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MOVING BEYOND CARICATURE AND
CHARACTERIZATION: THE MODERN
RULE OF REASON IN PRACTICE
ANDREW I. GAVIL
*

I. INTRODUCTION
After one hundred years one might expect a rule of law to be settled.
In the case oI the 'rule oI reason, Iirst endorsed by the Supreme Court in
its 1911 decision dissolving the Standard Oil trust,
1
the conventional
wisdom often portrays the opposite. Citing its principal early enunciation in
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States ('Chicago Board of Trade),
2

critics often denigrate the rule oI reason variously as 'unstructured, 'Iull-
blown, 'uncertain, 'error-prone, and costly to administer in all its
forms.
3
In a metaphor first applied by Judge Taft in his earlier United

* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law; B.A. 1978, Queens College of the City
University of New York; J.D. 1981, Northwestern University Law School. The author would like to
thank Reshaun M. Finkley, Gabrielle Sims, and Varnitha Siva for their research assistance. The author
would also like to thank Steven C. Salop and Jonathan B. Baker for helpful conversations regarding the
history, content, and operation of the rule of reason. The preparation of this article was supported by a
gift from Google Inc., which is not responsible for its content.
1. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61, 62 (1911). For more on Standard Oil and
its impact, see, for example, Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness,
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2012); Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil as Lochners Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 783 (2012); Timothy J. Muris & Bilal K. Sayyed, The Long Shadow of Standard Oil: Policy,
Petroleum, and Politics at the Federal Trade Commission, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 843 (2012).
2. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918).
3. For one of the now-classic critiques of the rule of reason, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1114 (1984). See also Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of
Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 32228 (1986) (criticizing
what he labeled as the 'standardless, constitutional Sherman Act). As one commentator has asserted,
with specific reference to Chicago Board of Trade`s statement oI the rule oI reason: 'This standard
formulation is often and properly criticized for being too unfocusedfor making almost everything
about an industry relevant and for inviting litigants and courts on endless fishing expeditions into the
deIendant`s records. 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1502, at 389
(3d ed. 2010). Areeda and Hovenkamp go on to explain, however, that a set of specific, more focused
734 SOUTHERN CALI F ORNIA LAW REVI EW [Vol. 85:733
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. decision,
4
application of the rule of
reason has been likened to 'set[ting] sail on a sea oI doubt.
5

That criticism of the rule of reason is dated and exaggerated. The rule
of reason has evolved considerably since Standard Oil and Chicago Board
of Trade, largely due to the Court`s own march away Irom per se rules and
undemanding burdens of proof. As that march began in the late 1970s, the
Court moved to add contemporary economic content to the broad principles
articulated in Chicago Board of Trade. In formative cases like Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.;
6
National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States ('NSPE);
7
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS
('BMI);
8
and NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,
9

the modern era`s rule oI reason was honed to Iocus on specific, core
economic concepts, especially anticompetitive effect and efficiency.
The shift at the Supreme Court has since further evolved into defined
and structured legal frameworks that have been developed by government
enforcement agencies and across many of the circuit courts of appeals.
Although Standard Oil and, far more often, Chicago Board of Trade are
still cited and quoted, few courts still stop at vague, throw-in-the-kitchen-
sink formulations of the rule of reason.
10
Today, guided by decision

inquiries about effects and justifications can fairly be inferred from Chicago Board of Trade`s 'classic
formulation. Id. See also id. 1507, at 42526.
4. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
5. Id. at 28384 ('It is true that there are some cases in which the courts, mistaking, as we
conceive, the proper limits of the relaxation of the rules for determining the unreasonableness of
restraints of trade, have set sail on a sea of doubt, and have assumed the power to say, in respect to
contracts which have no other purpose and no other consideration on either side than the mutual
restraint of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public interest, and how much is
not.). Some contemporary critics have invoked TaIt`s 'sea oI doubt metaphor to support their own
criticisms of the rule of reason. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 3; Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of
Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in U.S. Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916223.
6. Cont`l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
7. Nat`l Soc`y oI ProI`l Eng`rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
8. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
9. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
10. For example, in abandoning the per se rule for resale price maintenance, the Supreme Court
did not stop at simply announcing that the practice would thereafter by judged under the rule of reason.
Instead, it sought to guide the rule of reason inquiry by describing four specific scenarios that could
lead to anticompetitive effects, as well as three criteria that could be used to identify suspect cases. See
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 89294; 89798 (2007). But see Am.
Needle, Inc. v. Nat`l Football League, 555 U.S. 1168, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 n.10 (2010) (quoting
Justice Brandeis`s 'classic general Iormulation oI the rule oI reason Irom Chicago Board of Trade
with approval, but providing no guidance as to how it should be applied in practice).
2012] THE MODERN RULE OF REASON 735
theory,
11
the core economic concepts of antitrust provide a common
foundation for all antitrust analysis, not just Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
with which the rule of reason is most often associated.
12
They have in
eIIect spawned a collection oI 'rules oI reason that cut across Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act and Sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act and
serve as a set of unifying first principles of antitrust law. The various
frameworks of the new rules of reason are all animated by a common
purpose: to differentiate anticompetitive from efficient conduct.
In application, these 'new rules oI reason have more economic
content and more of a defined legal framework than did the seemingly
more abstract Standard Oil and Chicago Board of Trade approach. To
decide cases, particularly at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment
stages, courts today focus more intently on evidence of competitive effects
and efficiencies as they relate to burdens of pleading, production, and
proof. Oftentimes, the filtering process commences with challenges to
standing that evaluate the plaintiII`s ability to allege 'antitrust injury,
13

and many cases fail to overcome even this first hurdle. Few cases make it
to trial. Plaintiffs must make out a case of anticompetitive effects;
14

defendants must proffer evidence of cognizable efficiencies.
15
'Common

11. As applied to the formulation of legal rules, 'decision theory considers the likely incidence
and costs associated with false convictions (false positives) and false acquittals (false negatives)
collectively, error costsas well as the costs of administering any particular rule. For a more complete
explanation, see Andrew I. Gavil, Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law, in I ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 125, 12931 (2008). For an argument that the
more recent antitrust decisions of the Supreme Court are consistent with a decision-theoretic
framework, see Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV.
871 (2011).
12. See, e.g., Natl Socv of Profl Engrs, 435 U.S. at 68792 (describing the history and origins
of the rule of reason under Section 1); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept, 74
YALE L.J. 775 (1964) (providing an extensive analysis of the origins and evolution of the rule of
reason).
13. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (holding that a
private plaintiII must allege 'antitrust injury, which it deIined as 'injury oI the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that Ilows Irom that which makes deIendants` acts unlawIul). In addition,
distinct rules have developed excluding indirect purchasers from federal courts, see Ill. Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 72829, 740 (1977), and precluding recovery for injuries that are deemed too
remote or speculative from the point of view of causation, Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
14. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) ('[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of
reason analysis, under which antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular contract or
combination is in Iact unreasonable and anticompetitive beIore it will be Iound unlawIul.).
15. For two examples of this kind of structured rule of reason analysis based on shifting burdens
of production, see United States v. Visa, USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003); Law v. NCAA,
134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998). See also Cal. Dental Ass`n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advocating use of four sequential questions to
structure rule of reason inquiry). Areeda and Hovenkamp similarly propose a set of sequential questions
concepts and variable, but essentially like, Irameworksthat`s the current
state of the art, and it generally works well to sort the strong cases from the
weak cases.
16
Although application of the rule of reason in the closest of
cases will necessarily be fact intensive and demand sometimes difficult
judgment calls, it can no longer fairly be said that the standard itself is
vague.
17

Because they are animated by a greater focus on competitive effects,
these modern rules of reason also tend to rely far less on the traditional
approach oI 'categorization Iollowed by condemnation or exoneration.
For at least fifty years, from United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.
18
to
Sylvania, the Supreme Court developed a sorting framework that separated
antitrust cases into categories based on the nature of the conduct and two
distinct rules: per se and rule of reason.
19
As the Court would eventually
acknowledge, in truth these were but two ways of applying the same legal
standard: the rule of reason.
20
Per se treatment was reserved for what was
viewed as the most obviously and extremely anticompetitive conduct.
21

Conduct falling into this category was presumptively unreasonably
anticompetitive and the presumption was irrebuttable.
22
For a plaintiff,
application of the per se rule meant victory. In contrast, rule-of-reason
treatment meant detailed inquiry into effects and justifications and an

as a way to operationalize the rule of reason. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1507, at
42527.
16. See, e.g., ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 20211 (2d ed.
2008).
17. As Areeda and Hovenkamp have observed with respect to the rule of reason,
We cannot realistically hope to know and to weigh confidently all that bears on competitive
impact. Nevertheless, we cannot escape this uncertainty either by condemning everything that
might possibly impair competition or by validating everything that might possibly serve it.
The former violates Standard Oil`s mandate and the latter eviscerates the statute.
We thus have no choice except to make the best judgments we can, guided by the
statutory purpose, our knowledge of the economy, generally accepted economic principles,
and the facts of the case.
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1500, at 382.
18. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
19. During this period, many types of conduct were categorized as per se unlawful. See, e.g.,
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 61012 (1972) (division of markets by
competitors); Klor`s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 21214 (1959) (concerted
refusals to deal); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (tying); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (price fixing by competitors). Some conduct,
however, was instead funneled to the rule of reason. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (exclusive dealing).
20. Nat`l Soc`y oI ProI`l Eng`rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
21. N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
22. Id.
elevated burden of proof for plaintiffs.
23
As was true of the per se rule,
although to a lesser extent, categorization of a case as falling under the rule
of reason was often outcome determinativeplaintiffs won per se cases;
defendants almost always won rule of reason cases. As parties came to
realize the consequences of this sorting approach, litigation intensified and
Iocused on 'categorization. Judicial decisionmaking often turned on
characterization of conduct and subsequent categorization into one of the
two approaches. Did it fall into a per-se category of conduct or a rule-of-
reason category? Plaintiffs clung to the per se rule; defendants sought to
shred it.
Today, although this kind of pigeonholing persists for some of the
most obviously egregious types of conduct, such as cartel formation,
24
the
courts` reduced reliance on per se rules has diminished the role of sorting.
The movement toward greater reliance on economic analysis has instead
elevated the importance of sorting cases by type of competitive effects
instead of type of conduct, although conduct can, in some cases, be a
surrogate for type of effect. As a result, conduct involving 'collusive or
direct efIects on the one hand and 'exclusionary or indirect eIIects on the
other are treated alike for purposes of analysis based on their economic
characteristics.
25
The traditional characterization approach is limited today
to narrowly defined instances of single firm conductpredatory pricing
and refusals to dealthat share two characteristics: they involve inherently
high risks of overdeterrence and present unique remedial problems.
26

Hence, the courts have developed specialized tests for evaluating their
legality.
27

23. As Areeda and Hovenkamp explain, 'The deIendant invokes the rule oI reason in order to
maximize the plaintiII`s burden and its own chances oI prevailing on the merits or oI outlasting
plaintiIIs lacking the energy, time, or money Ior a lengthy inquiry into reasonableness. AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1511a, at 464.
24. As the Supreme Court has consistently maintained, 'Price-fixing agreements between two or
more competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price-fixing agreements, fall into the category of
arrangements that are per se unlawIul. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006). See also Palmer v.
BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 4950 (1990) (division of markets by rivals is per se unlawful).
25. For a more complete explanation of collusive and exclusionary anticompetitive effects, see
GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 16, at 4553.
26. See, e.g., Verizon Commc`ns Inc. v. Law OIIices oI Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
40810 (2004) (adopting a limited and specialized rule of liability for unilateral refusals to deal);
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 22224 (1993) (adopting a
specialized two-part test for predatory pricing).
27. See supra note 26. Residual specialized rules also formally remain for exclusionary group
boycotts, see Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 29495
(1985) (finding that the per se rule to be applicable only under specified conditions), and tying, see
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 1314 (1984) (same).
Despite the critics` considerable success in persuading courts and
agencies alike to impose multiple limitations on standing and to move away
from the certainty of per se rules and undemanding burdens of proof,
criticism of the rule of reason persists in some quarters. Ironically, having
won the battle to restore the rule oI reason, today`s critics detest what they
view as its inherent uncertainty and expense to implement.
28
They now
yearn for the certainty of the per se era but at the other end of the spectrum;
they advocate easy-to-apply filters that would more readily terminate weak
or allegedly 'Irivolous cases even though deIendants already prevail an
overwhelming percentage of the time and private antitrust litigation is at a
historically low level.
29
When these arguments are unpacked, however,
they turn out to be more directed at the U.S. antitrust system than at the

28. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 1213 ('Litigation costs are the product oI vague
rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination more deadly than in antitrust
litigation under the Rule oI Reason.). For more recent examples of critical views of the rule of reason,
see Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single Entity Argument for Sports Leagues:
American Needle and the Supreme Court's Opportunity to Reject a Flawed Defense, 2009 WISC. L.
REV. 835, 898; Nathaniel Grow, American Needle and the Future of the Single Entity Defense Under
Section One of the Sherman Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 450 (2011); Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule
of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 142266 (2009). The proposition that
rule of reason litigation can be uncertain and costly is oft repeated and does not appear to be
controversial. See, e.g., Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Joint-Venture Analysis After American Needle,
7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 543, 546 (2011) ('Full-blown rule-of-reason analysis subjects defendants
to considerable expense and uncertainty.). More generally, the high cost oI antitrust litigation, as well
as the uncertainty oI the Sherman Act`s prohibitions and the related risk oI Ialse positives, has animated
the Supreme Court to constrain antitrust litigation through a variety of mechanisms. For example, in
imposing a more demanding burden of pleading antitrust claims in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court expressed its concern that discovery costs alone might coerce
defendants to settle weak claims. Id. at 559 ('|T|he threat oI discovery expense will push cost-
conscious deIendants to settle even anemic cases beIore reaching those proceedings.). The Court has
expressed similar concerns in connection with the anti-monopolization provision of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, pointing more specifically to the link between uncertain legal standards and the likely
incidence oI error, or 'Ialse positive|s|. See Jeri:on Commcns, 540 U.S. at 414.
29. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 1439 (advocating use oI a set oI 'Iilters, including
absence of market power, to weed out unmeritorious antitrust complaints). Judge Easterbrook has relied
on that approach to dismiss rule of reason cases when the absence of market power is relatively
obvious. See, e.g., Wallace v. IBM Corp., 467 F.3d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 2006); Sanderson v. Culligan
Int`l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 622 (7th Cir. 2005). Due to the cumulative eIIect oI enhanced burdens oI
pleading, production, and proof, as well as limits on standing, the number of civil antitrust cases
annually filed in the federal courts has dropped from an average of over 1500 in the 1970s, to fewer
than 600 today. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Leah Brannon, Determinants of Private Antitrust
Enforcement in the United States, Competition Pol`y Int`l, Autumn 2005, at 29, 32 (showing in figure 1
that the level of private and public antitrust cases filed in federal courts from 19452000). According to
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which tracks civil filings on a September-to-September
annual basis, there were 1038 civil antitrust cases filed in 2007, 1318 in 2008, 812 in 2009, 544 in 2010,
and 475 in 2011. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 2011, Table C-2A,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.
pdf.
substance of the modern rule of reason. The combination of antitrust
specific incentives to suittreble damages and attorneys` Ieesand the
predominant features of our litigation systemdiscovery, class actions,
and jury trialsare derided as a 'toxic cocktail that brings deIendants to
their knees and promotes coerced settlements, which in turn further
encourage commencement of weak cases.
30
While these arguments are
exaggerated and often minimize the considerable evolution in the substance
of the rule of reason, the critique of the antitrust litigation system surely has
some merit.
31

This Article will argue that eIIorts to caricature the 'Iull-blown rule
oI reason based on the 'everything is relevant, but nothing decisive
Chicago Board of Trade formulation are simply outdated. Today,
numerous filters are available to weed out truly weak cases. Because of
those filters, the few cases that defy early weeding are likely to have at
least some merit. Even when a comprehensive rule of reason is required in
closer cases, courts are likely to apply a very structured and demanding
framework that largely favors defendants. False positives are far less likely
today than ever before, and the standards of antitrust overall are the most
business friendly ever to exist in American antitrust law. If anything, room
for improvement lies on the underdeterrence side of things. Sometimes the
burdens of proof imposed on plaintiffs at the behest of defendants are
irrationally demanding, even in cases of conduct that is obviously suspect.

We are primed, therefore, for the next phase in the evolution of the
rule of reason. Our highest priority should be to simplify its administration
in the most obvious casesboth anticompetitive and not. Despite the
considerably higher burdens imposed on plaintiffs today, a review of the
cases reveals that relatively weak cases still can be prolonged at great cost
to parties and courts. Likewise, defending parties are far too able to wear
down plaintiffs with possibly meritorious claims through years of scorched-
earth trench warfare, and by demanding layers of proof even in cases in

30. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American
Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 640 & n.79 (2010). Cavanagh persuasively argues, however, that
this characterization is 'harsh and misleading. Id.
31. Again, however, there is irony. Some of the costs associated with litigating complex antitrust
cases today are significantly attributable to an increased demand for sophisticated economic evidence
that in turn requires more extensive discovery and is delivered by highly compensated economist-
experts. The litigating practices of the large law firms that typically represent defendants in antitrust
cases may also be a contributing factor. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, LITIGATION
COSTS IN CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2010) (identifying representation by larger law firms as a factor
contributing to the higher costs of litigation).
which anticompetitive effects are relatively obvious and cognizable
defenses lacking. Second, even in the closer cases, we must better articulate
relative burdens of production and proof, as well as our approach to
processing claims and defenses, so that reasonably accurate decisions can
be reached without incurring years of party and institutional costs.
Although the movement toward structured analysis is pronounced, there
remain significant instances of surprisingly confused, confusing, and
inconsistent applications of the rule of reason. These cases deserve our
attention regardless of outcome; they are poorly reasoned and undermine
the continued efficacy of the otherwise modern rules of reason.
II. THE RULE OF REASON: EARLY PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT
A. FOUNDATIONS: 18901918
The Supreme Court famously declared in Standard Oil that the
'standard oI reason which had been applied at the common law should
guide interpretation oI the phrase 'restraint oI trade in Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
32
The Court`s adoption oI this rule oI reason was something
of a personal triumph for Chief Justice Edward Douglass White, who, as an
Associate Justice, had dissented Irom the Court`s decision Iourteen years
earlier in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn;
33
he faulted the
Court for its literal reading of the Sherman Act when it gave full weight to
the '|e|very that opens Section 1, thereby rejecting his call for a
reasonableness limitation on its provisions.
34
To support his view, then
Associate Justice White cited to common law usage of the term:
Is it correct to say that at common law the words 'restraint of trade had
a generic signification which embraced all contracts which restrained the
freedom of trade, whether reasonable or unreasonable, and, therefore,
that all such contracts are within the meaning of the words 'every
contract in restraint of trade? I think a brief consideration of the history
and development of the law on the subject will not only establish the
inaccuracy of this proposition, but also demonstrate that the words
'restraint of trade embrace only contracts which unreasonably restrain
trade, and, therefore, that reasonable contracts, although they, in some
measure, 'restrain trade, are not within the meaning of the words.
35

Elevated to the position of Chief Justice by President Taft in

32. 15 U.S.C. 1 (2006); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
33. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass`n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
34. Id. at 346 (White, J., dissenting).
35. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
December 1910, Chief Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court in
Standard Oil. Drawing on the arguments he had first developed in his
Trans-Missouri dissenting opinion, he now wrote for the majority,
abandoning Trans-Missouri`s expansive reading of Section 1 and ushering
in the era of the rule of reason.
36

Chief Justice White`s reinterpretation oI the Sherman Act to
incorporate a reasonableness qualification has never been seriously
questioned. Moreover, it is now widely understood that Congress adopted
the common law term oI art 'restraint oI trade not only to give the
prohibition of Section 1 a known meaning, but also to provide it with the
flexibility to evolve over time.
37
As the Court observed years later in
NSPE:
Congress . . . did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the
full meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The
legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to
give shape to the statute`s broad mandate by drawing on common-law
tradition.
38

That common law tradition also provided the Sherman Act with its
'flexibility and durability.
39
The Court later emphasized this flexibility in
explaining why 'stare decisis is not an inexorable command under the
Sherman Act:
In the area of antitrust law, there is a competing interest [to stare decisis],
well-represented in this Court`s decisions, in recognizing and adapting to

36. President Taft, a former circuit judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and
later a Chief Justice himself, shared Justice White`s view that interpretation oI Section 1 of the Sherman
Act should be guided by the common law origins oI 'restraint oI trade. That view had been reIlected in
his opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 28384 (6th Cir.1898), affd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899), which is itself a still-relevant authority on application of the rule of reason. Like
Justice White, he turned to the history of the common law usage of the term as a guide to its use. In
contrast to Justice White`s approach, however, then-Judge Taft saw a more structured use of
reasonableness at common law based on ancillary restraint analysis, which he incorporated into his
approach to the Sherman Act. Id. He viewed the approach as an alternative to any unguided reliance on
'reason as a general concept. Indeed, in a since oIten-quoted turn of phrase, he derided the unguided
alternative, expressing his concern that courts applying the rule of reason absent the discipline of a
structured approach 'have set sail on a sea oI doubt. Id. at 28384. Some courts still appear to view
ancillary restraint analysis as a superior method of implementing the rule of reason when the conduct
challenged is an integral part of a broader cooperative integration. See, e.g., Major League Baseball
Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 33441 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
37. Similarly, it added 'or otherwise Iollowing 'in the Iorm oI trust to insure that the
specification that Section 1 could reach concerted action would remain effective regardless of the
corporate form it might take. Nat`l Soc`y oI ProI`l Eng`rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 68788
(1978) (quoting Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
38. Id. at 688.
39. Id.
changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience. Thus,
the general presumption that legislative changes should be left to
Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the
accepted view that Congress 'expected the courts to give shape to the
statute`s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition. As we
have explained, the term 'restraint of trade, as used in 1, also
'invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that
the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.
40

It was not until the Court`s 1918 decision in Chicago Board of Trade,
however, that the content of the rule of reason began to take shape. There,
Justice Brandeis penned what to date remains one of the most frequently
cited expressions of that content:
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by
so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain,
is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
41

Justice Brandeis`s timeless explanation of the rule of reason
incorporates many of its most enduring characteristics. He recognized that
restraints on competition may often be a valuable and integral part of
business arrangements, and that not all restraints should be condemned.
42
He thus can be credited with laying the foundation for important and much
later decisions of the Court that, as was true in Chicago Board of Trade
itself, rejected Sherman Act challenges to conduct that had procompetitive
or competitively neutral effects. Moreover, his articulation of the content of
the rule of reason intuitively focused on the issues that lie at the core of the
rule of reason inquiry and always have: the nature of the conduct, its

40. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 2021 (1997) (citing Natl Socv of Profl Engrs, 435
U.S. at 688; Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726, 732 (1988)).
41. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
42. Id.
purpose, and, perhaps most importantly, 'its effect[s], actual or
probable.
43
While much was left to evolve and even change over time, this
basic approach has endured, with good reason: for the most part, it focused
on the right questions. Although perhaps lacking in the economic precision
demanded of antitrust analysis today,
44
the Chicago Board of Trade
framework has not been given its due.
But the Chicago Board of Trade framework also left important
questions unanswered and invited some mischief. Justice Brandeis
presented the rule of reason as a very open, fact-intensive, and seemingly
unstructured inquiry.
45
To reach a conclusion about any speciIic restraint`s
reasonableness, all of the relevant evidence would have to be collected and
evaluated.
46
While this proscription might have worked from the broad
perspective of competition policy, it was not responsive to the needs of
litigation, through which the closest cases would be decided. He did not
address, for example, the procedural specifics with respect to relative
burdens of pleading, production, or proof, or the various techniques that
might be used to establish and measure effects.
47
And even though he
focused on competitive eIIects when he posed the rule oI reason`s central
inquiry as whether a restraint 'merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition, in his application oI the Iramework, he seemed to deIine
relevant 'eIIects broadly, suggesting a willingness to go beyond
competitive effects.
48

The Chicago Board of Trade formulation of the rule of reason,

43. To evaluate the restraint`s eIIects, Justice Brandeis looked to output and price, often the focal
point of modern economic analysis, observing that the restraint at issue 'had no appreciable eIIect on
general market prices; nor did it materially aIIect the total volume oI grain coming to Chicago. Id. at
240
44. The successful modern antitrust case must commence with a sound economic theory of
competitive harm and, with the exception of the few remaining per se offenses, it must also take into
account possible justifications for the conduct under examination. See, e.g., GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER,
supra note 16, at 89293. For a thoughtful account of the intellectual history of economic analysis in
antitrust, see William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal
Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000). See also William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern
U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1.
45. See Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 23840.
46. See id. at 23839.
47. Id. at 23839 (discussing the error of the district judge in striking allegations and excluding
evidence in relation to the antitrust case).
48. Id. at 238, 241 ('Every board of trade and nearly every trade organization imposes some
restraint upon the conduct of business by its members. Those relating to the hours in which business
may be done are common; and they make a special appeal where, as here, they tend to shorten the
working day or, at least, limit the period oI most exacting activity.).
therefore, did not establish a fully operable rule of reason for purposes of
litigation. What would a plaintiff need in terms of evidence of effect to
shift a burden of production to a defendant? How would a defendant shift a
burden back? What kinds of presumptions, if any, might be used? What
kinds of effects matter and what kinds of defenses would be recognized?
These issues simply were not addressed.
49

Beyond this lack of specification lies a more fundamental flaw in the
rule of reason as stated in Chicago Board of Trade: the search for truth is
not costless. Even in Justice Brandeis`s day, Chicago Board of Trade`s
open-ended approach might prove to be burdensome. Over time, business
practices became more complex and industries more regional, then
national, and today international; such an approach could call for large
volumes of data and difficult-to-make assessments of effect. Moreover,
modern rules of pleading, discovery, and motion practice were still twenty
years in the future for Justice Brandeis, and he surely could not have fully
anticipated the challenges of implementing the rule of reason in today`s
world of global enterprises that rely on electronically stored information.
B. TRANSITION TO THE MODERN ERA: 19771979
1. The Bipolar Rule of Reason
For nearly sixty years after Chicago Board of Trade, the rule of reason
lay fallow. With few exceptions,
50
the Court turned away from application
of the rule of reason in favor of expansive reliance on its abbreviated
variant, the per se rule, which presumed anticompetitive effects from the
nature of conductand the presumption was irrebuttable. As the Court
explained in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 'there are
certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on

49. The omission is not uncommon. Indeed, in one of its most recent decisions embracing the
rule of reason for vertical price restraints, the Supreme Court openly invited lower courts to fill in the
unanswered questions presented by its decision over time:
As courts gain experience considering the effects of these restraints by applying the rule of
reason over the course of decisions, they can establish the litigation structure to ensure the
rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market and to provide more
guidance to businesses. Courts can, for example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or
even presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to
prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 89899 (2007).
50. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 26264 (1963) (applying the rule
of reason to nonprice vertical intrabrand restraints); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
320, 333335 (1961) (applying a rule-of-reason-type approach to exclusive supply contracts under
Section 3 of the Clayton Act).
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse Ior their use.
51
Until
the Court altered course in its 1977 decision in Sylvania, it invoked this
characterization for a wide range of conduct, banning not only hardcore
price fixing
52
and division of markets by rivals,
53
but also group boycotts,
54

tying,
55
and vertical price
56
and nonprice restraints.
57
When it did not rely
on per se rules, it often embraced relatively low burdens of proof for
plaintiffs and invoked rhetoric suggesting its reliance on noneconomic
factors.
58

This was the state of affairs when the makeup of the Court began to
change during the administration of President Nixon. With four new
appointees to the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger, along with Associate
Justices Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist, and especially Lewis Powell,
a new majority coalesced, one that was far more receptive to complaints
Irom industry and academic criticism directed at antitrust`s unduly
restrictive, albeit predictable, prohibitions.
59
Justice John Paul Stevens,
who brought antitrust-specific expertise to the Court, was appointed by
President Ford in 1975 and would thereafter make significant contributions

51. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
53. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (extending Timken`s per se ban to a less obviously horizontal
division of markets).
54. See Klor`s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
55. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
56. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (finding that maximum resale price
maintenance was per se unlawful), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997); Dr. Miles
Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (finding that minimum resale price
maintenance was per se unlawful), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 882, 907 (2007). The Court later overruled both Albrecht and Dr. Miles, concluding that a
more complete rule of reason approach should be used for all forms of resale price maintenance.
57. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding nonprice vertical
restraints unlawful), overruled by Cont`l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Klors, 359 U.S. at 213 (emphasizing the adverse impact of the challenged refusal
to deal on dealer 'Ireedom and expressing an interest in protecting 'small businessmen); Schwinn,
388 U.S. at 378 (citing Klors and observing adverse impact of challenged restraint on dealer
'Ireedom). This was especially true in the case of merger law. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (declaring a merger of competing firms with combined, single-digit market
shares unlawful).
59. For a more complete discussion of the impact these changes had at the Court, see Andrew I.
Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars Episode I: Illinois Brick from Inside the Supreme Court, 79 ST. JOHN`S
L. REV. 553 (2005); Andrew I. Gavil, Sylvania and the Process of Change in the Supreme Court: A
First Look at the Powell Papers, ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 89.
as well to this change of direction.
60

For this new majority, Section 1 of the Sherman Act appeared at first
to be a bipolar world.

As Justice Stevens explained writing the opinion of
the Court in NSPE in 1978,
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In
the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are
so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is
needed to establish their illegalitythey are 'illegal per se. In the
second category are agreements whose competitive effect can only be
evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of
the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed. In either event, the
purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive
significance of the restraint . . . .
61

This all or nothing, bipolar view of Section 1 was, by the time of
NSPE, deeply rooted in the law of antitrust. Courts and parties had two
choices in applying its prohibitions of unreasonable restraints of trade:
presumptive and conclusive condemnation or comprehensive analysis.
Those two choices were repeatedly described by courts and commentators
alike as distinct and alternative 'rulesper se and rule of reason.
62

Even as Justice Stevens appeared to embrace this bipolar approach to
applying Section 1, however, his explanation of it emphasized the deeper,
unitary character of the rule of reason.
63
In stating that '|i|n either event
[per se or rule of reason], the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment
about the competitive signiIicance oI the restraint, he was in eIIect
reintegrating the 'two rules.
64
The rule of reason is the standard under
Section 1, the per se rule but one means to apply it. There were, therefore,
not two standards, but two alternate ways of applying the one.

60. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Justice Stevens and the Rule of Reason, 62 SMU L.
REV. 693 (2009) (discussing the origins oI Justice Stevens`s antitrust philosophy and his method oI
defining the rule of reason).
61. Nat`l Soc`y oI ProI`l Eng`rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (emphasis added).
62. This was evident just a year before NSPE in the Court`s Sylvania decision. Cont`l TV, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 4950 (1977). Indeed, the Supreme Court continues on occasion to
reIer to 'the per se rule and 'the rule oI reason as iI they were two distinct and alternative 'rules.
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).
63. Waller, supra note 60, at 693 ('Justice Stevens, more than any justice, helped define the rule
of reason as a single unitary continuum in analyzing agreements under section 1 of the Sherman Act
and further defined what counted as potential legitimate justiIications under the rule. (emphasis
added)). Cf. Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859, 859 (1988) ('It is
sometimes said there are two antitrust rules, per se and that of reason. This view is incorrect; there is
only one Iorm oI analysis, the rule oI reason.).
64. Natl Socv of Profl Engrs, 435 U.S. at 69192.
In addition, Justice Stevens`s application of the bipolar rule of reason
in NSPE implicitly acknowledged that it was incomplete.
65
The case
involved a ban on competitive bidding that was incorporated into the
National Society oI ProIessional Engineers`s ('the Society) Code of
Ethics, which the Court struck down as a violation of the Sherman Act.
According to the Court,
The parties compiled a voluminous discovery and trial record. The
District Court made detailed findings about the engineering profession,
the Society, its members` participation in interstate commerce, the
history of the ban on competitive bidding, and certain incidents in which
the ban appears to have been violated or enforced. The District Court did
not, however, make any finding on the question whether, or to what
extent, competition had led to inferior engineering work which, in turn,
had adversely affected the public health, safety, or welfare. That inquiry
was considered unnecessary because the court was convinced that the
ethical prohibition against competitive bidding was 'on its Iace a
tampering with the price structure of engineering fees in violation of 1
oI the Sherman Act.
66

The inherently ambiguous characterization of the case in this passage
reveals that it was a poor fit for the simple bipolar model. The record
appeared to go well beyond the traditional facial invalidity associated with
a true per se rule, yet the United States did not introduce any evidence of
actual competitive effects.
67
The seeming justification for lengthy inquiry
was the Society`s deIense, which was the issue that appeared to challenge
all oI the courts: whether the Society`s assertion that competitive bidding
would undermine public safety was a cognizable defense to an allegedly
anticompetitive restrictionthe ban on bidding. The Court famously
concluded that such a deIense was 'a Irontal assault on the basic policy of
the Sherman Act, because it attributed ill effects to the process of
competition itself.
68
Like 'reasonable prices, which was urged as a
defense by price fixers in some of the early Sherman Act cases, a defense
based on the assertion that competition was harmful was not cognizable.
69

Although the Court firmly condemned the ban, however, it never

65. See id.
66. Id. at 68586 (quoting United States v. Nat`l Soc`y of ProI`l Eng`rs., 389 F. Supp. 1193,
1200 (D.D.C. 1975)).
67. Id. at 69295.
68. Id. at 695.
69. For an argument that there are no true 'per se oIIenses under antitrust law, but rather
deIenses that have been deemed inadmissible, such as the Society`s proIIered deIense, see Thomas G.
Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165
(1988).
specifically labeled it per se unlawful. And in this crucial paragraph, it at
Iirst appears to reject, then embrace 'Iacial condemnation:
While this is not price fixing as such, no el aborate industry analysis is
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an
agreement. It operates as an absolute ban on competitive bidding,
applying with equal force to both complicated and simple projects and to
both inexperienced and sophisticated customers. As the District Court
Iound, the ban 'impedes the ordinary give and take oI the market place,
and substantially deprives the customer oI 'the ability to utilize and
compare prices in selecting engineering services. . . . On its face, this
agreement restrains trade within the meaning of 1 of the Sherman
Act.
70

The Court would later look back at NSPE with uncertainty,
characterizing it as a per se case in one instance and as a case rejecting
reliance on the per se rule in another.
71
As will be discussed in the next
section, the decision is best understood as the precursor to a more nuanced
approach to analysis under the rule of reason, one that would later be called
the 'quick look, and one that does not Iit comIortably within the simple,
bipolar model.
2. First Principles: Focus on Competitive Effects
Justice Stevens`s 1978 opinion in NSPE was also significant in a far
more fundamental way. As was true oI the Court`s decision in Sylvania the
previous term, NSPE sharply refocused the Sherman Act inquiry on
competitive effects. It was one of a trilogy of decisions from the Court
between 1977 and 1979 that also included Sylvania (1977) and BMI (1979),
which collectively laid the foundation for the modern rule of reason. These
decisions had one unifying and forcefully expressed theme that was rooted
in Standard Oil and especially Chicago Board of Trade. The central
concern of the rule of reason is competitive effects, what Steven C. Salop
would later label antitrust`s 'Iirst principles.
72

70. Natl Socv of Profl Engrs, 435 U.S. at 69293 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v.
Nat`l Soc`y of Prof`l Eng`rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1979)).
71. Compare Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc`y, 457 U.S. 332, 362 (1982) ('[I]n National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States . . . we held unlawful as a per se violation an
engineering association`s canon oI ethics that prohibited competitive bidding by its members.), with
FTC v. Ind. Fed`n oI Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) ('[W]e have been slow to condemn rules
adopted by professional associations as unreasonable per se, see National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States . . . .).
72. Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the
Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187 (2000). As Salop explained
Sylvania and BMI were twin cornerstones of the resuscitated rule of
reason, which was based on three propositions that they advanced. First,
the Court restored comprehensive rule of reason analysis as the default
setting for antitrust analysis and repositioned the per se rule as an
exception.
73
Second, they, like NSPE, which was decided during the term
between them, sharpened the focus of the relevant inquiry under the rule of
reason on competitive effects.
74
Finally, Sylvania and, in particular, BMI,
invited a decidedly more economic approach to evaluating effects, one that
would also value and integrate considerations of efficiency.
75
The
interrelation of these three marked changes was evident in BMI:
[I]n characterizing . . . conduct under the per se rule, our inquiry must
focus on whether the effect and, here because it tends to show effect, the
purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation of our
predominantly free-market economythat is, whether the practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output, and in what portion of the
market, or instead one designed to 'increase economic efficiency and
render markets more, rather than less, competitive.
76

After a sixty year absence, Chicago Board of Trade was back in play,
but with greater definition.

