PEOPLE VS QUE PO LAY CASE DIGEST G.R. NO.

L-6791 Facts: Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20. The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange failed to sell to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. He appeals basing on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. Issues: Whether there was a need for a publication of the said circular to make it effective? Whether the respondent is guilty of violating the said Circular 20? Held: The Court agrees that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents,especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. The Court further contends that appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.

GARCIA VS. RECIO G.R. NO. 138322 OCTOBER 2, 2001 Facts: Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, inCabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

Held: In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in thePhilippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.
ISSUE: W/N the divorce between Recio and Samson was valid and proven HELD: NO. Remand the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy Divorces: 1. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. 2. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." 3. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it

o o

legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself

The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country o Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either: 1. an official publication; or 2. a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be: 1. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and 2. authenticated by the seal of his office Since the divorce was a defense raised by Recio, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him

1. 2.

In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types: absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii - terminates the marriage limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - suspends it and leaves the bond in full force Recio presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: "1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."

CONSUNJI VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G. R. NO. 137873, APRIL 20, 2001 Facts : Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Respondent avers, among others that the widow cannot recover for from the company anymore an civil damages on the account that it has recovered damages under the Labor Code. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow and awarded actual and compensatory damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC in toto. Issue: Whether or not private respondent is barred from availing ofdeath benefits under the Civil Code after recovering from damages provided for under the Labor Code. Held: The Supreme Court has already ruled in various cases that a recovery of damages under the Workers Compensation Act is a bar to a recovery under an ordinary civil action. It ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either remedies. The Supreme Court allowed some exceptions. In the case at bar, the CA ruled that the widow had a right to file an ordinary action for civil actions because she was not aware and was ignorant of her rights and courses of action. When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the

absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. However, waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. In the case at bar, the widow was not aware of her rights and remedies and thus her election to claim from the Insurance Fund does not constitute a waiver on her part to claim from the petitionercompany. Petitioners argument that Art 3 of the New Civil Code, stating that Ignorance of the law excuses no one cannot stand. The Supreme Court ruled that the application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her . CUI VS. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY G.R. NO. 15172 MAY 30, 1961 Facts: Before the school year 1948-1949 Emeterio Cui took up preparatory law course in the Arellano University. After Finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourt year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of mother of plaintiff, was the dean of college of law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano, having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he has studying law in Defendant University was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were retured to him after the end of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fess paid by the plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,003.87. After Graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed the transcript of his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he paid back the P1,003.87 which

defendant refunded him. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. Issue: Whether the provision of the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship in cash, is valid or not. Held: Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools provides that When students are given full or partial scholarship, it is understood that such scholarship are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to These scholarship should not be subsequently charged to recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarship should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school. Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. The defendant uses the scholarship as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. The practice of awarding scholarship to attract students and keep them in school is not Good custom nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institution as in Arellano University. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing the defendants counterclaim. It is so ordered.