 7 March
SUEDE the enemy used chemtcal weapons (they)
were white colored powder, whtch are soluble
in water. It i s s IT i that when one drinks the water , he will be ktlled
tnstantaneously. Thts has been discovered by the medical section of the
Volunteer troops stationed here:'
. S6/& c-
Comment: Previous Communtst propaganda
charges against the UN have been preceded by stmtlar "reports:' The alleged
dtscovery of a toxic chemicql by a Chinese Communtst unlt may indtcate
that Chtna 1s taktng the initiative tn expandtng the campaign to include
chemical warfare.
NR
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18-Mar-201 0
5. North K oreE' s gi ant chemical comDlex mav retai n some
-
_ _ ..
capaci ty: A ITM arch North K orean message, reporti ng the
aischarae of an afficer. notes that he "has been disrrosed
at the fiungnam f actory,'hi s former work shap." A 15 March
North Karean message reports that the problem of l oadi ng
vehi cl es i n the Hamhung area with "oxygen and ni trogen"
can be sol ved. A North Korean suppl y uni t i n the Hamhung-
Wonsan area reports that "the di recti ves of tha center f or
carbi de have not arri ved at the factory." (SUEDE 501st
Corn Recon GrpXDrea, SK-H-513, 14 Mar; 9K-H-696, 16 Mar;
SK-H-724, 17 Mar 52)
Comment: The Hungnam chemical complex, the l argest
in the Ftu.I$aat prior to the Korean conf l i ot; suffered
destructi on varyi ng from 90 to 96 percent i n its five major
i nstal l ati ons. Calcium carbide was one of the pri nci pal
products for i nter-pl ant use and for export; and both
oxygen and ni trogen were produced i n consi derabl e. quanti -
ti es. I t is possi bl e that some segment8 of , the.eonsi derabi Le
i ndustri al capaci ty of the pl ant have been rehabi l i tated
i n some sl i ght degree.
6 . North Korean XV Corps organi zati on suggested: The
commander of t h e North K orean ~3% 'Bri gade i n a 12 March
message i nstructed hi s 5th battal i on-commander to "draw
up the name-l i st,of the persons recei ved from tbe I Oth,
17th, 105th Di vi si ons and other uni ts, from J anuary 25th
to today." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SIC-H-546,
14 Mar 52)
Comment: Probably the 23rd Bri gade i n converti ng to
a mechanized arti l l ery uni t recei ved personnel wi th armored
trai ni ng from the 17th mechanized and 105th armored Di vi si ons.
Thi s message suggests that the f our uni ts are subordi nate to
the same major command, possi bl y the I V Corps. This corps-
bel i eved composed of the 4th, 5th, and 10th I nf antry
Di vi si ons, the 105th Armored Di vi si on, and the 23rd and
26th Bri gades--i s l ocated in the rear area of western Korea.
No recent ref erences have been seen to ei ther the 4th or
the 5th Di vi si ons, but the 17th Mechanized Di vi si on is
known to be still i n the area.
3
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T t r i ' S E C R E T S U E D k e

7 . Chi nese Communist uni t deals di rpctl y wi th North Korean
local gaverment: I n a 9 M arch Chi nese Communist message a
l ower echel on unf t was i nstructed to ''pl ease contact the
governmental of f i ci al s of the k'un (county) af that l ocal i ty
and i nfarm them we need 3,000 bottl es." (SUEDE 501st Cor n
Recon Grp Korea, K-1444, 14 Mar 52)
Comment: Thi s i s the fi rst i nstance noted of a di rect '
Chi nese Communist requi si ti on upon a lower echel on of the
North Korean Government, While it is probabl e that the bul k
of Chi nese Communist suppl i es are provi ded through normal
l ogi sti cal channel s ori gi nati ng i n China proper, i nstances
such as thi s wi l l -undoubtedl y contri bute to f ri cti on between
the Chi nese uni ts and Korean vi l l agers.
8 . New North Korean brigade possibly formed: R 13 March
message from the North K orean -8th D i vi si on to its subordi nate
82nd.regi ment at Kaesong mentioned two sol di ers, bath of
whom were from the "22nd Bri gade under the direct command
of the Supreme Eesdquarters." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp
Korea, SK-H-554, 14 Mar 52)
as havi ng f our bri gade-type uni ts--the 23M, Z4th, 25th,
and 26th Mechanized A rti l l ery Brigades--evenly di vi ded
between the east and the west coast. While confi rmati on
is sti l l l acki ng, it is possi bl e that amther bri gade--the
22nd~-mi ght have been formed i n the Pyongyang area as a
speci al reserve force.
Comment: The North Korean Army at present is accepted
9. Chi nese Cammunist uni t reports f rozen f eet caused by
shortage of footwear: A 4 M arch Chi nepe Communist message
Tram the headquarters of an arti l l ery di vi stan to its rear
area suppl y uni t states that. 90 percent of the regi ment's
shoes are unusabl e and "recentl y more than 20 men have
gotten f rozen feet." The sender requests that a second pai r
of shoes be i ssued because the men "do not have addi ti onal
shoes to wear." (SUEDE SOl st Comm Recon Co Korea, K-1489,
17 Mar 52)
Comment: Thi s is the second report wi thi n the past
two w m a shoe shortage i n Chinese Communist uni ts.
As the Communist suppl y si tuati on has been general l y good
duri ng the past months, these are probabl y i sol ated i nci dents.
4 19 Mar 52
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3. Epi demi cs among Communist troopn.mqumtred i n northwestern
Orean VI11 C orps, after reorgani zi ng i n the
Si nui j u-Ui j u area, moved duri ng earl y March to, an area east
of Pyongyang. The general morale of the usderstrength corps
is low and about 30 percent of the troape " ar e bedri dden wi th
typhoid f ever or typhus," A hi gh mortal i ty rate exi sts among
these di seased pati ents.
I I
I ' 1 ~. I
Comment: Some substance is l ent to thi s report by a
fragmentary d March message on the Russi an GCI net in north-
western Korea reporti ng an outbreak of typhus i n thi s general
area.
Whxle the exrstence of epi demi cs in North Korea cannot
be determined, a l ack of sanrkary condatAonts and preventi ve
measures and a shortahe of medi cal personnel have probabl y
made condi ti ons ri pe f or an epi demi c.
The present whereabouta of the North Korean VI11 Corps
are unknown, al though recent reports have i ndi cated that i t
was i n the process of reorgani zati on i n northwestern Korea.
4. Hi gh-l evel i nspecti on to be carri ed out i n North Korean
Army soon: I n a 14 Y arch message, an uni denti f i ed North
korean regi ment i nformed a subordi nate uni t that the "di vi ei ont*
would carry out a prel i mi nary i nspecti on on I Apri l "i n order
to sati sf actori l y meet the Supreme Headquarters i nspeati on.**
I n thi s same regard, a 16 March message, probabl y from
the North Korean VI1 Corps i n the Wonsan-Hamhung area,
reported that "Nati onal i nspecti on w i l l be opened from the
17th day. Prepare f or it suf f i ci entl y.'* (SUEDE 330th Comm
Recon Co Korea ALT-845, 15 Mar; 501at Comm Recon Grp Korea,
SK-I-747, 17 MU 52) I
3 20 par 52
[DATE: 22-Mar-201 0 I
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T O P S E C R E T - S U E D E
Comment: Thi s impending high l evel i nspecti on may
i ndi cate the cul mi nati on of the extensi ve trai ni ng and
reorgani zati on program which has been going on i n the North
Korean Army i n past months.
5 . Communists conti nue organi zi ng to meet thre.at of BW: A
Chinese Communist message on 13 H arch reported. %hat ,'la
certai n uni t ha6 di scovered a l arge concentrati on of plague
germs. Many people have been af f l i cted wi th thi s undiagnosed
disease and already several persons have succumbed wi th the
i l l ness." Another Chinese Communiat uni t on 14 March l i Eted
f our preventi ve measures for carryi ng out the' Hanti-small-
pox campaign" and the "anti-plague program."
Meanwhile, a 17 March North Korean aessage detai l ed
preventi ve steps to be taken by subordi nate uni ts "to
prevent vari ous diseases which may i ntrude i nto here by the
new weapons used by the enemy." These measures. l ncl uded
establ i shment of i nf ecti ous di sease hospi tal s, cooperati on
wi th l ocal governments i n the anti-epidemic ampai gn,
stricter hygi eni c .di sci pl i ne, i sol ati on of i nfected uni ts,
high pri ori ty reporti ng of the outbreak of diseaee, and
strict observati on of "enemy ai rcraf t . . . of bacterJ a1
bombs.". (SUEDE SOlst CommRecon Grp Korea, K-1499, 17 Mar;
K-1500, 17 M a r ; SK-H-768, 18MU 52)
6 .
North Korean food economy measures not as harsh as
revi ousl y reported: A more 'accwate trans-latfan o f a
b March North Korean message (eee.Speci a1 l ntsl l i gence
Supplement, 18 March, I t em 4) concerning economy in food
consumption has been recei ved. The message-urges con-
servati on of provi si ons i n the mi l i tar y establ i shment and
decrees that "50 grams of meat and 800 grams of rice" w i l l
be "deductedqq i ron each man's monthly rati on. The previ ous
transl ati on i ndi cated that each man's monthly rati on would
be lllimited'' to qt 509 grams of meat and 800 grams of rice."
(SUEDE 330th Corn Recon Co Korea, ALT-897, 17 Mar 52)
Comment: While thi s new transl ati on still i ndi cates
a shortage of food i n North Korea, the deducti on of roughly
one day's rati on per month is not nearl y as severe as the
measures suggested by the previous i ntercepti on.
4 20 par 52


,
7. Chinese MIG-15'6 moye to Korean border: Twenty-seven
MIG-l'S's, probably o f the Chinede Communiet 17th A i r Di vi si on,
were scheduled to f l y frbm Tangahan i n North China to
Tatungkou near Antung on 17 March. Thi rteen MI G's of thi s
di vi si on l ef t Tangshan f or Manchuria on 9 March. (SUEDE
A i r Force Roundup 5 5 , 21002, 18 Mar 52)
Comment: Si nce the 17th Di vi si on is equipped wi th about
SO YI & l b ' S, its transf er will raise the total enemy j et
strength at Antung and Tatungkou to nearl y 250, a record number.
The 17th may, however, repl ace a combat-depleted uni t i n the
area; rotati on of thi s nature has ocuyrred before.
Ai rcraf t of the 17th Di vi si on were noted i n an advanced
stage of trai ni ng i n February. On 26 February they practi ced
rel easi ng auxi l i ary f uel tanks, the f i r st i ntercepted reference
to auxi l i ary tanks on MI G-15's.
~~
5 20 Var 52

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8. Propaganda val ue of BW scare stressed i n North Korean
uni t: An 18 Y arch Norxh Korean message note8 that i n
reference to the "publ i c opi ni on proj ect: progress is slow
at battal i on uni ts. I n accordance wi th the outl i ned regul a-
ti on, you must report publ i c opi ni on concerni ng the appear-
ance of bacteria weapons i n a wide sphere." (SUEDE Det 151
15th RSM Korea, CS 351, 19 Mar 52)
Comment: Thi s i ntercept shows that the current BW
pr o pamamps i gn is i ntended to i ncrease both ci vi l i an
and mi l i tar y f eel i ng i n North Korea agai nst the UN.
9. North Korean IV Corps uni ts i denti f i ed i n western Korea:
A series of! 17 Y arch North Korean messages, possi bl y i ncl ud-
i ng dupl i cate i ntercepti ons, i ndi cates that an anti ai rcraf t
uni t of: the "11th Regiment" shot down a UN F-84 in western
Korea, south of Chinnampo. An al tercati on developed between
the "11th Regiment" and a uni t of the North Korean 23rd
Bri gade, known to be in thi s area, as t o the credit for
downing the UN pl ane.
A 19 March North Korean message, probabl y from the 23rd
Bri gade ,i n westemKorea, reports the al l eged droppi ng of
bacteria in the area occupi ed by the P'18th Regiment, 4th
Di vi si on.'' (SUEDE 330th Comm Roeon Co Korea ALT-936 and
ALT-837, 18 Mar; 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea, 15 RSM/8724
and 15 RSM/8725, 18 Mar; Det 151 15th RSM Korea, CS-355,
19 Mar 52)
Comment: The 11th North Korean i nf antry regi ment is
organ'ic to the 5th Di vi si on, IV Corps. No recent informatian.
has been recei ved on ei ther the 4th or 5th North Korean
Di vi si ons, both goad combat uni ts, which were l ast located
in the Pyongyang-Chinnampo-Sariwon area of western Korea;
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4. Slno-Sovlet-Korean preparations for future hostilities
reported: I
and Korean leaders decided early in 1952
I Russian , Chinese,
(1) " t o continue fighting" in Korea until t he end
of April 1952, in order to cover preparations
for a military movement elsewhere;
operation" at once if the US Air Force bombs
Manchuria; and
must be conmlete by August 1952.
(2) that the Soviet Air Force will " go into
(3) that "preparations for war" in Southeast As i a
Comment: Many sources have reported Sino-Soviet-Forean ~
preparations for an expansion of hostilities. 1
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..
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FAR EAST
1. Communist prisoners report no plague or cholera in their unit:
2lLMar 52
i L revealed that they knew of no plague or cholera
in North Korea. Captured Communist soldiers reported that unit political
and non-commlsfiioned medical officers were the source of claims that the
Untted Nations were ustng biological warfare,
interrogation of 80 pri soners
some of whom were in
Communist North Korea as recently as 10 March,
r
The incidence of typhus, typhoid and smallpa-,
however, e s last year's epidemic conditions,
Comment: The outbreak of disease in epidemic
proportions among Communist troops and civilians in North Korea is a
constant possibility, There is no convincing evidence from any source,
however, of the recurrence of epidemics similar to those experienced by
the enemy last year.
2
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DATE: 22-Mar-201 0
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New major Chi nese Communist uni t may be i n Korea: A
16 March message, probabl y carried on the; Chi nese Communist
7th A rti l l ery Di vi si on's net, menti ons a "63rd Di vi si on."
The f i el d reporti ng uni t adds that t hi s uni t is organi c t o
the 21st Chihese Communist Army, l ast reported i n the coastal
areas of Chekiang Provi nce, East Chi na.
A 7 March Chi nese Communist message passed i n Korea
mentioned the "61st Di vi si on," also a subordi nate of the 21st
Army. (SUEDE CINCFE SIB 465, 22 Mar; AFSA CC/CAP-172, 20 Mar 52)
Comment: The 21st Chi nese Communist A rmy, al though i t
has been menti oned i n connecti on wi th Korea, has never been
accepted i n the theater. While not concl usi ve, these l atest
i denti f i cati ons may i ndi cate its presence i n Korea.
menti oned uni ts not accepted i n thi s theater, but thought t o
be el sewhere i n Chi na. I t is enti rel y possi bl e that such is
the case wi th the 21st Army,
Many recent Chi nese Communist messages i n Korea have
North Korepns use di vi ng equipment f or sal vagi ng
or orean naval message o arch from
3 e i e c : i f l n %itffV1 reports that l l we-t:l t: : o reconstruct
i tt1 but di vi ng equipment i s needed f or ''a saf e sal vagi ng j ob."
The ori gi nator, requesti ng that a di vi ng party be mobi l i zed,'
decl ares that "we mi ht be abJ e to use i t af ter ref l oatati on
or sal vage." (SUSDEpp12968, 18 Mar 52)
Comment: I t is uncl ear what type of materiel is bei ng
sal vaged by the North Korean naval uni t. I n the past the
enemy has gone t o consi derabl e l engths to recover UN equi pment.
Number of ai r combat uni ts i n Manchuria reveal ed: An
anal ysi s of uneval uated material from the Russi an, Chi nese
and Korean l anguage tr af f i c on the Ground Control I ntercept
(GCI ) voi ce network, which di rects enemy ai rcraf t i n combiLt
over Korea i ndi cates that, as of 10 March 1952, the f ol l owi ng
uni ts were regul arl y committed to combat from-Manchurian
bases: three Sovi et regi ments equi pped wi th about 50 M1G- l . 5' ~
each, a Soviet LA-11 ni ght f i ghter regi ment, two Chi nese
f i ghter regi ments wi th about 25 MIG's each, and a North
5 24 Mar 52
F or inf o on P D F Compr es s ion a nd O CR go t o T heP a per les s O f f ice.or g
T O P S E C R E T S U E D L P - '

Korean regiment of unkpown size. An addi ti onal two to f our
Chinese uni ts and f i ve Korean uni ts observed on these nets
appeared to be engaged only i n trai ni ng actl vi ti ea. (SUEDE
AFSA Chinese and Korean Voice GCI N e t s i n the Korean Area,
14 Mar 52)
cati on of t h ese uni ts, The t hree Soviet MI G-15 regi ments may
be the Fi f th Fleet uni ts which l ef t Port Arthur for Antung
i n the f al l of 1951. The onl y known Chinese uni ts at Antung
or Tatungkou in February were two regi ments of the 6th A i r
Di vi si on. A regiment of the North Korean A i r Force 1st Di vi si on
has been acti ve at Antung.
Comment; Other i ntercepts provi de tentati ve i denti f i -
,j N R
F or inf o on P D F Compr es s ion a nd O CR go t o T heP a per les s O f f ice.or g
T t i P S E C R E T S U E D e

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C . A C )
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MR70-I 4
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5 . Communist uni ts i n Korea report vari ous di seases: Duri ng
the peri od 12 th rough 20 M arch, Communist uni ts i n North
Korea reported a vari ety of di seases, rangi ng from smal l pox
to ni ght bl i ndness.
Although on 12 March the suppl y organi zati on of the
Chi nese Communist 7th A rti l l ery Di vi si on reported that onl y
f our men had smal l pox out of a total of 519, a garbl ed
15 March message from thi s same uni t reported that deaths
occurred from the outbreak and that the uni t was powerless
to combat the di sease.
Si mi l arl y, a 20 March North Korean message mentioned a
ci vi l i an death from trpest'l i n Hamhung and the occurrence of
rtpextrl and cholera i n another northeastern Korean area. A
North Korean battal i on i n the Bamhung area on 19 March reported
onl y six sol di ers as pati ents, f our of them for surgery.
reported that 122 persons were af f l i cted wi th ni ght bl i ndness,
due pri mari l y to a vi tami n def i ci ency, and requested that
llsome ni ght bl i ndness medicine" be i ssued. (SUEDE 5Qlst Comm
Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-866, 20 Mar; SK-H-945, 22 Mar; K-1570,
21 Mar; K-1602, 22 Mar; K-1578, 21 Mar 52)
An uni denti f i ed Chi nese Communist regi ment on 17 March
6 . Organi zati on and l ocati on of North Korean J et di vi si on
reveal ed:
has reveal ed the organi zati on and i ocati ons of: the North
c
AFSA anal ysi s of Ch i nese Com-unis t f 37 i ght reports
Korean 1st (j et-equi pped) A i r Di vi si on.
and l ocated at Antung ai rf i el d, is f l yi ng combat trai ni ng
f l i ghts i n North Korea. The other regi ment of 24 MI G- l Sf s,
commanddd by Yang Tuhi and located at Anshan, was l ast
observed i n trai ni ng. (SUEDE KC/CAP-15, 22 Mar 52)
One regi ment of 26 MIG-lS's, commanded by Kang Taeyon
7 . Enti re North Korean cor al erted to capture def ector
from Pol .i ti cal Mi ni stry: On
Qecti on," probabl y of the North Korean IV Corps, informed the
"Securi ty Secti on chi ef , each di vi si on and bri gade" of the
deserti on "to the 38th paral l el " of LI Un Un (?), who had
arch t h e PvChi ef of Securi ty
4 25 Mar 52

.
served wi th the "Pol i ti cal Mini All ef f orts were to
be made to capture him. (SVEDEktry'. 2972, 22 Mar 52)
corps, the first t i me such a procedure has been noted,
i l l ustrates the importance attached to preventi ng the defec-
ti on of thi s i ndi vi dual , probably a member of the Mi ni stry
of Social Securi ty. The North Korean A i r Force has demon-
strated a similar high l evel of s ecuri t y di sci pl i ne i n i t s
ef f orts to prevent the deserti on of personnel i n sensi ti ve
posi ti ons.
Comment: The apparent al erti ng of an enti re North Korean
5 25 Mar 52
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4. North Korean Army uni t di sproves pol i ce report of BW
i nci dent: Two messages from a North K orean battal i on i n
the Hamhung area reported on 25 March that a ci vi l i an pol i ce
offi cer had di scovered an American bacteri a bomb. The
pol i ceman's f i ndi ngs apparentl y were based on the coi nci dence
of a UN bombing attack and the appearance of "flies" i n the
area.
A North Korean mi l i tary sani tati on of f i cer, sent t o
af f i rm thi s i nci dent, reported that the pol i ceman's report
was f al se an@ that the f l i es "were not caused from the
bacteri al weapon but from the f er ti l i zer s on the pl ace."
(SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-1045, 25. Mar; Det
151 15th RSM Korea, 26 Mar 52)
Comment: Thi s is the f i r st observed i nstance i n
which a Communist uni t has i nvesti gated and entered a
negati ve report on an al l eged American use of BW agents.
5. Addi ti onal subordi nate of new Chi nese Communist army
group reported i n Korea: A recent message, probabl y passed
by the Chi nese Communist 7th A rti l l ery Di vi si on, states that
"the 18th Army requests that you compute the total number of
al l personnel under your command....ll
FECOM comnients that the 18th Army, subordi nate to the
5th Chi nese Communist Army Group, has been located i n Korea
I by several col l ateral reports. The ref erence to "18th Army,"
FECOM warns, coul d be a garbl e f or "68th ArrnylI known to be
i n the general area of the 7th A r t i l l er y Di vi si on. (SUEDE
CINCFE SIB 468, 26 Mar 52)
Comment: Communications i ntel l i gence i n 1952 has
suggested the presence i n Korea of f our new Chi nese Communist
armies-the l oth, 16th, 18th, and 21st. While i t is possi bl e
that al l or el ements of these armies may have entered Korea,
there is i nsuf f i ci ent evi dence to accept thei r presence i n
the combat zone.
Q
6 . North Korean V Corps loses two major uni ts: A
29 J anuary North K orean message menti ons that "si nce the
V Corps is transf erri ng the control of the 46th Di vi si on
3 27 'War 52
18-Mar-2010

H R 7 0 - 1 4

H R 7 0 - 1 4

- T O P S E C R E T S U E D E
, .
u u
and the 25th Di vi si on (probabl y 25th Bri gade), and si nce
all of the bei ng turned over, i t is not possi bl e
to . . . I 1 (SU~D~[mL130t33, 29 J an 52) HR70-14
Comment: The l oss of these two major uni ts l eaves the
V Corps wi th the 6th, 12th, and 32nd Di vi si ons. I t is
possi bl e that this J anuary transf er was a preparati on f or the
V Corps' return to combat i n eastern Korea, possi bl y to re-
l i eve the I1 Corps.
i denti f i ed i n a coast81 def ense rol e. The V Corps has been
engaged i n trai ni ng and coastal securi ty duty i n the Wonsan-
Bamhung area, si nce it was rel i eved from combat by I Corps
i n the f al l of 1951.
The 25th Mechanized A rti l l ery Bri gade has been general l y
7 . North Korean regi ment at Kaesong has l arge securi ty
el ement: A poorl y transl ated 20 M arch message from the North
Korean 82nd regi ment, the Kaesong guard f orce, to its parent
8th Di vi si on reports the currdnt strength of securi ty men i n
the re ime t a8 324, organi zed i nto between 50 and 70 nets.
Comment: Al though it is not known what the normal
c o m p l m securi ty personnel is i n a North Korean regi ment
of 3,000 sol di ers, thi s f i gure seems hi gh. The llshowpiece"
role of the 82nd Regiment as the Kaesong guard f orce may
account f or the extra securi ty precauti ons.
(SUEDEvpf29/7&, 21 Mar 52) HR70-14
4 27 Mar 52
H R 7 0 - 1 4

, 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
HR70-14
18-Mar-201 0
FAR. .EAST
7 . North Korean rear uni ts ordered to produce hal f thei r
vegetabl e requi rements: A North Korean message on 23 M arch
orders each rear servi ce battal i on commander to obtai n
approxi matel y 30 acres of farmi ng l and i n order to provi de
50 percent of the uni t' s vegetabl e requi rements for seven
months. The remai ni ng 50 percent w i l l be provi ded by the
l ogi sti cs command, but each battal i on is warned that "the
superi w i l l be unabl e t o suppl y more than thei r hal f .
( S U E D E B 3007, 23 Mar 52)
Comment: The North Koreans are apparentl y f ol l owi ng
the practi ce of the Chi nese Communist uni ts i n stati c
positions which were recentl y ordered to start vegetabl e
gardens (See Speci al I ntel l i gence Supplement 19 Mar 52).
The consi derabl e amount of acreage to be obtai ned by the
mi l i tary may w e l l work a f urther hardshi p on the strai tened
North Korean f armers, already suf f eri ng from exorbi tant
taxes i n ki nd.
8. Chi nese Communist mi l i tar y cl othmg arri ves i n North
Korea: Messages from a Chi nese Communist ar ti l l er y di vi sxon
a n 8 e 68th Chi nese Communist Army on 21 and 23 March
confi rm the arri val of these uni ts' cl othi ng i n Antung, North
Korea. Both messages i ndi cate the uni forms w i l l be sent to
the forward area. (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-1689,
21 Mar; K-1680, 22 Mar 52)
Comment: These messages presumably ref er to stocks
of summer uni forms. The i ssuance of this cl othi ng suggests
a Chi nese Communist expectati on that thei r troops w i l l be
i n Korea f or at l east a few more months.
5 28 Mar 52

2.
NR
FAR EAST
Chinese Communist divtsion in Korea receives gas masks:
Chtnese Communist
Military
22 Mar 52
SUEDE
A Chinese Communist 7th Artillery Mvision
message on 22 March gives instructions on
the tssue of gas masks.
to the receipt of 500 llAmerican-type" gas
masks and 500tubes of anti-gas ointment.
The message refers
- 3 -
SUEDE
DATE: 24-Mar-201 0
To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website

SUEDE
Comment: This is the first observed reference
in Communist communications in Korea to chemical warfare defense equip-
ment.
recent expansion of Communist charges of American use of biological war-
fare in Korea to include use of chemical warfare.
It is possible that the arrival of this equipment is linked with the
Gas masks are not believed to be standard
equipment in either the Chinese Communist or North Korean army. The
small size of this issue in relation to the 7,000 to 8,000 men in the 7th
Artillery Division may indicate an initial delivery.
3. North Korean Ai r Force increases activity at Sariwon:
US A i r Force
26 Mar 52
SECRET
United Nations aerial reconnaissance on
24 March disclosed that two airfields in the
Sariwon area, 35 miles south of Pyongyang,
had been repaired and that their runways were
hA - 3i ew operational.
Comment: An 11J anuary North Korean A i r
Force message from Sariwon reported that three "practice airf ields"
were suitable for training; it also indicated that aircraft were to be
ferriedinto and disassembled in the Sariwon area.
Although a 6 March North Korean Ai r Force
message from Sariwon indicated that unsatisfactory conditions neces-
sitated permission ''to transfer. . . the training planes;' a 10 March
message from Pyongyang reported that We dismantled the (main parts?)
and transferred them to number two."
The enemy's unwillingness, thus far, to
provide adequate jet fighter coverage this far south would seem to rule
out Sariwon's utiltty as an operational Communist airfield. It ispossi-
ble, however, that the Communists are seeking to establish operational
air installations within North Korea either i n anticipation of a cease-
fire or tn preparation for a renewed offensive.
'
- 4 -
7 S U E D E
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1 t 1 P S E C R E T S U E D e

- T O P S E C R E T S U E D E -
5 1 c t y p
D A T E : 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
HR70-14
FAR EAST
4 . Chi nese Communist di vi si on i n Korea recei ves gas masks:
A Chi nese Communist
March gi ves i nstructi ons on the i ssue of gas masks. The
message ref ers to the recei pt of 500 "American-type" gas
masks and 500 tubes of anti -gas oi ntment. (SUEDE 501 Comm
Recon Grp Korea, K-1716, 22 Mar 52)
Comment: This is the f i r st observed ref erence i n
Communist communications i n Korea to chemical warfare de-
f ense equi pment. I t is possi bl e that the arri val of thi s
equipment is l i nked wi th the recent expansi on of Communist
charges of American use of bi ol ogi cal warfare i n Korea to
i ncl ude use of chemi cal warfare.
7th A r t i 3
Gas masks are not bel i eved to be standard equipment i n
ei ther the Chi nese Communist or North Korean army. The small
si ze of thi s i ssue i n rel ati on to the 7, 000 to 8,000 men i n
the 7th A rti l l ery Di vi si on may i ndi cate an i ni ti al del i very.
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE: 18-Mar-201 0
T d P S E C R E T S U E D e