The first principles approach centers on an examination of the competitive effects of the
conduct at issue. This is appropriate because competitive effect is the true core of antitrust.
Although market power and market definition have a role in antitrust analysis, their proper
roles are as parts of and in reference to the primary evaluation of the alleged anticompetitive
conduct and its likely market effects. They are not valued for their own sake, but rather for the
roles they play in an evaluation of market effects.
Id. at 188.
73. This repositioning was evident in the Court`s declaration in Sylvania that 'departure from the
rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic eIIect, Cont`l T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 5859 (1977), and in its penultimate conclusion that '|w|hen
anticompetitive effects are shown to result from particular vertical restrictions they can be adequately
policed under the rule of reason, the standard traditionally applied for the majority of anticompetitive
practices challenged under 1 of the Act, id. at 59 (emphasis added). See also Broad. Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) ('It is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships
that courts classify them as per se violations . . . . (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405
U.S. 596, 60708 (1972))).
74. Sylvania thus asserted that '[i]nterbrand competition . . . is the primary concern of antitrust
law, GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19 (emphasis added), and in a passage that echoed Judge TaIt`s
warnings about an open-ended and unfocused rule of reason, the Court similarly cautioned that 'an
antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks, id. at 53
n.21.
75. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 20; GTE Sylvania, 443 U.S. at 36. Both decisions also stood
for the proposition that application of the per se rule was inappropriate in the presence of plausible
efficiencies associated with the conduct under scrutiny. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 20; GTE
Sylvania, 443 U.S. at 36.
76. Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 1920 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)).
Building on Justice Powell`s watershed decision in Sylvania, Justice
Stevens`s decision in NSPE was especially significant in mooring the
modern rule of reason to its first principles. Reaching back to its common
law roots, he argued that
The Rule of Reason, with its origins in common-law precedents long
antedating the Sherman Act . . . has been used to give the Act both
flexibility and definition, and its central principle of antitrust analysis has
remained constant. Contrary to its name, the Rule does not open the field
of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that
may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the
challenged restraints impact on competitive conditions.
77

Justice Stevens then completed his historical analysis, reestablishing
the connection between the Sherman Act`s common law roots and the
Court`s decisions in Chicago Board of Trade and Sylvania:
In this respect the Rule of Reason has remained faithful to its origins.
From Mr. Justice Brandeis` opinion Ior the Court in Chicago Board of
Trade, to the Court opinion written by MR. JUSTICE POWELL in
Continental T. V., Inc., the Court has adhered to the position that the
inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged
agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses
competition.
78

Driving home his point, he also reached back to Standard Oil:
The test prescribed in Standard Oil is whether the challenged contracts
or acts 'were unreasonably restrictive oI competitive conditions.
Unreasonableness under that test could be based either (1) on the nature
or character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving
rise to the inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain
trade and enhance prices. Under either branch of the test, the inquiry is
confined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions.
79

After Sylvania, NSPE, and BMI, therefore, the presumptive approach
under Section 1 was comprehensive rule of reason analysis. The per se rule
was de-emphasized and viewed as an exception whose use would need to
be specifically justified. And all Section 1 decisions would have to be more
firmly anchored to an assessment of competitive effects, based on
economic inquiry that looked at both adverse and beneficial effects. With
these building blocks in place, it was once again time to consider how the

77. Nat`l Soc`y oI ProI`l Eng`rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 691.
79. Id. at 690 (footnotes omitted). Justice Stevens added that '|t|hroughout the Court`s opinion
[in Standard Oil| the emphasis is on economic conceptions. Id. at 690 n16.
rule of reason could be sensibly implemented across a range of conduct,
and the bipolar model quickly proved to be inadequate to the task.
80

III. THE BREAK DOWN OF THE BIPOLAR MODEL AND THE RISE
OF THE 'QUICK LOOK: 19841999
Both NSPE and BMI hinted at recognition that the bipolar model was
inadequate. First, if the per se rule could be applied only after some
considerable experience with conduct, or if some degree of inquiry beyond
facial analysis might be required even before the per se presumption could
be invoked and justified, then it was not truly a bright line rule. Moreover,
both decisions hinted at the idea that a nonper se approach might not
always warrant 'elaborate inquiry.
81
If neither immediate condemnation
nor elaborate inquiry was always needed, was there some middle ground
that could lead to either condemnation or exoneration?
A closer examination of the evidence and reasoning of the two cases
reveals an often overlooked nuance to their application of the rule of
reason. Both involved conduct that the plaintiffs sought to characterize
under the per se rule as a variation of price fixing. And in both cases the
Court eschewed the easy label, concluding in NSPE that the ban on
competitive bidding was not 'price Iixing as such
82
and in BMI that the
blanket licensing practices of ASCAP and BMI were only price fixing in a
'literal sense, but not the equivalent oI per se unlawIul price Iixing.
83

NSPE went on to condemn the Society`s ban on competitive bidding.
84

BMI concluded that owing to plausible efficiencies, application of the per

80. In the hands of adversarial litigants, the bipolar model also tended to distort the rule of reason
over time. Plaintiffs pressed for application of the per se rule regardless of the presence of plausible
eIIiciencies Ior the deIendants` conduct and deIendants sought to impose unnecessarily demanding
burdens of proof on plaintiffs in rule of reason cases. As the Federal Trade Commission ('FTC)
observed in 1988,
[L]itigants and courts have taken positions that distort both ends of this dichotomysaying
that conduct must be condemned automatically, without regard for any redeeming competitive
virtues, if it can be categorized as falling into a per se category; while conduct falling into the
residual rule of reason category cannot be condemned at all until all aspects of definition,
market power, intent, and net competitive effect have been analyzeda process that many
consider to be the antitrust equivalent to Chinese water torture.

In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 60304 (1988).
81. The phrase was first used by the Supreme Court to characterize per se offenses in Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
82. Natl Socv of Profl Engrs, 435 U.S. at 692 ('While this is not price fixing as such, no
elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an
agreement.).
83. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 89 (1979).
se rule to the blanket license was inappropriate.
85
It remanded the case for
consideration of whether the plaintiffs could prove anticompetitive effects
in any way other than through the presumption accorded by the per se
rule.
86

Importantly, in neither case did the Court reach its conclusion based
on any metes-and-bounds expert economic evidence of measured or
measurable anticompetitive effects or efficiencies. Having relied on the per
se rule, the government did not offer evidence of actual adverse effects in
NSPE.
87
Similarly, the defendants in BMI did not offer specific evidence of
measurable efficiencies; it was enough that they were able to articulate and
support the idea that there were efficiencies served by their conduct.
88
Yet
in both cases the Court was able to reach firm conclusions based on its
assessment oI the conduct`s eIIects. It did so not by demanding 'elaborate
economic proof, but by reaching a judgment about the effects of the
challenged conduct based on an economically informed evaluation of the
background evidence concerning the history, purposes, and operation of the
two practices.
89
In short, the all-important issue of competitive effects was
a product of economic reasoning, built on that background evidence.
90

85. Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 810.
86. The court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs could not do so and dismissed the
complaint. See CBS v. Am. Soc`y oI Composers, Authors & Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980).
88. Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 20.
89. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. 1; Natl Socv of Profl Engrs, 435 U.S. 679.
90. For preliminary assessments, the Court`s observations regarding adverse competitive effects
in NSPE and efficiencies in BMI were quite specific and read like findings of fact, leaving little room
for debate. In NSPE, the Court stated
In this case we are presented with an agreement among competitors to refuse to discuss prices
with potential customers until after negotiations have resulted in the initial selection of an
engineer. While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement. It operates as an absolute ban
on competitive bidding, applying with equal force to both complicated and simple projects
and to both inexperienced and sophisticated customers. As the District Court found, the ban
'impedes the ordinary give and take oI the market place, and substantially deprives the
customer oI 'the ability to utilize and compare prices in selecting engineering services. On
its face, this agreement restrains trade within the meaning of 1 of the Sherman Act.
Natl Socv of Profl Engrs, 435 U.S. at 69293 (citation omitted). And in BMI, the Court observed
that
The blanket license, as we see it, is not a 'naked restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except
stifling of competition, but rather accompanies the integration of sales, monitoring, and
enforcement against unauthorized copyright use . . . . ASCAP reduces costs absolutely by
creating a blanket license that is sold only a few, instead of thousands, of times, and that
obviates the need for closely monitoring the networks to see that they do not use more than
they pay for. ASCAP also provides the necessary resources for blanket sales and enforcement,
resources unavailable to the vast majority of composers and publishing houses. Moreover, a
bulk license of some type is a necessary consequence of the integration necessary to achieve
these efficiencies, and a necessary consequence of an aggregate license is that its price must
be established.
Somewhere between facial invalidity and comprehensive analysis there
appeared to be additional choices.
A. DIRECT VERSUS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF ANTICOMPETITIVE
EFFECTS AND THE 'QUICK LOOK TO CONDEMN
The Court was presented with an opportunity to examine that middle
ground five years later when two powerhouse college football teams
challenged the television broadcast licensing contracts of the NCAA.
91
The
plan had two critical features. First, it limited the number of college
football games that could be televised in a season.
92
Second, it set an
aggregate licensing fee for all of the televised games, even as it appeared to
authorize individual, game-specific price negotiations.
93
As the Court
explained
A restraint of this type has often been held to be unreasonable as a matter
of law. Because it places a ceiling on the number of games member
institutions may televise, the horizontal agreement places an artificial
limit on the quantity of televised football that is available to broadcasters
and consumers. By restraining the quantity of television rights available
for sale, the challenged practices create a limitation on output; our cases
have held that such limitations are unreasonable restraints of trade.
Moreover, the District Court found that the minimum aggregate price in
fact operates to preclude any price negotiation between broadcasters and
institutions, thereby constituting horizontal price fixing, perhaps the
paradigm of an unreasonable restraint of trade.
94

In another oI Justice Stevens`s influential antitrust opinions, the Court
nevertheless declined the plaintiIIs` invitation to apply the per se rule,
resting its decision on the Iact that 'this case involves an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all.
95
In a crucial paragraph oI the Court`s decision, however,
it also rejected the NCAA`s demand that the plaintiII be required to
establish the NCAA`s market power in a properly deIined relevant market,
holding that

Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 2021 (footnotes omitted). As will be argued infra, NSPE fits better into
what became known as the 'inherently suspect category than it does the per se category, whereas BMI
seemed to be a pioneering example of the conversean inherently not suspect approach.
91. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
92. Id. at 9095.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 99100 (footnotes omitted).
95. Id. at 101.
As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify
a naked restriction on price or output. To the contrary, when there is an
agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, 'no elaborate
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character
of such an agreement.
96

The Court`s wording is paradoxical on a number oI levels. First, the
Court oddly seems to be differentiating market power from proof of
anticompetitive effect,
97
yet economic teaching suggests that such effects
are likely to occur only in the presence of market power. Traditionally,
however, market power was inferred from high market shares in defined
relevant markets, and from market power, courts inferred anticompetitive
effect.
98
Given that the Court was responding to the NCAA`s demand that
the plaintiffs prove a relevant market and sufficient market shares to infer
market power, what the Court likely meant in this passage was that proof of
market power through circumstantial means was not required given
alternative evidence that would justify the same conclusion as to effect.
This would later become clearer in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists
('I F D), in which the Court explained
Since the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market
power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for
genuine adverse eIIects on competition, 'prooI oI actual detrimental
eIIects, such as a reduction oI output, can obviate the need Ior an
inquiry into market power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental
effects.
99

Second, NCAA describes the conduct at issue as 'a naked restriction
on price or output,
100
wording long associated with the per se rule, yet it
declines to apply the per se rule;
101
it also asserts that 'no elaborate
industry analysis is required,
102
which sounds like it is declining to apply a
comprehensive rule of reason analysis. As already discussed, prior to
NCAA, the Court had suggested that there were but two choices in applying

96. Id. at 109 (quoting Nat`l Soc`y oI ProI`l Eng`rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
The citation to NSPE here, given the NCAA Court`s reIusal to apply the per se rule, may suggest that it
did not view NSPE as a pure example of application of the per se rule.
97. Id. at 185.
98. For a more complete discussion, see GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 16, at 18587.
99. FTC v. Ind. Fed`n oI Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 46061 (1986) (quoting 7 PHILLIP AREEDA,
ANTITRUST LAW 1511, at 429 (1986)). The Court went on to uphold the FTC`s complaint, based on
its Iinding oI 'actual, sustained adverse eIIects on competition, and once again rejected the demand by
the deIendants Ior more 'elaborate market analysis. Id.
100. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109.
101. Id. at 117.
102. Id. at 109.
Section 1: per se or full rule of reason.
103
Here, it appeared to be holding
that neither was a good fit for the case.
None of the parties had suggested any third way to apply the rule of
reason in their briefs to the Court. That option was instead advocated in the
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae
104
and is embedded in two
crucial Iootnotes in the Court`s opinion that reIlected key tenets oI the
government`s position.
105
The government argued that
It is our submission that antitrust analysis is not restricted to these two
extremes, a per se category that precludes an examination of actual
effects, and an elaborate, 'full-blown category that requires precise
measurement oI markets and market power. Rather, as this Court`s
decisions in Broadcast Music and Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society . . . suggest, there is some middle ground in the continuum of
antitrust analysis. Often a restraint can escape per se condemnation and
yet be judged unreasonable without a full evaluation of its precise effects
in the marketplace. For example, the market power of a combination
may be so obvious that no elaborate evaluation is needed and rule of
reason analysis may thereIore be 'truncated.
106

To support that view, the government cited a 1981 monograph on the
rule of reason that had been prepared by Phillip Areeda for the Federal
Judicial Center and was quoted at length by the Court. The Court stated
that
The fact that a practice is not categorically unlawful in all or most of
its manifestations certainly does not mean that it is universally lawful.
For example, joint buying or selling arrangements are not unlawful per
se, but a court would not hesitate in enjoining a domestic selling
arrangement by which, say, Ford and General Motors distributed their
automobiles nationally through a single selling agent. Even without a
trial, the judge will know that these two large firms are major factors in
the automobile market, that such joint selling would eliminate important

103. See supra text accompanying notes 5163.
104. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 1516, NCAA v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (No. 83-271) [hereinafter Brief for the United
States]. The Brief was cosigned by Douglas H. Ginsburg, then a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. As the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, Ginsburg would later author one of the more significant appellate
court decisions applying abbreviated rule of reason analysis. See infra notes 16167 and accompanying
text.
105. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39 & 110 n.42.
106. Brief for the United States, supra note 104, at 1617 (citation omitted). For an account of the
developmental process that led to the government`s position in NCAA, see Timothy J. Muris, The
Federal Trade Commission and the Rule of Reason: In Defense of Massachusetts Board, 66 ANTITRUST
L.J. 773, 774 n.4 (1998).
price competition between them, that they are quite substantial enough to
distribute their products independently, and that one can hardly imagine
a pro-competitive justification actually probable in fact or strong enough
in principle to make this particular joint selling arrangement
reasonable under Sherman Act 1. The essential point is that the rule
of reason can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye.
107

The Court`s receptivity to the government`s argument is reIlected not
only in this footnote quoting Areeda, but also in a later footnote quoting the
government`s brieI, to the eIIect that 'where the anticompetitive effects of
conduct can be ascertained through means short of extensive market
analysis, and where no countervailing competitive virtues are evident, a
lengthy analysis oI market power is not necessary.
108

The inIluence oI the government`s brieI is evident and provides useful
insight into what the Court likely had in mind when it embraced what
would later be labeled the quick look or truncated rule of reason. Given the
arguments presented to the Court and its own observations, NCAA could be
understood as endorsing two alternate approaches to implementing a quick
look rule of reason:
(1) The Actual Effect Quick Look. Viewed through the characterization
of it in Indiana Federation, NCAA could stand for the proposition that a
horizontal restraint can be objectionable not only when it is facially
objectionable (per se), but also when there is evidence of its actual
anticompetitive effect. In such cases no detailed market analysis is
required.
109

(2) Asymmetrical Economic Plausibility Quick Look. Read together with
BMI, NCAA might also support the proposition that per se treatment is
inappropriate when a defendant proffers a plausible justification for its
conduct, but when the anticompetitive potential of the conduct is
nevertheless relatively obvious, and the defendant cannot support that
justification with evidence or that upon closer examination the proffered
justification is not cognizable, no detailed market analysis is needed
before the conduct warrants condemnation.
110

Unfortunately the clarity and utility of the truncated rule of reason, as
conceived by Areeda, advocated by the government, and endorsed by
NCAA, would later be undercut by the Court`s decision in California

107. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39 (emphasis added) (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA, THE 'RULE OF
REASON IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 3738 (1981)).
108. Id. at 110 n.42 (quoting Brief of the United States, supra note 104, at 1920).
109. For a variation of these propositions, see GAVIL, KOVAVIC & BAKER, supra note 16, at 206.
110. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
Dental Assn v. FTC
111
and viewed by some courts and commentators as
limited to the first proposition.
B. CONSTRAINING THE QUICK LOOK
In California Dental, the Court for the first time sought to more
clearly deIine the limits oI the 'quick look, which had become associated
with NCAA and I F D.
112
California Dental involved a challenge by the
Federal Trade Commission ('FTC) to a variety of restrictions on price and
nonprice advertising adopted by the California Dental Association
('CDA).
113
The FTC concluded that the restrictions on price-related
advertising were per se unlawful or, in the alternative, unlawful based on
an 'abbreviated rule oI reason analysis, as were the nonprice
restrictions.
114
One of the principal issues before the Court was the
propriety oI the FTC`s reliance on such abbreviated or 'quick look
analysis.
115
Citing NSPE, NCAA, and I F D, the Court observed that
In each of these cases, which have formed the basis for what has come to
be called abbreviated or 'quick-look analysis under the rule of reason,
an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.
116

The FTC, the Court concluded, did not satisIy that standard: 'The case
before us . . . fails to present a situation in which the likelihood of
anticompetitive eIIects is comparably obvious.
117
In the Court`s view, the
CDA`s 'plausible assertions oI competitive beneIits associated with the
restrictions 'rules out the indulgently abbreviated review to which the
Commission`s order was treated. The obvious anticompetitive effect that
triggers abbreviated analysis has not been shown.
118
The final sentence
appeared to impose a bright line limitation on the quick look. Thereafter,
lower courts and many commentators assumed that the quick look was
limited in application to cases presenting evidence of actual anticompetitive

111. Cal. Dental Ass`n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
112. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 16, at 187 (stating that California Dental clarified
how NCAA and I F D established a more structured and focused approach to applying the rule of reason).
113. In re Cal. Dental Ass`n, 121 F.T.C. 190, 284 (1996).
114. Id. at 30022.
115. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 759.
117. Id. at 771.
effects.
119

But to limit California Dental to a simple, actual-effects version of the
quick look is to wrench one sentence from the opinion out of its full
context. While true that the Court Iaulted the Federal Trade Commission`s
evidence by observing that '|t|he obvious anticompetitive eIIect that
triggers abbreviated analysis has not been shown, the Court did not
necessarily equate 'obvious with 'actual.
120
To the contrary, in
responding to Justice Breyer`s dissenting opinion, the Court majority
explicitly endorsed the option of quick look burden shifting based on
theoretically obvious effects, but it placed a condition in it, that, in the
Court`s view, the FTC had not satisIied:
The point is that before a theoretical claim of anticompetitive effects can
justify shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of
procompetitive effects, as quick-look analysis in effect requires, there
must be some indication that the court making the decision has properly
identified the theoretical basis for the anticompetitive effects and
considered whether the effects actually are anticompetitive. Where, as
here, the circumstances of the restriction are somewhat complex,
assumption alone will not do.
121

In this segment of its opinion, the Court clearly accepted the
possibility that, in addition to actual eIIects, a 'theoretical claim oI
anticompetitive eIIects also could shiIt the burden oI production to a
defendant, which is an approach to truncated rule of reason analysis that is
more consistent with Areeda`s 'twinkling oI an eye conception oI the
quick look as endorsed by the Court in NCAA.
122
The significance of this
endorsement of an approach focused on economic reasoning was obscured,
however, by the Court's subsequent implicit emphasis on actual effects.
Thus, while reaffirming that the quick look was a legitimate means of
applying the rule of reason, some of the language used by the Supreme
Court in California Dental appeared to limit its use to cases involving
evidence of actual anticompetitive effects. Echoing the government`s
position in NCAA, the Court then completed its march away from the
traditional, bipolar view of the rule of reason, concluding that

119. My own previous work made this analytical error. See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil, Copperweld
2000: The Vanishing Gap Between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 9798
(2000).
120. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 778
121. Id. at 775 n.12 (emphasis added).
122. See supra text accompanying note 107.
The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are
less fixed than terms like 'per se,` 'quick look, and 'rule of reason
tend to make them appear . . . . As the circumstances here demonstrate,
there is generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that
give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and
those that call for more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an
enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic
of a restraint. The object is to see whether the experience of the market
has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion
about the principal tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or
at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one.
123

This is where the rule of reason stood in 2000. The Court had
progressively moved away from expansive reliance on the per se rule in
favor of a more effects-focused analysis of anticompetitive effects and
efficiencies. The rule of reason was the rule; per se an exceptional method
of applying the rule. It had also expressly abandoned the bipolar model,
endorsing the concept of quick look use of the rule of reason, but
seemingly limiting its application to cases of actual anticompetitive
effects.
124
And it had discouraged any suggestion that it was replacing the
bipolar model with a tri-polar rule of reason. The point was not to move
from per se versus the rule of reason to a new per se versus quick look
versus the rule of reason, but instead to embrace a continuum model, which
the Court likened to a 'sliding scale approach.
125

IV. THE MODERN RULE OF REASON IN PRACTICE
A. CORE ECONOMIC CONCEPTS, STRUCTURED FRAMEWORKS, AND THE
MYTH OF BALANCING
Concurrent with developments at the Supreme Court over the two
decades between NSPE and California Dental, other courts and
commentators, as well as the FTC and the Justice Department, devoted
considerable thought to improving the operability of the resurgent rule of

123. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 77981 (emphasis added).
124. Some courts and commentators also have sought to integrate some form of Addyston Pipe`s
ancillary restraint analysis into the structured rule of reason, suggesting that it can be invoked as a
defensethe restraint was ancillary and necessary to some underlying legitimate transactionbut also
permitting the plaintiff to respond to the defense by demonstrating that the restraint was either not
'reasonably necessary to achieve the stated legitimate purpose, or that it was greater than necessary to
do so. See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993); AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1505, at 41519.
125. Id. at 780.
reason. Various frameworks were advocated both to better structure the
rule of reason and to provide it with greater flexibility than the bipolar
model permitted. All of these efforts share a greater focus on the core
economic concepts embraced by the Court in its formative modern rule of
reason cases, especially anticompetitive effects and efficiencies.
126

One of the most significant structuring efforts undertaken in the
context oI a speciIic enIorcement action was the FTC`s decision in In re
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry, which advocated the
use of a series of questions to guide the analysis of horizontal restraints.
127

A decade later, the thenAssistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division oI the Justice Department proposed a 'StepWise
approach that consisted of a sequential set of inquires focused on effects
and justifications.
128
The government`s various efforts to define a modern,
structured rule of reason culminated in 2000, when these two federal
agencies jointly issued a comprehensive set of guidelines for evaluating
collaborations among rivals under the antitrust laws.
129

At the same time, various courts also began to articulate structured
approaches to applying the rule of reason in light of the economic
principles that had been embraced by the Supreme Court. Not surprisingly,
their efforts were geared more towards the context of litigation and hence
focused on burden-shifting.
130
In virtually all of these frameworks the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of coming forward with evidence to
establish that the deIendant`s conduct resulted in a substantial adverse
effect on competition.
131
If that burden is met, the burden of production
shifts to the defendant to articulate and support some cognizable,
procompetitive justification for its conduct.
132
If it does so, the burden

126. See supra Part II.C.
127. See, e.g., In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988)
(establishing a set of questions to guide rule of reason analysis). For an in-depth discussion of
Massachusetts Board, see, e.g., Muris, supra note 106, at 77375 (discussing the history, background,
and decision in Massachusetts Board). Justice Breyer also envisioned the rule of reason as a series of
questions in his dissent in California Dental. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 782 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
As is discussed in Part IV.A, Massachusetts Board is also the source oI the 'inherently suspect model
of burden shifting.
128. See Joel I. Klein, A 'Stepwise` Approach for Analv:ing Hori:ontal Agreements Will Provide
a Much Needed Structure for Antitrust Review, ANTITRUST, Spring 1998, at 4143.
129. See FTC & U.S. DEP`T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS 12 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf. For a
discussion oI the Guidelines` approach, see GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 16, at 20810.
130. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998) ('Courts have imposed a
consistent structure on rule oI reason analysis by casting it in terms oI shiIting burdens oI prooI.).
131. Id.
132. Id.
again shifts back to the plaintiff to either challenge the justification or
introduce additional evidence of adverse effect.
133
Many courts assert that
when evidence of both adverse and procompetitive justifications are
presented, the court must as a final step engage in 'balancing to determine
whether the restraint is reasonable.
134
As I have argued elsewhere,
however, 'rule oI reason balancing is perhaps the greatest myth in all oI
U.S. antitrust law.
135
Most cases are resolved based on the weight of the
evidence and the presence or absence of evidence of competitive effects or
evident and substantial efficencies. In practice, rule of reason balancing
rarely, if ever, occurs.
136

Importantly, efforts to structure the antitrust inquiry with a greater
emphasis on competitive effects have not been limited to the analysis of
horizontal restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Courts have
embraced similarly structured frameworks for analyzing monopolization
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
137
exclusionary distribution
agreements,
138
and, most recently, commentators have advocated a
structured approach for evaluating resale price maintenance in the wake of
the Supreme Court`s 2007 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc. decision,
139
which abandoned per se treatment of the practice.
140

The efforts of federal enforcement agencies and courts alike all share
some common features and goals. All sought to synthesize the prior case
law and commentary in light oI the Supreme Court`s modern rule oI reason
decisions.
141
The common core of these varying models was an emphasis
first on principles of competitive effects. Although the treatment of

133. Id.
134. Id. For additional examples of courts suggesting that the final step of rule of reason analysis
is to 'balance anticompetitive and procompetitive eIIects, see, e.g., PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2010); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d
300, 316 (3d Cir. 2010); Benson v. St. Joseph Reg`l Health Ctr., 575 F.3d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 2009).
135. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 16, at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. For two empirical studies documenting the absence of balancing in rule of reason cases, see
Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 827, 828 (2009) [hereinafter Carrier, Empirical Update] (suggesting that balancing takes place in
less than 2% of cases and reporting that 97% of reported cases are disposed of based on the absence of
any anticompetitive effect); Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect,
1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 126768 ('In an astonishing 96% of Rule of Reason cases, courts do not
balance anything.). Carrier also documents that a 'burden-shiIting approach is now the predominant
mode of application of the rule of reason. Carrier, Empirical Update, supra at 828.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 5859 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003).
139. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
140. See Christine A. Varney, A Post-Leegin Approach to Resale Price Maintenance Using a
Structured Rule of Reason, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 22.
141. See supra Part III.
efficiencies has varied somewhat, all of the approaches have also sought to
integrate a more robust consideration of procompetitive justifications.
Finally, almost all of these approaches have assumed the inadequacy of the
bipolar model and have sought to define a range of options for resolving
easier cases, either through condemnation or exoneration, more quickly.
In the context of litigation, the initial issue under a structured, effects-
driven rule of reason inquiry is whether the plaintiff has adduced sufficient
evidence of adverse competitive effects to shift a burden of production to
the defendant. Three recognized methods for doing so by presumption are
now well-established: (1) through conclusive presumptionthat is, per se
condemnation;
142
(2) through rebuttable presumption triggered by what
California Dental described as 'obvious anticompetitive eIIect;
143
and (3)
through rebuttable presumption triggered by a showing of market power,
typically via definition of a relevant market, calculation of a market share,
the inference of market power from a sufficiently high share, and finally,
the inference of anticompetitive effects from market power.
144
A fourth
route, supported by I F D and California Dental, is evidence of actual
effects. Note that here I am differentiating the actual effects approach from
method 2, above, which rests on a presumption. As I FD correctly explains,
proof of actual effects 'obviates the need Ior the inIerential and
circumstantial analysis of market power through the market definition
exercise.
145
Actual effects evidence, however, is not properly understood as
based on any presumption. Presumptions would be used in the absence of
actual effects evidence. Similar to the use of presumptions, however, a
burden shift triggered by actual effects evidence would be rebuttable in
theory. But in practice, it would be difficult to do so, except by
undermining the effects evidence itself. Evidence of efficiencies would
seem to be irrelevant, given the apparent insufficiency of any such
efficiency to dissipate or eliminate the demonstrated adverse effects. The

142. In Northern Pacific Railway the Supreme Court described 'this principle oI per se
unreasonableness in explicit terms oI presumptions: '[T]here are certain agreements or practices which
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse Ior their use. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)
(emphasis added).
143. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass`n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999).
144. This method of applying the rule of reason is intimately connected with the market share
presumption still used in merger analysis, albeit less so as a comprehensive framework. See United
States v. Phila. Nat`l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 35455 (1963) (oIten reIerred to as 'the Philadelphia
National Bank presumption). For a discussion of both single and double inference methods of
establishing anticompetitive effects, see GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 16, at 92637.
145. FTC v. Ind. Fed`n oI Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 46061 (1986).
true option two is discussed below and is more appropriately referred to as
the quick look.
1. The FTC`s 'Inherently Suspect Approach to Burden Shifting
As noted above, one of the most significant early efforts to map out a
structured approach to rule oI reason analysis was the FTC`s decision in
Massachusetts Board. There the FTC proposed the following approach:
First, we ask whether the restraint is 'inherently suspect. In other
words, is the practice the kind that appears likely, absent an efficiency
justification, to 'restrict competition and decrease output? . . . If the
restraint is not inherently suspect, then the traditional rule of reason, with
attendant issues of market definition and power, must be employed. But
if it is inherently suspect, we must pose a second question: Is there a
plausible efficiency justification for the practice? That is, does the
practice seem capable of creating or enhancing competition (e.g., by
reducing the costs of producing or marketing the product, creating a new
product, or improving the operation of the market)? Such an efficiency
defense is plausible if it cannot be rejected without extensive factual
inquiry. If it is not plausible, then the restraint can be quickly
condemned. But if the efficiency justification is plausible, further
inquirya third inquiryis needed to determine whether the
justification is really valid. If it is, it must be assessed under the full
balancing test of the rule of reason. But if the justification is, on
examination, not valid, then the practice is unreasonable and unlawful
under the rule of reason without further inquirythere are no likely
benefits to offset the threat to competition.
146

In setting forth this framework, Massachusetts Board was expressly
building on the Court`s then recent decision in NCAA.
147
In fact, as noted
above, Tim Muris had a hand in both developments.
148
Where NCAA had
Iailed to Iully deIine the quick look beyond its reliance on Areeda`s
'twinkling oI an eye allusion, the FTC, through the 'inherently suspect
idea, sought to do so.
149
Critically, neither NCAA nor Massachusetts Board,
however, equated the inherently suspect version of the quick look with
'actual anticompetitive eIIects.
Not surprisingly, Massachusetts Board played an important role in the
FTC`s case against the CDA, where the agency sought to again apply the

146. In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988).
147. Id. at 60203.
148. Id. at 603 n.11.
149. Id. at 60405.
inherently suspect framework.
150
When the Court in California Dental
appeared to tether the quick look to 'actual eIIects evidence, however, it
in effect created a rift between its own thinking and that of the FTC and the
DOJ as reflected in NCAA. The FTC`s loss in California Dental thus was a
setback for the inherently suspect approach. As discussed in Part III.B, by
appearing to consture NCAA and hence the quick look as dependent on
actual anticompetitive effects, however, California Dental seemingly
misread both NCAA and the authorities on which it had relied, and
unnecessarily limited its utility. In doing so, the Court failed to fully exploit
the value of its own characterization of the earlier quick look cases:
In each of these cases, which have formed the basis for what has come to
be called abbreviated or 'quick-look analysis under the rule oI reason,
an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.
151

Economic reasoning, not just economic facts, was an integral element
of the quick look.
2. California Dental`s Arguable Distortion of the Quick Look
In appearing to equate the quick look with actual anticompetitive
effectsand resting that conclusion on its previous decisions in NSPE,
NCAA, and I F Dthe Court in California Dental was arguably misreading
those cases and overlooking the intellectual roots of the quick look concept
as it had been advocated to the Court in NCAA.
First, nothing in NCAA suggests that the plaintiffs introduced evidence
of any actual effects in the sense of measured higher prices based on some
competitive benchmark, as is sometimes demanded today of plaintiffs.
Instead, the Court reasoned that '|b|ecause it restrains price and output, the
NCAA`s television plan has a signiIicant potential for anticompetitive
eIIects.
152
It went on to assert that '|t|he Iindings oI the District Court
indicate that this potential has been realized.
153
A careful reading of the
cited district court`s findings reveals, however, that the reduced output was
presumed based on the nature of the television plan and higher prices were
presumed from the price structure, which the Court observed was
'unresponsive to viewer demand and unrelated to the prices that would

150. See Cal. Dental Ass`n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 76263 (1999).
151. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770.
152. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 10405.
prevail in a competitive market.
154
No systematic or econometric analysis
was offered to support the idea of actual effects; no competitive benchmark
was demonstrated with respect to output and price.
155
In short, the Court`s
concerns about the television plan were deduced from basic facts and
economic reasoning, not induced from evidence of actual effects. The
Court stated that
The anticompetitive consequences of this arrangement are apparent.
Individual competitors lose their freedom to compete. Price is higher and
output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are unresponsive to
consumer preference. . . . At the same time, the television plan eliminates
competitors from the market, since only those broadcasters able to bid on
television rights covering the entire NCAA can compete. Thus, as the
District Court found, many telecasts that would occur in a competitive
market are Ioreclosed by the NCAA`s plan.
156

Perhaps more importantly, neither the government`s brieI in NCAA,
nor Areeda`s example in his Federal Judicial Center monograph,
157
relied
on evidence of actual price or output effects. Indeed, the entire point of
their shared view was that some conduct not subject to the per se rule will
nevertheless be so suspect as to warrant condemnation because of: (1) the
nature of the conduct; (2) the observable position of the parties to the
agreement; and (3) the absence of any plausible justification. Metes-and
bounds measurements of markets and effects are unnecessary in such cases
and so requiring them adds cost without improving the likely accuracy of
the court`s decisionan offense to the core principles of decision theory.
The approach advocated by Areeda and the government in NCAA was far
more akin, thereIore, to the 'inherently suspect Iramework developed at
the FTC then the 'actual eIIects concept that emerged in California
Dental.
Finally, the Court in California Dental erred to the degree it intended
to equate actual effects with a quick look. Although in some cases the
actual effects of conduct will be relatively obvious, in many others
gathering actual effects evidence may be as demanding, if not more so,
than the traditional market definition route to rule of reason analysis, and
may significantly overlap with it. Indeed, detecting and measuring actual
effects in the form of restricted output and higher prices, can be a time-

154. Id. at 106.
155. See id. at 10515 (failing to cite economic figures in determining actual effects).
156. Id. at 10608 (footnotes omitted).
157. See PHILLIP AREEDA, THE 'RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES
3738 (1981); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1508, at 43536 (providing an updated version
oI Areeda`s original hypothetical example).
consuming and evidence-demanding undertaking.
158
The inherently suspect
approach, like Areeda`s allusion to the 'twinkling oI an eye, instead
recognizes a more simple truth that the Court appeared to grasp in
California Dental, but then discounted, that some cases lend themselves to
an 'intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect.
159
On this
crucial point, the majority opinion in California Dental is internally
inconsistent and severed from the roots of the abbreviated rule of reason
analysis.
B. THE FTC`S EFFORTS TO CORRECT FOR CALI F ORNIA DENTAL`S ERROR
The FTC responded to the Court`s decision in California Dental not
only with criticism,
160
but with additional cases that sought to resurrect the
inherently suspect approach. Economic reasoning and basic facts could,
just like actual effects evidence, be sufficient to shift a burden of
production to the defendant, warranting evidence of a procompetitive
justification. In three successful efforts, the FTC persuaded various courts
of appeals to endorse this alternative formulation of the quick look.
The groundbreaking case was Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC,
161
in
which the FTC challenged an agreement by two record promoting
companies to suspend advertising on previously released albums during the
promotional period of a third and similar one. The two previous albums had
been produced independently by each of the two defendants. The third was
the product of a joint venture. When the parties to the venture realized that
much of the repertoire of the Three Tenors for the third album was similar
to that of the first two, they became concerned that sales of the new album
might easily be undercut by efforts by either of them to promote the earlier
albums during the release period for the new one, so they agreed to suspend
such efforts.
162

158. When the government initiates a post-consummation challenge to a merger, for example, it
often relies on actual effects evidencethe observed consequences of the merger. But the process of
building such a case is hardly 'quick and may require extensive discovery and study by teams of
lawyers and economists. See, e.g., In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 2007 WL 4358355 (F.T.C.
2007).
159. Cal. Dental Ass`n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (emphasis added).
160. See Timothy J. Muris, The Rule of Reason After California Dental, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 527,
531 (2000) ('II CDA is praiseworthy because of its rejection of a rigid bipolar approach to analyzing
restraints among competitors, it is less commendable in telling us when and how to apply truncated
analysis.).
161. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The case concerned the
distribution of recordings of several concerts jointly performed by operatic stars Jos Carrerras, Placido
Domingo, and Luciano Pavarotti, and is oIten reIerred to as 'The Three Tenors case. Id. at 31.
162. Id. at 3134.
The FTC expressly relied on the analytical framework of
Massachusetts Board and urged it on the court as an appropriate way to
apply the rule of reason.
163
In its view, although the agreement was not per
se unlawful, it was inherently suspect and neither evidence of actual effects
nor an elaborate market study was needed to shift a burden to the
respondents to offer a cognizable justification for their agreement. As the
court explained, Polygram Holding responded that
[T]he Commission`s Iramework conflicts with Supreme Court precedent
by condemning a restraint that is not per se illegal without the
Commission having to prove the restraint actually harms competition.
According to PolyGram, 'proof of actual anticompetitive effect (or
market power as its surrogate) is required in any Rule of Reason
case.
164

The case thus squarely presented the court with the seeming rift
between California Dental and the FTC`s Massachusetts Board opinion,
between a quick look limited to cases of actual effects and one that could
also operate based on theoretically sound and obvious economic reasoning.
In a unanimous opinion for the court by Chief Judge Douglas
Ginsburg, who had been a signatory to the Brief of the United States in
NCAA, the D.C. Circuit accepted the FTC`s Iramework. The D.C. Circuit
stated that
|W|e reject PolyGram`s attempt to locate the appropriate analysis, and
the concomitant burden of proof, by reference to the vestigial line
separating per se analysis from the rule of reason. . . . At bottom, the
Sherman Act requires the court to ascertain whether the challenged
restraint hinders competition; the Commission`s Iramework, at least as
the Commission applied it in this case, does just that.
We thereIore accept the Commission`s analytical Iramework. II, based
upon economic learning and the experience of the market, it is obvious
that a restraint of trade likely impairs competition, then the restraint is
presumed unlawful and, in order to avoid liability, the defendant must
either identify some reason the restraint is unlikely to harm consumers or
identify some competitive benefit that plausibly offsets the apparent or
anticipated harm. That much follows from the caselaw . . . .
165

The FTC argued that Massachusetts Board was in fact consistent with
California Dental, and the court saw no conflict between the two.
166
In its

163. Id.
164. Id. at 36.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 35.
view, as the Court had held in California Dental, the range of conduct
fairly viewed as suspect would evolve over time, as had conduct subjected
to the per se rule:
|U|nder the Commission`s own Iramework, the rebuttable presumption
oI illegality arises not necessarily Irom anything 'inherent in a business
practice but from the close family resemblance between the suspect
practice and another practice that already stands convicted in the court of
consumer welfare. The Commission appears to acknowledge, as it must,
that as economic learning and market experience evolve, so too will the
class of restraints subject to summary adjudication.
167

In effect, the court did not read California Dental as requiring proof of
actual effects.
168
The FTC would later urge the inherently suspect approach
in two other cases. It prevailed in one,
169
and in the other the court of
appeals concluded that the evidence of effect was substantial enough to
satisfy even a broader rule of reason analysis, so there was no need to rule
on the propriety of the FTC`s reliance on the inherently suspect
approach.
170

Although the FTC and the court, especially in Polygram, labored to
harmonize the inherently suspect approach with the quick look endorsed by
California Dental, it clearly goes beyond what a limited reading of
California Dental would permit. As noted above, although it might be
possible to read California Dental more broadly, the decision appeared to
endorse only a limited use of abbreviated rule of reason analysis, tied to
evidence of actual effects. Endorsing the idea that 'economic learning and
the experience of the market might also justiIy a burden shiIt, the courts
were going further, but doing so in a way that was wholly consistent with
the origins of the quick look idea in NCAA.

167. Id. at 37 (citing Cal. Dental Ass`n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999)). The Court cited
California Dental in support of this proposition, thus appearing to assume that had the case for
suspecting professional advertising there been stronger and the suggestion of potential justifications
weaker, the FTC might have prevailed. In effect, it did not read California Dental as requiring proof of
actual effects.
168. As Areeda and Hovenkamp correctly observe in finding fault with the result in California
Dental, 'requiring a showing oI actual output eIIects would foreclose antitrust inquiry into even the
most naked restraints. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1504b, at 403.
169. See N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 363 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding for the
FTC).
170. See Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 826 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding the FTC`s
decision without relying on quick look analysis).
C. THE LEGACY OF CALI F ORNIA DENTAL: CONTINUED CONFRONTATIONS
ABOUT CHOICE OF STANDARD AND CONFUSION ABOUT ABBREVIATED
RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS
The D.C. Circuit`s decision in Polygram provides a uniquely lucid
account of the current state of Section 1 analysis.
171
Then Chief Judge
Ginsburg, who, as already noted, was a signatory to the Brief of the United
States in NCAA, carefully and clearly recounts the development of the rule
of reason from NSPE to California Dental as it evolved from an exercise in
bipolar categorization to more of a case-by-case, sliding scale approach that
focused on competitive effects.
172
As noted in Part IV.B, the court in
Polygram also recognized the value of approaching rule of reason analysis
with a structured Iramework and it concluded that the FTC`s version oI that
framework, drawn from its decision in Massachusetts Board, was an
acceptable way to implement Section 1`s prohibition oI unreasonable
restraints of trade.
173

Although decisions like Polygram demonstrate that the state of the
rule of reason is far better than critics generally concede, there remains
considerable inconsistency and division among the lower courts in those
courts` application of Section 1. Because the choice of approach to the rule
of reason can be outcome determinative, as was true in the bipolar days,
parties and lower courts continue to invest sizeable resources into litigating
whether a given restraint should be evaluated under the per se, quick look,
or rule of reason analysis, as if they represented three discrete and alternate
choiceseven as the courts take note of California Dental`s direction that
they apply a sliding scale enquiry meet for the case.
174
In different ways,
these decisions illustrate how courts can still make critical analytical errors

171. The Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, issued jointly by the FTC
and the Department of Justice in April 2000, also provide a valuable synthesis of a near-century of case
law into a comprehensive framework for analyzing horizontal restraints. See FTC & U.S. DEP`T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 129.
172. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 3335 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In the course of its
discussion, Polygram also cites the D.C. Circuit`s previous decision in the Microsoft monopolization
litigation, which similarly sought to provide a comprehensive synthesis of the evolution of standards
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 35 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34
(D.C. Cir. 2001)).
173. Id. at 36 ('We thereIore accept the Commission`s analytical Iramework.).
174. See, e.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1134, 113739 (9th Cir.
2011); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 31719 (3d Cir. 2010); Deutscher Tennis
Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 83031 (3d Cir. 2010); Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v.
Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 31618 (2d Cir. 2008); Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone Cnty., 440 F.3d 336,
34344 (6th Cir. 2006); Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 773 (8th Cir.
2004).
that needlessly complicate rule of reason analysis and risk both false
positives and false negatives. In this final section, I profile one such recent
case, which pitted the State oI CaliIornia against Iour oI the state`s largest
supermarket chains.
As discussed in Part II, in explaining the Court`s prior decision in
NCAA, I F D appeared to equate the quick look with evidence of actual
anticompetitive effects.
175
That association was seemingly reinforced in the
Court`s later decision in California Dental, where the Court turned back
the FTC`s proposed invocation oI the approach because the Commission
'ha[d] not shown the 'obvious anticompetitive eIIect that triggers
abbreviated analysis.
176
As is also argued in Part IV.A, however, equating
the quick look with actual effects misreads its origins and ignores other
language in California Dental that clearly endorsed the idea that the burden
shiIt associated with the quick look could be triggered by a 'theoretical
claim oI anticompetitive eIIects.
177
That acknowledgement supports the
approach to abbreviated rule of reason analysis endorsed by cases such as
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC,
178
and North Texas Specialty Physicians.
179

In California v. Safeway, Inc.,
180
the State of California sued four
supermarket chains in Southern CaliIornia challenging the 'Mutual Strike
Assistance Agreement ('MSAA) they had negotiated in advance of the
expiration of their collective bargaining agreement with their employee
unions. The MSAA included what the defendants characterized as a
'revenue sharing provision ('RSP), which 'provid[ed] that in the event
of a strike/lockout, any grocer that earned revenues above its historical
share relative to the other chains during the strike period would pay 15% of
those excess revenues as reimbursement to the other grocers to restore their
pre-strike shares.
181
According to the record in the case, 'the 15 Iigure
was designed to estimate the incremental profit the grocers earned on each
additional dollar oI revenue.
182
When a strike ultimately ensued and the
parties invoked the provision, the State of California brought suit

175. 'Since the purpose oI the inquiries into market deIinition and market power is to determine
whether an arrangement has the potential Ior genuine adverse eIIects on competition, prooI oI actual
detrimental eIIects, such as a reduction oI output,` can obviate the need Ior an inquiry into market
power, which is but a surrogate Ior detrimental eIIects.` FTC v. Ind. Fed`n oI Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
46061 (1986) (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1511, at 429 (1986)).
176. Cal. Dental Ass`n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999).
177. Id. at 775 n.12.
178. Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 36.
179. N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 36061 (5th Cir. 2008).
180. California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011).
181. Id. at 1123.
182. Id.
challenging the RSP as a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
183
It
argued that the provision was per se unlawIul either as a 'proIit pooling
agreement or a 'market allocation scheme.
184
In the alternative, it urged
the courts to use a quick look because of the RFP`s obvious potential Ior
185

In the district court, the defendants twice moved unsuccessfully for
summary judgment seeking antitrust immunity pursuant to the 'non-
statutory labor exemption that had previously been recognized by the
courts.
186
California also sought summary judgment, arguing that because
the RSP was obviously anticompetitive, judgment against the grocers was
in order under either the per se rule or an abbreviated version of the rule of
reason.
187
When the district court also denied the State`s motion, the State
and the defendants entered into a stipulation providing for judgment in
favor of the grocers, while preserving all issues for appeal. Whereas the
grocers wanted to press their case for immunity, California effectively
declined to pursue the case under a comprehensive rule of reason, instead
committing the case to rise or fall based on its assertion that the RSP
should be condemned under either the per se or quick look versions of the
rule of reason.
188

A three judge panel oI the Ninth Circuit aIIirmed the district court`s
conclusion that the nonstatutory labor exemption did not apply, but
reversed the lower court`s holding that the case warranted comprehensive
rule of reason treatment.
189
Rejecting CaliIornia`s arguments for the per se
rule,
190
a 2-1 majority nevertheless concluded that the RSP should have
been condemned under a quick look. Invoking California Dental`s
'enquiry meet Ior the case standard, the panel proposed reliance on what it
described as a 'mixed or blended approacha quick look plusthat it
located somewhere mid-way along the continuum between per se and
comprehensive rule of reason.
191

183. Id. at 112324.
184. Id. at 1148.
185. Id. at 1124, 113439.
186. For a discussion oI the scope oI the exemption, and the Ninth Circuit`s explanation oI why it
was inapplicable, see id. at 112432.
187. Id. at 1124.
188. Id.
189. California ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010).
190. Id. at 117982.
191. As the court explained
Although the parties briefed the case on the traditional view that the two summary forms of
review [per se and quick look] are separate and unrelated, and we discuss the questions they
posed separately to some extent, we ultimately consider the lawfulness of the agreement in
light oI the Supreme Court's recent explanation that 'our categories oI analysis are less Iixed
The initial panel`s decision was withdrawn, however, when the Ninth
Circuit ordered rehearing en banc,
192
and in another divided opinion, the en
banc court reversed the initial panel`s conclusion regarding the propriety oI
applying the quick look to the supermarkets` proIit-sharing agreement.
193

The court agreed with the initial panel that per se treatment of the RSP was
inappropriate, citing three factors: (1) the short duration of the pact;
(2) what it viewed as the grocers` continued incentives to compete Ior
customers during the revenue sharing period; and (3) the presence of other
competitive supermarkets who were not subject to the agreement and hence
would serve as a competitive constraint on any incentive to raise price.
194

In its view, these factors tended to undermine the assumption that the
agreement would be obviously anticompetitive as is required for per se
condemnation. Citing these same three reasons, the majority also concluded
that application of the quick look would be inappropriate, reasoning instead
that 'Iurther development oI the record was needed beIore the court could
predict the agreement`s likely anticompetitive effects.
195
Specifically, the
court suggested that the plaintiff might need to come forward with both
expert testimony on the likely impact of the RSP on the incentives of the
grocers to compete on price and additional evidence on the likely reactions
of other market participants to any increase in price.
196
Absent such
evidence, no burden shiIt was warranted to test the grocers` proIIered
'procompetitive justiIication.
197

Although the en banc majority quoted some of the very same language
from California Dental that had been relied on by the initial panel, it

than terms like per se,` quick look` and rule oI reason` tend to make them appear. |quoting
Cal. Dental Ass`n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999)] . . . . We follow the Court's suggestion,
and apply a mixed or blended approach, engaging in an analysis 'meet Ior the casehere, a
thoroughgoing analysis that compels our confident conclusion that the principal tendency of
defendants' agreement is anticompetitive and that the agreement thus violates 1 of the
Sherman Act.
Id. at 1179.
192. California ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 633 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2011) (ordering
rehearing).
193. California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The en
banc court agreed with the district court and the initial appellate panel that the provisions of the MSAA
were not immune from antitrust scrutiny under the non-statutory labor exemption. Id. at 112932. The
en banc court differed with the initial Ninth Circuit panel, however, on the propriety of applying the
quick look to the MSAA, thus aIIirming the district court`s entry oI judgment Ior the grocers. Id. at
113739.
194. Id. at 113536.
195. Id. at 1137 ('To reach a conIident conclusion on the anticompetitive eIIects oI the RSP,
Iurther development oI the record is required.).
196. Id. at 113738.
197. Id. at 1138 n.17 ('Because CaliIornia has not met its burden to show that the RSP is
obviously anticompetitive, we need not address the grocers` procompetitive justiIications.).
interpreted and applied that language quite differently, in effect viewing the
quick look as a far more fixed and limited category, one located very near
the per se end of the rule of reason continuum. This was evident in its
decision to reject application of the quick look for the very same reasons it
cited for refusing to apply the per se rule.
198
The majority thus committed
two distinct errors.
First, it equated the per se and quick look, as if they were two very
closely aligned forms of summary condemnation. The majority`s mistaken
association of the quick look with per se condemnation was quite obvious
when it asked rhetorically, '|c|an it be successIully argued . . . that because
the RSP reduces the monetary risks of lost sales to participating grocers
during a whipsaw strike, it is irretrievably anti-competitive in eIIect?
199

While this may be an appropriate question to pose before applying the per
se rule, it evidences a serious lack of appreciation for the role and essential
character of abbreviated analysis. As noted in Part IV.A, abbreviated
analysis is designed merely to shift a burden of production based on
presumption, but that presumption is rebuttable. It acknowledges the
administrative desirability oI putting a deIendant`s 'deIenses to the test oI
evidence in the face of evidence suggesting an obvious threat to
competition.
Second, while at first appearing to accept the concept that a quick
look might be utilized based on economic reasoning and background
facts,
200
in closing the court seemed to align itself with the actual effects
view oI the quick look: 'While it is true that the arrangement provides a
cushion that may arguably affect incentives to compete, that alone, absent
evidence of actual anticompetitive impact on pricing, is not sufficient for us
to resolve the RSP issue on a per se` or quick look` or any other
abbreviated basis.
201
In two important ways, therefore, the majority did

198. Id. at 1138.
199. Id. (emphasis added).
200. Id. ('To use the quick look` approach, we must Iirst determine whether an observer with
even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question
would have an anticompetitive eIIect on customers and markets.` (quoting Cal. Dental Ass`n v. FTC,
526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999))). It even used the 'inherently suspect label to describe such conduct: 'Once
it is established that the restraint is inherently suspect and the anticompetitive effects are easily
ascertained, then the burden shifts to the grocers to produce evidence of procompetitive justification or
effects and thus demonstrate the need for more extensive market inquiry . . . . Id. (citation omitted).
201. Id. at 1139 (emphasis added). In contrast, the dissent observed that
Defendants' fallback position is that the state lacks empirical evidence to demonstrate that the
effects of the agreement were anticompetitive in practice. However, neither per se nor quick
look review ordinarily requires empirical evidence of anticompetitive effects, nor is it
required for the combined or mixed per se/quick look approach that should be applied
here . . . . So long as the anticompetitive nature of the likely effects of an agreement is, as a
not appear to fully comprehend, or perhaps accept, the concept and content
of abbreviated rule of reason analysis.
Judge Reinhardt, who had authored the initial panel`s decision,
concurred with respect to the majority`s decision that the nonstatutory labor
exemption was inapplicable,
202
but dissented on its refusal to apply any
version of abbreviated rule of reason analysis.
203
Largely reiterating the
arguments he had craIted in the initial panel`s decision, he argued that the
majority`s reliance on the MSAA`s short duration and the prospect that
there was sufficient remaining competition in the market to check any
incentive to raise price was speculative and largely missed the point of the
quick look approach.
204
In effect, the majority was dismissing the
importance of what even it conceded was evident'the immediate
monetary risk of losing sales to competitors during a labor strike is reduced
by revenue sharing.
205
And while expressing the intention not to reach the
merits of the justification proffered by the grocers,
206
the majority quite
obviously embraced and credited the grocers` Iundamental argument, that
the RSP was merely a strategy to deIeat the anticipated 'whipsaw tactics
of the striking union.
207
In doing so, the majority had in effect not only

theoretical matter, 'obvious, it is not necessary Ior a plaintiII to provide empirical evidence
demonstrating anticompetitive consequences.
Id. at 1157. Moreover, the dissent pointed out that under the Iacts oI the case, such 'empirical evidence
would be 'diIIicult to obtain, a Iurther reason to utilize abbreviated analysis when the eIIects are
comparatively obvious. Id. at 115758.
202. Id. at 1145 n.2 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
203. Id. at 114462.
204. Id. at 114662. In particular, he again emphasized the impact oI the RSP on the grocers`
incentive to compete during a strike:
I am confident in the conclusion that defendants' profit sharing arrangement removes, or at the
least significantly reduces, a key source of competitive pressurecompetition among
defendants for sales to be made during the agreement periodwithout there being any
countervailing pressure sufficient to neutralize or overcome the overwhelming likelihood of
anticompetitive effects. Although it is plausible that the two differences on which defendants
rely |the limited duration oI the agreement and the Iact that it only bound the 'dominant
market participants] will serve to reduce the competitive pressures to a lesser extent than
would a long-term agreement among competitors who control 100% of the market, it is
evident that the lessening of the reduction in competitive pressure will be one of degree only,
and that there is no likelihood whatsoever that the anticompetitive effects of a profit sharing
agreement will be eliminated.
Id. at 1153. The dissent`s reIusal to assign signiIicant weigh to the short duration oI the MSAA is
supported by Polygram. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(condemning restraint under abbreviated analysis even though it was in effect for a period of less than
three months).
205. Safeway, 651 F.3d at 1139.
206. Id. at 1138 n.17.
207. Id. at 1138, 1141 ('II a competitor Iinds itselI the target oI a strike, which would cause it to
lose sales to other competitors, then revenue sharing provides some cushion from the damaging
monetary impact oI the strike.).
accepted the grocers` mere assertion that they had a plausible efficiency
justification for the RSP, but implicitly relied on it to prevent the plaintiII`s
burden from shifting to the defendant to prove its defense. Yet as the
dissent correctly concluded, the deIendants` assertionthat the RSP would
help it to reduce their labor costswas not a cognizable 'procompetitive
defense.
208

The divisions within the Ninth Circuit in Safeway illustrate the
varying approaches to applying abbreviated analysis as well as the strategy
typically afoot in such cases. In all of the cases in which the plaintiffs have
successfully invoked the quick look, the courts concluded that the
'procompetitive justiIication oIIered by the deIendants was either not
cognizable or unsupported by the record evidence.
209
The key strategy for
defendants in most of these cases, therefore, was to arrest the burden shift
before it occurred by demanding more evidence of effect and seeking to
undermine the assumption that the conduct was anticompetitive.
210
That
pattern held true in Safeway. As already noted, the only 'procompetitive
justiIication oIIered by the grocers was that the RSP would help them to
secure a more favorable collective bargaining agreement with the unions
and hence facilitate lower prices to consumers:

208. '|D|riving down compensation to workers in this way is not a benefit to consumers
cognizable under our laws as a procompetitive` beneIit. Id. at 1161 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part). The dissent continued
Defendants do not pretend that they agreed to bargain in such a way that there will be a
greater overall amount of labor purchased, for example because the transaction costs to
purchase each unit of labor are lower when the supermarkets work together. Defendants'
argument for why their profit sharing agreement is procompetitive is instead, essentially, that
it increases their bargaining power relative to striking workers in order to buy their labor at a
lower price. In this way, the profit sharing arrangement resembles a cartel on the buyer side of
the market.
Id. The dissent`s analysis is Iurther supported by the court`s broad agreement that the deIendants were
not entitled to invoke the nonstatutory labor exemption to immunize their conduct from antitrust
scrutiny. Id. at 112932. See also supra note 204 (discussing economic reasons why the deIendants`
assertion should not have been credited as a 'procompetitive justiIication Ior the RSP).
209. See, e.g., N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 36870 (5th Cir. 2008)
(concluding that the deIendants` proIIered justiIications were unlikely to have any plausible
procompetitive effect); Polygram, 416 F.3d at 38 (likening the deIendant`s defenses to those found to
be noncognizable as a 'Irontal assault on the policies of the Sherman Act in NSPE); FTC v. Ind. Fed`n
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 46364 (1986) (same); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 115 (1984) ('The NCAA's eIIiciency justiIication is not supported by the record.); Nat`l
Soc`y oI ProI`l Eng`rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (characterizing the deIendants`
'deIense as 'nothing less than a Irontal assault on the basic policy oI the Sherman Act).
210. See, e.g., Polygram, 416 F.3d at 36 (rejecting deIendants` argument that plaintiff had to
prove actual anticompetitive effects); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 (stating that the NCAA had
unsuccessfully argued that plaintiffs failed to prove that it had market power in a properly defined
relevant market). But see Cal. Dental Ass`n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 77576 (1999) (agreeing with the
defendant that the evidence of adverse competitive effects was insufficient to justify a burden shift).
The supermarkets assert that . . . the procompetitive benefit of their
agreement is that it increased their chances of winning the labor dispute
and reducing the wages and benefits they would be required to pay to
their employees, which in turn would increase their ability to lower
prices and compete more eIIectively with other companies..
Defendants' proffered justification for their profit sharing arrangement is,
in essence, a countervailing power defense that the restraint of trade is
necessary in order to give them sufficient bargaining power to counteract
the market power exercised by their striking workers and thereby to
allow them to purchase their workers' labor at a lower price.
211

In this the dissent was surely correct. The RSP produced no economic
efficiencies as they are typically understood in antitrust law.
212
Indeed,
efforts to justify anticompetitive conduct based on the assertion that it will
aid in the creation of countervailing market power have consistently been
rejected in a variety of industries and antitrust contexts.
213
The grocers
prevailed in preventing the burden of production from shifting to them,
therefore, not by asserting a plausible, cognizable, and supported
procompetitive justification, but by casting enough doubt on the likely
anticompetitive consequences of their actionsand by finding a
sympathetic judicial ear who shared their aversion to aggressive labor
tactics. Given CaliIornia`s unwillingness to try the case under a
comprehensive rule of reasonperhaps because it would have been costly
and difficult to establish actual effectsthis left but one outcome given the
approach of the majority: judgment for the grocers.

211. Safeway, 651 F.3d at 1160 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
212. See GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 16, at 99192. In NCAA, the Supreme Court
associated 'procompetitive with increased output and reduced price. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114 ('II the
NCAA's television plan produced procompetitive efficiencies, the plan would increase output and
reduce the price oI televised games.). See also Safeway, 651 F.3d at 116062 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (discussing economic definitions of procompetitive justifications).
213. The issue has frequently arisen in the health care field in the context of physicians seeking to
improve their collective bargaining position relative to insurance companies. See, e.g., FTC & U.S.
DEP`T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION 14, 27 (2004) (opposing
efforts to grant physicians antitrust exemptions that would facilitate their exercise of countervailing
market power), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf; Roger G.
Noll, 'Buver Power` and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 619 (2005) ('A right to exercise
market power, whether statutory as in the case of labor, or through superior foresight and efficiency in
the case of an insurer, should not create a right to use otherwise anticompetitive means to exercise
countervailing market power without an explicit political decision to do so in the form of special
legislation.). But see Tom Campbell, Bilateral Monopoly in Mergers, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 52324
(2007) (advocating for a merger standard that would permit mergers to monopoly in industries with
existing monopoly buyers while acknowledging that in the past it has been up to Congress to grant
exemptions Irom the antitrust laws to permit groups oI Iirms to seek to create 'countervailing market
power).
The defining characteristic of the quick look, however, is its ability to
shiIt a burden Irom the plaintiIIs to the deIendants without 'elaborate
industry analysis.
214
One way to understand the divergence within the
Ninth Circuit, therefore, is as a conflict between two distinct views of what
constitutes sufficient evidence to secure that burden shift. In one version,
the one originally conceived by Areeda and embraced by the Supreme
Court in NCAA, obvious effects can be discerned from economic reasoning
and background facts;
215
but in the other, the one that emerged from I F D
and portions of California Dental, the burden shift can only be secured
with evidence of actual adverse effects.
216
Whereas the majority embraced
the latter, the dissent relied on the former. Thus, for the en banc majority,
California failed to shift its burden to the defendant grocers; hence there
was no need to consider their justifications.
217
In contrast, the dissent was
quite comfortable with its conclusion that the RSP presented a genuine
threat to competition, and upon examination oI the grocers` deIenses, it
found nothing that would shift the burden back to the State.
218

More deeply, Safeway may also illustrate a lack of appreciation for the
methodology of sliding scale analysis that was urged in California Dental.
A clearer articulation of that methodology might serve to bridge the gap
between the two opinions in Safewayand likely would have led to a
different outcome.
One way to envision the sliding scale is as a weight of the evidence
standard based on relatively formalistic burden shifting. As one court has
observed in the context oI merger analysis, '|t|he more compelling the
prima facie case, the more evidence the defendant must present to rebut it
successIully.
219
Under this view, although the burden of proof remains

214. Natl Socv of Profl Engrs, 435 U.S. at 692. See also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109. The burden
that shifts is one of production, not proof. See, e.g., United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238
(2d Cir. 2003). The dissenting opinion in Safeway erred, therefore, when it selectively quoted
California Dental for the mistaken proposition that when a plaintiff successfully makes out a case of
anticompetitive eIIects 'the burden oI proof shiIts to the deIendant. Safeway, 651 F.3d at 1150
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
215. See supra notes 10710 and accompanying text.
217. Safeway, 651 F.3d at 1138 n.17 ('Because CaliIornia has not met its burden to show that the
RSP is obviously anticompetitive, we need not address the grocers` procompetitive justiIications.).
218. Id. at 116062 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
219. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also U.S.
DEP`T. OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 10 (2010) ('The greater the potential
adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater must be the cognizable efficiencies, and the more
they must be passed through to customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market.), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
with the plaintiff, the burden of production shifts, but can be adjusted
upward in the face of an especially strong case of adverse effectsthe
stronger the plaintiII`s showing oI adverse competitive eIIects, the more
compelling a showing the defendant would need to make to rebut. In
response, if the defendant makes an especially strong showing of
procompetitive justifications, the burden of production would shift back to
the plaintiff, who would have to either discredit that proof or offer
additional proof in support of its case.
220

Another way to conceive of the operation of the sliding scale,
however, is less formalistic as to burden shifting and more holistic with
respect to evidence. It is more typical of internal agency decision-making,
but is also implicitly used in antitrust litigation, especially litigation under
abbreviated rule of reason analysis. Under this approach, evidence of
adverse effects is not evaluated in isolation. Instead, it is assessed together
with any evidence of procompetitive justifications. In contrast to
formalistic burden shifting, provided there is at least some credible
evidence of adverse effects, the decisionmaker undertakes at least a
preliminary assessment of the proffered justification, to determine whether
it is economically plausible and legally cognizable.
221
As with the
formalistic sliding scale approach, an especially strong case of
anticompetitive effects would demand compelling proof of efficiencies.
However, in contrast to a formalistic sliding scale approach, under a
holistic approach a weak or noncognizable justification could actually
count in favor of the plaintiffit could in effect strengthen the case for a
burden shift, which in turn would require more elaborate and formal proof
by the defendant to support its justification.
Under this approach, it is theoretically possible that the combination
of some evidence of adverse effects plus weak evidence of justification
could be deemed sufficient to meet a burden of proof. This approach to the
sliding scale can be usefully thought of as symmetrical abbreviated
analysis, in which the court takes a quick look at the economic plausibility

220. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 983 ('II the deIendant successIully rebuts the presumption, the
burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government, and merges
with the ultimate burden oI persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.). See also
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing burden shifting framework
and use of sliding scale).
221. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 3536 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ('First, the
Commission must determine whether it is obvious from the nature of the challenged conduct that it will
likely harm consumers. If so, then the restraint is deemed inherently suspect` and, unless the deIendant
comes forward with some plausible (and legally cognizable) competitive justification for the restraint,
summarily condemned. (emphasis added)).
oI both the plaintiII`s theory and evidence oI anticompetitive eIIects and
the deIendant`s justiIications, iI any. Abbreviated rule of reason analysis
will be especially well suited to cases in which that examination reveals
asymmetries: if the plaintiII`s case Ior harm seems particularly obvious, but
the case Ior eIIiciencies does not, the approach could result in a 'quick look
to condemn; conversely, iI the plaintiII`s case Ior harm appears to be
attenuated and the deIendant`s assertion of efficiencies is comparatively
obvious and strong, the approach could result in a 'quick look to
exculpate.
222
Procedurally, the approach will work especially well in
connection with a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.
223

This latter approach to implementing a sliding scale is not at all novel.
Indeed, it is commonplace in many of the cases in which the parties contest
the mode of application of the rule of reason standard. For example, in
neither NSPE nor NCAA did the Court rigidly refuse to consider the
deIendants` justiIications. Instead, it examined them and Iound them
wanting.
224
This was also true in other quick look cases, such as Polygram.
Noting that '|a|t Iirst glance Polygram`s competitive justiIication 'has
some Iorce,
225
the court concluded that upon closer examination the
defense, like that advocated in NSPE, was 'nothing less than a Irontal
assault on the basic policy oI the Sherman Act.
226
Moreover, the Supreme
Court has endorsed use of economic plausibility in a bilateral fashion,
using it as a screen that can be used not only to evaluate the plaintiII`s
ability to satisfy its burden of pleading
227
and production,
228
but also to

222. For a similar use of these concepts, see GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 16, at 206,
210.
223. One court has wrongly concluded that '|t|he application oI the quick look analysis is a
question oI law to be determined by the court,` and thereIore the concept oI quick look` has no
application to jury inquiry. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 833 (3d Cir.
2010) (quoting MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES A-8 n.2 (2005)). Although
the propriety of relying on a per se or quick look application of the rule of reason is surely a question of
law for the court, there is no reason why application of an abbreviated rule of reason analysis could not
be carried out by a properly instructed jury. Indeed, if application of the approach requires findings of
fact, doing so could deprive a party of its right to jury trial. The Model Jury Instructions misread the
cases it cites in support of this bold proposition, which was uncritically embraced in Deutscher Tennis
Bund. As noted in the text, however, application of abbreviated analysis may nevertheless lend itself
well to motion practice.
225. Polygram, 416 F.3d at 37.
226. Id. at 38 (quoting Nat`l Soc`y oI ProI`l Eng`rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
227. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 55659 (2007) (discussing the plaintiII`s
burden of pleading an antitrust claim of conspiracy).
undertake preliminary assessments of proffered efficiencies to conclude
that application of the per se rule was inappropriate.
229
In all of these cases,
the Court has undertaken a preliminary assessment of the overall economic
strengths and weaknesses of the case before it, without the aid either of
formal burden shifting or elaborate analysis.
Under either form of the sliding scale, Safeway appears to have been
wrongly decided. Once the majority conceded that the RSP was likely to
dampen the grocers` incentives to compete, its disagreement with the
dissent became one about the degree to which the RSP was likely to be
anticompetitive, not the fact of it. At that moment, it was error for it to
rigidly decline to undertake at least a preliminary assessment of the
grocers` deIenses. Ironically, it committed the inverse oI the error that
California Dental saw in the treatment of burden shifting by the court of
appeals:
The court indirectly acknowledged the plausibility of procompetitive
justiIications Ior the CDA's position when it stated that 'the record
provides no evidence that the rule has in fact led to increased disclosure
and transparency oI dental pricing, . . . . But because petitioner alone
would have had the incentive to introduce such evidence, the statement
sounds as though the Court of Appeals may have thought it was justified
without further analysis to shift a burden to the CDA to adduce hard
evidence of the procompetitive nature of its policy; the court's adversion
to empirical evidence at the moment of this implicit burden shifting
underscores the leniency of its enquiry into evidence of the restrictions'
230

This does not mean that California had no burden, but it should have
been enough that the RSP quite obviously diminished the incentives of the
grocers to compete during any strike. Indeed, that was its purpose: to
insulate each oI the grocers` Irom the lost proIits occasioned by a strike
directed at one, but not all of them. This one-for-all-and-all-for-one
strategy assured each of them that none had the incentive to exploit the
occasion of a targeted strike to take away its main rivals` customers. In the
end, any profits gained would have to be shared and hence the loss of

228. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 59697 (1986)
(discussing plaintiII`s burden oI production in response to a properly supported motion Ior summary
judgment).
229. See Cont`l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 5456 (1977) (declining to apply
per se rule to vertical non-price restraints in light of possible efficiency justifications); Broad. Music,
Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 1921 (1979) (declining to apply per se rule to blanket licensing arrangement
in light of potential for economic efficiencies).
230. Cal. Dental Ass`n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 77576 (1999)
business to its main rivals would be neutralized. As the dissent correctly
argued, the costs, if any, of a false negative under such circumstances
would be minimal. In contrast to California Dental, it could not be said that
the grocers` agreement might have 'a net procompetitive eIIect.
231
At
best, it might be said to have had no effect, but that seemed highly unlikely
given its explicit purposes.
The case for a burden shift under a bilateral economic plausibility
sliding scale approach in Safeway is even stronger. Again, once the
majority conceded that the RSP was likely to dampen the grocers`
incentives to compete, it should not have declined to examine their
justification. As was true in Polygram, even a cursory examination of the
RSP would have revealed that by design it was supposed to eliminate the
incentive to compete, in this case the incentive of the colluding grocers to
take advantage of a targeted strike to steal away its rivals` customers.
Hence, as in NCAA, the very theory of the defense tended to reinforce the
plaintiffs theory of competitive harm.
232
The critical error of the majority in
Safeway was that it implicitly credited a non-cognizable defense as a way
oI justiIying a reIusal to examine it. Had it done so, CaliIornia`s case Ior a
burden shift would have been fortified. In any event, the majority would
have been compelled to address rather than dodge CaliIornia`s, and the
dissent`s view, that the defense was unsupported and unsupportable.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the state of the rule of reason is far better than critics
generally concede, all is still not well. Some courtsoften at the behest of
defendantscontinue to rely on unstructured approaches based on
language from older Supreme Court and circuit court decisions, even when
more structured options are available.
233
Even though most still result in
victory for the defendants, litigation can be needlessly prolonged and, when
courts accede to deIendants` demands to pile on prooI burdens for

231. Id. at 771 ('[I]t seems to us that the CDA's advertising restrictions might plausibly be
thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no eIIect at all on competition.).
232. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984) ('By seeking to
insulate live ticket sales from the full spectrum of competition because of its assumption that the
product itself is insufficiently attractive to consumers, petitioner forwards a justification that is
inconsistent with the basic policy oI the Sherman Act.). This was also true in Polygram, where the
deIendants` purported 'justiIication strongly suggested a design to eliminate competition, not promote
it. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 3738 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
233. See supra note 16.
plaintiffs, the possibility of false negatives increases.
234

Three reforms might further improve the operation of the modern rule
of reason. First, the structured approach that has become ubiquitous in
many circuits could be even more uniformly applied to ensure that antitrust
analysis stays focused on the right questions. A focus on competitive
effects, as explained above, will tend to direct courts towards the kinds of
evidence that can be used successfully by plaintiffs to shift a burden to
defendants. When it is absent, either at the pleading or production stage,
appropriate motions can be invoked to terminate the litigation.
Second, we could revisit California Dental`s sometimes caricatured
idea oI an 'enquiry meet Ior the case.
235
As is done in merger analysis, the
sliding scale approach intended by the court recognizes that not all burden
shifts are created equally. The weaker the case for effects, the more easily it
will be for defendants to prevail with evidence of a procompetitive
justification. Conversely, courts should be demanding of defendants who
proffer economically implausible or noncognizable defenses, or defenses
that are not supported by substantial evidence, in cases where the case for
anticompetitive effects is comparatively strong.
236
If lawyers and
economists can differentiate these cases in the context of mergers to
provide clear guidance to their clients, they can also do so in the case of
horizontal restraints and other kinds of competitively sensitive conduct.
Finally, openly conceding the ambiguity of California Dental, courts
should continue to apply the FTC`s inherently suspect approach to burden
shifting where appropriate. The approach is superior to a narrowly
conceived quick look equated with actual effects and will accomplish more
than such a limited approach to expedite the adjudication of relatively more
obvious cases. It will work especially well if courts eschew rigid and
formalistic burden shifting in favor of bilateral plausibility analysis based
on informed economic reasoning.

