IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT

OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, petitioners, vs. ERNESTO PALA-GANAS, respondent. Civil Law; Probate Proceedings; Wills and Succession; Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country. Same; Same; Same; The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution. Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution. The Facts and the Case On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C.

Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.1 On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress andwithout the te stators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate. Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines. On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),3 arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,4 affirming the assailed order of the RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different

rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court. The Issue Presented The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed. The Courts Ruling Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will. But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.6 In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the

probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.7 The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution. In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or reauthentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established. Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.8 Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testators state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial courts directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005. [Palaganas vs. Palaganas, 640 SCRA 538(2011)]

No. L-23678. June 6, 1967. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. Wills; Succession; Conflict of laws; Renvoi doctrine.The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country and is domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that, even assuming that Texas has a conflicts rule providing that the domiciliary law should govern successional rights, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which calls for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties involved are found in the Philippines. Same; Foreign laws.In the absence of proof as to the conflicts rule of Texas, it would be presumed to be the same as our local conflicts rule. Same; Applicability of national law to succession; Capacity to succeedThe decedent's national law governs the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to succeed. Same; Third paragraph of article 17 of New Civil Code does not modify article 16. The third paragraph of article 17 of the New Civil Code is not an exception to the second paragraph of article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article," when it incorporated article 11 of the old Civil Code as article 17, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of article 10 of the old Civil Code, as article 16. The legislative intent must have been to make the second paragraph of article 176 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As a further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under article 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is governed by the decedent's national law, Same; Legitimes; Statutes; Special and general provisions. Whatever public policy and good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congres has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. It has

specifically chosen the decedent's national law to govern, inter alia, the amount of successional rights. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. Same; Testamentary provision that successional right to decedent's estate would be governed by law other than his national law is void.A provision in a foreigner's will that his properties should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not in accordance with his national law is void, being contrary to article 16 of the New Civil Code. Same; System of legitimes does not apply to estate of a citizen of Texas. Where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and under Texas laws there are no forced heirs, the system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot be applied to the succession to the decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the decedent's will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law. APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositorsappellants. Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al. Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al. J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company. Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman. BENGZON. J.P., J,: This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964. approving the project of partition f iled by the executor in 'Civil Case No. 37089 therein. The. facts of the case are as follows: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis.

Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid f or, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time accordingly as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies. On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of ?120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executorpursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testamentdivided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages. On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1 After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes. Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositorsappellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must applyTexas law or Philippine law. In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that "ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. "However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional

rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." "ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent." Appellants would however counter that Art. 17. paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that "Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country." prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succes-sions. As further indication of this legislative intent. Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter. alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones, Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void. for his national

law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered. Notes.In Philippine Trust Company vs. Bohanan, 60 O.G. 4615, it was held that the validity of the provisions of the will of a citizen of Nevada should be governed by his national law, the law of Nevada. Since the Nevada law allows a citizen of Nevada to dispose of all his property according to his will, the testamentary provisions therein, depriving his wife and children of what should be their legitimes under Philippine law should be respected and the project of partition made in accordance with. his will should be approved, In Aznar vs. Christensen Garcia, 61 O.G. 7302, it was held that, where the deceased citizen of California was domiciled in the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will should be governed by Philippine law, pursuant to article 946 of the California Civil Code, and not by the internal law of California. [Bellis vs. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358(1967)]

[No. L-2071. September 19, 1950] Testate estate of Isabel V. Florendo, deceased. TIRSO DACANAY, petitioner and appellant, vs. PEDRO V. FLORENDO ET AL., oppositors and appellees. 1. WILLS; EXECUTION OF JOINT WlLL OR EXPRESSION BY TWO OR MORE TESTATORS OF THEIR WILLS IN A DOCUMENT BY ONE ACT. The prohibition of article 669 of the Civil Code is directed against the execution of a joint will, or the expression by two or more testators of their wills in a single document and by one act, rather than against mutual or reciprocal wills, which may be separately executed. 2. ID.; PROVISION OF ARTICLE 669, CIVIL CODE, Is NOT UNWISE.The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of a will by two or more persons conjointly or in the same instrument either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third .person, is not unwise and is not against public policy. 3. ID. ; PROVISION OF ARTICLE 669, CIVIL CODE, Is STILL IN FORCE.Considering the wisdom of the provision of this article 669 and the fact that it has not been repealed, at least not expressly, as well as the consideration that its provisions are not incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure on the subject of wills, it is believed that said article of the Civil Code is still in force. (Doctrine of In re Will of Bilbao, G. R. No. L-2200, August 2, 1950, reiterated.) APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of La Union. De Aquino, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Sotto & Sotto for appellant. Alafriz & Alafriz for appellees. OZAETA, J.: This is a special proceeding commenced in the Court; of First Instance of La Union to probate a joint and reciprocal will executed by the spouses Isabel V. Florendo and Tirso Dacanay on October 20, 1940. Isabel V. Florendo having died, her surviving spouse Tirso Dacanay is seeking to probate said joint and reciprocal will, which provides in substance that whoever of the spouses, joint testators, shall survive the other, shall inherit all the properties of the latter, with an agreement as

