ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs. SECRETARY OF DAR G.R. No.

78742 July 14, 1989

FACTS: These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenantfarmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to

a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature. ISSUE: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional. HELD: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it. TOLOMEO ZURBANO CONRADO ESTRELLA G.R. No. L-61617 July 2, 1985 and BELEN B. ZURBANO vs.HONORABLE

FACTS: A letter of Instruction dated October 21, 1976, 4 the President directed the then Secretary, now Minister of Agrarian Reform, to "undertake to place under the Land transfer Program of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than

seven hectares ill aggregate areas or lands used for residential commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families.

Petitioners-spouses in this prohibition proceeding alleged that they are the owners of agricultural lands, with six (6) parcels planted to coconuts, 56 hectares in area and two (2) parcels of riceland, 1.86 hectares in size. 7 It is further alleged that said "coconut lands which are scattered in different barrios are very far from the poblacion of Labo where petitioners reside which they could not even visit due to the unsettled peace and order conditions," resulting in their only productive property being the ricelands. 8 On August 10, 1982, "petitioners received a communication from respondent Salvador Pejo of Region V of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform informing them that the processing of the land transfer had been initiated and requiring them to submit to the Regional Office all the necessary documents pertinent to their claim" otherwise, the farmer-beneficiaries would be issued the corresponding emancipation patents. 9 When they asked why a small piece of property of only 1.86 hectares of riceland should be under Presidential Decree No. 27, they were informed that the text of the letter of Instruction No. 474 calls for the two parcels of ricelands being included in the Land Transfer Program. 10 On August 2, 1982, respondent Director Pejo did take the initial steps for the issuance of the Emancipation Patent to the farmer beneficiaries based on the existing record of his office and earnestly required the utmost cooperation from petitioners, but despite the initiation of the proceeding for the land transfer claim, there was failure to extend such cooperation. He denied that the Letter of Instruction assailed is unconstitutional, setting forth its background as an implementing measure of Presidential Decree No. 27, the validity of which is not in doubt. ISSUE: 1. WON the Letter of Instruction No. 474 denies equal protection. 2. WON the Letter of Instruction No. 474 amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law 3. WON t he contention that there would be the taking of property for public use without just compensation. **** FOR DIGEST PUPOSES KUNG GUSTO NYO MAIKLI LANG ITO ANG ISSUE

1. WON the Letter of Instruction No. 474 void on its face on equal protection, due process and taking of private property without just compensation grounds.

HELD: ***FOR WRITING PURPOSES ITO ANF MAIKLING HELD---There is no legal basis for declaring Letter of Instruction No. 474 void on its face on equal protection, due process and taking of private property without just compensation grounds. The Constitution decrees no less than the emancipation of tenants, and there are safeguards therein to assure that there be no arbitrariness or injustice in its enforcement. There are, moreover, built-in safeguards to preclude any unlawful taking of private property. **** DETAILED NA HELD----

1. There is no merit to the contention that Letter of Instruction No. 474 denies equal protection. Presidential Decree No. 27, which anticipated what was to be constitutional mandate that tenants in rice and corn lands be freed from bondage of soil was issued. Again, this Court in the cited case of Gonzales v. Estrella, 20 had no difficulty dismissing a petition that it be declared unconstitutional. Nor did counsel even insinuate a possible violation of the equal protection guarantee. In the face of such consistent course of action dictated by the commitment of the fundamental law to the Ideal of putting an end tot he evils of tenancy, any argument that thereby landholders would be adversely affected is an exercise in futilityexcept on showing that in implementing such mandate, there is arbitrariness or unfairness. To that aspect of the case, we now turn. 2. There is no merit to the contention that the Letter of Instruction No. 474 amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law. All that it provides is that the Secretary then, now the Minister, of Agrarian Reform, is to take charge of Land Transfer Program pursuant to the Presidential Decree No. 27. Landholders with tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less are included if they own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. 21 It is manifest that there is no departure from constitutional restraints. Nothing in its language lend support to the contention that consequences so harsh and drastic would attend its implementation. In language, scheme, and framework, this Letter of Instruction reveals the plan and purpose to attain the goal envisioned by the Constitution but with due regard to the landowners affected. There is a saving clause. They are exempt from

its operation if it be shown that from the other lands owned by them of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas if agricultural, or other areas, whether residential, commercial, or industrial, or lands devoted to other urban purposes, they are unable to derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. 3. Neither is there any merit tot he contention that there would be the taking of property for public use without just compensation. The Constitution itself imposes the duty on the State to emancipate the tenants from the bondage of the soil. Its validity, to repeat, was unanimously sustained by this Tribunal. No other conclusion could have been reached, conforming as it did to what the fundamental law ordained. The only remaining question then is the compensation to be awarded the landowner. This petition may be premature. There are, as pointed out, built-in safeguards to assure that landowners are not to be deprived of such lots "from which they derive adequate income for the support of themselves and their families." If petitioners could show that the application of the Letter of Instruction to them would be visited by the failure to meet that standard, they are exempt. They would have then no valid cause for complaint. JEREMIAS vs. ESTATE OF MARIANO GR No. 174649 September 26, 2008 FACTS: Irene P. Mariano, a widow, owned 2 parcels of land covered by TCTs No. 6886 and 6887 with an aggregate area of a little more than 27 hectares. In 1972, the said parcels of land were placed under the Operation Land Transfer program pursuant to PD No. 27, and accordingly, the tenanted portion of the landholdings were subdivided among identified tenant-beneficiaries, and a subdivision plan was made. One of the more than 40 tenant-beneficiaries of the two titled properties of Irene, who were already given emancipation patents, was Santiago Jeremias, father of petitioner Leopoldo Jeremias, whose apportionments consisted of three lots. On 26 June 1988, Irene died intestate and was succeeded by her two children, Jose P. Mariano and Erlinda M. Villanueva. In an unsigned hand-written letter, Helen S. Mariano, wife of heir Jose, and despite the fact that the estate of the late Irene remained unpartitioned and still under intestate proceedings, allegedly instituted by Ruben Vias as a tenant. Sometime in 1991, Danilo David P. Mariano was appointed as administrator of respondent Estate of Irene. Danilo, lodged before the PARAD two separate complaints for ejectment and damages against Leopoldo and Ruben. In the complaint against Leopoldo, respondent Danilo averred that sometime

in July 1993, he discovered that the former entered the land, which lands were inside the Estates landholding covered by TCT No. 6887, and planted various agricultural products, without his knowledge and consent. Respondent Danilo further alleged that Leopoldo was not a tenant of Irene. It was his father, Santiago Jeremias, who was her tenant in lots, which are also inside the property covered by TCT No. 6887. After Leopoldo's refusal to vacate said lots despite oral and formal demands, respondent made a formal complaint for ejectment with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC), which proved futile since the parties failed to amicably settle the case. In his answer, Leopoldo denied he unlawfully entered the lots. He claimed that he cultivated and farmed these lots upon the permission and tolerance of Irene, the registered owner. He likewise averred that being the son of Santiago Jeremias, the tenant of Irene P. Mariano, he lawfully acquired the right to cultivate said lots by virtue of succession. In the case against Ruben, respondent Danilo alleged that in June 1993, he came to know of the fact of Ruben's intrusion and cultivation of Lots No. 25 and No. 48 which are within the landholding covered by TCT No. 6886. When respondent made verbal and formal demands for Ruben to vacate the areas, the latter declined to heed the demands. Ruben, on the other hand, answered that his cultivation of the areas was pursuant to a hand-written letter of Helen S. Mariano instituting him as a tenant of said lots. PARAD ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered Leopoldo and Ruben to vacate the subject lots. Leopoldo and Ruben filed a notice of appeal with the PARAD. In their Appellants Brief before the DARAB, they assailed the PARADs reliance on the subdivision plan in ruling that the lots that were the subject matter of the controversy were not tenanted. They asserted that the PARAD should not take all the annotations in the subdivision plan as the absolute truth, since they were not privy to its preparation; there was a possibility therefore, that they were not notified by the authorities of the date of the survey; hence, it could happen that the lots they tilled as tenants were not identified or listed in their names. Leopoldo lamented the PARADs failure to give weight to the receipts of rentals and certification from the Land Bank in his favor. Although these receipts and certifications did not indicate the farm lots the payments pertained to, he insisted that such doubt must be resolved in his favor in line with the constitutional and agrarian statutes mandate that interpretation must be on the tenants side. For his part, Ruben stressed that the proviso in the letter instituting him as tenant in Lots No. 25 and No. 48, which stipulated that he would vacate the same was neither legal nor binding on him since it violated Sec. 49 of RA 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954. DARAB promulgated its decision which favored Leopoldo and Ruben under the belief that all the lots of respondent Estates landholdings covered under TCTs No. 6886 and No. 6887 were tenanted, the DARAB was of the opinion that respondent could not claim that the disputed lots (within TCTs No. 6886