234. See Carrier, Empirical Update, supra note 136, at 830 (reporting, after a survey of 222 rule-
of-reason decisions, that 'plaintiIIs almost never win under the rule oI reason).
235. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 781.
236. Just as the Supreme Court has demanded 'plausibility oI plaintiIIs at the burden oI pleading,
see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007), and burden of production stages of
litigation, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 59697 (1986), so too
would a symmetrical plausibility screen for defenses prove to be a useful administrative device.
EXCLUSION AS A CORE COMPETITION CONCERN

Jonathan B. Baker

August 21, 2012

ABSTRACT

A contemporary consensus in antitrust discourse inappropriately places
exclusionary conduct at the periphery of competition policy. Contrary to
that common view, exclusion is as important as collusion as a matter of
precedent, the structure of doctrinal rules, economics, and sound
competition policy. In particular, courts treat exclusionary violations as
routine and serious competitive problems; an emerging doctrinal rule for
truncated condemnation of 'plain exclusionary conduct (practices
foreclosing rivals that lack a plausible efficiency justification) parallels the
evolving judicial approach toward 'naked collusion; exclusion and
collusion can be understood within a common economic framework that
emphasizes the close relationship between the two ways of exercising
market power, notwithstanding differences between them in the
mechanisms by which market power is obtained; and policy concerns about
the likelihood or significance of enforcement errors do not justify assigning
exclusion a lesser priority than collusion. Moreover, anticompetitive
exclusion may be the more important problem because it poses a particular
threat to economic growth. Recognizing exclusion as a core concern of
competition policy along with collusion could lead enforcers to place a
higher priority on attacking exclusion, particularly conduct foreclosing
potential entry in markets subject to rapid technological change, and to raise
the penalties in egregious exclusion cases through criminal enforcement. It
would also encourage further development of the doctrinal rule governing
truncated condemnation of exclusionary conduct, and protect the legitimacy
of the rules prohibiting anticompetitive exclusion against pressure for
modifications that would limit enforcement.
Aug. 21, 2012 Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern 1
EXCLUSION AS A CORE COMPETITION CONCERN

Jonathan B. Baker
*

INTRODUCTION

Exclusionary conduct
1
is commonly relegated to the periphery in
contemporary antitrust discourse, while price-fixing, market division and
other forms of collusion are placed at the core of competition policy. When
the term 'hard core is applied to an antitrust violation,
2
or the 'supreme
evil oI antitrust is identiIied,
3
the reference is invariably to cartels.
4
At the
same time, antitrust is 'more cautious in condemning exclusion than
collusion.
5

*
Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. This paper
revises and extends keynote remarks delivered to the Twenty-second Annual Workshop of
the Competition Law and Policy Institute of New Zealand (CLPINZ). The author is
especially grateful to Andy Gavil and also indebted to Svend Albaek, Rick Brunell, Peter,
Carstensen, Pat DeGraba, Aaron Edlin, Harry First, Scott Hemphill, Heather Hughes, Al
Klevorick, Prasad Krishnamurthy, Bob Lande, James May, Doug Melamed, Doug
Richards, Steve Salop, David Snyder, Peter Taylor, John Woodbury, Josh Wright, an
anonymous referee, and participants in the faculty business law workshop at American
University, the law and economics workshop at Berkeley Law School, the CLPINZ
workshop, and the Loyola Antitrust Colloquium. A revised version will be published in
Antitrust Law Journal.
1
The terms 'exclusion and 'Ioreclosure, which will be used interchangeably,
encompass both the complete foreclosure of rivals or potential entrants and conduct that
disadvantages rivals without necessarily inducing them to exit. Exclusion is
anticompetitive if the excluding firms use it to obtain or maintain market power, as by
raising price or keeping a supracompetitive price from declining.
2
E.g., OECD, 1998 Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action
Against Hard Core Cartels (March 25, 1998) reprinted at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/63/2752129.pdf (p. 58) ('|H|ard core cartels are the most
egregious violations oI competition law . . . . ). 'Hard core cartels are collusive
arrangements lacking an efficiency justification. In Europe, the term 'hard core is also
applied to a class of prohibited vertical restraints. Commission Regulation (EC) 330/2010,
2010 O.J. (L 102) 1, 5 (block exemption for vertical agreements not applied to supply or
distribution agreements containing a 'hardcore restriction such as vertical price-fixing or
territorial or customer sales restrictions).
3
Verizon Commc`ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (collusion is the
'supreme evil oI antitrust).
4
Accord, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer 3, retrieved
Aug. 31, 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/211491.htm (cartels
are 'the worst antitrust oIIenses).
5
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 24 (2005). Cf. Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) ('Concerted activity subject
to 1 is judged more sternly than unilateral activity under 2.); Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888 (2007) ('Our recent cases Iormulate
2 Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern Aug. 21, 2012
Antitrust commentators associated with the Chicago school
6
have
long expressed deep skepticism about exclusion as an antitrust theory,
particularly as applied to dominant firm conduct.
7
Mainstream and
progressive commentators also call collusion the central antitrust problem,
8

although post-Chicago commentators tend to take exclusionary conduct
more seriously than most.
9
Moreover, the antitrust enforcement agencies
routinely emphasize collusion over exclusion in articulating their
enforcement priorities.
10
These rhetorical distinctions may be framed in

antitrust principles in accordance with the appreciated differences in economic effect
between vertical and horizontal agreements.).
6
The three major eras of antitrust interpretation classical (1890 to the 1940s,
structural (1940s through the 1970s), and Chicago school (since the late 1970s) and
emerging post-Chicago approaches are surveyed in Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-
Chicago Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 60 (Roger
van den Bergh, Roberto Pardolesi & Antonio Cucinotta, eds. 2002).
7
In Judge Robert Bork`s view, in his influential book The Antitrust Paradox, courts
should almost never credit the possibility that a firm could exclude rivals by refusing to
deal with suppliers or distributors also or otherwise force rivals to bear higher distribution
costs. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 156, 346 (1978). However, Bork did
identify one case in which he believed that unilateral conduct by a dominant firm had
properly been condemned as exclusionary. Id. at 34446 (citing Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951)). Judge Richard Posner has similarly described
anticompetitive exclusion as 'rare, RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 194 (2d ed. 2001),
though he is not as skeptical about exclusion as other Chicago school commentators. Id. at
194 & note 2.
8
For example, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, author of the leading antitrust treatise,
recently described price-Iixing as 'kind oI the Iirst-degree murder oI antitrust violations,
Thomas Catan, Critics of E-Books Lawsuit Miss the Mark, Experts Say, WALL ST. J., Apr.
23, 2012, at B1, and Professor Robert Lande, a Director of the pro-enforcement American
Antitrust Institute, recently called collusion among rivals 'the essence oI the most evil
thing we have in antitrust. Sara Forden, Whats Apples Best Defense in E-Books Antitrust
Case?, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2012.
9
Professor Steven Salop, a leading post-Chicago antitrust commentator, has long
emphasized the importance oI antitrust`s concern with exclusion. Thomas G. Krattenmaker
& Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion. Raising Rivals Costs to Achieve Power
Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 213 (1986); Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of
Exclusionary Vertical Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 141, 142 (Robert Pitofsky, ed. 2008). See generally
Jonathan B. Baker, Remarks on the Presentation of the American Antitrust Institute
Antitrust Achievement Award to Steven C. Salop (June 24, 2010),
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/files/Baker%20Salop%20Comment
s_062820101005.pdf. Exclusionary conduct has been the source of the most significant
divide between Chicago school and post-Chicago commentators.
10
A recent Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust identified cartel enforcement as
his agency`s 'top priority, well ahead oI 'single Iirm conduct (which oIten involves
exclusion by a dominant Iirm). Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att`y Gen. Ior Antitrust, U.S.
Dep`t oI Justice, Antitrust EnIorcement Priorities: A Year in Review (Nov. 19, 2004),
terms of traditional doctrinal distinctions between concerted and unilateral
conduct, and between horizontal and vertical conduct, but, as section I of
this article explains, they are better understood in terms of the related but
not identical economic distinction between collusive and exclusionary
conduct.
Exclusion is routinely described as having a lesser priority than
collusion even though exclusion is well established as a serious competitive
problem in both antitrust law and industrial organization economics.
Section II of this article shows that exclusion has not been downplayed in
court decisions, and that the emerging doctrinal rules governing exclusion
and collusion place the two types of competitive problems on similar
footing. In formal structure, antitrust rules are not tougher on collusion.
Rather, the rules are tough on conduct with no plausible efficiency
justification: what is commonly termed 'naked collusion or what will be
referred to here as 'plain exclusion. Section III demonstrates that
collusion and exclusion are also closely related as a matter of economics
so much so as to make the economic reasons for concern about
anticompetitive collusion equally reasons for concern about anticompetitive
exclusion. If anything, this section further explains, anticompetitive
exclusion may be the more important problem because of the particular
threat exclusion poses to economic growth.
Notwithstanding the broad parallels in the economic analysis of
exclusion and collusion, the two types of anticompetitive conduct arise
through different economic mechanisms. Just as colluding firms must find
a way to solve 'cartel problems (reaching consensus on terms oI
coordination, deterring cheating on those terms, and preventing new
competition), excluding Iirms must Iind a way to solve 'exclusion
problems (identiIying an exclusionary method, excluding suIIicient rivals
to harm competition, and ensuring that the exclusionary conduct is

available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/206455.htm. Similarly, it is
'uncontroversial, according to a Iormer Chairman oI the Federal Trade Commission, that
non-merger antitrust enforcement should focus on 'horizontal activities (which are oIten
collusive). Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm`n, Antitrust EnIorcement at the
Federal Trade Commission: In a WordContinuity (Aug. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisaba.shtm. By 'horizontal activities, Muris
intended to reIer primarily to collusive conduct; he would have used the term 'single Iirm
to discuss most exclusionary behavior. E-mail from Timothy Muris to Jonathan Baker
(Dec. 10, 2011, 7:37 PM EST) (on file with author). Even enIorcers 'not so aligned with
the Chicago School may approach exclusionary claims more cautiously than collusion
claims. John Woodbury, Paper Trail : Working Papers and Recent Scholarship,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2012, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr12_papertrail
_4_26f.authcheckdam.pdf (referencing Justice Department materials from the current
administration) (comment on working paper predecessor to this article).
profitable for each excluding firm). Despite these differences, as section IV
demonstrates, the doctrinal rules identified in section II truncate the
comprehensive reasonableness analysis of exclusionary conduct in ways
analogous to the structured reasonableness rules governing collusive
conduct in both cases obviating the need to demonstrate the specific
mechanism defendants would or did employ, and so making it unnecessary
to show how or whether defendants solve the relevant exclusion problems
or cartel problems. Again, therefore, the formal structure of antitrust rules
does not downplay anticompetitive exclusion.
The rhetorical consensus is so powerful that claims of priority for
collusion over exclusion are typically stated without explicit justification.
They nevertheless appear to be grounded primarily in two commonly-
accepted and closely-related suppositions,
11
evaluated critically in section V
along with other purported justifications for downplaying exclusion. The
first supposition is that it is more difficult for courts and enforcers to
identify anticompetitive exclusionary conduct than to identify harmful
collusive conduct, because conduct that looks exclusionary commonly also
promotes competition by enhancing efficiency. The second is that
exclusionary conduct often benefits consumers in the short run, and that in
consequence, overly aggressive enforcement against exclusionary conduct
risks chilling pro-competitive practices such as price-cutting and new
product introductions. Together, these premises, if accepted, would imply
that mistakes in enforcement and adjudication against anticompetitive
exclusion pose greater threats than mistakes in enforcement and
adjudication against anticompetitive collusion, and, in consequence, would
justify downplaying exclusionary conduct in antitrust enforcement.
Justice Scalia`s opinion Ior the Supreme Court in Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Trinko
12
also suggests that mistakes in enforcement
and adjudication are more frequent and more troublesome in exclusion
cases, but grounds that view in different and more controversial arguments.

11
E.g., U.S. DEP`T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 12-13 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gove/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf, withdrawn,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm. These themes were also
emphasized at a conference discussion of a draft of this article, including among those
sympathetic to a robust antitrust concern with exclusionary conduct.
12
Verizon Commc`ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). The central claim in the
case involved exclusionary conduct: a class of local telephone service customers alleged
that Verizon, an incumbent local exchange carrier, had protected its monopoly prices from
erosion by denying interconnection services to entrants seeking to offer competing local
telephone service. (Verizon was obligated to provide new entrants with interconnection
services under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.) The Court held that Verizon`s
unilateral refusal to assist its rivals did not state a claim under the Sherman Act.
The opinion`s sweeping rhetoric all dicta
13
minimizes the competitive
concern arising from a monopolist`s unilateral exclusionary acts by
implicitly describing the consequences of judicial mistakes from Sherman
Act 2 enforcement in asymmetric terms.
14
The Trinko opinion can be
understood to claim that false negatives (false acquittals) are not
troublesome because monopolies are temporary, hence self-correcting, and
that false positives (false convictions) are troublesome because monopolies
foster economic growth
15
and because of the difficulty of crafting relief to
avoid ongoing judicial supervision, at least with respect to the violation
alleged in the case.
16
Consistent with its skeptical view of antitrust
enforcement against exclusionary conduct, Trinko declares that collusion is
the 'supreme evil oI antitrust
17
and rhetorically cabins-in an earlier pro-
plaintiff monopolization decision, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp.,
18
by describing it as 'at or near the outer boundary of Section
2 liability.
19

Whether the claimed policy justifications for downplaying exclusion

13
Trinko is best read as precluding monopolization liability in a setting in which a
separate statutory scheme provided for extensive regulation aimed at promoting
competition. (The statute incorporated specific mechanisms for promoting competition by
requiring incumbent monopolists to deal with entrants.) If the regulatory scheme is
sufficiently extensive and effective, Trinko holds, antitrust enforcement may be displaced.
See Verizon Commc`ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 413 (2004) ('the [regulatory] regime
was an eIIective steward oI the antitrust Iunction). See also Nobody v. Clear Channel
Communications, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 111214 (D. Colo. 2004) (limiting Trinko to
regulated industry settings); but see John Doe 1 v. Abbott Laboratories, 571 F.3d 930 (9th
Cir. 2009) (applying Trinko outside the regulated industries context). Since Trinko, the
Court has maintained its skepticism about the value of antitrust enforcement, and its
resulting preference for having competition issues decided exclusively by an industry
regulator rather than preserving concurrent jurisdiction in an antitrust court. Credit Suisse
Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (expanding the implied antitrust immunity
conferred by regulation under the securities laws). See generally Howard A. Shelanski,
The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2011).
14
Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking
a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 42-51 (2004) (offering a detailed exposition and
critique of the rhetoric of the majority opinion in Trinko).
15
The opinion argues in particular that the prospect of monopoly induces risk-taking
and innovation. Verizon Commc`ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 406 (2004).
16
Verizon Commc`ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08, 414-15 (2004).
17
Verizon Commc`ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
18
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1983).
19
Verizon Commc`ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004). Accord, Pacific Bell
Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc`ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009) (Aspen suggests that a
Iirm`s unilateral reIusal to deal with its rivals can give rise to antitrust liability in 'limited
circumstances) (dictum). Appeals courts have noted the narrow reading that Trinko and
linkLine give Aspen. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 316 (3d Cir. 2007);
MetroNet Services Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 113134 (9th Cir. 2004).
are grounded in common ideas about the difficulty distinguishing
procompetitive conduct from anticompetitive exclusion or in the more
controversial arguments made in Trinko, they do not stand up to analysis.
The antitrust enforcement agencies do challenge collusion more frequently
than exclusion. This observation could be explained through a theory
sympathetic to assigning exclusion a lower priority than collusion, as
consistent with the dual suppositions that it is more difficult to rule out
efficiencies and avoid erroneous findings of liability in exclusionary
conduct cases than in collusive conduct cases. But, as section V explains,
there are better interpretations for the relatively low frequency of
enforcement against anticompetitive exclusion. Section V also criticizes
other policy arguments that have been offered for assigning lesser priority
to exclusion, including one based on empirical studies, another rooted in an
analysis of institutional competence, and still others suggested by the
Supreme Court in Trinko.
The troublesome rhetorical consensus placing exclusionary conduct
at antitrust`s periphery, not its core, is not just unwarranted; it is pernicious.
The more that exclusion is downplayed rhetorically, the more that its
legitimacy as a subject for antitrust enforcement will be undermined,
20
so
the greater the likelihood that antitrust rules will eventually change to limit
enforcement against anticompetitive foreclosure when they should not.
Accordingly, anticompetitive exclusion, like anticompetitive collusion,
must be understood as a core concern of competition policy.
Section VI of this article discusses the implications for antitrust
enforcement of recognizing exclusion as a core concern of competition
policy along with collusion. Doing so could lead enforcers to assign a
higher priority to attacking exclusion than they do today, particularly
conduct foreclosing potential entry in markets subject to rapid technological
change, though the relative frequency of exclusion cases is unlikely to
increase greatly as a result. It could also encourage enforcers to seek
criminal penalties in egregious exclusion cases. In addition, it would
encourage further development of the doctrinal rule governing truncated
condemnation of exclusionary conduct in the courts, and protect the rules
governing anticompetitive exclusion against pressure for modifications that
would limit enforcement.

20
Cf. Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of
the Non-Interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 605,
625-25 (2010) ('Had Microsoft come out differently, Trinko might have gone farther to
question the legitimacy oI the antitrust bar on monopolization.).
I. EXCLUSION AS AN ANTITRUST CATEGORY

Exclusion and collusion are neither statutory nor doctrinal categories;
they are economic categories. The Sherman Act distinguishes between
concerted conduct (1) and single firm behavior (2),
21
each of which could
harm competition through exclusion or collusion.
22
The doctrinal rules
developed to implement both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act
prohibition on anticompetitive mergers distinguish between horizontal and
vertical agreements, each of which again could harm competition through
exclusion or collusion.
23
Although these legal categories continue to play a
role in modern antitrust analysis, 'today`s antitrust lawyers, enIorcers and
courts focus far more on the nature of the anticompetitive effects, and in
private cases, the antitrust injuries, alleged.
24
For this reason, the antitrust
casebook I co-authored 'separately groups conduct threatening collusive
anticompetitive effects including traditional horizontal agreements,

21
Sherman Act 2 also recognizes conspiracy to monopolize, but this statutory
provision is rarely invoked.
22
A single firm could harm competition collusively if a dominant firm fixes prices or
divides markets in cooperation with a fringe rival, for example.
23
The Sherman Act also distinguishes between exclusionary and exploitative conduct.
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (the exercise of market
power by a firm that obtained it 'as a consequence oI a superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident is not actionable as monopolization). But cf. Einer Elhauge, Tying,
Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397,
420-26 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court`s tying jurisprudence is predicated in part
on recognition of the exploitation of monopoly power as a basis for liability). By contrast,
under the European approach to competition policy, a dominant firm can be found to have
abused its position through exploitative offenses such as charging higher prices, though
such cases are rare, and it is an open question whether exploitative conduct could be
reached as a violation of FTC Act 5. Compare E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Fed.
Trade Comm`n, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (Ethyl) (requiring 'some indicia oI
oppressiveness such as anticompetitive intent or the absence oI a legitimate business
justiIication beIore labeling unilateral Iacilitating practices as 'unIair under the FTC Act)
with Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the
Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 211-
12 (1993) ('the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the FTC may condemn a
unilateral act under FTC Act 5 when an agreement to engage in the identical conduct
would violate Sherman Act 1).
24
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW
IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY vii (2d ed.
2008) (Preface to the First Edition). Although the modern focus emphasizes effects, the
Sherman Act`s agreement requirement means that the statute does not reach every instance
in which firms harm competition through coordination, Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman
Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary
Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143 (1993), and, as indicated in the previous note,
the anticompetitive conduct requirement in the case law means that the statute does not
reach every instance in which firms harm competition through exclusion.
vertical intrabrand agreements and horizontal mergers and conduct
threatening exclusionary effects -- including dominant firm behavior,
vertical interbrand restraints and vertical mergers.
25
In making this
distinction, the casebook adopted the major structural division employed by
Judge Posner in his antitrust treatise and his co-authored antitrust
casebook.
26

Although exclusionary claims are most commonly framed as challenges
to vertical agreements or monopolization, antitrust`s traditional doctrinal
categories do not perfectly track the distinction between exclusion and
collusion. Vertical conduct is not invariably exclusionary. Agreements
between manufacturers and distributors, for example, may harm
competition by facilitating collusion at either level as well as by excluding
entrants into manufacturing or distribution.
27
Nor is horizontal conduct
invariably collusive. The category includes, for example, exclusionary
group boycotts.
28
Moreover, dominant firms could harm competition by
colluding with fringe rivals as well as by excluding those firms.
The antitrust rules most closely associated with exclusion those
governing the conduct of monopolists and would-be monopolists and
vertical agreements have long been among the most controversial in U.S.
competition policy; the antitrust norms in these categories have aptly been
described as 'contested.
29
Over the course of antitrust history, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly altered its approach to evaluating the legality
of vertical non-price restraints.
30
The modern legal rule nearly inverts the

25
Id. The doctrinal categories are grouped based on whether the harm to competition
addressed in the leading cases more commonly results from exclusion or collusion, but all
the practices could harm competition either way.
26
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS xv (2d
ed. 1981). Cf. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 134 (1978) (describing
collusive and exclusionary conduct as 'two theories oI the ways in which competition may
be injured that . shape and drive the law).
27
E.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 89294
(2007) (discussing both collusive and exclusionary explanations for resale price
maintenance).
28
E.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985).
29
William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement
Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 410 (2003) (describing as 'contested the antitrust norms
governing 'abuse oI dominance and vertical contractual restraints between 1961 and
2000). Kovacic sees different patterns in the evolution of norms developed in other areas
oI antitrust: 'progressive contraction (Robinson-Patman matters), progressive expansion
(criminal and civil horizontal restraints), [or] contraction followed by stabilization
(mergers). Id.
30
Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 6 (1981) (between 1963 and 1977, the
rule applied forty-five years ago.
31
The standard used to test vertical
agreements concerning price has been even less consistent,
32
and remains
contested,
33
although the case law did not explicitly associate resale price
maintenance with exclusion until recently.
34
A switch of one vote would
have led the Supreme Court to abandon the longstanding per se prohibition
against tying.
35
Monopolization standards are also controversial, as is
evident from a debate between the federal antitrust enforcement agencies
early in the 21
st
century.
36

From a contemporary perspective that recognizes the central role
economic concepts play in antitrust today, the controversies over

legality of (non-price) distribution restrictions 'oscillated Irom the Rule oI Reason to per se
illegality and back).
31
The Court adopted a rule of per se illegality in 1967, United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), but overruled that decision in favor of applying the
rule oI reason ten years later. Cont`l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Since 1977, vertical non-price restraints have rarely been prohibited, leading one
commentator to describe the practical standard as close to per se legality. Douglas H.
Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60
ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (1991).
32
Since vertical restraints on price were held illegal per se in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), Congress authorized states to allow such
agreements, Miller-Tydings Act, Pub. L. No. 314, ch. 690, Title III, 50 Stat. 693 (1937),
broadened that authority, McGuire Act, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 632 (1952) and returned the law
to the rule of per se illegality by repealing that authorization, Consumer Goods Pricing Act
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801. More recently, the Supreme Court overruled
Dr. Miles and adopted the rule of reason. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
33
The Leegin decision drew a passionate dissent from four Justices. Id. at 908
(Breyer, J., dissenting). One month before the oral argument, an FTC Commissioner
issued an unusual public statement detailing her disagreement with the Solicitor General`s
pro-deIendant brieI. Pamela Jones Harbour, Commissioner, Fed`l Trade Comm`n, An
Open Letter to the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/070226verticalminimumpricefixing.pdf. The
continuing controversy over resale price maintenance in the wake of Leegin is discussed in
Andrew I. Gavil, Resale Price Maintenance in a Post-Leegin World: A Comparative Look
at Recent Developments in the United States and European Union, THE CPI ANTITRUST
JOURNAL, June 2010 (1), available at,
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/jun-10-1.
34
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 89294 (2007)
(discussing both collusive and exclusionary explanations for resale price maintenance).
35
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (5-4 decision).
36
During the George W. Bush administration the Justice Department encouraged
courts to adopt a doctrinal approach that would favor defendants but the Federal Trade
Commission pointedly refused to go along. At the start of the Obama administration, the
Justice Department withdrew the previous administration`s proposal. See Jonathan B.
Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist
Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 60607 (2010).
monopolization and vertical restraints standards are best understood as
proxy battles over the appropriate treatment of exclusionary conduct.
37

While the rhetorical consensus prioritizing collusion could be interpreted
from a statutory perspective as downplaying single firm conduct and from a
doctrinal perspective as downplaying vertical agreements and
monopolization, this article interprets it from an economic perspective that
frames contemporary antitrust thinking as downplaying exclusionary
conduct.

II. EXCLUSION IN ANTITRUST CASE LAW AND DOCTRINE

The rhetorical consensus downplaying the significance of
exclusionary conduct is surprising because anticompetitive exclusion is
treated by antitrust law as a routine and serious competitive problem. Many
leading U.S. antitrust decisions, including recent ones, have been concerned
primarily with exclusionary conduct. Microsoft made it difficult for
Netscape to market its browsers to computer users in order to protect its
Windows operating system monopoly from the competition that would be
created if software applications could access any operating system through
the browser.
38
Standard Oil exploited its leverage over the railroads to stop
the entry of new refiners in order to protect its monopoly in oil refining.
39

Before AT&T (Bell System) was broken up, it maintained market power in
unregulated markets for specialized telephone service and customer
premises equipment by discriminating against rivals that sought to connect
with its regulated local telephone service monopoly.
40
Visa and MasterCard
prevented member banks from issuing American Express and Discover

37
Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 4 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that the
economic theory of monopoly had much more to say about collusive practices than
exclusionary ones, leading some economists and lawyers identified with the Chicago
school (but not Posner) to the view 'that there was no economic basis Ior concern with .
exclusionary practices). But cf. Bus. Elecs. Corp v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
74748 (1988) (dissent explains the Court`s decision as turning, without justiIication, on
treating the distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements as more important than
the distinction between collusive and exclusionary conduct).
38
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
39
United States v. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See generally Elizabeth Granitz &
Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by Raising Rivals Costs: The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1996). Compare George L. Priest, Rethinking the Economic Basis of the
Standard Oil Refining Monopoly: Dominance Against Competing Cartels, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 605 (2012) (questioning some oI Granitz & Klein`s argument) with Benjamin Klein,
The Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracv that Created the Standard Oil Monopolv, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 459 (2012) (responding to Priest).
40
See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. 131, 162 (D.D.C. 1982) (entering
consent decree requiring divestitures).
cards in order to protect their own market power.
41

Exclusionary conduct allegations are also central to other antitrust
decisions commonly thought of as alleging collusion. The NCAA
threatened two large state universities with disciplinary action if they did
not comply with the NCAA`s arrangement Ior broadcasting college football
games.
42
Dentists that did not comply with the advertising restrictions
promulgated by the California Dental Association could be censured or
expelled.
43
The National Society of Professional Engineers encouraged
state societies to launch disciplinary proceedings against engineers that did
not comply with its ethical code, which included the challenged restrictions
on competitive bidding restrictions.
44
The predatory conspiracies alleged
(but ultimately not demonstrated) in Brooke Group and Matsushita were
said to have excluded generic cigarettes and a U.S. firm manufacturing
televisions, respectively.
45
The horizontal (collusive) market division
agreement attacked in Topco allowed the firms to prevent their rivals from
selling the cooperative`s private label products.
46
The nearly two hundred
insurance companies indicted for price-fixing during the early 1940s were
also accused of employing boycotts, coercion, and intimidation to prevent
competition from firms that were not members of their trade association.
47

During the modern era, moreover, the Supreme Court and the
appeals courts have addressed exclusionary conduct without consistently
favoring either defendants or plaintiffs.
48
Looking to outcome, reasoning
and tone, decisions of the appeals courts during the first half of 2011 (an

41
United States v. Visa, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003).
42
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla, 468 U.S 85 (1984).
43
Cal. Dental Ass`n v. Fed. Trade Comm`n, 526 U.S. 756 (1959).
44
United States v. Nat`l Soc`y oI ProI`l Eng`rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193, 1210 (D.D.C.
1974), affd 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), affd 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
45
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Brooke Group
was arguably decided incorrectly. See Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing after Brooke
Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 598 (1994) ('the Court took the
case from the jury to award judgment to the defendant when the record on this key question
oI Iact, construed Iavorably to plaintiII, arguably supported plaintiII`s position).
46
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. (405 U.S. 596 (1972). See generally Peter
C. Carstensen & Harry First, Rambling Through Economic Theory: Topco`s Closer Look,
in ANTITRUST STORIES 171 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane, eds., 2007).
47
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass`n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
48
The relative success of plaintiffs and defendants is difficult to interpret because it
may depend on a variety of factors beyond the general attitude of the courts, including
whether legal rules are changing, the willingness of firms to engage in questionable
conduct that could be challenged, and the willingness of the parties to a lawsuit to litigate
rather than settle. Accordingly, even a consistently one-sided pattern of decisions may be a
poor indicator of judicial attitudes toward exclusionary conduct.
arbitrarily chosen recent period),
49
as well as notable decisions of the circuit
courts and the Supreme Court from the past three decades,
50
do not
systematically favor either side.
To show how seriously the courts take exclusionary conduct, this
article adopts two approaches. Section II.A documents the wide range of
exclusionary conduct that the courts have evaluated. This informal survey
shows that anticompetitive exclusion has not been downplayed by the
courts through limitation to a narrow range of practices.
Section II.B identifies parallels in the formal structure of the
emerging doctrinal rules employed by the courts to identify anticompetitive
exclusionary and anticompetitive collusive conduct. In particular, the
courts have evolved a similar approach to the two doctrinal areas: adopting
a presumption in each against conduct lacking a plausible efficiency
justification. Although antitrust enforcers more frequently allege that the
challenged conduct has no justification in collusion cases than exclusion
cases, the parallel structure of the relevant legal rules shows that the rules
themselves are not tougher on collusive conduct than on exclusionary
practices.

49
During this period, arguably pro-enforcement exclusion decisions were issued by
circuit courts in Watson Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d
452 (6th Cir. 2011), E.I DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435
(4th Cir. 2011), and Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC., 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011), while
arguably non-interventionist exclusion decisions were issued in Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard
Inc., 642 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011), Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 2011 WL 2163961
(9th Cir. 2011), and Smugglers` Notch Homeowners Ass`n v. Smugglers` Notch Mgmt.
Co., 414 Fed. Appx. 372 (2d Cir. 2011).
50
The Supreme Court exclusion decisions listed below more often take the non-
interventionist side, exclusively so since 1993, but the circuit courts do not appear to have
interpreted the recent pattern as a mandate to raise the bar to plaintiffs in exclusion cases.
Notable decisions from the Supreme Court and appeals courts arguably on the pro-
enforcement side of the ledger include Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504
U.S. 451 (1992); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1983);
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Dentsply Int`l., Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Visa, 344 F.3d 229 (2d
Cir. 2003); LePage`s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. MicrosoIt
Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc); and JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor
Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999). Notable decisions arguably on the non-
interventionist side include Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438
(2009); Verizon Commc`ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004); Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574 (1986); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Cascade
Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008); E&L Consulting, Ltd. v.
Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d
1109 (10th Cir. 2003); and Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
1997).

A. Exclusionary Practices Identified by the Courts

The courts do not treat exclusion as an exceptional practice; instead they
have recognized that exclusionary conduct harming competition can take a
wide range of forms.
51
The anticompetitive possibilities surveyed have
been divided into three broad categories based on the mechanism by which
exclusion takes place, with an eye toward the economic analysis in section
III. In general, these practices are neither necessarily nor invariably
anticompetitive, as rivals can be excluded without harm to competition, and
practices that exclude rivals could help firms lower costs, improve products,
or otherwise achieve efficiencies as well as helping them obtain or maintain
market power. The survey is not intended as an inventory of all possible
means of exclusion; rather, it is intended to illustrate the breadth of conduct
that could harm competition through foreclosure.
The practices described in the first two categories exclude rivals by
imposing a constraint on the latter Iirms` conduct, as by raising rivals` costs
or, to similar effect, reducing rivals` access to customers.
52
The methods in
the first category can be accomplished by the excluding firms alone,
whether through the unilateral action of a single excluding firm or the joint
action of a group of excluding firms. The methods in the second category
require the excluding firms to coordinate with firms that are not rivals
through the purchase of an exclusionary right. Because coordination is
required, the profitability of practices in the second category turns in part on
factors not relevant to the profitability of practices in the other categories, as
discussed below in section IV.A. In the third category, the excluding firms
discourage competition by altering their rivals` incentives, in particular by
credibly threatening the rivals with harm should the latter firms seek to
compete aggressively.
Constraints Imposed on Rival Conduct. The most obvious
anticompetitive exclusionary strategies directly constrain rivals by imposing
costs or reducing rivals` access to customers. A dominant firm might
destroy a Iringe rival`s distribution Iacilities,
53
or obtain a monopoly

51
See generally Richard M. Steuer, Foreclosure, in 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 92629 (2008) (surveying case law).
52
Input foreclosure strategies are commonly thought of as raising rivals` costs while
customer Ioreclosure strategies are commonly thought oI as limiting rivals` access to the
market, but customer foreclosure strategies can also be understood as another form of
raising rivals` costs on the view that they raise rivals` costs of distribution.
53
Conwood v. United States Tobacco, 290 F.3d 768 (6
th
Cir. 2002) (dominant
manuIacturer oI snuII excluded a Iringe rival by destroying its rival`s in-store display
racks). See Kenneth P. Brevoort & Howard P. Marvel, Successful Monopolization Through
Predation: The National Cash Register Company, 21 RES. IN L. & ECON. 85 (2004)
position through fraudulent acquisition of a patent.
54
To similar effect, a
vertically-integrated dominant firm could redesign its upstream product in
order to create an incompatibility for its downstream rival.
55
A firm may
also directly exclude its rivals by failing to disclose in advance its patent
rights in a technology adopted as an industry standard,
56
engaging in sham
litigation,
57
or manipulating a regulatory scheme.
58

Other methods by which firms can impose constraints that exclude

(dominant firm maintained its monopoly power in part through espionage and sabotage;
federal criminal prosecution settled by consent). Allegedly tortious conduct accompanied a
restriction on access to supply in Watson Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus.,
Inc., 648 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2011) ('Ialse derogatory accusations about the excluded Iirm
to potential customers). See also Nat`l Ass`n oI Pharm. Mfrs. V. Ayerst Lab., 850 F.2d
904, 916 (2d Cir. 1988) (dominant Iirm`s public statements disparaging rival`s product
would support monopolization claim iI 'clearly Ialse, clearly material, and clearly likely to
induce reasonable reliance); Int`l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 625
F.2d 1255 (8
th
Cir. 1980) (dominant Iirm`s exclusionary conduct included a Ialse,
misleading and deceptive newspaper ad). Managers at one pizza chain were recently
charged with arson after allegedly burning down a rival`s nearby store in order to increase
sales, though no antitrust violation was apparently charged. Florida Domino`s Managers
Charged With Burning Down Rival Pizza Parlor, FOXNEWS.COM, Oct. 29, 2011, available
at http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/10/29/florida-dominos-managers-charged-with-
burning-down-rival-pizza-parlor/print#ixzz1d1mfXJ3B. Business torts can exclude rivals
without harming competition, though, and thus do not necessarily also constitute violations
of the antitaws.
54
Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
55
E.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A
deceptive misrepresentation concerning incompatibility may similarly harm competition if
believed. See Joseph Farrell, Janis K. Pappalardo & Howard Shelanski, Economics at the
FTC: Mergers, Dominant-Firm Conduct, and Consumer Behavior, 37 REV. INDUS. ORG.
263, 268 (2010) (discussing FTC complaint against Intel resolved by consent settlement
based in part on this theory).
56
Several related exclusion scenarios are suggested by the case law. All suppose that a
standard-setting organization (SSO) selects a particular technology owned by firm A in
preference to alternative technologies, conditional on a representation by the firm that it
does not have intellectual property covering the standard or that it will abide by a
commitment to license on a non-discriminatory basis and charge reasonable royalties if the
technology is selected. After the technology is incorporated into the standard, and firms
adopting the standard make sunk investments to use it (become locked-in), firm A acts
inconsistently with the commitment, as by asserting intellectual property rights and
charging royalties, see In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996), charging
unreasonably high royalties, or preventing firms from using its intellectual property if they
compete with it in the sale of products that incorporate the standard. See Broadcom Corp.
v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 316 (3d Cir. 2007).
57
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
58
See, e.g., Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(allegedly excluded rival may be able to satisfy antitrust injury standard in alleging harm
based on excluding firm manipulation of a statutory scheme for regulatory approval of
generic drugs).
rivals may be less direct but equally harmful. A vertically-integrated
dominant firm can refuse to sell a key input to rivals,
59
or degrade the
quality of the input it provides, as by refusing to sell the highest quality
inputs.
60
A vertical merger may threaten anticompetitive exclusion by
conferring an incentive for the merged firm unilaterally to foreclose
upstream rivals from access to distribution (customer foreclosure) or
unilaterally to foreclose downstream rivals from access to a key input (input
foreclosure).
61
A dominant firm can exclude its rivals by refusing to deal
with their suppliers, thereby discouraging the suppliers from dealing with
competing firms.
62
A dominant firm that sells complementary products can
take customers away from an unintegrated rival, thereby reducing the rival`s
scale of operations and so raising its costs. The dominant firm can also
accomplish the same end by tying complementary products together,
63

59
E.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1983) (firm
controlling three of the four mountains at a leading destination ski resort excluded the
company owning the fourth mountain from participating in a multi-area ski ticket, making
it difficult for the excluded firm to attract customers scheduling week-long ski vacations).
60
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (major local telephone companies,
which had different territorial footprints, allegedly acted in concert to evade their statutory
obligation to interconnect with new rivals by making interconnection costly and
cumbersome or providing low quality connections).
61
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Applications of Comcast Corporation, General
Electric Company, and NBC Universal, Inc. For Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer
Control of Licensees, -- FCC Rcd. (2011) (Comcast could disadvantage rival video
distributors by denying them access to NBC programming or raising the price, and
disadvantage rival programming suppliers by denying them access to Comcast`s video
distribution customers or charging them more), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/transaction/comcast-nbcu.html.
62
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (monopolist newspaper
refused to accept ads from firms that advertised on a new radio station).
63
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (Kodak
allegedly tied copier parts to copier service in order to exclude independent service
operators). Under some conditions, excluding firms can successfully employ tying or
bundling as an exclusionary strategy. E.g., John Simpson & Abraham L. Wickelgren,
Bundled Discounts, Leverage Theory, and Downstream Competition, 9 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 370 (2007); Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002);
Michael D. Whinston, Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and
Dont Know, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 63 (2001); Michael D. Whinson, Tying, Foreclosure, and
Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990). Other explanations for tying include price
discrimination, which could either harm or promote competition, and an effort to achieve
efficiencies such as scale or scope economies for sellers or a reduction in transactions costs
for buyers. E.g., Marius Schwartz & Daniel Vincent, Quantity Forcing and Exclusion:
Bundled Discounts and Nonlinear Pricing, in 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES
IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 939 (2008); David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why
Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying
Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 38 (2005).
offering discounts to buyers purchasing a package of products,
64
or offering
discounts to buyers based on the share oI the buyer`s total input purchases
accounted for by the excluding seller.
65
Similar exclusionary strategies to
those set forth above could be employed by a group of excluding firms
acting collectively to harm a rival, as through an exclusionary group
boycott,
66
parallel exclusionary conduct,
67
or pooling weak patents.
68

Purchase of an Exclusionary Right. The exclusionary strategies in the
second category require the cooperation of non-excluding firms to raise
rivals` costs, as through vertical agreement. A firm can foreclose its rivals
by contracting with sellers of key inputs, inexpensive distribution, or other
complementary products or services to raise the price that rivals must pay
for the complement or to deny rivals access to that product entirely.
69
A
dominant firm may also employ other contracting strategies to raise rivals`
costs. It may overbuy a key input to bid up the market price; this may be
worth it if the higher input price forces rivals to exit,
70
or if the strategy

64
Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008).
65
See Joseph Farrell, Janis K. Pappalardo & Howard Shelanski, Economics at the
263, 267 (2010) (discussing FTC complaint resolved by consent settlement based on this
theory). Market share discounts could exclude rivals through two distinct economic
mechanisms. First, they may operate like a tax on incremental buyer purchases from
competitors. Joseph Farrell, Janis K. Pappalardo & Howard Shelanski, Economics at the
263, 267 (2010). Second, iI rivals` marginal costs increase as their output Ialls, market
share discounts (like quantity discounts) could shift sales away from rivals, thereby raising
rivals` costs by denying them economies oI scale.
66
284 (1985) (office supply store members of a purchasing cooperative expelled a rival).
67
See generally Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, YALE L.J.
(forthcoming).
68
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963). The pooling of patents that
would be essential (or otherwise substitutes) if valid could harm competition through
exclusion by reducing the likelihood that questionable patents would be reviewed for
validity. Pooling could also benefit competition if used to avoid costly litigation over
patent boundaries.
69
Alcoa, the early 20
th
century aluminum monopolist, entered into contracts with
hydroelectric power producers that forbade the power companies from supplying electricity
to other aluminum manufacturers. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 422 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa) (describing 1912 government enforcement action).
See also United States v. Dentsply Int`l., Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (exclusionary agreements between
Microsoft and Original Equipment Manufacturers and Internet Access Providers). When
the excluded firm is forced to adopt a higher cost method of distribution, this exclusionary
strategy is sometimes described as disrupting an optimal distribution strategy.
70
E.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312
(2007) (dominant seller of hardwood lumber protected the market power of its hardwood
lumber mills by bidding up the price of logs, in order to force a rival mill to exit).
raises competitors` marginal costs, and thus increases the market price by
more than the dominant Iirm`s own average costs rise.
71
The dominant firm
may also exclude rivals by contracting with suppliers to give the monopolist
the benefit of any discount the suppliers offer a rival.
72

Commitment to Tough Competition. In the third category of
exclusionary strategies, excluding firms, perhaps especially dominant firms,
scare off competition through commitments that convince rivals that
aggressive conduct will be met with a strong response. Such a strategy
works when the rivals conclude that their best response is to live and let live
to avoid entry, price-cutting, or other competitive moves that would
provoke the giant.
73
The leading antitrust example involves predatory
pricing: a multimarket monopolist may respond aggressively to single
market entry, and profit from doing so mainly by discouraging entry in
other markets, allowing the monopolist to protect its market power there.
74

Overbuying could alternatively be viewed as a constraint on rival conduct, and placed in
the first category.
71
In general, a Iirm`s marginal cost is the cost concept relevant to determining its
price, while its average cost is the cost concept relevant to determining its profitability.
72
E.g., Comp., United States. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich.; No. 2:10-CV-
14155-DPH-MKM (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f263200/263235.htm; United States v. Delta Dental of
R.I., 943 F. Supp. 172 (D.R.I. 1996). These contractual provisions are termed 'most
Iavored nations or 'most Iavored customer clauses. They can protect the dominant Iirm
from new competition by making it impossible for an entrant to obtain key inputs cheaply
from suppliers that might have been willing to give the entrant a discount in exchange for a
large share oI the entrant`s business. Most Iavored customer provisions can also harm
competition by facilitating coordination. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical
Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive Effects of " Most-Favored-
Customer " Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 517 (1996).
73
See generally Steven C. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON REV. 335
(Papers & Proceedings, May 1979) (excluding firms can make investments that commit
them to an aggressive response to future rivalry, with the consequence that future
competition is deterred); Richard J. Gilbert, Mobility Barriers and the Value of
Incumbency, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 475 (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert Willig, eds., 1989) (same). See also JOHN SUTTON, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET
STRUCTURE (1981) (excluding Iirms may be able to deter entry by raising a new Iirm`s
post-entry marginal costs of production and distribution, as through investments that have
the effect of increasing the sunk investments a new firm must make on marketing or
research and development if it chooses to enter).
74
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005). A predator
may also succeed by convincing lenders or investors no longer to support the prey ('deep
pocket predation), by convincing a prospective entrant that the predator`s costs are too
low to make entry proIitable (predation 'cost-signaling), or by convincing a prospective
entrant that its product will be unattractive to buyers ('test-market predation). See
generally Patrick Bolton, Joseph Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing:
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239 (2000). See also Aaron S. Edlin,
Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941 (2002). Predatory pricing may
In addition, a dominant Iirm`s contract with suppliers to give the
monopolist the benefit of discounts offered to rivals could be viewed as a
commitment by the monopolist to match any price-reduction by a rival (as
well as falling in the previous category, purchase of an exclusionary right).

B. Parallel Legal Rules

The breadth of practices that could be considered exclusionary suggests
that the courts take exclusion seriously. The parallel structure of the legal
rules governing exclusion and collusion similarly suggests that exclusionary
conduct is not assigned lower priority in antitrust law. As will be seen, both
types of allegations are generally reviewed under the rule of reason, and in
the emerging framework for doing so, courts employ analogous methods of
truncation based importantly on the absence of a plausible efficiency
justification.
75
The parallelism in legal rules is not primarily a legacy of
antitrust`s historical reliance on doctrinal categories that encompass both
exclusionary and collusive conduct,
76
as the truncation methods reflect a

also succeed by denying the prey economies of scale when the predator has more captive
buyers. Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, A Simple Theory of Predation, (IGIER
Working Paper No. 437, 2012) available at http://www.igier.unibocconi.it/files/437.pdf.
75
The terms 'truncated or 'structured refer to a collection of analytical
approachesper se rules, quick look rules, presumptions and burden-shiftingthat
potentially condition liability on a limited factual inquiry rather than requiring courts to
engage in a wide-open reasonableness analysis. Limiting the factual inquiry is
advantageous if it reduces the costs of operating the legal system, and provides guidance to
firms seeking to comply with the antitrust laws and to generalist judges seeking to enforce
those laws under circumstances in which limiting the evidence considered is unlikely to
result in erroneous decisions relative to what a fact-finder would conclude from a complete
factual review. See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER,
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION
POLICY 206 (2d ed. 2008) at 103-106 (discussing benefits and costs of per se
condemnation). In general, the errors from truncation could go in either direction:
truncated rules could sweep in conduct that should not be condemned, or avoid
condemning conduct that should be prohibited. Conduct that avoids condemnation on a
quick look can still be reviewed under the comprehensive rule of reason.
76
Antitrust`s traditional legal categories do not divide perIectly along exclusion vs.
collusion lines. Supra Section I. While exclusion cases tend to be framed as vertical
agreements or mergers, or as monopolization or attempts to monopolize, those categories
can also be employed to attack collusive conduct and the legal categories in which
collusive cases tend to be framed, including horizontal agreements, can also be employed
to attack exclusionary conduct. Within a doctrinal category, moreover, the legal rule
generally does not differ depending on whether the alleged conduct is collusive or
exclusionary. The rules governing group boycotts may be an exception, however. The
Supreme Court`s collusive group boycott decision in F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass`n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (SCTLA) treated that conduct as tantamount to price-
fixing among rivals. Id. at 423. The SCTLA majority did not make reference to the
modern evolution to rule of reason review. This parallelism shows that
courts do not place a higher burden on plaintiffs seeking to demonstrate
anticompetitive exclusionary conduct.
In both the exclusion and the collusion context, the legal rules single out
for particular attention anticompetitive conduct lacking a plausible
eIIiciency justiIication. The term 'naked collusion is oIten applied to
agreements among rivals to fix prices, divide markets, or otherwise harm
competition that cannot plausibly be justified as efficient.
77
The term 'plain
exclusion will be used to describe the comparable exclusionary conduct:
anticompetitive exclusion lacking a plausible efficiency justification.
78
So-
called 'cheap exclusion is a type oI plain exclusion, namely plain
exclusion that is also inexpensive for the excluding firms to implement.
79

It is commonplace today that agreements among rivals (which more
commonly threaten collusive rather than exclusionary harms), when
reviewed under Sherman Act 1, are analyzed under the rule of reason
through an analysis that can be structured or truncated using quick look or
burden-shifting approaches.
80
In consequence, a horizontal restraint can be

Court`s then-recent exclusionary group boycott decision, Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pac. Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). Stationers appears to demand a
more extensive showing (perhaps including proof of market power) before applying a per
se rule to invalidate the conduct than is required for horizontal price-fixing though it is
not possible to say more than 'appears and 'perhaps because Stationers does not clearly
delineate the elements of the per se rule it applies.
77
See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) ('no purpose
except stiIling oI competition).
78
The seemingly analogous term 'naked exclusion was not adopted because that
phrase is used in the economics literature to describe a particular economic model. Eric B.
Rasmussen, J. Mark Ramseyer & John S. Wiley, Jr., Naked Exclusion, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
921 (1986). But see Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, 'Foreclosure,` and
Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L. J. 311, 360 (2002) (reIerring to 'naked exclusion);
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion. Raising Rivals
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 227 (1986) (same). Plain exclusion
in a Sherman Act 2 setting has been reIerred to as 'no eIIiciency justiIication
monopolization. Harry First, The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76 ANTITRUST L.J.
127, 160 (2009).
79
Susan A. Creighton, D. Bruce Hoffman, Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Ernest A.
Nagata, Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975 (2005). See also Patricia Schultheiss &
William E. Cohen, Cheap Exclusion: Role and Limits (Jan. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/section2cheapexclusion.pdf. The concept
of cheap exclusion was developed in part as a guide to the enforcement agencies in
allocating investigative resources, and incorporated the expense of implementation on the
view that it would be related to the likelihood of uncovering anticompetitive exclusion.
80
See generally Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization:
The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 So. Cal. L. Rev. 733 (2012); cf. ANDREW I.
GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE:
CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 206 (2d ed. 2008) (plaintiffs
condemned without a comprehensive analysis of its effects on competition
if three elements are demonstrated: (a) an agreement among rivals,
81
(b)
certain facts suggesting the likelihood of harm to competition; and (c) the
absence of a plausible efficiency justification for the agreement at issue.
The second element may be satisfied by showing that the conduct falls in a
traditional per se category (price-fixing or market division),
82
by showing
that anticompetitive effect is intuitively obvious based on facial analysis of
the agreement,
83
or (with retrospective conduct) through actual effects
evidence demonstrating that competition has been harmed.
84

seek courts to truncate the rule oI reason review oI horizontal restraints in order 'to
condemn conduct without detailed analysis of market power and likely effects when the
conduct 'is Iacially objectionable or has actual adverse eIIects, and to do so when the
conduct 'would be in a traditional per se category but Ior plausible eIIiciencies, and on
review the eIIiciencies do not actually appear substantial). Courts may also consider
truncating the rule of reason review of horizontal restraints in order to exculpate conduct
when defendants collectively have a low market share. Id. at 206. In the context of
burden-shifting, however, this possibility would presumably be considered only after both
plaintiff and defendant have satisfied their initial burdens of production.
81
Application of Sherman Act 1 is predicated on proof of agreement; the rules
discussed in this paragraph govern the analysis of agreements among (horizontal)
competitors. The agreement element often goes undisputed, but if an agreement among
rivals must be inferred from circumstantial evidence, that element may be difficult to
assess. See generally Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price F ixing, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 343 (2011); Louis Kaplow, Di rect vs. Communications-Based Prohibitions
on Price-Fixing, J. L. ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1892095; Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1
Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic
Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143 (1993). Antitrust law could in theory condemn
collusive conduct on a truncated basis without proof of agreement among rivals if the other
elements of the truncated rule are present, but the limited experience with identifying
collusive effects from unilateral conduct after Ethyl and from vertical agreements after
GTE Sylvania and Leegin offers little guidance as to when or under what circumstances
courts would do so. See generally E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm`n,
729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (Ethyl); Cont`l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) (non-price restraints); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007) (resale price maintenance).
82
E.g., Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979) (horizontal price-fixing); Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990)
(horizontal market division). The Supreme Court has also recognized that a collusive
group boycott is tantamount to horizontal price-fixing. F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass`n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (SCTLA).
83
E.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C., 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ('II, based
upon economic learning and the experience of the market, it is obvious that a restraint of
trade likely impairs competition, then the restraint is presumed unlawIul .) (Iinding this
criterion satisfied by an agreement between joint venturers to restrain price cutting and
advertising with respect to products not part of the joint venture).
84
E.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla, 468 U.S 85 (1984); FTC v. Ind.
Fed`n oI Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). But cf. Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atlantic
This approach is typically implemented today through a burden-shifting
framework that has been developed by the lower courts in agreement cases
alleging collusive effects.
85
Plaintiff must satisfy an initial burden of
production by demonstrating likely harm to competition.
86
If plaintiff
makes a satisfactory initial showing, the burden of production shifts to
defendants to identify a plausible business justification. If defendant does
so, the plaintiff, on whom the burden of persuasion rests, must prove
unreasonableness by showing that the harm to competition is not dissipated
or eliminated by the benefit to competition,
87
or that defendant had a

Trading Co., 381 F. 3d 717, 737 (7
th
Cir. 2004) (Ind. Fedn of Dentists does not allow
plaintiff to dispense entirely with market definition by proffering actual effects evidence;
plaintiII must still show the 'rough contours oI a market and that deIendant commands a
substantial share). In a retrospective exclusion case, for example, proof that prices rose
after a rival was excluded might count as actual effects evidence. (Actual effects evidence
can be rebutted in this example, perhaps, with evidence that non-excluded firms
experienced an independent increase in marginal cost of sufficient magnitude to explain the
price increase.)
85
E.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C., 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Law v.
NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998). See generally Andrew I. Gavil, Moving
Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 SO.
CAL. L. REV. 733 (2012); Andrew I. Gavil, Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law, in ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 125, 145-48
(2008).
86
Plaintiff may meet this burden with any of the limited factual showings of harm to
competition that would provide a basis for truncated or quick look condemnation: that the
agreement falls in a traditional per se category, that harm is intuitively obvious, or that
harm has already occurred (actual effects evidence). Because the plaintiff also has the
option of proving unreasonableness through a comprehensive rule of reason review,
plaintiff can also satisfy its initial burden with a more detailed demonstration of harm to
competition based on an analysis of a wider range factors such as defendant market power
or the actual effects of the agreement as implemented in which case the plaintiII`s initial
burden of production would merge with its ultimate burden of persuasion. In practical
application under Sherman Act 1, most plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their initial burden.
Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV.
1265, 1293; Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (2009).
87
Courts routinely describe the unstructured reasonableness inquiry in terms of
balancing benefits and harms, but in practice they almost never actually balance. Michael
A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265;
Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16
GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (2009). Accordingly, following a suggestion of Prof. Andrew
Gavil, this article describes reasonableness review as evaluating whether the benefits
'dissipate or eliminate the harms rather than as 'balancing or 'weighing harms against
benefits. If a court were to permit efficiency benefits in one market to justify conduct that
harmed competition in a different market, however, it would be difficult to interpret that
process other than as balancing. Cf. U.S. Dep`t oI Justice & Fed. Trade Comm`n,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 10 n.14 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html ('The Agencies normally
practical less restrictive alternative for achieving the benefits with less harm
to competition.
88

The burden-shifting framework implies that the rule of reason review of
allegedly collusive horizontal agreements can be truncated relative to the
way a court would proceed under the comprehensive rule of reason in two
senses.
89
First, a plaintiff may satisfy its initial burden without undertaking
a detailed market analysis (which would require defining markets,
analyzing market shares, evaluating entry conditions, and the like), by
relying instead upon categorization of the agreement, facial analysis of the
agreement, or actual effects evidence. In addition, harm to competition may
be inferred from the limited showing required to satisIy plaintiII`s initial
burden combined with the absence of plausible efficiencies, without need
for further analysis.
The courts appear to be developing a structured approach for evaluating
anticompetitive exclusion similar to the approach they apply to evaluate
anticompetitive collusion. As with alleged collusive harms, allegations of
anticompetitive exclusion are generally tested under the rule of reason
across doctrinal categories.
90
Exclusive dealing allegations are evaluated
for their reasonableness, whether challenged under the Sherman Act or the
Clayton Act.
91
Vertical agreements, which could result in exclusion, are
reviewed under the rule of reason regardless of whether they involve price

assess competition in each relevant market affected by a merger independently . . . . In
some cases, however, the Agencies in their prosecutorial discretion will consider
efficiencies not strictly in the relevant market, but so inextricably linked with it that a
partial divestiture or other remedy could not feasibly eliminate the anticompetitive effect in
the relevant market without sacriIicing the eIIiciencies in the other market(s).).
88
For one court`s statement oI this Iramework, see Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010
(10th Cir. 1998); see also Gregory v. Fort Bridger Rendezvous Ass`n, 448 F.3d 1195, 1205
(10
th
Cir. 2006) (reaffirming Law framework). For a collection of cases, see ABA SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 62 n. 353 (7
th
ed. 2012).
89
This article uses the phrases 'comprehensive rule oI reason, 'unstructured rule oI
reason, and 'Iull blown rule oI reason interchangeably to refer to the type of wide-
ranging analysis undertaken in Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S.
231 (1918).
90
Many economic factors relevant to showing that exclusion and collusion have
harmed competition, discussed below in Sections III and IV, would be relevant when
applying the unstructured rule of reason, but are not all relevant if the reasonableness
review is truncated.
91
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 4445 (1984) (O`Connor, J,
concurring) (Sherman Act); Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th
Cir. 1997) (Clayton Act); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593
(1st Cir. 1993) (Sherman Act). See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing,
'Foreclosure,` and Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L. J. 311, 363 (2002) (exclusive
dealing analysis has been 'Ireed . to conIorm to more general analysis oI trade restraints
under the rule oI reason).
or non-price terms.
92
Tying and exclusionary group boycotts are evaluated
under the rule of reason if a per se rule does not apply.
93
The exclusionary
conduct element of the monopolization offense is reviewed in a burden-
shifting framework similar to the approach now applied to evaluate the
reasonableness of conduct under Sherman Act 1.
94

The courts have also arguably begun to develop an approach for
truncating the rule of reason review of exclusionary conduct across legal
categories, much as they have come to do with collusive horizontal
agreements. Synthesizing the leading cases, exclusionary conduct may be
found unreasonable today without a comprehensive analysis of the nature,
history, purpose, and actual or probable effect of the practice in the presence
of two additional elements: if the excluding firms have foreclosed
competition from all actual or potential rivals other than insignificant
competitors,
95
and if the exclusionary conduct lacks a plausible efficiency

92
Cont`l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (non-price restraints);
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (resale price
maintenance).
93
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29 (1984) (tying); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (tying); see Nw. Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 297 (1985) (exclusionary
group boycott); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003) (conduct
tantamount to exclusionary group boycott analyzed under the rule of reason).
94
Compare United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 5859 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
with Polygram Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C., 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005) and Law v. NCAA,
134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). Cf. United States v. Standard Oil. Co., 221 U.S. 1, 61-62
(1911) (the rule of reason applies to the analysis of conduct under both Sherman Act 1
and Sherman Act 2). The reasonableness analysis of monopolization is structured further
when price-cutting is the alleged exclusionary act, as predatory pricing requires proof of
below-cost pricing and an assessment of the price-cutter`s prospects Ior recouping the costs
of below-cost pricing through the later exercise of monopoly power. See Brooke Group
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (Robinson-Patman Act
decision applying Sherman Act principles). The recoupment inquiry can be understood as
assessing the profitability of the alleged anticompetitive strategy, and thus evaluating
whether the excluding Iirms can solve the third 'exclusion problem discussed below in
Section IV.
95
Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (a dominant
firm excludes its only competitor); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (exclusionary conduct protected the 'applications barrier to entry that insulated
the dominant firm from competition from current and potential rivals); United States v.
Dentsply Int`l., Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (dominant Iirm Ioreclosed its rivals from
access to dealers; while this exclusionary method did not cover two small rivals, which
sold directly to the ultimate customers, their alternative method of distribution was less
effective); see Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (dominant daily
newspaper excluded rival radio station from advertising market but did not exclude a
weekly newspaper). The Supreme Court and the district court appear to have treated the
small weekly newspaper as an insignificant market participant, in which case the
exclusionary conduct foreclosed only the sole significant rival, but these decisions could
justification.
96
Truncated condemnation on this basis appears possible
across most if not all of the disparate legal categories in which exclusionary
conduct allegations may be evaluated, including attempt to monopolize,
97

monopolization,
98
exclusionary group boycott,
99
non-price vertical
restraints,
100
and exclusive dealing.
101
Although this truncation approach

instead be read to have defined the market narrow to exclude that firm as a participant.
United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794, 796 -97 (N. D. Ohio 1950), affd, 342
U.S. 143 (1951). It is not necessary to identify with specificity every foreclosed rival to
determine that all such rivals were excluded. See Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company, and NBC Universal, Inc.
For Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, -- FCC Rcd. 39-43,
61 (2011), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/transaction/comcast-nbcu.html; cf. United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (inferring causal link between
deIendant`s anticompetitive conduct and maintenance oI its monopoly Irom the exclusion
of nascent competitive threats, but not identifying each excluded potential rival).
96
See Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms:
Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 27 (2004) (plaintiffs are most likely to
succeed in proving exclusionary violations under Sherman Act 2 when the harm to
competition or deIendant`s market power are obvious and defendant lacks a plausible
business justification); cf. United States v. Visa, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003) (government
prevailed by showing harm to competition and the absence of procompetitive benefits,
though the inquiry into competitive harm was wide-ranging). See also Mark S. Popofsky,
Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle
Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 Antitrust L.J. 435, 445 (2006) (the Microsoft framework for
evaluating exclusionary conduct under Sherman Act 2 'is virtually indistinguishable Irom
the test courts employ under Section 1`s rule oI reason).
97
See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (dominant daily
newspaper excluded rival radio station from advertising market). Neither the Supreme
Court nor the district court make clear whether advertising competition from a small
weekly newspaper in the same city was ruled out by defining the market to exclude that
firm as a participant in which case the exclusionary conduct at issue foreclosed
competition from all rivals or whether it treated that firm as an insignificant market
participant, in which case the exclusionary conduct foreclosed only the sole significant
rival. United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794, 796 -97 (N. D. Ohio 1950),
affd, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
98
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Aspen Skiing v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). Cf. Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting
Innovation Competition Though the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 496
(1999) (explaining that the Supreme Court had established a truncated legal rule finding a
violation of Sherman Act 2 when a monopolist excludes rivals by restricting a
complementary or collaborative relationship without an adequate business justification).
99
See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985) (remanding for review under legal rule creating the possibility of truncated
condemnation). The Stationers Court used the term 'per se rule, but, in contrast to the
traditional per se rules employed in the analysis of horizontal restraints, conditioned
application of its rule on up to three elements including defendant market power. See infra
note 111. For this reason, its approach is better thought of as describing a truncated or
structured inquiry. Accord, Toys 'R Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., 221 F.3d 928, 936 (7
th
Cir. 2000).
100
See Graphic Products Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983)
requires identiIication oI the excluding Iirms` rivals, doing so does not
undermine the benefits of truncation in reducing transactions costs and
providing guidance when market definition is not difficult,
102
and may not
fully undermine those benefits even if market definition is strongly
contested.
The case law establishing the truncated approach to reasonableness
review of exclusionary conduct does so more clearly in some legal
categories, particularly monopolization, than in others.
103
Many more
collusion cases have been condemned after truncated review than exclusion
cases, most likely because the enforcement agencies more frequently
challenge naked collusion than plain exclusion,
104
so the specifics of the
structured approach are less evident in the exclusion context than the
collusive one.
105
It is nevertheless evident that as the legal rules governing

(affirming jury verdict for plaintiff upon proof of defendant market power absent evidence
that the restraints were reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate business purpose); cf.
Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980) (unjustified exclusion condemned
without inquiry into defendant market power); Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution
Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 8 n.29
(2004) (Cont`l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), 'strongly implies that
if a plaintiff can demonstrate that its supplier possesses market power, the burden of
production should shiIt to the deIendant to justiIy its conduct). Although non-price
vertical restraints can be subject to truncated condemnation, rule of reason litigation of
such agreements almost always ends with defendant prevailing. HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 11.6b (4th
ed. 2011); Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic & Jonathan B. Baker, Sidebar 4-1:
Dealer Relations After Sylvania, in ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 369 (2d ed. 2008).
101
Cf. United States v. Dentsply Int`l., Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (exclusive
dealing conduct analyzed as monopolization).
102
Market definition appears to have been uncontroversial in a number of pro-plaintiff
exclusion decisions. E.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (the
mass dissemination of news and advertising, both of a local and national character, in
Lorain, Ohio); U.S. v. Dentsply Int`l., Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (sale oI
prefabricated artificial teeth in the United States); Conwood v. United States Tobacco, 290
F.3d 768 (6
th
Cir. 2002) (moist snuff in the U.S.). Cf. Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atlantic
Trading Co., 381 F. 3d 717, 737 (7
th
Cir. 2004) (the approximate magnitude of market
shares may be assessed aIter proving the 'rough contours oI a market). By contrast, the
second element in the truncated reasonableness review of collusive conduct does not
require market definition.
103
For this reason, the cases could be read as establishing a burden-shifting approach
to truncation only for the review of monopolization allegations, but that reading would be
inconsistent with the broad trend in antitrust elevating concepts over categories discussed
above in Section I.
104
Cf. infra notes 235-45 and accompanying text (discussing relative frequency of
exclusion and collusion cases).
105
Moreover, the small number of recent exclusion decisions consistent with the
synthesized rule does not mean that there is no such rule; it more likely shows that there are
exclusion and collusion evolve, they are converging on an approach that is
harsher on conduct lacking a plausible efficiency justification, regardless of
whether the anticompetitive effects are exclusionary or collusive thus
demonstrating that antitrust`s doctrinal rules evaluate collusion and
exclusion in a similar way, and do not tilt the scales to downplay exclusion.
The courts have not explicated as doctrine the synthesized rule for
truncating the reasonableness review of exclusionary conduct set forth
above.
106
In consequence, many questions about truncated condemnation of
exclusionary conduct remain open for future refinement, including the
following six.
107

First, if some rivals are not excluded, what showing is required to
demonstrate their competitive insignificance? As an economic matter, a
firm or firms would be insignificant for this purpose if, given the cost and
difficulty of output expansion, it or they would not increase sales
sufficiently to undermine the post-exclusion exercise of market power.
Courts that have treated non-excluded firms as insignificant have not
experienced difficulty concluding that they have high costs of output
expansion or low market shares,
108
but these factual determinations will not

fewer litigated exclusionary conduct claims than collusive conduct claims in the first place,
and that the conduct in such cases is less frequently justified by a plausible efficiency.
106
An earlier work by the present author described a truncated legal rule established by
the Supreme Court in two monopolization decisions: Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451 (1992). Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Though the
Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 496 (1999). Under that rule, Sherman Act
2 is violated when a monopolist excludes rivals by restricting a complementary or
collaborative relationship without an adequate business justification. This discussion
updates that prior analysis to reflect more recent precedent. Most importantly, a number of
questions about the elements of the rule that seemed open in 1999, id. at 503-505, have
been addressed through the analytical framework set forth in United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc). Moreover, the generality of the Microsoft
framework also suggests, contrary to the cautious interpretation of the cases offered in
1999, that truncation does not turn on the means of exclusion (that is, it would not be
limited to exclusionary conduct that takes the form of a restriction to a prior
complementary or collaborative relationship).
107
In addition, it is an open question whether truncated condemnation under the rule of
reason can be applied to exclusionary conduct undertaken by or associated with the
creation of joint research or production ventures, including voluntary standards
development organizations, as these types oI joint ventures 'shall be judged on the basis oI
its reasonableness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting competition.. 15
U.S.C. 4302.
108
A low market share may indicate competitive insignificance in this context because
small firms often have difficulty expanding output inexpensively, as would be the case if
they are small mainly for reasons other than aggressive competition by the excluding firms.
Even if production costs are low and do not increase with output, for example, the costs of
identifying and marketing to new customers often increase as output rises.
always be easy to make.
109
If competitive insignificance is not easily
determined, the truncated rule could lose its administrative advantage over
unstructured rule of reason review, leading a court to prefer not to decide
the matter before it on a quick look.
Second, can proof of excluding firm market power most likely
through showing that the excluding firm or firms collectively have a
substantial market share permit the inference that all significant rivals,
actual or potential, have been excluded or likely would be excluded from
evidence that one such rival has been excluded? That is, if the excluding
firms have market power and are able to foreclose one rival, is it reasonable
to presume they have the ability and incentive to foreclose all rivals? The
Federal Trade Commission answered this question in the affirmative in a
decision condemning an exclusionary group boycott.
110
If its answer is
generally accepted, truncated condemnation could be undertaken without
identifying every significant rival and proving that each been excluded or
likely would be excluded.
111
Instead, exclusionary conduct would be
condemned without full rule of reason review on a showing that one or
more rivals were excluded, the excluding firms possess market power and
the exclusionary conduct at issue had no plausible efficiency justification.
Third, in a prospective exclusion case, if the exclusionary conduct
forecloses all actual and potential rivals, and has no business justification,
can it be condemned without proof that the excluding firms previously had
market power particularly regardless of the excluding Iirm`s market
share?
112
The obvious logic of the inference created by the synthesized rule

109
See supra note 102 (providing examples from exclusionary conduct cases in which
courts did not find market definition difficult). Problems that arise in defining markets in
exclusion settings are discussed in Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical
Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 16673 (2007).
110
Toys 'R Us, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 415, 590-608 (1998), affd, 221 F.3d 928 (7
th
Cir.
2000). Moreover, if harm to competition can be inferred from proof of market power and
the absence of efficiencies, it is an open question what market share would be sufficient to
satisfy the rule. In Toys, the FTC applied the rule to a firm it found to have a market share
of more than 30% in the areas in which it did business and between 40% and 50% in many
cities. Id. at 597-99. The risk of a false positive in particular the risk of wrongly inferring
that non-excluded rivals would be unable to counteract the harm to competition by
collectively expanding output may be greater the lower the market share threshold.
111
Doing so could be consistent with the truncated condemnation approach described
in Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985),
which looks to exclusion, market power, and the absence of efficiencies. But it is hard to
be sure what Stationers requires because the Court did not clearly specify whether all three
of these elements must be satisfied in the event that a court chooses not to employ
comprehensive reasonableness review. In the wake of Stationers, the lower courts have
grappled inconclusively with the issue. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 492-93 (7th ed. 2012).
112
Market power in exclusion cases can also be demonstrated by actual effects
set forth above a firm clearly can exercise market power by excluding all
its rivals no matter how small its prior share implies that proof of pre-
existing market power should be unnecessary for truncated
condemnation.
113
Moreover, that outcome is consistent with the rule
governing attempted monopolization, which requires prooI oI a 'dangerous
probability of achieving monopoly power rather than pre-existing
monopoly power,
114
and the case law establishing that a monopoly obtained
through the fraudulent acquisition of a patent violates Sherman Act 2.
115

Given the historical importance of defendant market share in evaluating
allegations of anticompetitive exclusion outside of Sherman Act 2,
116

however, it is possible that a court could nevertheless require proof of
excluding firm market power before truncating its reasonableness review
when the case cannot be framed to fall under Section 2.
117

Fourth, is truncated condemnation available in a retrospective exclusion

evidence. E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 477
(1992) (market power may be inferred from direct evidence that prices rose and rivals were
excluded); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(alternative holding on monopoly power); ReMax Int`l v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995
(6
th
Cir. 1999); see Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs Inc., 385 F.3d 485, 500 (2d
Cir. 2004) (showing of adverse effects insufficient on the facts of the case); Tops Markets,
Inc. v. Quality Markets, Inc., 142 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998) (same).
113
'A Iirm that seeks to create a monopoly by dynamiting its competitor`s plants does
not need market power only a saboteur and a match. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 6.5 (4th ed. 2011).
114
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993). Market shares too low to
prove market power may be suIIicient to show 'dangerous probability. ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 323 (7th ed. 2012).
115
Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
To similar effect, suppose a firm that manipulates a standard-setting process through
deception to ensure that the standard incorporates its intellectual property, giving it the
potential to exercise market power by asserting intellectual property rights. This showing
combined with proof that the exclusionary conduct has no legitimate business justification
would likely be sufficient to prove harm to competition if there is no practical way to
compete without complying with the standard. See Rambus Inc. v. Fed Trade Comm`n,
522 F.2d 456 (2008) (no antitrust violation found because the proof of exclusion was
insufficient on the facts of the case). Cf. Note, Deception as an Antitrust Violation, 125
HARVARD L. REV. 1235, 1251 1254 (2011) (advocating rule permitting court to find
monopolization when a monopolist`s deceptive act was reasonably capable oI contributing
to monopoly power, and to find an agreement to deceive unreasonable if it creates a
significant anticompetitive effect).
116
See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 216
(7th ed. 2012) ('Since the early 1970s, judicial decisions |in exclusive dealing cases| have
established a virtual safe harbor for market foreclosure oI 20 percent or less).
117
Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, 'Foreclosure,` and Consumer Harm, 70
ANTITRUST L. J. 311, 365 (2002) (in the reasonableness analysis of exclusive dealing
within a burden-shifting framework allowing for truncated condemnation, plaintiff must
prove defendant market power to satisfy its initial burden).
case without proof of market power but with a showing of actual
anticompetitive effects? This approach would follow the logic of a quick
look methodology established in collusive agreement cases,
118
and it was
endorsed for anticompetitive exclusion by the Federal Trade
Commission,
119
but it has been questioned by the Seventh Circuit.
120

Fifth, how will the synthesized rule for truncating the reasonableness
review of exclusionary conduct be harmonized with the rules establishing
below-cost pricing and recoupment as elements of the predatory pricing
offense?
121
Truncated condemnation is unlikely to be available in such
cases because one or more of the many competitive justifications for low
prices would typically appear plausible,
122
rather than because these
elements are part of the offense. (On similar reasoning. truncated
condemnation is also unlikely to be available when the exclusionary
conduct involves the introduction of a (non-sham) product design
improvement.
123
) The open question that remains, which is almost surely
academic rather than having practical significance, is whether the below-
cost pricing and recoupment elements would prevent truncated
condemnation in a predatory case in the event no plausible justification is

118
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla, 468 U.S 85 (1984); FTC v. Ind.
Fed`n oI Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
119
Toys 'R Us, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 415, 608 (1998), affd, 221 F.3d 928 (7
th
Cir. 2000).
120
In Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atlantic Trading Co., 381 F. 3d 717, 737 (7
th
Cir.
2004), the Seventh Circuit declined to allow plaintiff to dispense with market definition by
proffering actual effects evidence in a vertical exclusion case. Although this position had
seemingly been rejected by the Supreme Court when previously adopted by the same
circuit court, FTC v. Ind. Fed`n oI Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), revg 745 F.2d 1124 (7
th

Cir. 1984), the appellate court in Republic Tobacco interpreted Indiana Federation of
Dentists as requiring plaintiII to show the 'rough contours oI a market and that deIendant
commands a substantial share. That Seventh Circuit took a different view Indiana
Federation of Dentists in an earlier exclusionary group boycott case not discussed in
Republic Tobacco. Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass`n, 895 F.2d 352, 360 (7
th
Cir. 1990) (alternative
holding).
121
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
122
See Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing after Brooke Group: An Economic
Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 587-89 (1994) (surveying procompetitive
explanations for prices that might appear to below costs). Cf. John E. Lopatka & William
H. Page, Obvious Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-
Chicago School and the Courts, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS 129 (Roger Van den Bergh, Roberto Pardolesi & Antonio Cucinotta, eds. 2002)
(courts tend to have sympathy for conduct conferring short run consumer benefits and
hostility for conduct conferring short run consumer harm, even when careful economic
analysis might support a decision otherwise).
123
Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group, 592 F.3d 991, 1000
(9
th
Cir 2010). See generally Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Anticompetitive Innovation
and the Quality of Invention, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2012).
proffered.
124

Sixth, what business justifications for exclusionary conduct are
cognizable?
125
For example, can defendants justify exclusionary conduct
on the ground that the opportunity to charge monopoly prices induces the
excluding firms to invest in developing or marketing innovative products or
production processes?
126
This argument would seem to be 'a deIense based
on the assumption that competition itselI is unreasonable, and thus ruled
out by the holding of National Society of Professional Engineers,
127
but
dicta in Trinko might appear to call that conclusion into question.
128

In a general sense, the truncated rule of law explicated above allows
condemnation of exclusion as anticompetitive without comprehensive
reasonableness upon a showing of three elements: (a) exclusionary
conduct, (b) facts suggesting the likelihood of harm to competition; and (c)
the absence of a plausible efficiency justification for the exclusionary
conduct. The second element would be satisfied by the exclusion of all
actual and potential rivals (other than insignificant ones); the open questions
raise the possibility that it may also be satisfied in other ways, particularly
excluding firm market power combined with the ability to foreclose at least
one rival, or actual anticompetitive effects.