to how the surviving spouse shall dispose of the properties in case of his or her demise. The relatives of the deceased Isabel V. Florendo opposed the probate of said will on various statutory grounds. Before hearing the evidence the trial court, after requiring and receiving from counsel for both parties written arguments on the question of whether or not the said joint and reciprocal will may be probated in view' of article 669 of the Civil Code, issued an order dismissing the petition for probate on the ground that said will is null and void ab initio as having been executed in violation of article 669 of the Civil Code, From that order the proponent of the will has appealed. Article 669 of the Civil Code reads as follows: "ART. 669. Two or more persons cannot make a will conjointly or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person." We agree with appellant's view, supported by eminent commentators, that the prohibition of article 669 of the Civil Code is directed against the execution of a joint will, or the expression by two or more testators of their wills in a single document and by one act, rather than against mutual or reciprocal wills, which may be separately executed. Upon this premise, however, appellant argues that article 669 of the Civil Code has been repealed by Act No. 190, which he claims provides for and regulates the extrinsic formalities of wills, contending that whether two wills should be executed conjointly or separately is but a matter of extrinsic formality. The question now raised by appellant has recently been decided by this court adversely to him in In re Will of Victor Bilbao, supra, p. 144, It appears in that case that on October 6, 1931, the spouses Victor Bilbao and Ramona M. Navarro executed a will conjointly, whereby they directed that "all of our respective private properties both real and personal, and all of our conjugal properties, and any other property belonging to either or both of us, be given and transmitted to anyone or either of us, who may survive the other, or who may remain the surviving spouse of the other." That will was denied probate by the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on the ground that it was prohibited by article 669 of the Civil Code. The surviving spouse as proponent of the joint will also contended that said article of the Civil Code has been repealed by sections 614 and 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. In deciding that question this court, speaking through. Mr. Justice Montemayor, said:

"We cannot agree to the contention of the appellant that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on wills have completely superseded Chapter I, Title III of the Civil Code on the same subject matter, resulting in the complete repeal of said Civil Code provisions. In the study we have made of this subject, we have found a number of cases decided by this court wherein several articles of the Civil Code regarding wills have not only been referred to but have also been applied side by side with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. "The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of a will by two or more persons conjointly or in the same instrument either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person, is not unwise and is not against public policy. The reason for this provision, especially as regards husband and wife, is that when a will is made jointly or in the same instrument, the spouse who is more aggressive, stronger in will or character and dominant is liable to dictate the terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons whom he or she desires to favor. And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless or desperate, knowing as he or she does the terms of the will whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to the survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other. "Considering the wisdom of the provisions of this article 669 and the fact that it has not been repealed, at least not expressly, as well as the consideration that its provisions are not incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure on the subject of wills, we believe and rule that said article 669 of the Civil Code is still in force. And we are not alone in this opinion. Mr. Justice Willard as shown by his Notes on the Civil Code, on page 48 believes that this article 669 is still in force. Sinco and Capistrano in their work on the Civil Code, Vol. II, page 33, favorably cite Justice Willard's opinion that this article is still in force. Judge Camus in his book on the Civil Code does not include this article among those he considers repealed. Lastly, we find that this article 669 has been reproduced word for word in article 818 of the New Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386). The implication is that the Philippine Legislature that passed this Act and approved the New Civil Code, including the members of the Code Commission who prepared it, are of the opinion that the provisions of article 669 of the old Civil Code are not incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure." In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Moran, C. J., Pars, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason. Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur. Order affirmed. [Dacanay vs. Florendo, 87 Phil. 324(1950)]

G.R. No. 76714. June 2, 1994.* SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, respondent. Succession; Probate of Wills; Conflict of Laws; Proof that wills executed abroad conform with the formalities prescribed by laws in the foreign jurisdiction or by Philippine laws is imperative.The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. Same; Same; Same; Evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside the Philippines.The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Same; Same; Same; Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]). Same; Same; Same; Evidence; In the probate of wills, the courts should relax the rules on evidence, as the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate. Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of

which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]). Same; Same; Same; The separate wills of the spouses may be probated jointly. There is merit in petitioners insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judges view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]). Same; Same; Same; Joint Wills; What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills, not the joint probate of separate wills containing essentially the same provisions and pertaining to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature.What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]). Same; Same; Same; With regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an original will or a will that is presented for probate for the first time and accordingly must comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice to the known heirs, legatees and devisees, and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner.The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an original will or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication

and notice by mail or personally to the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states: If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41). Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of her will states: If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption (Rollo, p. 31). On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor. On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan. On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special administratrix.

Same; Same; Certiorari; Parties; A judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party.This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring factpetitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]). SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Natividad T. Perez for petitioner. Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondent. QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M. We grant the petition. II Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14. On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife all the remainder of his real and personal property at the time of his death wheresoever situated (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife,

As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion. Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan. In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52. On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before receiving petitioners motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore, in the interest of simple fair play, they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motion of May 19, 1983. Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and therefore, they had no legal or proprietary interests to protect and no right to intervene; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance with the solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that the Cunanan collaterals are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution under a will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112 113).

On June 23, the probate court granted petitioners motion of May 19, 1983. However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez- Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been deliberately excluded in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such misrepresentation deprived them of their right to due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the misrepresentation and concealment committed by petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized his father, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator as practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate. In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the sole and only heir of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the Cunanan collaterals; hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have concealed the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came from the capital of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan

heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160). In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States to settle and divide equally the estates, and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance (Records, pp. 184-185). Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanans executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd *a+ par *4+ (Rollo, p. 52). On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provision of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator. Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982 (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she had to attend to the settlement proceedings of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanan heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00 from the Surrogates Court as part of legacy based on the aforesaid agreement of November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248). On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by

her as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law. On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York governing the execution of last wills and testaments. On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the other order issued that same day. Contending that the second portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court. On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that (W)hen the last will and testament x x x was denied probate, the case was terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records, p. 302). On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985.

On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge failed to appreciate the significant probative value of the exhibits x x x which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the said probate (Records, pp.. 313-323). Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel. On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner proved that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question. However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381). On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect. However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986 but allowed petitioner to file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator (Records, p. 391). The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for reconsideration stating that she was ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York and praying that she be granted the

opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and allowance of wills (Records, p. 393). On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two wills in a single proceeding would be a departure from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one will. He pointed out that even in New York where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings (Records, p. 395). On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings (Records, pp. 405-407). On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Pea, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records, p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a final ruling on her supplemental motion (Records, p. 421). On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition (Records, pp. 376-378). Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings. II Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:

(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. F and G); (b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the County of Onondaga which is a court of record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. F-1 and G-1); (c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore stating that they have in their records and files the said wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. F-2 and G-2); (d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. F-3, F-6 and Exh. G-3G6); (e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs. F-7 and F-7); (f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York (Exh. H and F). (g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken (Exhs. H-1 and I-1); (h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. H-2 and I-2); (i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. H-3 and I-10); (j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. H-4 and I-5); (k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly executed, genuine and valid and that the said instruments were admitted to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs. H-5 and I-5); and

(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness and authenticity of each others signatures in the exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. H-6 and I-6) (Rollo, pp. 13-16). Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Courts Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29, 1984. The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Phi lippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]). Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate pf a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive

the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]). There is merit in petitioners insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judges view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]). What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]). This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring factpetitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]). The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an original will or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3

and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioners claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, xxx. WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Cruz, J., (Chairman), On leave. Petition granted, order set aside. Note.Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will (Alvarado v. Gaviola, Jr., 226 SCRA 347 [1993]). [Vda. de Perez vs. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722(1994)]