5 Urgency shown i n North Korean transportati on messages:
A 26 March North K orean message from an uni denti f i ed suml v - - -
of f i cer requests a battal i on Eommander i n northeastern Korea
t o "qui ckl y transport ... commodities. The t i me limit expi res
i n 30 days."
On the same day, another message i n northwestern Korea
orders vehi cl es di spatched l vqui ckl y...wi thout f ai l '' to maj or
suppl y poi nts. The vehi cl es are i nstructed to take "repair
tool s, engi neer equi pment, spare ti res, and i ron pl ates . . . I t
shi pments, notes the possi bi l i ty that "deadl i nes have been
establ i shed i n preparati on f or f uture operati ons." (SUEDE
501st Corn Recon Grp, Korea SIC-H-1079 and SK-H-1087, 27 Mar;
CINCFE SIB 470, 28 Mar 52)
prepari ng for ground operati ons on a greater scale than
heretof ore, the bal ance of evi dence conti nues t o i ndi cate
def ensi ve or l i mi ted attack operati ons i n the near f uture.
FECOM, while stati ng that these may be ordi nary pri ori ty
koment: Although it is possi bl e that the enemy is
-
6 . North ICorean 10th ,'Wechanized'' Di vi si on sti l l i n Chong-
chon fi i ver area: A N or 'th K orean message on 26 116 arch notes
%hat th e "1st Battal i on of the 1st Mechanized I nf antry Regi-,
merit" and the "2nd Battal i on of the 2nd Mechanized I nf antry
Regiment" are sti l l i n the Kaechon area near the Chongchon
Ri ver i n northwestern Korea. (SUEDE 330th Comm Recon Co
Korea, ALT-112, 25 Mar; 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea,
15RSM/9375, 27 Mar 52)
are bel i eved subordi nate to the newly mechanized 10th North
Korean Di vi si on, l ocated i n northwestern Korea.
The conti nued presence of the three major North Korean
armored uni ts--the 10th) 17th, and 105th Di vi si ons--i n the
same general area of northwestern Korea recalls f requentl y
unconfi rmed reports that the deacti vated North Korean V I 11
Corps was undergoi ng reorgani zati on i n thi s general area.
I n l ate December,, a North Korean pri soner reported heari ng
that an V I I I Mechanized Corps" was bei ng formed .
Comment: The 1st and 2nd Mechanized I nf antry Regiments
4 31 Mar 52

7 . Code number s assi gned to subor di nat e di vi si ons by Nor t h
Kor ean I1 C or ps: I n an 11 Y ar ch message, t he commander o r
t he Nor t h Kor ean I1 Cor ps, cur r ent l y i n combat i n east er n
Kor ea, i nst r uct ed h i s subor di nat e di vi si on commander s t o
car ve i ndi a r ubber number ed st amps t o i dent i f y t hei r docu-
ment s. Code number s assi gned were: I1 Cor ps - 498; 2nd
Di vhi ol A - 271; 13t h Di vi si on - 741; 27t h Di vi si on - 878.
(SUEDE 501st CommRecon Grp Kor ea, SK- H- 1074, 2'1 Mar 52)
Pr om' t hose pr evi ousl y assi gned i~ f hese' uni t s.
Comment : Al l of t hese code desi gnat i ons ar e di f f er ent
8 . Nor t h Kor ean uni t s or der ed to pr, epare f or "nat i onal
i nspect i on": Accor di ng to a 24 Mar ch message, an uni dent i -
Pi ed Nor t h Kor ean r egi ment al chi ef of st af f has or der ed
"each bat t al i on commander " t o make exhaust i ve pr epar at i ons
f or :he "nat i onal i nspect i on ... whi ch wi l l be made f r omnext
Apr i l 1st. " The l i st i ncl udes: dest r uct i on of non- r egul a-
t i on document s, al l act i vi t y' t o be conduct ed i n a r egul at i on
manner , pr oper knowl edge and use of t he chai n of: command,
cl ean uni f or ms, and r i gi d adher encet o hi gh- l evel t r ai ni ng
schedul es. (SUEDE 501st CommRecon Gr p Kor ea, SK- H- 1043,
26 Mar 52)
Comment : Nor t h Kor ean communi cat i ons have pr evi ousl y
ment i oned tliis i mpendi ng hi gh- l evel i nspect i on. The nat ur e
of t he pr epar at i ons, as r eveal ed i n t hi s message, i ndi cat es
an over - al l i nspect i on of al l phases of t he enemy' s mi l i -
t ar y est abl i shment .
5 31 Mar 52
0
2 5 X 1

R E T U R N T O A R C H I V E S F t R E C O R D S C E N T E R
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T O P S E C R E T S U E D t r

H R 7 0 - 1 4

T O P S E C A E T S U E D E
$ 4 4 0 .
: 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
5. Suppl y si tuati on i n two North Korean uni ts reveal ed:
Recentl y avai l abl e North K orean messages of mid-February,
addressed to the rear area l ogi sti cs command from unl ocated
uni ts i n the Wonsan-Hamhung area, ref l ected the suppl y
si tuati on. ' One uni t stated that the grai n suppl y recei ved
from Kowon had been enti rel y used up and "we are worri ed"
because the enti re grai n and kerosene suppl y at Hamhung is
exhausted. The other i ntercept al so reported on the grai n
si tuati on at Kowon, stati ng that two trai ns of (wh ice?)
f or the 7th and 37th Di vi si on3 had arri ved. (SUEDEi ~~SOOl ,
10 F eb; r 13002, 14 Feb 52)
the Communist uni ts have been w e l l suppl i ed. I n thi s eastern
coastal areh, however, constant bombardment by UN naval uni ts
and ai rcraf t caused a general deteri orati on i n rai l road
f aci l i ti es which probabl y resul ted i n temporary shortages.
Comment: Previ ous i ntercepts reveal ed that most of
...
HR70-14
6 . Syntheti c petrol eum pl ant on Sovi et-Korean border may
A 28 M arch North IC orean message from be sti l l i n operati on:
Tf Ao j i s q was addressed tb the "Heavy I ndustri al Mi ni stry,
Chemical Control Department." (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp
Korea, 15RSM/9523, 30 Mar 32)
1 Apr 52
CtD
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- T O P - S E eR E T - S U E - D -

Comment ; The J apanese const r uct ed a synt het i c f uel
pl ant usi ng a l ow t emper at ur e car boni zat i on syst emat Aoj i .
Dur i ng 1940- 45, t hi s i nst al l at i on pr oduced dai l y 250 bar r el s
of l i qui d f uel s and 100 bar r el s of met hanol . The pl ant was
known t o be oper at i ng i n ear l y 1950.
7. Chi nese Communi st cont r ol of Nor t h Kor ean r ai l syst em
su gest ed: The Nor t h Kor ean Si nui j u Depot Chi ef i nf or med a
2 f r ei ght car go t r ai ns, but we unl oaded because t he ( Chi nese?)
Vol unt eer Ar my t hought t hewooden f r ei ght car s wePe i nsuf f i ci ent .
The message cont i nued t hat shi pment woul d be i mpossi bl e I n
Mar ch, but woul d be ef f ect ed i n Apr i l . (SUEDE 501st CommRecon
Gr p Kor ea, 15RSM/9530, 30 Mar 52)
Comment : The exact r egi onal r ai l aut hor i t y i n Kor ea
can not be cl ear l y est abl i shed; however , t her e ar e a number
of i ndi cat i ons whi ch poi nt t o Nor t h Kor ean pr edomi nance i n
t he east and Chi nese Communi st aut hor i t y i n t he west . I t is
known t hat a j oi nt r ai l r oad command exi st s i n Mukden.
-57 super or on 28 Mar ch t hat we had l oaded t he mat er i al s on
8 . Communi st s r epor t epi demi c i n Nor t h Manchur i a: A t r ans-
por t pl ane was schedul ed to l eave Pei pi ng on 31 H ar ch and t o
pr oceed t o Tsi t si har i n nor t her n Manchur i a. The mi ssi on, as
st at ed i n an i nt er cept ed Chi nese Communi st message, was to
i nvest i gat e t he epI demi cat f ( SUEDE 6920 Secur i t y Gr p J ohnson
AB, SPOT NR 223, 30 Mar 52)
ar eas 03 Manchur i a whi ch t he Communi st s decl ar e wer e vi ol at ed
by Amer i can bi ol ogi cal war f ar e at t acks.
Numer ous r epor t s now st at e t hat epi demi cs i n Manchur i a
and Chi na pr oper ar e wi despr ead.
r ecent messages do not yet con f i rmt he exi st ence of epi demi cs
on a scal e unusual for Chi na, t hey do r eveal unpr ecedent ed
at t ent i on by t he Chi nese t o t he epi demi c t hr eat .
Comment : Tsi t si har i s much f ar t her nor t h t han t he
Al t hough , i nt er cept s of
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4 1 Apr 52
1 I
H R 7 0 - 1 4


1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
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18-Mar2010
HR70-14
FAR EAST
3. Enemy uni ts sti l l reporti ng BW agents i n Korea: An
uni denti f i ed North Korean regi ment noti f i ed its battal i ons
on 30 March that "the enemy is acti vel y droppi ng bacteri al
weapons i n general now.'( A l l uni ts were to report promptl y
UN bi ol ogi cal warfare at tacks.
A Chi nese Communist, arti l l ery di vi si on'reported the
formati on of a f i ve man 'lhefslth program,' committee "i n an
attempt to check the spread of bacteria."
North Korea a8 i ndi cated by conti nui ng reports of uni t i nocu-
l ati ons.
however, that i nocul ati ons have not been made and that a
l'grave si tuati onv1 has devel oped because "the f ri endl y troops
(probabl y North Koreans) have devel oped (some sort o f di sease?).,,
(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-1226, 30 Mar; K-1813,
26 Mar; K-1729, 29 Mar 52)
Preventi ve measures are still bei ng pushed acti vel y i n
One Chi nese Communist uni t on 24 March reported,
4. Chi nese Communist uni t hel ps North Korean ci vi l i ans:
The g h t of a 27 M arch message from the Chi nese Communist
7th A rti l l ery Di vi si on, depl oyed i n central Korea, reveal s
that two members of that uni t on 23 March "parti ci pated i n
an attempt to al l evi ate the suf f eri ngs of the North Korean
peopl e, who areat a loss to suppl y themsel ves wi t h foodot'
(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-1797, 30 Mar 52)
troops have assi sted North Korean farmers i n thei r harvesti ng.
However, recent Chi nese Communist messages have i ndi cated
that certai n suppl i es are requi si ti oned di rectl y from the
North Korean ci vi l i an popul ati on.
Comment: On previ ous occasi ons, Chi nese Communist
The di stress of ci vi l i ans in Communist-held areas of
North Korea is bel i eved to be seri ous. A l l i ndi cati ons poi nt
to lower grai n yi el ds i n 1951 and 1952 and to the conti nued
pri ori ty of military,!:aupply over the ci vi l i an economy.
5 . Conventi onal North Korean ai rcraf t di vi si on menti oned:
A 29 March message from a North K orean ai r uni t near Pyongyang
to ai r headquarters at Si nui j u mentioned "seed to %he LA
Di vi si on.g1 (SUEDE Det 151 15 RSM J apan CS 397, 30 .Mar 92)
3 2 A pr 52
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T O P S E C R E T S U E D r


6 .
Comment: The t e r m "LA Division," named after t..e
Soviet-made LA-9 conventi onal f i ghter ai rcraft, has long
been i denti f i ed wi th the North Korean A i r Force, al though
the term has not recentl y been observed. Recentl y, however,
North Korean messages have ref errod to numbered di vi si ons:
the MIG-15-equipped 1st; and the 2nd) 3rd, and l oth, which
have not been def i ni tel y i denti f i ed. Probabl y the "'LA
Di vi s i on" also bears a numbered desi gnati on.
Communist lvcommand post" hit by UN bombers: A North
Korean message passed between two unlocated uni ts on 27 March
states that the "Pyangyang (?) command post was di rectl y
hi t wi th four ona-ten bombs,...on 25 March ti ng i n
the i nj ury of a number of personsmt g ( S U E D m 018, 28 Mar
52)

c i b
I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
H R 7 0 - 1 4 .,
3.
4.
I
FAR EAST
North Korean battal i on commander gi ven two weeks to
atreng.then hi s uni t: A a1 Apri l message from an uni denti f i ed
North K orean "Brigade Commander , I t possi bl y l ocated i n coastal
western Korea, to one of hi s battal i on commanders ordered ,
that "i n accordance wi th the Supreme Commander's order, you
are not to rest unti l you have trai ned your uni ts and ti ghtened
your defense." The message conti nued that " thi s duty" is b
begi n on 3 Apri l and that two weeks w i l l be allowed f or its
accomplishment. (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea,15RSM/9836,
2 Apr 52)
Comment: While no immediate i mpl i cati ons can be drawn
f r o m t h i s message, behi nd t he s ens e of urgency there may be
an i ntensi f i ed anti - guerri l l a dri ve i n western North Korea,
coupl ed wi t h operati ons agai nst UN-held i sl ands.
Chi nese Communists i n Korea prohi bi ted from sendi ng
Korean money to China: A 2- 8 g e sent by the
TShinese Communist 7th A rti l l ery Division stated that "con-
cerni ng the regul ati on which prevents our sendi ng Korean
money home to China, main rear headquarters has al ready
proclaimed some deci si on on the case concerni ng the Mid-
(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Gr p Korea, K-1856, 2 Apr 52)
Comment: The meaning of thi s message is not enti rel y
cl ear. I t may i ndi cate, however, that an attempt is bei ng
made t o di scourage Chi nese personnel i n Korea from accumulat-
i ng North Korean won, which can onl y be Used there, A l l
Chinese Communist suppl y messages have ref erred to val ues
i n terms of Chinese currency.
South Army D i s t r i c t and thei r sendi ng Korean currency home. ... I ?
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ATE: 18-Mar-201 0
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J
:"R
8 . Addi ti onal bombers l eave Mukden area for Pei pi ng: Four
more Tl3-2 li ght b ombers of the Chi nese Communist 10th A i r
Di vi si on flew from Mukden on 31 March to Pei pi ng's Nanyuan
ai rf i el d. Two weeks earl i er, f our TU-2's of thi s di vi si on
had fl own the same route on an "ai rf i el d transf er." The
reporti ng agency commented that possi bl y onl y six Tu-2'~
of thi s di vi si on are now i n Manchuria.
Messages from Harbi n reported TU-2's on trai ni ng f l i ghks
on 31 March and 1 Apri l , and uni denti f i ed ai rcraft, bel i eved
to be Tu-2'~~ conducted "aerial straf i ng" there on 31 March.
(SUEDE A i r Force Roundup 64,' 6920 Securi ty Grp J ohnson AB,
AP 268, 1 Apr 52)
3 4 Apr 52
T O P S E C R E T S U E D t

Comment: The recent departure of the bomber-equipped
8th Di vi si on from Mukden to Tsi tsi har i n North Manchuria,
and the conti nui ng transf er of 10th Di vi si on TU-2's to
China proper, l eavesfewknown l i ght bombers wi thi n immediate
range of the Korean f ront. The Chinese Communist A i r Force
is neverthel ess esti mated to have 240 TU-2's, of which
about 70 arri ved from the USSR i n l ate 1951.
9. MI G-15 Di vi si on may be based at Pei pi ng: A message
schedul i ng 24 -1S"s on a round-robin f l i ght at Pei pi ng's
Nanyuan ai rf i el d on 31 March suggests that the Chinese
Communist 14th A i r Di vi si on is now based there. On 11March
38 MI Gb15' s of thi s di vi si on l ef t Takushan, a Yalu Ri ver
base, for Pei pi ng. (SUEDE A i r Force Roundup 65, 2 Apr 52)
Comment: The final desti nati on of this di vi si on,
which appears now to be Pei pi ng, was not known when it
transf erred. Thi s is the onl y known MI G-15 di vi si on i n the
Pei pi ng-Ti entsi n area.
---
The 14th was repl aced at Takushan by the 12th Di vi si on;
it f l ew there from Shanghai wi th about 50 MI G@sinmid-March.
Rotation of Chinese air combat uni ts has occurred f requentl y
since October 1951, when they f i r st appeared i n combat over
Korea
I I
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H R 7 0 - 1 4

3 1 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
FAR EAST
DATE: 31 -Mar-201 0
7. North Korean armored di vi si on conti nues trai ni ng north
of Pyongyang: A communication on 1 Apri l f rom "Number loan
i denti f i ed as the 2nd Tank Regiment of the 105th North Korean
Tank Di vi si on, stated "concerni ng the uni t move....I agreed
to i t. We shal l be quartered i n the barracks by the end of
Apri l . Taphyon-dong ( 20 miles north of Pyongyang) is
sui tabl e.
Another 1 Apvi l message frnm the same uni t stated that
fPwhil-e i t was pl anned to start trai ni ng from 3 Apri l , the
tanka of the 1st Company, 1st Battal i on" were del ayed. The
message suggested that at l east the 2nd Regiment of the 105th
North Korean Armored Di vi si on w i l l be trai ni ng i n the Taphyon-
dong area duri ng Apri l . (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea,
15RSM/9890; 330th Comm Recon Co Korea, ALT-385, 2 A pr 52)
Comment: The conti nued presence of thi s di vi si on i n
the rear areas duri ng A pr i l is another i ndi cati on that the
Communistsdo not i ntend to l aunch an al l - out of f ensi ve i n
the immediate f uturo.
4
7 Apr 52
C b
HR70-14
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9. Russi an ni ght - f i ght er pi l ot l eads MI G- 15 uni t i n
Manchur i a: Recent Ch i nese mmsssages ae-ated
e n a n s l i t e r a t i o n f or t he Russi an name Ef i mov. as
ehf ei maof u , w
pi l ot of a t r ai ner MI G- 15 f r omAnshan possi bl y to Tat ungkou
on 30 Mar ch, and as l ead pi l ot of ni ne MI G' s on a r ound- r obi n
f l i ght f r omAnshan on 2 Apr i l . Thi s i s t he f i r st ment i on of
Ef i mov i n i nt er cept s si nce December 1951 when t he Manchur i an
t act i cal net wor k di sappear ed f r omt he ai r . At t hat t i me
Ef i mov was i n command of anLA- 11 convent i onal ni ght - f i ght er
uni t at Anshan.
The Ai r For ce comment s t hat t he associ at i on of M1G- 15' ~
wi t h Efimov suggest s t hat hi s LA-11 uni t may have conver t ed
f r omconvent i onal f i ght er s t o j et s. (SUEDE USAFSS Br ooks AFB
ODD- 2- 21153, 1 Apc; Air For ce Roundup 66, 3 Apr 52)
Comment: The enemy' s ni ght i nt er cept i on at t empt s have
gener al l y been i nef f ect i ve. Conver si on of t hi s ni ght f i ght er
uni t to j et s wi l l st r engt hen Communi st def ense of Nor t hwest
Kor ea, but no MI G- 15' s at pr esent ar e used as ni ght i nt er cept or s.
7 Apx 52
1
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N I N 1 0 W I N E S
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,
HR70-14
FAR EAST
5 . Chi nese agai n report ci vi l i an suf f eri ng i n porth Korea:
The suppl y component o f t h e Chi nese Communist 7th A r t i l l er y
Di vi si on i n central Korea reported i n a 28 March message that
qP....there is a l arge segment of the ci vi l i an population which
is wi thout food." The message urged that Chinese Communist uni ts
shoul d make some contri buti ons "to al l evi ate some of these di s-
tressi ng cases." The sender suggested that Chi nese ri ce might
be exchanged f or Korean straw for roof thatchi ng. (SUEDE 501st
Comm Recon Grp Korea, M-1908, 28 Mar 52)
Comment: Ci vi l i an food shortages, al ready critical, are
p r o b a m n g accentuated by the tradi ti onal "spri ng hungert1
--the period fol l owi ng consumption of the f al l ri ce harvest and
the maturi ng of the summer g.rai ns i n J une.
A l l . i ndi cati ons, however, poi nt to a conti nued adequate
l evel of suppl y f or both Chinese Communist and North Korean
mi l i t ar y uni ts.
North Korean ai rcraf t f l y from Yenchi to Si nui j u: A 3 Apri l
message sent from Yenchi. Manchuria. to Mukden reuorted a a
w i l l take off on 5 A pri l ' . ' . . from'Yenchi vi a Chbgchun and
Shenyang (Mukden) to Si nui j u. Mi ssi on: transport and del i ver
. . - l P The f i el d reporti ng uni t observes that Yenchi $6 the
headquarters for the North Korean A i r ForcePs trai ni ng command
and that al l types of conventi onal ai rcraf t, except l i ght bomb-
ers, are stati oned there. A previ ous movement from Yenchi oc-
curred when Y AK-18 trai ners flew to Fengcheng, north of Antung.
(SUEDE 6920 Securi ty Orp, J ohnson AB J apan, No. 284, 4 Apr 52)
Comment: Thi s message is too fragmentary to eval uate
properl y. I t is worth noti ng, however, that recent messages
have i ndi cated that trai ner ai rcraf t are bei ng stored at certai n
ai rfi el ds i n North Korea.
7 . Securi ty ,Mi ni stry i n North Korea restricts troop tobacco
rati on: On 31 M arch a message,passed between two uni denti f i ed
-%-Korean uni ts,stated that "accordi ng to the Mi l i tary Orders
a . and t he order of the Raci al (Soci al ?) Securi ty Mi ni stry,
. . i nvesti gate the members who do not smoke, and from 1 March
except them from ci garette supply.11 (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp
Korea, SK-1-7, 2 Apr 52)
~P P ROVE D FOR RELEASE I
IDATE: 18-Mar-2010 I
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T O P S E C k E T S U E D E
'P-
Comment: Thi s message is uni que because i t suggests the
degree of authori ty exercised by the state securi ty organ of
North Korea. Si nce tobacco is essenti al l y a morale booster,
i t s suppl y would properl y be a f uncti on of the Securi ty Minis-
try.
8 . Supply depot f or North Korean combat corps moves from
western sector: A recentl y avai l abl e 11J anuary communication
'from the North Korean I V Corps suppl y chi ef to the 23rd Brigade
reported' that "si nce the I Corps is moving all of the materi al s
from its present l ocati on a . . ( i n western Korea) . , you
are to organi ze . * I 1 (SUEDE ASAPAC J apan Spot No. 3309A,
4 Apr 52)
Comment: The North Korean I Corps, currentl y i n combat
i n ea-'Roreas made a trans-peni nsul ar move from the west-
ern sector i n November 1951. Thi s message suggests that the
corps suppl y i .netal l ati on fol l owed a month or so l ater.
9 . North Korean mi l i tar y personnel ordered to hel p ci vi l i nr-
farmorst A North Korean message of 4 A pr i l from the.'East Cc a~j c
K 2Fn.5 Headquarters at Songhyon-ni orders every man of an un-
i denti f i ed naval unit at Songj l n to "assi st the farmers for
seven daysOP' (501s.t: Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/10072, 6 Apr 52)
indicated that the enemy is taki ng advantage of the stati c mili-
t ar y si tuati on to improve the food si tuati on i n North Korea.
Comment: Other recent Communist messages from Korea have
10 * Qmmwi csrti ons suggest presence of another'chi nese Cgmmunist
Army ko'up i n Korea: The'Far East Command reports that a 21 M arc6
Chinese Communist message mentioned the 505th, 508th, and 524th
Regiments. The fi rst two are organi c to the 57th Chi nese Commun-
I st Army, whi l e the l atter is subordi nate to the 59th Army. The
net over which these uni ts were mentioned was i n the Pyongyang -
Si ngye area of western Korea. A 24 February Chi nese Communist
message spoke of the 174th Di vi si on of the 58th Chi nese Communist
Army e
FECOM adds that the 57th Army is carri ed j ust north of
the Yalu ri ver, the 58th i n Nanyang i n east central Chi na, and
the 59th i n the Taiyuan area of north China.
and the presence of thi s new force i n Korea cannot be accepted.
(SUEDE CINCFE SIR 475, 5 Apr 52)
No concl usi ons can be drawn from these i sol ated messages

Comment: The ri se i n Chinese Communist uni t i denti f i catbs
made communications i ntel l i gence duri ng 1952 may be caused
by the San-Fan traf f i c making comparative ref erences to,units
not i n Korea.
~-
r I
12. Chinese guard agai nqt pl ague threat from Korea: The Chinese
Communists are panri cti ng the return from Korea of personnel
wi thout an i nocul ati on record and a no-plaguett certi f i cate. n
some 500 of tho more than 800 persons enteri ng the border ci ty of
Antung on 25 March Rad thei r records wi th them.
Corn Recon Grp KoreaL, K-1949, 1 Apr 52)
Comment: The numerous report6 of pl ague i n Manchuria are
u n c o n m; al though several Chinese Communist messages hawe
emphasized epidemic control . Communist precauti ons are under-
standabl e i n view of the f ac t that pl ague is endemic to the area.
They al so serve to emphasize the bi ol ogi cal warfare chargers.
i ntercept from the Chinese mi l i tar y net i n Korea says that on I y
(SUEDE 501st
1
6 8 Apr 52

D A T E : 2 4 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
H R 7 0 - 1 4 HR70-14 I
FAR EAST
3. Chinese again report civilian suffering in North Korea:
Chinese Commun is t The supply component of the Chinese Commu-
Military nist 7th Artillery Division in central Korea re-
28 Mar 52 d r - ' f 0 8 ported in a 28 March message that ". . . there
SUEDE is a large segment of the civilian population
which is without food" The message urged
that Chtnese Communist units should make some contributions "to allevi-
ate some of these diatreasing cases:' The sender suggested that Chinese
rice might be exchanged for Korean straw for roof thatching.
Comment: Ctvtltan food shortages, already
critical, are probably being accentuated by the traditional ??spring hunger ''
--the period between consumption of the fall rice harvest and the maturing
of the summer grains in J une.
adequate level of supply for both Chinese Communist and North Korean
military units.
Ail indications, however, point to a continued
. 4 Chinese guard against plague threat from horea:
Chinese Communist
Military
1 Apr 52 I ( - I
SUEDE
800 persons entering the border city of Antung on 25 March had their
records with them.
- 4 -
The Chinese Communists are restricting the
return from Korea of personnel without an
inoculation record and a "no-plague" certificate.
An intercept from the Chinese military net in
Korea says that only some 500 of the more than
7
SUF,DE
3
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,,' NF
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE: 24-Mar-201 0
T O P S E CR E T

., . .
- 6 -
W S U E D E
Comment:
The numerous reports of plague
Communist precautions
tn Manchuria are unconftrmed, although several Chtnese Communist
messages have emphasized epidemic control.
are understandable in view of the fact that plague is endemic to the area.
They also serve to emphastze the biological warfare charges.
H R 7 0 - 1 4

D A T E : 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

c r b
$ l . 5 1 p
[7
HR70-14
FAR EAST
2. North Korean anti ai rcraf t arti l l ery may be concentrat-
i ng on east coast: A N orth K orean message f r om an east coast
Apri l !!the 20th Regiment."
On 4 A p r i l a message, probabl y addkessed to the commander
of the "21st Regiment," orders him to set up hi s command post
i n the Hamhung area, but t o conti nue mai ntai ni ng ef f ecti ve
control over hi s uni ts i n the Pyongyang area.
A Worth Korean communication. on 5 Apri l notes that the
"(Mechanized?) Battal i on is moving from Si nsong (possi bl y i n
western Korea) to Chotnptyongll (near Hamhung). (SUEDE 501st
Corn Recon Gr p Korea, 15R$M/9982; 15RSM/10053, 5 A pr; 330th
Comm Recon Co Korea, ALT-475, 6 Apr 52)
Comment: While onl y the 19th, 20th and 23rd Anti ai r-
craf t A rti l l ery Regiments are accepted i n the North Korean
Army, other evi dence i ndi cates that a 21st and a 22nd may
al so exi st. The general text of these messages suggests
that t he 20th and 21st AAA Regiments are j oi ni ng the 23rd
i n the Hamhung area.
I n thi s connecti on, a net decrease of nearl y ten percent
i n enemy anti ai rcraf t weapons occurred al ong.maj or enemy
communication routes duri ng the l ast two weeks of March, and
recent photo reconnai ssance i n the Wonsan area of eastern'
Korea showsnew anti ai rcraf t arti l l ery i nstal l ati ons.
I
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1 P P R O V E D
8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
i
FAR EAST
5 . Front l i ne Chi nese Communist di vi si on prepares f or acti on
i n eastern Korea: A recent message, passed from the 2l st
Chi nese COmmunist A rti l l ery Regiment to its parent 7th
A r ti l l er y Di vi si on, i ndi cated that the 21st had been attached
to the arti l l ery group of the 303rd Chi nese Communist I nf antry
Di vi si on i n eastern Korea. The message I ndi cated that the
regi ment was moving forward together wi th the mortar and
arti l l ery el ements of the 203rd's arti l l ery group. The forward
di spl acement of the command post of the 203rd Di vi si on was
al so suggested.
The Far E ast Command stated that "the pl aci ng of a
compl ete CCF arti l l ery regi ment of an i ndependent arti l l ery
di vi si on under control of an i nf antry di vi si on suggests that
the lat.ter di vi si on may be assi gned a task where the uti l i za-
ti on and complete control of a l arge amount of arti l l ery is
requi red." (SUEDE CINCFE, SIB 477, 8 Apr 52)
Comment: The 68th Chi nese Communist Army, of which the
203rd Di vi si on is a component, occupi es the eastern-most
porti on of the Chi nese-hel d f ront. Recent reports have i ndi -
cated that it was about to be rel i eved by a sister army--the
67th--which has depl oyed i nto thi s sector.
While thi s acti vi ty cannot be i nterpreted def i ni ti vel y,
a flurry of recent reports have i ndi cated an impending
"offensi ve.11 The bul k of i nformati on suggests that such
acti on would take place i n the eastern sector.
Communist i ntenti ons to l aunch a "general of f ensi ve" al ong
the enti re f ront. I t is enti rel y possi bl e, however, that
a l i mi ted obj ecti ve ofCensi ve of some si ze might be l aunched
In eastern Korea by Chi nese and North Korean f orces.
There conti nues to be a l ack of f i rm i ndi cati on of
0 . Chi nese Communist 40th.Army may be prepari ng f or combat:
A recent message, probabl y passed on the 2nd Chi nese Com-
muni st A r ti l l er y Di vi si on's, net, reported that "today person-
nel of the arti l l ery uni t of the 40th Army arri ved (and
115th Di vi si on
, i nspected?) my battal i on. They were i ntroduced to us by the
The Far East Command commented that an i nspecti on of
an arti l l ery uni t, currentl y i n support of the 39th Chi nese
' 4 10 Apr 52
m=-w.
~P P ROVE D FOR RELEASEDATE: I
118-Mar-201 0 I
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m i r

Communist Army, by another major uni t--the 40th Army--may
i ndi cate an impending rel i ef of the 39th. More omi nousl y,
the suggested presence of the 40th Army i n the immediate rear
of the 39th, poses a consi derabl e of f ensi ve threat i n thi s
sector., (SUEDE CINCFE, SIB 478, 9 Apr 52)
Comment: A number of reports have recentl y been recei ved
i ndi cati ng the possi bi l i ty bf a.*renewed Communist general
of f ensi ve. The bul k of them have poi nted to the eastern
sector as the f ocus f or such an operati on. Thi s is the f i r st
i ndi cati on recei ved of a si gni f i cant strengtheni ng of enemy
forces depl oyed i n the wes t .
7 . I nformati on Drof zram on atom bomb Drobablv conducted bv
v - _ "
Chinese-Communists i n Korea': On 4 A pr i l - a message I I
r
I di rects that "shoul d Army
di stri bute any materi al that has the powers of the atom bomb.
i mmedi atel y nbti f y us to pick them up-so that they may be
returned t o the educati on uni t." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon
Comment: I t i s probabl e that thi s message refers t o
l i terature and propaganda on atomic weapons which w i l l be
used to educate Chi nese Communist troops i n Korea.
broadcast on 30 March charged that si nce the Uni ted States
has al l egedl y tested BW and CW agents i n Korea, the use of
atomic weapons would be a l ogi cal step.
r-- - - I 4 qpr 52)
I t is noteworthy that a Chi nese Communist propaganda
8 . Chi nese Communists bel i eved trai ni ng 2, 500 pi l ots a
Air Force anal ysi s of i ntel l i gence rel ati ng to %Tie
ra n An tag of Chi nese pilots i ndi cates that there were 2, 800
graduated pi l ots i n the Chi nese Communist A i r Force as of
1 J anuary 1932, and the trai ni ng ef f ort i n China shoul d
produce 2, 500 pi l ots annual l y.
The number of ai rcraf t employed i n pri mary, basi c and
advanced stages of trai ni ng are 93, 63 and 44, respecti vel y.
The rel ati vel y smal l number of advanced trai ners suggests
that some of thi s trai ni ng is done.i n the Sovi et Union, or
that part of the conventi onal f i ghter regi ments of the CCAF
are actual l y advanced trai ni ng uni ts. (SUEDE US A i r ' Force
SRTS Cont 2-30803, 4 Apr 52)
5 10 Apr 52
I S

Comment: Expansion of Communist ai r school s and
t r ai nhg acti vi ty has been pronounced i n the' past six
months. However, recent performance i n the Korean ai r war
of MIG15 pi l ots bel i eved to be Chi nese shows that they are
less prof i ci ent than Russi an pi l ots.
9. Message ref ers to unknown Si no-Sovi et,enterpri se i n
Manchuria: A message from Moscow to Mukden ref erred to a
shi pment of goods sent to the "Daldok works" on a contract
concl uded wi th the "Sino-Soviet Shi pbui l di ng J oi nt Stock
Company." (SUEDE APSA-261 Weekly I ntel l i gence Notes 14-52,
2 Apr 52)
Comment: Nothing is known of this "Sino-Soviet Ship-
building J oi'nt Stock Company." The onl y large shi pyard i n
Manchuria is Daldok i n Dai ren, which was a Si no-Sovi et trust
unti l earl y 1961 when i t was returned to f ul l Chi nese owner-
shi p. The Chi nese Changchun Rai l way is the onl y other Sino-
Sovi et economic organi zati on presentl y i denti f i ed i n Manchuria.
10. Chi nese Communists change weather ci pher: On 1 Apri l the
Chi nese Communists changed the ci pher used by the Pei pi ng
col l ecti ve weather broadcasts. A prel i mi nary study of the
al terati on i ndi cates that a larger suppl y of ci pher books has
been di stri buted. Thi s i ncrease was necessi tated, i n part,
by the establ i shment of new stati ons. Changes were to be
expected, si nce they previ ousl y occurred i n Apri l and September
1951. (SUEDE AFSA-271 WIB 15-52, 1 Apr 52)
were reported i n November 1950 pri or to Chinese entry i nto
the Korean war, and i n Apri l 1951 pri or to the Communist
spri ng of f ensi ve.
Comment: Changes i n major Chi nese meteorol ogi cal ci phers
6 10 A pr 52

r P P R O V E D
1 6 - D e c - 2 0 0 9

H R 7 0 - 1 4 HR70-14
necessary.
W
FAR EAST
5. Re-election of Rhee as ROR President reported "assured":
Syngman Rhee cannot be defeated in the coming election for
Dresident conducte d by t he BOK Nat ional A ssemblv I
~~~
Comment: President Rhee's election to another term of
office is considered highly possible by American officials
in Korea. The principal reason for these opinions, however,
is the inability of the National Assembly to agree on an
alternate candidate,
The dominant factor in the coming election will be the
temper at the time: of the National Assembly; currently it is
strongly anti-Rhee. The possihility remains that if Rhee
continues his campaign of intimidation and subversion, an
enraged National Assembly will bring his defeat.
=I
6. Communist offensive in east central Korea again p
d i c t e m
Communist-North Korean offensiveri is to be launchbd on the
east central front in "a matter 02 weeks . "
" a Chinese
In connection with this data,[ 1
the 20th Chinese Communist Army had moved into the Hamhung-
Kowon area between 20 and 24 March, displacing *he V North
Korean Corps which had proceeded southwest of Wonsaa. Heavy
troop movements have recently been observed
of Wonsan. I
Comment: A very recent report from this same general
area similarly predicted an offensive in the near future,
although different Chinese Communist units were named.
There are no indications that the Communists intend to
launch a general offensive along the entire front in the near
' 4 10 Apr 52
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V
-
C'
future. Various reports 'and troop movements duringrecent
weeks, however, raise the definite possibility that Communist
forces in eastern Korea are Contemplating a limited objec-
tive offensive of considerable weight.
NR
: 5 10 Apr 52
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H R 7 0 - 1 4
R R S E C R E T S U E D e


HR70-14
18-Mar-2010
FAR EAST
4. Addi ti onal detai l s on North Korean A i r Force combat ai r-
cr af t reported: l% e .US A i r Force reports that a Korean pi l ot
"'Yang Tu Hut' was schedul ed on 8 Apri l to l ead a f l i ght of
twel ve Y I G- 15' s ant$ 0ne'WMIG-l5*~from Anshan, near Mukden.
Thi s pi l ot has been i denti f i ed as bei ng acti ve wi th the ele-
ment of the North Korean 1st A i r Di vi si on (MIG-15 equipped),
l ast reported at Anshan.
A 7J anuaryNorthKorean A i r Force message i ndi cated that
f ourteen LA-9 (conventi onal f i ghter) f l i ght leaders were
bei ng di spatched to the 2nd Di vi si on. On 12 J anuary a message
acknowledged the arri val of these pi l ots at Si nui j u.
el ements of the North Korean 2nd A i r Di vi si on (LA equi pped)
at Si nui j u. (SUEDE 6920 Securi ty Group, J ohnson AB, C i t e
AP354, 8 Apr; USAF Roundup 68, 8 Apr 52)
Thi s is consi dered a si gn of the presence of at leakt
5 . Qaqi tary and anti -epi demi c campaign conti nues i n North
Korea: Th e conti nui ng outbreak of smal l pox cases was men-
m d i n a 1 Apri l message from the Chi nese Communist 7th
A rti l l ery Di vi si on. Each army was to recei ve enough "vacci ne"
(presumabl y f or smal l pox) to i nocul ate 50,000 and every
"speci al 1' di vi si on (i .e. arki l l ery?) would be gi ven enough
f or 10,000 VaCCinatiOns The message concl uded that i t was
the army's responsi bi l i ty to i nocul ate ci vi l i ans -- starti ng
wi th those under 15 years of age.
A 2 Apri l Chi nese Communist message from an el ement of
thi s same ar ti l l er y di vi si on reported that sani tary measures
were to be taken, such as bui l di ng new l atri nes and wells.
Rats and mice were l i sted as the pri nci pal target of exter-
mi nati on. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2030, 2 Apr;
K-2072, 1 Apr 52)
6 . North Korean uni t i n west used i n road repai r work: A
ranki ng of f i cer of the North K orean Sth I nf antry Di vi si on i n
the Pyongyang-Chinnampo regi on reported on 7 Apri l that 112,000
men of thi s di vi si on must form . . to repai r the mad." The
road i n questi on l eads from Pyongyang to "Munsongni" and 18
to be repai red between 12 and 18 Apri l .
of thi s message: one is south of Chinnampo, .another is near
Three ltMunsongnisll are presented i n vari ous transl ati ons
11Apr 52
Cl B
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T b i l ) S E C R E T s u E D e

Sibyon-ni i n a predomi nantl y Chinese sector, and the thi rd
is on the l ateral main trans-peni nsul ar suppl y route.
(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/10320, 8 Apr; CINCFE
Tokyo, SI B 478, 9 Apr 52)
Comment: Thi s is the second recent observed i nci dent
of N o m e a n tacti cal f orces bei ng employed i n a communi-
cati ons mai ntenance rol e. Probabl y thi s uni t w i l l be used
al ong the main l ateral route.
7 . Addi ti onal Communist mi l i tary acti vi ty i n Korea duri ng
Apri l i ndi cated: A l l regi mental commanders of an uni denti -
f i ed North K orean di vi si on were ordered on 7 A pri l by the
di vi si on commander to be sure that vehi cl es wererepaired and
ready f or operati on "by the end of Apri l ." The message stated
that no gasol i ne would be provi ded i n Apri l , and that ox-drawn
carts were to be mobi l i zed by 15 Apri l .
A rti l l ery Regiment, subordi nate to the 2nd A rti l l ery Di vi si on
i n western Korea, i nstructed hi s battal i on commanders on 6
Apri l that "Di vi si on has i nstructed us to order . . . (the
gatheri ng of) i nformati on as to the exact posi ti ons of enemy
suppl y centers, arti l l ery posi ti ons and tank assembl y areas.
Other detai l s concerni ng the posi ti ons shoul d al so be sub-
mi tted. Your i nvesti gati on must be completed by 15th Apri l
and you w i l l report the resul ts on the 16th Apri l ." (SUEDE
501st Comm Recon Grn Korea, K-2053, 8 Apr; 15RSM/10275,
8 Apr 52)
The regi mental commander of the 29th Chi nese Communist
Comment: Recent troop movements and reports of impending
attacks have hei ghtened the possi bi l i ty that the enemy i ntends
t o l aunch another l arge scale mi l i tar y operati on, al though
they are too nebul ous to reach firm concl usi ons on enemy i n-
tenti ons. To date, most signs poi nt to a l i mi ted obj ecti ve
attack i n eastern Korea. Arti l l ery reconnai ssance and target
sel ecti on in the west, however, are an i ndi cati on that the
of f ensi ve -- if it materializep -- w i l l be on a broader f ront.
8 . Chi nese Communist arti l l erv di vi si on i n eastern Korea ._
distribute's as masks: pr i l message from the neys e
tommunist A b i v i t i z / i n east central Korea =d
that "rel ati ve to the gas masks, the l l th, 20th, and 21st
Regiments w i l l each recei ve 120 api ece.'' The bal ance was
to go to another arti l l ery battal i on, and the "other uni ts
w i l l have to awai t the next al l otment." (SUEDE 501st Corn
Recon Grp Korea, K-2039, 8 Apr 52)
4 11Apr 52
R I P S E C R E T S U E D e

.
Comment : The 7th A r t i l l e r y Di vl e i on r e c e i ve d 500 masks
on 22- Thi s l a t e r message i ndi c a t e s t hat t he above was
t he onl y shipment r e c e i ve d 80 far. It is probabl e t hat t he s e
masks are to be used for troop i ndoct ri nat i on and t ha t t h e i r
r e c e i p t does not presage enemy use of gas i n Korea.
5 11 Apr 52
NR
A p p r o v e d F & P P R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 1 1 1 4 0 0 0 9 0 0 o 9 0 0 0 1 - 4
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A T E : 2 3 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
HR70-14
APPROVED FOR RELEASE -TcP SUEDE
DATE: 23-Mar-201 0
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FAR EAST
2. Early Communist offensive !n Korea possible:
,
Armed Forces
Securtty Agency
12 Apr 52
SUEDE week. .
Developments along the front in Koreq may
indtcate Chinese Communist preparations for
an offensive to take place some time after this
,,' N R
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SUEDESJ
Recent Chinese Communist voice messages in-
dicate that at least two armies may be moving up to the line, that some
Chinese artillery elements have been displaced forward, and that com-
mand organization of forward artillery units has been changed to permtt
more effective tactical control. Other messages indicate that 15 April
has been established as the deadline for reconnaissance reports on UN
posttions as well as for completion of supply movements.
These developments could also mean either a
roptine rotation of certain front line units or anticipation of a UN spring
offensive.
Comment: Evidence is still too tenuous to
establish firm conclusions on enemy intentions. Earlier reports of an
impending attack indicated that a limited offensive might be planned for
the eastern sector; recent enemy reconnaissance and target selection in
the west, however, suggest that the offensive, if it materializes, wi l l
be on a broader front.
NR
- 4 -
L S U E D E
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O P S E C R E T S U E D E '

1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

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HR70-14
FAR EAST
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5 14 Apr 52
C/D
J = z s y
I (APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE. I
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9. Earl y Communist of f ensi ve i n Korea possi bl e: Developments
al ong the f ront i n Korea may i ndi cate Chi nese Communist pre-
parsCtions f or an of f ensi ve to take pl ace some t i me af ter thi s
week.
Recent Chi nese Communist voi ce messages i ndi cate that at
least two armies may be moving up to the l i ne, that some Chi-
nese ar ti l l er y el ements have been di spl aced forward, and that
command organi zati on of forward arti l l ery uni ts has been
changed to permi t more ef f ecti ve tacti cal control . Other
messages i ndi cate that 15 Apri l has been establ i shed as the
deadl i ne f or reconnai ssance reports on UN posi ti ons as w e l l
as f or compl eti on of suppl y movements.
tati on of certai n f ront l i ne uni ts or anti ci pati on of a UN
spri ng of f ensi ve. (SUEDE AFSA CC/CAP-196, 12 Apr 52)
These devel opments coul d al so mean ei ther a routi ne ro-
Comment: Evidence is sti l l too tenuous to establ i sh
f i rm -ions on enemy i ntenti ons. Earl i er reports of an
i mpendi ng'attack i ndi cated that a l i mi ted of f ensi ve might be
pl anned for the eastern sector; recent enemy reconnai ssance
and target sel ecti on i n the wes t , however, suggest that the
of f ensi ve, if i t materializes, will be on a broader f ront.
I
! 118-Mar-201 0 I
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T O P S E C R E T S U E D E ?

10. Chi nese Communist rocket l aubcher regi ments attached to
arti l l ery di vi si ons: A T A pri l message from an uni denti f i ed
Tfhinese Communist arti l l ery uni t i n western Korea outl i nes
the "command rel ati onshi p of the rocket arti l l ery regi ments."
I t says that each rocket l auncher regi ment w i l l be under the
command of an "automati c arti l l ery di vi si on" (presumably the
Chi nese desi gnati on of thei r motori zed arti l l ery di vi si ons).
Thus the a O l s t Rocket Launcher Regiment w i l l be attached to
the 8th A r ti l l er y Di vi si on, the 202nd to the 2nd A r t i l l er y
Di vi ai on, and the 203rd to the 7th A r ti l l er y Di vi si on. Thi s
arrangement, the message announces, w i l l el i mi nate the
"confusi on i nherent i n too many chef s in the ki tchen."
(SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-2083, 9 Apr 52)
Comment: The message does not i ndi cate whether the
21st Rocket Launcher Di vi ei an--the parent unit for the 201st,
202nd and 203rd Regiments--has been de-acti vated and its sub-
ordi nate rocket l auncher regi ments made organi c to the l i sted
arti l l ery di vi si ons or whether thi s is onl y an attachment.
I t has previ ousl y been observed that the rocket l auncher
regi ments were depl oyed across the enti re f ront.
1
11. Chi nese Communist arti l l ery, di vi si on in eastern Korea: A
nese Communist message of 2 A pr i l reveal s that uni ts of
the 7th Chi nese Communist A rti l l ery Di vi si on, in eastern
Korea, w i l l be i ssued about 93,000 catti es (approxi matel y 46
tons) of food from the suppl y depot. (SUEDE CINCFE Tokyo,
SIB 479, 10 Apr 52)
rati ons f or onl y three to four days f or the di vi si on, the
movement of thi s quanti ty of suppl i es shows that the enemy's
f ront l i ne l ogi sti cs are sati sf actory.
Comment: Although t hi s amount of food w i l l provi de
N R
6 14 Apr 52
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s L y r
.HR70-14
18-Mar-2010
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FAR EAST
3. Chinese Communist rear area uni ts conti nue forward
.cl;;",';~:rn;nt: or'-o&rati ons' to the 203rd Chinese Communist I nf antry
Th e Chi nese Communist 21 st A r t i l l ery Regiment,
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Di vi si on i n eastern Korea, requested its parent 7th Arti l l ery
Di vi si on to suppl y addi ti ongl communications equipment, i ncl ud-
ing wire, because of "orders recei ved from the i nf antry rela-
ti ve to the deployment of posi ti ons, there w i l l be a re-
deployment forward . . . .'' The message conti nued that
"depending on ci rcumstances each battal i on and company w i l l
al so create from one to two observati on post6 that they may
exercise ef f ecti ve control over thei r f i el ds of fi re. Thus
we may correct and adj ust t o af f ect sl aughter of enemy troops.11
On 4 A pri l , the suppl y uni t of the 7th A r t i l l er y Di vi si on
recei ved orders to move. One suppl y i nstal l ati onwas to di spl ace
rearward to the Yangdok area, a major Communist suppl y center.
The new l ocati on of the uni t's other major suppl y i nstal l ati on
was not gi ven.
On 6 Apri l , however, headquarters of the 7th A rti l l ery
Di vi si on ordered thi s suppl y uni t to the ef f ect that "A t
present, you can not . . . but you can . . . move forward . , .
before you move, pl ease search your area f or any scrap lumber
An 8 Apri l measage i ndi cated that the 7th A rti l l ery
Di vi si on's hospi tal was also moving forward. (SUEDE 50lst
Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-2161, 12 Apr; K-2154, 11Apr; CINCFE,
Tokyo SIB 481, 12 Apr 52)
Comment: These messages i ndi cate cl earl y that a re-
deployment $8 bei ng undertaken by major el ements of the 7th
Chi nese Communist Arti l l ery Di vi si on. I t is not immediately
evi dent,however,what l i es behind thi s acti on. I n the case of
the 21st A r ti l l er y Regiment, the move may onl y ref l ect its
attachment to the 203rd I nf antry Di vi si on. The request for
wire and the establ i shment of addi ti onal abservati on posts
would seemto poi nt to a conti nued stati c role f or thi s uni t.
, and bri ng i t wi th you:'
4.
.
North Korean Air Force uni t near Pyongyang has equipment
An 11A Pr i -l-Kax orean A i r Force message arri val deadl i ne:
from an ai r uni t' near Pyongyang to headquarters at Si nui j u
rgported that I fthe 'pe pe u' (probabl y communications equi p-
ment) must be . . , by the 20th.11 (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp
Korea, 15RSM/10669, 13 Apr 52)
3 15 Apr 54


Comment: Whi l e the unrecovered porti on of thi s message
p r e c l mc u r a t e anal ysi s, the enemy has establ i shed a
number of deadl i nes f or movement, suppl y f uncti ons, and other
mi l i tary. acti vi ti es duri ng the peri od 15 to 20 Apri l .
6 . Acute shortage of work ani mal s suggested i n North Korean
messa e: An uni denti f i ed North K orean battal i on commander
& a ned i n an 11A pri l message that "even a s mal l cattl e,
which can barel y till (the soi l ),coste 60, 000 to 70, 000 won
i n the market pri ce. Most of the cattl e, which appear in
the market, have wounds in thei r necks. We can see very f ew
cattl e, which ar e f at and wi thout wounds, out of al l the
cattl e assembled i n the market." (SUEDE 501et Comm Recon
Gr p Korea, SK-1-318, 12 Apr 52)
i n North K ore8 was about 12,000 won. During the bri ef peri od
of UN occupati on i n November 1950, the price on the f ree market
rose to 20, 000 won. Duri ng the summer and f al l of 1951, cattl e
pri ces apparentl y reached the l evel reported above, al though
the control l ed pri ce is still bel i eved t o be about 15,000 won.
Comment: The control l ed pre-war pri ce of a good work ox
The ox is almost as vi tal to the Korean agri cul tural
economy as ri ce. The acute shortage of work ani mal s i ndi cated
i n thi s message, coupl ed wi th the extreme shortage of farm
labor, adds another burden to the suf f eri ng ci vi l i an popul ati on.
6. New ni ght f i ghter uni t, probabl y j et-equi pped, acti ve over
Korea: Th e Russi an-voi ce ground-control l ed i ntercept net
7
reveals that an addi ti onal ni ght f i ghter uni t, probabl y j et-
equi pped, appeared over Korea on 29 J anuary. The A i r Force
bel i eves that thi s new uni t is associ ated wi th the conventi onal
LA-11 ni ght fighter uni t at Anshan, under the command of
Efimov. Si nce these LA-11's are sti l l active, the j et ai r-
craf t i n the new uni t may augment rather than repl ace the
LA-11's. (SUEDE A i r Force Roundup 71, 11Apr 52)
Comment: LA-11 f i ghters under Ef imov have been f l yi ng
ni ght patrol s and i ntercept mi sl i ons over Koreq si nce the fall
of 1951., when they were the only i denti f i ed enemy ni ght f i ghter
uni t. Efimov has also led f l i ghts of MIG-15's at Anshan.
Duri ng March UN pl anes observed j et f i ghters on several eveni ngs.
Another Russi an, l *Kuteszufu,vl perhaps an assi stant or re-
placement for Efimov, was noted for the f i r st t i me on 10 Apri l
as l eader of ei ght "al l i ed1' MIG-15's at Anshan.
4 15 Apr 52
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7 , Chi nese j et di vi si on sti l l at Mukden: A message of 4
Apri l from Mukden to Pei pi ng reported the' 3rB A i r Division's
tower wave l ength and its cal l si gn.
Pei pi ng, 4 Apr 52)
( SUEDEm686, Mukden-
Comment: Thi s message suggests that the MIG-equipped
3rd A i r Di vi si on is still at Mukden. J et f i ghters of thi s
division have been unobserved since mid-J anuary when they
withdrew from Antung. Chinese jet f i ghter di vi si ons now in
Manchuria i ncl ude: the 6th, 12th and 17th, in the Antung
area; the 3rd, and probabl y the 4th, i n the Mukden area.
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concl udes, however, wi th the statement that "at present we sti l l
have not di scove y cases of bubonic pl ague among the
troops (suEDEr-edpT 62, 3 Apr 52)
I Comment: Rats are the pri mary hosts of bubonic pl ague.
FAR EAST
6. Compunists i n Korea may anti ci pate a UN of f ensi ve: A 12
Apri l message passed to "al l b attal i ons" of an uni denti f i ed
North Korean uni t stated that "accordi ng to the of f i cer at
the corps, the enemy has pushed forward i nto our -.ea. They
are f eel i ng out our posi ti ons so can bomb them." (SUEDE
501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSMl-p 081, 13
Comment: Although thi s message may have been ori gi nated
by a rear area uni t and may have ref erence to UN agents, a
Chi nese Communist uni t i n eastern Korea on 17 March ordered
its uni ts to be i n readi ness because "the enemy are prepari ng
to l aunch a revenge attack agai nst us. .
52)
11
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8 . North Korean uni t may possess l arge stockpi l e of gasol i ne:
I n a 10 A pr i l message "th e ' arti l l ery stati sti cal of f i cerv1 of
the North Korean 5th Di vi si on i n the Pyongyang &rea reported
to hi s superi or that "gasol i ne QQ hand on the 13th of March:
2,217,800 ki l ograms.1q The bal ance of his report on fuels
mentioned that the authori zed quanti ty used f or vari ous pur-
poses aggregated 10 487 ki l ograms. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon
Gr p Korea, 15RSM{~'-13080, 11Apr 52)
Comment; If the f i gure is correct, thi s North Korean
uni t m a v e over 700, 000 gal l ons of gasol i ne.
been no I ndi cati on that f uel was BO pl enti f ul i n North Korea;
i n f act current reports show f ai rl y strict gasoline regul ati ons.
There has
4 16 A m 52
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118-Mar-2010 I
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reported t o its headquarters on 2 Apri l that the di vi si on had
a total of 438 operati onal vehi cl es wi th 225 addi ti onal ones
under repai r, The bul k of them were s i mi l ar to the US 24-ton
truck. The message conti nued that gasol i ne expendi ture is
l i mi ted to 91 gal l ons par vehi cl e per month.
suppl y el ement reported that "the regul ati ons rel ati ve to the
use of petrol eum products are not stri ct enough.1f The message
notes that "utter confusi onbq prevai l s and that they have been
"experi enci ng unseeming lossestv i n f uel consumpti on, I n con-
cl usi on the sander suggests that rati on books be pri nted wi th
stamps f or 5, 10, and 25 gal l ons and that the new system be
gi ven tri al run begi nni n 21 Apri l OgP (SUEDE 501st Comm
Recon Grp Korea, K-2169 andT-PS3, 9 Apr 52)
Comment: The monthly rati on of 91 gallons per vehi cl e
would l i mi t each vehi cl e to under 500 mi l es of travel . Never-
thel ess, thi s message i ndi cates that suf f i ci ent gasol i ne is
arri vi ng i n the forward areas to al l ow consi derabl e tryck
movement a
A l ater message of 6 Apri l from the same 7th A rti l l ery
11. Cbi nese army uni ts urged to exceed quotas i n san-fan
nese Communi,st arti l l ery di vi si on headquarters
w' qu%zl i a di recti ve from the Northgaat (Manchuria)
Bureau of the Chi nese Communist Party which establ i shes a
ttquotatl of maj or and minor embezzl ers to be di scovered i n each
di vi si on duri ng the campaign agai nst corrupti on, waste and
bureaucracy. The headquarters urges al l uni ts t o "seek t o
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16 Apr 52


1
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exceed'? the quota o f three "l arge tigersv' and ei ghteen "small
ti gers" al l otted to the di vi si on i n the " f i rst phase" of the
campaign. ( S U E D E r t QOO, Unknown-Unknown, Korea, 10 Feb 52)
Comment: The above di recti ve, orderi ng an arbi trary
number of of f enders to be found regardless of the evi dence,
is clearly L mi suse of the hi ghl y regarded quota system and
may in time be viewed as an expressi on of the l tbureaucrati sm"
which the campaign i n past aims to combat. Although any gi ven
uni t may contai n its al l otted number of t'ti gors,'t the eatab-
l i shment of a quota and the exhortati on to exceed that quota
i l l ustrate. the process by which Communist f uncti onari es can
prove thei r i ndustry and recti tude onl y by denouncing thei r
associates, f abri cati ng evi dence where necessary ~
6 16 Apr 52
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FAR EAST
4 . UW pilots see 500 jets on two Yalu River airfields: Four
F-86 pilots reported on 13 A Pril th e sighting of 4'50 jets at
Tatungkou and 50 at Antungboth airfields on the Korea-
Manchuria border. The pilots were thoroughly interrogated
and FBAF gives full credence to their account. Photographs
taken five hours later showed only 81 aircraft at Tatungkou
and 101 at Antung.
concentration of aircraft:
precluded use of other Manchurian airfields, (2) testing
the facilities at Tatungkou for staging large numbers of air-
craft, and (3) training pilots and maintenance personnel in
necessary procedures and techniques under crowded conditions.
FEAF offers several possible reasons for this unusual
(1) bad weather which may have
Qp-i 15 A P ~ 52)
Comment: On 9 March UN pilot reports of enemy aircraft
on the Palu River airfield were Invalidated by photographs
taken at the time. However, conditions f or observation may
have been more favorable on 13 April. If accepted, the
report of tho pilots means that most of the estimated jet
aircraft in Manchuria were aarked on these two fields. Their
normal complement is about 100 planes each.
16 Apr 52
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PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE: 23-Feb-2010
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6. Greater communications acti vi ty among North Korean
commands: T heFar East Command reports tha$,'for the
first tfme si nce l ate J anuary the three North Korean
corps which are now at the f kont are i n dai l y radi o con-
tact wi th each other and wi th f ront l i ne headquarters.
Concurrent w i t h thi s development, North Korean Supreme Head-
quarters has been i n acti ve communicati-on wi th both the
f ront l i ne headquarters and the remai ni ng North Korean
combat corps, at present i n reserve i n the Wonsan area.
(SUEDE Bg ASAPAC Tokyo, J apan 8621 AAU, Spot 3335A,
16 Apr 52)
Comment: I ntercepted operati onal messages i n Korea
have al ready i ndi cated an acceleration of Chinese Com-
muni st mi l i tar y acti vi ty. Thi s, however, is the first
observed si gn of greatl y i hcreased acti vi ty on the p*rt
of the North Korean Army.
7 . AFSA summarizes recent hei ghtened Chinese Communist
mi l i tary acti vi ty i n Korea-: On 15 A P r i l th e US A rmed
>arized recent developments i n
the Chi nese Communist f orces i n North Korea and- concluded
that three i nterpretati ons are possi bl e:
1) a routi ne rotati on of f ront l i ne uni ts may be i n
process ,
2) the enemy may anti ci pate a UN spri ng of f ensi ve
and is consequentl y bol steri ng hi s def enses, or
3) the enemy may be prepari ng to l aunch an of f ensi ve
sometime af ter 15 Apri l .
The mi l i t ar y acti vi ty that AFSA summarizes i ncl udes
new command al i gnments i n Chinese Communist i nf antry and
ar ti l l er y uni ts, forward di spl acements of uni ts, si gni f i -
cant meeti ngs of Communist personnel , emphasis on suppl y
mattem, and certai n communications changes. (SUEDE
AFSA CC/CAP-196, 15 Apri l 52)
8 . North Korean j et uni t may move t o i nteri or of Man-
w i n :e:trti that a recent ref erence t o an ai rf i el d
r Force coinmunicatiohs i ntef i i gence uni t
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T t i l ) S E C R E T S U E D i e

I
' i nspecti on @t Tungfeng, northeast of Mukden, may i ndi cate
'
f uture ocqupancy of thi s f i el d.
uni t involved would be a North Korean one, and ci tes a
25 J anuary message which stated Vi11 Yang Tu Hi's uni t
come to Tungfeng immediately." Another rel ated message
of 20 J anuary s ai d that the lldocuments...which order
the transf er from An(?)@robably Anshan) to Tungfeng have
come."
CHICOMSUM 636, 14 Apr 52)
same pi l ot as mentioned above, l ed a f l i ght of twelve
MIG-15's from Anshan ai rfi el d.
The f i el d stati on specul ates that the most "l i kel y1'
(SUEDE 6920th Securi ty Group J ohnson AB J apan AP 434,
Comment: On 8 Apri l a "Yang Tu Hu," probably the
The reasons for thi s move to Tungfeng, and whether it
has occurred or w i l l occur, have not been reveal ed.
9. Chinese may have l arger rol e i n UN pl ane i ntercepti on:
An anal ys'i s of Russian voi ce ground-controlled .i ntercept
(GCI ) traf f i c reveal s that two Antung-based j et regi ments,
, normally acti ve i n combat over Korea, have not been ob-
served si nce 1 Apri l .
The Air Force bel i eves that these ai r uni ts are
Chi nese. A s of 1 March they were di rected by both the
Russian and Chinese components of the GCI net. Now,
accordi ng to the A i r Force, these f l yi ng uni ts may be oper-
ati ng sol el y under the di recti dn of the Chinese GCI net,
or they may have l ef t the Yalu River area. (SUEDE A i r
Force Roundup 72, 15 Apr 52)
Comment: The Russian-voice GCI net, which control l ed
four -and two Chinese regiments unti l earl y March,
di rected most of the fl ghCers which engaged UN pl anes. The
Chinese GCI net, f i r st i denti f i ed i n mid-November 1951, was
occupied mai nl y in di recti ng ai rcraf t i n trai ni ng, patrol
and al ert exercises.
I f excl usi ve Chineee control of these ;two ai r uni ts is
conf irllred ~t would i ndi cate i ncreasi ng Chinese, and cor-
respondi ngl y less Sovi et, responsi bi l i ty for the i ntercepti on
of UN pl anes.
5
17 Apr 52
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H R 7 0 - 1 4
C I S

N R
HR70-14
FAR EAST
3. Greater communications activity among North Korean commands:
US ArmyJ apan - $CJ( aRdThe Far East Command reports that for the
first time since late J anuary the three North
Korean corps which are now at the front are SUEDE
h t ~ . . 30633, in daily radio contact with each other and
with front ltne headquarters. Concurrent with this development, North
Korean Supreme Headquarters has been in active communication with
boththe front line headquarters and the remainidg North Korean combat
corps, at present in reserve in the Wonsan area.
Comment: Intercepted operational messages
in Korea have already indicated an acceleration of Chinese Communist
military activity.
increased activity on the part of the North Korean Army.
l6 Apr 52 Sf *b33358
This, however, is the first observed sign of greatly
NR
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PPROVED FOR RELEASE
r DATE: 23-Mar-201 0
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For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
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18-Mar-201 0
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5. Uni denti f i ed Chi nese art,i l l ery uni t i n Korea awaits
orders: On 6 A pr i l an uni denti f i ed Chi nese Communist arti l l ery
m n Korea was ordered t o report dai l y on the enemy si tu-
ati on and battl e resul ts, "to di spatch a crew to sel ect new
posi ti ons and then proceed wi th the camouflage to prevent
detecti on .I1 The message .concluded wi th "af ter di scussi ons
are compl eted at our pl ace r el l ti ve to your si tuati on, we
shal l advi se you by w i r e of our deci si on.11 (SUEDE 501st
CommRecon Grp Korea, K-2244, 16 Apr 52)
Comment: Thi s is another of the many recent i ntercepted
Chi nese Communist messages which have i ndi cated an expectancy
of imminent change. I ts nature remai ns uni denti f i ed.
6. North Korean' uni t reports suspected BW drop: An uniden-
ti f i ed North K orean uni t i n the Wonsan area reported on 14
Apri l that "enemy pl anes1* dropped f l our mixed wi th arseni c.
The statement concl uded that "we are not sure whether i t i s
the bacteri al weapon or not." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp
Korea, SK-201622, 15 Apr 52)
BW d r o p h e past three or i ore weeks.
thi s report might revi ve the l aggi ng BW campaign i n Korea, but
i t ~eems more l i kel y that thi s is j ust a resi dual ef f ect of
the now-subsiding campaign.
Comment: Thi s is the f i r st enemy report of a suspected
I t is possi bl e that
7 . Si ze and equipment of Chi nese Communist ar ti l l er y regi -
ment i n eastemKorea presented: Th e 21st Ch i nese Communist
A r t i l l ery Regiment, attached for operati ons to the 203rd
Chanese Communist I nf antry Di vi si on, repqrted on 15 Apri l that '
"at present our regi ment has. 2,305 men . I 1
from its parent 7th A rti l l ery Di vi si on to the di vi si onal suppl y
i nstal l ati on which stated that from 1 t o 10 Apri l the t121st
A r ti l l er y Regiment (f i red) 204 rounds of Sovi et 122 (mm)
howi tzer ammunition." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea,
K-2253, K-2254, 16 Apr 52)
The armament of the 21st is i ndi cated i n a 13 Apri l mbssage
, 4 18 Apr 52
\
NR
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R R S E C R E T S U E D e

T I

Comment: The 21st Chinese Communist Arti l l ery Regiment
was attached f or operati ons to tpe 203rd I nf antry Di vi si on i n
earl y Apri l .
the other el ements of the 7th A rti l l ery Division, recei ved 120
gas masks i n l ate March.
I t may be noted that the 21st, together wi t h
8 . Organi zati on of North Korean eastern coaqtal securi tx
cor 8 i ven- or orean message on pr i l menti ons
!7tih&obably the 7th) , 37:h Di vi si on and
the 24th Bri gade l oaded the rice on the vehi cl es on the 13th.w
The message conti nues that ri ce f or the 3rd Di vi si on was un-
l oaded at a major suppl y depot southwest of Wonsan. (SUEDE
501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/10817, 16 Apr 52)
organi zati on of the North Korean VI1 Corps i n the Wonaan area.
The unl oadi ng of the 3rd Diui9ioas ri ce at a suppl y depot
responsi bl e f or suppl yi ng North Korean combat corps at the
f ront may i ndi cate that thi s di vi si on is south of the Wonsan
area, possibly i n a reserve capacity.
Comment: This massage confirms the general l ocati on and
5 . 18 Apr 52
..R
_ T S E C R E T - S U E D h i P - -

H R 7 0 - 1 4

D A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
- 3 -
T O P _ S E C R E T - S U E D E - -
HR70-14
observes that "there are no tndications of
an imminent attack:' The comment con-
FAR EAST
2. Far East Command sees no imminent Communist offensive:
I I
The e n e m y , l 1 is able to
launch a major offensive wi th little warning. The duration of such an
attack would depend on the Communists' ability to keep their advancing
units supplied.
- 3 -
>
,-
(DATE: 20-Mar-201 0 I I
F or a compr eh ensi ve gui de on P D F C ompr essi on a nd O C R vi si t T h eP a per lessO ffi ce.or g

H R 7 0 - 1 4

, 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
c
18-Mar-2010
HR70-14
FAR EAST
6. I ntensi ve enemy mi l i tar y acti vi ty i n Korea still i ndi -
cated: A t) A P r i l Chi nese Comuni st message, possi bl y from an
uni dsnti f i ed i nf antry di vi si on headquarters, I ndi cates i nten-
si ve trai ni ng of mobile radi o operators. The message states
that personnel "must l earn the passwords used i n attack and
the code words.@' Another message of 13 Apri l from an uni denti -
f i ed Chi nese Communist uni t queri es,"what report is there on
the mud si tuati on as it af f ects the f ront l i ne posi ti ons and
r o ads
A 12 Apri l message from another uni denti f i ed Chi nese
Communist uni t relates that "at 1100 hours the bi vouacki ng
party arri ved saf el y wi thout i nci dent .'l The message menti ons
a uni t number which is possi bl y that of a regi ment of the 42nd
Chi nese Communist Army i n combat i n the west central sector.
(SUEDE 50tst Cam Recon Grp Korea, K-2264, 17 Apr; K-2274 and
2275, 17 Apr 52)
i nterpretati on, the bul k of current enemy tr af f i c I ndi cates
preparati ons f or some undi scl osed type of operati on.
Comment: While al l of these messages can be gi ven routi ne
-~ -

8. Combat di vi si on i n North Korea reports suppl y status:
I n a message to the "3rd Corps A r t i l l erY Chi ef of St af f , an
uni denti f i ed North Korean di vi si on reports on 17 Apri l that
i t has 69 horses on hand. The message also states that "fi xed
rati ons for ten days, horse feed f or f i ve days and dry grass
unti l the end of May have been secured." (SUEDE 330th Cam
Recon Co, Korea A-10090, 17: Apr 52)
Conunent: This message may only refer to the unidentified
uni t' s ani mal fodder, but it is si gni f i cant to note that onl y
a ten day l evel of rati ons is bei ng mai ntai ned at division.
I t has previ ousl y been specul ated that the enemy had bui l t up
a consi derabl e stockpi l e of food and ammunition i n the forward
area.
_ _ ~-
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North Korean ai r uni t ordered to suspend May Day
cel ebratson: A message from North K orean A i r Force Head-
quarters at Si nui j u sent on 13 Apri l to the commander of an
ai r servi ce uni t, probabl y at Sariwon, near Pyongyang,
stated: "The May Day cel ebrati on ha n suspended. Do
not make any preparati ons. 'I ( StJ EDEqiha" 352, 13 Apr 52)
ti es apparentl y does not appl y to al l enemy f orces, si nce
18 A pr i l message8 from enemy ground uni ts have referred to
making preparati ons f or the day.
Comment: The suspensi on of tradi ti onal May Day acti vi -
The North Korean A i r Force has used the sod ai rfi el d
at Sariwon 'to operate obsol escent bi pl anes i n harassi ng
rai ds agai nst the UN; there is also an early warning radar
i nstal l ati on nearby.
Possi bi l i ty of major new Chinese Communist uni t i n
Korea reRortetl: Th e ''50ath re&zlmentlt was mentioned i n a - --_ I
garbl ed, L i gh pri ori ty 16 April-Chinese Communist message
which ref erred to "l i nes contact
Regiment is subordi nate to the 169th Di vi si on, 57th Army, l ast
located at Antung. I t is not possi bl e to j udge from thi s
message whether the 505th is actual l y i n Korea, (SUEDE
501st Comm Recon Gr p Korea, K-2351, 20 Apr 52)
The f i el d col l ecti ng uni t noted that the 505th I nf antry
Comment: The 505th, 508th, and 524th Regiments were
menti- a 21 March Chinese Communist i ntercept.
uni ts are organi c to the 57th and 59th A r mi es.
While no new Chinese Communist mador uni ts have
recentl y been confirmed i n Korea, al l or el ements of the
l oth, 16th, 21st, 66th, and now more recentl y the 57th
have been tentati vel y i denti f i ed by communications i ntel -
l i gence. Collateral i ntel l i gence gi ves some support for
the presence of the 16th, the 66th and the 57th.
These
5 . Immediatq need f or North Korean armored personnel
seen: An uni denti f i ed North Korean uni t was ordered on
m a y to "send the reserve tank crews immediatelytll
( SUVE Hqs ASA Paci f i c Tokyo J apan 8621 AAU-Spot 33588
19 A pr 52)
23 Air 52
CID
HR70-11


' Comment: North Korean messages of l ate March and
earl y A prU suggested that both the 105th Tank and the
10th Mechanized Divisions would be i nl trai ni ng north of
Pyongyang duri ng Apri l . Thi s requi rement f or addi ti onal
armored persoonel may reflect urgency in the trai ni ng.
6, Emergency cal l procedure establ i ehad for North Korean
coastal uni t: East coa4t defense headquarters informed a
coastal securi ty uni t at Songj i n on 19 Apri l that "the enemy
si tuati on is severe. e .i n one week we w i l l do an emergency
ea11 trai ni ng and w i l l bq prepared f or compl ete combat."
The fol l owi ng day, qnother North Korean uni t, probabl y
a100 on coastal securi ty duty, stated:"thi ngs are not goi ng
good. . .the,emergency cal l must be practi ced once a week.
Trai ni ng shoul d be ti ghtened." (SUEDE 330th Comm Recon Co
ALT-836, 20 Apr; 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea, 15RSY/11140,
21 Apr 62)
enemy-fieastern Korea may be anti ci pati ng a UN amphibi-
ous operat i on.
Comment: The tepor of these orders suggests that the
I The over-al l deployment of Communist f orces i n North
I Korea, si nce'the I nchon l andi ng, ha6 ref l ected the f ear of
another similar successf ul UN operati on.
i
7 . Enemy Counterattack i n eastern Korea f oi l ed by UN
i ntel 'l i gencd: " "In order' to confuse the enemy," th e 2Tst
Chinege ComW61$t A r ti l l er y Regiment reported on 15 Apri l ,
"we hail ori gi nal l y i ntended to counterattack agai nst Square
Top mountain (in eastern Korea). . .but because our counter-
attack pl an l eaked out, it was decided not to move i nf antry.
However, our arti l l ery barrage advanced accordi ng t o the
ori gi nal pXan.T1 (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2262,
19 Apr 52)
A rti l l ery RBig'iment was attached to the 203rd I nf antry
Di vi si on, 68th Army, an uousual procedure, presumably
desi gned to support a speci f i c operati on assi gned to the
i nf antry uni t.
b
Comment: I n earl y Apri l , the 21st Chi nese Communist
I t is Rossi bl e that the' "counterattack1' ref erred to
was the operati on i ntended.
3 28 qpr 52
; I P

8 .
9.
10.
11.
* Communist suppl y of f i cers i nspecti ng,vehi cl es i n
North Korea:
bervi ce started t o i nspect al l cars i n al l uni ts. . .under
the Korean Pebpl e's Army,'! reports an uni denti f i ed North
Korean uni t on 18 Apri l . (SUEDE 501st CommRecon Grp Korea,
$K-1-599, 19 Apr 52)
i nspecti on is -rel&ted to a general i nspecti on which was
underway in many North Korean uni ts i n earl y Apri l .
"I nspectors o,f th e General Bureau of lb ar
Comment; I t is not clear whether or not thi s vehi cl e
Chinese deserters assaul t North Korean convoy commander:
A- recebtl y'avai l abl e North K orean message passed between t wo
east Goast securi ty uni ts states that a convoy commander w a s
assauf tgd by an undi scl osed number of llChinese ruf f i ans and
deserters from the Chinese Vol unteer Army." The message
i ndi catgs that the attack took pl ace i n a s mal l town l ocated
on an al ternate suppl y route l eadi ng from hortheastern Korea
to the. Sino-Korean border,
8621 AAAU, Spot 33484, 23 Mar 52)
(SUEDE HQS ASAPAC Tokyo J apan
North Korean naval uni t expects combat: "As soon as
the combat be.g'ins, the. . .chief w i l l gi ve the orders con-
cerni ng communications," roported an uni denti f i ed North
Koreaa naval uni t on 17 Apri l . The message deaI t wi th certai n
communications f uncti ons which were to be carri ed out by
22 Apri l . (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea, 15RSY/10593,
18 Apr 52)
Comment: Thi s i nformati on may refl ect tommunist
expec%ati on"of another UN amphibious operati on. On the
other hand, recent i ntercepts have expressed i ncreased
urgency and have i ndi cated preparati ons f or some type of
mi l i tary operati on.
Koreans may be connected wi th Chi nese paratroop school :
A message about an ai'r t Tansport f li ght t o Manchuria, apparentl y
from a paratroop school in Centrd China, ref erred t o one or
more vTdr*eantl passengers. The A i r Force comments that Korean
el ements may have been trai ned as paratroopers i n Central
China, and are now returni ng to Manchuria. (SUEDE A i r Force
Roundup 77, 4 Apr 52)
4 23 Apr 52
T C Y P S E C R E T

! '
.. Comment: The i nt ercept may also mean t hat Korean
o f f i c m d been v i s i t i ng t h i s paratroop s chool . However,
previ ous messages have suggested that a'paratroop uni t is
t ransf erri ng to Manchuria. Although the Chinese Communists
have l ong conducted paratroop t rai ni ng i n Central China, and
poslaibly Manchuria, t hi s is the f i r s t i ndi cat i on of Korean
i nt eregt in t h i s activity.
, 5 23 Agr 52
NR
I
T C Y P S E C R E T S U E D L N -

1 1

1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
1 1 1
w

C l b
HR70-14
FAR EAST
9. R i
si ni f l cant: Moscow-originated ti affi c addressed t o
+-----T orrespon ent 20," i denti f i .ed as connected wi th mi l i tary
acti vi ti es in the Sovi et Mi l i tary Mi ssi on i n Korea, was
i ntercepted on 16 and 17 Apri l for t he first time si nce
28 October 1951.
The reappearance of thi s addressee i n traf f i c is a
possible! i ndi cator of the resumpti on of mi l i tary acti vi ty.
(SUEDE AFSA RU-TIB 1949, 23 Apr 52)
Comment; The si gni f i oance of 318 October 1951 l i es
i n its proxi mi ty to the end of , acti ve mi l i tary operati ons i n
Korea. Pri or to thi s, there was an apparent correl ati on
between the volume of "Korr 20" traffi c and the i ntensi ty
of mi l i tar y operati ons.
The reappearance of "Korr 20" is not i n i tsel f con-
cl usi ve evi dence of anti ci pated' Y zl i tary acti vri j i ,
si nce i ntercepted messages are presumed t o represenL ou* y
the overfl ow of tr af f i c from l and l i nes.
10. Chi nese Communist uni t wants map of Korean f ront: !'It
is necessary 'that I go to Army to procure and return wi th
maps which cl earl y def i ne both the enemy's and our zone of
authori ty across the enti re peni nsul a, reported an uni denti -
f i ed Chi nese Communist uni t on 16 Apri l . (SUEDE 501st Comm
Recon Grp Korea, IC-2318, 19 Apr 52)
probab'ly of di vi si on si ze or less, wi shesabroader vi ewof the
f ront, i ncl udi ng the l i ne of contact. No immediate si gni f i -
cance can be attached to this message.
'Comment; Thi s i nformati on suggests that the enemy uni t,
11. Communi.sts i n Korea uneasy about UN i ntenti ons: "I n
the zone between the enemy 'armies and our own al l th e wav
to the western sea cl i f f s; there is some ki nd of changi nk
acti vi ty goi ng on, but as yet the Army has not advi sed us
of the nature of the acti vkty,l ' a Chi nese Communist uni t
reported on 18 Apri l . The message conti nued reassuri ngl y,
however, that when "Vol unteer Headquartersfq ascertai ns the
acti vi ty "they w i l l in turn tel l U~.~~(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon
Grp Korea, K-2368, 21 Apr 52)
' 5 24 Apr 52
4 -
(~PPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: I
118-Mar-201 0 I
R R S E C R E T S U E D b -

Comment: Thi s message i nti mates that the enemy
f ears a possi bl e UN operati on. Si mi l ar apprehensi ons have
been recentl y expressed in other enemy messages and i n
pri soner of war statements.
12. Pol i ti cal meeti ng to be hel d by North Korean mechani zed
di vi si on: Th e "Pol i ti cal Department Ch' i ef VP of t h e North
Korean 10th Di vi si on, recentl y mechani zed, i nstructed a
subordi nate pol i ti cal of f i cer on 20 Apri l that an uni denti f i ed
type of meeti ng
Recon Grp Korea,
weeks in the number of conferences schedul ed by vari ous North
Korean and Chi nese Communist uni ts. High l evel meeti ngs have
general l y preceded previ ous enemy of f ensi ves.
o begi n on 22 Apri l . (SUEDE 330th Corn
3201, 21 Apr 52)
r3
Comment: There has been an i ncrease duri ng the past
1 6 24 Apr 52

A p p r o v e d F o r R a b a t l i t O S E G R I E T 9 7 5 A S S 0 0 5 3 0 0 0 1 - 6
S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t r e v i e w
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L I D E C L A S S I F I E D
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T S S C
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A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a se 2 0 0 3 / 1 2 / 0 3 : CI A - R D P7 9 T 0 0 9 7 5 A 0 0 0
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2 5 X 1
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2 5 A p r i l 1 9 5 2
O C I N o . 5 1 6 7
C o p y N o .
2 6 6
T h i s d i g e s t o f s i g n i f i c a n t r e p o r t s h a s b e e n p r e p a r e d p r i m a r i l y
f o r t h e i n t e r n a l u s e o f t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y . I t d o e s
n o t r e p r e s e n t a c o m p l e t e c o v e r a g e o f a l l c u r r e n t r e p o r t s r e -
c e i v e d . C o m m e n t s r e p r e s e n t t h e i m m e d i a t e v i e w s o f t h e O f f i c e
* A r m y a n d S t a t e D e p t . r e v i e w s c o m p l e t e d *
R E T U R N T O A R C H I V E S E t R E C O R D S C E N T E R
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f i l i
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S E C R E T

G E N E R A L

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T
7 2 5 A p r 5 2
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2 5 X
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2 5 X 1 A
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T O P S E C R E T

2 5 A p r i l 1 9 5 2
C I A N o . 4 9 6 2 5
C o p y
4 6
T O T H E C U R R E N T W T E L L I G E N C E D I G E S T
O f f i c e o f C u i r e n t I n t e l l i g e n c e
I t d o e s
o r i n t h e O f f i c e o f C u r r e n t I n t e l l i g e n c e . C o m m e n t s r e p r e s e n t t h e
i m m e d i a t e v i e w s o f t h e O f f i c e , o f C u r r e n t I n t e l l i g e n c e .
T O P S E C R E T

1 .

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2 5 X 6
A p p r o v e d F o r a l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 4 1 6 3 0 0 9 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 1 - 3

T O P
A p r 5 2
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H R 7 0 - 1 4
I t i l D S E C R E T S U E D e

r P P R O V E D
8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

C r i b
5 1 5 , y r '
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HR70-14
18-Mar-2010
1
.
FAR EAST
6. Further forward movement bv Chinese Communist arti l l erv ~~
observed i n eastern Korea: Th e suppl y el ement of th e 7th
Chi nese Communist A r ti l l er y Di vi si on, I n east central and
eastern Korea, recentl y requested headquarters.to l et them
know "the di stance between the new posi ti ons t o which the
20th Regi ment has advanced and Yongdok."
The Far East Command notes that thi s i ndi cates a "si zeabl e
forward di spl acementJ t of the 20th A r ti l l er y Regiment, subordi -
nate to the 7th Di vi si on. Si nce the 21st A rti l l ery Regiment
of thi s di vi si on has been the onl y uni t acti vel y supporti ng
f ront l i ne enemy uni ts i n the sector, thi s movement def i ni tel y
i ncreases 'I the potenti al fi re support f or any f uture. . .
operati on." (SUEDE CINCFE SLB 491, 24 Apr 52)
Di vi si on, previ ousl y i n support of the 39th and 42nd A r mi es i h
west central Korea, were to be rel i eved by an uni denti f i ed uni t
between 20 and 24 Apri l . The messages di scussed routes of
approach, the l ocati on of headquarters, and gave i nstructi ons
about the ammunition l oad to accompany pi eces moving i nto
posi t i on.
to the 2nd A r ti l l er y Di vi si on, advi sed i ts 2nd Battal i on that
"f or t he next few days we shoul d mai ntai n normal acti vi ty. .
so as to avoi d arousi ng enemy suspi ci on about us. . . f aci l i -
tate compl eti on of our taki ng overOfp
On 16 A pr i l , the 39th A r t i l l er y Regiment, subordi nate
' On 20 Apri l , al though the 2nd Battal i on reported
compl eti on of a f i ri ng mi ssi on, messages cl earl y i ndi cated
that both it and a battal i on of the 30th Regiment, al so of
the 2nd A r ti l l er y Di vi si on, were moving to a new l ocati on,
st ill uni denti f i ed e
A possi bl e i ndi cati on of which uni t repl aced the 2nd
Chi nese Communist A r ti l l er y Di vi si on is i n a 210 Apri l message
from the 2nd Battal i on, 29th A rti l l ery Regiment, which stated
"the 27th Regiment is l acki ng 10 uni ts of . . . and t wo copi es
of . . . I Q The 27th A rti l l ery Regiment, subordi nate to the
1st Chi nese Communist A rti l l ery Di vi si on, has not been
; 4 25 Apr 52
V I P S E C R E T S U E D e

I
identified previous1 in this'sector of the f ront . (SUEDE
501s t Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2378, K-2386, K-2387, 22 Apr 52)
[ 11-] 997, 14 Aprr-598, 12 Apr, and I p O l 2 , 16 Apr;
Comment: While it is apparent that major elements of
the 2nd Artillery Division have moved from their previously
occupied positions, the messages do not clearly indicate
whether the units were relieved or if they remained in the
immediate area of the front.
I
,/ N R
\
' 5 25 Apr 52

T h e n e w a t t e m p t

I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 2 3 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

1.
___
HR70-14
' GENERAL
North Koreans order increased hate propaganda for military units:
US Army
24 Apr 52
C 3 - J s b ~ U J - 31-l B e hostility by having talks about the US
SUEDE
imperialtsts illing the prtsoners." The message continued that
the political officer should "tell them about their (the UN's ) vtolent
action toward the servicemen."
The senior North Korean Political officer
in a northeast area was instructed on
4 Aprtl to "spread propaganda andincrease
ck
Comment: Although the enemy has con-
sistently maintained that the UN grossly mtstreated its prisoners
of war, t he current reactton to the new Hst handed to theCommu-
nist negotiators at Panmunjom, containing the names of only 70,000
enemy prtsoners who would not resist repatriation, wi l l probably
reach new heights of invective.
The new attempt to intensify animosity may
have a connection wi th coming mtlitary operations of which there
have been some indications but no confirmatton
- 3 -
T o le a r n h ow t o use P D F Com p r e ssion a n d O CR go t o T h e P a p e r le ssO ffice .or g

SUEDE
3. Soviet air unit at new base in central Manchuria:
US A i r Force A Chinese Communist message of 22 April
23 Apr 52 revealed a Soviet air detachment at Tungfeng,
SUEDE 120 miles northeast of Mukden. Onthe same
day, six Soviet MIG-15's landed at Tungfeng.
e ' a x e e transports, probably of theSoviet 9th
<OM-\+ 3as ~) - LIIO
shuttle flights from Mukden and Anshan to Tungfeng
between 16 and 23 April,
Comment: These developments suggest that
a Soviet air unit, equipped wi th -15's is now based at Tungfeng. The
only Soviet M1G-15'~ previously known to be based outside of the Dairen
and Antung area of Manchuria were in a small unit at Anshan, which may
include the aircraft involved tn the move tb Tungfeng, This group has
been associated with night interception oyer Korea
- 4 -
NR
SUEDE
T o le a r n h ow t o use P D F Com p r e ssion a n d O CR go t o T h e P a p e r le ssO ffice .or g

H R 7 0 - 1 4

1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

C t
5 1
,
HR70-14
18-Mar-201 0 -
I
FAR EAST
4. Rel i ef of 2nd Chi nese Communi st Ar t i l l er y Di vi si on by
t he 1st Di vi si on f ur t her i ndi cat ed: ms i n g t he peri od t o
2 4 Apr i l , a new Chi nese Comni uni st artiIlery uni t occupl ed
posi t i ons i n west cent r al Kor ea whi ch had been occupi ed by
el ement s of t he 2nd Art i l l ery Di vi si on. One message i ndi -
oat ed t hat el ement s o f t he 1st Art i l l ery Di vi si on ni ght be
t he r el i evi ng f or ce.
el ement s i s seen i n anot her message f r oma O6d Di vi si on uni t
i n pr ocess of r el i ef whi ch st at ed t hat l ' concerni ng t he mat t er
of t he 27t h r egi ment ( subordi nat e t o t he 1st Di vi si on) want i ng
to bor r ow, t empor ar i l y our one map. . .
On 22 Apr i l , an uni dent i f i ed Chi nese ar t i l l er y uni t r e-
por t ed a successf ul f i r e mi ssi on i n west cent r al Kor ea and
not ed t hat "our ar t i l l er y , . . assumed f ul l y t he def ensi ve
Conf i r mat i on of t he pr esence o f 1st Ar t i l l er y Di vi si on
11
3 28 Apr 52
F or mor e infor ma t ion on P D F C ompr ession a nd O C R visit T heP a per lessO ffice.or g
T t i P S E C R E T S U E D k i

1
duti es of the 29th' Regimentt1 (subordi nate to the 2nd Di vi si on).
(SUEDE 501~t Corn Recon Grp Korea,K-2414, 23 Apr 52)
5. Crypti c message suggests enemy ai r acti vi ty wi thi n North
Apri l noted that I t . . . today. . . the pi l ot of the 2nd
Korea: A crypti c, garbl ed North K orean ground force message
battal i on at the combat area was sent by emergency ai rpl ane at
1100 hours. . a f t (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/11235,
23 A pr 52)
covered and destroyed a Communist conventi onal ground attack
ai rcraf t on Wonsan ai rf i el d on 22 Apri l . While there is no
di rect l i nk between thi s message and the destroyed enemy
pl ane, it may be specul ated that a North Korean operati onal
ai r uni t exi sts i n the Wonsan-Hamhung area of the east coast.
Commept: Possi bl y coi nci dental l y, UN f i ghter pi l ots di s-
6 , orth Korean uni t orders vegetabl es at extremely low pri ce:
denti f i ed North K oreap unl t ' states that, I'af tet. conf erri ng
wi t h the ci ty peopl e's commissar," i t w i l l buy some 27 metric
tons of vegetabl es at a pri ce of !'one won per one kilogram.1t
(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/l1268, 23 Apr 52)
Comment: Vari ous vegetabl es of f ered to the North Korean
publ i c at government-control l ed pri ces average 37 won per ki l o-
gram. Probabl y the mi l i tary would pay less than the ci vi l i an
segment; however, one won per ki l ogram seems eqcessi vel y low.
7 . Sovi et ai r uni t at new base i n central Manchuriia:
Chi nese Communlst message of ' 22 A pr i l reveal ed a Sovi et ai r
detachment at Tungfeng, 120 miles northeast of Mukden. On
the Same day, s i x Sovi et MIG-15's l anded at Tungfeng.
Three transports, probabl y of the Sovi et 9th A i r Army,
made shuttl e f l i ghts from Nukden and CLaaElhan to Tungfeng be-
tween 16 and 23 Apri l .
6920 Securi ty Grp J ohnson AB J apan, 23 Apr 52)
uni t, equipped wi th MIG-l5's, is now based at Tungfeng. The
onl y Sovi et MI G-15's previ ousl y known to be based outsi de of
the Dai ren and'htung area of Manchuria were i q a small uni t
at Anahan, which may i ncl ude the ai rcraf t i nvol ved i n the move
to Tungfeng. This group has been associ ated wi thtpaght i n-
tercepti on over Korea.
A
\
(SUEDE A i r Forbe Roundup 79, 23 Apr;
Comment: These developments suggest that a Sovi et ai r
' 4 28 Abr 52
F or mor e infor ma t ion on P D F C ompr ession a nd O C R visit T heP a per lessO ffice.or g

A p p r o v e d R a b R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0
: C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 0 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
S E C R E T

2 8 A p r i l 1 9 5 2
O C I N o . 5 1 6 8
C o p y N o .
2 6 6
C U R R E N T I N T E L L I G E N C E
D I G E S T
A G E N C Y
T h i s d i g e s t o f s i g n i f i c a n t r e p o r t s h a s
f o r t h e i n t e r n a l u s e o f t h e C e n t r a l
I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y .
I t d o e s
c o v e r a g e o f a l l c u r r e n t r e p o r t s r e -
c e i v e d . C o m m e n t s r e p r e s e n t t h e i m m e d i a t e
v i e w s o f t h e O f f i c e
* A r m y a n d S t a t e D e p t . r e v i e w s
c o m l e t e d *
S E C R E T

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 / 2 0
: C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
F o r mo r e info r ma tio n o n OC R a nd P D F C o mp r e s s io n go to o ur we b s ite
A p p r o v e d % L a e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 4 4 8 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
S p C R E T

*

S T A T

3 .

: C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
9 .
A p p r o v e d c R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T OffitA 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
S E C R E T

A p p r o v e d F ib R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
S E C R E T

S T A T

A p p r o v e d F l ip R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 8 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1

2 8 A p r 5 2
9 .
' A p p r o v e d F o s R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 0 1 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
S E C R E T
F A R E A S T

2 5 X 6

A p p r o v e d N ir o R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 tA 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1

2 5 X 1 C

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 1 2 0
: C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
A p p r o v e d N g, R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 V A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1

2 5 X 1 A

2 5 X 1 A

2 5 X 1
A p p r o v e d c it: R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 ` 1 4 1 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
S E C R E T

2 5 X 6
1 5 .

: C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1

1 6 .
2 5 X 6
1 7 .
A p p r o v e d R io / R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 S A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
S E C R E T

2 5 X 6

2 5 X 1 C I
A p p r o v e d A p tte l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T O1 fe A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
S E C R E T

S E C R E T
1 0 2 8 A p r 5 2
2 5 X 1 C
2 5 X 1 A
: C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
2 5 X 1
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 / 2 0
: C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
e / C e e
A p p r o v e d F o l io & l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
T O P S E C R E T
S E C U R I T Y I N F OR M A T I ON
2 8 A p r i l 1 9 5 2
C I A N o . 4 9 6 2 6
C o p y N o .
4 8
T O T H E C U R R E N T I N T E L L I G E N C E D I G E S T
I t d o e s
o r i n t h e O f f i c e o f C u r r e n t I n t e l l i g e n c e . C o m m e n t s r e p r e s e n t t h e
T O P S E C R E T
S E C U R I T Y I N F OR M A T I ON
1 .
2 5 X 6
2 5 X 1
A p p r o v e d F o c a R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1

T OP S E C R E T
1
2 8 A p r 5 2
: C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
A p p r o v e d F o r il ib 6 l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1

2 5 X 6

2 5 X 6
A p p r o v e d F o a l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 1 3 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1

3 2 8 A p r 5 2
2 5 X 6
5 X 6
: C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
: C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
H R 7 0 - 1 4

D A T E : 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

e i D
' < p p
i
DATE: 18-Mar-2010
HR70-14
FAR EAST
4. Addi ti onal armor arri ves i n North Korea: North Horean
messacres of 24 and 1 5 A psi 1 refer to the arri val of addi ti onal
tanks-and sel f -propel l ed guns i n the Pyongyang area.
The messages suggest that at least 43 tanks and 22
sel f -propel l ed arti l l ery pi eces have been brought i nto Korea
on f rei ght cars from China. The uni denti f i ed North Korean
uni t whi ch ori gi nated these messages is to recei ve some of
thi s armor. (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea, SK-1-828,
SK-1-853, SK-1-859, 25 Apr; 151 Det, 15th RSM J apan,YSG CS 464,
27 Apr 52)
Comment: Both the North Korean 105th Tank Di vi si on and
10th Nechanized Di vi si on are located in the Pyongyang area,
and coul d reasonabl y be the reci pi ent of these tanks.
6 . North Korean aircraft reported ni ght f l yi ng extensi vel y:
Prel i mi nary anal ysi s of Nor'th Korean ai r voi ce traffi c revears
that North Korean aircraft are making many ni ght f l i ghts,
reports a US A i r Force uni t i n J apan on 27 Apri l . (SUEDE
6920 Securi ty Grp J ohnson AB J apan,Spot 26, 27 Apr 52)
Comment: The North Koreans have l ong engaged i n ni ght
harassi ng operati ons wi th obsol escent PO-2 bi pl anes and
possi bl y wi th hi gher performance conventi onal ai rcraft.
To date the mi ssi on of ni ght i ntercepti on has been
performed l argel y by a Sovi et ai r uni t at Anshan, Manchuria.
Thi s group, ref erred. to as "Ef imov ' 8 , ' v has flown conventi onal
LA-11 hi gh performance f i ghters, but may currentl y be convert-
i ng t o MIG-15's.
29 Apr 52
@m
T o lea r n mor e a bout O CR a nd P D F Comp r ession go to T heP a p er lessO ffice.or g
r

- T O P S E C A T S U E D E
8 . Chi nese Communi st l ogi st i cal i nspect i on t eamar r i ves i n
Kor ea: "Th e Hua- t ung ( bel i eved t o be a maj or l ogi st i cal
headquar t er s i n Chi na) st af f i nspect i on t eam wi l l arri ve i n
Kor ea on t he 25t h. Ni nt h Army Gr oup st af f of f i cer s. . . wi l l
meet t hemwi t h t rucks" at a Chi nese border t own, r epor t s t he
7t h Chi nese Communi st Art i l l ery Di vi si on Headquar t er s on
22 Apri l . The message adds t hat 400 gal l ons of gasol i ne wi l l
be i ssued for t hei r use. ( SUEDE 501st CommRecon %rp Kor ea,
K-2419, 24 Apr 52)
Comment : Whi l e t he si gni f i cance of t hi s i nspect i on
t eam' s ar r i val i n Nor t h Kor ea can not be i mmedi at el y assessed,
hi gh l evel i nspect i on acti vi ti es suggest pr epar at i ons for
f ut ur e mi l i t ar y oper at i ons. A pr i nci pal f ai l i ng i n pr evi ous
enemy of f ensi ves i n Kor ea has been t he i nabi l i t y to keep
advanci ng ground uni t s suppl i ed.
,,,,' N R
i NR
29 Apr 52
T o lea r n mor e a bout O CR a nd P D F Comp r ession go to T heP a p er lessO ffice.or g

2 ? / ( 1 - - r r S -
c .

H R 7 0 - 1 4

D A T E : 2 4 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

1
c I ' .
GENERAL
HR70-14
1. Britain backs UN stand on Korean prisoner exchange issue:
1 I
British Foreign Secretary Eden has instructed
the Foreign Office to prepare a paper for cir-
culation to the other Commonwealth members
i r @commending support of the United Nations' re-
fusal to repatriate prisoners of war against their, will.
Comment: The Foreign Off ice had previously
submitted to Eden a brief recommending compromise with the Communists
on this issue if necessary to prevent the collapse of the trucenegotiations.
Prime Minister Churchill had tnformally expressed the vtew that prisoners
held by the UN must not be handed over to face reprisals.
The other Commonwealth countries contributing
to UN forces in Korea have not committed themselves on the prisoner ex-
change issue.
SUEDE
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE: 24-Mar-201 0

" t0 P - S E - CR E T - S U E & E -

SOVIET UNION
FAR EAST
5. Additional armor arrives in North Korea:
North Korean Military North Korean messages of 24 and 25 April refer
to the arrival of additional tanks and self-pro-
pelled guns in the Pyongyang.area.
The messages suggest that at least 43 tanks
The unidentified North Korean unit whichorigi-
I 24,25 Apr 52
pieces have been brought Into Korea on
frelght cars from China.
nated these messages is to receive some of this armor.
Comment: Both the North Korean 105th Tank
Division and 10th Mechanlzed Division are located in the Pyongyang area,
and could reasonably be the reclpient of these tanks.
- 5 -
NR
4 5 / c c ,
A p p r o v e d O W / R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 0 1 4 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

2 9 A p r i l 1 9 5 2
O C I N o , 5 1 6 9
C o p y N o . 2 6 6
f o r t h e i n t e r n a l u s e o f t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y .
I t d o e s
n o t r e p r e s e n t a c o m p l e t e c o v e r a g e o f a l l c u r r e n t r e p o r t s
r e -
* A r m y , D I A a n d S t a t e D e p t r e v i e w s c o m p l e t e d *
R E T U R N T O A R C H I V E S
a
R E C O R D S C E N T E R
S E C R E T
I M M E D I A T E L Y A F f E R U S E

J O B l i a l - 4 - 4 2 - B O X S
p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 , 4 + 1 0
F o r mo r e i nf o r ma ti o n o n O C R a nd P D F C o mp r e s s i o n go to T he P a p e r l e s s O f f i ce .o r g
S T A T
2 5 X 1
A p p r o v e d ho l e R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T O S A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0

2 5 X 1

S t i


A p p r o v e d P I N / R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

A p p r o v e d P e i R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 W 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0

2 5 X 1
i nd i ca ti o n o f V i j o l i u ' s

2 5 X 1 C
2 5 X 1
A p p r o v e d F S R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 W 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T
2 5 X 1

S E C R E T
5

2 5 X 1
8 .
9
1 0
A p p r o v e d P w ' R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 4 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

S E C R E T
6
2 9 A p r 5 2
2 5 X 6
2 5 X 1 C
A p p r o v e d N a r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 W 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0

2 5 X 1 A

2 5 X 1 A 1
C o mme nt:

2 5 X 1 A
2 5 X 6
A p p r o v e d R i e k e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 W A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

1 6
A p p r o v e d P W R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 " X A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

2 9 A p r 5 2
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 9 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
A p p r o v e d ca p R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R O P 7 9 T 0 1 1 1 7 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

A p p r o v e d P e R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 ) 6 4 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0

2 1 .

1 1 2 9 A p r 5 2
2 5 X 6
2 2 .
2 3 .
2 4
A p p r o v e d F d l o o r te l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 1 4 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
2 5 .
2 6
2 5 X 1 C
A p p r o v e d F b a R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 N 8 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

A u s tr i a n

d i s mi s -
s a l

S E C R E T
1 3
2 9 A p r 5 2
2 5 X 1 C
2 7 .
2 5 X 1
2 8 .
A p p r o v e d P e r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 N tA 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

p a r a i n i a i a n G o e n t t S e s a c t i o n a g n
r i m e r c i V e z y
t h e

1 5 0

i n t o

S E C R E T
1 4 2 9 A p r 5 2
A p p r o v e d N e k e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 4 4 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0

4 / c o t ,
A p p r o v e d F o ci , e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 0 6 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0
T O P : S E C R E T

- U S O F F I C I A L S O N L Y
2 9 A p r i l 1 9 5 2
C I A N o . 4 9 6 7
C o p y N o . 4 1 0
D I G E S T
( i n c l u d t h g S / S C a b l e s )
N o t f o r d i s s e m i n a t i o n o u t s i d e
0 / C I a n d 0 / N E .
T h i S d i g e s t o f s i g n i f i c a n t r e p o r t s h a s b e e n
I t d o e s
n o t r e p r e s e n t a c o m p l e t e c o v e r a g e o f a l l c u r r e n t
T O P S E C R E T

2 5 X 6
A p p r o v e d F o l ta e l e a s e i 8 9 , 2 / M i tf l A - R D P 7 9 1 - 0 1 1 4 1 0 1 6 ) 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 1
/ 2 0 : C I A - R D F 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 A 2 1 1 8 3 6 1 1 2
A p p r o v e d F o f j e l e a s e 2 0 0 2 1 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 a tk 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 - 0

2 5 X 1
H R 7 0 - 1 4
- T t * S E C R E T S U E D h - d

T O P S E C R E T S U E D E c
I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
-
1 HR70-I 4
-
$ #
,
FAR EAST
6. Addi ti onal use of radar by North Koreans i ndi cated: A ~
recenny avai l abl e North K orean A i r Force lnessage of 12 March
i ndi cated that an ai r uni t, possi bl y at Sariwon, was to use
"detectors" and wanted to know what "type of detecti ng
machin'e. . .is to be used."
Si mi l arl y, the 2l st North Korean I ndependent Anti ai r-
craf t Arti l l ery Regiment reported on 26 Apri l that an
i ndi vi dual "who was being trai ned to be a radar operator"
must return to hi s uni t. (SUEDE ASAPAC J apan, 8621 AAU
Spot 33704, 25 Apr; 501st CommRecon Grp Korea,,15RSM/11503,
27 A pr 52)
Comment: Although the Communistshave made consi derabl e
use of radar i n North Korea for anti ai rcraft arti l l ery
di recti on, ground-controlled i ntercept, and earl y warning,
i t was general l y bel i eved that Sovi et personnel were operati ng
the bulk of thi s equipment.
Sarawon has been i deri ti fi ed as the si te of an earl y-
I
warning radar i nstal l ati on, possi bl y served by Sovi et personnel ]
and t hi s message suggests that the North Korean ai r uni t
there might receive addi ti onal equipment of thei r own.
7 . "Ori entati on" to be conducted at North Korean Supreme
Headquarters: An unl ocated element of th e North Korean
Rai l road Securi ty Di vi si on was informed on 25 ApriT that
"the persons attendi ng the Supreme Headquarters ori entati on
w i l l arri ve by 26 Apri l ." (SUEDE.330th Comm Recon Co Korea,
ALT-940, 26 Apr 52)
Comment: An i ncrease i n the number of staf f meetings
and conferences] parti cul arl y i n tacti cal uni ts, has general l y
preceded enemy offensi ves in the past. I t is probabl e,
however, that thi s meeting is f or pol i ti cal or l ogi sti cal
i nstructi on, rather than for operati onal pl anni ng.
" '1
8 . North Korean A i r Force may be uping ai rf i el d wi thi n
Korea: I n the l ate afternoon of 25 A pril, reports a US
m r c e f i el d uni t, North Korea ai r force voi ce traf f i c
i ndi cated that an operati opal ai rf i el d was undergoing repai rs.
A Korean ground control stati on informed an ai rcraf t to
"come i n 'one hour l ater. l e are' cl eani ng the playgrodnd"
(cover-hame f or ai rf i el d) .
4
(DATE: 18-Mar-2010 I

1.
9.
10.
11.
The f i el d uni t comments that thi s is the f i r st such
OcCuTmnce si nce 23 November 1951, when a North Korean
ground stati on reported that "the playground is di rti ed."
UN ai rcraf t had straf ed Uiju airfield that day. (SUEDE
6920 Securi ty Grp J ohnson AB J apan,AP 604, 28 Apr 52)
Comment: Both Si nui j u and Ui j u were operati onal on
25 Apri l .
noted at Sarlwon, Wonsan and Yonpo, near Hamhung.
Recently North Korean ai r acti vi ty has been
Mechanized Nmtb Korean uni t bel i eved deacti vated.
mentioned: An uni denti f i ed North Korean armored uni t T n' the - - _ - -~
Pyongyang area mentioned the "17th Di vi si on" on 24 Apri l .
The text of the message di d not i l adi cate the status of the
Di vi si on. (SUEDE 330th Corn Recon Co Korea, ALT-935,
26 A pr 52)
Korean Mechanized Di vi si on was deacti vated, and that its
personnel and equipmeqt were transferred to the 105th
Armored, 10th Mechanized and the newly formed mobile
arti l l ery bri gades. While thi s message alone doesl nbt
ref ute the previ ous i ndi cati ons that the 17th was deacti-
vated, it rai ses the possi bi l i ty that thi s uni t still exi sts.
Comment: I t is general l y thought that the 17th North
Chinese Communist arti l l ery uni t is i n "bivouac1'
fol l owi ng relief: Headquarters of the 2nd Chi nese Communist
A r t i l l ery Di vi si on i n west central Korea requested its
recentl y rel i eved 29th A rti l l ery Regi ment to "report by
l etter a summary 0% the transf er of your battal i on's
posi ti ons, also the present arrangement of your bivouac
area." (SUEDE 501st CommRecon Grp Korea, K-2472, 26 Apr 52)
rel i eved from combat between 20 and24 Apri l .
al though i ndi cati ng that the 29th has not returned to
combat in another sector of the f ront, reveal s that it is
still l ocated in some proximity to the f ront l i nes. -
Comment: Elements of the 29th Arti l l ery Regiment were
Thi s message,
Large f l i ght of Sovi et j ets at Tungfeng in central
Manchuria: A Chi nese message of 26 A pr i l reported 35 S ovi et
15's on a trai ni ng f l i ght at Tungfeng, 120 mi l e s north-
east of Hiikden. Transports subordi nate t o the Sovi et Union
conti nue to make shuttl e f l i ghts froqr Mukden i nto the
Tungf eng area

The Air Force comments t hat t he appearance of 35
Soviet jets is another i ndi cat i on t hat a Sovi et f i ght e r
uni t has just moved t here.
28 Apr 52)
t hat a Sovi et a i r uni t Wa f 3 at Tungfeng. The number of
MfG-15's observed f l yi ng there on 26 Apri l is t he normal
complement of a Sovi et ai r regiment.
Comment: A Chinese message of 22 April revealed
6
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6. North Korean tank di vi si on recei ves new armor: A con-
sl derabl e number of armored vehi cl es were brought i nto Korea
from China between 22 and 25 Apri l . Some were dri ven and
others were shipped i n by rail.
While the quanti ty of 'thi s newly arri ved material can
not be accuratel y establ i shed, a 24 A pr i l North Korean
message shows that the 105th Armored Di vi si on,l ocated north
of Pyongyang, recei ved 43 tanks and 22 sel f -propel l ed guns.
An unknown addi ti onal amount of armor is to be shi pped
f urther south to Pyongyang. (SUEDE ASAPAC J apan, 8621 M U ,
Spot 3382A, 29 Apr 52)
Comment. Earlier estimates
r-- - 1 M t h e two North Korea/ armored uni ts--the 1O!ith
Tank and the 10th Mechanized Di vi si on--a f ul l complement of
armor, i ncl udi ng a total of 192 tanks. These messages,
however, seem to i ndi cate that the f i l l i ng out process is
conti nui ng.
Si nce there is no known enemy armored uni t l ocated i n
Pyongyang proper, i t is possi bl e that the addi ti onal
armor which was sent there may provi de f or a f urther
expansi on of North Korean armored strength.
7.
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5. Recent enemy messages i n Korea suggest no major operati ons
pl anned i n May: North K orean A i r Headquarters at Si nui j u
advised an uni denti f i ed ai r uni t i n North Korea on 30 A Dr ' i l
that "the f requenci es and cal l si gns f or the ai r nets for
May w i l l remai n the same as they were in Apri l ."
An uni denti f i ed North Korean uni t, possi bl y subordi nate
to the V Corps in the Wonsan-Hamhung area, reported on
29 Apri l that "the trai ni ng course at the Corps w i l l be hel d
from the 1st of May to the 30th of May." (SUEDE Det 151
15th RSW J apan, CS 477, 30 Apr; 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea,
15RSM/11672, 30 Apr 52)
Comment: The conti nuance of Apri l communication
procedures duri ng May and conti nued trai ni ng in a major North
Korean command may be i nterpreted a8 an i ndi cati on that no
major enemy operati on is contempl ated i n the Xmmedi hte'future.
.
6 . Chi nese Communist V l ak trap" described: An uni denti f i ed
Chi nese Communist unl t i n North Korea gi ves a detai l ed account
in a 26 April message of the operati on of a decoy to lure UN
ai rcraft i nto range of anti ai rcraf t weapons.
The system, as described, consi sts of remote control l ed
ground l i ghts which are reveal ed upon orders from the uni t
command post. The UN ai rcraf t, it is anti ci pated, w i l l make
a bomb run on the l i ght. A second l i ght is then di spl ayed
and it is presumed that the UN ai rcraf t will make a low-level
second run on thi s new l i ght--at which t i me the anti ai rcraf t
weapons will open f i r e.
tested, the UN ai rcraft made one pass and fl ew away. (SUEDE
501st Corn Recon Grp KQrca, K-2547, 30 Apr 52)
The one t i me when the system was
7 , Sovi et advi sers still wi th North Korea uni t: I n a
24 Apri l message
vvTulovvl i nf o r m e n a oryuc eyev s o
arri ve at the Di vi si on by 25 Apri l ." (SUEDE ASAPAC Tokyo,
J apan 8621 AAU Spot 3391A, 29 Apr 52)
Comment; The code system of the message was new i n
Apri l . Previ ous messages i n thi s system have ref erred to
the movement of armor from Manchuria i nto Korea. T hi s
3 2 May 52
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F o r info o n P D F C o mpr essio n a nd O C R visit T heP a per lessO ffice.o r g

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movement raises the possibility that t hese Soviet advisers
may have been assigned to North Korean armored uni t s i n
northwestern Korea.
2 May 52
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SUEDF
GENERAL
FAR EAST
Recent enemy messages in Korea suggest no mj or operattons planned
!!es!
US Army J apan
30 Apr 62
w?$, -,SAu6n,
m/ db, , , , h
North Korean Ai r Headquarters at Sinuiju
advised an unidenttfied air unit in North Korea
.+77 on 90 April that "the frequencies and call signs
,- K+for the air nets for M a y wi l l remain the same
as they were ? i ApriL'," ha-
An unidentified North Korean unit, possibly sub-
ordinate to the V Corps in the Wonsan-Hamhung area, reported on
29 April that "the training course at the Corps wi l l be held from the
1st of May to the 30th of May."
Comment: The continuance of April commu-
nication procedures during M a y and continued training in a major North
Korean command may be interpreted as an tndication that no major
enemy operation is contemplated in the immediate future.
- 3 -
' 3WHWR E Y SUEDE
[DATE: 23-Mar-201 0
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SOVIET UNION
4. Real i gnment of Sovi et-Far East A i r Forcee i ndi cated:
Anal ysi s of Sovi et' Far East Air Force communications since
20 March suggest that a fighter di vi si on of the 9th A i r
Ar my , located i n the Mar$tirne Provi nce and Port 4rthur-
Dai ren area, has been transf erred to the Khabarovsk region.
Recent messages reveal ed aircradt from all three regi ments
of this division t o be under 10th Air Army rather than .
9th Air Ar my control .
Transf er of this di vi Bi on, if confi rmed, i ncreases
f i ghter strength i n the Khabarovsk area t o four di vi si ons
wi th 12 regi ments and gives the 10th Air Army a total of
23 f i ghter regi ments. (SUEDE A i r Force Roundup F6, 2 May 52)
2 5 May 52
..
HR70-14
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Comment: The suggested real i gnment of Sovi et Far East
ai r forces is In line with i ndi cati ons of a bui l dup duri ng
the past 15 months of the 10th A i r Rrrny, whose zone of
operati ons stretches from the Khabarovsk area to the Chukotsk
peninsula and i ncl udes Sakhal i n and the Kuri l e I sl ands.
Whereas fighter strength in the 9th A i r Army has remained
rel ati vel y stabl e since February 1951, the 10th A i r Army has
recei ved other si gni f i cant uni t rei nforcements and has ap-
parentl y been engaged in j e t conversi on training at a f aster
rate than the 9th A i r Army.
The transfer of three fi ghter regiments out of the 9th
A i r Army may also be related t o Indications that the bui l dup
of the Chinese Communist and North Korean ai r forces has
reached proporti ons making possible withdrawal of 6ovl et
uni ts i nvol ved in ai r defense of the Yalu Ri ver border.
I
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7 . Personnel from North Korean f ront l i ne di vi si on start
trai n'i nrr: Th e chief of staff of an uni denti f i ed N o r t h K orean
- ,
reglment reports the arri val of 47 men f or trai ni ng from the
North Korean 15th Di vi si on, currentl y i n immediate reaerve
i n the North Korean I11 Corps sector of the eastern f ront.
He states f urther thgt May w i l l be a day of rest. . .f rom
3 May the ai r. . .prqject w i l l be done and w i l l be accomplished
by 10 May, and from y l ectures w i l l start." (SUEDE 330th
Corn Recon Co Korea, 3242, 1 May 52)
Comment: I t is i mprobabl e that the 15th Di vi si on would
have m d these personnel for trai ni ng if imminent mi l i tary
operati ons were contempl ated. The crypti c ref erence to an
"ai r. . .proj ect1? cannot be eval uated.
8 . Ma DL greeti ngs occupy North Korean uni ts: May Day has
i n th*adi nspi red many North Korean uni ts to exchange greet-
i ngs and f el i ci tati ons.
- -
Notabl e among the numerous messages was one which stated
that "the enemy w i l l never gi ve up the l and, so, you shoul d
get busy and get better resul ts i n combat." Another from the
North Korean ai r trai f i i ng center at Y enchi , Manchuria, sent
t o A i r Headquarters at Si nui j u congratul ated: 'Iyou who are i n
combat on Ma Dag." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp K or i ! a, r I
3241, andd365, 1 May 52)
9. Smal l North Korean community on verge of starvati on:
Fourteen North R orean familFes, consi sti ng of 63 people
are on the verge of starvati on; "to the poi nt of exi sti ng
on roots and bark," accordi ng to a 28 A p r i l Chi nese Communist
message. I t stated, however, that 37 i ndi vi dual s can work and
shoul d be gi ven "materials to grow rspring spi nach f or wi th thei r
present suppl i es they cannot l i ve ten days.?l (SUEDE 501st
Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-2551, 28 Apr 52)
Comment: Previ ous i ntercepts and i ntel l i gence reports
have revealed i sol ated cases of starvati on exi sti ng amopg the
North Korean ci vi l i an popul ati on. The i mportati on of 'f l our and
5 May 52
I
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grain from the USSR and the use of troops for farm labor are
two of the l at est measures adopted by the Worth Korean
regime to al l evi at e the cri t i cal ci vi l i an food ehortage.
1
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10. Chi nese Communist arti l l erymen i n Korea to attend f i ve-
day course on tTattack" tactics:
'launcher regi ment i n east central Korea on 29 Apri l informed
i ts di vi si on headquarters: "The i nformati on came by tel ephone
-that present battl e tacti cs and assi gnments are not adequate.
I t is requested that di vi si on promul gate a ri gi d fi ve-day
educati onal program on the subj ect of 'Army Functi ons i n the
Attack.' Is thi s sati sf actory?" (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp
Korea, K-2608, 3 May 52)
A Ehi nese Communist rocket
DATE: 18-Mar-201 0
Comment: The schedul i ng of such a course i s not
i mmedi atel y i ndi cati ve of enemy i ntenti ons to i ni ti ate
of f ensi ve operathons. I t seems more l i kel y that Chinese
Communist arti l l ery units, probably i nadequatel y trai ned
i n di vi si on or hi gher maneuvers, are tryi ng to improve
Weir mi l i tar y ef f i ci ency.
HR70-14
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EASTERN EUROPE
2 7 May 52
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FAR EAST
6. Future combat ro$e f or North Kgrean armor suggested:
Four horth K oaean of f i cers, i ncl udi ng t wo "tank battal i on
techni cal department chi ef s," were ordered On 25 Apri l to
report to an uni denti f i ed North Korean uni t, possi bl y the
105th Tank Di vi si on, The officers were i nstructed re-
%7--'-'13247, 2 May 52)
Comment: These messages are probabl y related to the
movement i nto Korea i n l ate Apri l of tanks and sel f - propel l ed
guns from Manchuria. The ref erence to preparati on for combat
is i ndi cati ve of the conti nued aggregsi ve posi ti on of the
North Koreans, but cannot be i nterpreted as poi nti ng towards
imminent bf f ensi ve i ntenti ons.
extensi ve (combat) . '* (SUEDE ASAPAC Tokyo, rc1324B
7 . New Chinese Communist arti l l ery regi ment may be in Korea:
An uni denti f i ed Chi nese Communist uni t on 2 Z ' A pr i l reported
that ' l . . .al l the ammunition for the 1st battal i on of the
13th regi ment has arri ved." The message mentioned guns
crossi ng a ri ver and asked whether the uni t shouTd suppl y
materials and l abor f or repai ri ng seven bri dges on the route
from Wonsan south toward the battl e l i ne. (SUEDE ASAPAC
Tokyo, 8621 AAU Spot 3400A, 2 May 52)
Comment: The 13th Chinese Communist A rti l l ery Regiment
is bel i eved to be subordi nate to the 3rd A r ti l l er y Di vi si on.
I t was l ast l ocated at Amoy on the east China coast. There
have been no i ndi cati ons that any el ements of the 3rd
A r ti l l er y Di vi si on were enroute to Korea.
Another possi bi l i ty is that the 13th A rti l l ery Rekiment
is organi c to a Chinese Communist Army presentl y i n Korea.
A r mi es i n the 9th Army Group are known to have organi c
numbered arti l l ery regi ments.
4 7 May 52
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HR70-14
DATE: 18-Mar2010
FAR EAST
9. Communists conti nue to strengthen anti ai rcraf t def enses
i n eastern Korea: l'he North,Korean Z l s t Anti ai rcraf t A r t i l rery .
Regiment is to establ i sh an ammunition depot i n the Wonsan-
Hamhung area by 10 May, accordi ng to a "top secret" North
Korean message of 5 May.
The, order says that the depot should be "secure from
straf i ng by enemy pl anes," addi ng that the "rear area
department started transporti ng ammunition on the 4th of
May. . . 11
The North Korean 23rd AAA Regiment, also bui l di ng an
ammunition depot i n the area, apparent1.y is to rel i nqui sh
thi s f uncti on to the 21st because that uni t is ordered to
"take in thei r tasks." (SUEDE 501et Comm Recon Grp Korea,
r 1 3 2 5 5 , 6 May 52)
Comment: A bui l dup i n enemy anti ai rcraf t def enses i n '
eastern Korea has been Underway f or the past month. Recent
messages have stressed the i mportance of protecti ng the l i nes
of communication i n thi s area and of ensuri ng the flow of
suppl i es to the f ront.
5 8 May 52
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a lin

10. Communist uni t reports use of BW agai n i n Korea: An.
uni denti f i ed North K orean naval uni t reported in a 5 May
message that "on the second of May, at ni ght (they?)
dropped bacteria weapons at Chongpyong (near Hamhung i n
northeastern Korea).
ki l l ed it .Iv
6 May 52),
Comment: The l ast i htercepted enemy report of an
alleged Uni ted States drop of BW occurred on 14 Apri l . Si nce
that t i me, the Communist al l -out propaganda campaign has
l ost much of its i ntensi ty. The bul k of recent Communisti
commentary on the subj ect has deal t wi th the f i ndi ngs of
vari ous committees and the accumul ati on of I tevidence ."
The preventi on di sease committee
(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp I f o r ea, p254,
I t is possi bl e that thi s report, pl us other s i mi l ar
ones, w i l l renew the vi gor of the BW propaganda theme.
11. Chi nese Communists assessi ng transportati on capabi l i ti es
i n Korea: Th~ e- i nese Communist 7th A r ti l l er y Di vi si on
-an l l urgent wire from Army rear" on 3 May demanding
a "detai l ed reportv1 on the vehi cl e si tuati on in Korea. The
wire asked f or the i nformati on to be broken down by manu-
f acture and mi l eage of the vehi cl es. (SUEDE 501st CommRecon
Grp Korea, K-2656, 5 May 52)
Comment: Thi s message may mean onl y that the Chinese
Communists have i nsti tuted a regul ar reporti ng system as a
mai ntenance requi rement.
I n view of other reports of i ncreased Communist
acti vi ty, however, thi s urgent wire may i ndi cate a desire
to assess truck transportati on capabi l i ti es f or a f uture
operati on.
12. Manchuria-based ai rcraf t adopt new system of i ndi cati ng
f uel level: A new and more preci se system of i ndi cati ng a
pl ane's f uel l evel has been used on the Russian-language F-:
ground-controJ l ed i ntercept net on the Korea-Manchuria border
since 20 March. The new system uses the numbers three, f our
and f i ve, wi th an immediate l andi ng ordered i f an ai rpl ane's
f uel l evel drops below three. Previ ousl y only general terms,
such as ''watch your fuel ,I 1 were used. (SUEDE AFSA JCAFE-30,
2 May 52)
6 8 May 52
I
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Comment: The at t ent i on the enemy ground cont rol l er is
paying t o t he fuel supply of combat aircraft suggests that
t he Communists have been l osi ng p$@nes'which have run out
of f u e l . Si mpl i f i ed instruments and i nexperi enced p i l o t s
map be responsi bl e for t h i s problem.
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12. Communist uni ts renew charges of BW attacks in North
Korea: T h ey dropped spi ders and ants over Songj i n ci ty. . .
t oday, " a North Korean coastal securi ty stati on in north-
eastern Korea reported on 6 Yay. The message conti nues
that the al l eged drop area has been isolated and is bei ng
i nvesti gated by "the plague preventi on work comi tteeOf 4
(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/l2019, 6 May 52)
Coment: I n February and March, reports of BPI attacks
sent by many Communist uni ts i n North Korea were used i n
propaganda charges agai nst the United States. During the
pas t few weeks, Communist propaganda has made l i ttl e reference
to specific BW i nci dents, al though some enemy uni ts reported
such attacks as l ate as mid-April.
HR70-14
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9 May 52
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DATE: 24-Mar-201 0
rF SUEDW
FAR EAST
1. Communist units renew charges of BW attacks in North Korea:
US Army Korea "They dropped spiders and ants over Songjin
5,6 May 52 city. . . today," a North Korean coastal
SUEDE security station in northeastern Korea re-
l SR5f l / I L 0 1 f ported on 6 May. The message continues
that the alleged drop area has been isolated and is being investigated
by '*the plague prevention work committee."
Farther south in the Wonsan-Hamhung area,
another North Korean unit on 5 May reported that Iton the second of
May, at night, they dropped bacteria weapons at Chongpyong."
Comment: In February and March, reports
of BW attacks sent by mmi i u n i s t units in North Korea were
used in propaganda charges against the United States. During the
past few weeks, Communist propaganda has made little reference to
specificBW incidents, although some enemy units reported suchattacks,
as late as mid-April.
t
I
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2 6 6

O S D , D O S , N A V Y D e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n / R e l e a s e I n s t r u c t i o n s
o n F i l e

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e S 2 E 0 0 0 U R V I n O 9 / 0 6 7 O R M A P C l A - R D I P O 1 1 7 9 1 - 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 7 3 9 p , 7
F o r mo r e i n f o r ma t i o n o n O C R a n d P D F C o mp r e s s i o n v i s i t o u r w e bs i t e
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M a y 5 2
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S E C R E T
3 9 M a y 5 2
A p p r u o d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P W 1 - 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

A p p r g y e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D O 9 1 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

5 2
A p p r q u e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D ~ 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

9 M a y 5 2

4 p p r e me d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R O P P O 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

9 M a y 5 2
A p p r bi r e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P W 1 r 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

8 M a . 1 /


A p p r c o d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P 1 1 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

1 9 .
A p p w e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D I W T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

9 M a y 5 2
A p r : w i l e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P W 1 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

1 1
9 M a y 5 2
A p p s g me d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P G O T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

M a y
A p p a v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D N I R T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

2 4

S E C R E T
M a y 5 2
A p p r u p d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D 0 W T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2
S E C R E T
2 5 .

1 4 5 2
N e w
A p p r a i s e ! F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

M a y

d i S s e mi n a t i o n

1 .
A p p r o V i & F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 1 6 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2
A p p r o l l e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P i r 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

U N t L A S S I F I E D w h e n bl i k O p s : W e W F V F I R L A D 8 0 8 0 2 b0 1 / 0 9 I 0 5 e t T r A - T h e r r g t o 4 f i n 5 1 1 5 6 h d t i l bl i d d i d f r d e c l a s s '
f i e d w h e n f i l l e d i n f o r m i s d e t c i c h e d f r o m
c o n t r o l l e d d o c u me n t .
D O C U M E N T D E S C R I P T I O N
C - T _ P
R E G I S T R Y

7 7 c - 5

f o r m

s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 - 2

A p V i l d v e d
F o r
f O R I A 2 6 ( mo o n s .

T O P S E C R E T
0

D A T E : 2 3 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

H R 7 0 - 1 4 HR70-14
SUEDE
DATE: 23-Mar-201 0
NR
FAR EAST
2. More effective Communist training wi th AA rockets reported in Korea:
US Army A garbled and fragmentary Chinese Commu-
11 May 52 nist message of 4 May states that an unidenti-
SUEDE
fied Commwist untt commenced antiaircraft
ftring on 3 May with equipment tentatively
tdenttfied by translation as "rocket Launchers." The unit reported that
it expended rounds of ammunition at various altitudes from 10,800 to
24,600 feet.
"performed splendidly" and that it was estimated that "weeither hit
and damaged or hit and dropped" each of the targets.
.
1-f- 274-G
The message stated further that two of the launchers
Comment: This report, as received, indi-
cates that the Communist forces are training with A A rockets possesetng
vertical range and accuracy characteristics In excese of those of any
known Soviet or Chinese rocket. During the last three months, there
have been a series of sightings of Communtst AA rockets at steadily
increasing vertical ranges, but this is the first indication of a ground-
launched rocket attaining 24,600 feet.
- 3 -
F or mor e infor ma tion on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession visit our website

TYlP SECRET SUEDE
y b o c k e t s directed agatnst
UN aircraft to date have been ineffective and inaccurate. This message
suggests that the enemy may have new equipment which wi l l increase his
AA capabtltty.
. - .
- 4 -
TOP SECRET SUEDE

H R 7 0 - 1 4

T O P S E C R E T S U E D E c o
1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
- -.
. .
HR70-14
- -
FAR EAST
0 . Russi ans make large shi pmepts to Chi nese and Korean
Communists: Recent Russi an medsages reveal l etters of credi t
coveri ng Chi nese purchases of four mi l l i on jrubles (one mi l -
l i on dol l ars at the of f i ci al ri te of exchange) worth of spare
parts for motor vehi cl es and thctors, almost 200, 000 rubl es
for medi cal suppl i es, and over 350,000 rubl es for expl osi ves.
The del i very date for these i t ems is bel i eved to be no l ater .
than 21 J une.
The US A i r Force comments that a burld-up pattern
stri ki ngl y si mi l ar to that which precedeti the outbreak of
hosti l i ti es i n 1990 is provi ded by this transacti on coupl ed
w i t h recentl y reported letters of credit amounting to 13
mi l l i on rubl es coveri ng Sovi et shi pments of petrol eum pro-
ducts to the North Koreans, and del i veri es i n l ate May or
earl y J une of approxi matel y 2, 000 motor vehi cl es. (SUEDE
A i r Force Roundup 91, 9 May 52)
Comment: A steady bullti-up of suppl i es duri ng the
peri oh of the truce negoti ati ons has provi ded the Communists
wi th suf f i ci ent materiel to l aunch a major of f ensi ve agai nst
the UN f orces. A conti nui ng f l o w of deliveries from the
Sovi et Union is foreshadowed by a Si no-Sovi et trade protocol
which was si gned i n mid-April and which provi ded, accordi ng
to TAISS, for Ita consi derabl e expansi on of goods exchange i n
the coming year as agai nst the 1951 l evel ."
7 . North Koreans i ntercept UN communications: The commander
of the North K orean 23rd Bri gade, assi gned to coastal defense
i n western Korea, l earned I'by i ntercepti ng the enemy wireless
telegram," of UN operati onal pl ans i n thi s area. The of f i cer,
reporti ng to hi s corps commander on 9 May, stated that ROK
guerri l l as were evacuati ng i sl ands north of the 38th paral l el
and were concentrati ng on Paengnyon i sl and, j ust south of the
paral l el .
3 12 May 52
NR
T o lea r n mor e a bout P D F Compr ession a nd O CR go to T heP a per lessO ffice.or g

T O P S E C R A T S U E D E
, . i,
i
He attributes this withdrawal to a UN expectation of
"final success at the truce conference" which provides for
such a withdrawal. The North Korean warns, however, that
the ROK guerrillas are preparing to attack the Communist-
held Ongjin peninsula area. (SIIEDE CSSO6-extract, UnknoFn-
Unknown, 10 Way 52)
8. Four new Soviet GCI stations appear in northwest Korea:
The US Ai r Force reports that an additional Russian-language
ground-controlled-intercept station, possibly located at an
airfield south of the Yalu River, appeared on 15 April.
Three additional Russian-language GCI radar stations, also
located in the same generhl area and directly subordinate
to the chief controller at Antung, appeared between 16 and
19 April.
Following the discovery of these new GCI installations,
the volume of inter-net communications among the stations of
the Russian-language GCI net has increased sharply.
The Air Force observes that the establishment of these
new stations represents an expansion of operational air de-
fense capabilities, while the increased volume of communica-
tions suggests an increased state of readiness on the part
of the Communist air defense system. (SUEDE Air Force
Roundup 90, 8 May 52)
9. No communications eauioment increase scheduled for
. L
North Korean Army in May:
staff officet informed a communications suDulv officer at
A N orth K orean communications
- - -
Pyongyang on 6 May that "there are no plans for the com-
munications equipment for the 'Inmingun' (Peoples Army)
for May." The message continued that although some equip-
ment had arrived presumably in Manchuria, as "trading
material,11 the two freight cars assigned to the communica-
tions office were incapable of transporting any equipment
owing to rail damage in northwestern Korea. (SUEDE 501st
Corn Recon Grp Korea, 15RSW/12030, 7 May 52)
Comment: This communications organization has previously
c o n c e m s e l f with the manufacture of batteries and with
the importation of wire and telephone equipment.
communications equipment i s to be imported in May. It al so
suggests that either a sufficient quantity of such material
is on hand or that bad scheduling caused a break in ar-
r ivale .
The reference to the lack of plans indicates that no
12 May 52
T o lea r n mor e a bout P D F Compr ession a nd O CR go to T heP a per lessO ffice.or g
A p p r o v d * F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 6 :

2 6 6

o n f i l e

U S

; M O R N M
M I C H A S
' R E C O R D S O M R

I M M E O I M a l
A F I E R
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 , 0 , 0 7 6 9
S s
. s n

A p p r o v s g e F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 1 9 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0

A p p r o v e % ' , F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T W 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0

S E C R E T
2
1 2 M a y 5 2
A p p r o v e d * * R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T O U 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0

S E C R E T
1 2 M a y 5 2

A p p r o v e t wo r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T R e l 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

M a y 5 2

[ 9 .
2 5 X 1 C
A p p r o v e d e t R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 6 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

2 5 X 1 A

S E C R E T
5 1 2 M a y 5 2
2 5 X 1 C
A p p r o v e 4 f o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 7 4 4 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

S E C R E T

A p p r o v e 4 , F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 0 1 . 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

2 5 X 1 A
1 6 .
2 5 X 1 A
A p p r o v e d / n o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 1 8 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

a r e n a w

8 1 2 M a y 5 2
2 5 X 1 A
1 7
1 9
A p p r o v e t W o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T * 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0

9
1 2 M a y 5 2
2 5 X 6

A p p r o v e d f o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 t 8 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

1 2 M a y 5 2
A p p r o v a l . F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 W 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0

S E C R E T
1 1 1 2 M a y 5 2
A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 / 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 * 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0
S E C R E T

1 2 M a y 5 2
A p p r o v * F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 6 : C l A - R D P 7 9 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0

A p p r o 3 e a l i F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0

A p p r o V u t F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 0 9 1 0 6 : C I A - R D P 7 9 7 e ) 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0

T O P
M a y 5 2
T O P S S E C R E T
"
f l e d wh e n f i l l e d i n f o r m i s d e t a c h e d
f r o m c o n t r o l l e d d o c u me n t .

D O C U M E N T E 4 4

U N C L A S S I F I E D wh e n bk A p p r O v e d E R E I R e t e a t a 2 4 0 1 i 0 g f e e t T A C t i br i t 9 t h n i t i g t e 9 t 3 6 1 0 0 0 e 1
!

7 . / ( e
0 c 1 - -

t n t h e

i

A p i f l e l i i e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 / 0 6 : C I - R D P 7 9 1 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 - 0

!

2 6

T O P S E C R E T
0
- E
M O /

H R 7 0 - 1 4

2
I P P R O V E D
8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

. .
HR70-14
FAR EAST
2. American BW drop reported by Chi nese uni t: A Chi nese
Communist rocket l auncher arti l l ery uni t reported on 6 May
that "an enemy pl ane (was observed) droppi ng.propaganda
l eaf l ets and germi ci dal bombs." The message conti nued that
"the germs wer e epread over an area 150 met er s wide and
600 meters long" and that the"42nd Army ( i n combat i n west
central Korea) was di spatchi ng personnel to take some speci -
mens." (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-2757, 11May 52)
Comment: Vari ous North Korean uni ts reported the
al l eged use of bi ol ogi cal warfare by the Uni ted States earl i er
i n May. I t is enti rel y possi bl e that these messages may be
used to conti nue the momentum of the Communist BW propaganda
campaign.
3.
Lumbering job occupi es Chi nese Communist ar ti l l er y uni t:
On 5 Kay an uni denti f i ed Chi 11888 Communist uni t, possi bl y an
anti -tank ar ti l l er y battal i on, was ordered to "pull out one
pl atoon each, conSi sti ng of 20 men, from the f ourth company
and the anti - ai rcraf t company t o proceed to. . .where they
w i l l assist i n the choppi pg and gatheri ng of lumber." The
message added that "thi s wood w i l l be uti l i zed in the
repai ri ng of i nstal l ati ons." (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp
Korea, K-2759, 11May 52)
are repai ri ng and bui l di ng semi-permanent f aci l i ti es. While
not a concl usi ve i ndi cati on of enemy i ntenti ons, it would
appear doubtf ul that combat personnel would be di verted by
the uni t commander to l umberi ng operati ons to repai r def ensi ve
i nstal l ati ons i f he were aware of a pendi ng major of f ensi ve.
Comment: Thi s is f urther evi dence that the Communists
$ 4 . Chi nese akti l l ery di vi si on i nacti ve si nce l ate Apri l :
The Chi nese Communist 2nd A r t i l l ery Di vi si on, rel i eved from
combat i n mi d-Apri l , i nstructed ."all regi ments" on 27 Apri l
that "begi nni ng 28 Apri l , Di vi si on stati on w i l l cease
contact wi th al l stati ons."
Accordi ng t o the Far East Command, the 2nd A rti l l ery
Di vi si on net had not reappeared as of 9 May. FECOM bel i eves
that thi s net bei ng cl osed f or an i ndef i ni te peri od i ndi cates
2 13 May 52
C/D
> =*7?
APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE.
18-Mar-2010

that "no acti ve operati ons were envi saged f or the uni t i n
the immediate f uture." (SUEDE CINCFE SIB 499, 9 May;
CCM-1109, 27 Apr 52)
Comment: When combat el ements of the 2nd A rti l l ery
Di vi si on were rel i eved i n west central Korea by el ements
of the 1st A r ti l l er y Di vi si on between 20 and 24 Apri l , it
was specul ated that the 2nd A rti l l ery mi ght remai n i n combat.
I t now appears that the di vi si on has been wi thdrawn from
the f ront.
5. Record number of Chi nese j et di vi si ons bel i eved
based on Korean border: An al ysi s of messages passed on the
Chi nese Communist ground-control l ed i ntercept net duri ng
April i ndi cates that f our Chi nese Communist MI G-15 di vi si ons
are based on Manchurian f i el ds near the Yalu Ri ver. They
are the 4th Di vi si on probabl y at Antung, the 6th and 17th
at Tatungkou, and the 12th at Takushan. (SUEDE USA-38 Ap 741,
9 May 52)
Comment: Four Chi nese J et di vi si ons are the largest
number noted i n thi s area, and they represent a doubl i ng of
strength si nce February.
50 pl anes each, there are bel i eved to be gne Korean and three
Sovi et WIG-15 uni ts, of unknown strength, i n I he Antung area.
I n addi ti on to these f our di vi si ons, wi th an average of
'6. Sovi et J et uni t i ndi cated at Mukden: Several messages
i n earl y May reported f l i ghts of as many as 34 l tal l i ed"
MI G-15's on- round-robi n f l i ghts at Wukden,
l eaders were menti oned. (SUEDE USA-38 AP 741, 9 May; A i r
Force Roundup 92, 12 May 52)
Russi an f l i ght
Comment: These messages provi de the f i r st i ndi cati on of
a Sovl et MI6 -15 uni t at Mukden. Sovi et MI G's are also based
at Antung, Anshan and Tungfeng. The ones at Antung and
Anshan have fl own combat mi ssi ons over Korea, but the
f uncti on of the uni ts at Tungfeng and Mukden I s not yet
determi ned.
7. Chi nese admi t ?'mi shandl i ng of pol i cyt1 i n san-f an
pr i l message from Chinese "vol unteer
=er: :t torea deal s wi th "cases of sui ci de ani
3 13 May 52
r i . 0 1 3 S E C R E T S U E l p e :

self-mutilation resulting from mishandling of policy and
extortion of evidence" during the san-fan campaign among
lvvolunteerll forces .
The report has been sent to *la11 party committees'* with
the explicit aim of preventing the recurrence of such
incidents. (SUEDE Chinese Communist Military Identifications
Bulletin No. 69, CC/CAP-217, 7 May 52)
Comment: An Intercepted message of early February
revealed the establishment of a rcquotall of major and minor
offenders to be discovered in each llvolunteerll unit during
the campaign against corruption, waste and bureaucracy.
Moreover, all units were urged to exceed the established
quotas.
quota system, in particular encouraging fabrication of
evidence, has resulted as expected in new expressions of
corruption, waste, and bureaucracy.
The 15 April report confirms that this misuse of the
I
..."R
4 , 13 May 52
~
I
t 3 p u , , L H R 7 0 - 1 4
T O P S E C R E T S U E I X
c .
F A R E A S T
1 . R e c o r d n u m b e r o f C h i n e s e j e t d i v i s i o n s b e l i e v e d b a s e d o n K o r e a n b o r d e r :
U S A i r F o r c e A n a l y s i s o f m e s s a g e s p a s s e d o n t h e C h i n e s e
9 M a y 5 2 C o m m u n i s t g r o u n d - c o n t r o l l e d i n t e r c e p t n e t
S U E D E d u r i n g A p r i l i n d i c a t e s t h a t f o u r C h i n e s e C o m m u -
3 v A P - 7 V / n i s t M I G - 1 5 d i v i s i o n s a r e b a s e d o n M a n c h u r i a n
f i e l d s n e a r t h e Y a l u R i v e r . T h e y a r e t h e 4 t h D i v i s i o n p r o b a b l y a t A n t u n g ,
t h e 6 t h a n d 1 7 t h a t T a t u n g k o u , a n d t h e 1 2 t h a t T a k u s h a n .
C o m m e n t : F o u r C h i n e s e j e t d i v i s i o n s a r e t h e
l a r g e s t n u m b e r n o t e d i n t h i s a r e a , a n d t h e y r e p r e s e n t a d o u b l i n g o f
s t r e n g t h s i n c e F e b r u a r y .
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e f o u r d i v i s i o n s , w i t h a n
a v e r a g e o f 5 0 p l a n e s e a c h , t h e r e a r e b e l i e v e d t o b e o n e K o r e a n a n d t h r e e
S o v i e t M I G - 1 5 u n i t s , o f u n k n o w n s t r e n g t h , i n t h e A n t u n g a r e a .
V P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E . 2 3 - p a r - 2 0 1 0
3
- T O P - S E e R E T - - S U E D E
-.
1.
FAR EAST
Record number of Chinese jet divisions believed based on Korean border:
US A i r For
9 May 52
SUEDE
ice Analysis of messages passed on the Chinese
Communist ground-controlled intercept net
during April indicates that four Chinese Commu-
q s f i - 3 7 P P - 7f l nist MIG-15 divisions are based on Manchurian
fields near the Yalu River. They are the 4th Dtvision probably at Antung,
the 6th and 17th at Tatungkou, and the 12th at Takushan.
HR70-14
13-52
~ *%
Comment: Four Chinese jet divisions are the
largest number noted in this area, and they represent a doubling of
strength since February.
In addition to these four divisions, with an
average of 50 planes each, there are believed to be one Korean and three
Soviet MIG-15 units, of unknown strength, in the Antung area.
NR
- 3 -
I
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
23-Mar-201 0
T o lea r n how t o u se P D F Comp r ession a nd O CR go t o T heP a p er lessO ffic e. or g
1 1 .

T O P . S E C R E T S U E D E
1 1 1 P P R O V E D
8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
HR70-14
I .
18-Mar-2010 -
11.
12.
13.
FAR EAST
Communist uni t i n Korea has epi demi c outbreak: An
uni denti f i ed North K orean uni t, probabl y an anti ahcraf t
arti l l ery battal i on i n eastern Korea, reported on 8 May
that "on the 6th and 7th day, 17 pati ents suddenl y came
down wi %h a hi gh fever." (SUEDE USM-664, Korea, SK-J-225,
8 May 52)
Comment: Thi s is the f i r st i ndi cati on i n communica-
ti ons i ntel l rgence thi s year of di sease i n epi demi c propor-
ti ons among Communist uni ts i n North Korea.
a rel ati vel y hi gh i nci dence of communicable di seases i n
North Korea.
Other i ntel l i gence sources, however, have i ndi cated
Chi nese move anti ai rcraf t ar ti l l er y nearer Korean f ront:
An unl denti f i ed Ch i nsse Communist anti ai rcraf t uni t, probab3y
located i n the Si ngye area of west central Korea, in
ref erri ng to **the 38th Army's I ndependent 2nd Battal i onv1
reported on 6 May: "at the present time that battal i on' s
commander accompanied by one company has a.rrived.lI A
l i ttl e l ater on the same day, thi s uni t reported that "as
the 38th Army's s mal l anti ai rcraf t arti l l ery uni ts, and
the 11th Battal i on have al ready proceededforward to assume
the def ensi ve duti es of the 1st and 3rd compani es. . . 11
Thi s message conti nued that the 1st and 3rd compani es which
were rel i eved by the 38th Army M A Battal i on ' I. . . wi l l be
depl oyed. . .wi th thei r pri nci pal duty. . .the di recti on of
f i r e upon enemy ai rcraf t. . . " (SUEDE USM-664, Korea,
K-2731 and K-2732, 10 May 52)
l ocated i n t6e Sunchon area, northeast of Pyongyang. The
deployment of i ts organi c anti ai rcraf t battal i on to an
area i n the immediate rear of the f ront l i nes gi ves f urther
evi dence of the i ncreasi ng i mportance attached to anti ai r-
craf t def enses i n the combat zone. I t does not appear that
the bul k of the 38th Army w i l l f ol l ow thi s AAA battal i on.
Comment: The 38th Chi nese Communist Army is bel i eved
North Korean uni t w e l l suppl i ed wi th food despi te
reducti on i n meat rati on: Every man i n the 21st Anti ai rcraf t
A rti l l ery Regiment w i l l be provi ded wi th 150 grams of sal t
6 14 May 52
T o lea r n a bout O CR a nd P D F Compr ession go to our website
1 ) ( ) P S E C R E T S U E e E

a month "to use f or toothpastef 1 but 50 grams of meat w i l l
be deducted from the month's rati on, accordi ng to a 10 May
North Korean message. The message concl uded that "there
is no need to save the main and auxi l i ary food begi nni n
on the f i r st of Yay." (SUEDE USM-664, Korea ,- I. ! j RSB. r73280,
11 May 52)
Comment: Despi te the curtai l ment of meat, which is
of m i n r t a n c e i n the sol di er's di et, the above
message demonstrates f urther the conti nued l ogi sti cal
success of the Communists,
14. Smal l amount of f er ti l i zer pay be impokted i nto North
Korea: A N orth Korean message passed between t wo uni denti f i ed
un'i-t;son 9 May statel3 that "they have l oaded" 130 bags of
f er ti l i zer at a smal n i n the Hungnam area. (SUEDE
USM-664 ,"', Korea, l SRSY ~L o~ 3281, 11May 52)
amount of commercial f er ti l i zer , known to be vi rtual l y
unobtai nabl e by the average North Korean f armer, is bei ng
i mported. Other possi bi l i ti es are that thi s f er ti l i zer
was stockpi l ed i n some i sol ated area or that a s mal l amount
is bei ng produced i n the Hungnam-Hamhung area, the
former center of North Korea's extensi ve f er ti l i zer i ndustry.
Comment: Thi s message suggests that possi bl y a s mal l
15. More gas masks needed by Communist ar ti l l er y uni t i n
Korea: The 7th Ch' i nese Communist A r t i l l ery Di vi si on head-
quar'ters i nformed its suppl y el ement on 7 May that personnel
were goi ng to Antung "to request gas masks." The message
conti nued that two vehi cl es were bei ng prepared by the
transportati on company, possi bl y to transport the masks.
(SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-2762, 11May 52)
Comment: On 22 March,the 7th A r ti l l er y Di vi si on
recei ved S u r gas masks, the first recei pt of anti -gas equi p-
ment noted i n Korea. These masks, probabl y i ntended for
trai ni ng purposes, were di stri buted to the arti l l ery
regi ments subordi nate to the 7th A rti l l ery on 2 A pr i l .
16. North Korean A i r Force l*lecturevl schedul ed for
12 Ma? at Si nui j u:
uni denti f i ed and unl ocated North Korean ai r uni ts,
I n a 6 May message passed between t wo
7 14 May 52
O P S E C R E T S U E v E

I . . i
an i ndi vi dual was i nstructed: "si nce there is a l ecture
from 12 May, you are to arri ve at Si nui j u by 11May."
The message was garbl ed. (SUEDE USM-35, Korea, ALT-024,
10 May 52)
Comment: While no immediate si gni f i cance can be
at t ac h ed t h i s meeti ng, the enemy i n Korea has al ways
preceded a major operati on w i t h a series of hi gh echel on
of f i ci al conferences.
17. Another Chi nese j et di vi si on may move to Antung
ai rf i el d: A Ch i nese message schedul ed 22 MXG -13's of the
3rd Di vi si on from Mukden to Antung on 13 May..' Thi s ?l i ght
may be a uni t transf er,accordi ng,,to the reporti ng agency,
which comments that af ter thi s move there w i l l be at least
347 j ets on Yalu Ri ver bases.
I2 May 52)
(SUEDE USA-38 AP 782,
Comment: The 3rd Di vi si on f l ew combat missions at
Antung,'from mid-October 1951 t o mid-J anuary 1952, when i t
returned to Mukden. Although i t may be moving i nto the
Antung area to replace one of the uni ts now based there,
there are no i ndi cati ons yet that any are moving out.
Four Chi nese MLG-15 di vi si ons, averagi ng 50 pl anes each,
and one, Korean and three Sovi et uni ts are bel i eved to be
al ready based i n the Antung area.
1111 NR
8 14 May 52
- . 1 0 P - S E C R E T - S U b f e

H R 7 0 - 1 4
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' FAR EAST
_...-
More ef f ecti ve Communist trai ni pg wi th AA rockets
repor%ed i n .Korea:
ni st message of 4 M ay states that an unidentified&.ommunist
A garbl ed and frag'mentary Chi nese Cornu-
uni t commeGced anti ai rcraf t f i ri ng on 3 May wi th Giuipment
tentati vel y i denti f i ed by transl ati on as l troqket l aunchers .*l
The uni t reported that it expended rounds of',ammunition at
vari ous al ti tudes from 10,600 to 24,600 feet. The message
stated f urther that two of the l aunchers "performed spl endi dl y"
and that it was esti mated that "we ei ther hi t and damaged or
hi t and dropped" each of the targets. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon
Gr p Korea, K-2752, 11 May 52)
Comment: This report, as recei ved, i ndi cates that the
C o mmu mr c es are trai ni ng wi th AA rockets possessi ng
verti cal range and accuracy chaPacteri sti cs i n excess of those
of any known Sovi et or Chi nese rocket. Duri ng the l ast three
months, there have been a series of si ghti ngs of Communist
AB rockets at steadi l y i ncreasi ng verti cal ranges, but thi s
is the f i r st i ndi cati on of a ground-launched rocket attai ni ng
24,600 f eet.
The USAF reports that rockets di rected agai nst UN
ai rcraf t to date have been i nef f ecti ve and i naccurate.
This message suggests that the enemy may have new equipment
which w i l l i ncrease hi s AA capabi l i ty.
5
F or info on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession go to T heP a per lessO ffice. or g

s l l ' O P S E C R E T S U I D E

12.
Higher North Korean echel on expresses i nterest i n
i ntercepted UN message:
of th e North K orean 23rd Bri gade Commander that he had
Th e day Pol l dai ng the 9 M ay report
i ntercepted a UN message reveal i ng operati onal pl ans in
western Korea, an uni denti f i ed North Korean uni t, probabl y
IV Corps headquarters, queri ed "let me know where the regi -
ment commander caught the enemy wireless communication
telegram." (SUEDE 15th RSM Det 1, 15RSM/12241, 11May 52)
Comment: The i nterest evoked by thi s i ntercepted UN
message and the method of handl i ng it suggests that these
North Korean mi l i tary units, at least, do not have access to
i ntel l i gence deri ved from UN communications.
13 North Korean regi ment recei ves arti l l ery ammunition:
The commander of an uni denti f i ed North Korean regi ment,
possi bl y the 21st Anti ai rcraf t A rti l l ery, recei ved a message
on 10 May stati ng that "1,400 76 mm" shel l s and 96,050 armor
pi erci ng shel l s had arri ved at the "f i el d ammunition depot."
Ten addi ti onal truckl oads of ammunition were to be del i vered
t o the regi ment "thi s eveni ng," accordi ng to the ori gi nator.
(SUEDE USH 664, SK-5-320, 11May 52)
was ordered i n a "top secret" message t o establ i sh an
ammunition depot in the Wonsan-Hamhung area. Thi s apparentl y
is the f i r st arri val of ammunition at the newly establ i shed
anti ai rcraf t ar ti l l er y depot.
Comment: On 5 May, the 21st North Korean AAA Regiment
14 Unknown Chinese uni t moving to the Korean f ront: An
uni denti f i q c h i e nese Conlmunist uni t in western Korea, possi bl y
an anti ai rcraf t arti l l ery uni t, was advi sed on 5 May that
llyour submi tted pl an f ai l ed' to advi se us ah t o what t i me you
i ntended to move. . .you w i l l pl ease submi t a report pri or
to any move you make that we may send representati ves forward
to control the move and the tr af f i c on the road. . . f t
(SUEDE 501at Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-2737, 11May 52)
Comment: Thi s message possibly refers to the recentl y
n o t e d w d deployment of small Chi nese anti ai rcraf t
ar ti l l er y uni ts i n western Korea. The statement that tr af f i c
control would be i nsti tuted, however, may be an i ndi cati on
that a l arger uni t i s on the move.
6 15 May 52
J 4 1 1 .
M P ' I I I

i
I
I
I
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~~ -
16.
Chinese in Korea short of ski l l ed ordnance repai rmen:
'?The bo.: 27 L arge Depo"t has no ski l l ed weapons and motor
per80nnel 't a712 May i ntercept from a Chi nese regi ment
reveal ed. The message sai d, "We have recei ved 60 motor
cyl i nder repai r order8 and are hopi ng to recrui t qual i f i ed
personnel from 'our own ;regiment. . e I t will requi re two
months t i me to compl ete (backl ogged orders?)." (SUEDE 501st
Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2788, 12 May 52)
Comment: The Chinese Communists are esti mated to have
recei-0 addi ti onal vehi cl es i n Korea si nce December.
Thi s message may be the f i r st sign that thi s sudden i ncrease
i n motor transport is seri ousl y taxi ng thei r mai ntenance
capabi l i ti es. The 27th "Large Depot," one of f our l ogi sti cal
regi ments in the 4th Supply Area,would ordi nari l y be respons-
i bl e for maj or motor repai r orders. It would seemthat the
reporti ng regi ment has been f orced to recrui t its own personnel
f or thi s work.
-

l i t / P
E T S U E D h - -

H R 7 0 - 1 4

' I C I F - S - E C R E T S U E D E
V P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 2 2 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

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HR70-14
6. Chineste rice i mports by Nw$h Koreans suggested: The
pol i ti cal comrdander of an D&iQ enti f l ed. North Korean supply
;pit, possi bJ y on the east Coast , has, accordi ng to a 30 Apri l
meshage !'issued a di recti ve t o receive f i f t y f rei ght cars of
rice qt Hamyong-&amdo Provi nce."
also passed between t wo uni denti f i ed North Korean uni ts,
st at ed that *9nanagsment of the Manchurian rice shoul d not be
taken-re (of) by thi e pl ace.*# (BUEDE OOlbt Conuii ReEon Grp
A l ater message on 9 May,
.Korea, SK-37335, p2 Yay; l Sth RSM Det l Korea 15RSM/12392,14 May 52)
Codent : Although f rapentary and inconclusive, these
massages l end confi rmati on to pri soner and agent reports
that ri ce for mi .l i tgfy .conbumption' is bei ng i mported vi a
the east coast rai l l i ne.
3' 16 May 52
?anEGRE T SUEDE
DATE: 22-Mar-2010
T o t a i E C R E T S U E D e

T O P S E c R E T S U E D E
7 . North Korean wes t coast tactical uni t short of of f i cers:
A major North IC orean tacti cal uni t, probabl y subordi nate to
the IV Corps in western Korea, comp&ained i n a 30 Apri l
message that "the paper work on the recommendations for
appl i cants to the Kangkon Mi l i tary Academy cannot be done
before 30 Apri l , because more than hal f of the heavy machine
gun pl atoon l eaders. . .are bei ng trai ned. . .at the 5th
Di vi si on." Af ter f urther questi oni ng a possi bl e nevi si on
i n the quota of personnel to be sent to the North Korean
"West Poi nt," the sender conti nued that "we shoul d have
3 i ntel l i gence of f i cers, but si nce 2 are presentl y bei ng
trai ned we have onl y 1 of f i cer. Although we have vacanci es
f or 2 i nf antry company commanders, we have not been al l otted
a si ngl e replacement." (SUEDE USM-86, SPOT 3434A, 10 May 52)
Comment: Although no crl ti cal of f i cer shortage is
demonstrated i n thi s message, the lack of offi cer repl ace-
ments and the trai ni ng status of many of the uni t'sj uni or
of f i cer personnel i ndi cate that the uni t is not currentl y
prepared for combat operati ons, I
8 . East coast North Korean tacti cal uni t has mid-May
i nspecti on: A N orth K orean tacti cal uni t, possi bl y a
subordi nate of the V Corps i n the Wonaan-Hamhuna area of
eastern Korea, stated i n- a 12 May message that ;if you
del i ver the di vi si on's orders si nce there is an i nspecti on
meeti ng on 14 May, you ar e to arri ve at di vi si on. . ,by the
eveni ng of 13 May." (SUEDE USM-35, Korea ALT-225, 12 May 52)
Comment: Thi s i nspecti on may be a conti nuati on of the
series of i nspecti ons started by the North Korean General
Headquarters in earl y Apri l . Thi s is the f i r st noted
i nci dent of a tacti cal uni t bei ng i nspected.
9. Evacuati on pol i cy f or Chinese wounded in Korea: Only
men "who sust ai n heavy wounds to the poi nt where more than
two months conval escence is requi red, or who recover from
thei r wounds but wi th l asti ng def ects renderi ng them unf i t
f or servi ceq1 can be transf erred to di vi si on medi cal uni ts,
accordi ng to an 11May Chi nese Communist message. Tpe
communication noted that s i x men i n the battal i on were
qual i f i ed to recei ve the wounded sol di ers'compensati on
benef i t. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2768, 11May 52)
Comment: Thi s stri ct evacuati on rul e was announced i n
an s wemr eq u es t for i nstructi ons by a subordi nate uni t.
4 16 May 52 ,
T - ET SUEDE
.
T S T S U E D Y

1 3 - S E G l i E T S U E D E

, . *z
10.
TUP b T S SUEDW
I f it represents a general pol i cy, it may reveal i nadequate
medical f aci l i ti es f or wounded sol di ers i n rear areas. The
f act that the Communists are awarding wounded sol di ers at the
f ront "compensation benef i tsvq i n the form of extra rati ons
may be f urther evi dence of an i nsuf f i ci ent hospi tal i zati on
capabi l i ty.
Korean and S.ovi etj etsunusual l y active at Anshan i n
Manchuria: J et acti vi ty at Anshan. 25 mi l es south of Mukden.
on 14 and 15 May i ncl uded: a roundLrobin f l i ght of 23 MI G-lS;s,
believed subordi nate to the 1st North Korean Di vi si on; a
schedul ed ni ght f l i ght from Anshan to Antung of el even more
MI G's under Efi mov's command; and a dayti me f l i ght over Kdrea
of 14 MI G- 15vs wi th a Russi an f l i ght l eader. Efimov al so led
a f l i ght of LA-11 conventi onal f i ghters the ni ght of 13 May,
possi bl y on an i ntercepti on mi ssi on over Korea. (SUEDE A i r
Force Roundup 94, 14 May 52)
known Korean j et uni t, are also bel i eved based at Antung.
MI G-15's and LA-ll's, usual l y under Efimov's command, have
been f l yi ng ni ght mi ssi ons over Korea si nce l ate J anuary,
but have not been a seri ous threat to UN ai r ni ght operati ons.
aomment; El ements of the 1st Korean Di vi si on, the onl y ,
5 16 May 52
- SUEDE
NR
NR
b
, - A p p r o v e d r w a t R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 1 1 / 2 0 : C l A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 N I S A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7

2 6 7

O S D , D O S D e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n / R e l e a s e I n s t r u c t i o n s
o n F i l e

A p p r o v e d F o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 1 1 1 2 0 : C l A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 1 0 0 v A
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A p p r o v e d A W R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 4 1 4 6 A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7
S E C R E T

A p p r o v e d % p i R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 1 1 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 t 4 4 6 A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7

A p p r o v e s f r o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 1 1 1 2 0 : C I A - R 0 P 7 9 T 6 4 4 4 6 A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7

2 5 X 1 A

2 5 X 1 C
2 5 X 1 C
A p p r o v e d M s R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 1 1 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7
S E C R E T

2 5 X 1 C
2 5 X 1 A
2 5 X 1 C 1

S E C R E T
4
1 6 M a y 5 2

A p p r o v e c k l e r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 1 1 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 4 4 1 4 6 A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7

6

A p p r o v e d f o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 t 4 4 5 A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7
S E C R E T

1 5 .

: C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 6 A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7

A p p r o v e t p o r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 1 1 W 1 4 6 A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7

8
1 6 M a y 5 2
A p p r o v e d , W i r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T a t r 1 4 6 A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7
S E C R E T

S E C R E T
9
1 6 M a y 5 2

A p p r o v e d R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 1 1 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T O T W A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7
S E C R E T

A p p r o v e d N W R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 1 1 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 t i d i A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7
S E C R E T

S E C R E T
1 1

2 4
A p p r o v e d P e r R e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 1 1 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7
S E C R E T

S E C R E T
1 2
M a y 5 2
A p p r o v e d F o r l I C a l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 1 1 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 4 1 1 / 1 1 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7

S E C U R I T Y I N F C R M A T I O N

S E C U R I T Y I N F C E M A T I O N
A p p r o v e d F o * e l e a s e 2 0 0 1 / 1 1 1 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 1 * 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 - 7
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M a y 5 2
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M a y 5 2
T O P S E C R E T
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A T T E N T I O N : T hi s f o r m be p l a c e d o n t o p o f a n d a t t a c he d t o e a c h T o p S e c r e t d o c u me n t r e c e i v e d by t he C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y
o r c l a s s i f i e d T o p S e c r e t w i t hi n t he C I A a n d w i l t r e ma i n a t t a c he d t o t he d o c u me n t u n t i l s u c h t i me a s i t i s d o w n g r a d e d , d e s t r o y e d , O r
t r a n i mi t t e d o u t s i d e o f C I A . A c c e s s t o T o p S e c r e t ma t t e r L s l i mi t e d t o T o p S e c r e t C o n t r o l p e r s o n n e l a n d t ho s e i n d i v i d u a l s w ho s e o f f i c i a l
d u t i e s r e l a t e t o t he ma t t e r . S e c r e C o n t r o l O f f i c e r s w ho r e c e i v e a n d / o r r e l e a s e t he a t t a c he d T o y S e c r e t ma t e r i a l w i l t s i g n t hi s
a n d i n d i c a t e p e r i o d o / c u s t o d y i n t he l e f t - ha n d c o l u mn s p r o v i d e d . E a c h i n d i v i d u a l w ho s e e s t he T o p S e c r e t d o c u me n t w i l l s i g n a n d
i n d i c a t e t he d a t e ha n d l i n g i n t he r i g ht - ha n d c o l u mn s .

N O T I C E O F D E T A C H M E N T : W he n t hi s f o r m i s d e t a c he d f r o m S e c r e t ma t e W I i t s ha l l be c o mp l e t e d i n t he a p p r o p r i a t e s p a c e be l o w
a n d ' t r a n s mi t t e d t o C e n t r a l T o y S e c r e t C o n t r o f o r r e c o r d .

;
I

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T O P S E C R E T
0
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T O P S E C R E T
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FAR EAST
2. Communications equipment apparentl y needed by North
Koreans: A N orth K orean offi cer, pre3i nusl y noted i n the
Eomuni cati ons Bureau of Supreme Headquarters, i nstructed
a communications of f i cer, possi bl y in Manchuria, on 8 May
that "if i t is i mpossi bl e to transport by rai l for a l ong
durati on because of the damaged railroad south of Sonchon,
you are to. . .take the roundabout northeast route to make
transporti ng possi bl e. . ." (SUEDE ASAPAC, Tokyo Spot 34488,
15 May 52)
Comment: On 6 May, the North Korean addressed i n thi s
message informed Pyongyang that he was i ncapabl e of trans- ,,
porti ng any communications equipment i nto Korea from
Manchuria owing t o track damage i n northwestern Korea
"south of Sonchon."
1
19 May 52
CID
s/ s"ft"

The northeastern route is very ci rcui tous. I t i nvol ves
a tri p across Manchuria, entry i nto Korea near the Sovi et
border:, and then the peri l ous tr i p south on the exposed
east coast l i ne.
3. UN f ront l i ne arti l l ery posi ti ons reported by Chi nese
; -gi : ent , in suppof tttf :::?.3E;h Army in west2rn
Korea, informed its forward command post on 4 May that."we
have recei ved a report from the 39th Army gi vi ng posi ti ons
of enemy arti l l ery as fol l ows. . . I 1 The message pi npoi nts
the l ocati on of the "147th A rti l l ery Company l ong-range
guns," the "99th A rti l l ery Battal i on," the "113th A rti l l ery
Company," and the "999th Battal i on headquarters .I' (SUEDE
ASAPAC, Tokyo Spot 3452A, 15 May 52)
Commant: I t would be normal f or the 39th Army to
assist its assi gned arti l l ery i n f i ri ng counter-battery
mi ssi ons. The 27th Arti l l ery Regiment had been i n support
of the 39th Army for onl y about two week6 when thi s message
was sent.
eadquarterg o e i nese Communis
4. North Korean,coastal uni t ordered to conserve anynunition:
An unl denti f i ed North K orean uni t, probabl y charged With
coastal securi ty of a porti on of northeastern Korea, ordered
that "you shoul d save al l arti l l ery ammunition even i n the
extreme combat.l? The message al so mentioned a change i n
the l ocati on of the 11107mmgunT1 posi ti ons. (SUEDE 15th
RSM Det 1, Korea 15RSM/12395, 14 May 52)
reveal ed that Communist arti l l ery posi ti ons on the east
coast had been ordered t o ref use f i r e mi ssi ons i n order to
retai n ammunition f or an expected UN amphibious operati on.
Comment: A recentl y captured North Korean pri soner
5 . Evacuatl on,of North Korean postal uni t from western
city ordered: A N orth K orean message on 12 Y ay sent i n a
system sometimes used by GHQ for admi ni strati ve messages and
si gned by a '#Li ai son of f i cer," ordered that "the f i el d post
exchange of f i ce i n SarPwon w i l l be evacuated and al l af f ai rs
of the of f i ce must be handed to the central f i el d post
department." (SUEDE 15th RSM DetI.1, Korea 15RSM/12414,
14 May 52)
2 19 May 52

Comment: Although Sariwon is i n an arga where Chi nese
Communist uni ts predomi qate, the ci t y is on the main suppl y
route to Kaesong and to North Korean uni ts i n western Korea.
A t l east two major Korean tacti cal uni ts and a North Korean
A i r Force uni t are al so l ocated i n the Sariwon area.
6. Ordnance type and aqmuni ti on suppl y of Chi nese anti ai r-
craft uni t reveal ed: An uni denti f i ed Chi nese Communist anti -
ai rcraft arti l l ery uni t, probabl y of regi mental si ze and
located i n the Si ngye area of western Korea, reported on
11 May its ammunition expendi ture and suppl y on hand. The
message reveal ed that 72 rounds of 85mmanti ai rcraf t ar ti l l er y
muni t i on had been f i red and that 2,453 raunds remained on
hand, that 82 rounds of 37mm were f i red wi th 9,291 remai ni ng,
and that 11 rounds probabl y of 12.7mm machine gun ammunition
were f i red wi th 61,169 remai ni ng. (SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp
Korea, K-2833, 15 May 52)
Comment: Thi s anti ai rcraf t uni t has been very acti ve
recentl y. Probabl y the ammunition expendi ture l i sted was
onl y for a 24-hour period.
7 . Three more Ryssi an f i ghter uni ts l ocated on Korea-
Manchuria border: Th ree addi ti onal Russi an f i ghter uni ts,
Rrobablu regi ments, became acti ve on the ground-control l ed
i ntercept (&?,I) net i n the Yalu Ri ver area on 21 Apri l .
A i r Force states that thi s i ncreases to ni ne the Russi an
f i ghter uni ts on thi s net, and represents a conti nui ng
bui l d-up, (SUEDE A i r Force Roundup 95, 15 May 52)
Comment: The Chi nese moved one or two j et di vi si ons
to Anxung i n the past month. Wit4 these new Sovi et uni ts
the number of j ets i n the Yalu Ri ver area is esti mated at
500. Si nce 13 Apri l UN pi l ots have on several occasi ons
observed 450-500 j ets on f i el ds i n thi s area.
ti on of another Russi an-l anguage GCI stati on and three
new radar stati ons near Antung were noted i n the l ast
month, provi di ng addi ti onal f aci l i ti es f or control l i ng
f i ghter operati ons over Korea.
The
I n addi ti on to the i ncrease i n ai r uni ts, the i nstal l a-
3 19 May 52

- - T O P - M C R E T S U E D E
1 8 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

C
S ( . 5 I p
H R 7 0 - 1 4
5. North Korean combat enginee,r couree to extend to 30 June:
The North Korean 8th Di vi si on i n eastern Korea informed one
18-Mar-201 0
of its subordi nate regi ments, probabl y the 82nd on Kaesong
guard duty, on 8 Apri l ,,of two f uture "short courses" for
engi neer of f i cers. One,to be.conducted by the engi neer
troops of an uni denti f i ed corps (probabl y the I Corps),
was to begi n 15 A pr i l and termi nate on 15 J une. Another
course f or engi neer staf f of f i cers was to be held at "Front-
line Headquarters" from 1 J une to 30 J une. (SUEDE 501st
Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-5-561, 17 May 52)
appear to be a cl ear i ndi cati on that at the t i me no i ncrease
in current mi l i tary operati ons was contempl ated by North
Korean seni or tacti cal commanders.
Comment: Although thi s i ntercept is dated, i t would
Despi te the f l urry of mi l i tary acti vi ty throughout
North Korea i n Apri l , which led to specul ati on of an impending
of f ensi ve, there are no clear current i ndi cati ons of immedia$e
Bommunist i ntenti ons other than defensi ve.
6 . Easi ng of North Korean mi l i tary manpower si tuati on
i ndi ca'ted: An uni denti f i ed Nor'th Korean regi ment, probabl y
on coastal securi ty duty i n eastern Korea, i nstructed a
subordi nate uni t on 13 Mqry to "report the men who are above
the age of 32 and have no techni cal abi l i ty and the wounded
men who are unabl e to Berve and send them to the regi ment at
once." (SUEDE 501st Comrn Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/12470,
17 May 52)
i n H mmassed ei mi l ar i nstructi ons to a subordi nate
battal i on, i ndi cati ng that these manpower categori es would
be di scharged. Other uni denti f i ed uni ts have i ssued si mi l ar
orders.
These messages, whi l e i ndi cati ng that some order is
bei ng i nj ected i nto the recrui ti ng pol i ci es of the North
Korean Army, have a connecti on i n that perhaps the manpower
need of the ci vi l i an popul ati on i s so great that i t forces
the North Korean Government to discharge margi nal mi l i tary
manpower. I t might be specul ated that the deacti vati on of
two North Korean corps wi thi n the pastni ne months and the
reducti on of major tacti cal uni ts to a number f or which
repl acements can more easi l y be provi ded f i t s i nto the
government's over-al l manpower pol i cy.
Comment: On 30 J anuary the 7th Rai l way Securi ty Regiment
I'
F or a comp r ehensive guide on P D F C omp r ession a nd O C R visit T heP a p er lessO ffice. or g

. z
I
!
I
7. Major North Korean V Corps uni t remai ns near Hamhung
i n east: In a message, probabl y addressed to the chi ef of
the mi l i tary securi ty bureau i n Pyongyang, a North Korean
of f i cer reports on 14 May the deserti on of f our men from the
6th Di vi si on. He l ocates the pl ace of deserti on as "Kumsu-
ri," a s mal l town near Yonghung, a rai l center south of
Hamhung. {SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-J -539,
17 May 52)
Comment: The 6th North Korean Di vi si on is a subordi nate
of the V Corps, which has been located i n the general Hamhung
area since its wi thdrawal from combat i n l ate 1951. A number
of recent reports have al l eged that the V Corps was to return
t o combat, rel i evi ng one of the North Korean corps on the
battl e l i ne.
8 . North Korean tank regiment t o be extremel y securi ty-
consci ous: The l tpol i ti cal l l of f i cer, probabl y attached t o the
North Korean 10th Mechanized Di vi si on, on 17 May i nstructed
"the pol i ti cal regi mental commander of the tank regi ment" to
pl ace a "j uni or propaganda man" i n each tank pl atoon and t o
di spose I tone i nformant" in each tank secti on. (SUEDE ROK I nt
Group, 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-J -578, 17 May 52)
to t hi s l evel has been conf i ned to l tel i tel l uni ts, such as the
Kaesong Guard Force, the 821113 Regiment and the North Korean
A i r Force.
Comment: Previ ousl y observed securi ty penetrati on down
9. 10th A i r School acti vi ty noted at Y enchi in Manchuri a:
Four VAK -11 trai ners of the 10th A i r School were to f l y on
16 May from Y enchi t o Fengcheng, both i n Manchuri a, accordi ng
t o a Chi nese Communist A i r Force message. (SUEDE 6920
Securi ty Group J ohnson AB J apan, AP 831, 16 May 52)
North Korean ai r trai ni ng i nstal l ati on i n Manchuri a was the
!l oth Manchuri an A i r Academy," under di rect command of North
Korean A i r Force Headquarters, l ocated at Y enchi .
Comment: Pri soners of war have reported that the maj or
5 20 May 52
F or a comp r ehensive guide on P D F C omp r ession a nd O C R visit T heP a p er lessO ffice. or g

1 .
FAR EAST
DATE: 20-Mar-201 0
1. Gas mask issue to Chinese Communistgseen as propaganda maneuver:
Sixteen recently captured Chinese Communist
20 May 52 . soldiers reveal that they were either issued
gas masks or instructed in the use of anti-gas
field expedients during April 1952, according
L E E Three posstble reasons advanced by FECOM
for such enemy preparations are that the Communists anticipate UN use
of gas, that they intend to wage chemical warfare, or that the gas masks
are to provide t'proof" for enemy propaganda charges of the United States
using CW in Korea.
I
._
FECOM concludes that available evidence fails
to indicate enemy intentions of employing chemical warfare tn the immedi-
ate future,
Comment: The issue of gas masks, [
1 pr oba-
bly is intended to support Communist charges of American use of chemical
warfare agents In Korea.
of US use of biological warfare ended in early April, a continuation of the
American "atrocities" theme has been provided by recent charges that the
United States has used CW agents in combat.
While specific Communist propaganda allegations
Radio Pyongyang on 24 April detailed 33 inci-
dents of alleged use of chemical warfare occurring between 27 February
and 9 April, and again on 7 May charged that the United States used CW
on 22 and 25 April.
2.
- 3 -
To learn more about OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org
H R7 0 - 1 4
A I L

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l' PPROV E D
FOR RE L E A S E DA TE :
' 1 8 - M ar- 2 0 1 0

HR70-14
FAR EAST
5 . North Kgrean M.i,nistry of I qdustry to recei ve communica-
ti ons equipment: Th e worth Korean Supreme Headquarters i n
Pyongyang on 14 May, quoti ng from "the Trade Department
stati sti csI f 1 l i sted 238 tel ephones, 61 wireless radi os and
2)transmi tters which would be avai l abl e to the Mi ni stry of
I ndustry. The addkessee, an uni denti f i ed suppl y uni t, is
informed that "you w i l l be abl e to receive them. , ,at Antung,
if you bri ng the requi si ti on from the I ndustry Mi ni stry.''
"the equipment that arri ved at Antung is. . .i n the Si nui j u
warehouse.11 The ori gi nator then i nqui red about f uel 'I for
the purpose of transporti ng the equipment.'? (SUEDGi5Dlst
Comm Recon Grp, 15RSM/12530, 17 May; 330th Corn Recon Co,
BLT 101, Korea, 16 May 52)
On 16 May, an uni denti f i ed uni t informed Pyongyang that
Comment: I n view of the North Koreans' urgent desi re
to transport communications equipment i nto Korea, the regime
has probabl y deci ded to employ trucks i nstead of usi ng the
ci rcui tous northeastern rai l way routes. Thi s is one of the
rare i nstances of a non-mi l i tary agency recei vi ng qquipment
i n such short suppl y.
6. Family threatened if North Korean airman deserts: A
series of recent North Korean A i r Force messages have detai l ed
the i ntenti ons of a North Korean airman to desert ."to China."
I n ref erence to thi s si tuati on,North Korean A i r Headquarters
at Si npi j u informed an ai r uni t near Pyongyang on 15 May
that '(you are to tel l him that i f he deserts, hi s fami l y
w i l l share the troubl e. . . ' I (SUEDE 15th RSM Det 151, Korea,
15RSM/12642, 18 May 52).
Comment: Although many recent pri soners of war have
reveal ed that thei r pol i ti cal of f i cers threatened retal i ati on
on thei r f ami l i es i f they deserted, thi s message is the f i r st
evi dence of such a pol i cy noted in communications i ntel l i gence.
7 . A r ti l l er y regi ment mentioned at3 organi c to Chi nese
di vi si on in Korea: A Chi s ese Communist messrlge i n Eore'a on
'17 May di rectl y ref erred to the " A rti l l ery Regiment" of
the 117th Di vi si on. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon'Grp Korea,
K 2906, 17 May 52)
3

Comment: The Far East Command concl uded recentl y
that, as a general rul e, an arti l l ery regi ment was organi c
to each army. A r t i l l er y regi ments, however, have l ong been
recogni zed as i ntegral parts of di vi si ons i n the 9th and
20th Chi nese Army Groups. But thi s is the f i r st ref erence
to a di vi si onal arti l l ery regi ment wi thi n the 13th Army
Group.
8. US patrol pl ane attacked probably by Sovi et MIG's: A
US naval eatrol bomber was attacked by t wo YIG -15's on
11May while flying over Korea Bay, midway between Sovi et-
control l ed Port Arthur and Takushan, a Chi nese J et base.
About the same t i me a Chi nese ai r defense search net reported
t wo ai rcraf t travel i ng at 300 knot6 on a southerl y course
from Port A rthur. (S COMNAVFE 09202, 12 May( SUEDE A i r Force
Roundup 97, 19 May 52)
wi thi n the l i mi t s of tshe Port Arthur Naval Base area, as
def i ned i n the 1945 Si no-Sovi et T reaty, also suggests that the
attacki ng YIG's came from the Sovi et base at Port Arthur.
Cbmment: The f act that the US patrol bomber was almost
I I
4 21 May 52
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HR70-14
FAR EAST
7 . Substanti al suppl y of ammunition recei ved ,by North Korean
M A de ot: The Supply Chi ef of the North Korean 21st Anti ai r-
7-!k cra t r i l l er y Regiment reported the recei ot of 42.840
rounds of "i nstant-ammuni ti on'l on 11-12 May-.
Corn Recon Grp Korea, SK-J -515, 14 May 52)
(SUEDE 501st
Comment: The depot recei vi ng thi s ammunition%. $q in the
Wonsan-Hamhung area and, accordi ng to communications i ntel -l .
l i gence, was onl y schedul ed to be opened on 10 May.
rapi d arri val of thi s rel ati vel y large suppl y of anti ai raraf t
ammunition on 11-12 May i ndi cates the i mportance to the
enemy of the rapi d bui l dup of hi s anti ai rcraf t def ense i n
thi s regi on.
The
8 . Element of recentl y withdrawn Chi nese Communist arti l 1,ery
diViSiOA returns to combat: A message, probabl y from the
3rd Battal i on of the 30th Regiment, 2nd Chi nese Communist
A rti l l ery Di vi si on, to its parent uni t, stated on 15 May that
''1 arri ved at the 117th Di vi si on's command post today. .
and di scussed the resul ts wi th the di vi si on commander. If
3 22 May 52
Qb
r/s?iv
DATE: 18-Mar-2010
N - e l ' O P S E C R E T S U h O E

. .
\ ,
the si tuati on warrants. . .we w i l l shad one battal i on. . .
(of) two 105mmarti l l ery companies. . .(to posi ti ons near
the town of Sangyong). . .Commander Hui and Commander. . .
have al ready gone to cl ari f y and i nvesti gate the posi ti on. . .
(SUEDE 501st Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-2920, 18 May 52)
Conuient : Thi s ar ti l l er y battal i on, al ong wi th other
el ements of the 2nd Chi nese Communist A r ti l l er y Di vi si on),
was withdrawn from combat i n l ate Apri l and repl aced by the
27th Regiment of the 1st A r ti l l er y Di vi si on.
el ement of the 2nd A rti l l ery Di vi si on si nce 8 7 Apri l .
11
Thi s is the first noted si gnal tr af f i c assed by any
9. Shi p regair engi neer needed by North Korean naval uni t:
An uni denti f i ed naval uni t i n Songj i n, a large port on the
northeast Korean coast, advi aed another uni denti f i ed uni t
i n a 14 May message of its need f or a shi p repai r engi neer.
(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSY/12535, 14 May 52)
Comment: A North Korean uni t f ai l ed i n its 20 February
ef f ort to take Yang-do, the northernmost UN-held i sl and off
the Korean east coast, Recent South Korean naval i nterroga-
ti ons have reveal ed that the enemy has been construc.ti ng
wooden boats near Songj i n f or another attempt to capture
the nearby i sl and. The shi p repai r engi neer's duti es
would presumably be concerned wi th thi s constructi on program.
10. I ncreased Sovi et ni ght. i ntercepti on, noted over Korea:
Recent communications on the Russi an voice GCI' net i ndi cate 7
that the three new Sovi et f i ghter uni ts f i r st noted i n
Manchuria on 21 Apri l began ni ght combat operati ons agai nst
UN ai rcraf t over Korea i n mid-May. Each of these uni ts has
about 25 f i ghters, probabl y j ets, and they may be operati ng
from Anshan, 50 miles south of Mukden. Only one j et f i ghter
regi ment previ ousl y was engaged i n regul ar ni ght operati ons
over Korea. (SUEDE A i r Force-Roundup 98, 20 May 52)
since earl y Nay i n enemy ni ght i ntercepti on of UN bombers,
Although messages i ndi cate that the enemy has assi gned about
100 j ets and 25 conventi onal f i ghters to thi s operati on,
thei r l ack of ai rborne radar has hi therto prevented ef f ecti ve
i ntercepti on.
Comment: The Far.East A i r Force al so reports an i ncrease
4 22 May 52
` l l ' O P S E C R E T S U 1 I I ) 4 E

L
. .
1.1. Chi nese arti l l ery regi ment descri bes f i el d suppl y
system i n Korea: Th e 27th Chi nese Communist A rti l l ery
Regiment i n combat i n western Koree on 17 May i nstructed
i te subordi nate uni ts that,"when each uni t needs (certai n
types') of ammunition i t shoul d f i r st report to Regi mental
Forward Command Post (which w i l l ) authori ze you to go to
Rear Command Post and pi ck i t up. . . i f you need oi l ,
provi si ons, etc., you sho.uld noti f y Rear Command Post
di rectl y (which will) noti f y you to come and pi ck i t up."
(SUEDE 3 O l s t Cor n Recon Grp Korea, K-2906, lY*YIay 52)
Comment' .Chi nese tacti cal doctri ne i n f i el d suppl y,
even at the regi mental l evel , apparentl y requi res the uni t
needi ng suppl i es t o travel tothe rear f or them. Thi s
is contrary to the American practi ce under which the suppl i er
moves suppl i es forward as f ar as the battal i on.
12. Mi ssi ng Chi nese Communist air di vi si on i denti f i ed: A t
l east 27 mG -1S's of the Chi nese Communist 15th A i r Di vi si on
on 19 May began transf erri ng f r om Tdcushan, near the Yalu
Ri ver, to Kungchuling, about 250 mi l es north. On the f ol l owi ng
day 38 YIG's of the 6th Di vi si on began moving from Mukden to
,Takushan, to replsce the 15th. (SUEDE 6920 Securi ty Group
DOG 508, 519, 19 May; AP 889, 20 May 52)
Comment: These are the f i r st i ntercepted ref erences
to the 15th d i r Di vi si on, whi ch appears to have been at
Takushan f or at least several weeks. Every Chi nese Communist
ai r di vi si on from the 2nd to the 20th has now been i denti f i ed.
There i s'probabl y no Chi nese Communist 1st Di vi si on because
its number would conf l i ct wi th the North Korean 1st which is
based i n Manchuria. Of the 19 Chi nese di vi si ons, 13 are
equi pped wi th j et f i ghters; si nce September 1951 ni ne of these
have been depl oyed to Yalu Ri ver bases at one time or another.
22 May 52
5
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A p p r o v e d O M / R e l e a s e :

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A p p r o v e d F itie he ie a s e 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 2 0 : C I A - R D P 7 9 T 0 1 M I A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 1 - 3

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HR70-14
18-Mar-2010
FAR EAST
12. UN eastern rear area is target of North Korean recon-
nai ssance uni t: An uni denti f i ed North Korean tacti cal uni t,
probably i n combat on the east coast. was i nstructed in its
.itrear area reconnai ssance mi ssi on" to rendezvous at, an
l taseembl y area. . .i n the general area of Chang-si n-ni ,tl 12
mi l e s south of South Korean posi ti ons in the eastern sector.
The uni t, probably not more than f our or f i ve men, is t o
"decide on the enemi es'rear area suppl y transport si tuati on
and the mi l i tar y. . .si tuati on." Other i ntel l i gence targets
are the "suppl y repl eni shment si tuati on, communication si tua-
ti on and the enemi es'di sposi ti on. . . I 1 A pri soner is to be
taken "si l entl y by ambush. . .(and). . . af ter endi ng the
questi oni ng accuratel y, you are to bri ng the evi dence'wi th
you and ( ki l l ?) . . . 1t
A 19 May message, i n the.same system and probably to .
the same uni t, notes $hat "there w i l l be a reconnai ssance
search. . .from 21 May until 24 May." Fol l owi ng compl eti on
of the mi ssi on and "havi ng complete command of the enemy
si tuati on, you are to submi t a wri tten report by 29 May."
(SUEDE 330th Corn Recon Co Korea, ALT-344 and ALT-348,
20 May 52)
13. V dstl y i ncreased gasol i ne suppl y probabl y avai l abl e to
Chi nese Communist di vi si on: Th e Chi nese Communist 7th
A r t i l l ery Di vi gi on i n eastern Korea menti oned the possession
of 4, 000, and possi bl y 4 400, drums of gasol i ne i n a garbxed
15 May message.
15 May 52)
(SUEDE 401st Corn Recon Cjrp Korea, K-2936,
6
F or mor e i nfor ma ti on on O C R a nd P D F C omp r essi on go to our web si te
r i - O P S E C R E T S U E D E

Comment: A 9 Apri l message from thi s same uni t i ndi cated
that t h e i s i o n was then l i mi ted to a monthly gasol i ne
rati on of 91 gal l ons for each of its 438 operati onal vehi cl es.
The 15 May message suggests avai l abl e gasol i ne suppl i es have
been quadrupl ed or qui ntupl ed, i ndi cati ng that each vehi cl e
may now be f uel ed for 3000-2500 mi l e s duri ng the coming month.
I
14. North Korean armored command conti nues acti ve: A North
Korean of f i cer si gni ng hi msel f as "chi ef of of f i cer' s
department, Tank Head&arterq" informed the "Chief of Staf f ,
105,"of hi s arri val on 14 May "to organi ze the I c9th uni t."
The personnel of f i cer then requested that the "sel f -propel l ed
arti l l ery battal i on commander be di spatched to the tank regi ment."
Two days l ater a message sent i n thi s same system and
si gned by the "di vi si on commander" i nf orrned the "responsi bl e
of f i cer at Anj u," on the Chongchon Ri ver, that orders from
Supreme Headquarters had arri ved to "di sconti nue the works. . .
the tank personnel shoul d arri ve here. . .by the 19th day."
CSUEDE ROK I nt Grp M, thru 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea,
SK-J-642, 20 May; SK-5-548, 19 May 52)
the l bsth T ank Di vi si on ?ind to its 2nd'Tank Regiment (code
number - 1091, the later message may have been smt by the
10th Mechanized Di vi si on commander. El ements of thi s uni t
are known to be located i n the Chongchon Ri ver area.
Comment: Although the f i r st message obvi ousl y refers to
15. Chi nese Communist uni ts i n Korea conti nue to report
on extermi nati on of rodents and i nsects: Two f i i nese
Communist messages on 15 M aY reveal that measures are conti nu-
i ng to be taken-i n the Communists' sami tary and anti -
epi demi c campaign. One i ntercept stated that the enti re
battal i on ki l l ed 133 rats and 7, 378 f l i es i n two days. The
other message reveal ed that "there are many mosqui tos i n
the. . .regi ment's posi ti ons" and 500 bottl es of mosqui to
oi l are urgentl y requested. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp
Korea, K-2945 and K-2946, 20 May 52)
16. North- Korean .ci vi l i ans seek compensation from Chi nese
Cknuni st anti ai rcraf t regi ment to an uni dent i f E
n i mperfect i ntercept on 9 May from an uni den ied
di vi si on reports that "machine gun companies i n combat must
move thei r posi ti ons on a dai l y basi s and occupy and use
7 23 May 52

( f aci l i ti es and l and?) of the local popul ace. The peopl e
are greatl y opposed to th They i nsi st on some type of
9 May 52)
1174, Unknown-Unknown, Korea
Comment: The experi ence reported by thi s regi ment is
another example of the f ri cti on exi sti ng between Chi nese
Communist troops and North Korean ci vi l i ans. The North
Korean Mi ni stry of I nternal Securi ty, however, i s sufficiently
strong to prevent any f ri cti on from becoming a serious problem.
. : "R
8 23 May 52
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HR70-14
FAR EAST
-
i nstructed a
that your reg
immed4ately rqturn t4 the f ront.
prepadati oqs tq parti qi pate i n bat t l b .I' The message ordered
the raci pi ept to i nform the "601et Regiment" that they are tb
"proce'sd a6 ,of the 20th of th$s month to Kaesong" and "f or
f urther detai l @ on the move contact the 43rd Regiment of my
di vi si ,on." (SUEDE 501st Cow Recon Grp Korea, K-2988, 23
May 57) I
Comment: Prel i mi nary analysis of thi s i nformati on sug-
gests- Tthatn uni denti f i ed regi ment of the 8th Chi nese Conununist
Arti l l ery Di vi si on, currentl y supporti ng elements of the 19th
Army Group'i n western Korea, is soon to enter combat.
67th Chi nese A rmy, believed located i n eastern Korea and i n
no posi ti on to move to Kaesong, the extreme western f ront.
Yqu w i l l immediately snake
The 6OXst Regiment would normally be subordi nate to the
North Korean uni ts on Ongj i n PeninBula alerted f or UN
attack: An uni denti f i ed North Korean uni t on 22 M ay repo'rts
-on the 19th they were prep,ari ng to l and on Ongjin-. ..
theref ore al l tropps shoul d prepare for combat at any t i me
apd never l et one of them l and. The 81st Regiment, 22nd
Regiment, the uni ts i n the area and the patrol company shoul d
report thei r attempts from time to ti me. . . . "
Korea, CS 535, 21 May 52)
the enlemy to any suspected UN amphibious operati ons, thi s
massage locates two previ ousl y unl ocated North Korean uni ts
i n western Korea.
(SUEDE USA 54A
t
Comment: I n addi ti on to demonstrati ng the sensi ti vi ty of
The 2Znd Regiment is probabl y anti ai rcraf t arti l l ery.
The 81st Regiment, however, would normal l y be subordi nate to
the 8th Di vi si on, now i n eastern Korea. Recent agent re-
ports have i ndi cated the presence of an "81st Mixed Brigade"
wi th both Korean and Chinese troops on the Ongj i n Peni nsul a
i n western Korea. I t is possi bl e that the 81st, l i ke the 82nd
at Kaesong, di d not move to the east wi th its parent di vi si on,
but was expanded and remained i n the west wi th a coastal se-
curi ty mi ssi on.
26 May 52
e/
$ 1 S"PP
18-Mar-201 0
r i - O P S E C R E T S U E D ,

13.
14.
15.
Extensi on q$ North Korea4 l and l i nes conti nues: A North
Korean uni t. posblibly assi gned t o coastal securi ty duti es i n
the Wonsan area, 'stated i n- a 19 May message that it had
compl eted i nstal l i ng t wo lapd l i nes.
l ong and the other over 21.
15BSM/12929, 19 Yay 52)
f or communications despi te material shortages, such as copper
wi r e, has been typi cal of North Korean securi ty consci ousdess.
One l i ne is over 2 mi l eg
(SUEDE'50lst Comm.RQcon Grp Korea,
Comment: The conti nui ng ef f ort to provl de l and l i nes
Fi ve addi ti onal Chi nese Communi& ai r di vi si ons reported.:
.
An anal ysi s of tr af f i c i ntercep'ted od the Chi nese Cominunlst
A i r Force a@mi ni strati ve network i ndi cates that f i ve pre-
vi ousl y unknown Chi nese Communist ai r di vi si ons are located
i n Chi na proper. Four of them were f i r st noted i n Novepl&er
1951, and the f i f t h i n February. (SUEDE CC/CAP-231, 232 May 52)
The operati onal status,; type and strength of ai rcraft,
and nyrneri aal desi gnati ons of these di vi si ons are unkngwn.
Comment: This i nformati on i ncreases to 25 the number
of known Chi nese Communist ai r di vi si ons. Only ten, wi th an
esti mated strength of 500 pl anes, are i d Manchuria, where
350 t o 400 Sovi et and Korean jets and conventi onal f i ghters
are alwo baeed.
4
The number of' combat pl anes i n the Chin6de Communist A i r
Force i ncreased from an erjtimated 1,000 in J une 1951 to the
present est'imate of 1,800 pl anes.
Sharp i ncrease iil ;,Chinese f l i ghts reported on GC.1 net:
Anal ysi s of' t r af f i cbn the Chi nesedvoi ce GCI net on the
Manchuria-Korea border reveals that Chi nese Communist pl ane$
made a,minimum of 662 f l i ghts i n March and 1,292 i n Apri l .
The nuplber of ai rcraf t operati ng on thi s net al po i ncreased
i n the same peri od. (BUEDE A i r Force Roundtap 100, 22 May 52)
Co ent: An over- al l i ncrease i n Communist ai r strength .
near + t e orean border duri ng Apri l was apparent from UN
pi l ot observati ons of as many as 500 pl anes on the f i el ds
across t H e Y al u,Ri ver. There were f our known Chinecjre Com-
muni st di vi si ons-- the 4th, 12th, 15th and 17th -- at the
three f i dl ds near Antung i n Apri l . Perhaps the;Srd and 6th,
the remai ni ng Chi nese Communi st'j et di vi si ons i n Manchuyia,
alao operatad on the GCI net, even though they were bel i eved
to be i n Mukden.
26 May 52
1

N R
I N R
I 1
17. Chi nese move addi ti onal ai r el ements to Korean border:
The movement of el ements of the Chi nese Communist 18th A i P
Di vi si on to the Yalu Ri ver area is reveal ed in several i n-
tercepts. -
Heretof ore carried at Canton, i n South Chi na, thi s di vi si on
was mentioned in a 21 Yay message i n connecti on wi th the de-
parture of ai rcraf t from Yukden i n Manchuria. A message the
next day schedul ed the f l i ght of ni ne MIG-15's of thi s di vi si on
from Mukden t o Takushan, on the Korean border. (SUEDE A i r Force
Roundup No. 101, 23 May 52)
Comment: Movements of el ements of an ai r uni t have f re-
quent'L 'yshadowed enti re unit transf era.
the whole 18th Division materializes md this uni t enters
combat, some 75 percent of the known Chi nese Communist j et
uni ts w i l l have beeb combat trai ned.
If transf er of
26 May 52

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North lforeans conti nue sp.ecia4is.t. tr,ai ni ng: A battal i on
commander. tiresumablv of the North Korean 2l st AAA Regiment.
reported on' 17 May tile arri val of "f ortyh. ne A r t i l l er y dcadlemy
graduates of bi g calibre, s mal l calibre and machine gun!! near
Chongpyong, sl i ghtl y west of Hungnam. He requested i ndtruc-
ti ons as to thei r di sposi ti on. (SUEDE 601st Comm Recon Grp
Korea, SK-5-749, 20 May 52)
Cogmeqt: The conti nued trai ni ng acti vi ty i ndi cated by
thi s message has been characteri sti c of North Korean armed
f orce i nterest i n devel opi ng its arti l l ery and antkai rcraf t
servi ces.
Chi nese di vi si on i n Korea gi ves @muni t.i pn pri or.i ,ty ave.r
food: An i ntercept of a message from a Chi neee Communist uni t,
-ably the 7th A r ti l l er y Di vi si on, sai d: "Pl ease i mmedi atel y
stop al l food ehi pments. No matter how you obtai n i t you
must concentrate al l ef f orts on the obtai ni ng of f i ve thousand
rounds of ammunition and f i ve hundred barrels of gasol i ne by
the end of the month. The suppl y depot has al ready shi pped
three thousand of the ten thousand rounds al l otted.I v (SUEDE
501st Recon Comm Grp Korea,K-3027, 20 May 52)
this -message setti ng a deadl i ne for ammunition re-suppl y
may merel y i ndi cate that thi s arti l l ery division is seeki ng to
mai ntai n its basic load.
Comment: I n the absence of other of f ensi ve i ndi cati ons,
_ _ _
27 May 52
3
NR

I 4 P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
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the Chi ne8e Communist8 have
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FAR EAST
- _ _ _
6. Japan unable to grant equal rights to UN forces: Foreign
IIdinister Okazaki t old A mbassador Murphy that public and Diet
opposition will make it difficult, if not impossible, to grant
UN forces in Japan the same rights as American forces operating
under the security treaty. He said that parliamentary defeat
for the proposed UN agreement was certain i f the government
publicly relinquished its jurisdiction in cases involving
violation of Japanese law, although in practice Japan would not
exercise that right. Additionally, Diet sentiment was such
that the government had no chance of obtaining money to support
the UN forces.
to cooperate with the UN, but is restricted by the aolid
opposition. (C Tokyo 245, 24 May 52)
of Japan's unwillingness to accept any financial obligation
for the support of non-US troops based in or sojourning in
Japan, as well as its desire to retain criminal jurisdiction
over UN forces. The government has been severely attacked by
its political opposition on these points under the US-Japan
security treaty; it fears that extending similar privileges to
non-US forces will have serious domestic repercussions.
Murphy is convinced that the Japaneee Government is eager
Comment: The Commonwealth governments 4re highly critical
DATE: 09-Dec-2009
Comment: Pelping's views are presumed to determine the
North Korean line in the talks, because the over-all military
position in Korea depends upon Peiping's willingness to
continue its commitment.
-
27 May 52
c lb
F or info on O CR and P D F Compre ssion go to T he P ape rle ssO ffic e .org

W'
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Communist China has indicated an intention to hold its
"volunteers" in Korea at least until all UN forces are
withdrawn.
9. Rhee uses dictatorial measures against opposition: US
Embassy Pusan'reports that, since early on 23 H ay , President
Rhee has taken a series of high-handed actions against the
political opposition. Four opposition members of the Assembly
have been arrested while 15 or 16 others are in hiding. The
imposition of martial law by the ROK Military Police has been
employed as an excuse for this action. Some 44 Assemblymen
were held incommunicado by the Military Police on 26 May.
Recently appointed Prime Minister Chang, finding his telephone
wires cut and himself under virtual arrest, has resigned.
The UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation in
Korea called on Rhee on 26 May and expressed shock at this
series of events. The President was unimpressed. The US
Embassy comments that the President appears to be operating on
the basis that the UN and the United States will not intervene
and will sit by and watch the demise of democratic government
in Korea, (S Pusan 1160, 26 May; S Pusan 1164, 26 May; S
Pusan 1163, 27 May 52)
10. First Communist admission of Chinese air operations over
Korea : e Communist newspaper Ta Kun Pa0 in Aong Kong claimed
MaFthat CCAF's hero C h a n g - d i T d shot down two US
aircraft over North Korea on 10 February. The reporting
agency comments that this news story is the first Chinese Commu-
nist claim that their "volunteers" are flying MIG-15's in combat
in North Korea, a fact accepted by most observers for months.
(S Hong Kong 3117, Joint Weeka 21, 23 May 52)
5
27 May 52

' I .
U
Comment: It is not known how many of the estimated 350
to 5 0 D m i n the Manchurian-Korean border area are piloted
by either Chinese, Russians, or North Koreans, This is the
first Communist publicity indicating the nationality of the
pilots of any enemy jets.
11. American official doubts Peiping will compromise on POW
issue: Th e American Consul Ge neral in Honn KonC? notes increas-
-propaganda coverage of the POW issue i6 thewChinese Commu-
nist press and an adamant stand on whst Peiping describe6 as
the U"s "forcible retention" of POW'S.
The American official, recalling Indian Ambassador Panik-
kar's prediction in early 1952 that the POW i ssue would be the
most difficult of all to solve, remarks that it is "difficult
to conceivd'of Peiping backing down on this point. ( 6 Hong
Kong 3117, 23 May 52)
Comment: The Communist negotiators do not appear convinced
that the UN Command will not compromise on the POW issue. There
is thus insufficient evidence to indicate whether the Communists
will allow the talks to founder on this i ssue,
jNR
-
6 27 May 52
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