124
The policy bases for applying special rules to analyze predatory pricing may be
questioned. One possible justification, the view that predatory pricing is extremely rare,
has arguably been undermined by recent economic studies providing examples of the
practice. E.g., Malcolm R. Burns, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of
Competitors, 94 J. POL. ECON. 266 (1986); Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills,
Predatory Pricing in the Airlines Industry: Spirit Airlines v. Nw. Airlines, in THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 219 (John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 5th ed. 2008);
David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Predation and Its Rate of Return: The Sugar
Industry, 1887-1914, 37 RAND J. ECON. 47 (2006); Fiona Scott Morton, Entry and
Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 679, 714
(1997); David F. Weiman & Richard C. Levin, Preying for Monopoly? The Case of
Southern Bell Telephone Company, 1894-1912, 102 J. POL. ECON. 103 (1994). Another
possible justification, the fear that mistakes by enforcers and courts could chill
precompetitive price-cutting, is discussed infra at notes 253-61 and accompanying text.
125
In addition to the congnizability issue highlighted in the text, other issues familiar
from other antitrust contexts may include the treatment of cost savings that benefit sellers
but are not passed through to buyers, and whether or when to count efficiencies that benefit
buyers in markets other than the market in which the harm to competition occurs.
126
To similar effect, one commentator raises the possibility that a monopolist`s
exclusion of rivals from access to one side of its two-sided platform could be justified by
its success in making the platform more effective at attracting buyers on the other side.
Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, 'Foreclosure,` and Consumer Harm, 70
ANTITRUST L. J. 311, 361 (2002) ('one can imagine a nonIrivolous (albeit weak) argument
on behalf of the Lorain Journal that the value of the newspaper as an advertising medium
might be diluted iI the same messages were available elsewhere).
127
Nat`l Soc`y oI ProI`l Eng`rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
128
Describing the truncated rule for exclusion this way emphasizes its
structural similarity to the truncated rule for horizontal restraints applied to
collusion, which, as previously discussed,
129
establishes a violation on a
showing of three similar general elements: (a) an agreement among rivals,
(b) facts suggesting the likelihood of harm to competition; and (c) the
absence of a plausible efficiency justification for the agreement. If these
predicates for quick look condemnation are not satisfied, moreover, the
conduct is subject to unstructured rule of reason review in each case. As a
Iormal matter, thereIore, antitrust`s doctrinal rules treat plain exclusion and
naked collusion comparably; they do not confer a more relaxed scrutiny on
exclusionary conduct.
The structured doctrinal rules for exclusion and collusion both require
the absence of a plausible efficiency justification as a predicate for
truncated condemnation. This formal parallel does not mean that
exclusionary conduct has been or should be condemned on truncated review
as frequently as collusive conduct. Indeed, plain exclusion appears in the
cases with less frequency than naked collusion, for reasons discussed below
in section V.
The truncated rules differ in their first two elements. Their initial
elements are obviously not the same: the exclusion rule is predicated on
exclusionary conduct while the collusion rule is predicated on collusive
conduct.
130
As will be examined in detail in section IV, moreover, the rules
also differ in their second element. The facts suggesting that the collusive
conduct is anticompetitive, such as price fixing or market division, differ
from the facts suggesting that the exclusionary conduct is anticompetitive,
such as excluding all actual or potential rivals. Yet, as section IV will
explain, this difference also does not undermine the formal parallelism
between the truncated rules. Rather, the second step operates similarly in
both contexts by obviating the need to demonstrate the specific mechanism
by which defendants solve the economic problems of making exclusion or
collusion work. Those mechanisms are described in the next section, which
identifies the economic relationship between exclusion and collusion.

III. THE ECONOMICS OF ANTICOMPETITIVE EXCLUSION

The harm to competition that arises from exclusion and collusion

129
Supra at text accompanying note 80-84.
130
The first step could have been stated more broadly and in economic language as
requiring coordinated conduct rather than the more narrow concept of agreement among
rivals, but, as discussed supra note 81, antitrust law has only limited experience in
identifying collusive effects from unilateral conduct or vertical agreements and the modern
case law as yet offers little guidance on how to do so.
can be understood within a common economic framework that emphasizes
the close economic relationship between the two means of obtaining,
maintaining or exercising market power. Because of that relationship, the
economic reasons for concern about anticompetitive collusion are equally
reasons for concern about anticompetitive exclusion providing an
economic basis for treating exclusion and collusion with comparable
priority as antitrust violations.

A. Voluntary and Involuntary Cartels

To see the economic relationship between exclusion and collusion as
means of exercising market power, consider a hypothetical soft drink
industry with three participants: Coke, Pepsi and Royal Crown (RC). One
can imagine these three rivals reaching an express or tacit (horizontal)
agreement to act collectively as though they were a monopolist, reducing
industry output in order to raise price above the competitive level.
131
This
outcome could be termed, Ior reasons that will become clear, a 'voluntary
cartel.
Suppose instead that RC does not want to participate in the
voluntary cartel. It would prefer to compete rather than to cooperate. In the
merger context, one might describe RC as a 'maverick and be concerned
that a merger of RC with Coke or Pepsi would lead to coordinated
competitive effects.
132
More generally, if RC would not go along
voluntarily with the cartel that Coke and Pepsi want to create, then Coke
and Pepsi could make it go along by raising RC`s costs or by making it
more difficult for RC to reach customers.
133
With higher costs of

131
This discussion adopts the convention common in the economics literature of
describing competitive harms in terms of increased prices and a reduction in output. This
framework encompasses reductions in product quality, which can be understood as
increases in the quality-adjusted price. It also accounts for reductions in the rate of
innovation, as conduct that reduces competition also tends to discourage innovation. See
generally Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 579 (2007); Carl Shapiro, Competition and
Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull's Eye?, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity
Revisited 361 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds. 2012).
132
Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated
Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135 (2002).
133
If RC is a prospective entrant, Coke may consider a broader range of exclusionary
strategies than would be available iI RC is an incumbent Iirm. In addition to raising RC`s
post-entry marginal costs of production and distribution, Coke could also make greater
sunk investments in order to enter or by credibly committing to increase the post-entry
competition that RC expects to face. See sources cited supra note 73. (The latter strategies
can still be interpreted as raising RC`s marginal costs on the view that a prospective
entrant`s marginal decision includes whether to enter, not just how much to produce
production or distribution, RC would be forced to cut back its output and
raise price, and so permit Coke and Pepsi to reduce their output and raise
their prices without fear that aggressive competition by RC would
undermine their collusive efforts. The upshot is that all three firms would
reduce output and raise price, similarly to what would happen if RC went
along voluntarily with Coke and Pepsi`s eIIorts to collude.
134
Because RC is
coerced into participating through the exclusionary conduct of Coke and
Pepsi, this outcome can be understood as an 'involuntary (or coerced)
cartel.
135

The 'involuntary cartel terminology is a less natural way of
describing the outcome if Coke is a dominant firm (no Pepsi) and RC is
forced to exit or deterred from entry, as anticompetitive exclusion under
such circumstances would result in the creation of a literal monopolist.
Even in this limiting case, though, the 'involuntary cartel terminology
appropriately captures the way the excluding firm forces the excluded rival
to do what a cartel participant does voluntarily: avoid aggressive
competition.
136
The terminology captures the common adverse economic
effect of collusion and exclusion, and focuses attention on it.
As the soft drink example demonstrates and the 'involuntary cartel
terminology highlights, exclusion and collusion are complementary
methods of obtaining market power.
137
It does not matter to buyers whether
the cartel is voluntary or involuntary; either way, the same firms

conditional on entry.)
134
The possibility that competition could be harmed through exclusionary conduct has
been well established in the economics literature for decades. E.g., Steven Salop & David
Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 19 (1987); Oliver Williamson,
Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry; The Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 Q. J. ECON. 85
(1968); Richard Nelson, Increased Rents from Increased Costs: A Paradox of Value
Theory, 65 J. POL. ECON. 357 (1957).
135
Alternatively, the collusive anticompetitve effects could be described as direct and
the exclusionary effects described as indirect. ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC &
JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 45-49 (2d ed. 2008)
136
The 'involuntary cartel terminology may mislead iI Coke is a dominant Iirm,
however, to the extent it (incorrectly) suggests that excluding Iirms must solve 'cartel
problems in order Ior exclusion to succeed in that case.
137
Cf. Aaron Edlin & Joseph Farrell, Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process
(Nat`l Bureau oI Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16818, 2011) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761581 (collusion and exclusion both harm competition by
hindering the process through which buyers and sellers undertake potentially beneficial
trades and thereby form improving coalitions); but cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H.
Lande & Steven C. Salop, Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO.
L.J. 241 (1987) (distinguishing 'Stiglerian (collusive) market power and 'Bainian
(exclusionary) market power).
collectively reduce output and the price that buyers pay increases.
138

Exclusion and collusion are also closely related in a second way: they
are often and naturally combined by firms exercising market power.
139

Colluding firms may need to exclude in order for their collusive
arrangement to succeed.
140
They may find it necessary to deter a cheating
member through exclusionary conduct, or to exclude fringe rivals or new
entrants in order to prevent new competition from undermining their
collusive arrangement.
141
A recent study of multiple cartels found that
many 'use|| exclusionary behavior oIten Ieatured in monopolization cases
to ensure the eIIectiveness oI |their| eIIorts to restrict output.
142
Similarly,
excluding firms may need to collude in order to successfully exclude,
143
or
to profit collectively from exclusionary conduct.
144

B. Exclusion and Economic Growth

138
In a homogeneous product market, therefore, harmful conduct could be identified
through a common simple metric, a reduction in industry output, regardless of whether the
practice is collusive or exclusionary.
139
This discussion illustrates the way exclusion and collusion permit the firms
participating in a market to exercise market power within that market. It does not address
the potential competitive consequences of monopoly leveraging (the possible exploitation
of market power in one market to create market power in another market), except insofar as
entry into a complementary market would facilitate entry into the market served by the
excluding or colluding firms, and the excluding or colluding firms can maintain their
market power in the primary market by foreclosing entry by new competitors seeking to
sell the complementary product.
140
See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 23547
(2d ed. 2008) (colluding Iirms must solve three 'cartel problems, which include
preventing new competition, for their arrangement to succeed).
141
See JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir.
1999) (Posner, C.J.) ('JTC, a maverick, was a threat to the cartel but only if it could find
a source oI supply . . . ); See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers and
Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 135, 188-97 (2002). Exclusionary conduct may be necessary for coordination
among rivals to succeed, regardless of whether the coordination itself can be challenged as
an illegal agreement.
142
Randal D. Heeb, William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx,
Cartels as TwoStage Mechanisms: Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm
Conduct, 19 CHI. J. INT`L L. 213, 217 (2009).
143
284 (1985) (alleging agreement among rivals to exclude a competitor). See also Scott
Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, YALE L.J. (forthcoming).
144
Cf. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993) (rejecting predatory pricing claim in part because facts did not support oligopoly
recoupment theory).
The parallel between voluntary and involuntary cartels provides an
economic basis for treating exclusion and collusion as comparably serious
antitrust offenses. Indeed, anticompetitive exclusion may be the more
important problem because of the particular threat exclusion poses to
economic growth. While collusion commonly prevents competition on only
some dimensions,
145
often only price, complete foreclosure necessarily
prevents competition on all dimensions, including innovation, and
exclusionary conduct falling short of complete foreclosure commonly
discourages competition across multiple dimensions.
When antitrust cases address the suppression of new technologies,
products, or business models, the disputes are almost always framed as
exclusionary conduct allegations.
146
For example, Microsoft was found to
have harmed competition in personal computer operating systems by
impeding the development of a new method by which applications software
could access operating systems, involving the combination oI Netscape`s
browser and Sun`s Java programming language.
147
The D.C. Circuit
explained that 'it would be inimical to the purpose oI the Sherman Act to
allow monopolists free reign to squash nascent, albeit unproven,
competitors at will particularly in industries marked by rapid
technological advance and Irequent paradigm shiIts.
148
Similarly, much of
the relief accepted by the Justice Department and the Federal
Communications Commission in their concurrent reviews oI Comcast`s
acquisition of NBC Universal programming aimed to protect the
development of nascent competition from a new technology, online video
distribution, and new business models that could threaten Comcast`s market

145
Cf. Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Cartel Policing Under Uncertainty: The U.S.
Steel Industry, 1933-1939, 32 J. L. & Econ. S47, S58 n. 31 (1989) (the iron and steel
industry`s collusive Code oI Fair Competition, devised by the industry during the Great
Depression and promulgated by the National Recovery Administration, exempted areas of
ongoing technical progress from its prohibition on the erection of new production
capacity).
146
But see United States v. Auto MIrs. Ass`n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969)
(consent decree settling allegations of conspiracy to suppress automotive pollution control
R&D); but cf. Michelle S. Goeree & Eric Helland, Do Research Joint Ventures Serve a
Collusive Function?, TWELFTH CEPR/JIE CONF. APPLIED INDUS. ORG. (2011), available at
http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/6/6691/papers/GoereeFinal-P.pdf (providing empirical
evidence that research joint ventures among rivals may facilitate collusion). For this
purpose, cases alleging conspiracies to exclude, as through group boycott or predatory
pricing, are counted as exclusionary. E.g., Fair Allocation System, Inc., 63 Fed. Reg.
43182 (FTC 1998) (consent order settling charges that automobile dealers conspired to
induce auto manufacturer to foreclosure rival dealer marketing on the Internet).
147
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
148
Id. at 79.
power in cable television.
149
Moreover, exclusionary conduct inhibiting
price competition may also harm innovation competition in the same
market, as with the 'exclusionary rules adopted by Master Card and Visa
to prevent member banks from issuing Amex or Discover Cards.
150

The anticompetitive exclusion of new technologies is not just a modern
problem. Six decades ago, the newspaper monopolist in Lorain Journal
impeded the entry of a rival using a new technology, radio.
151
Had the
newspaper succeeded, and other newspapers followed suit,
152
it is easy to
imagine that few radio stations in regions with a dominant newspaper would
have succeeded unless they were owned by the newspaper, slowing the
growth of the radio industry.
These prominent examples make clear that antitrust is an 'inclusive
economic institution that supports economic growth and prosperity by
preventing successful incumbent firms and industries from erecting barriers
to the entry of rivals with lower costs, superior production technologies or
better products.
153
The main innovation-related argument otherwise does

149
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Applications of Comcast Corporation, General
Electric Company, and NBC Universal, Inc. For Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer
Control of Licensees, -- FCC Rcd. (2011), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/transaction/comcast-nbcu.html; Competitive Impact Statement,
United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00106 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2011) available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.pdf. The transaction took the form of a
joint venture between Comcast and the previous owner of the programming, General
Electric, but was treated as an acquisition because Comcast controlled the joint venture and
had the option to buy out General Electric.
150
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding
district court findings that exclusionary conduct stunted price competition and denied
consumer access to products with new features, and that absent the exclusionary conduct,
price competition and innovation in services would be enhanced).
151
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
152
See Kansas City Star v. U.S., 240 F.2d 643 (1957) (news and advertising
monopolist owned multiple newspapers and radio and television broadcasting stations in
the Kansas City region).
153
See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail 38-40 (2012)
(contrasting the growth-promoting economic institutions in the U.S. with the growth-
inhibiting ones in Mexico by comparing Bill Gates, whose technologically innovative
company was prevented from abusing its monopoly by U.S. antitrust enforcers, with Carlos
Slim, whose company was conferred monopoly power and protected from competition by
Mexican government institutions). Acemoglu and Robinson attribute economic growth
and prosperity primarily to 'inclusive economic institutions that Iacilitate entry,
investment, and innovation and permit less efficient firms to be replaced by more efficient
ones, id. at 75-79, as opposed to 'extractive economic institutions that 'expropriate the
resources of the many, erect entry barriers, and suppress the functioning of markets so that
only a Iew beneIit. Id. at 81. In their view, inclusive economic institutions are typically
supported by 'inclusive political institutions that vest power in a broad coalition or
plurality of political groups rather than in a narrow elite. Id. at 80-81, 86-87. Accord
not question the benefits of economic growth, whether in individual
industries
154
or to society as a whole;
155
both skeptics and advocates of
antitrust intervention in exclusionary conduct settings such as
monopolization are concerned with the impact of competition policy on
growth.
156
Rather, those concerned about antitrust enforcement against
exclusionary conduct argue that it could discourage innovation by making it
less profitable.
Their economic point is that a greater prospect of post-innovation

STEPHEN L. PARENTE & EDWARD C. PRESCOTT, BARRIERS TO RICHES (2000) (attributing
differences in living standards across nations importantly to competition-reducing policies
within less developed countries, put into place to protect the interests of groups that benefit
from current ways of production, that prevent firms from adopting better production
methods). Cf. Edward L. Glaeser, The Political Risks of Fighting Market Failures:
Subversion, Populism and the Government Sponsored Enterprises 10 (Nat`l Bureau oI
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18112, 2012), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18112) ('II bargaining across Iirms is diIIicult, especially
when trying to arrange for large bribes, then competition will lead to less corruption risk
than monopoly).
154
At the level of individual industries, studies find substantial social gains from new
product introductions. For example, the welfare gain from the introduction of personal
computers has been estimated to equal 2% to 3% of consumption expenditure. Jeremy
Greenwood & Karen Kopecky, Measuring the Welfare Gain from Personal Computers,
ECON. INQUIRY (forthcoming). Compare Jerry A. Hausman, Valuation of New Goods
Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition, in THE ECONOMICS OF NEW GOODS 209
(Timothy F. Bresnahan & Robert J. Gordon, eds., 1996) (estimating substantial social
welfare gains from the introduction of a differentiated consumer product) with Timothy F.
Bresnahan, The Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios War: Valuing New Goods, Identifying Market
Power, and Economic Measurement (undated unpublished manuscript),
http://www.stanford.edu/~tbres/Unpublished_Papers/hausman%20recomment.pdf
(questioning Hausman`s methodology and conclusion, but not doubting the likelihood of
substantial benefits from new products in high-technology sectors). Moreover, other
studies find that the social return to innovation substantially exceeds the private return.
Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics of Technological Innovation, in TECHNOLOGY AND
GLOBAL INDUSTRY 311 (Bruce R. Guile & Harvey Brooks, eds., 1987); Jeffrey Bernstein
& M. Isaq Nadiri, Interindustry R&D Spillovers, Rates of Return, and Production in High-
Tech Industries, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 429 (1988); Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D
Spillovers, 94 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. S29 (Supp. 1992); Charles I. Jones & John C.
Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R&D, 113 Q. J. ECON. 1119 (1998).
155
See generally J. Bradford DeLong, Cornucopia: Increasing Wealth in the Twentieth
Century (2000), http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/tceh/2000/TCEH_2.html.
156
Compare David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise
of Monopoly Power and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, 4 COMPETITION
POL`Y INT`L 203 (2008) (arguing that antitrust pays excessive attention to the static harms
of monopoly pricing and insufficient attention to the dynamic benefits of dominant firm
innovation) with Jonathan B. Baker, 'Dvnamic Competition` Does Not Excuse
Monopolization, 4 COMPETITION POL`Y INT`L 243 (2008) (describing innovation benefits of
antitrust enforcement against monopolization).
competition could reduce the return to innovation.
157
But as an argument
against antitrust enforcement, it is incomplete because it does not recognize
the importance of competitive forces both pre-innovation product market
competition, and competition in innovation itself for fostering innovation
and economic growth.
158
The latter forces are likely the more important on
average.
159
As an argument against antitrust, the observation also does not
recognize the way antitrust enforcement can target industry settings and
categories of behavior where such enforcement can promote innovation.
160

Those settings include antitrust enforcement to foster product market
competition in 'winner-take-all or 'winner-take-most industries,
industries where the extent of future competition will be determined mainly
by developments in technology or regulation, and rapidly growing
industries
161
all features that frequently characterize high technology
sectors.
162
In short, antitrust enforcement against exclusionary conduct is

157
For example, in the model analyzed by Hylton and Lin, antitrust enforcement
against the exclusionary conduct of dominant firms benefits society by lowering post-
innovation consumer prices, but harms society by discouraging innovation. Keith N.
Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and
Changing Economic Conditions, 77 Antitrust L.J. 247 (2010). The model does not
incorporate the dynamic benefits of pre-innovation competition in providing an incentive to
innovate. See also Verizon Commc`ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 406 (2004) (the
prospect of monopoly induces risk-taking and innovation).
158
See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust
Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 579 (2007); Carl Shapiro, Competition and
Revisited 361 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds. 2012); cf. TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH:
THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 308 (2010) ('To grant any dominant
industrial actor the protection of the state, for whatever reason, is to arrest the
Schumpeterian dynamic by which innovation leads to growth, an outcome that is ultimately
never in the public interest.).
159
Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 583-87 (2007); Carl Shapiro, Competition and
Revisited 376-82 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds. 2012).
160
Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 589 (2007). Cf. Jonathan B. Baker, 'Dvnamic
Competition` Does Not Excuse Monopoli:ation, 4 COMPETITION POL`Y INT`L 243 (2008)
(describing innovation benefits of antitrust enforcement against monopolization).
161
Id. at 593-98. Policies increasing pre-innovation competition in these industries
such as monopolization cases or other antitrust enforcement actions are unlikely to make
much difference to the reward to successful innovation but can increase pre-innovation
competition in both product markets and in innovation, and thus increase incentives to
innovate.
162
Anticompetitive conduct, whether exclusionary or collusive, can occur in rapidly-
innovating high-technology industries, as illustrated by recent government enforcement
efforts involving information technology providers. E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (exclusion); In re Intel Corp., Docket No. 9342 (Fed`l Trade
important because it fosters economic growth and prosperity, not just
because it addresses harms to price competition similar to those attacked by
enforcement against collusive conduct.

IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXCLUSION AND COLLUSION

Notwithstanding the broad parallels between voluntary and
involuntary cartels, anticompetitive collusion and exclusion arise through
different mechanisms. This section is concerned with the differences
between these mechanisms.
As is well known, colluding firms must find a way to solve their
'cartel problems: reaching consensus on terms of coordination, deterring
cheating on those terms, and preventing new competition.
163
Section IV.A
below will show that excluding firms face the parallel challenge of finding a
way to solve three 'exclusion problems: identiIying an exclusionary
method, excluding sufficient rivals to harm competition, and ensuring that
the exclusionary conduct is profitable for each excluding firm. Section
IV.B looks in detail at the factors affecting excluding firms ability to solve
one of their problems, profitability, when they adopt one particular
exclusionary method, purchase of an exclusionary right. This is an
important exclusionary strategy, and the factors relevant to its profitability
have been the subject of recent economics scholarship not well known in
the antitrust context.
The methods that excluding or colluding firms exercising market
power adopt to achieve an anticompetitive end could be relevant to the
unstructured reasonableness analysis of that conduct under the antitrust
laws. The legal discussion in section IV.C, shows that the rules employed

Comm`n Oct. 29, 2010) (Decision and Order) (exclusion); United States v. Adobe Systems,
Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. March 17, 2011) (final judgment) (collusion); United
States v. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., No. CR 05-249 PJH DRAM (N.D. Cal. May 11,
2005) (plea agreement) (collusion).
163
See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST
LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 23547
(2d ed. 2008). These problems are connected with the Stiglerian deterrence perspective on
coordination (as refined by the economic literature on oligopoly supergames). See
Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly
Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 149-69 (1993)
(describing economics of coordination). They are not tied to the broader perspective on
coordination adopted by the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The Guidelines go
beyond the Stiglerian perspective by also recognizing as coordination 'parallel
accommodating conduct (high price outcomes that result Irom Iirm conduct that soItens
competition when firm strategies do not depend on history and rivals have accommodating
reactions). U.S. Dep`t oI Justice & Fed. Trade Comm`n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 7
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.
to truncate the review of exclusionary and collusive conduct, described
above in Section II, do so in analogous ways. In each case, truncation
obviates the need to demonstrate the specific mechanism defendants would
or did employ to solve the relevant exclusion or cartel problems. Again, the
formal structure of antitrust rules does not downplay anticompetitive
exclusion.

A. The Economics of 'Exclusion Problems`

For an exclusionary strategy to succeed, and thus for the excluding
firms successfully to create an involuntary cartel, the excluding firms must
solve three problems: identifying a practical method of exclusion,
excluding rivals sufficient to ensure that competition is harmed, and
ensuring profitability of their exclusionary strategy.
164
These three
problems method, sufficiency, and profitability may be termed
'exclusion problems,
165
by analogy to the 'cartel problems colluding
firms must solve in order for the coordinated arrangement to succeed.
First, the excluding firms must be able to identify a method of
partially or fully excluding some or all rivals.
166
The possible methods
include four economic mechanisms Ior raising rivals` marginal input costs
described by Professors Krattemaker and Salop.
167
First, excluding firms
may create a 'bottleneck
168
The excluding firms can do so by purchasing
exclusionary rights from a sufficient number of the lowest-cost suppliers to

164
These exclusion problems were identified by Professors Krattenmaker and Salop in
their seminal survey article on exclusionary conduct in antitrust. Thomas G. Krattenmaker
& Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion. Raising Rivals Costs to Achieve Power
Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). In that article, Krattenmaker and Salop refer to the
Iirst exclusion problem (method) as 'raising rivals` costs, to the second problem
(suIIiciency) as 'gaining power over price and to the third exclusion problem as
'proIitability, using the same term employed here. The three exclusion problems set forth
in the text also generalize the three conditions described as necessary for successful
exclusion through vertical agreement set forth in Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints
with Hori:ontal Consequences. Competitive Effects of 'Most-Favored-Customer`
Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 524 (1996) (explaining that the benefits of the strategy to
the firms undertaking it must exceed its costs (profitability), the excluding firms must not
cheat on each other (an aspect of sufficiency), and the excluded firm must be unable to
avoid the strategy (method)).
165
When there are multiple excluding Iirms, the Iirst and second 'exclusion problems
could require coordination among rivals, further illustrating the close connection between
collusion and exclusion. See Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, YALE L.J.
(Iorthcoming) (discussing the ways excluding Iirms solve their 'cartel problems).
166
Methods evaluated by the courts are surveyed informally in section II.A.
167
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
168
Id. at 234.
force excluded rivals to shift to higher cost suppliers or less efficient inputs.
The cost increase leads the excluded rivals to compete less aggressively
with the excluding firms. Second, excluding firms may engage in 'real
foreclosure.
169
Under this method, excluding firms purchase exclusionary
rights over a substantial fraction of the supply of a key input, and, by
withholding that supply, drive up the market price for the remainder of the
input still available to excluded rivals. Again, higher costs would lead the
excluded rivals to compete less aggressively. Third, the excluding firms
may act as a 'Cartel Ringmaster by inducing multiple suppliers of a key
input to sell to the excluded rivals only on disadvantageous terms, thereby
reducing competition from those rivals.
170
Fourth, the excluding firms may
create a 'Frankenstein Monster.
171
The excluding firms would do so by
purchasing exclusionary rights from a number of suppliers of the key input,
thereby increasing the likelihood that the remaining suppliers would
successfully collude, expressly or tacitly, to raise price to the excluded
rivals. With higher input prices, the excluded rivals would once again be led
to compete less aggressively.
The economic mechanisms by which excluding firms foreclose their
rivals could work through raising input prices (input foreclosure), but could
also operate by reducing rivals` access to the market (customer Ioreclosure).
For example, if the rivals benefit from scale economies and the excluding
firms adopt methods that foreclose the excluded rivals from access to low
cost distribution,

the excluding firms may raise their rivals` costs by
reducing their rivals` scale.
172
Indeed, any economic mechanism available
for input foreclosure is potentially available for customer foreclosure, and
vice versa.
173

If the excluded firms can inexpensively adopt counterstrategies to
avoid or evade the exclusionary conduct, the excluding firms will be unable
to solve the first exclusion problem, identifying an exclusionary method.
174

In the hypothetical soft drink example sketched in section III.A, if Coke and

169
Id. at 236.
170
Id. at 238.
171
Id. at 240.
172
If the excluded rivals must produce and sell at a reduced scale, they may have
higher marginal costs. If the excluded rivals can no longer achieve a minimum viable
scale, those rivals would be forced to exit.
173
Some conceptual gymnastics may be required to see the parallel. Consider, for
example, an industry with firms at three levels: input supply, manufacturing, and
distribution. Distribution may more naturally be seen as downstream of manufacturing, but
it would not be inappropriate to view it alternatively as a service purchased by the
manufacturer. Hence conduct excluding a rival from access to distribution could be viewed
as input foreclosure as well as customer foreclosure. See supra note 52 & infra note 192.
174
Krattenmaker and Salop analyze rivals` counterstrategies solely as a profitability
issue; here that issue is treated as also an aspect of the first exclusion problem.
Pepsi attempt to exclude RC by denying it access to bottlers, but RC can
instead obtain comparable distribution through beer distributors at little cost
penalty,
175
the exclusionary strategy would not be successful.
176
Moreover,
if the method of exclusion requires coordination between Coke and Pepsi,
the inquiry into method of exclusion would also include asking whether
those firms could successfully coordinate.
177

Second, the exclusionary conduct must be sufficient to harm
competition. This condition requires in part that the excluded firm matter
competitively; its exclusion must relax a competitive constraint on the
excluding firms.
178
In addition, it requires that any remaining competition
whether from rivals not excluded or not fully excluded, from entrants, or
from among the excluding firms themselves not undermine what the
relaxation of a competitive constraint has achieved for the excluding firms:
their ability to raise market prices. Accordingly, the excluding firms must
prevent their involuntary cartel from being undermined through
repositioning or output expansion by unexcluded rivals, by the entry of new

175
This counterstrategy would be unlikely to succeed unless beer distributors can
produce bottled products from concentrate.
176
Although customers may have an incentive to help the excluded firms avoid
foreclosure, see David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Buvers Strategies, Entrv Barriers,
and Competition, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 418 (1992), they need not be able or willing to do so.
Customers` ability to assist excluded Iirms in executing a counterstrategy is unlikely to be
greater than their ability to undermine a voluntary cartel by sponsoring entry. In a market
with many buyers, for example, no individual customer may have sufficient incentive to
sponsor entry: doing so would be costly and each would recognize that most of the
benefits would accrue to its rivals rather than itself.
177
With multiple excluding firms, the excluding firms may have difficulty committing
to their exclusionary method, as they may be unable to avoid the temptation to cheat on the
involuntary cartel they have created by foreclosing their excluded rivals. The analysis of
whether the excluding firms can successfully overcome this problem, an aspect of
sufficiency, would be similar to the analysis of whether the excluding firms would cheat on
the collusive arrangement that would have formed had the excluded firms joined the
excluding firms voluntarily. This issue would not arise if there is only a single excluding
firm, as would be the case if Coke was a dominant firm.
178
An excluded firm can constrain the excluding firms competitively even if it is not
as efficient as the excluding firms. For example, if the industry price is 18, the excluding
firms have marginal costs of 10, and the sole excluded firm has a marginal cost of 15,
competition would be harmed if the excluding firms are able to raise the price to 20 (say)
through foreclosure of the excluded firm, even though the excluded firm has a higher
marginal cost than the excluding firms. In this example, if the monopoly price is at least
20, it is evident that the exclusionary conduct would both raise price to consumers and
increase the allocative efficiency loss that arises when price exceeds marginal cost. If
foreclosure of an inefficient firm allows a lower cost firm to expand output in its place, as
may or may not occur, the resulting production cost savings would create a countervailing
benefit to aggregate welfare (although that benefit would not be cognizable if the welfare
criterion looks solely to consumers).
competitors, or by cheating among the excluding firms. In a prospective
exclusion case, the ability of excluding firms to solve the sufficiency
problem might be inferred from an analysis of market structure,
179
or from
past history of successful exclusion. In a retrospective exclusion case,
where market definition may be more difficult,
180
evidence of actual
competitive effects may also be available.
181

Finally, the exclusionary conduct must be profitable for each
excluding firm.
182
Each must reasonably expect the additional profits it will
obtain or maintain through the successful operation of an involuntary cartel
would exceed the costs it incurs in achieving that arrangement.
183
The costs
might include, for example, payments to sellers of complements that agree
to exclude rivals, forgone revenues from reducing price below what the
excluding firms might otherwise charge (e.g., if predatory pricing is alleged
as the exclusionary mechanism), or forgone profits on lost sales (e.g., if the
excluding firms refuse to deal with buyers that deal with a rival).
184

179
If the exclusionary conduct is undertaken by a dominant firm, for example, and the
dominant firm excludes all significant fringe rivals (those that are not capacity-constrained
or otherwise have a high cost of expansion) and entrants, the dominant firm would not face
any competitive threats. This simple economic idea underlies the truncated legal rule
governing exclusionary conduct discussed in Section II.B. The first three open questions
about the rule governing truncated condemnation of exclusionary conduct suggest some
ways of making this inference other than analyzing the consequences of excluding firm
conduct for each actual and potential rival individually. Supra notes 108-17 and
accompanying text.
180
See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 16973 (2007).
181
This possibility underlies the fourth open question about the truncated legal rule
governing exclusionary conduct. Supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
182
Krattenmaker and Salop`s notion oI proIitability includes an evaluation oI
efficiency justifications. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion. Raising Rivals Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 277-82
(1986). The analysis of efficiency justifications is potentially an aspect of evaluating the
profitability of the strategy, to the extent ancillary efficiencies reduce the costs and increase
the benefits of exclusion. But efficiencies also matter to the analysis of allegedly
anticompetitive exclusionary strategies as a possible means by which the excluding firms
would justify otherwise harmful conduct. The truncated rule governing exclusionary
conduct set forth in section IV.B requires the absence of a plausible efficiency justification,
and efficiencies are considered as part of a comprehensive reasonableness analysis (as
would be undertaken if the truncated rule does not apply).
183
When predatory pricing is the exclusionary instrument, this problem is termed
'recoupment because the excluding Iirms bear the cost oI exclusion beIore they earn the
rewards. The prospects for profitability may be challenging to demonstrate in a case that is
brought after the excluding firms have incurred costs of exclusion but before the profits
they may earn can be observed, as may occur with predatory pricing, but may be easier to
evaluate when the profits from exclusion arise coincident with the costs, as in many non-
price exclusion settings.
184
The costs may also include any expense associated with solving 'cartel problems
The cost of exclusion, and thus the profitability of anticompetitive
exclusionary conduct, depends upon the nature and scope of the method
used to exclude.
185
Exclusionary strategies need not be expensive.
186
A
dominant Iirm`s unilateral refusal to deal with suppliers that also supply an
entrant or fringe rival, for example, may not be costly if few or no suppliers
defect to dealing with the rival.
187
Exclusionary conduct with a strategic
component, as with commitment to tough competition or the purchase of an
exclusionary right, may require a more complex analysis of profitability
than needed to evaluate conduct involving direct harm to rivals or harm
through passive decisions. Even when it is expensive for the excluding
firms to foreclose their excluded rivals, the prospective monopoly profits
the excluding firms obtain from successfully obtaining or protecting market
power may be great enough to make the expenditure worthwhile.
188

