DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, rep. by REGIONAL DIRECTOR NASER M. MUSALI, Petitioner, vs. HON. HAKIM S.

ABDULWAHID, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. XII of Zamboanga City, and YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS, INC., Respondents. FACTS: Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Violations of R.A. Nos. 6657 and 3844 as amended, Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against Buenavista Yupangco Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (BYARBAI), the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5113 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12 of Zamboanga City. The DAR filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (a) Yupangcos causes of action were not within the jurisdiction of the RTC, (b) forum shopping, and (c) litis pendentia. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that Yupangcos action was within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19, Chapter II of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. DAR and BYARBAI filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit.DAR filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court with the CA, alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when DARs motion to dismiss was denied. The appellate court sustained the RTC, finding that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not the DARAB because Yupangco primarily sought the recovery and possession of the subject parcel of land. ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case. Ruling: It is the rule that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasijudicial office or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all of such reliefs. It is also settled that jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. Thus, if the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB. In the case at bar, the complaint filed by Yupangco seems at first blush to be within the jurisdiction of the RTC, as it has been

denominated as Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Violations of R.A. Nos. 6657 and 3844[,] as amended, Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. But as correctly pointed out by the DAR, the allegations of the complaint actually impugn the CARP coverage of the landholding involved and its redistribution to farmer beneficiaries.

Office (MAO) that the property was not prime agricultural property, and from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) that the subject land was not covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) or by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27. The certifications were sought so the land could be reclassified as industrial land. Meanwhile, the Municipal Council of Tagbong, Pili, Camarines Sur approved Resolution No. 67, which embodied Ordinance No. 28 and reclassified the land from agricultural to industrial. The Laynesas filed a complaint before the DARAB for threatened ejectment and legal redemption of the subject property. Pacita and her husband Paquito alleged that DARAB had no jurisdiction since the land had already been reclassified as industrial land. The DARAB ruled in favor of the Laynesas. The CA reversed and ruled that DARAB had no jurisdiction. According to the CA, the evidence on record shows that when the Laynesas filed their action with the DARAB, the property was no longer agricultural but had been reclassified. Thus, the DARAB had no jurisdiction. Issue Whether the reclassification of a lot by a municipal ordinance, without the Department of Agrarian Reforms (DARs) approval, suffices to oust the jurisdiction of the DARAB over a petition for legal redemption filed by the tenants NO Held Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657), the adjudication of agrarian reform disputes was placed under the jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR, through the DARAB, shall exercise quasi-judicial functions and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all disputes involving the enforcement and implementation of all agrarian reform laws. However, in 1991, RA 7160 or the Local Government Code was passed into law, granting local government units the power to reclassify land. Being a later law, RA 7160 shall govern in case of conflict between it and RA 6657, as to the issue of reclassification. Despite the reclassification of an agricultural land to non-agricultural land by a local government, the DARAB still retains jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a tenant of the land in question for threatened ejectment and redemption for the following reasons: (1) Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The case filed by the Layneses who were tenants of an agricultural land was for threatened ejectment and its redemption from respondents. It cannot be questioned that the averments of the DARAB case clearly pertain to an agrarian reform matter and involve the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. Such being the case, the complaint falls within the

Laynesa v. Uy, G.R. No. 149553, 29 February 2008 [Tenants filed a case of threatened ejectment and legal redemption against alleged owners of an agricultural land before the DARAB. While the case was pending, the local government passed a municipal resolution embodying an ordinance which reclassified the subject land from agricultural to industrial. The alleged owners of the land argued that DARAB had no jurisdiction since the subject land was already classified as industrial. Held: Despite the reclassification of an agricultural land to nonagricultural land by a local government, the DARAB still retains jurisdiction. DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Furthermore, Sec. 20(e) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code is unequivocal that nothing in said section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of RA 6657. As such, Sec. 50 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, on the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR has not been repealed by RA 7160. ] Facts Robert Morley was an owner of a parcel of land in Camarines Sur. Santos. A portion of the land was sold to Sixto Cuba Sr., while the remaining portion was leased to Santos Laynesa and his son Nicolas as tenants. When Cuba Sr. died, Santos and Nicolas continued as tenants, delivering the owners share of the produce to the children of Cuba Sr., namely Sixto Cuba Jr. and Bienvenido Cuba. Subsequently, Sixto Cuba Jr. executed a deed of absolute sale of unregistered land, transferring the property to Pacita Uy. Notably, the deed was not registered with the Register of Deeds. Later, Cuba, Jr. executed a deed of assignment of the undelivered owners share of the produce in favor of Pacita. Subsequently, Pacita demanded that the Laynesas vacate the land. She claimed that she had purchased the land. Thereafter, Pacita obtained a certification from the Municipal Agricultural

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jurisdiction of the DARAB. It bears stressing that the DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Primary jurisdiction means in case of seeming conflict between the jurisdictions of the DAR and regular courts, preference is vested with the DAR because of its expertise and experience in agrarian reform matters. Sec. 20(e) of RA 7160 is unequivocal that nothing in said section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of [RA] 6657. As such, Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on quasijudicial powers of the DAR has not been repealed by RA 7160.