and No. 6887) could not be legally retained by respondent Estate, since the area of respondents landholdings exceeded 24 hectares; and under PD 27, landowners are not entitled to retention if they own more than 24 hectares of rice and corn lands. The DARAB said that even if respondent merely owned tenanted rice and corn land totaling less than 24 hectares, still it had no right of retention, since he had other lands used for residential, commercial and other urban purposes wherein it derived sufficient income to support itself. Under AO No. 4, a supplemental guideline of PD 27,the right of retention cannot be had by a landowner even if he has less than 24 hectares of rice and corn lands if he additionally owns lands for residential, commercial, industrial or urban purposes, from which he derives adequate income to support himself and his family. The DARAB considered the subdivision plan as a mere scrap of paper, and it could not be used as evidence, because said document was not signed by the approving officer who made it. Moreover, the DARAB ruled that the letter signed by Mrs. Helen Mariano, the wife of Jose Mariano, a co-owner of the subject lots, effectively made Ruben a lawful possessor and cultivator. The DARAB explained that since Helen Mariano signed on behalf of her husband, the principal, then she became the agent of her husband. Considering that the husband did not repudiate the act of Helen Mariano, such agency subsists. Hence, the institution of Ruben to till the lots in question must be respected. The Court of Appeals decided in favor of respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not they are tenants of the lands belonging to respondent and, consequently, entitled to security of tenure.

HELD: Tenancy relationship arises if all the following essential requisites are present: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. A tenant has been defined under Sec. 5(a) of RA No. 1199, a person who, himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold system. To prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented; self-serving statements are deemed inadequate. In this case, there is no substantial evidence that the petitioners were installed by the owner of the lots in question as agricultural tenants on the property. There is, likewise, no evidence that the petitioners shared with the landowner the harvest and/or produce from the landholding. There is no evidence on record, other than the self-serving declaration of Leopoldo and his witnesses, that indeed, the landowner had authorized him to till the disputed lots Ruben's evidence is likewise remotely substantial. The hand-written letter allegedly instituting Ruben as tenant is unsigned. This Court has ruled that the unsigned handwritten documents and unsigned computer printouts, which are unauthenticated, are unreliable. This is mere self-serving evidence, which should be rejected. Thus, in Daez v. Court of Appeals, the Court said that PD 27 would not apply if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops. There is no question that Irene's landholdings with a total area of a little more than 27 hectares, of which the disputed lots form apart, were subjected to agrarian reform in 1972 under PD No. 27. However, it is also established by the records of the case that disputed lots were classified as untenanted by the Bureau of Lands. This important piece of evidence, absent any substantial evidence to the contrary, only leads to the conclusion that the lots which are the subject matter of the controversy are beyond the pale of the said statute.