B. Profitability of Purchasing an Exclusionary Right

The recent economics literature on exclusionary conduct has paid
particular attention to identifying conditions under which one particular
exclusionary method, the purchase of an exclusionary right, would be
profitable for the excluding firms thus explaining how the excluding firms
solve the third 'exclusion problem using this exclusionary strategy.
189

if multiple excluding firms must coordinate in order to exclude rivals or raise price once
that exclusion has occurred. Ancillary benefits to the excluding firms of pursuing
exclusionary conduct, such as efficiencies, could reduce the net costs of implementing the
method of exclusion.
185
When exclusion is coordinated, moreover, the costs and benefits of exclusion can
differ among the excluding firms. See Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke
Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 601-02 (1994) (one firm may
have borne a disproportionate fraction of the costs and earned the bulk of the benefits of an
alleged predatory pricing conspiracy among cigarette manufacturers).
186
See generally Susan A. Creighton, D. Bruce Hoffman, Thomas G. Krattenmaker &
Ernest A. Nagata, Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975 (2005).
187
See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
188
Cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 273-77 (1986) (the
rivals that benefit from an involuntary cartel may find it necessary to share their monopoly
profits with sophisticated input suppliers).
189
Other exclusionary methods, not discussed in detail here, may resemble the
purchase of an exclusionary right because they may also involve contracts or
understandings between the excluding firm and sellers of complements. These may
include 'most Iavored nations (MFN, or 'most Iavored customer) clauses, which can be
employed by dominant firms to ensure that fringe rivals and entrants cannot lower their
costs by obtaining lower prices from sellers of complements, and bundled (or loyalty)
discounts (or rebates) offered by manufacturers to dealers. To the extent these methods
operate like the purchase of an exclusionary right, the economic analysis in the text is
Because this literature is not well known in the antitrust context,
190
because
the analysis is complicated by the need to account for the interaction
between the excluding firms and the vertically-related firms (or other sellers
of complements) that agree not to deal with the excluded firms or otherwise
foreclose them, and because the purchase of an exclusionary right is an
important category of exclusionary strategies, these profitability conditions
will be described in some detail.
The analysis below follows the economics literature in assuming
that a dominant firm is engaged in the exclusionary conduct, thus putting
aside the possibility of multiple excluding firms. Suppose, for example,
that a hypothetical dominant soft drink producer a hypothetical Coke that
has acquired Pepsi seeks to create an involuntary cartel by excluding RC,
a potential entrant, through the purchase of an exclusionary right. Coke
may do so in at least two ways: by paying bottlers for exclusivity (that is,
paying bottlers not to bottle RC`s soIt drinks), or by paying supermarkets
Ior prime shelI space (that is, paying supermarkets not to display RC`s
products prominently).
191
These exclusionary tactics may raise RC`s
marginal costs directly,
192
or reduce RC`s post-entry profitability by

likely relevant to understanding their competitive implications. (In other settings, though
these practices may harm competition through means other than exclusion (including
facilitating collusion, dampening competition, or facilitating anticompetitive price
discrimination), or they may permit firms to achieve efficiencies.) Under some
circumstances, moreover, resale price maintenance agreements may exclude in a manner
similar to the purchase of an exclusionary right. John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac,
Exclusionary Minimum Resale Price Maintenance (NYU Working Paper, 2011) available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911714 (a resale price maintenance agreement between a
dominant manufacturer and its dealers can deter entry in manufacturing by providing a
mechanism by which the manufacturer shares profits from its upstream monopoly with the
dealers, thereby giving the dealers an incentive not to cooperate with the entrant),
190
But see MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 133-97
(2006) (surveying the economic literature on exclusionary vertical contracts, with attention
to antitrust applications).
191
Both methods could be thought of as input foreclosure strategies (with bottling as
an input for production and shelf space as an input for distribution). Both could also be
viewed as customer foreclosure strategies (to the extent prime shelf space helps attract
customers or distribution by bottlers is needed to service end of aisle displays in
supermarkets, which attract customers).
192
For example, exclusive contracting with bottlers could raise RC`s costs oI
distribution (in the event RC enters) by taking away the most cost-effective bottlers. If RC
nevertheless finds a few bottlers willing to distribute its products, moreover, those bottlers
may need to ship RC greater distances than the dominant firm ships its soft drinks.
Limiting RC`s access to bottlers could also prevent RC Irom reaching suIIicient scale to
cover its fixed costs or, if marginal cost declines with output, from obtaining sufficiently
low marginal costs to permit it to sell profitably at a price low enough to compete with
Coke. Exclusive contracts between Coke and the bottlers could also raise the sunk entry
investments RC must make by forcing RC to outbid the dominant firm in order to obtain
increasing the threat of post-entry competition.
193
In the latter case they
could still be understood as an exemplifying exclusion undertaken through
the purchase of an exclusionary right, but they could also be viewed as
falling into the third category of exclusionary methods in the typology of
section II.A, as a commitment to tough competition.
The purchase of an exclusionary right may be costly for the
dominant firm, as Coke must convince the bottlers or supermarkets not to
deal with RC, seemingly against their financial interest.
194
The profitability
of these methods of exclusion also turns on strategic considerations: the
views of the bottlers and supermarkets as to RC`s prospect Ior success and
as to the related ability of RC to outbid Coke in order to obtain bottling or
attractive shelf space.
195
These strategic considerations differentiate the
purchase of an exclusionary right from other methods of exclusion that also
constrain rivals` conduct.
To illustrate, suppose that the excluding firm adopts an input
foreclosure strategy. In particular, assume that a hypothetical dominant soft
drink producer, Coke, is negotiating with bottlers to exclude RC, while RC
is bargaining with the same firms to obtain bottling. In this setting, four
factors help determine whether the dominant firm or RC has the upper hand
in negotiating with the bottlers in Coke`s case, bargaining with bottlers Ior
exclusivity and in RC`s case negotiating with bottlers Ior a distribution
relationship and thus whether the exclusionary strategy will be profitable
for Coke.
196

bottling.
193
For example, if the dominant firm contracts with bottlers for exclusive distribution,
or if it contracts with supermarkets for prime shelf space, those relationships may give the
dominant firm a greater ability to cut prices and expand output should RC enter than it
would otherwise have possessed.
194
The dominant Iirm`s success in excluding RC would be expected to reduce the
aggregate level of soft drink bottling or supermarket sales relative to what would obtain if
RC were to enter successfully and create more soft drink industry competition. Fewer soft
drinks would be bottled and sold in aggregate, so the typical bottler or supermarket may
expect the anticompetitive exclusion of RC to reduce its sales. More generally, an
involuntary cartel will reduce output in order to raise price, thereby also reducing sales of
complementary products. Sellers of complements would, in consequence, generally not
benefit from the involuntary cartel unless the excluding firms pay them for their help in
foreclosing the excluded rivals by purchasing an exclusionary right.
195
II a bottler or supermarket expects RC`s entry eIIort to succeed, then the bottler or
supermarket may view dealing with RC as an attractive alternative to agreeing to
exclusivity with the dominant Iirm. The better the bottler or supermarket`s alternative to
contracting with the dominant firm, the more the dominant firm would have to offer to
convince it to sell an exclusionary right, and the greater the likelihood that this form of
exclusionary conduct would not be profitable for the dominant firm.
196
For expositional convenience, the discussion of one factor will make the alternative
assumption that Coke seeks to prevent entry by RC through contracting with supermarkets
One factor is the relative profitability of success to Coke and RC. If
Coke succeeds in its anticompetitive scheme (that is, iI RC`s entry attempt
fails), Coke would earn monopoly profits giving Coke the funds it needs
to compensate the bottlers for excluding RC.
197
If RC avoids exclusion and
its entry attempt succeeds, the profits it earns would give it the resources it
needs to compensate the bottlers Ior declining Coke`s oIIer to pay Ior
exclusivity. RC`s proIits Iollowing entry may be small after all, if RC
avoids exclusion, it would still have to compete with the dominant firm.
198

But RC`s proIits after successful entry could be large if it would be a more
efficient producer than the excluding firms,
199
if it can offer an attractive
new or improved product, or if it would reasonably expect that the dominant
firm would not compete aggressively in the event RC avoids exclusion.
200

Accordingly, if one firm, whether Coke or RC, anticipates greater profits if
its strategy succeeds, so has a substantial advantage in financing payments
to the bottlers while the other does not, that firm may be able to outbid the

for exclusivity.
197
Cf. JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir.
1999) (Posner, C.J.) ('II by reIusing to sell to mavericks the |suppliers| increase the proIits
of the [downstream] cartel, they create a fund out of which the cartel can compensate them,
in the form of a higher price for the purchase of the product, for their services to the
cartel.). Coke`s payments to the bottlers have the eIIect oI sharing the monopoly proIits
Coke earns from successful collusion with the bottlers. In consequence, the bottlers can
profit from the exclusionary conduct while soft drink consumers are harmed. See Timothy
J. Brennan, Getting Exclusion Cases Right: Intel and Beyond, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE
5-7, December 2011 (1), available at,
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/dec-11 (exclusionary conduct that
operates by suppressing competition in the market for a complementary product can profit
firms selling complements).
198
The excluding firms can spend some of their anticipated monopoly profits on the
means of securing their involuntary cartel, while similar funds may be unavailable to
excluded firms. After all, if excluded firms succeed in avoiding the foreclosure efforts of
the excluding firms, that success would likely mean that the excluded firm would earn
competitive profits (or at least more competitive profits), not monopoly profits.
199
RC may have an efficient production technology or business model that would
permit it to have lower marginal costs than Coke if it is able to establish itself as a market
participant. If so, RC could reasonably anticipate that its success in entering would give it
the resources it needs to outbid Coke for bottler services.
200
Cf. Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, Exclusive Dealing and Entry When Buyers
Compete, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 785 (2006) (if a successful entrant would be likely to take a
substantial fraction of the market from the dominant incumbent, distributors may see
greater beneIit in dealing with the entrant than they would iI the entrant`s prospects were
more limited). The extent of post-entry competition between a hypothetical dominant soft
drink producer and RC may depend on structural factors similar to those relevant to
assessing cartel stability. See generally ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC &
JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 24045 (2d ed. 2008).
other firm when negotiating with bottlers.
201

A second factor affecting whether it would be profitable for Coke to
purchase an exclusionary right is Coke`s ability to limit the scope and cost
of its investments in exclusion through careful targeting.
202
Suppose
(changing one aspect of the ongoing example), that Coke plans to exclude
RC by contracting for exclusivity with supermarkets rather than by
contracting with bottlers. Using this method, Coke may be able to raise
RC`s promotion costs suIIiciently to exclude RC through contractual
arrangements short of insisting that supermarkets deny RC access to their
shelves. It may be enough, for example, if Coke obtains the exclusive right
to promote soft drinks through end of aisle displays and week-long
manufacturer-funded price reductions; if so, Coke may be able to exclude
RC on the cheap making it more likely that Coke will succeed in prevent
RC`s entry.
203
Or Coke may be able to deter entry by RC simply by
negotiating an agreement with the supermarkets by which Coke commits to
match any promotional effort by RC, funding comparable price reductions
and end oI aisle displays to appear simultaneously with RC`s promotions.
204

201
Even if RC has substantial financial resources, however, its ability to convince
bottlers to distribute its products will also depend on the extent to which an individual RC
bottler would expect to share in the profits from RC entry. The more that competition
among RC`s bottlers would be expected to dissipate RC bottlers` proIits, the less interest a
bottler would have in Iacilitating RC`s entry by distributing RC. Hence, if the bottlers
expect that RC will allow aggressive competition among those bottlers that distribute for it,
each bottler may see little profit to be gained from choosing to bottle for RC rather than
accepting Coke`s request Ior exclusivity. MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 14849 (2006); John Simpson & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Naked
Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1305
(2007).
202
See Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Naked Exclusion: An Experimental
Study of Contracts with Externalities, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1850 (2009) (discrimination by
incumbent seller facilitates exclusion); Patrick DeGraba, Naked Exclusion by a Dominant
Supplier: Exclusive Contracting and Loyalty Discounts (FTC, Working Paper No. 306,
2010) available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp306.pdf (a dominant input
supplier can prevent a smaller rival from expanding by using exclusive contracts and price
discriminating based on an end user`s likelihood oI purchasing products made with the
rival`s input).
203
To similar effect, Alcoa apparently targeted entry by rival aluminum producers by
contracting with hydroelectric power producers to prevent the generators from supplying
electricity to other aluminum manufacturers. The contracts were targeted because they did
not preclude the power producers from selling electricity to firms producing other products.
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 422 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa)
(describing agreements addressed in a 1912 government antitrust enforcement action).
204
More broadly, if an excluding firm can commit to match any price reduction that an
excluded firm offers with a comparably low price, and can target that commitment so that it
only cuts price to those customers solicited by the excluded firm, the excluding firm may
be able to undermine the profitability of entry inexpensively, and in doing so reinforce the
Targeting may also be possible in the example in which Coke seeks to
prevent entry by RC through exclusive contracts with bottlers: Coke may
be able to deter RC at limited cost by contracting only with bottlers that
have substantial excess capacity, if those bottlers are the most likely to
accept a solicitation from RC.
The number of bottlers that RC must enlist for success also affects
the proIitability oI Coke`s strategy to prevent entry by contracting Ior
bottler exclusivity, though the significance of this factor turns importantly
on the extent to which each bottler`s decision whether or not to distribute
RC will aIIect other bottlers` decisions. Bottler decisions may be
interdependent, as each bottler`s agreement to distribute RC may make it
more likely that RC will convince enough other bottlers to distribute RC as
well, and in consequence make it more valuable for each undecided bottler
to agree to distribute RC.
205
Under such circumstances, each bottler`s
decision may depend on the bottler`s expectations about RC`s prospects Ior
success in signing up other bottlers. Each bottler would recognize that if
RC`s entry eIIort is unlikely to succeed, it would do better by contracting
for exclusivity with Coke even if it gets little or nothing for doing so
than by contracting with RC.
206
The critical role of bottler expectations in

entry-deterring consequences of its commitment by making that commitment credible. But
if the incumbent firm cannot commit to limited targeting in response to entry, and must
fight the entrant with an (expensive) across-the-board price reduction, then the incumbent
may not have a credible price-cutting strategy for deterring entry. Cf. MICHAEL E. PORTER,
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 500-01, 511 (1985) (recommending 'plac|ing| potential
challengers at a relative cost disadvantage by 'targeting price cuts on 'products that are
likely initial purchases by new buyers or by 'localizing the response to rival price cutting
'to particularly vulnerable buyers rather than across-the board to reduce the cost of the
response); BRUCE GREENWALD & JUDD KAHN, COMPETITION DEMYSTIFIED 231 (2005)
(recommending than an incumbent respond to entry by 'punish|ing| the newcomer as
severely as possible at the lowest possible cost to itselI); but cf. Judith R. Gelman &
Steven C. Salop, Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition, 14 Bell
J. Econ. 315, 316 n.2 (1983) (even small sunk expenditures may be sufficient to prevent
entry by serving as a credible commitment to post-entry competition across-the-board).
The author is grateful to Aaron Edlin for sharing his insights into the exclusionary potential
of price-matching by incumbent firms.
205
This discussion presumes, consistent with an assumption commonly adopted in the
economics literature, that a bottler`s decision to distribute RC conIers a positive externality
on other bottlers, as by making it more likely that RC`s entry would succeed. That
assumption may not always hold, however. In some settings, the decision by one bottler to
distribute RC would instead be expected to reduce the sales and profits available to nearby
bottlers, conIerring a negative externality that lessens the second bottler`s gains Irom
distributing RC.
206
If RC needs multiple bottlers to survive but each bottler thinks the other bottlers
will accept an exclusive deal with Coke, no bottler will break ranks to deal with RC even if
Coke pays nothing. AIter all, a bottler that expects RC`s entry attempt to Iail would not
want to ruin its relationship with Coke by contracting with RC. See Eric B. Rasmussen, J.
this dynamic means that the greater the number of bottlers that RC needs in
order to reach a viable scale, the less likely that any individual bottler will
expect RC to succeed and, thus, the more likely that each bottler will agree
to distribute Coke exclusively.
207

The relative ability of Coke and RC to make credible commitments
to the bottlers constitutes a Iourth Iactor aIIecting the proIitability oI Coke`s
exclusion strategy. In particular, Coke`s bargaining position in seeking
bottler exclusivity will be improved if it can commit to cut off bottlers that
distribute RC and to Iollow through regardless oI whether RC`s entry
turns out to be successful.
208
If Coke can convince the bottlers that they
must choose between it and RC, the bottlers may prefer to bottle soft drinks
for Coke, which has a large market share, rather than bottling for RC, which
has uncertain prospects for success even if Coke offers the bottlers little or
nothing in payment for exclusivity. But if the bottlers think that in the event
RC succeeds and they choose to bottle for RC, Coke would prefer not to cut
them off, then Coke will have to pay more for exclusivity, possibly making
it uneconomic Ior Coke to employ this strategy Ior deterring RC`s entry.
On the other hand, if RC can commit to limited entry, it may be able
to avoid provoking a response from Coke.
209
Suppose, for example, that
RC adopts a strategy of entering with canned soft drinks, not bottled, or a
strategy of distributing its product through drug stores, not supermarkets. If
Coke reasonably believes that RC will not seek to expand to bottled
products or supermarket distribution and thus not threaten most oI Coke`s
business, Coke may conclude that it is less costly to go along rather than
spend what would be required to prevent RC from succeeding. Under such
circumstances, entry by RC would succeed, though that entry would be
limited.
These four factors affect whether it would be profitable for Coke to
prevent entry by RC through contracting for bottler exclusivity. Coke
would face an additional difficulty if it seeks to convince the bottlers to
exclude RC through a tacit understanding rather than through a contract.

Mark Ramseyer & John S. Wiley, Jr., Naked Exclusion, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 921 (1986).
Although the pure 'naked exclusion model has two equilibria, one in which all bottlers
agree to exclusivity to Coke and one in which none do so, the exclusion equilibrium
dominates if Coke can convince even a small number of bottlers not to bottle for RC.
207
Eric B. Rasmussen, J. Mark Ramseyer & John S. Wiley, Jr., Naked Exclusion, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 921 (1986); Ilya R. Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Naked Exclusion:
Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 296 (2000).
208
Cf. Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic
Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 64042 (1999)
(discussing credibility of predatory threats by a dominant firm).
209
Judith R. Gelman & Steven C. Salop, Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and
Coupon Competition, 14 Bell J. Econ. 315 (1983).
Coke could not profitably subsidize the bottlers as an implicit quid pro quo
for exclusivity, perhaps by paying generously for bottling services, if the
bottlers would take the payment without remaining exclusive to Coke, and
instead also start bottling for RC. The bottlers may still stick with Coke,
however, if they fear that Coke would respond by cutting off the bottlers
from Coke products, and if that cost would be substantial.
210

These factors were considered by the Seventh Circuit, most implicitly,
in evaluating the plausibility of an alleged bid-rigging scheme in which the
defendant producers were said to have purchased an exclusionary right.
211

Under the alleged scheme, the producers contracted with suppliers of a key
input to refuse to sell that input to JTC and other maverick rivals that
otherwise would have cheated on the cartel. In overruling the district
court`s award oI summary judgment to deIendants, ChieI Judge Posner
addressed the first factor by explaining that the cartel profits could have
given the producers a fund with which to compensate the input suppliers.
212

The second factor was addressed implicitly, as the alleged exclusionary
conduct targeted only the maverick producers such as plaintiff JTC.
The opinion did not explicitly consider the third factor, whether the
cartel`s ability to convince the suppliers to exclude JTC and other maverick
producers would be defeated by suppliers that prefer to be mavericks
themselves, on the expectation that the cartel would not succeed so they
would profit more by selling to the maverick than accepting payment from
the cartel not to do so. But it implicitly did so by providing three possible
reasons why no supplier would act against the cartel`s wishes that way
(notwithstanding the small number of suppliers a factor that could tend to
make breaking ranks profitable): the cartel might be able to coerce the
suppliers by threatening to exercise monopsony power, the cartel`s
payments to the suppliers may have been too large to resist, and the
suppliers themselves may have colluded (as plaintiffs had alleged) so each
supplier`s individual decision not to sell to the maverick producers may also

210
Regardless oI whether Coke`s understanding with the bottlers is express or tacit,
moreover, Coke may be able to improve its odds of success if it can supplement its efforts
to convince the bottlers not to deal with RC with exclusionary strategies that do not involve
exclusive bottling, such as paying supermarkets for the best shelf space or refusing to deal
with supermarkets that carry RC.
211
JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Posner, C.J.). The terminology employed here highlights the vertical structure of the
exclusionary contracts but it may be confusing to a reader familiar with the opinion. In the
opinion, the Iirms described here as producers are termed 'applicators (they are road
contractors), and the Iirms described here as suppliers are termed 'producers (because
they produce asphalt for use by the applicators).
212
Id. at 778. There was no suggestion that the excluded firm would have higher
profits in a competitive market than the alleged cartelists would have obtained through
successful bid-rigging.
have been supported by the threat of punishments from the other
suppliers.
213
The court also did not explicitly consider the fourth factor, but
it implicitly addressed the credibility of cartel threats not to purchase from
suppliers that sell to JTC and other maverick producers by suggesting the
possibility that the colluding producers had coerced the suppliers.
The extended discussion of factors affecting the profitability of
exclusion through purchase of an exclusionary right highlights differences
between the analysis required to assess the ability of firms to solve their
exclusion problems (means, sufficiency, and profitability) and the analysis
required to determine whether firms can solve their cartel problems
(reaching consensus, deterring deviation, and preventing new competition).
The mechanisms by which firms achieve an involuntary cartel and a
voluntary one differ. But as will be seen in the next subsection, the legal
rules governing structured review of alleged exclusionary and collusive
conduct, limit the factors that a court must consider before truncated
condemnation in analogous ways providing additional support for the
conclusion that antitrust doctrine treats anticompetitive exclusion and
anticompetitive collusion as comparably serious offenses.

C. Exclusion Problems and Truncated Reasonableness Review

The structured rules that permit condemnation of exclusionary or
collusive, described above in section II.B, rely in part on limited factual
showings to prove harm to competition; this was the second element of each
approach.
214
In the collusion context, plaintiff may rely on facial analysis
or categorization of the agreement (as price-fixing or market division), or on
actual effects evidence.
215
In the exclusion context, plaintiff may rely on
evidence that all actual or potential rivals other than insignificant
competitors have been excluded, and some of the open questions ask
whether other limited forms of proof (such as actual effects evidence) could
be sufficient instead.
216

The two truncated rules limit the detail with which competitive effects
are analyzed. They may make it unnecessary to examine whether defendant
can or did solve each exclusion problem (in an exclusionary effects case) or
each cartel problem (in a collusive effects case), as would be relevant when

213
Id. at 777-79.
214
Before inferring harm to competition from these facts, courts also look for the
absence of a plausible efficiency justification for the exclusionary conduct or collusive
arrangement at issue.
215
Supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
216
evaluating the conduct under the comprehensive rule of reason.
217
Those
analyses may be relevant regardless of whether the review is prospective or
retrospective; in the latter case, it is possible to imagine a court finding
strong evidence that the firms could not achieve adverse competitive effects
more compelling than weak evidence of actual adverse effects, for example.
The truncated condemnation rule for exclusionary conduct infers harm
to competition from evidence that all actual or potential rivals other than
insignificant competitors have been excluded through conduct lacking
plausible efficiency justification. If these facts can be demonstrated, the
conduct can be found to harm competition by presuming (or inferring) the
profitability of the exclusionary method without specifically analyzing it.
Two of the open questions the possibility that proof of excluding firm
market power may permit the inference that all rivals are or likely would be
excluded from evidence that one has been excluded, and the possibility that
harm to competition could be shown through actual effects evidence in a
retrospective exclusion case raise the possibility of presuming (or
inferring) sufficiency, again without specifically analyzing it.
The import of truncation in the antitrust review of alleged
anticompetitive exclusion can be illustrated using the soft drink example.
Suppose that RC accuses Coke of harming competition by contracting with
many supermarket chains for the exclusive right to promote soft drinks
through end of aisle displays and week-long manufacturer-funded price
reductions.
218
A comprehensive reasonableness analysis of those

217
See, e.g., United States v. Visa, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003) (explicitly analyzing
the method of exclusion and its sufficiency, and implicitly analyzing its profitability by
recognizing that it protected excluding firm market power from erosion). A wide range of
other evidence could be relevant to determining under the comprehensive rule of reason
whether defendants in an exclusionary conduct have solved their exclusion problems. For
example, the availability of potential alternative sources of distribution to an excluded
manufacturer may bear on whether the plaintiff was substantially or insignificantly
excluded, as may the duration and costs of terminating the exclusivity agreements that limit
the excluded firm`s access to customers. The percentage oI the market Ioreclosed to the
excluded firm by the conduct at issue may be relevant to assessing the sufficiency of the
alleged exclusionary acts to create harm to competition. E.g., Omega Envtl., Inc. v.
Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1997); cf. NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co, 507 F.3d 442
(6
th
Cir. 2007) (excluded rival challenging dominant manuIacturer`s multi-year distribution
contracts with all major retailers lacked antitrust injury when the excluded rival was
formerly dominant, previously had exclusive distribution arrangements with most of the
leading retailers, and had an equal opportunity to compete for exclusivity with the new
dominant Iirm). The Iocus on 'coercion by the excluding Iirm in a recent appellate
decision can be understood either as an aspect of the inquiry into whether the plaintiff has
alternatives Ior avoiding exclusion (an inquiry into 'method) or as an aspect oI an inquiry
into whether the defendant had a legitimate business justification for the practice. Race
Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 77-79 (3d Cir. 2010).
218
For the purpose of explicating reasonableness analysis, it is immaterial whether the
agreements would likely ask a wide range of questions, such as the
following: Did these contracts in fact exclude RC?
219
Did the limitations
make much diIIerence to RC`s ability to promote and sell its products at the
supermarkets? Were other significant rivals, actual or potential, also
excluded? Was the exclusion of those rivals sufficient to confer (possibly
additional) market power on the excluding firm or allow it to maintain pre-
existing market power?
220
Did the price Coke paid the supermarkets for the
rights it obtained exceed the likely gains from the exercise of market
power? Did the exclusionary conduct confer efficiencies, as by allowing
Coke to promote its products more effectively?
221
After accounting for any
efficiencies, were consumers harmed?
A truncated reasonableness analysis of the same agreements between
Coke and supermarkets, consistent with how courts often approach
exclusionary conduct, could infer harm to competition with less evidence:
from proving that Coke excluded RC, a significant rival; that Coke has
excluded all other significant rivals (if any); and that the exclusivity
agreements had no plausible efficiency justification. This approach makes
it unnecessary for RC to proffer evidence that Coke solved one of the
exclusion problems, profitability; profitability is presumed or inferred. In
addition, and depending on the resolution of the open questions, truncation
could also simplify the showing RC must make to prove that Coke solved

conduct is challenged by the government or an excluded firm, or whether the case is
brought under Sherman Act 1 (as a vertical agreement), Sherman Act 2 (as
monopolization or an attempt to monopolize), Clayton Act 3 (as exclusive dealing), or
FTC Act 5. Cf. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 10.9 (4th ed. 2011) (exclusive dealing has been
condemned under several statutes).
219
For example, could RC reach customers as easily through convenience stores? Cf.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (exclusionary
conduct did not extend to less effective means of distribution).
220
If some significant rivals were not excluded, and those firms have the ability and
incentive to compete away the exercise of excluding firm market power, the limited
exclusion would not be sufficient to confer market power on the excluding firms.
221
John Woodbury suggests that the retailers could pass through to consumers the
payments they receive in exchange for excluding RC in the form of more or larger stores.
John Woodbury, Paper Trail : Working Papers and Recent Scholarship, ANTITRUST
SOURCE,5 n. 11, Apr. 2012, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr12_papertrail
_4_26f.authcheckdam.pdf (comment on working paper predecessor to this article). Such
efficiencies, if demonstrated, could largely benefit consumers of products other than soft
drinks, and, in consequence, may not be cognizable legally. Even if they would count,
their (net) magnitude would turn on the extent to which the incremental revenues from
selling an exclusionary right were used to benefit supermarket consumers rather than
shareholders and the extent to which the lost revenues to Coke harms consumers, as by
reducing Coke`s promotions of soft drinks or non-soft drink products.
another problem, sufficiency. For example, if Coke obviously has a
dominant position regardless of which market is defined among the
plausible alternatives, it may not be necessary for the plaintiff identify every
rival and show that it was excluded in fact, that it likely would be excluded
if not yet foreclosed,
222
or that it is not excluded but insignificant (unable to
undermine the possible exercise of market power through price cutting and
output expansion).
Whether exclusion or collusion is alleged, truncation of the
reasonableness review means that adverse competitive effects can be
inferred without showing why the anticompetitive mechanism worked
why it was profitable in both settings, perhaps why the method was
sufficient in an exclusion case, and how the firms deterred cheating and
prevented new competition in a collusion case. The specific methods by
which firms exercise market power differ across the settings, but the burden
on plaintiff is reduced in a similar way in each. Again the formal structure
of the truncated doctrinal rule does not treat exclusion differently from
collusion.

V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT JUSTIFY DOWNPLAYING
EXCLUSION

Although the rhetorical consensus for treating exclusion as a lesser
offense is commonly asserted without explicit justification, it has been
defended in the form of claims that false positives (convictions) are more
likely or more costly for exclusionary violations than for collusive ones,
while false negatives (acquittals) are less likely or less costly for exclusion
than collusion.
223
This framing adopts an 'error cost perspective to
evaluate antitrust rules, in which the best rule minimizes total social
costs.
224
This general approach toward evaluating legal rules has been

222
Under the comprehensive rule of reason, the analysis of whether other rivals likely
would be excluded could turn on the profitability of the exclusionary strategy to Coke. If
so, the inference could be understood as making it unnecessary for plaintiff to prove two
exclusion problems: sufficiency as well as profitability.
223
E.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Monopolization Standards, in
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 82, 102 (Keith N. Hylton, ed. 2010).
224
The relevant social costs are commonly described as the costs of false positives
and false negatives, along with the transactions costs associated with the use of the legal
process. See U.S. DEP`T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 15-18 (2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm (endorsing error cost
framework for the evaluation of section 2 standards) . Transactions costs include more than
the costs of litigation; they also include costs associated with information-gathering by the
institution specifying decision rules. C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision
employed by the Supreme Court in recent antitrust decisions.
225

In antitrust applications, the costs to society that need to be
considered extend beyond litigation costs and the consequences of
alternative decisions to the parties to a case; they also include the economy-
wide benefits (negative costs) of deterring harmful conduct and costs of
chilling beneficial conduct.
226
But it can be difficult to account for these
economy-wide effects within the error cost framework.
227
Moreover, when
deterrence and chilling effects are accounted for, substantive legal rules can
properly be compared on the basis of their error costs only conditional on
antitrust enforcement institutions such as rules governing burdens of
proof,
228
which can vary in impact across doctrinal categories,
229
and non-

Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999).
225
E.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007);
(explaining that per se rules may 'increase the total cost oI the antitrust system even when
they 'decrease administrative costs iI they 'prohibit|| procompetitive conduct the antitrust
laws should encourage or 'increase litigation costs by promoting Irivolous suits against
legitimate practices) (overruling rule oI per se illegality against vertical price restraints);
Verizon Commc`ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (describing a need to be 'very
cautious in Iinding an antitrust violation when a dominant Iirm unilaterally reIuses to
cooperate with a rival 'because oI the uncertain virtue oI Iorced inIormation sharing and
the diIIiculty oI identiIying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a single Iirm); id.
at 414 (expressing concern with the 'cost oI Ialse positives arising Irom the possibility
that 'generalist antitrust court would need to enIorce a complex statutory scheme in a
dynamic industry). Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 226 (1993) (stating that in predatory pricing cases, 'the costs oI an erroneous Iinding
oI liability are high, because oI the danger that Ialse convictions would chill
procompetitive price-cutting).
226
See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
223 (1993) (permitting predatory pricing enforcement based on above cost prices would
create 'intolerable risks oI chilling legitimate price-cutting); Allied Orthopedic
Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group, 592 F.3d 991, 1000 (9
th
Cir 2010) (courts
should not find monopolization when the alleged exclusionary act is a (non-sham) product
design improvement because of the danger of dampening technological innovation and the
difficulty of weighing uncertain future benefits against current competitive harms).
Deterrence considerations are particularly important in evaluating antitrust rules. See
generally Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27
(2003).
227
False positives and false negatives may not neatly map to over- and under-
deterrence, respectively, because the deterrence consequences of legal errors depend in part
on the way the errors affect the marginal costs and benefits to firms of taking precautions to
avoid violations. See generally Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Error, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS, http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0790book.pdf (last visited Jan. 29,
2012).
228
See generally Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738 (2012).
229
See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples
of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L. J. 1065 (1986)
(documenting the way the antitrust treble damages remedy has shaped substantive and
antitrust institutions, such as the scope of intellectual property rights.
Notwithstanding these conceptual and practical difficulties, this
section will discuss antitrust rules in terms of the familiar categories of false
positives and false negatives. In doing so, it will Iocus on today`s rules, as
the error costs oI the rules that prevailed beIore antitrust`s Chicago school
revolution
230
are not useful for understanding the balance of error costs
today.
231

Given the parallels in the economic analysis of collusion and
exclusion set forth above in section III, it would be difficult to sustain an
argument that voluntary cartels are bad but involuntary cartels are good.
Potentially collusive conduct, such as agreements among rivals, is not
inherently more suspicious competitively than potentially exclusionary
conduct, such as agreements for exclusive distribution or supply. Not
surprisingly, a wide range of agreements among rivals joint ventures,
trade association activity, standard setting, and the like are routinely
permitted to proceed with negligible antitrust scrutiny, just as many
exclusionary arrangements are routinely accepted.
The two leading and closely-related policy arguments offered for
downplaying exclusion relative to collusion rely instead on arguments about
the relative likelihood and magnitude of mistakes in the antitrust review of
collusive conduct compared with exclusionary conduct. The first is the

procedural antitrust law across doctrinal categories).
230
Cf. Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 Antitrust L J.
483, 519 (2006) ('Antitrust`s Chicago School revolution . successIul|ly| . reorient|ed|
antitrust doctrine to protect producers from enforcement practices and doctrinal rules that
might discourage procompetitive business conduct). The legal rules governing exclusion
will likely evolve to clarify the open questions concerning truncation set forth in Section
II.B, but they are unlikely to change to resemble the rules that applied before the courts
reformed antitrust doctrine in response to Chicago school criticisms.
231
For example, predatory pricing cannot be found today unless the predator`s prices
Iall below some measure oI the excluding Iirm`s costs. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). This predicate for liability lessens the
prior concern of commentators associated with the Chicago school that permitting plaintiffs
to bring antitrust claims arising from low prices would chill competition on price and thus
create false positives. The below-cost pricing requirement also risks false negatives. Cf.
United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10
th
Cir. 2003) (rejecting four methods of
measuring cost proposed by the Department of Justice). Thus, an error cost analysis of
predatory pricing rules would come out diIIerently today than it would during antitrust`s
structural era, before the introduction of the below-cost pricing requirement. Cf. Aaron
Edlin, Predatory Pricing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST
LAW (Einer Elhauge, ed. 2010) (surveying legal policy issues associated with predatory
pricing from an economic point of view); Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H.
Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239 (2000)
(same); Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic
Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (1994) (same).
supposition that it is harder to tell apart harmful and beneficial conduct
when exclusion is alleged, so enforcers and courts are more likely to make
errors in that setting.
232
The second is the view that false positives are more
dangerous when exclusion is alleged because they are more likely to chill
beneficial conduct like price-cutting and new product introductions, so it is
more important that enforcers and courts avoid errors in the exclusion
setting.
233
If errors are more frequent and more costly to society when
exclusionary conduct is alleged, this story goes, enforcers and courts should
be more cautious in challenging such conduct.
Although the observation that the enforcement agencies challenge
anticompetitive collusion more frequently than anticompetitive exclusion
may seem to follow from this perspective,
234
or even vindicate it, there is
actually no necessary relationship between the distribution of errors and
their costs and the the relative frequency of cases. Even if the allocation of
agency cases provides a reliable guide to the relative frequency of the two

232
See Frank H. Easterbrook, When is it Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for
Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 Colum Bus. L. Rev. 345, 345 ('competitive and exclusionary
conduct look alike); U.S. DEP`T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 13 (2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm ('oIten the same conduct
can both generate eIIiciencies and exclude competitors).
233
Frank H. Easterbrook, When is it Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for
Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 Colum Bus. L. Rev. 345, 347.
234
Cf. U.S. DEP`T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 5, 8 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf, withdrawn,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm (relying on the U.S
experience applying Section 2 to derive broad principles). The frequency of
anticompetitive collusion relative to harmful exclusion in court cases is also likely skewed
toward collusion, even though the frequency of court cases is likely driven by private
litigation rather than agency enforcement actions. Private attorneys general face a similar
cost-benefit calculus as the agencies in allocating their resources and many private cases
are follow-ons to government investigations. A study of the private treble damages cases
filed between 1973 and 1983 in five districts found substantially more raised horizontal
allegations (which tend to involve collusive conduct) than vertical allegations (which more
often involve exclusionary conduct). Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. Wright, Treble
Damages Reform: Implications of the Georgetown Project, 55 Antitrust L.J. 73, 74 (1986)
(finding that 52.8 percent of cases incorporated vertical allegations while 71.6 percent
incorporated horizontal allegations). Many cases included both horizontal and vertical
claims, consistent with the possibility that exclusionary conduct was part of a collusive
scheme (as can be the case even when the plaintiff is a rival). E.g., JTC Petroleum Co. v.
Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999). These statistics were not driven by
cases brought by stand-alone competitors, as they accounted for only 22.9% of the filings
in the sample. Id. The explanations and implications of the disparity in agency cases,
discussed below, would also likely apply to the interpretation of the relative frequency of
private cases.
types of competitive problems, the observed enforcement pattern does not
mean that errors in resolving antitrust allegations, whether false positives or
false negatives, are either more frequent or more costly in exclusion
settings. In order to evaluate the relative frequency and magnitude of
errors, as will be done in turn, it is nevertheless useful to begin by
examining why the agencies emphasize collusion over exclusion in case
selection.

1. Relative Frequency of Errors

To begin with frequency, the connection between the relative
number of collusion and exclusion challenges and the frequency of errors
depends on why the agencies bring more collusion cases than exclusion
cases. There are a number of possible explanations, including the following
four. First, the agencies may bring more collusion cases because the
antitrust laws have succeeded in deterring anticompetitive exclusion more
effectively than in deterring anticompetitive collusion. This could have
happened because collusion is more easily hidden from view, because
exclusion can more easily or reliably be achieved through conduct that
would not violate the antitrust laws (such as lobbying for governmentally-
created entry barriers
235
), or because firms with an incentive to avoid
antitrust liability can more easily prevent managers from harming
competition through exclusion than from doing so through collusion.
236

Second, the agencies may bring more collusion cases simply
because they have chosen to direct the bulk of their investigative resources
toward collusion rather than exclusion.
237
Since 1980, U.S. cases involving

235
See James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler & Todd J. Zywicki, Theory and Practice of
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005) (describing trends in
the FTC`s competition advocacy program, which questions proposed federal or state
legislation and regulations that threaten to impede competition). The Federal Trade
Commission has also emphasized the importance of construing the state action exemption
to the antitrust laws narrowly in order to discourage the manipulation of regulatory
processes for private rent-seeking. John T. Delacourt & Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and
State Action: Evolving Views on the Proper Role of Government, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1075
(2005).
236
See William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis 15-16 (Working
Paper 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061791.
237
Even if it were equally difficult to investigate and challenge exclusion and
collusion, one would expect to see more collusion cases simply because the agencies direct
more investigative resources in to that area. Cf. Susan A. Creighton, D. Bruce Hoffman,
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Ernest A. Nagata, Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975
(2005) (recommending retargeting investigative resources toward the types of exclusionary
conduct most likely to be observed, particularly inexpensive exclusionary acts that lack a
plausible efficiency justification).
horizontal restraints, a collusion-oriented doctrinal category, have been
brought with substantially greater frequency than cases in doctrinal
categories where exclusion is more likely to be found (monopolization and
vertical agreements).
238
The antitrust enforcement agencies may have
channeled their enforcement efforts away from exclusionary conduct either
for reasons of efficiency or reasons of principle. They may find it cost-
effective to focus their efforts on anticompetitive conduct that lacks a
plausible efficiency justification,
239
and when they do, they may discover
that naked collusion is more common than plain exclusion.
240
Or the U.S.
agencies may have chosen to target collusion cases because they believe
collusion should have a higher priority than exclusion.
241

Third, the relative counts of collusion and exclusion cases may
overstate the relative frequency of collusion because of the way the cases

238
See generally William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition
Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003). Including Robinson-Patman
violations as an exclusion category would not change this conclusion.
239
See Susan A. Creighton, D. Bruce Hoffman, Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Ernest A.
Nagata, Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975 (2005) (recommending that enforcers
target cheap exclusion); cf. Harry First, The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 127, 160-62 (2009) (recommending new remedial tools for attacking
monopolization through conduct lacking an efficiency justification).
240
Cf. Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, 'Foreclosure,` and Consumer
Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L. J. 311, 361 (2002) (in the context of vertical exclusive dealing,
exclusionary conduct lacking any plausible justiIication 'appears unusually rare). Even if
plain exclusion is no less common than naked collusion, moreover, antitrust cases
attacking plain exclusion may be less frequent if exclusionary conduct lacking any
plausible business justification is commonly attacked under non-antitrust statutes. A.
Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice,
and Refusals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247, 1249 (2005).
241
In recent years, the agencies may have begun to prioritize collusion in ways that go
beyond allocating enforcement resources. The agencies have targeted collusion for
increased penalties, greater international cooperation, and the increased use of leniency
programs to provide an incentive for colluding firms to come clean. Scott D. Hammond,
Deputy Assistant Att`y Gen., U.S. Dep`t oI Justice, The Evolution oI Criminal Antitrust
Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades (Feb. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.htm; Steven Labaton, The World Gets
Tough on Fixing Prices, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001. At the same time, they have debated
whether courts should relax the legal rule governing monopolization, which is almost
always an exclusionary offense, in order to raise the practical burden on plaintiffs. See
supra note 36. By contrast, European competition policy-makers tend to express greater
concern with exclusionary conduct. See, e.g,. Eleanor Fox & Daniel Crane, GLOBAL
ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW 123 (2010) (contrasting the European Union
(E.U.) test for predatory pricing with the 'very conservative approach oI U.S. courts); id.
at 130 (E.U. law is more likely to require that a dominant firm deal with its rival than U.S.
law); id. at 143 (noting 'a signiIicant divide between the U.S. and E.U. on using
competition policy to address margin squeezes by regulated firms); id. at 197 (the E.U. is
less permissive than U.S. law on vertical restraints).
are counted. The most plausible way this could happen is if mixed cases
cases in which firms both collude and exclude are not infrequent and are
routinely viewed solely as collusion cases.
242
Under such cirumstances, the
agencies may appear to be directing their enforcement efforts toward
collusion markedly more than they are doing in fact.
These three explanations greater deterrence of exclusion, more
enforcement resources aimed at collusion, and treating mixed cases solely
as collusion matters are collectively more likely than the fourth
possibility, which is implicitly accepted by those who favor the error cost
argument for downplaying collusion: that it is more difficult to distinguish
harmful from beneficial conduct in collusion settings than exclusion
settings. Yet only the fourth explanation tends to suggest that enforcers and
courts are more likely to make errors in resolving exclusion allegations than
collusion allegations.
It is hard to see why the difficulties identifying harm to competition
would be systematically greater in the exclusion setting than the collusion
one if the challenged conduct has no plausible efficiency justification in
each case that is, if we are thinking only about naked collusion and plain
exclusion. It is also hard to see why the difficulties identifying
anticompetitive practices would be greater in an exclusion setting for the
rest of the relevant universe that is, if the challenged conduct does have a
plausible efficiency justification in each case.
For example, to pick an exclusionary practice,
243
a manufacturer
requiring a retailer not to distribute rival manufacturers` products may
benefit primarily because the practice creates efficiencies (as by eliminating
double marginalization or otherwise aligning incentives between
manufacturer and retailer), or it may benefit the firm primarily because the
practice confers market power by excluding rival manufacturers from
access to low cost distribution. It may be difficult to distinguish between
these explanations. But it may equally be difficult to tell whether a retailing
joint venture between two manufacturers, to pick a collusive practice,
primarily benefits them by lowering production costs (as by generating
scale economies) or by conferring market power through a reduction in the
direct competition between them. It may also be difficult to tell whether an
agreement among rivals to exchange information (perhaps implemented
through their trade association) benefits competition by helping the firms
match production to costs and demand or harms competition by facilitating

242
Supra notes 42-47 & 139-44 and accompanying text.
243
Although is hard to be confident that any example would be representative, the
examples provided in this paragraph are sufficiently generalizable to make clear the
argument.
collusion, as by helping them detect cheating rapidly.
244

The casual but erroneous supposition that it is harder to distinguish
harms from efficiencies in the exclusion setting is likely the result of a
category mistake: comparing the difficulty of proving harm from naked
cartels, where there is no plausible efficiency, with the difficulty identifying
anticompetitive exclusionary practices when the conduct has a plausible
justification.
245
Naked cartels probably come first to mind as a collusive
practice given the frequency with which the enforcement agencies announce
such cases. But when thinking about exclusion, the top-of-mind
exclusionary practice is more likely a vertical contract with a plausible
efficiency justification, not an example of plain exclusion such as those
found to be violations in Lorain Journal or Microsoft. Antitrust analysis is
sometimes easy and sometimes difficult, but the difficulties in distinguish
harmful from beneficial conduct do no differ systematically between
collusion and exclusion settings. Accordingly, there is no reason to expect
more frequent enforcement and adjudicative errors in resolving exclusion
cases than in evaluating collusion cases.

2. Relative Cost of Errors

For the reasons set forth above, downplaying exclusion cannot be
justified based on the view that false positives are more common in the
exclusion setting. If a justification remains, it would instead have to be
based on a supposition that any errors that do occur are more costly when
exclusion is alleged than when collusion is alleged. Two primary
arguments have been offered for this latter supposition one based on
empirical studies and the other rooted in an analysis of institutional
competence but neither is convincing.

244
For case examples that suggest the difficulty of distinguishing harms to competition
and efficiencies when collusion is alleged, see, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.
(405 U.S. 596 (1972) (striking territorial restrictions on the marketing of private label
products distributed by a joint venture among supermarkets, some of which were
effectively horizontal rivals); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (reversing lower court decision finding a blanket licensing
agreement among rival copyright owners illegal per se); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 103
F.T.C.374 (1984) (approving joint production venture between rival automakers subject to
conditions).
245
Similarly, it would be inappropriate to make inferences about the relative harm
arising from exclusion and collusion by comparing the competitive harm from the typical
naked cartel to the competitive harm from the typical instance of exclusionary conduct,
whether plain or justified by an efficiency. See Aaron Edlin, Predatory Pricing, RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW (Einer Elhauge, ed. 2010)
('Presumably, it is true . . . that most price cuts are pro-competitive . . . . However, no
antitrust proposals attack all price cuts, so that sample is irrelevant.).
First, some commentators suggest that the many empirical studies
that have identified efficiencies and other competitive benefits from vertical
integration and vertical agreements show that anticompetitive consequences
of such practices are unlikely, so antitrust rules should favor defendants in
exclusionary conduct categories.
246
But these studies would be probative
only if they show that errors are more costly when exclusion is alleged than
when collusion is alleged, which they do not.
247
Many of the cited studies
do not discriminate between exclusionary and collusive explanations for
vertical agreements;
248
taken at face value, they would question the
prevalence of both explanations so cannot provide a basis for downplaying
exclusion relative to collusion.
249
Moreover, the business decisions
evaluated in these studies are commonly made under the shadow of the
antitrust laws. Because of the deterrent effect of antitrust enforcement, the
observed practices would be expected disproportionately to benefit

246
James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O`Brien & Michael G. Vita, Vertical
Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT`L J. INDUS. ORG. 639 (2005); Jeffrey
Church, Vertical Mergers, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY 1455, 149597 (2008); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and
Antitrust, 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 153, 161 n.23 (2010).
247
The studies also do not bear on the relative frequency of errors, so do not show that
false positives would be more frequent in exclusion cases than collusion cases.
248
Cf. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 89294
(2007) (discussing both collusive and exclusionary explanations for resale price
maintenance).
249
The prevention of free-riding can potentially justify both vertical and horizontal
agreements. Cont`l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical non-price
agreement); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985)
(horizontal market division agreement between potential rivals). 'Free-riding reIers to the
externality that arises when investments by one firm increase demand or reduce costs for
rivals, and the first firm is not compensated for providing this benefit. The elimination of
free-riding is frequently invoked to justify restrictions imposed by manufacturers on
distributors, where the manufacturer claims that absent the restrictions, the dealer would
not provide an appropriate level of services to customers or promotional investments. See
generally Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 3 J.L. & ECON.
86 (1960); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract
Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988); Benjamin Klein & Andres V.
Lerner, The Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-
Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 473 (2007). For other
examples of business justification defenses considered in antitrust cases, see HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE
5.2 (4th ed. 2011) (horizontal joint ventures); Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger
Analysis, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 53 (1994) (horizontal mergers); Mary Anne Mason & Janet
L. McDavid, Business Justification Defenses, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 2 ISSUES
IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1019 (2008) (monopolization cases); Michael Salinger,
Business Justification Defenses in Tying Cases, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 3
ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1911 (2008) (tying cases).
competition even if they have anticompetitive potential in other settings.
250

In consequence, empirical studies evaluating exclusionary conduct provide
little evidence of value regarding either the potential for those practices to
harm competition
251
or the likelihood that the particular instances selected
for enforcement in fact harm competition.
252

The other commonly-offered justification for the view that errors are
more costly when exclusion is alleged than when collusion is alleged turns
on a claim about the institutional competence of enforcers and courts. For
institutional competence to matter, enforcers and courts must make
systematically different (and worse) errors when evaluating exclusion cases
than in analyzing collusion cases. Because the main concern of those
arguing to downplay exclusion is that false positives will chill
procompetitive conduct, the issue turns on the relative incidence and
significance of judicial errors when the conduct under review has a
plausible efficiency justification. In the exclusion context, this includes
price-cutting and new product introductions conduct that at least in the
short run benefits consumers.
253
There is no reason to think that enforcers

250
Relatedly, the leading studies of vertical restraints may have examined competitive
effects primarily in relatively competitive markets, where those practices would not be
expected to harm competition, rather than in sectors in which firms exercise substantial
market power, where antitrust enforcement tends to be concentrated. Vincent Verouden,
Vertical Agreements: Motivation and Impact, in ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 2
ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1813, 1837 (2008). (Although defendants
commonly prevail in vertical restraint cases, those outcomes frequently result from lack of
proof of market power so they provide little guide to the likelihood that such conduct,
whether exclusionary or collusive, would be justified when defendants have market
power.) Furthermore, the prevalence of a practice in markets thought to perform
competitively at best establishes that the practice could be procompetitive. It does not
indicate whether the conduct could harm competition when employed by firms with market
power or whether anticompetitive uses have been deterred by the threat of antitrust
enforcement. Cf. Randal D. Heeb, William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M.
Marx, Cartels as TwoStage Mechanisms: Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm
Conduct, 19 CHI. J. INT`L L. 213, 229 (2009) (loyalty rebates, which in theory can under
some circumstances benefit competition and under other circumstances harm competition,
are sometimes used with cartels).
251
Empirical economic studies about the competitive effects of specific business
practices are generally more useful for evaluating conduct in industries similar to those
studied than for generalizing across industries to formulate legal rules. Jonathan B. Baker
& Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and
Measuring Market Power, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 1, 24-29 (Paolo
Buccirossi, ed., 2008).
252
By contrast, the many examples of anticompetitive conduct observed during periods
of lax antitrust enforcement suggest the benefits of antitrust. Jonathan B. Baker, The Case
for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2003).
253
Collusive conduct can also appear to benefit consumers in the short run. Examples
may include various practices facilitating coordination, such as the parallel adoption of
and courts will systematically fail to notice when defendants have a
plausible efficiency justification in exclusion cases, while recognizing that
possibility in collusion cases.
254
If, under such circumstances, outcomes are
systematically biased in favor of plaintiffs in exclusion cases but not in
collusion cases, that outcome would have to result from some aspect of the
decision-making process that differs across the two settings.
The most common institutional competence argument presumes that
exclusion cases are disproportionately prompted by the trumped up
complaints of inefficient rivals, losers in the marketplace, who seek to
overturn the market`s verdict in the courts directly as plaintiIIs or indirectly
by inducing enforcement agency suits. If so, and if, in addition,
complaining rivals bringing bad cases tend to have more influence over the
judicial process than the firms wrongly accused of anticompetitive
exclusionary conduct, then false positives would be more likely to arise in
exclusion cases than in collusion cases.
255
Under such circumstances,

simplified and common product definitions, the parallel adoption of price lists, or the
parallel adoption of guarantees to buyers that they will get the best price the seller gives
any buyer. Cf. Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the Electronic
Marketplace, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1996) (describing competitive problems that can arise
when rivals respond more quickly than customers to price announcements).
254
To similar effect, some claim that antitrust enforcement against exclusion is
problematic because it is difficult for courts to make the detailed factual assessments
required to determine whether firms can solve their exclusion problems or to compare the
harms from exclusionary conduct against the pro-competitive benefits. See, e.g., Geoffrey
A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and Antitrust 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 153, 157
(2010) (characterizing Easterbrook`s analysis as premised in part on the view that 'errors
of both types are inevitable, because distinguishing procompetive conduct from
anticompetitive conduct is an inherently diIIicult task in the single Iirm context). Yet iI
fact-finding is the problem with comprehensive reasonableness review of exclusion
allegations, it raises a comparable difficulty for collusion enforcement under the
comprehensive rule of reason, where a court must determine whether firms can solve their
collusion problems and whether the benefits to competition dissipate or eliminate the
harms. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 916-17
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulties of assessing whether the benefits of
resale price maintenance in preventing free riding outweigh the potential harm of
facilitating a dealer cartel, and the difficulties judges and juries may face in evaluating
market power).
255
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ROBERT E. LITAN & CARL J. SCHRAMM, GOOD
CAPITALISM, BAD CAPITALISM, AND THE ECONOMICS OF GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 819
(2007); cf. Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The
Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551 (1991) (a small minority of the 37 horizontal
restraints cases filed by competitor plaintiffs between 1973 and 1983 in five federal
districts alleging exclusionary practices seemed meritorious). If the courts do not weed out
false claims from competitors, moreover, even efficient rivals would be expected to bring
unwarranted exclusion claims in order to discourage hard competition from dominant
firms.
antitrust institutions would inappropriately tend to protect competitors
rather than competition in exclusion cases, but not so often in collusion
cases, consistent with what those making this institutional competence
argument contend.
256

This argument about institutional competence is unconvincing,
however, because there is no reason to think that the agencies and courts are
biased in favor of the victims of alleged exclusion,
257
or that unsuccessful
rivals can systematically convince the enforcement agencies and courts to
accept bad cases.
258
Even if unsuccessful rivals or terminated dealers
foresee the possibility of substantial gains from bringing a speculative (or
even trumped up) antitrust complaint, they must also consider the low
probability of success in determining the expected gain, and thus when
deciding whether to bring a case. After all, it is no more difficult for
enforcers and courts to understand the possible biases of rivals, and
discount their testimony appropriately, than for those decision-makers to
discount as necessary the testimony of alleged excluding firms and
customers.
259
More than most firms, moreover, defendants in exclusion
cases, particularly large firms accused of monopolization, tend to have the
ability to present an effective courtroom case, employing top quality legal
representation and economic experts and supporting them with a generous

256
Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (antitrust aims to protect
'competition, not competitors).
257
One commentator speculates without evidence that antitrust enforcers tend to
sympathize with smaller firms. D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private
Litigation in Antitrust as Business Strategy, 85 SO. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (text
at the end of section V.C). It is also possible that juries could systematically misinterpret
colorful evidence of defendant intent to crush rivals as indicating an aim to do so through
anticompetitive means (rather than by lowering costs and prices or introducing new or
better products), notwithstanding jury instructions making the relevant distinction. The
likelihood and magnitude of the possible prejudicial effect of such evidence on the
interpretation of aggressively competitive conduct close to the line is hard to assess, but if
it is important systematically, it is better addressed through rulings on the admissibility of
evidence in those cases where the problem may arise rather than through caution in
enforcing the antitrust laws against anticompetitive exclusion generally.
258
In addition, the antitrust injury requirement, introduced at the start oI antitrust`s
Chicago school revolution, limits the possible misuse of the antitrust laws in this way.
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
259
Cf. Staff Analysis and Findings, Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom
AG For Consent To Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, FCC WT
Docket No. 11-65 at 44-45 n.255 (Nov. 29, 2011), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-11-1955A2.pdf (describing interests
of merging firms and merger opponents and their possible alignment with the public
interest).
budget.
260
Large firm defendants in exclusion cases also tend to have the
resources to make an effective public relations case and mobilize political
support.
261

3. Other Error Cost Arguments

Other error cost arguments for prioritizing collusion over exclusion
are also unconvincing. Some suggest, consistent with Justice Scalia`s
Trinko dicta,
262
that false negatives are limited in antitrust cases because
markets are almost invariably self-correcting,
263
or that false positives are
particularly expensive to society because market power rather than
competition forms the primary spur to innovation.
264
Those controversial
claims should not be accepted.
265
Market power is often durable: economic
theory suggests many reasons why monopoly power would not be
transitory,
266
and the case law offers many examples of durable market

260
But see D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in
Antitrust as Business Strategy, 85 So. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (dominant firms do
not employ effective counterstrategies because they are prone to inertia, focused on
running their business, arrogant, and unsympathetic victims).
261
Another institutional competence argument concerns remedy. Exclusionary
violations are sometimes said to be difficult to remedy in rapidly-changing industries,
where dramatic changes in the marketplace are likely to occur between the date of violation
and the time a court determines liability and crafts relief. Even when remedies that would
restore competition in the market under review appear limited, however, remedies
providing general deterrence (such as fines and damages) remain available. United States
v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Cf. Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 416-32 (2011) (preferring fines to
injunctions as the sanction for collusion on general deterrence grounds).
262
263
E.g., Fred S. McChesney, Easterbrook on Errors, 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 11, 16
(2010); Fred S. McChesney, Talkin Bout Mv Antitrust Generation: Competition for and
in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1412 (2003); Keith N. Hylton, The
Law and Economics of Monopolization Standards, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS
82, 102 (Keith N. Hylton, ed. 2010); see Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright,
Innovation and Antitrust 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 153, 157 (2010) (claiming that
Easterbrook`s analysis is premised in part on the view that 'Ialse positives are more costly
than false negatives, because self-correction mechanisms mitigate the latter but not the
Iormer).
264
See David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of
Monopoly Power and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, COMPETITION POL`Y
INT`L at 203 (2008).
265
For a discussion of other arguments potentially related to the balance of error costs
in the context of monopolization enforcement, see Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving a
Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to
Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 61620 (2010).
266
See, e.g., see Ariel Ezrachi & David Gilo, Are Excessive Prices Really Self-
Correcting? 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 249 (2008) (supracompetitive prices only attract
power,
267
including in high-tech markets.
268
Moreover, the empirical
evidence indicates that the push of competition is generally more important
for innovation than the pull of monopoly.
269
Hence a focus on 'dynamic
competition does not justify exclusionary conduct such as
monopolization.
270
For the present discussion, though, the more important
point is that even if these suspect claims were accepted, they would not
justify the rhetorical consensus prioritizing collusion: they would be
reasons to oppose all antitrust enforcement, not to downgrade exclusion
relative to collusion.
Another error cost argument has been accepted by some U.S. courts
as a reason to allow a monopolist to make exclusive vertical agreements:
the claim that exclusionary practices cannot make matters worse (and thus
cannot harm competition) because there is a 'single monopoly proIit.
271

This possibility does not justify treating exclusion less seriously than
collusion, however, because the argument applies only in narrow
circumstances.
272
If the excluding firms have literally no fringe rivals and
face no potential entrants, and if there are no ways that buyers can substitute
away from the monopoly, then there would indeed be no way to increase
the rents from exercising market power through (further) exclusionary
conduct. Outside of such unusual facts, though, firms can potentially

entry efforts if they signal that the post-entry price would be high or that the incumbent
firms have high costs, and even then entry may not succeed in competing those prices
down to competitive levels); cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.
REV. 271, 289 (1987) ('Economies as an antitrust defense excepted, no one has provided a
demonstration that the cost differences are as Easterbrook indicates. Easterbrook has an
undischarged burden of proof that the cost of false positives in the market power region
where strategic behavior is implicated is similarly low.).
267
E.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
Dentsply Int`l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005).
268
E.g. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
269
See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust
Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (2007); Carl Shapiro, Competition and
Revisited 361 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds. 2012).
270
Jonathan B. Baker, 'Dvnamic Competition` Does Not Excuse Monopoli:ation, 4
COMPETITION POL`Y INT`L 243 (2008); cf. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S.
643, 649 (1980) (rejecting the argument that the potential for supracompetitive prices to
induce entry could justify horizontal price fixing).
271
E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2006); G.K.A.
Beverage Corp. v. Honickman, 55 F.3d 762, 767 (2d Cir. 1995); Town of Concord v. Bos.
Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23, 32 (1
st
Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.J.); see Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 3637 (1984) (O`Connor, J., concurring).
272
It is similarly possible that a horizontal agreement with no efficiency justification
would not harm competition because the horizontal rivals are already coordinating
perfectly. But this unlikely possibility does not justify downplaying the concern with
collusive conduct.
obtain, extend or maintain their market power through exclusionary conduct
that suppresses these forms of competition,
273
even if the excluded firms are
less efficient competitors than the excluding firms.
274

In sum, the policy (or error cost) arguments for downplaying
exclusion do not stand up to analysis, whether grounded in common ideas
about the difficulty distinguishing procompetitive conduct from
anticompetitive exclusion or in the more controversial arguments made in
Trinko. The close relationship between the ways by which exclusion and
collusion allow firms to exercise market power, and the convergence in the
legal rules governing exclusionary and collusive conduct, do not mislead.
Exclusion should not be treated as a less serious offense than collusion.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT

Exclusion should be recognized as a core concern of competition
policy along with collusion, and the common rhetorical convention that
treats anticompetitive exclusionary conduct as of lesser importance than

273
See generally Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic & Jonathan B. Baker,
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION
POLICY 41718 (2d ed. 2008) (example in which a monopolist manufacturer harms
competition by consolidating distribution in one dealer); id. at 86165 (example in which
single monopoly profit theory holds when downstream buyer uses monopolized product in
fixed proportions with other inputs but fails to hold when the product is used in flexible
proportions); id. at 81112 (example in which a monopolist achieves additional market
power through the exclusionary effect of tying). See also Timothy F. Bresnahan,
Monopolization and the Fading Dominant Firm, in COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS:
ADVANCES IN COMPETITION POLICY ENFORCEMENT IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 264
(Abel Mateus & Teresa Moreira, eds. 2010) (demonstrating that a dominant firm threatened
by rival innovation can profit by blocking those rivals, leading to the failure of the single
monopoly profit theory in the case of technologically dynamic industries). An incumbent
monopolist would also be unable to increase its market power through exclusion in an
unusual case in which it has sufficient bargaining power to permit efficient entry while
appropriating virtually all the rents. Cf. Phillipe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a
Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1987) (model in which the manufacturer and
distributor seek to allow efficient entry and extract all the rents the entrant creates, but
bargaining over splitting the surplus can break down when the parties have imperfect
inIormation). The economics literature has also considered the applicability oI the 'single
monopoly proIit argument in the context oI 'monopoly leveraging concerns outside the
scope of the present discussion. See generally Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on
Foreclosure, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2145, 218283 (Mark
Armstrong & Robert Porter, eds. 2007) (discussing models oI 'horizontal Ioreclosure); cf.
Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal
Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 62426 (1999) (distinguishing
between application oI the 'single monopoly proIit argument to monopoly leveraging
allegations and preserving monopoly allegations).
274
See supra note 179.
anticompetitive collusion should be resisted. Doing so could lead enforcers
to place a higher priority on challenging exclusion than they do today,
particularly aiming to prevent exclusionary conduct that forecloses potential
entry in markets subject to rapid technological change. It is particularly
important to reaffirm the innovation benefits of antitrust enforcement
against anticompetitive exclusion in high-tech markets in the wake of the
Trinko opinion`s nod toward monopoly power as a means oI encouraging
innovation,
275
which risks leading lower courts astray.
Recognizing exclusion as a core competition problem is unlikely to
lead courts to modify the substantive antitrust rules they employ to test
exclusionary conduct. Those rules are, in general, well-crafted to test the
reasonableness of firm conduct, whether the analysis is truncated or
comprehensive. Nor is rhetorical parity likely to affect the frequency with
which the courts address exclusionary conduct. Because the rules would
not change, it is unlikely that private plaintiffs, which account for the bulk
of antitrust litigation, would bring more exclusion cases (other than follow-
ons in the event government actions against exclusionary conduct
increase).
276
Government enforcers should treat exclusionary conduct as
comparable in priority with collusive conduct, but as a practical matter the
relative frequency of government cases alleging anticompetitive exclusion
would increase only to the extent the enforcement agencies shift resources
away from investigating and challenging anticompetitive collusion.
277
Even
if the agencies did so aggressively, budgetary and staffing limitations would
most likely permit the agencies to bring only a handful of additional
exclusion cases.
278

275
276
Neither the relative frequency of the underlying anticompetitive conduct nor the
tools available to enforcers and plaintiffs for identifying them would directly be affected if
exclusion is no longer described as a lesser antitrust offense. The number of exclusion
cases could even decline. To the extent firms today have been misled by the common
rhetoric, and incorrectly believe that anticompetitive exclusionary conduct would not
successfully be challenged, a rhetorical change of course could increase deterrence, reduce
the prevalence of such conduct, and, in consequence, reduce the frequency with which it is
challenged.
277
The frequency of government enforcement in various categories is surveyed in
William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement
Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003).
278
In recent years, the Justice Department has brought between two and five non-
merger civil actions annually and challenged twelve to twenty mergers during each of the
least five years (fiscal years 2007-11), ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP`T OF JUSTICE,
WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2002-2011, www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-
statistics.html, so has limited ability to increase the number of exclusion cases through
reallocation of civil resources. The Antitrust Division also filed between forty and ninety
criminal cases annually during these years. Because criminal exclusionary conduct cases
are likely to be rare even if exclusion is viewed as having equal priority as collusion, the
The major benefit of recognizing that exclusion is comparably important
as collusion would instead come from protecting the legitimacy of the
antitrust rules governing exclusionary conduct against pressure for
modifications that would limit enforcement inappropriately. Enforcers and
courts would not be misled by the contemporary consensus in antitrust
discourse to shy away from attacking anticompetitive exclusion in order to
focus their efforts on collusive conduct. A rhetorical shift may also
heighten the salience of the open questions in the formulation of the rules
governing truncated condemnation of anticompetitive exclusion,
279
and
thereby encourage the further development of the law in that area.
A shift in how exclusion is viewed could also matter for remedies, as it
may encourage the Justice Department to raise the penalties for
anticompetitive exclusionary conduct in appropriate cases through criminal
enforcement.
280
The Justice Department has the discretion to challenge
anticompetitive exclusionary conduct as a civil violation or to prosecute it
criminally, in the same way that the government has the discretion to attack
collusion civilly or criminally.
281
Criminal enforcement has been employed
to attack exclusion in the past, as with a monopolization case brought
against a dominant newspaper and its senior officials alleging exclusionary
conduct similar to the anticompetitive practices attacked in Lorain
Journal.
282
Today, however, criminal antitrust enforcement is directed at

Justice Department is unlikely to be able to increase its exclusionary conduct case count
substantially without shifting resources from criminal to civil investigations. The Federal
Trade Commission would similarly have only limited ability to increase the number of
exclusion cases through reallocation of resources.
279
See supra notes 108-28 and accompanying text.
280
The penalties could also be raised by awarding the government the ability to collect
civil fines for antitrust violations. Harry First, The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 127 (2009) (recommending that Congress enlarge government antitrust
remedies to include civil penalties, and that the enforcement agencies initially target the use
of those remedies to monopolization cases in which the exclusionary conduct had no
efficiency justification or in which the defendant engaged in a systemic effort to maintain
monopoly).
281
The Justice Department challenged the lysine cartel criminally, for example, but
brought a civil case when challenging price-fixing among the major airlines. Compare
United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645 (7
th
Cir. 2000) (upholding criminal convictions of
executives conspiring to fix lysine prices) with United States v. Airline TariII Publ`g Co.,
1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,687, (D.D.C. 1994) (final consent decree settling airline
price-fixing allegations).
282
Kansas City Star v. U.S., 240 F.2d 643 (1957). See also William E. Kovacic, The
Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The
Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 17 & n.44 (identifying three
criminal monopolization cases brought during the early 1960s); cf. United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 467 U.S. 1000 (9
th
Cir. 1972) (upholding criminal conviction of firms that
conspiring to boycott suppliers, though the group boycott was collusive rather than
cartel conduct,
283
consistent with the common description of exclusion as a
lesser offense.
If exclusion is viewed as central to antitrust, criminal prosecution would
no longer be reserved for collusive conduct. When applied to exclusionary
conduct, it would almost surely be directed at the most egregious cases of
plain exclusion, in much the way that the government now targets only the
most egregious naked cartels for indictment.
284
It would be easy to imagine
a criminal antitrust indictment (as well as other criminal charges) brought
against senior executives if, for example, a dominant firm harms
competition by destroying its key rival`s Iactory,
285
or a price-fixing cartel
engages in cooperative conduct to exclude an actual or potential rival that
threatened to destabilize their collusive arrangement. Just as the Justice
Department employs criminal cartel enforcement to attack clearly
reprehensible collusive conduct agreements among rivals concerning price
or dividing markets with no efficiency justification it would be expected
to reserve criminal exclusion enforcement for clearly reprehensible

exclusionary). Only a small fraction of antitrust cases prosecuted criminally have involved
exclusionary practices. Joseph C. Gallo, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Joseph L. Craycraft &
Charles J. Parker, Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study of Law and
Economics, 16 RESEARCH IN L. & ECON. 25, 28 (1994) (finding that thirty-three, or 2%, of
the 1522 criminal antitrust cases brought by the Justice Department between 1955 and
1993 involved exclusionary practices).
283
'In general, current |Antitrust| Division policy is to proceed by criminal
investigation and prosecution in cases involving horizontal, per se unlawful agreements
such as price Iixing, bid rigging, and customer and territorial allocations. . |C|ivil
prosecution is used with respect to other suspected antitrust violations .. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL III-20 (4th ed. Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/atrdivman.pdf. Accord, Thomas O.
Barnett, Criminal Enforcement of Antitrust Laws: The U.S. Model (Sept. 14, 2006),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/218336.htm ('the Division Iocuses
its criminal enforcement . . . narrowly on price fixing, bid-rigging, and market allocations,
as opposed to the rule of reason` or monopolization analyses used in civil antitrust law).
In the past, however, the Antitrust Division has indicated that criminal enforcement is
appropriate when predatory (exclusionary) conduct supports collusion. REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL`S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 350
(1955) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Stanley N. Barnes).
284
See generally Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion
in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1978); cf. William E. Kovacic,
The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
377, 41625 (2003) (describing the progressive evolution of the U.S. norm treating cartel
behavior as criminal conduct since the 1970s, and providing statistics concerning the
relative frequency of criminal (DOJ) and civil (FTC) enforcement against anticompetitive
horizontal agreements).
285
Cf. United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 298 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976)
(corporate president acquitted in criminal case alleging destruction of property; the Justice
Department also brought an unsuccessful attempt to monopolize case against the firm).
exclusionary conduct exclusion of all significant rivals through means
lacking any efficiency justification.
286
In both settings, therefore, the
Justice Department would limit criminal enforcement to only a subset of the
cases to which truncated condemnation applies. If plain exclusion is less
frequently observed than naked collusion,
287
criminal enforcement in
exclusion cases would be rare cartel cases would remain the mainstay of
the Justice Department`s criminal enIorcement eIIorts but that is not a
reason to avoid criminal sanctions in appropriate exclusionary conduct
cases.

CONCLUSION

Enforcers and commentators routinely describe anticompetitive
exclusion as a lesser offense than anticompetitive collusion. The absence of
rhetorical parity misleads because the two types of conduct harm
competition in similar ways and are treated comparably in the framing of
antitrust rules. Nor do policy considerations, whether or not framed in
'error cost terms, suggest downplaying exclusion relative to collusion in
antitrust enforcement.
The rhetorical relegation oI anticompetitive exclusion to antitrust`s
periphery must end. The more that exclusion is described as a lesser
offense, the more its legitimacy as a subject for antitrust enforcement will
be undermined and the greater the likelihood that antitrust rules will
eventually change to limit enforcement against anticompetitive foreclosure
when they should not. It is time to recognize that exclusion, like collusion,
is at the core of sound competition policy.

286
The moral condemnation and loss of liberty associated with criminal sanctions
would thus be limited to the perpetrators of serious anticompetitive conduct that firms and
their managers should have understood in advance would be subject to criminal
prosecution.
287
See supra notes 239-40 and associated text.

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