In view of the foregoing reasons, we rule that the DARAB retains jurisdiction over disputes arising from agrarian reform matters even though the landowner or respondent interposes the defense of reclassification of the subject lot from agricultural to nonagricultural use. On the issue of whether there has been a valid reclassification of the subject lot to industrial land, we rule that respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to buttress their assertion that all the conditions and requirements have been satisfied. Landowners must understand that while RA 7160, the Local Government Code, granted local government units the power to reclassify agricultural land, the stringent requirements set forth in Sec. 30 of said Code must be strictly complied with. Such adherence to the legal prescriptions is found wanting in the case at bar.

January, 2000, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations, and with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one [Wilson A. Manzo] by then and there falsely representing that he has the power and capacity to recruit and employ persons in Saipan and could facilitate the necessary papers in connection therewith if given the necessary amount, and by means of deceit of similar import, when in truth and in fact, as the accused knew fully well his representation was false and fraudulent and designed to inveigle [Wilson A. Manzo] to give, as in fact the latter gave and delivered the amount of [P14,000.00] to him, which the accused misappropriated to himself, to the damage and prejudice of Wilson A. Manzo in the said amount of [P14,000.00]. Rogelio Cambay: Domingo recruited him for a painting job in Marianas Island for which he paid him the amount of P15,000 in two installments P2,500 during his medical examination at Newton Clinic in Makati City, and the balance of P12,500 before the scheduled departure on January 25, 2000. On his scheduled departure, appellant did not show up at their meeting place in Malolos, Bulacan, hence, the around one hundred people who waited for him organized a search party to look for him in Zambales. Appellant was arrested on February 25, 2000 at the Balintawak tollgate. Verification with the Department of Labor and Employment showed that appellant was not a licensed recruiter. Florentino Ondra: He was recruited by Domingo for employment as laborer in Saipan, for which he gave P14,700 representing expenses for passporting, NBI clearance, and medical examination. Dionisio Aguilar: In September, 1999, he met Domingo thru a friend whereupon he was interviewed, tested for a hotel job, and scheduled for medical examination. He gave P30,000 to Domingo inside the latters car on November, 1999 after his medical examination. While he was twice scheduled for departure, it did not materialize. Ma. Leah Vivas: After meeting Domingo thru Eddie Simbayan on October 19, 1999, she applied for a job as a domestic helper in Saipan, for which she paid appellant P10,000, but like the other complainants, she was never deployed. Simeon Cabigao: He was recruited by Domingo in September, 1999 for employment as carpenter in Saipan with a guaranteed salary of $375 per month. For the promised employment, he paid Domingo P3,000 for medical fee, and an additional P9,000, supposedly to bribe the examining physician because, per information of Domingo, he (Cabigao) was found to have an ailment. He was scheduled for departure on February 23, 2000, but the same never took place. He was among those who looked for appellant in Zambales. Cabigao later recanted this testimony, per his affidavit dated March 3, 2003. Testifying anew, this time for the defense, he averred that the one who actually recruited him and his cocomplainants and received their money was Danilo Gimeno

(Gimeno), and that they only agreed among themselves to file a case against appellant because Gimeno was nowhere to be found. Domingos Argument: Domingo, denying all the accusations against him, claimed as follows: He was a driver hired by the real recruiter, Gimeno, whom he met inside the Victory Liner Bus bound for Manila in September, 2000. It was Gimeno who undertakes recruitment activities in Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan at the residence of Eddie Simbayan, and that the other cases for illegal recruitment filed against him before other courts have all been dismissed. Domingo likewise presented as witnesses Enrico Espiritu and Roberto Castillo who corroborated his claim that it was Gimeno who actually recruited them, and that the filing of the complaint against appellant was a desperate attempt on their part to get even because Gimeno could not be located. Issue: Whether or not Domingo is guilty of Illegal Recruitment despite that there is no evidence showing that he actually received money from complainants. Held: Yes, Domingo is guilty of Illegal Recruitment. The term recruitment and placement is defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines as follows: (b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the other hand, Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, under which the accused stands charged, provides: Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article. (b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any recruitment activities to be undertaken by nonlicensee or non-holder of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39

People vs Domingo (2009) G.R. 181475 Facts: In or about the month of November 1999 to January 20, 2000, in the Municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, Domingo, being a non-licensee or non-holder of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and/or place workers under local or overseas employment, did then and there willfully and feloniously, with false pretenses, undertake illegal recruitment, placement or deployment of Wilson A. Manzo, and 22 other individuals. This offense involved economic sabotage, as it was committed in large scale. The Informations for 23 counts of Estafa, all of which were similarly worded but varying with respect to the name of each complainant and the amount which each purportedly gave to Domingo. That in or about the month of November, 1999 to

of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution must prove three essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he/she did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) he/she committed the prohibited practice against three or more persons individually or as a group. No receipt or document in which appellant acknowledged receipt of money for the promised jobs was adduced in evidence does not free him of liability. For even if at the time appellant was promising employment no cash was given to him, he is still considered as having been engaged in recruitment activities, since Article 13(b) of the Labor Code states that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It suffices that appellant promised or offered employment for a fee to the complaining witnesses to warrant his conviction for illegal recruitment.

resulted. Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such documents came into petitioners hands at some point, respondents should have provided evidence of petitioners functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. There was, therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting petitioners to the alleged tampering of shipping documents. The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to petitioners because it was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or access to these documents. Unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated otherwise, impartial tribunals should not rely only on the statement of the employer that it has lost confidence in its employee. -No. Respondents illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer's decision to dismiss the employee. - Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and served notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. - Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that the so-called standards of due process outlined therein shall be observed "substantially," not strictly. This is recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process. An employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause provided by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days, after which the employee shall either be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period. In this case, petitioners contended that they were not paid during the two 15-day extensions, or a total of 30 days, of their preventive suspension. Respondents failed to adduce evidence to the contrary. Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that the employee is entitled to

reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement. In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible because of the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution. Fourteen years have transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To order reinstatement at this juncture will no longer serve any prudent or practical purpose.

Becmen v. Cuaresma FACTS: These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 finding White Falcon Services, Inc. and Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. solidarily liable to indemnify spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma the amount of US$4,686.73 in actual damages with interest. On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.[2] (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month. Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning. Jasmins body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by the KSA examining physician. On March 11, 1999, Jasmins remains were exhumed and examined by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for nonvolatile, metallic poison and insecticides On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmins death.[8] In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmins death was work-related, having occurred at the employers premises that under Jasmins contract with Becmen, she is entitled to iqama insurance coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary of US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the remaining years of her productive

Perez v. PT&T, GR 152048, April 7, 2009 Facts: - Perez and Doria were employed by PT&T as shipping clerk and supervisor, respectively. Pursuant to an unsigned letter, investigations were commenced by the company, yielding findings that hipping Section jacked up the value of the freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition. Petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days. The 15-day suspension was extended twice. A memorandum was issued charging criminal charges against petitioners and mandating their dismissal for falsification of documents. Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. - Labor Arbiter: found that the 30-day extension of petitioners suspension and their subsequent dismissal were both illegal. - NLRC: Reversed. CA: Affirmed NLRC Issues: 1. Was there just cause for dismissal? 2. Was due process observed? 3. Is a hearing (or conference) mandatory in cases involving the dismissal of an employee? 4. Were petitioners illegally suspended? Held: - No. Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or request, we find respondents evidence insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from which the loss of confidence

life had death not supervened at age 25, assuming that she lived and would have retired at age 60). In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a prior unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other benefits totaling P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to iqama insurance because this refers to the issuance not insurance of iqama, or residency/work permit required in the KSA. On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City and the NBI as contained in their autopsy and toxicology report, respectively, the Commission, via its November 22, 2002 Resolution declared that, based on substantial evidence adduced, Jasmin was the victim of compensable work-connected criminal aggression. The appellate court affirmed the NLRCs findings that Jasmins death was compensable, the same having occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually provided by the employer. Thus her death should be considered to have occurred within the employers premises, arising out of and in the course of her employment. ISSUE: The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way of benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin. HELD: Yes, they are. Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc., and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into her employment contract. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year old Filipina, in the prime of her life and working abroad with a chance at making a decent living with a high-paying job which she could not find in her own country, would simply commit suicide for no compelling reason.

Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc They have placed their own financial and corporate interests above their moral and social obligations, and chose to secure and insulate themselves from the perceived responsibility of having to answer for and indemnify Jasmins heirs for her death. Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,[22] the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country or overseas, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular.[23] The State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers.[24] The rights and interest of distressed[25] overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded.[26] Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by the provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to their deployed OFWs, especially those in distress. Instead, they abandoned Jasmins case and allowed it to remain unsolved to further their interests and avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly exact from them. They willfully refused to protect and tend to the welfare of the deceased Jasmin, treating her case as just one of those unsolved crimes that is not worth wasting their time and resources on. The evidence does not even show that Becmen and Rajab lifted a finger to provide legal representation and seek an investigation of Jasmins case. Worst of all, they unnecessarily trampled upon the person and dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on the argument that Jasmin committed suicide, which is a grave accusation given its un-Christian nature. Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcons acts and omissions are against public policy because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are entitled to full protection under the law. They set an awful example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to their distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmins case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death, and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate interests above of the welfare of their employees all these are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and constitute taking advantage of the poor employee and her familys ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of power and resources to seek the truth and obtain justice for the death of a loved one.

Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers.