OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O.

2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

Padilla vs. COMELEC October 19, 1992 | Romero Facts: On September 6, 1991, R.A. No. 7155 was approved, creating the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte. In the plebiscite held throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. The petitioner, governor of Camarines Norte, sought to set aside the plebiscite and to have a new one conducted. He contended that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, excludig the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. By virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, petitioner argued that the Courts ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC (which held that the residents of the mother province or municipality from which the new LGU is to be created must participate in the plebiscite) has been superseded, thus reinstating its earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC (only the voters of the unit to be segregated should be included in the plebiscite). Issue: WON the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid Held: YES. Petitioners main argument is that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, the Courts ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, especially since the latter provision deleted the words "unit or." This is incorrect. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution did not affect the ruling in Tan vs. Comelec. As explained by then CONCOM Commissioner Associate Justice Hilario Davide during the debates in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the words units or were deleted because the plebiscite must involve all the units affected. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite.

Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Tan vs. COMELEC July 11, 1986 | Alampay Facts: Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 entitled An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte was enacted on December 3, 1985. The residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, filed with the Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite, which sought to implement the said law, which was confined only to the inhabitants of the new territory of Negros del Norte. Despite the petition, the plebiscite still pushed through. Only the inhabitants of the three cities and 11 municipalities in Negros Occidental, which would comprise the new province, participated. Because of the exclusion of the voters from the rest of the province, petitioners submitted a supplemental petition for a writ of mandamus, directing COMELEC to hold another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire province will participate. The respondents argued that the remaining cities and municipalities of the mother unit (Negros Occidental) do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected" as referred to in Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution1. They invoked the ruling in Paredes vs. Executive Secretary (1984): To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in pari materia. Respondents also insisted that the requisite territory of the new province contemplates not only land area but also the waters over which it has jurisdiction, within the three-mile marginal sea limit. Thus, Negros del Norte, with more or less 4,019.95 sq. km., its internal waters include, has complied with the requisite geographical area (3,500 sq. km).

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
1

OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. 2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

Issues: a. WON the excluded inhabitants of Negros Occidental should participate in the plebiscite b. WON the territory requirement in the LGC embraces both the land area and the waters over which the political unit exercises control Held: a. YES. Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. The boundaries of the existing province will be altered by the creation of the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The unit or units referred to in Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution embraces both the parent province as well as its constituent provinces or municipalities which will form the new LGU. The Court understands the reliance of the respondents on the case of Paredes and Lopez vs. COMELEC. The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the Constitution should be correctly interpreted. The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected." The Court was given considerable leeway in that case because lesser problems were involved in the earlier case, which was about the division of a barangay only. The instant case now concerns the creation of a new province, the largest political unit contemplated in the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte will result in Negros Occidental losing not only least seven of the 15 sugar mills, but also approximately 2,768.4 sq. km. from the land area of the province. Thus, the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte, as well as their economy. There is no legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into B.P. Blg. 885. From "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of 120 days from the approval of this Act it was changed so that it now provides that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." By no mere legislative fiat can the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law be diminished by the

Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province. As petitioners correctly argued, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', and 'abolished' as used in the constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct situations mutually exclusive to each other. Such cases necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially altered. It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its boundary substantially altered, only some and not all the voters which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true. Corollary, the Court was prepared to declare that the plebiscite held last January 3 was null and void for being violative of the Constitution. But it cant direct the conduct of a new plebiscite because theres not legal basis to do so. The constitutional infirmity attached to the said law and also due to the failure of Negros del Norte to comply with the criteria established in the LGC. The ruling in Paredes and Lopez was also abandoned. b. NO. The LGC provision states that the "territory need not be contiguous." "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. Therefore, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. Teehankee, J. concurring: I congratulate my brethren for the unanimous decision we issue today striking down an Act approved in "deep secrecy and inordinate haste" apparently on the last day of session of the Batasang Pambansa on December 3, 1985 and signed on the same day by the then President of the authoritarian regime. The discredited Commission on Elections of the time played its customary subservient role by setting the plebiscite with equal "indecent haste" for January 3, 1986, notwithstanding that the Act itself provided for an ample period of 120 days from its approval within which to inform the people of the proposed dismemberment and allow them to freely express and discuss the momentous issue and cast their vote intelligently. This was learned by petitioners through an item in the printed media one day before they filed the present rush petition on December 23, 1985 to seek a restraining order to atop the plebiscite, even as no printed copies of the Act as finally enacted and approved.

OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. 2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

Miranda vs. Aguirre September 16, 1999 | Puno Facts: On May 5, 1994, R.A. No. 7720, which converted the city of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city, was signed into law. The people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On February 14, 1998, R.A. No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. The amendment did not contain a provision submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. The Solicitor General contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units," hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. A similar Comment was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, arguing that both the Constitution and the LGC do not require a plebiscite "to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial elections. Issue: WON R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for failing to provide that the conversion from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to the people in a proper plebiscite Held: YES. The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of LGUs is legislative in nature. The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution. The Court is of the opinion that the downgrading of Santigao from an independent component city to a component city falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision shows that the creation, division, etc. of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator material change in the political and economic rights of the LGUs directly affected. It is for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." The rationale for the constitutional requirement of the plebiscite sought to give the sovereignty that was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. It aims to abolish the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people

of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of the legislative power. The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. When R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There no justifiable reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the LGC is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that: (f) Plebiscite (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected xxx xxx xxx The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people. On J. Buenas dissenting opinion: R.A. No. 8528 is an exercise of the power of Congress to amend the charter of Santiago City. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, limits Congress power of amendment. Quite clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, etc. of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. The spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The amendment merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a city. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change

OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. 2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

its physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people. On J. Mendozas dissenting opinion: "Only if the classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people . . . ." It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions first, the creation, division, merger, etc. must meet the criteria fixed by the LGC on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." The requirements in Sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the LGC were imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose. In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering. Tobias vs. Abalos December 8, 1994 | Biden Facts: R.A. No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong" was signed into law on February 9, 1994. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. At the plebiscite, the people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout was a low 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no."

Petitioners contended the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 492 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution, namely: 1. The one subject-one bill rule the law embraced two principal subjects: a) the conversion of and b) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. 2. The the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond what was provided in the Constitution. 3. It also the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited. Petitioners also asserted that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite as the same involved a change in their legislative district. Issues: a. WON R.A. No. 7675 is constitutional b. WON the residents of San Juan should have participated in the plebiscite Held: a. YES. The statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than 250,000 indubitably ordains compliance with the "one cityone representative" proviso in the Constitution: . . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. The title of R.A. No. 7675 necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49. The Court has also applied a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule in order to not cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec, the Court ruled It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." As to the composition of the House of Representatives, the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The
ART. VIII, SEC. 49. As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election.
2

OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. 2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

Constitution clearly provides that the HOR shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 pre-empts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since it is a glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right, which pertains to itself. b. NO. The inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto.