Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-20034 January 30, 1965

(i) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants, the sum of P2,000.00 by way of exemplary damages; (j) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (k) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. As above stated, the plaintiffs are entitled to be reimbursed in the sum of P19,587.26 and P12,464.24. It is understood, however, that these amounts should be reimbursed to the plaintiffs after they have surrendered the possession of the premises in question to the defendants and the same to be deducted from the respective amounts to be paid by said plaintiffs to the defendants. From the unfavorable decision, plaintiffs Astraquillo filed on 27 September 1961 their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal. Upon defendants' objection to the approval of said record on the ground that it was incomplete and defective, the plaintiffs were ordered by the trial court to amend the same to conform to said opposition. Plaintiffs submitted their amended record on appeal, and set it for approval on 14 October 1961, which was later reset for 28 October 1961. In the meantime, defendants Javier filed on 10 October 1961 their motion for execution pending appeal based on the alleged insolvency of the plaintiffs, which motion was amended on 25 October 1961 substantially alleging the same ground. Plaintiffs opposed said motion. On 28 October 1961, the trial court granted defendants' motion and issued an order which we deem pertinent to quote hereunder because it discusses the respective contentions of the parties relative to the disputed issue in the present petition. Said order reads: Before the Court for resolution is an Amended Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, dated October 25, 1961, filed by counsel for the defendents. Counsel for the plaintiffs filed an opposition on October 28, 1961. The special reasons set forth in the instant motion is that, plaintiffs in this case are insolvent. To substantiate their claims, defendants allege that: (a) as early as March 1955, the PHHC had attempted to eject plaintiffs from the property in question for nonpayment of the installments due thereon, which attempt was not carried out only because defendants stepped in and paid the balance due to said PHHC; (b) plaintiff Isabelo Astraquillo himself admitted on the witness stand that he was in need of funds; that (c) plaintiffs' gross income for the year 1959 amounted to only P4,400.00 of which sum P1,500.00 was the total income of plaintiff Isabelo Astraquillo, while the balance was the salary of plaintiff Juanita J. Astraquillo from her teaching position. The main argument advanced by the plaintiffs in support of their opposition of the issuance of the writ of execution prayed for herein by the defendants is that, "the mere allegation that plaintiffs are insolvent without the corresponding finding of proof to that effect is not special or good reason that will justify the issuance of execution pending appeal." Plaintiffs further contend that the discretion of the trial court in issuing an immediate execution is to be reckoned from the circumstances obtaining after the decision has been rendered and not from the circumstances that took place during the period of trial.1wph1.t Needless to state in this connection, that among other things, the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the defendants the sum of P250.00 in the form of rentals from April 1956 up to the time possession of the premises in question is surrendered to the defendant. Apparently, as to this date, the total of the accrued rentals amounts to some P16,000.00 more or less. As the years go by pending appeal of this case, the accrued rentals would gradually increase as a matter of course, and there are strong indications, as pointed to by the defendants, that plaintiffs are not in a position to pay the same. Should it be the case, as there are well founded reasons to believe that it would be, such circumstances would undoubtedly render the decision nugatory. This

ISABELO ASTRAQUILLO and JUANITA J. ASTRAQUILLO, petitioners, vs. PRIMITIVO JAVIER, AMPARO S. JAVIER, COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE NICASIO YATCO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch V, Quezon City), and of QUEZON CITY, respondents. Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for petitioners. E. Quisumbing-Fernando and Y. Quisumbing-Javellana for respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Petitioners-spouses Isabelo and Juanita Astraquillo prosecuted before this Court the instant petition to review on certiorari a resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special Fourth Division), in its CA-G.R. No. 30249-R, which, upon motion for reconsideration of respondents-spouses Primitivo and Amparo Javier (defendants-appellees below), reversed its original decision granting herein petitioners' petition for certiorari, and upheld a special order of execution of the decision pending appeal issued by respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch V) in its Civil Case No. Q-2276. After a protracted trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch V) had rendered a decision in its case No. 2276, dated August 1961, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered in this case in favor of the defendants Primitivo Javier and Amparo S. Javier and against the plaintiff Isabelo Astraquillo Juanita J. Astraquillo, as follows: (a) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint; (b) Declaring the real estate mortgage marked in evidence in this case as Exhibit K-1, inexistent and void; (c) Ordering the plaintiffs to vacate pay the premises in question and surrender possession thereof to the defendants; (d) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P250.00 in the form of rentals from April 1956 up to the time the possession of the premises in question is surrendered to the defendants; (e) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P200.00 a month from September, 1956 until the possession of the premises in question is delivered to the defendants, by way of actual damages; (f) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P2,240.00 which the former received from Patrocinio Evalle but which was not turned over to the latter; (g) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P2,789.48 which the plaintiffs received from the PHHC by way of condonation of delinquency interests and which was not turned over to the defendants. All the foregoing to bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint, until fully paid; and (h) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages;

to the Court, is sufficient reason to justify the issuance of the writ of execution prayed for. In fine, the primordial reason that impels the Court to grant the motion of defendants is because plaintiffs are insolvent. If they were not in such situation or if they are now better off than they were during the pendency of this case for trial, said plaintiffs have no proof on that score. WHEREFORE, for the special reasons set forth above, the Court orders the issuance of a writ of execution in this case pending appeal, unless the plaintiffs file a supersedeas bond in the sum of P20,000.00 within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this order. It is understood that if after the period of ten (10) days as aforestated, plaintiffs have not filed the supersedeas bond, the Clerk of Court is directed to issue the writ of execution in this case pending appeal. Counsel for both parties notified hereof in open court. Plaintiffs filed on 28 November 1961 a motion to reconsider the above-quoted order which the trial court denied on 2 December 1961, and for failure to post the supersedeas bond required in the same order the trial court also directed, on 28 November 1961, respondent Sheriff to enforce the corresponding writ of execution. Plaintiffs went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside said writ of execution pending appeal, which, as intimated at the beginning of this opinion, was ultimately denied by said appellate court. However, before petitioners herein could seek a reconsideration of said resolution, and before the same could become final and executory, respondents Javier secured on 14 July 1962 an alias writ of execution in the trial court, and, pursuant thereto, respondent Sheriff levied on the personal properties of the petitioners herein and set the sale thereof for 25 July 1962. Respondent Sheriff also threatened to eject petitioners herein from the property in question. Petitioners herein therefore presented on 23 July 1962 the instant petition to review on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction before this Court. We gave due course to the petition, and issued the corresponding writ upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P10,000.00, which the petitioners posted in due time. The sole issue for determination in the present petition is whether respondent Court of Appeals correctly upheld the order of the trial court in executing its decision pending appeal. In other words, the only issue is whether respondent trial judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the special order of execution in question. Petitioners herein question the propriety of the conduct of the Court of Appeals in completely reversing its original decision granting their petition for certiorari and setting aside and annulling the order of execution of the decision of the trial court pending appeal. They contend that respondents Javier, in their motion to reconsider, raised substantially the very same issues and grounds alleged in their answer to the petition; hence, there was no justification for respondent appellate court to change its original decision. Petitioners herein also contend that respondents Javier, as the prevailing parties and movants for executing the decision pending appeal in the trial court, had the burden to prove the former's alleged insolvency, and since no evidence was submitted to substantiate such claim of insolvency, the issuance of said special order was not warranted under the circumstances. On the other hand, respondents Javier maintain that respondent Court of Appeals correctly upheld the disputed special order of the trial court, the same being conformable to the law and jurisprudence on the matter. It is already well-settled that under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, The power to grant or deny a motion for execution is discretionary with the court (Federal Films v. Ocampo, 78 Phil. 479). Accordingly, the appellate court will not interfere to modify, control, or inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless it be shown that there has been an abuse thereof (Calvo v. Gutierrez, 4 Phil. 203; Case v. Metropole Hotel, 5 Phil. 49; Gamay vs. Gutierrez David, 48 Phil. 768; Buenaventura v. Pea, 78 Phil. 795; Ong Sit v. Piccio, 78 Phil. 785; Naredo v. Yatco, 80 Phil. 220).

(Federation of United Namarco Distributors v. National Marketing Corp., et al., & National Marketing Corp. v. Tan, et al., G. R. Nos. 1-17819 & L-16678, March 31, 1962). It is not disputed that respondents Javier filed their motion for execution pending appeal in the trial court before petitioners Astraquillos perfected their appeal, and averred the insolvency of the latter as the special and good reason for such execution specifying and citing the facts appearing in the records of the case upon which such claim is based. Respondent trial judge, in granting the motion seem to have been satisfied that the evidence already submitted did warrant such execution pending appeal. This finding was confirmed by the Court of Appeals in its disputed resolution. Under the circumstances prevailing in the case at bar, we are constrained not to disturb the disputed ruling of the Court of Appeals. Coming to the first contention of the petitioners herein, suffice it to state that it is one of the inherent powers of the court "to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice" (Sec. 5, Rule 135, Revised Rules of Court). This power includes the right to reverse itself, specially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party-litigant. This appears to have been what happened in the case at bar; hence respondent Court of Appeals perfectly acted within its prerogatives in reversing itself. With respect to the second contention of the petitioners herein, the records of this case belie their claim. In its resolution, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence to confirm the order of the trial court executing its decision pending appeal. Thus, it ruled that the insolvency of the petitioners herein has been clearly shown, which is a good and special reason for the immediate execution of the decision, to wit: 1. The petitioners owe in back rentals alone to the respondents, as per decision of respondent Judge the sum of P250.00 monthly from April, 1956 to the present or roughly P18,000.00; 2. Petitioner Isabelo Astraquillo admitted during the trial of the civil case, his need of funds several times; 3. As per notice of the Sheriff's sale, dated December 4, 1961, respondent Sheriff could levy only on household effects of the petitioners, mostly furniture items, to satisfy the judgment; xxx xxx xxx

5. Petitioners could have stayed the writ of execution by filing the P20,000.00 supersedeas bond required by respondent judge, which they did not do; Considering that we are bound by the above-quoted factual findings, since in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 (formerly Rule 46 of the old Rules) of the Revised Rules of Court "the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court" [11 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 ed.), 413], we see no way to hold that the Court of Appeals committed any grave abuse of discretion in ultimately affirming the special order of execution issued by the trial court. Anyway, insolvency of a party (in the sense of inability to show apparent assets adequate to meet its obligations) need not be proved directly, but may be inferred, as the appellate court did, from a number of circumstances appearing of record. WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued ordered dissolved. With costs against the petitioners.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant. Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee. FERNANDO, J.: The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not. The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law." When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm." Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of 1 Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon 2 City on a confidential mission; the oath of office of the accused as such secret 3 agent, a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret 4 agent" of Gov. Leviste. Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.t Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government." The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed. The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the 5 manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in 6 the performance of their official duties." The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been 7 demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside. Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang, where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
8

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are uncomplicated and undisputed. In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City. On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares the protestant as having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local election held on May 11, 1992, the protestant having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the protestee's votes. Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the private respondent on 1 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice of appeal and paying the appellate docket fees. On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal. On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the private respondent opposed on 22 July 1994. On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal. The corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration of the order of execution and the sheriff held in abeyance the implementation of the writ. This motion was denied on 5 August 1994. The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid other of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94. On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition. 4 The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES that is [sic] has exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law, and therefore, assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition for certiorari which is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the Writ of Execution issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED. Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position .as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending resolution of the appeal before this Commission in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No. 108-94. In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, the respondent COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction, viz., Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the

G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995 EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner, vs. ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court revives the issue of whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction In the split decision of 4 March 1992 in the consolidated cases of Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on Elections, 1 this Court ruled in the negative because of the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the constitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary writs. It held that jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law, whether the jurisdiction is original or appellate, and since these two classes of jursdiction are exclusive of each other, each must expressly conferred by law. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other. This Court proceeded to state that in the Philippine setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which has always been expressly conferred either by Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any power to exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus unlike the case of this Court which is specifically conferred with such authority in Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that the doctrines laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC 2 that neither the Constitution nor any law has conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such writs still finds application under the 1987 Constitution. In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, reiterated the Garcia and Uy doctrine.
3

this Court

In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC adhered to the affirmative view of the issue, citing as authority therefore its own decision of 29 July 1993 in Dictado vs. Cosico and the last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697, which reads: Sec. 50. Definition. xxx xxx xxx The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases. The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and nullified for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He contends that while the COMELEC's position is inherently compelling, it deserves scant consideration in view of Garcia and Uy and Veloria and the nature and purpose of B. P. Blg. 697 which was to govern solely the Batasang Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it was a temporary statute which self-destructed after such election.

Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),and that it is not exactly correct that this law selfdestructed after the May 1984 election. It further reasoned out that in the performance of its judicial functions, the COMELEC, is the most logical body to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction. It ratiocinated as follows: It is therefore clear that if there is a law which specifically confers jurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs, then the Commission has jurisdiction. Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law. B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE SELECTION OF SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50 provides: Sec. 50. Definition. Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission. The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all preproclamation controversies. The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.(Emphasis supplied). We have debated among ourselves whether Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697, has been repealed. We have come to the conclusion that it has not been repealed. The repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985), provides: Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise known as the The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election Laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code is hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII. (Emphasis supplied). B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, in the cited Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in the Veloria case, the Supreme Court itself said, reiterating previous cases, that implied repeal of statutes is frowned upon, thus: Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned upon, so also should the grant of original jurisdiction by mere

implication to a quasi-judicial body be tabooed. (Garcia/Uy/Veloria Cases: Emphasis supplied). xxx xxx xxx It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 . . . did not modify or repeal, whether expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. It is common place Learning that implied repeal are not favored in Law and are not casually to be assumed. The first effort of a court must always be to reconcile or adjust the provisions of one statute with those of another so as to give sensible effect to both provisions (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55 SCRA 261 (1974); Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196-197 (1971); National Power Corporation vs. ARCA, 25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916); and Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377(1965). Only when there is clear inconsistency and conflict between the provisions of two (2) statutes, may a court hold that the provisions later in point of time have impliedly repealed the earlier ones" that (Philippine American Management Co., Inc., vs. Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973); and Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971) (Larga vs. Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August 3, 1984, 164 SCRA 25). It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after the Batasang Pambansa elections of 1984; because of the provisions of Section 1 (Title and Applicability) which provides: "This act shall be known and cited as "The Law on the 1984 Batasang Pambansa Election." It shall govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution. While that may be true with most of its provisions which were applicable only for the particular election (like election and campaign periods, voting constituency, etc.) most if not all of the remaining provisions could be applicable to future elections. It is not lost to the Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also "for other purposes." But the important consideration is that the authority granted to the Commission under B.P. Blg. 697 is not inconsistent with our election laws. It should be mentioned that the provisions of Republic Act No. 6638 which governed the local elections of January 18, 1988, as to the number of councilors in specified cities (Sec. 3) and the number of Sangguniang members in different provinces and cities (Sec. 4) are still applicable up to this day. In fact, it became one of the important controlling provision which governed the May 11, 1992 elections. If provisions of Republic Act No. 6636 which are not inconsistent with the present election laws did not self-destruct, why should Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697?

Another provision which did not self-destruct is that which provides that "any city or municipal judge, who includes or excludes any voter without any legal basis in inclusion and exclusion proceedings, shall be guilty of an election offense," although this provision is found in Section 10 of Executive Order No. 134 supposedly with limited application as the enabling act for the elections for Members of Congress on May 11, 1987 and for other purposes. Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, jurisdiction to the Commission on Elections because the Pimentel case said there was none, to fill a void in the law, and avoid an incongruous situation. A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately but in its relation to the statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to "harmonized it with the pre-existing body of laws." Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled. . . . (Commissioner of Customs vs. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. L-28329, August 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 113). xxx xxx xxx The statutory construction rule is: "When the Legislature enacts provision, it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter and that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in the prior statutes." (Legaspi vs. Executive Secretary, L-36153, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253). The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial functions to take jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because it has appellate jurisdiction in election cases granted by the Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has no more appellate jurisdiction over such cases And in the case of the Supreme Court, Justice de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in his dissenting opinion that under the Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in election cases should properly be limited to decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections, not from lower courts. It was of course different under the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388, September 2, 1971) because the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals then had appellate jurisdiction in election case decided by the lower courts. In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have certiorari jurisdiction over election cases from the lower courts because after reiterating the ruling in the Garcia and Uy cases, the Supreme Court said: In view of this pronouncement, an original civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against a regional trial court in an election contest may be filed only in the Court of Appeals or in this Court

being the only courts given such original jurisdiction under the Constitution and the Law. ( Emphasis supplied). While these two appellate Courts do have the jurisdiction under the Constitution and the law, it is most logical for the Commission whenever it performs judicial functions to have the authority to issue these prerogative writs. . . . ... In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision laid down in the case of Antonio Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio Tiongco promulgated on July 29, 1993. In this case, the Commission en banc had occasion to rule on the question of whether or not the Commission has the authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari in election cases. The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon. Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong, ruled that there is [a] law which grants the Commission, the exclusive authority to issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases, and there are also Supreme Court decisions, recent in fact, which declare that the Commission has no such authority precisely because; according to the decisions, there is no law granting such authority, and without any hint whatsoever of the existence of Sec. 50 of Batas vs. Pambansa Blg. 697. As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents were arguing that Sec. 50 of BP Blg. 697 was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985). Furthermore, in their answer, respondents cited Supreme Court decisions where it was declared that, indeed, the Commission has no jurisdiction to issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not been repealed. As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess, of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII). Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 5 It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's order of execution pending appeal and the writ of execution because [a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed on July 12, 1994 the court a quo had already lost jurisdiction over the case for as early as July 8, 1994, it had already acknowledged through its order

issued on that date, the perfection of the appeal of petitioner as in fact it ordered the elevation of the records of the case to this Honorable Commission. 6 Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil action. In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing is challenged resolution. As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment, opposed the petition by invoking the very arguments adduced by the respondent COMELEC in its challenged the resolution and the dissenting opinion in the Garcia and Uy cases. In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the respondent COMELEC postulates that it issued the said resolution after it had taken cognizance of the appeal interposed by the private respondent from the RTC decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uy cases, and therefore, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, thus: it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent powers to employ means necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court) and verily, there was no need for any statutory grant for that purpose. Indeed, in annulling the Order of Execution of the Regional Trial Court, public respondent did not exceed its jurisdiction since its action in this regard was necessary to preserve the subject of the appeal and to maintain the status quo of the parties pending the final outcome of its review of the correctness of the appealed decision. 7 It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had jurisdiction over the cases unlike in the instant case where the trial court had already given due course to the appeal and elevated the records of the case to the COMELEC which had taken cognizance of the appeal. This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on its merits. The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the Solicitor General is unacceptable. It goes against its theory in the assailed resolution and is not supported by the facts. The challenged resolution involves a case which the COMELEC docketed as a special relief case (SPR. No. 1-94). Under Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the special relief cases are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and contempt proceedings. The ordinary appeal from the RTC decision was, as disclosed in the challenged resolution; docketed as EAC No. 108-94. 8 Clearly then, the COMELEC had recognized and taken cognizance of two cases: one, the ordinary appeal from the RTC decision (EAC No. 108-94), and two, the special civil action for certiorari docketed as SPR No. 1-94. The two cases were not consolidated. The dissimilarities between them need no further elaboration. Since it issued the challenged resolution under the latter case, it cannot now be heard to state that it issued it as an incident in the former, the ordinary appeal. This erroneous contention of the Office of the of the Solicitor General notwithstanding, the position taken by the COMELEC in its resolution now in question paves the way for a re-examination of this Court's pronouncement in the Garcia and Uy cases. As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in Veloria, 10 this Court ruled that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction.

The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such jurisdiction. Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that the said law was, per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and in view of the passage of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular Batasang Pambansa, 11 this Court is then confronted with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697 became functus officio after the 14 May 1984 election of members of the regular Batasang Pambansa or the selection thereafter of the sectoral representatives at the latest, and whether it was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code. The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697 whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of sectoral representatives. In fact, by the very wording of the last paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit: Sec. 50. Definition. xxx xxx xxx The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. (Emphasis supplied). it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a specific period of time. Taken in the context of the conspicuous absence of such jurisdiction as ruled in Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections , 12 it seems quite obvious that the grant was intended as a remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationality resulting in a splitting of jurisdiction pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice De Castro in the said case. But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The repealing clause of the latter reads as follows: Sec. 282. Repealing clause. Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwise known as The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 .and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII. The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has been said: An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an express recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts. 13

This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14 By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that the Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all prior election statutes and to replace them with the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a reservation that all prior election statutes or parts thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall remain in force. That sentence predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on existing and prior acts of the same subject matter. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule on strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that, if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to express it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws. 15 This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code to determine if the former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter, It found none. In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases, We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows: The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to review the substance of the challenged resolution. That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five days 16 from 1 July 1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal, 17 or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction over the case. 18 Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion was filed

before the perfection of the appeal. 19 Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged resolution of 9 February 1995 of the Commission on Elections in SPR No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita Cumba vs. Manuel M. Relampagos, et al. " is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February 1995 is hereby LIFTED. No pronouncemnt as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 117040 May 4, 2000 RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents.

. . . Respondent was, from the time of [petitioner's] separation, offering to pay his last salary and proportionate 13th month pay less payment of his loan but he unreasonably refused to accept it . . . . . . . On October 11, 1991, [petitioner] together with all other employees holding the position of Security Checker were formally terminated by the Respondent Company on the ground of the adoption of cost saving devices. Accordingly, all the security checkers were duly paid one month for every year of service plus their last salaries and proportionate 13th month pay less payments for loans obtained from the Respondent Company and other dues deductible from their last salary. . . . [A]ll the security checkers with the sole exception of [petitioner] herein , gladly accepted the offer and readily got what was due to them and in turn, executed an "Affidavit of Quitclaim" manifesting their utter satisfaction to the offer of Respondent and expressed their waiver and quitclaim for any claims from the company. Respondent reserves the right to present such affidavits of quitclaim at the right opportune time. After a few months, [petitioner] did not manifest his reaction to the company's offer after he failed to appear on the day the Respondent scheduled the giving of the separation pay and other amounts due to them. The next time, Respondent received a word from [petitioner] was when it received this summons. 1 Joining issue with private respondent with respect to the validity of the latter's scheme for terminating the services of its security employees, petitioner contended before the Labor Arbiter: 2. [Petitioner's] dismissal is patently illegal. The constitutional duty of the state to protect the right of the laborers to security of tenure demands that an employer may be permitted to terminate the services of an employee only under conditions allowed by and with due process of law (Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., v. Regional Director/Minister of Labor, 168 SCRA 315). 3. This doctrinal pronouncement of the Highest Tribunal was wantonly disregarded by respondent in the instant case [a]s purely narrated by [petitioner] in his affidavit Annex "A." He performed his work faithfully and efficiently and he never transgressed the rules and regulations of company during the entire period of his employment. The commendation of the Company with regard to [petitioner's] exemplary performance are attached and marked as Annex "G" to "G-27" respectively. However, he was verbally told and notified by respondent[s] Human Resource Division Manager Teresita A. Villanueva that his employment was terminated on October 11, 1991 . . . . Indeed, it is mandatory for an employer to accord to the supposed errant or unwanted worker the legal requirements of written notice of the specific reason for the retrenchment and eventual termination of complainant and he should have been given a chance to present his side, otherwise, the worker's security of tenure would be at the pleasure of the employer. 2 Ruling on this issue as thus defined by the parties' pleadings, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner "was not afforded due process. Respondent merely issued to him a dismissal letter stating retrenchment as the sole ground for his dismissal." 3 But, as the Labor Arbiter found, private respondent failed to prove that it was laying off employees in order to

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.: Respondent Isetann Department Store moves for reconsideration of the decision in this case insofar as it is ordered to pay petitioner full backwages from the time the latter's employment was terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time it is determined that the termination of employment is for an authorized cause. The motion is opposed by petitioner. The decision is based on private respondent's failure to give petitioner a written notice of termination at least thirty (30) days before the termination of his employment as required by Art. 283 the Labor Code. In support of its motion, private respondent puts forth three principal arguments, to wit: (1) that its failure to give a written notice to petitioner at least thirty (30) days in advance in accordance with Art. 283 of the Labor Code is not in issue in this case because, as a matter of fact, it gave its employees in the affected security section thirty (30) days pay which effectively gave them thirty (30) days notice, and petitioner accepted this form of notice although he did not receive payment; (2) that payment of thirty (30) days pay in lieu of the thirty (30) days prior formal notice is more advantageous to an employee because instead of being required to work for thirty (30) days, the employee can look for another job while being paid by the company; and (3) that in any event the new ruling announced in this case should only be applied prospectively. Private respondent's contentions have no merit. First. Private respondent states that in September 1991, its employees in the security section were called to a meeting during which they were informed that a security agency would take over their work and that the employees would be paid "their last salaries, one month pay for every year of service and proportionate 13th month pay"; that all affected personnel, numbering around fifty (50), accepted the company's offer and stopped working by October 1, 1991, although they were paid their salaries up to October 31, 1991; that petitioner Ruben Serrano said he was reserving the right to take advantage of the offer but after several months brought this case before the Labor Arbiter's office. Private respondent claims that "petitioner accepted the mode of notice in this case [and] never questioned it" and that "not having been raised as an issue in the petition. . . the said notice requirement "lies outside the issues raised by the pleadings of the parties" and should not be passed upon by this Honorable Court." It is not true that the validity of private respondent's offer to pay thirty (30) days salary in lieu of the thirty (30) days written notice required under Art. 283 of the Labor Code was not raised in issue in this case. Private respondent itself raised the issue in its position paper before the Labor Arbiter's office, thus:

prevent or minimize losses. Accordingly, he ruled that petitioner had been illegally dismissed and ordered him to be reinstated and paid full backwages and other monetary benefits to which he was entitled. Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. Maintaining that it had complied with the notice requirement of the law, it said in its Memorandum on Appeal: POINT SIX. When the [Labor Arbiter's] decision finds that [petitioner] was not afforded due process, the Hon. Labor Arbiter failed to make distinction between termination by reason of "just causes" (Arts. 282, Labor Code) and termination for "authorized causes" (Art. 283 and 284, Labor Code). Due Process which is to afford an employee to explain why he should not be terminated is only required if termination is for just cause under Art. 282 but not [in] termination for authorized causes under Arts. 283 and 284 of the Labor Code. Termination for authorized causes requires notice of 30 days before the intended termination date or in lieu of notice, payment of wages for 30 days which respondent, in the case at bar, was willing to pay the complainant . 4 The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision not because it found that private respondent had complied with the notice requirement but only that petitioner's employment had been terminated for a cause authorized by law, i.e., redundancy. Accordingly, the NLRC ordered petitioner to be given separation pay in addition to the other monetary benefits to which he is entitled. Indeed, the NLRC failed to address the question of whether the notice requirement in Art. 283 had been complied with. Because of this gap in the NLRC decision, this Court, in affirming the decision, ordered the payment of full backwages to petitioner from October 11, 1991 when his employment was terminated without the requisite thirty (30) days written notice until the decision finding the termination to be for an authorized cause had become final. There is thus no basis for private respondent's allegation that its failure to give a written notice of termination to petitioner was never in issue and that, in awarding full backwages to petitioner for its failure to comply with the notice requirement of Art. 283 of the Labor Code, this court dealt "almost entirely" with a "non-issue." In any event, this Court has authority to inquire into any question necessary in arriving at a just decision of a case before it. 5 Second. It is contended that payment of petitioner's salary for thirty (30) days, "even when [he is] no longer working, is effective notice and is much better than 30 days formal notice but working until the end of the 30 day period." 6 Private respondent's letter of October 11, 1991, so it is claimed, was a mere reiteration of the oral notice previously given to petitioner in September that effective October 1, 1991, he and his fellow security checkers would no longer be required to work because they would be replaced by a security agency, although they would be given their salary for the month of October 1991. Private respondent's position has no basis in the law. The requirement to give a written notice of termination at least thirty (30) days in advance is a requirement of the Labor Code. Art. 283 provides: Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel . The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on

the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof . In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. (Emphasis added). As pointed out in Sebuguero v. National Labor Relations Conmission: 7 . . . [W]hat the law requires is a written notice to the employees concerned and that requirement is mandatory. The notice must also be given at least one month in advance of the intended date of retrenchment to enable the employees to look for other means of employment and therefore to ease the impact of the loss of their jobs and the corresponding income. Nothing in the law gives private respondent the option to substitute the required prior written notice with payment of thirty (30) days salary. It is not for private respondent to make substitutions for a right that a worker is legally entitled to. For instance, as held in Farmanlis Farms, Inc. v. Minister of Labor, 8 under the law, benefits in the form of food or free electricity, assuming they were given, were not a proper substitute for the 13th month pay required by law. Indeed, a job is more than the salary that it carries. Payment of thirty (30) days salary cannot compensate for the psychological effect or the stigma of immediately finding one's self laid off from work. It cannot be a fully effective substitute for the thirty (30) days written notice required by law especially when, as in this case, the fact is that no notice was given to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Besides, as we held in our decision in this case, 9 the purpose of such previous notice is to give the employee some time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job as well as the DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the verity of the alleged authorized cause of termination. Such purpose would not be served by the simple expedient of paying thirty (30) days salary in lieu of notice of an employee's impending dismissal, as by then the loss of employment would have been a fait accompli. Private respondent nevertheless claims that payment of thirty (30) days salary in lieu of written notice given thirty (30) days before the termination of employment is in accordance with our ruling in Associated Labor Unions-VIMCONTU v. NLRC. 10 This claim will not bear analysis. In that case, the employees and the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) were notified in writing on August 5, 1983 that the employees' services would cease on August 31, 1983 but that they would be paid their salaries and other benefits until September 5, 1983. It was held that such written notice was "more than substantial compliance" with the notice requirement of the Labor Code. Indeed, there was "more than substantial compliance" with the law in that case because, in addition to the advance written notice required under Art. 284 (now Art. 283) of the Labor Code, the employees were paid for five days, from September 1 to 5, 1993, even if they rendered no service for the period. But, in the case at bar, there was no written notice given to petitioner at least thirty (30) days before the termination of his employment. Had private respondent given a written notice to petitioner on October 1, 1991, at the latest,

that effective October 31, 1991 his employment would cease although from October 1 he would no longer be required to work, there would be basis for private respondent's boast that "[payment] of this salary even [if he is] no longer working is effective notice and is much better than 30 days formal notice but working until the end of the 30 days period." This is not the case here, however. What happened here was that on October 11, 1991, petitioner was given a memorandum terminating his employment effective on the same day on the ground of retrenchment (actually redundancy). Third. It is contended that private respondent's non-observance of the notice requirement should not be visited with a severe consequence in accordance with Art. III, 19(1) of the Constitution. The contention is without merit. In the first place, Art. III, 19(1) of the Constitution, prohibiting the imposition of excessive fines, applies only to criminal prosecutions. In the second place, the decision in this case, providing for the payment of full backwages for failure of an employer to give notice, seeks to vindicate the employee's right to notice before he is dismissed or laid off, while recognizing the right of the employer to dismiss for any of the just causes enumerated in Art. 282 or to terminate employment for any of the authorized causes mentioned in Arts. 283-284. 11 The order to pay full backwages is a consequence of the employer's action in dismissing an employee without notice which makes said dismissal ineffectual. 12 The employee is considered not to have been terminated from his employment until it is finally determined that his dismissal/termination of employment was for cause and, therefore, he should be paid his salaries in the interim. This eliminates guesswork in determining the degree of prejudice suffered by an employee dismissed with cause but without notice since the penalty is measured by the salary he failed to earn on account of his dismissal/termination of employment. Fourth. Private respondent finally contends that, in any event, the new doctrine announced in this case should only be applied prospectively. Private respondent invokes the ruling in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 1 that [While] a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, [this is] subject to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. It is apparent that private respondent misconceived the import of the ruling. The decision in Columbia Pictures does not mean that if a new rule is laid down in a case, it should not be applied in that case but that said rule should apply prospectively to cases arising afterwards. Private respondent's view of the principle of prospective application of new judicial doctrines would turn the judicial function into a mere academic exercise with the result that the doctrine laid down would be no more than a dictum and would deprive the holding in the case of any force. Indeed, when the Court formulated the Wenphil doctrine, 14 which we reverse in this case, the Court did not defer application of the rule laid down imposing a fine on the employer for failure to give notice in a case of dismissal for cause. To the contrary, the new rule was applied right then and there. For that matter, in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals 15 the Court laid down the rule that in determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases, the court must require the production of the master tapes of copyrighted films in order to compare them with the "pirated" copies. The new rule was applied in opinion of the Court written by Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in the very same case of 20th Century Fox in which the new

requirement was laid down. Where the new rule was held to be prospective in application was in Columbia Pictures and that was because at the time the search warrant in that case was issued, the new standard had not yet been announced so it would be unreasonable to expect the judge issuing the search warrant to apply a rule that had not been announced at the time. A good illustration of the scope of overruling decisions is People v. Mapa, 16 where the accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The accused invoked the ruling in an earlier case 17 that appointment as a secret agent of a provincial governor to assist in the maintenance of peace and order sufficiently put the appointee in the category of a "peace officer" equal to a member of the municipal police authorized under 879 of the Administrative Code of 1917 to carry firearms. The Court rejected the accused's contention and overruled the prior decision in People v. Macarandang on the ground that 879 of the Administrative Code of 1917 was explicit and only those expressly mentioned therein were entitled to possess firearms. Since secret agents were not among those mentioned, they were not authorized to possess firearms. Although in People v. Jabinal 18 the Court refused to give retro active effect to its decision in Mapa, because the new doctrine "should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith thereon" and, for this reason, it acquitted the accused of illegal possession of firearms, nonetheless it applied the new ruling (that secret agents of provincial governors were not authorized to possess firearms) in the very case in which the new rule was announced and convicted the accused. In the case at bar, since private respondent does not even claim that it has relied in good faith on the former doctrine of Wenphil and its progeny Sebuguero v. NLRC, there is no reason not to apply the new standard to this case. WHEREFORE, private respondent's motion for reconsideration is DENIED with finality for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 121905 May 20, 1999 VITARICH CORPORATION, DANILO SARMIENTO and ONOFRE SEBASTIAN, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ISAGANI E. RECODO, respondents.

On 6 June 1992 a cash audit generated these findings: (a) cash collections were diverted to defray the area's operational and administrative expenses as the revolving fund was consumed before its replenishment in the form of countersigned checks from Cebu came; (b) personal "vales" (cash advances) were disbursed from the revolving fund in violation of company policies; and, (c) payments to suppliers were 7 taken from the revolving fund instead of being paid in checks. But, unlike in the first two audit examinations where no action was taken by VITARICH after receipt of the corresponding reports, Recodo this time was required to explain why he allowed the 8 reported violations of company policies. In his letter of 11 August 1992 Recodo clarified that the alleged personal "vales" were actually for business expenses and for wages of employees and that the use of collections to dafay operational and administrative expenses was unavoidable particularly when the chartered vessel was on dock unloading feeds while the replenishment of the revolving fund was delayed. He further assured VITARICH that all transactions with stevedores, shipping lines, PAL and piece workers were all on 9 C.O.D. basis. Admittedly, when petitioner Onofre Sebastian took over in June 1992 as Division head he was faced with a high volume of account receivables (A/R) accumulated during the time of Ben Cruz, his predecessor. To address the problem petitioner Sebastian and respondent Recodo conferred in the middle of July 1992 with the latter being instructed to cut down the accountabilities of Rex Cordova, a company salesman in Iloilo. Thereafter Recodo advised Cordova to reduce his technical credit extensions. In less than a month, the amount of account receivables was reduced 10 from P800,000.00 to P205,000.00. . However on 27 August 1992 Recodo was asked again to explain within forty-eight (48) hours why he should not be terminated for failure to ground Rex Cordova in accordance with the 4 August 1992 memorandum of vice president Onofre Sebastian.1wphi1.nt The other grounds cited for terminating Recodo were his failure to reduce Cordova's A/R driver, the allowance of extension of his credit line, as well as the 11 misrepresentation of his outstanding A/R. The memorandum of 4 August 1992 instructed Recodo to confirm all A/R drivers who were already two (2) weeks overdue to preclude any ghost deliveries and to ground all salesmen with A/R drivers who were already thirty (30) days old so that they could only resume deliveries after 12 accounts were collected or payment arrangements were made. In his 5 September 1992 letter Recodo explained that only the first paragraph of the faxed memorandum was readable so he had it verified. He only learned its full context when he was negotiating for the security of Cordova's past accounts. Thus, he postponed grounding Cordova until 20 August 1992 in order to bring about positive results. The negotiation reduced Cordova's A/R driver from P800,000.00 to P250,000.00 as of 19 August 1992 which amount would be further lowered to P150,000.00 by September. The alleged misrepresentation in the figures given was 13 not deliberate but was merely a mental lapse due to tension at work. After investigation, E.T. Enriquez, Head of Personnel, submitted his report on Recodo's alleged insubordination. Enriquez found that there was "no defensible ground for terminating (Recodo's) services." He cited as reasons therefor the nondocumentation of any warning given to Recodo to justify any loss of trust and 14 confidence in him. Nevertheless, VITARICH terminated Recodo on 15 October 1992 for violation of the 4 August 1992 Memorandum including policies on credit extensions and cash advances.

BELLOSILLO, J.: VITARICH CORPORATION (VITARICH), together with its co-petitioners Danilo 1 Sarmiento and Onofre Sebastian, through this petition for certiorari, assails as grave abuse of discretion the reversal of its previous decision by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Private respondent Isagani E. Recodo was hired by VITARICH, a feeds manufacturing corporation, as an Accounting Clerk in its office in Marilao, Bulacan. In 1979, he was promoted as Accounting Supervisor, then in 1986 as Sales Superintendent while assigned in Davao City. In 1988 he became the Sales Manager 2 for Western Visayas based in Iloilo City with a monthly salary of P18,200.00. As Sales Manager Recodo was supervised successively by three (3) division heads who were his immediate supervisors, namely, Dave Fernandez (1988-1989), Ben Cruz (1990-1992), and Onofre Sebastian (15 June 1992 up to Recodo's termination). 3 He also underwent several audit examinations in his line of work. In March 1991 VITARICH conducted an audit in Iloilo in response to a letter of a 4 certain Espinosa pointing to anomalies in the backloading and arrastre transactions of Recodo. The evaluation of the audit team found no concrete evidence that Recodo was receiving direct commission from the backloading of the chartered vessel but faulted him for his inadequate exercise of internal control regarding the matter, and no evidence either that Recodo had been receiving a share in the arrastre since the shipper and the arrastre operators managed by the Espinosa family denied this. However, an unaccounted difference of P14,002.50 in the backloading profits surfaced. Consequently, the audit team recommended that bills of lading should cover all backloading shipments; all collections from backloading shipment should be directly paid to the cashier who is responsible for procedural controls; and, incentive payments to the captain of the vessel and the cash advances for the port expenses 5 should be covered by pro performs. On 25 June 1992 another audit report was submitted detailing the accommodation of Mr. Elbert Jeanjacquet as a trade client whose account was 74% past due and unsecured yet was allowed as a contract grower for two thousand (2,000) chicken heads. The accounts of twelve (12) other customers granted extensions over and beyond the credit limit were further enumerated in the report. Except for two, all these 6 accounts did not have any collaterals to secure them.

On 13 October 1992, Recodo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of managerial incentive bonus and for moral and exemplary damages. Initially the complaint was directed against VITARICH and its president Danilo Sarmiento, but on 21 January 1993 vice president Onofre Sebastian was also included as respondent. On 23 June 1993 the Labor Arbiter adjudged VITARICH and its impleaded officers guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered them to pay Recodo seven (7) months back wages from November 1992 to May 1993 in the total amount of P418,600.00 plus 10% attorney's fees of P41,860.00. A separation pay of P291,200.00 was granted Recodo because reinstatement was no longer feasible in view of the strained relations between the parties. Moral and exemplary damages were not awarded since there was no finding of a valid reason to do so. For one to be entitled to theses damages, the manner in which the dismissal was made must be deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. In this case the Labor Arbiter found no proof that petitioners acted in bad faith when they dismissed Recodo from employment. The claim for management incentive bonus was likewise denied as the grant of a bonus is 15 a management prerogative. The Labor Arbiter pointed out that although VITARICH justified the dismissal of Recodo by the audit reports on backloading, unauthorized credit extensions and cash disbursements and insubordination the company's dismissal letter was only anchored on insubordination without any mention of the past audits as bases thereof. Consequently, for want of prior notice, the Labor Arbiter ruled that lack of due process attended Recodo's termination. Nonetheless, the evidence of VITARICH relative to the charges of backloading and unauthorized transactions was examined. Thus, the Labor Arbiter reached the following conclusions: Firstly, there was no concrete evidence to support the claim that Recodo was receiving commissions or profited through hidden deals in the backloading transactions; nor did the company suffer any material loss as it even profited substantially therefrom. The Labor Arbiter noted that the transactions were undertaken upon the instructions of Recodo's supervisor, Dave Fernandez, hence, officially authorized by the company. They were properly documented by bills of lading considering that the shipper would suffer legal 16 and other constraints if it were otherwise. Secondly, credit extension limits, unsecured accounts and disbursements of cash collection for operational and administrative expenses were already part of the system when petitioner Onofre Sebastian took the helm as division head and instructed Recodo to solve the problems. Recodo exerted efforts to do so, especially with the reduction of Cordova's account and accomplished the lowering of overdue and unsecured accounts within a 17 month. It was clear that the cash disbursements were utilized for official business. Lastly, the Labor Arbiter significantly found that Recodo's explanation to the charges imputed to him by VITARICH was sincere and reasonable and that any breaches in company policies he might have committed were only ordinary, not willful to warrant 18 his dismissal. On appeal by VITARICH, the NLRC while finding a lack of due process in Recodo's dismissal reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision on the following rationale: (a) had the backloading transactions been properly handled by Recodo the profits would have been greater, hence, VITARICH suffered losses by such mismanagement; (b) although the backloading transactions were authorized by the division head, the proper handling thereof was the duty of Recodo and his failure to do so was enough basis for the company's loss of confidence in him; (c) violations of company policies were not mere carelessness since they were due to mismanagement by Recodo; (d)

the non-grounding of salesman Cordova might have had a sincere and reasonable explanation but the very act of defying management's specific directives constituted a strong ground for its loss of trust and confidence; and, (e) Recodo's failure to require security for accounts and his allowing them to exceed the limit were contrary to accepted business practices and company policies. All told then, the series of infractions committed by Recodo were enough bases for his termination. Thus, in its 19 September 1994 decision, the NLRC set aside the judgment of the Labor Arbiter but awarded Recodo a P2,000.00 indemnity fee because he was 19 terminated without due process. Upon motion for reconsideration by Recodo, the NLRC issued its assailed resolution of 18 July 1995 reversing its earlier decision. It acknowledged that its previous decision was flawed by surmises on the backloading transactions, conjectures on the credit line extensions and speculations on the grounding of Cordova. The resolution applied the time-honored doctrine that the Labor Arbiter, as a trier of facts, had the superior oppotunity to test the credibility of witnesses and the veracity of the documentary evidence submitted. It further upheld the findings and recommendations of the audit teams that failed to find the accusation that Recodo violated a number of 20 company policies. On 14 August 1995 the NLRC denied a motion for reconsideration by VITARICH, hence, this petition based on the sole allegation that the reversal was a grave abuse 21 of discretion as it was the main decision which was in accord with the facts. We are not persuaded by VITARICH. In rectifying its previous appreciation and NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less grave. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is suffused with the established facts and a correct understanding of them. Consequently, it is but proper for NLRC to abandon its former stance and adopt the Labor Arbiter. We can only agree with the 22 preliminary statement by the NLRC in its 18 July 1995 resolutionn One of the inherent powers of the Court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice includes the right to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgement, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant (Astraquillo v. Javier, L-20034, January 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 125). It is beyond question that the issue on the dismissal of Recodo was not any of the backloading, credit limit and cash disbursement transactions insisted on by VITARICH as sufficient reasons for Recodo's dimissal but, as incisively pointed out by the Labor Arbiter, the alleged insubordination of Recodo. The very inaction by VITARICH on every audit belies its posture that it had lost its trust and confidence in Recodo as a consequence of the audit results. That it did not even notify Recodo of any charge against him after each audit nor that it asked for any explanation from him therefor, only proves that the imputations of alleged company violations were nothing more than mere garnishings to the more relevant charge of insubordination. The records do not even show that VITARICH deemed it necessary to penalize Recodo, not even only to warn him of any infraction. In fact, except for the alleged insubordination, it did not include any other charge against him in the termination notice.

Quite obviously, since the alleged insubordination could not stand on its own merit, VITARICH had to prop it up with charges that had already been forgotten, set aside and deemed inconsequential. Being a mere afterthought to justify its earlier action of terminating Recodo, the allegations of policy violations do not constitute just causes of dismissal on account of the lack of confidence contemplated in Midas Touch Food 23 Corporation v. NLRC under which the guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of confidence are: (a) loss of confidence which should not be simulated; (b) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; (c) it should not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and, (d) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. Of the charge of insubordination, there is concrete evidence on record that Recodo was instructed by his superior to ground all all salesmen with due accounts; that Recodo delayed implementing the order and eventually grounded Cordova only after being made to explain his previous inaction. Apparently, there was a lawful, reasonable order to Recodo to support his actuations. While it may be true that there was a delay by Recodo in the implementation of his superior's order as regards Cordova's accounts, the question now to be resolved is whether the delay constitutes disobedience. If so, was it willful on the part of Recodo to risk his tenure in office based on loss of confidence? In AHS/Philippines, Inc. v. CA 24 we explained . . . willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two (2) requisites: the employees assailed conduct must be willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In its assailed resolution, the NLRC found
25

WHEREFORE, the questioned resolution of the NLRC of 18 July 1995 reinstating the 23 June 1993 decision of the Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED with the modification that the corresponding back wages of respondent ISAGANI E. RECODO be forthwith updated and released to him.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

It would appear from the foregoing facts that the non-compliance by the complainant of the directive of Onofre Sebastian was not an open defiance to said directive but as one of the discretions which he has (sic) to take under the circumstances in his capacity as sales manager which to his mind would better serve the interest of the company. And true enough, his act turned to be more beneficial rather than being prejudicial to the company as it was shown earlier. While an employer is allowed a wide latitude to dismiss managerial employees on loss of trust and confidence, still the loss thereof must have some basis and must be proved by the employer otherwise the social justice policy of the labor laws and the 26 Constitution will be for naught. This very norm of social justice demands the presumption of good faith credited to the employees in the performance of their duties 27 upon failure of their employer to prove just cause for their dismissal. It is in obedience to the mandate of social justice and truth that the NLRC reversed its own decision contrary to the pull of pride and hubris, and for this, the NLRC must be commended, instead of censured, for reversing itself.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 154618 April 14, 2004

ordering defendants to immediately return and deliver to plaintiff its equipment, machineries and the materials to be used for fiber-optic components which were left in the plant of Integrated Silicon. It further prayed that defendants be ordered to pay actual and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.11 Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C,12 on the grounds of lack of Agilents legal capacity to sue;13 litis pendentia;14 forum shopping;15 and failure to state a cause of action.16 On September 4, 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted petitioner Agilents application for a writ of replevin.17 Without filing a motion for reconsideration, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.18 In the meantime, upon motion filed by respondents, Judge Antonio S. Pozas of Branch 92 voluntarily inhibited himself in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. The case was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 35, the same branch where Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C is pending. On August 12, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted respondents petit ion for certiorari, set aside the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 4, 2001, and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. Hence, the instant petition raising the following errors: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT DISMISSING RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE RESORTING TO THE REMEDY OF CERTIORARI. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3123-2001-C BELOW ON THE GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3110-2001C. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3123-2001-C BELOW ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 31102001-C. IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 323-2001-C BELOW INSTEAD OF ORDERING IT CONSOLIDATED WITH CIVIL CASE NO. 3110-2001-C.19 The two primary issues raised in this petition: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in giving due course to respondents petition, notwithstanding the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the September 4, 2001 Order; and (2) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. We find merit in the petition. The Court of Appeals, citing the case of Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO v. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc.,20 held that the lower court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C

AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES SINGAPORE (PTE) LTD., petitioner, vs. INTEGRATED SILICON TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, TEOH KIANG HONG, TEOH KIANG SENG, ANTHONY CHOO, JOANNE KATE M. DELA CRUZ, JEAN KAY M. DELA CRUZ and ROLANDO T. NACILLA, respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review assails the Decision dated August 12, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66574, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C and annulled and set aside the Order dated September 4, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92. Petitioner Agilent Technologies Singapore (Pte.), Ltd. ("Agilent") is a foreign corporation, which, by its own admission, is not licensed to do business in the Philippines. 1 Respondent Integrated Silicon Technology Philippines Corporation ("Integrated Silicon") is a private domestic corporation, 100% foreign owned, which is engaged in the business of manufacturing and assembling electronics components.2 Respondents Teoh Kiang Hong, Teoh Kiang Seng and Anthony Choo, Malaysian nationals, are current members of Integrated Silicons board of directors, while Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz, and Rolando T. Nacilla are its former members.3 The juridical relation among the various parties in this case can be traced to a 5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement ("VAASA"), entered into on April 2, 1996 between Integrated Silicon and the Hewlett-Packard Singapore (Pte.) Ltd., Singapore Components Operation ("HP-Singapore").4 Under the terms of the VAASA, Integrated Silicon was to locally manufacture and assemble fiber optics for export to HP-Singapore. HP-Singapore, for its part, was to consign raw materials to Integrated Silicon; transport machinery to the plant of Integrated Silicon; and pay Integrated Silicon the purchase price of the finished products.5 The VAASA had a five-year term, beginning on April 2, 1996, with a provision for annual renewal by mutual written consent.6 On September 19, 1999, with the consent of Integrated Silicon, 7 HP-Singapore assigned all its rights and obligations in the VAASA to Agilent.8 On May 25, 2001, Integrated Silicon filed a complaint for "Specific Performance and Damages" against Agilent and its officers Tan Bian Ee, Lim Chin Hong, Tey Boon Teck and Francis Khor, docketed as Civil Case No. 3110-01-C. It alleged that Agilent breached the parties oral agreement to extend the VAASA. Integrated Silicon thus prayed that defendant be ordered to execute a written extension of the VAASA for a period of five years as earlier assured and promised; to comply with the extended VAASA; and to pay actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.9 On June 1, 2001, summons and a copy of the complaint were served on Atty. Ramon Quisumbing, who returned these processes on the claim that he was not the registered agent of Agilent. Later, he entered a special appearance to assail the courts jurisdiction over the person of Agilent. On July 2, 2001, Agilent filed a separate complaint against Integrated Silicon, Teoh Kang Seng, Teoh Kiang Gong, Anthony Choo, Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz and Rolando T. Nacilla,10 for "Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages", before the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92, docketed as Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. Agilent prayed that a writ of replevin or, in the alternative, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, be issued

because of the pendency of Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C and, therefore, a motion for reconsideration was not necessary before resort to a petition for certiorari. This was error. Jurisdiction is fixed by law. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 vests jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C in the RTC.21 The Court of Appeals ruling that the assailed Order issued by the RTC of Calamba, Branch 92, was a nullity for lack of jurisdiction due to litis pendentia and forum shopping, has no legal basis. The pendency of another action does not strip a court of the jurisdiction granted by law. The Court of Appeals further ruled that a Motion for Reconsideration was not necessary in view of the urgent necessity in this case. We are not convinced. In the case of Bache and Co. (Phils.), Inc. v. Ruiz,22 relied on by the Court of Appeals, it was held that "time is of the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, on account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary." Tax assessments in that case were based on documents seized by virtue of an illegal search, and the deprivation of the right to due process tainted the entire proceedings with illegality. Hence, the urgent necessity of preventing the enforcement of the tax assessments was patent. Respondents, on the other hand, cite the case of Geronimo v. Commission on Elections,23 where the urgent necessity of resolving a disqualification case for a position in local government warranted the expeditious resort to certiorari. In the case at bar, there is no analogously urgent circumstance which would necessitate the relaxation of the rule on a Motion for Reconsideration. Indeed, none of the exceptions for dispensing with a Motion for Reconsideration is present here. None of the following cases cited by respondents serves as adequate basis for their procedural lapse. In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 24 the questioned order was null and void for failure of respondent tribunal to comply with due process requirements; in Matanguihan v. Tengco,25 the questioned order was a patent nullity for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the defendants, which fact the records plainly disclosed; and in National Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals,26 the questioned orders were void for vagueness. No such patent nullity is evident in the Order issued by the trial court in this case. Finally, while urgency may be a ground for dispensing with a Motion for Reconsideration, in the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,27 cited by respondents, the slow progress of the case would have rendered the issues moot had a motion for reconsideration been availed of. We find no such urgent circumstance in the case at bar. Respondents, therefore, availed of a premature remedy when they immediately raised the matter to the Court of Appeals on certiorari; and the appellate court committed reversible error when it took cognizance of respondents petition instead of dismissing the same outright. We come now to the substantive issues of the petition. Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means "a pending suit." It is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. While it is normally connected with the control which the court has on a property involved in a suit during the continuance proceedings, it is more interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and

(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.28 The Court of Appeals correctly appreciated the identity of parties in Civil Cases No. 3123-2001C and 3110-2001-C. Well-settled is the rule that lis pendens requires only substantial, and not absolute, identity of parties.29 There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.30 The parties in these cases are vying over the interests of the two opposing corporations; the individuals are only incidentally impleaded, being the natural persons purportedly accused of violating these corporations rights. Likewise, the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.31 The identity of parties notwithstanding, litis pendentia does not obtain in this case because of the absence of the second and third requisites. The rights asserted in each of the cases involved are separate and distinct; there are two subjects of controversy presented for adjudication; and two causes of action are clearly involved. The fact that respondents instituted a prior action for "Specific Performance and Damages" is not a ground for defeating the petitioners action for "Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages." In Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C filed by respondents, the issue is whether or not there was a breach of an oral promise to renew of the VAASA. The issue in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, filed by petitioner, is whether petitioner has the right to take possession of the subject properties. Petitioners right of possession is founded on the ownership of the subject goods, which ownership is not disputed and is not contingent on the extension or non-extension of the VAASA. Hence, the replevin suit can validly be tried even while the prior suit is being litigated in the Regional Trial Court. Possession of the subject properties is not an issue in Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C. The reliefs sought by respondent Integrated Silicon therein are as follows: (1) execution of a written extension or renewal of the VAASA; (2) compliance with the extended VAASA; and (3) payment of overdue accounts, damages, and attorneys fees. The reliefs sought by petitioner Ag ilent in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, on the other hand, are as follows: (1) issuance of a Writ of Replevin or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction; (2) recovery of possession of the subject properties; (3) damages and attorneys fees. Concededly, some items or pieces of evidence may be admissible in both actions. It cannot be said, however, that exactly the same evidence will support the decisions in both, since the legally significant and controlling facts in each case are entirely different. Although the VAASA figures prominently in both suits, Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C is premised on a purported breach of an oral obligation to extend the VAASA, and damages arising out of Agilents alleged failure to comply with such purported extension. Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, on the other hand, is premised on a breach of the VAASA itself, and damages arising to Agilent out of that purported breach. It necessarily follows that the third requisite for litis pendentia is also absent. The following are the elements of res judicata: (a) The former judgment must be final; (b) The court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (c) It must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) There must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.32

In this case, any judgment rendered in one of the actions will not amount to res judicata in the other action. There being different causes of action, the decision in one case will not constitute res judicata as to the other. Of course, a decision in one case may, to a certain extent, affect the other case. This, however, is not the test to determine the identity of the causes of action. Whatever difficulties or inconvenience may be entailed if both causes of action are pursued on separate remedies, the proper solution is not the dismissal order of the Court of Appeals. The possible consolidation of said cases, as well as stipulations and appropriate modes of discovery, may well be considered by the court below to subserve not only procedural expedience but, more important, the ends of justice.33 We now proceed to the issue of forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum-shopping was laid down in the case of Buan v. Lopez.34 Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the final other. There being no litis pendentia in this case, a judgment in the said case will not amount to res judicata in Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C, and respondents contention on forum shopping must likewise fail. We are not unmindful of the afflictive consequences that may be suffered by both petitioner and respondents if replevin is granted by the trial court in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. If respondent Integrated Silicon eventually wins Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C, and the VAASAs terms are extended, petitioner corporation will have to comply with its obligations thereunder, which would include the consignment of properties similar to those it may recover by way of replevin in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. However, petitioner will also suffer an injustice if denied the remedy of replevin, resort to which is not only allowed but encouraged by law. Respondents argue that since Agilent is an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, it lacks the legal capacity to file suit. 35 The assailed acts of petitioner Agilent, purportedly in the nature of "doing business" in the Philippines, are the following: (1) mere entering into the VAASA, which is a "service contract"; 36 (2) appointment of a full-time representative in Integrated Silicon, to "oversee and supervise the production" of Agilents products;37 (3) the appointment by Agilent of six full-time staff members, who were permanently stationed at Integrated Silicons facilities in order to inspect the finished goods for Agilent; 38 and (4) Agilents participation in the management, supervision and control of Integrated Silicon, 39 including instructing Integrated Silicon to hire more employees to meet Agilents increasing production needs,40 regularly performing quality audit, evaluation and supervision of Integrated Silicons employees,41 regularly performing inventory audit of raw materials to be used by Integrated Silicon, which was also required to provide weekly inventory updates to Agilent, 42 and providing and dictating Integrated Silicon on the daily production schedule, volume and models of the products to manufacture and ship for Agilent.43 A foreign corporation without a license is not ipso facto incapacitated from bringing an action in Philippine courts. A license is necessary only if a foreign corporation is "transacting" or "doing business" in the country. The Corporation Code provides: Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. The aforementioned provision prevents an unlicensed foreign corporation "doing business" in the Philippines from accessing our courts. In a number of cases, however, we have held that an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may bring suit in Philippine courts against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited from said corporation. 44 Such a suit is premised on

the doctrine of estoppel. A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. This doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity applies to foreign as well as domestic corporations.45 The application of this principle prevents a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract.46 The principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be condensed in four statements: (1) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine courts; 47 (2) if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction48; (3) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the foreign corporations corporate personality in a suit brought before Philippine courts;49 and (4) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction. The challenge to Agilents legal capacity to file suit hinges on whether or not it is doing business in the Philippines. However, there is no definitive rule on what constitutes "doing", "engaging in", or "transacting" business in the Philippines, as this Court observed in the case of Mentholatum v. Mangaliman.50 The Corporation Code itself is silent as to what acts constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has it, however, that the term "implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization."51 In Mentholatum,52 this Court discoursed on the two general tests to determine whether or not a foreign corporation can be considered as "doing business" in the Philippines. The first of these is the substance test, thus:53 The true test [for doing business], however, seems to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. The second test is the continuity test, expressed thus:54 The term [doing business] implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization. Although each case must be judged in light of its attendant circumstances, jurisprudence has evolved several guiding principles for the application of these tests. For instance, considering that it transacted with its Philippine counterpart for seven years, engaging in futures contracts, this Court concluded that the foreign corporation in Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Spouses Lara,55 was doing business in the Philippines. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Japan Airlines ("JAL"),56 the Court held that JAL was doing business in the Philippines, i.e., its commercial dealings in the country were continuous despite the fact that no JAL aircraft landed in the country as it sold tickets in the Philippines through a general sales agent, and opened a promotions office here as well. In General Corp. of the Phils. v. Union Insurance Society of Canton and Firemans Fund Insurance,57 a foreign insurance corporation was held to be doing business in the Philippines, as it appointed a settling agent here, and issued 12 marine insurance policies. We held that these transactions were not isolated or casual, but manifested the continuity of the foreign corporations conduct and its intent to establish a continuous business in the country. In Eriks PTE Ltd. v. Court of Appeals and Enriquez,58 the foreign corporation sold its products to a Filipino buyer who ordered the goods 16 times within an eight-month period. Accordingly, this

Court ruled that the corporation was doing business in the Philippines, as there was a clear intention on its part to continue the body of its business here, despite the relatively short span of time involved. Communication Materials and Design, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, ITEC, et al.59 and Top-Weld Manufacturing v. ECED, IRTI, et al.60 both involved the License and Technical Agreement and Distributor Agreement of foreign corporations with their respective local counterparts that were the primary bases for the Courts ruling that the foreign corporations were doing business in the Philippines.61 In particular, the Court cited the highly restrictive nature of certain provisions in the agreements involved, such that, as stated in Communication Materials, the Philippine entity is reduced to a mere extension or instrument of the foreign corporation. For example, in Communication Materials, the Court deemed the "No Competing Product" provision of the Representative Agreement therein restrictive. 62 The case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having been adopted with some qualifications in various pieces of legislation. The Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (the "FIA"; Republic Act No. 7042, as amended), defines "doing business" as follows: Sec. 3, par. (d). The phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity, or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization. An analysis of the relevant case law, in conjunction with Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended by Republic Act No. 8179), would demonstrate that the acts enumerated in the VAASA do not constitute "doing business" in the Philippines. Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended by Republic Act No. 8179) provides that the following shall not be deemed "doing business": (1) Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; (2) Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interest in such corporation; (3) Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in the representatives or distributors own name and account; (4) The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast media; (5) Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by another entity in the Philippines; (6) Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be used in the processing of products for export; (7) Collecting information in the Philippines; and (8) Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale which are not on a continuing basis, such as installing in the Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines, servicing the

same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental services. By and large, to constitute "doing business", the activity to be undertaken in the Philippines is one that is for profit-making.63 By the clear terms of the VAASA, Agilents activities in the Philippines were confined to (1) maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by Integrated Silicon; and (2) consignment of equipment with Integrated Silicon to be used in the processing of products for export. As such, we hold that, based on the evidence presented thus far, Agilent cannot be deemed to be "doing business" in the Philippines. Respondents contention that Agilent lacks the legal capacity to file suit is therefore devoid of merit. As a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, it needed no license before it can sue before our courts. Finally, as to Agilents purported failure to state a cause of action against the individual respondents, we likewise rule in favor of petitioner. A Motion to Dismiss hypothetically admits all the allegations in the Complaint, which plainly alleges that these individual respondents had committed or permitted the commission of acts prejudicial to Agilent. Whether or not these individuals had divested themselves of their interests in Integrated Silicon, or are no longer members of Integrated Silicons Board of Directors, is a matter of defense best threshed out during trial. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66574 dated August 12, 2002, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated September 4, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92, in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, is REINSTATED. Agilents application for a Writ of Replevin is GRANTED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 125607 March 18, 2004

13, 1965 and the corresponding TCT Nos. 117134 and 117094, and reconveyance of the First and Second Parcels. They alleged that both parcels were fraudulently registered in the name of Pastor Cayabyab by means of the forged Deeds of Absolute Sale. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 15298. On February 28, 1977, Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab entered into an agreement of counter guaranty with the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines (ICP) with respect to the Second Parcel. On June 12, 1977, Pastor Cayabyab mortgaged6 the First Parcel to the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo. On October 10, 1977, Pastor Cayabyab sold the First Parcel to Rosafina Reginaldo for P15,000.00 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.7 Subsequently, TCT No. 117134 was cancelled and TCT No. 1243048 was issued in the name of Rosafina Reginaldo on October 11, 1977. On the same day, the mortgage over the First Parcel was cancelled. 9 On December 23, 1977, Rosafina Reginaldo mortgaged10 the First Parcel to the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00. Meanwhile, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 15298 proceeded. Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab filed an Answer asserting the validity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale but were subsequently declared in default after failing to appear at the pre-trial conference. Thus, the plaintiffs were allowed to present evidence ex-parte. In a decision11 dated June 17, 1978, the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1965 and March 3, 1976, and the corresponding TCT Nos. 117094 and 117134 covering the Second and First Parcels, respectively, null and void. The court, however, denied the prayer for reconveyance in view of the plaintiffs evidence attesting to the fact that Eulalia Cayabyab is still the owner and possessor of the subject properties. No appeal was taken and the decision consequently became final. On April 21, 1981, the mortgage over the First Parcel was foreclosed and the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, as the highest bidder, bought the property.12 The bank consolidated its title on August 2, 198213 and TCT No. 14247914 cancelling TCT No. 124304 was issued in its name on August 19, 1982. In a Deed of Absolute Sale15 dated September 3, 1982, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo sold the First Parcel to Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab for the amount of P7,221.95. Two days later, the latter were issued TCT No. 14288716 cancelling TCT No. 142479. For the amount of P10,000.00, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab sold the First Parcel to Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate Property17 dated January 14, 1983. On January 25, 1983, TCT No. 143859 18 cancelling TCT No. 142887 was issued in the name of the Ramos spouses. On June 8, 1983, the petitioners herein as plaintiffs, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 37, a Verified Complaint19 docketed as Civil Case No. 15937 against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos and ICP. They prayed for the annulment of the deeds of sale in favor of Rosafina Reginaldo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael Ramos and Rosemarie Cayabyab; cancellation of TCT Nos. 124304, 142479, 142887, and 143859 issued in favor of Rosafina Reginaldo, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos, respectively; and recovery of possession of the First and Second Parcels by virtue of an alleged deed of donation inter vivos purportedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab in favor of the petitioners herein.

RUFINA C. CAYANA, JOSEFINA C. RABINA, MERCEDES C. DE GUZMAN, and SUSANA C. SAMBALE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. PASTOR & ROSITA CAYABYAB, SPS. MARCELIANO & ROSALIA CAYABYAB, SPS. RAFAEL & ROSEMARIE CAYABYAB and INSURANCE CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: The instant case involves an unfortunate, albeit all too common, property dispute among siblings. The petitioners, Rufina Cayana, Josefina Rabina, Mercedes de Guzman and Susana Sambale, and respondents Pastor and Marceliano Cayabyab are children of the spouses Raymundo and Eulalia Cayabyab. The other respondents, Rosita and Rosalia Cayabyab are the wives of Pastor and Marceliano Cayabyab, respectively. Respondent Rosemarie Cayabyab-Ramos is the daughter of Marceliano Cayabyab, while respondent Rafael Ramos is the formers husband. Their dispute involves two parcels of land1 specifically described thus: First Parcel A parcel of land Lot A, (LRC), Psd-231284, being a portion of Plan Psu136181, LRC Rec. No. N8805, situated in Rosario, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Bounded on the E by Mactec River; SE by Agapito Cabrera; SW by Anselmo Cabrera; NW by Lot B of the subdivision plan, containing an area of 11,735 square meters, more or less. Covered by TCT No. 29332 and assessed at P1,730.00; and Second Parcel A parcel of land Lot 2-A of the subdivision plan Psd-36621, being a portion of Lot 2 described on Plan Psu-70452, GLRO Rec. No. 41762, situated in Rosario, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Bounded on the N by Ludovico Cayabyab & Agapito Cabrera; E by Eduvejas Cabrera and Lot 2-B of subdivision plan; S by Lot 2-B and W by Clemente Cruz, containing an area of 20,000 square meters more or less. Covered by TCT No. 117094, declared under Tax Decl. No. 29333 and assessed at P2,600.00. It appears that Raymundo Cayabyab, with the marital consent of Eulalia Cayabyab, sold the First and Second Parcels to Pastor Cayabyab by virtue of two Deeds of Absolute Sale2 respectively dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965. Thereupon, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 117134 and 117094 covering the First and Second Parcels, respectively, were issued in the name of Pastor Cayabyab. After the death of Raymundo Cayabyab on March 20, 1976, his wife Eulalia Cayabyab executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim,3 dated June 4, 1976, on the subject parcels of land, alleging that the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab were forgeries. However, on June 17, 1976, she executed another Affidavit4 recognizing Pastor Cayabyabs title and requesting the cancellation of the adverse claims earlier annotated on the titles of the subject properties. On February 9, 1977, Eulalia Cayabyab, together with her children, Marceliano, Mercedes, Rufina, Josefina, Susana and Alfredo, filed a Complaint5 against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May

As regards the Second Parcel, the plaintiffs prayed that ICP or Pastor Cayabyab, in whose name TCT No. 117094 remained, be ordered to surrender the title. It appears that ICP was not served with summons because it had already ceased to exist due to bankruptcy. 20 The plaintiffs theorized that the documents sought to be annulled are fictitious, simulated and entered into in bad faith as the defendants had full knowledge of the pendency of, as well as the consequent decision in, Civil Case No. 15298. On the other hand, the defendants claimed that all the transactions over the First Parcel were entered into free from all liens and encumbrances not inscribed in the title. Recognizing the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 on the nullity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the corresponding TCTs issued in favor of Pastor Cayabyab, the trial court rendered on August 22, 1989, a Decision in Civil Case No. 15937 in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of which provides: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering: 1. The plaintiffs to be the true and lawful owners over the landholdings in question; 2. The annulment of all documents pertaining thereto; namely, Exhs. C,D, & E; 3. The cancellation of TCT No. 124304, TCT No. 142479; TCT No. 142887 & TCT No. 143859; 4. The defendants restore possession of the landholdings in question to plaintiffs; 5. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages; 6. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P5,000.00 as/for attorneys fees; 7. The defendant Pastor Cayabyab and/or Insurance Corporation of the Philippines to surrender TCT No. 117094 free from all liens and encumbrances; 8. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; 9. The dismissal of defendants counterclaim; and 10. The defendants to pay the costs of this suit. 21 The respondents herein as appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the judgment in Civil Case No. 15298. According to them, the institution of Civil Case No. 15937 resulted in the joinder of issues and allowed them to adduce evidence to prove ownership and possession of the subject parcels of land. Agreeing with the appellants, the appellate court in its Decision22 dated August 21, 1995, held that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable, there being no identity of the causes of action in Civil Case No. 15298 and Civil Case No. 15937. While both cases were for the annulment of public documents, the former covered only the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 and the corresponding TCTs for the First and Second Parcels. On the other hand, the latter case covered not only the annulment of the subsequent transactions over the subject parcels of land but also the recovery of possession on the basis of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos executed by Eulalia Cayabyab.

The Court of Appeals also upheld the validity of the deeds of sale and the corresponding TCTs in favor of the appellants, declaring that the affidavit cancelling the adverse claim annotated in TCT No. 117134 was duly admitted; that the subsequent sales transactions have not been proven to be simulated or fictitious; that no notice of lis pendens was recorded in the title; and that the appellees were not able to prove their claim of title having failed to present the original or certified true copy of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos or to prove the existence and due execution of the original deed. Hence, the appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court, accordingly declaring that the deeds of sale as well as the TCTs which emanated from them valid and enforceable, and the appellants the true and lawful owners and possessors of the properties in question. The Court of Appeals denied the appellees Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution23 dated July 11, 1996. In the instant Verified Petition24 dated July 30, 1996, the petitioners reiterate their argument that the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965, the corresponding TCTs covering the First and Second Parcels, and the subsequent transfers of the subject properties are all null and void by virtue of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 15298 declaring them to be so. They allege that a notice of lis pendens and an affidavit of adverse claim were duly annotated on the TCTs covering the two parcels of land. Hence, Rosafina Reginaldo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos should be considered purchasers in bad faith. The petitioners further claim that the considerations for the subsequent transfers were grossly inadequate leading to the conclusion that the respondents were motivated by a desire to execute fictitious deeds of conveyance. The petitioners also insist that the First and Second Parcels were donated to the petitioners by their mother, Eulalia Cayabyab, through an alleged Donation Inter Vivos attached to the petition as Annex "F". Finally, they reiterate that Pastor Cayabyab and ICP entered into a contract of guaranty over the Second Parcel despite the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on the title. In their Comment25 dated October 8, 1997, the respondents contend that whatever doubts may have been raised by Eulalia Cayabyab on the validity of Pastor Cayabyabs title were removed when she executed the Affidavit requesting the cancellation of the adverse claims inscribed in the titles. Hence, the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 in favor of Pastor Cayabyab are legal and valid. The deed of donation inter vivos allegedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab did not vest ownership and possession over the subject properties in favor of the petitioners because of the prior sale to Pastor Cayabyab. Besides, Eulalia Cayabyab did not have the right to donate the subject properties to the petitioners because there was no previous partition of the intestate estate of Raymundo Cayabyab. In a Resolution dated July 27, 1998, the Court denied the instant petition for noncompliance with the Resolution of February 25, 1998, requiring the petitioners to file a reply to the respondents Comment. The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Reply26 dated September 21, 1998. In our Resolution of November 16, 1998, we granted the motion, reinstated and gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.27 The pivotal issue is whether the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 operates to bar the respondents defenses and counterclaims in Civil Case No. 15937. The petitioners insist that the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 15298 has settled with finality the nullity of Pastor Cayabyabs ti tle. Following the principle of res judicata, the respondents, as transferees of Pastor Cayabyab, should not have been allowed to adduce evidence to prove their ownership of the subject parcels of land.

The appellate court, however, ruled that the principle of res judicata does not apply there being no identity of causes of action in the two cases. The trial court and the appellate court both erred in the manner by which they treated and applied the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 to the instant case. This error apparently stems from a misreading of the provisions in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the effect of judgments. Section 47, Rule 39 thereof provides: SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement to the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessarily thereto. The distinction between the doctrine of res judicata, or bar by prior judgment, under paragraph (b) above and conclusiveness of judgment under paragraph (c) is well-laid. In Gamboa v. Court of Appeals,28 we held: There is bar by prior judgment when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. But where between the first and second cases, there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action, the first judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. 29 For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions. According to the appellate court, the third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in this case. In order to determine the identity of the causes of action in Civil Case Nos. 15298 and 15937, and consequently, the application of the doctrine of res judicata, it is essential to consider the identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of action. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the

two actions are considered the same and covered by the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of fact, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other. 30 We find that the evidence required to prove the allegations in Civil Case No. 15937, which involves the annulment of the subsequent transactions and TCTs covering the subject parcels of land and the recovery of possession thereof on the basis of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos, is necessarily more than that required in Civil Case No. 15298, which involves only the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs covering the First and Second Parcels. Furthermore, the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 necessarily turned only upon whether the Deeds of Absolute Sale were fictitious or simulated, while that in Civil Case No. 15937 will also have to include a determination of the good or bad faith of the subsequent purchasers. Res judicata, therefore, does not apply. Nonetheless, the trial court and the Court of Appeals should have applied the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment. In Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,31 the concept of conclusiveness of judgment was explained, thus: xxx conclusiveness of judgmentstates that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.32 Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 declaring null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs covering the subject parcels of land precluded the Court of Appeals from further adjudicating on the validity of the said deeds and titles. The appellate courts pronouncement that "the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 which declares null and void the deeds of absolute sale dated May 13, 1965 and March 20, 1976 and the corresponding TCT is not conclusive upon the action in Civil Case No. 15937" 33 is, therefore, flawed. It is likewise utterly erroneous for the appellate court to have disregarded the final judgment in Civil Case No. 15298 declaring null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs covering the two parcels of land. It is axiomatic that decisions which have long become final and executory cannot be annulled by courts and the appellate court is deprived of jurisdiction to alter the trial courts final judgment.34 The issue concerning the validity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1965 and March 3, 1976 and the corresponding TCTs covering the subject properties must be laid to rest. These documents cannot be relied upon by Pastor Cayabyab and his successors-ininterest as the basis of their claim of ownership over the First Parcel.

Having said that, we find it necessary still to determine whether the respondents who take title over the First Parcel from Pastor Cayabyab were purchasers in good faith, i.e., whether they bought the property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and paid a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before they had notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.35 If so, their rights will be protected and the nullity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the corresponding TCTs covering the subject properties cannot be successfully invoked to invalidate the titles subsequently issued, for it has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes.36 As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. 37 However, this principle admits of an unchallenged exception: a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law. 38 [Emphasis supplied] A judicious evaluation of the records and the applicable legal principles leads us to the conclusion that the subsequent purchasers of the First Parcel were not purchasers in good faith. First. The Court notesand it is not disputedthat Rosafina Reginaldo, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos are successors-in-interest of Pastor Cayabyab, having purchased the First Parcel after the filing of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 15298. In the case of the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos, they even purchased the property after the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 had been rendered. The records reveal that a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 39 dated November 18, 1985, was filed by Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie Cayabyab assailing the order and resolutions of the trial court in Civil Case No. 15937, delegating the reception of the plaintiffs evidence ex-parte to the Branch Clerk of Court and denying the defendants motions for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals40 set aside the questioned order and resolutions and directed the respondent Judge to allow the defendants to adduce their evidence. The decision was anchored, among others, on the defendants representation that the plaintiffs were neither parties nor intervenors in Civil Case No. 15298 but have only laid claim on the subject properties as donees.41 This allegation is patently false since, as previously mentioned, Eulalia Cayabyab and her children, Marceliano, Mercedes , Rufina, Josefina, Susana and Alfredo Cayabyab, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15298. Even so, the decision apparently became one of the bases for the respondents claim that the institution of Civil Case No. 15937 resulted in the joinder of issues thereby allowing them to adduce evidence in support of their claim of ownership and possession of the subject properties, a stand sanctioned by the appellate court in the instant case.

Second. It is important to emphasize that Marceliano Cayabyab was among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15298, contrary to the vehement denial in his Answer,42 dated July 21, 1983, in which he claimed that "answering defendants (Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab) are not parties to the said case and are totally strangers as regards the same." 43 Third. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 15298, Eulalia Cayabyab and her children Alfredo, Ludovico, Marceliano, Mercedes, Susana, Rufina, Buenaventura and Josefina, filed a new case44 for the annulment of certain documents affecting several parcels of land, including the two parcels subject of the instant petition, against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab and Rosafina Reginaldo. This was revealed by the respondents themselves in their Comment45 dated October 8, 1997 and Memorandum46 dated January 20, 1999. Parenthetically, in order to bolster their claim of valid title, the respondents constantly underscore the fact that Eulalia Cayabyab executed an Affidavit47 dated June 17, 1976, affirming the genuineness of the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and requesting the cancellation of the adverse claims annotated on the TCTs covering the First and Second Parcels. It should be noted, however, that after executing the Affidavit on June 17, 1976, Eulalia Cayabyab herself filed a Complaint (Civil Case No. 15298) for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the reconveyance of the subject properties on February 9, 1977. It is beyond this Courts power to hypothesize on the reasons for Eulalia Cayabyabs change of mind. What is clear is that the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 15298 which subsequently became final. Eulalia Cayabyabs Affidavit which was executed before the institution of Civil Case No. 15298 cannot, by any means, be construed as a bar to the final decision declaring Pastor Cayabyabs titles null and void. Curiously, the respondents never questioned the petitioners assertion that a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of the TCT covering the First Parcel. The trial court did not rule on this point but the Court of Appeals declared that there was no such notice annotated on TCT No. 117134. Whether there was an annotation inscribed in TCT No. 117134 will not, however, affect the Courts finding that the respondents are not purchasers in good faith. To summarize, the records disclose circumstances indicating that Rosafina Reginaldo, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo and the respondents Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos were not purchasers in good faith. Rosafina Reginaldo purchased the First Parcel during the pendency of Civil Case No. 15298. Moreover, she was one of the defendants, together with Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab, in Civil Case No. SCC-552 filed by Eulalia Cayabyab and her children Alfredo, Ludovico, Marceliano, Mercedes, Susana, Rufina, Buenaventura and Josefina for the annulment of certain documents concerning several parcels of land, among which was the First Parcel. As for the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, it became a mortgagee of the First Parcel initially on June 12, 1977 and later, on December 23, 1977, after the filing of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 15298 on February 9, 1977. After the decision in the case became final, the bank purchased the property during foreclosure proceedings. It later sold the property to Marceliano Cayabyab, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15298. As regards Marceliano, his participation in Civil Case Nos. 15298 and SCC-552 seals his knowledge of the petitioners claim over the subject properties. Likewise, Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos cannot feign ignorance of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 15298 and the final decision therein declaring null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the corresponding TCTs issued in the name of Pastor Cayabyab. The fact that the parties are family members also convinces the Court that the respondents assertion of lack of knowledge of Civil Case No. 15298 and the petitioners claim over the subject properties is a mere pretext.

As regards the Second Parcel, it is not disputed that TCT No. 117094 is in Pastor Cayabyabs name and possession. Emanating, as it did, from the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298, Pastor Cayabyabs title is null and void. The final issue pertains to the deed of donation inter vivos allegedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab in favor of the petitioners. The trial court sustained the existence and validity of the deed and declared the plaintiffs, the petitioners herein, to be the true and lawful owners of the subject properties. Interestingly, petitioner Rufina Cayana verified the existence of the deed of donation inter vivos on direct examination. She declared: Q: You said, you know the two parcels of land, subject of this litigation, why do you know them? A: I know them, sir, because I am one of the owners of said parcels of land. Q: Who are your co-owners? A: Mercedes C. de Guzman, Josefina C. Rabina and Susana C. Sambale, sir. Q: How did you and your co-owners acquire these two parcels of land? A: By way of donation intervivos executed by our mother, Eulalia Aquino Vda. De Cayabyab, sometime on January 5, 1980, sir. Q: Do you have a copy of that donation intervivos? A: Yes, sir. Q: Showing to you this document, entitled Donation Inter -Vivos", will you go over this if this is the same document you are referring to? A: Yes, sir, that is the one. ATTY. PALMA: May we pray that this document be marked as Exh. A.48 [Emphasis supplied.] Petitioner Josefina Rabina also confirmed the existence of the deed. She testified: Q: Is there any document regarding the donation? A: Yes, sir. Q: Showing to you this deed of donation, is this the deed of donation you are referring to? A: Yes, sir. Q: There is a signature above the typewritten name Eulalia Aquino Vda. De Cayabyab, do you know those (sic) signature is that? A: Yes, sir, this is the signature of my mother.49 [Emphasis supplied.] The appellate court, however, pronounced that the petitioners were not able to prove their claim of ownership of the subject properties as they failed to present the original or certified true copy of the deed of donation inter vivos. The Court of Appeals, in fact, held that the purported Exhibit "A" is actually the allegation on the existence of the alleged deed contained in the complaint itself.50 Due to the conflicting findings of the trial court and the appellate court, we requested 51 the transmittal to this Court of, among others, the deed of donation inter vivos marked as Exhibit "A" for the plaintiffs during the direct examination of Rufina Cayana. In her reply

dated September 2, 2002, the clerk of court informed the Court that the entire original records of Civil Case No. 15937, including Exhibit "A," were listed in the trial courts records as among the exhibits forwarded to the Court of Appeals. However, except for the Index of Exhibits for the Plaintiffs-Appellees52 which lists Exhibit "A," the records of this case are bereft of any showing that the plaintiffs formally offered in evidence the original or certified true copy of the deed of donation inter vivos purportedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab. The fact that it was only when they filed the instant petition that the petitioners actually attached as Annex "F"53 a copy of the said deed is further proof of the petitioners lapse. As a rule, the court shall not consider evidence which has not been formally offered.54 This being so, the donation in favor of the petitioners cannot be upheld. This leaves us with the question of who the rightful owners of the subject properties are. The Court holds that the First and Second Parcels properly belong to the estate of Raymundo and Eulalia Cayabyab, the same to be partitioned in accordance with the law on succession. WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and the Decision of the trial court is accordingly REINSTATED but with the modification that the First and Second Parcels should be included in the estate of Raymundo and Eulalia Cayabyab and partitioned in accordance with the law on succession. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-39674 January 31, 1978 URBANA VELASCO AROC, assisted by her husband CELESTINO AROC, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION and CIRILO B. GARCIA and FELICIANA BITO, defendants-appellees. Benjamin A. Bongolan for appellant. E.B. Garcia & Associates for appellees Garcia and Bito.

It is further gathered that plaintiff formally protested the award and sale of Lot 6 to defendants spouses with the Board of Directors of defendant corporation. The investigating officer recommended the rescission of the conditional sale of Lot 6 and the award of the lot to plaintiff and Alfonso Naparan. In spite of said recommendation defendant corporation executed a deed of sale in favor of defendant-spouses. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106146 covering the lot was subsequently issued to them by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. At the time of the filing of the complaint an January 22, 1968, plaintiff and her family still occupying one-half portion of the lot. In its answer with counterclaim, defendant corporation denied the material allegations of the complaint and, as special and affirmative defenses, alleged that the complaint stated no cause of action; that plaintiff was a mere squatter of Lot 6; that the award and sale of said lot to defendants-spouses was legal and valid, for they had complied with the requirements imposed by defendant corporation for its acquisition; and that plaintiff's claim had been passed upon by an investigating committee which found the same to he without basis. Defendants-spouses likewise denied the material allegations of the complaint. They set up as special and affirmative defenses the following: that there was a pending action to quiet title and/or recovery of possession of Lot 6 with preliminary injunction and damages filed by them against Alfonso Naparan and herein plaintiff Civil Case No. Q-10442) and in her answer she raised the same issues of fact and law alleged by her in the present complaint; that there was a valid ground to dismiss the new complaint due to the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-10442 between the same parties for the same cause of action; that Lot 6 was lawfully awarded and sold to them by defendant corporation and if ever plaintiff suffered damages her action should be against the corporation; that plaintiffs could no petitioner question the validity of the award and sale, since it was duly approved by the General Manager of defendant corporation after the investigations on plaintiff's protest had been conducted and she had been given the opportunity to air her grievances, but her protest was dismissed for lack of merit. Defendants-spouses later ammended their answer to include the i following allegation: 6-A That on December 26, 1968, the Honorable Judge Honorato r,. Masakyan Branch V of this Court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. Q-10442, the dispositive portion of Which is quoted as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Cirilo B. Garcia and against defendants Alfonso Naparan and Urbana Velasco Vda. de Aroc, plaintiff Cirilo B. Garcia the rightful and legal owner of Lot 6, Block E-144, Pinahan Subdivision, Quezon City, and ordering the defendants Alfonso Naparan and urbana Velasco Vda. de Aroc and all person claiming rights under

GUERRERO, J.: This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46525-R entitled "Urbana Velasco Aroc assisted by her husband Celestino Aroc, PlaintiffAppelle, versus People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and Cirilo B. Garcia and Feliciana Bito, Defendants-Appellees," pursuant to the provisions of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended, and Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court per its Resolution dated October 31, 1974 since the appeal involves pure questions of law. Plaintiff-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-11807 dismissing on the ground of res judicata the complaint to declare null and void the award and sale of a parcel of land, known as Lot 6, Block E-144, Pinahan Subdivision, Quezon City, to defendants-appellees Cirilo R. Garcia and his spouse, Feliciano Bito, by the other defendant-appellee PHHC, and the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said spouses. The facts are stated in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, thus: From the allegations of the complaint we gather that as early as 1956 plaintiff and her family started occupying one-half of the lot in controversy while a certain Alfonso Naparan and his family occupied the other half. In 1956 plaintiff constructed a house of strong materials worth P3,270, planted fruit-bearing trees and fenced the portion occupied by her. In May 1956 she filed with defendant corporation an application for the award and sale of said portion to her. She filed another application in January 1957. Later she discovered both applications were missing from the files of defendant corporation. Upon suggestion of an official of the latter, she reapplied for the same portion of Lot 6 on February 3, 1966. However, Lot 6 was unlawfully and in bad faith awarded and sold to defendants spouses who were disqualified from purchasing it, since they had previuosly purchased a 1,450-square meter lot (Lot 12, Block W-28) from defendant corporation and already owned several lots in Greater Manila.
1

them to vacate the premises in question and restore the possession thereof to the plaintiff, and to pay the plaintiff the sum P500.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. so much so that the above decision having become final and executory, there is nothing left for this Honorable Court to do except to dismiss the instant complaint based on the doctrine of res judicata, otherwise their will be no more end to the controversy, as the parties will be litigating, all over again on the same issues. Two days after the filing of the amended answer, defendants spouses moved for the dismissal of the action on the ground of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. Attached to their motion were the complaint, answer and decision in Civil Case No. Q-10442. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action. Appellant now assails before this Court the order of dismissal, claiming that the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the requisite that there must be Identity of cause of action between the two cases not being present, since the case on appeal is for annulment of the award and sale of Lot 6 to defendants-spouses while Civil Case No. Q-10442 was for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession. Thus, the sole issue to determine is whether or not the final judgment in civil case No. Q-10442 is a bar to the case before us. This involves a question of law (Bengua vs. Abay, CA-G.R. No. 19408-R, July 30,1959) which is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. It is for the Supreme court to pass upon the issue in accordance with Section 17 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended. Said section vests in the Supreme court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved. Plaintiff-appellant, litigating this case on appeal as a pauper-litigant, contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint on the ground of res judicata. We find the contention to be meritorious. In determining whether the final judgment in the first case, Civil Case No. Q-10442 for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession, constitutes res judicata as would bar the appellant's complaint in Civil Case No. Q-11807, now subject of this appeal, for annulment of award and deed of sale and cancellation of the certificate of title to the land, We must examine if between these two cases the requisites of res judicata are present, namely: 1) The former judgment must be final; 2) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, 3) It must be a judgment on the merits; and 4) There must be, between the first and 2 second actions, Identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. It is only in the Identity of cause of action that the parties dispute and disagree. The term "cause of action" has been defined as "an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the 3 defendant in violation of said legal right."

Is there Identity of cause of action between the two aforementioned cases, the first case for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession and the second case for annulment of award and deed of sale and cancellation of certificate of title? This query can be answered by a searching look into and a careful perusal of the records of said two cases. In the first case, the records disclose that on Sept. 16, 1966, defendant-appellee, Colonel Cirilo V. Garcia, filed against plaintiff-appellant Urbana vs. Aroc and Juan Alfonso Naparan the complaint alleging that plaintiff therein is the absolute owner in fee simple of the parcel of land, Lot No. 6, Block E-144 Pinahan Subdivision; that he acquired the land by way of purchase from the PHHC on December 8, 1965; that said lot is now titled in the name of the plaintiff and is covered by TCT No. 106146 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, that defendant therein, Urbana Velasco Aroc, asserts a claim of ownership and right of decision to the land and in fact still occupies the land, that defendant's claim of ownership and possession is invalid, ineffective and prejudicial to plaintiff's title as owner in fee simple, consequently entitling plaintiff to bring an action to remove the cloud on and to quiet his title; that defendant owns a house constructed on the western portion of the land and refuses to demolish or remove the same notwithstanding plaintiff's demand therefor. The above allegations state the basic or ultimate facts which constitute complaints cause of action. Defendant Urbana Velasco Aroc having filed her answer on November 29, 1966 but failed to appear at the trial of the case, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, declaring him the rightful and legal owner of the land, and ordering defendant to vacate the premises in question and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff plus the payment of attorneys fees and costs. The above judgment became final and executory during the pendency of the present case. In the second case, now subject of this appeal in Civil Case No. 11807 instituted on January 22, 1968, the plaintiff therein Urbana Velasco Aroc alleged that she is a bona fide occupant and possessor of the one-half portion of Lot 6, Block E-144 Pinahan Subdivision,: that she started occupying the lot as early as 1952; that in 1956, she built her own house therein made of strong materials. introduced improvements and fenced the area; that she applied for the award and subsequent sale to her of the one-half portion in May, 1946, reiterated in January, 1957 and re-applied on Feb. 3, 1966; that the lot was, however, awarded later to the defendant Cirilo V. Garcia and his wife Feliciana Bito in bad faith, contrary to law and public policy. The complaint further alleged that the awardees Cirilo V. Garcia and Feliciana Bito are disqualified from purchasing Lot No. 6 because they had earlier purchased a parcel of land formerly belonging to the PHHC, consisting of 1,460 sq. meters, known as Block 12, Lot W-8 covered under TCT No. 31596 of the land records of Quezon City, aside from the fact that they are already owners and possessors of several other 'lots in Manila and in the suburbs; and that the award to the spouses Cirilo V. Garcia and Feliciana Bito was in violation of the charter provisions of the PHHC. The above allegations likewise establish the ultimate facts that constitute the cause of action of plaintiff (now the appellant), entitling her to the one-half portion of Lot 6. Considering now the cause of action in the first case and the cause of action in the second case, the conclusion is inevitable that one is different from the other; that they are not one and the same cause of action. The first seeks only to remove the cloud on the title of the land. The action is premised on Art. 476, New Civil Code, which provides:

Art 476. When ever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, remembrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable and may, be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to teal property or any interest therein. The second seeks not only the nullification of the award and sale to the awardee, the cancellation of the Certificate of Title, but also places in issue the power and authority of the grantor (PHHC) to make the award and sell the land to one disqualified to purchase the same, the awardee being a Colonel in the Armed Forces of the 4 Philippines, as admitted by the PHHC. The qualification of the purchaser is likewise placed in issue. These issues are more basic and fundamental than the quieting of the title and the removal of the cloud on such title. In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second action is for the same cause of action as the first, the test generally applied is to consider the Identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other. It has been said that this method is the best and most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent proceedings between the same parties and it has even been described 5 as infallible. Applying the test accordingly, We hold that the evidence needed to prove the allegations of the second cause of action must necessarily be more than that in the first case for in the herein second case, additional evidence must be adduced to prove that the PHHC acted in violation of its charter, that the PHHC made the award in violation of the presidential directive alleged in plaintiff's "Opposition to Motion and to Reinstate Writ of Preliminary Injunction," evidenced by a letter dated January 12, 1967 of the President of the Philippines to the General Manager of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, directing the Board of said corporation to award the lots in the Pinahan Area, Quezon City, to the actual and bona fide occupants 6 there; that the awardees have previously purchased another lot from the PHHC and were the owners of several other lots in Manila and Quezon City which disqualified 7 them from acquire the lot in controversy, evidenced by Annexes A & B. There is merit to the claim of the appellant that the legality of the award and sale of the lot in controversy was not directly litigated in the first case not only because the defendant therein did not appear at the trial to adduce evidence, but also because the PHHC, the grantor and vendor of the property, was not impleaded as a party litigant in the case. It is also a general rule that a judgment in an action to quiet title is not conclusive as to matters not in issue and determined particularly where such matters could not have been determined in 8 such action.

Since the power or authority of the PHHC was not in issue in the first case to quiet title, and neither was the qualification of the awardees, the plaintiff therein, directly determined the judgment in said case is not conclusive and binding in the pre. sent case for annulment of the award and sale, and the cancellation of the title of the awardees or purchaser. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Q-11807 dated February 19, 1970 is hereby reversed and the records remanded to the said court for further proceedings. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION [A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131. August 20, 2001] MIGUEL ARGEL, complainant, vs. JUDGE Vigan, Ilocos Sur, respondent. HERMINIA M. PASCUA, RTC-Br. 25,

that the judgment of acquittal was rendered without all the facts and circumstances being brought to her attention. Respondent Judge explained that the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of eyewitness Tito Retreta was not attached to the records when she wrote her decision. Thus, in a Decision dated 19 August 1993, respondent Judge declared herein complainant Miguel Argel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder on the basis of the eyewitness account of Tito Retreta, sentenced complainant Argel to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P60,000.00 for actual damages. Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature,[8] to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion,[9] or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial.[10] A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.[11] In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation.[12] It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment[13] except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.[14] Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a decision promulgated on 13 August 1993. Applying the aforestated rule, the decision became final and immutable on the same day. As a member of the bench who is always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and judicial developments, more so of elementary rules, respondent should have known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[15] The fact that respondent never had any intention of having complainant incarcerated on the basis of the second decision but only to make him answer for the civil liabilities arising from the crime, as respondent explained, cannot exculpate her from administrative liability. On the contrary, such thinking on the part of respondent that she could still "revise" a promulgated decision of acquittal even for such a purpose underscores, not mitigates, her gross ignorance. We cannot write finis to this case without also commenting on respondent's negligence in the preparation of her decision. Judges have always been reminded to take down their own notes of salient portions of hearings and not to rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes. The pivotal testimony of Tito Retreta would not have been overlooked and consequently disregarded had respondent prepared her own notes and read them as she was supposed to. WHEREFORE, for Gross Ignorance of the Law respondent Judge Herminia M. Pascua, RTC-Br. 25, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, is FINED P20,000.00, the same to be deducted from her retirement benefits. Since respondent has already compulsorily retired as of 18 September 1998, let her retirement benefits be immediately released to her minus the amount of P20,000.00 herein imposed on her as fine. SO ORDERED

RESOLUTION BELLOSILLO, J.: A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131 (Miguel Argel v. Judge Herminia M. Pascua, RTC-Br. 25, Vigan Ilocos Sur). - This is an administrative complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law filed by Miguel Argel against Judge Herminia M. Pascua, RTC-Br. 25, Vigan, Ilocos Sur.[1] Complainant alleged in his complaint that respondent Judge rendered a Decision dated 19 August 1993[2] in Crim. Case No. 2999-V entitled People v. Miguel Argel convicting him of murder notwithstanding the fact that he had already been previously acquitted by respondent in her Decision[3] dated 22 July 1993, promulgated on 13 August 1993. Complainant contends that respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy. In a letter-explanation dated 7 March 1994 respondent Judge alleged that she rendered the judgment of acquittal dated 22 July 1993 because she erroneously thought that there was no witness who positively identified the accused, herein complainant, as the perpetrator of the crime. Her mistake was brought about by the fact that the testimony of the eyewitness was not attached to the records at the time she wrote her decision. However, when she re-read her notes after her attention was called by the lawyer of the private complainant that there was such an eyewitness, respondent confirmed that there was indeed one in the person of Tito Retreta. Hence she "revised" her previous decision and rendered the Decision dated 19 August 1993 finding the accused guilty of murder. Fully aware of her prior decision of acquittal, respondent nevertheless ordered the police to bring complainant Argel to court not for the purpose of having him incarcerated but only to inform him of her new decision so that he could be made to answer for his civil liabilities arising from the crime. Before she could explain the matter to complainant, the latter's brother already filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals.[4] According to respondent, she decided to await the hearing of the petition before setting complainant free so that she could give him a copy of her new decision.[5] In his Reply to the letter-explanation of respondent, complainant additionally charged respondent with gross negligence for not exercising extreme caution in the preparation of her decision by making sure that all the transcripts of stenographic notes were attached to the records before writing the decision.[6] In a Memorandum dated 11 May 2001 the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent be fined P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. As stated earlier, complainant was accused of murder in Crim. Case No. 2999-V of the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On 13 August 1993 judgment was promulgated acquitting him on the ground that there was no witness who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. However after respondent's attention was called by the private complainant's counsel to the fact that there was such a witness and confirmed by respondent upon rereading her notes, she issued an Order dated 16 August 1993 stating her intention to"revise" the previous judgment of acquittal, branded the same as "uncalled for" and "not final," and reset the case for another "rendering of the decision."[7] The reason given was

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 139020. October 11, 2000] PAQUITO BUAYA, petitioner, vs. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO., Inc., respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and executory judgments. Moreover, the remand of a case does not nullify the entire proceedings. It merely authorizes the trial court to receive additional evidence, not to conduct a trial de novo. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the August 28, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52999, dismissing Petitioner Paquito Buaya's appeal of the trial court's Order dated November 13, 1995, which denied his Petition for Relief. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: "IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Order appealed from is AFFIRMED. With costs against the Appellant."[2] The Facts The facts of this case are as follows:[3] "On July 31, 1985, x x x Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., the [respondent] in the present recourse, filed a complaint against Paquito B. Buaya, its erstwhile [b]ranch [m]anager for Cebu and the [petitioner] in the present recourse, for the collection of the principal amount of P678,076.83, representing his unremitted premium collections owing to the [respondent]. For failure of the [petitioner] and his counsel to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the [petitioner] was declared x x x in default, and the [respondent] was allowed, by the [c]ourt, to adduce its evidence, ex parte. On the basis of the evidence of the [respondent], the Court a quo promulgated a Decision, dated September 17, 1987, in favor of the [respondent], the decretal portion of which reads as follows: 'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent] and against the [petitioner] ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P678,076.83 plus legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; the sum equivalent to 25% of [respondent's] claim as and for attorney's fees plus the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.' (at page 135, Records).' The [petitioner] appealed, from said Decision, to [the CA], entitled and docketed 'Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., versus Paquito B. Buaya, CA-GR. No. 17329.' On March 30, 1990, this [c]ourt promulgated a Decision in favor of the [petitioner] annulling the Decision of the [c]ourt a quo and remanding the case to the lower [c]ourt

for further proceedings. (at page 154, Records). The Decision of this [c]ourt became final and executory. Accordingly, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order setting the case for hearing on December 13, 1990 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning (at page 169, Records). The [petitioner] himself filed a 'Motion for Postponement' of the hearing. [Petitioner's] motion was granted by the [c]ourt a quo and the hearing was reset [to] February 15, 1991, at 8:30 in the morning. However, the hearing was reset to March 14, 1991, at the same time, on motion of the [respondent] (at page 180, Record). The [petitioner] himself filed a 'Motion for Postponement' of the hearing set on March 14, 1991 on the ground that his [c]ounsel, Atty. Bartolome A. Avancena, had died and [petitioner] needed time to engage the services of new counsel. The hearing was reset to May 16, 1991 at the same time (at page 187, Record). However, the [petitioner] filed another motion for the resetting of said hearing on the ground that he needed [more] time to secure the services of new counsel. The hearing was reset to July 26, 1991, at the same time. But then, the [petitioner] filed another motion for the postponement of said hearing on the ground that 'he was weak and sickly'. However, the [respondent] opposed [petitioner's] motion. Nevertheless, the [c]ourt reset the hearing to November 29, 1991, at the same time, but subject to the condition that if, for any reason, the [petitioner] still failed to appear on said setting, such failure shall be deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence (at page 250, Records). On November 27, 1991, Atty. Manuel Maranga, the new counsel of the [petitioner], filed a 'Motion to Postpone'. The [respondent] opposed [petitioner's] motion. On December 19, 1991, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying [petitioner's] motion and declaring the [petitioner] to have waived his right to adduce evidence in his behalf (at page 222, Record). The [respondent] forthwith filed a motion praying the [c]ourt to reinstate its Decision, dated September 17, 1987. The [petitioner] filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of the Order of the [c]ourt a quo, dated December 19, 1991. On March 18, 1992, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying [petitioner's] 'Motion for Reconsideration' and granting [respondent's] motion for the reinstatement of its Decision, dated September 17, 1987. The [petitioner] filed a 'Petition for Certiorari' with [the CA], entitled and docketed as 'Paquito Buaya versus Hon. Fernando Agdamag, et al.,['] CA-G.R. No. 27814 (SP), assailing the Orders of the [c]ourt a quo, dated December 19, 1991 and March 18, 1992. On August 24, 1992, [the CA] promulgated a Decision dismissing [petitioner's] Petition for lack of merit (at page 261, Record). The Decision of this [c]ourt became final and executory on June 28, 1993 (at page 282).[4] On [m]otion of the [respondent], the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order, dated October 29, 1993, directing the issuance of a [W]rit of [E]xecution (at page 298, Record). The [petitioner] filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of said Order, dated October 29, 1993. On March 16, 1995, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying motion (at pages 359-360, Record). On April 12, 1995, the [petitioner] filed a 'Notice of Appeal' from said Order. However, on May 11, 1995, the [c]ourt [a quo] issued an Order declining to give due course to the appeal of the [petitioner] considering that the Decision of the [c]ourt had already become final and executory (at page 365, Record). On June 2, 1995, the [c]ourt a quo issued a Writ of Execution. On July 27, 1995, the [petitioner] filed a 'Petition for Relief from Order'. On November 13, 1995, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying the Petitioner's 'Petition for Relief." Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA denied petitioner's appeal which centered on these issues: (1) whether the September 17, 1987 Decision of the trial court had become final and executory, and (2) whether the failure of petitioner to inform his new counsel of the status of the case before the trial court constituted "mistake and excusable negligence."

In view of the amount involved in the collection suit, the CA disbelieved petitioner's contention that he had failed to apprise his counsel of the status and the particulars of the case in the trial court. Granting arguendo that he did make such omission through sheer inadvertence, his counsel was duty-bound to familiarize himself with the case before accepting the same, specially because litigation had already commenced. Such omission did not constitute "mistake or excusable negligence" that would have entitled him to relief from the trial court's judgment. Thus, he deserved to suffer the consequences of his own mistake or omission. Noting that the validity of the March 18, 1992 Order of the trial court reinstating its September 17, 1987 Decision had been affirmed by both the CA and the Supreme Court, the CA also condemned the penchant of petitioner for resurrecting the same issues. Hence, his appeal was solely designed to further derail the execution of the lower court's Decision. Besides, the present posture of petitioner is antithetical to his earlier "Petition for Relief from Order," which was denied by the trial court. In filing said action for relief, he was admitting that the Decision of the trial court had become final and executory. Hence, he cannot claim the Decision's nullity. Hence, this Petition.[5] Issues Petitioner interposes the following issues for resolution:[6] "I - Petitioner is presenting in this petition a question of law which is believed or which appears to be one of first impression, namely: Can a decision of a Regional Trial Court which is annulled by the Court of Appeals be reinstated by the trial court which rendered the decision or any trial court for that matter and thereafter order its execution? "II - When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without notice to the [petitioner] of the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, does the jurisdiction of the trial court merely require the presentation of evidence for the [petitioner] and without anymore requiring the presentation of [respondent's] evidence for cross-examination by the [petitioner]?" The Court's Ruling This Petition has no merit. First Issue: Annulled Decision Petitioner persistently avers that no trial court can reinstate a decision that has been annulled by the CA because such a decision is "dead" in legal contemplation. We disagree. We doubt the veracity of petitioner's claim that the September 11, 1987 Decision of the trial court was annulled by the CA, because his Appeal Brief stated that it had merely been set aside. He merely alleged that "[t]he aforesaid judgment of September 11, 1987, was a judgment by default x x x so that the Court of Appeals, on appeal by [petitioner], in its decision rendered on March 30, 1990, SET ASIDE said judgment and ordered the case to be REMANDED to the court of origin for FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. x x x."[7] This allegation shows that the trial court's Decision was reversed and set aside, not annulled, by the appellate court. Since it was merely set aside to enable petitioner to present his evidence, then there was nothing wrong with

the Order of the trial court reinstating its original decision after he had failed to take advantage of the ample opportunity given him to present evidence. Moreover, the failure of petitioner to attach a copy of the March 30, 1990 CA Decision, which he claims annulled the September 11, 1987 trial court Decision, is an added reason why this Petition should be denied. True, said CA Decision is not in question here. Nonetheless, an authentic copy thereof should have been submitted to support his claim that the Decision of the trial court had indeed been annulled by that of the CA.[8] Hence, a copy of the latter is a "material portion of the record [that] would support the petition." Failure to attach or submit it is sufficient ground for this Petition's dismissal.[9] We also reject the assertion of petitioner that the CA Decision of August 24, 1992 did not affirm the reinstatement of the September 11, 1987 trial court Decision, but only sustained the denial of his Motion for Postponement. This is simply not true. The CA specifically resolved the issue of the legality of the RTC Orders dated December 19, 1991 and March 18, 1992, which not only denied petitioner's Motion for Postponement but also reinstated the September 17, 1987 trial court Decision.[10] The appellate court ruled that respondent judge showed no arbitrariness or capriciousness that would warrant the grant of that Petition.[11] Hence, there was no need for the CA to explicitly reinstate the September 11, 1987 trial court Decision. Indeed, petitioner cannot be allowed to prevent that RTC Decision from attaining finality by engaging in useless hairsplitting distinctions. On this dilatory practice, the CA clearly and cogently ruled: "x x x. The [Petitioner] raised the same issue in his Petition for Certiorari in CA-GR No. 27814 (SP) filed with this Court where he assailed the validity of the Order of the Court a quo, dated March 18, 1992, ordering the reinstatement of the Decision of the Court a quo, dated September 17, 1987, and this Court dismissed [petitioner's] Petition for lack of merit, and, [i]n effe[c]t, affirmed the aforesaid Order of the Court a quo. The [petitioner] filed a "Petition to Review" with the Supreme Court, from said Decision of this Court and the Supreme Court dismissed [petitioner's] Petition. Appellant's penchant [for] resurrecting the same issue in the Court a quo x x x, in the present recourse, deserves the severest condemnation as it was designed solely to further derail the execution of the Decision of the Court a quo. x x x."[12] Second Issue: Final and Executory Judgment Petitioner condemns the unfairness of the trial court when it ruled that he had waived his right to submit evidence, when it should have merely ordered plaintiff to present its evidence first. He interprets the CA remand to mean that both parties, subject to cross-examination, would again present their respective sets of evidence. We disagree. The CA remanded the case to the court of origin for further hearing, not for retrial. A motion for new trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, is a remedy separate and distinct from an appeal. Plaintiff (herein respondent) had rested its case long before the September 11, 1987 Decision was rendered. In fact, the evidence adduced by herein respondent became the sole basis of the Default Judgment of September 11, 1987. Finally, the Court holds that the September 11, 1987 Decision of the trial court become final and executory on June 28, 1993.[13] A Writ of Execution of the March 16, 1995 Order of the trial court reinstating the September 17, 1987 Decision was issued by the trial court on May 11, 1995. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the

issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.[14] It is axiomatic that once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous.[15] Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors it may contain.[16] The February 24, 1993 Resolution of this Court in GR No. 108354 barred not only a rehash of the same issues resolved in the Petition, but also any other issues that might have been raised therein. An existing final judgment or decree -- rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction acting upon a matter within its authority -- is conclusive of the rights of the parties and their privies. This ruling holds in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, touching on the points or matters in issue in the first suit.[17] Indeed, nothing decided on in the first appeal, between the same parties and the same facts, can be reexamined in a second or subsequent appeal. Right or wrong, the decision in the first appeal is binding on both the trial and the appellate courts for the purpose of that case and for that case only. Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will not allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a question, once it has been considered and decided with finality. Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and executory judgments. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof; and (8) That he shall impose upon the vendee or new owner of the property the conditions abovementioned; other conditions set forth in Doc. No. 4236, Page No. 11, Book No. 84 of Nicasio P. Misa, Not. Pub. of Manila. 3 The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use. On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates. Subsequently, the latter moved to have the order lifted, on the grounds that: (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner; (2) the petitioner has another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity therefor; and (4) the petitioner has not shown that the right-of-way lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The private respondent's opposition notwithstanding, the trial court issued a "temporary writ of preliminary injunction to continue up to the final termination of the case upon its merits upon the posting of a P5,000.00 bond by the plaintiff. 4 (the petitioner herein). Thereafter, the respondent corporation answered and reiterated its above defenses. On April 15, 1986, the petitioner moved for summary judgment and the court a quo ruled on the same as follows: In view of the foregoing, this Court finds it unnecessary to try this case on the merit ( sic) and hereby resolve (sic) to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. (pp. 15-107, Record). 5 On January 19, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment against the private respondent, the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered making permanent the temporary mandatory injunction, that had been issued against the defendant, and for the defendant to pay the plaintiff the costs of this suit. The defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit. (Summary Judgment, p. 6). 6 The private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the private respondent itself went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition for the cancellation of the annotation in question. The court granted cancellation, for which the petitioner instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 13421 of the respondent Court of Appeals which ordered the restoration of the annotation "without prejudice [to] the final outcome of 7 the private respondent's own appeal (subject of this petition). In reversing the trial court which had, as earlier mentioned, rendered summary judgment, the respondent Court of Appeals held that the summary judgment was improper and that the lower court erroneously ignored the defense set up by the private respondent that the easement in question had been extinguished. According to the Appellate Court, an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private respondent's title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the property, "merger" brought about an extinguishment of the easement.

G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991 SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Balgos & Perez for petitioner. Alfredo G. de Guzman for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:p This is an appeal filed by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner raises two questions: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals 1 erred in reversing the trial court which had rendered summary judgment; and (2) whether or not it erred in holding that an easement had been extinguished by merger. We rule for the petitioner on both counts. It appears that the petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 157750 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784. The private respondent's title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way: . . .a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates, this being duly annotated at the back of the covering transfer Certificate of title per regulations of the Office of the City Engineer of Manila and that the three meterwide portion of said parcel along the Pasig River, with an area of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE METERS, more or less, had actually been expropriated by the City Government, and developed pursuant to the beautification drive of the Metro Manila Governor. (p. 3, Record). 2 As a consequence, an annotation was entered in the private respondent's title, as follows: Entry No. 7712/T-5000 CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE ALLEY It is hereby made of record that a construction of private alley has been undertaken on the lot covered by this title from Concepcion Street to the interior of the aforesaid property with the plan and specification duly approved by the City Engineer subject to the following conditions to wit: (1) That the private alley shall be at least three (3) meters in width; (2) That the alley shall not be closed so long as there's a building exists thereon (sic); (3) That the alley shall be open to the sky; (4) That the owner of the lot on which this private alley has been constituted shall construct the said alley and provide same with concrete canals as per specification of the City Engineer; (5) That the maintenance and upkeep of the alley shall be at the expense of the registered owner; (6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the

The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of Appeals erred, because the very deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale. As already stated at the outset, the Court finds merit in the petition. There is no question that an easement, as described in the deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the seller, had been constituted on the private respondent's property, and has been in fact annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784. Specifically, the same charged the private respondent as follows: "(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not [ask] for any indemnity for the use thereof. . ." 8 Its act, therefore, of erecting steel gates across the alley was in defiance of these conditions and a violation of the deed of sale, and, of course, the servitude of way. The Court then is of the opinion that injunction was and is proper and in denying injunctive relief on appeal, the respondent Appellate Court committed an error of judgment and law. It is hardly the point, as the Court of Appeals held, that the private respondent is the owner of the portion on which the right-of-way had been established and that an easement can not impair ownership. The petitioner is not claiming the easement or any part of the property as its own, but rather, it is seeking to have the private respondent respect the easement already existing thereon. The petitioner is moreover agreed that the private respondent has ownership, but that nonetheless, it has failed to observe the limitation or encumbrance imposed on the same There is therefore no question as to ownership. The question is whether or not an easement exists on the property, and as we indicated, we are convinced that an easement exists. It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioner's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence. Thus: Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. 9 Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. 10 Although they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they can not, however, be alienated 11 from the tenement, or mortgaged separately. 12 The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use ( jus utendi). As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the tenement] measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates. . ." 13 and precisely, the former owner, in conveying the property, gave the private owner a discount on account of the easement, thus: WHEREAS, to compensate for the foregoing, the parties hereto agreed to adjust the purchase price from THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,790,440.) to THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,503,240.00) 14 Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property including the disputed alley as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.

The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. 15 Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates. One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public. Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code: Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
16

In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, 17 in this case, the public at large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public if that is possible no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement. For this reason, the trial court was not in error in rendering summary judgment, and insofar as the respondent Court of Appeals held that it (the trial court) was in error, the Court of Appeals is in error. Summary judgments under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court are proper where there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact, and the facts appear undisputed based on the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits of record. 18 In one case, this Court upheld a decision of the trial court rendered by summary judgment on a claim for money to which the defendant interposed the defense of payment but which failed to produce receipts. 19 We held that under the circumstances, the defense was not genuine but rather, sham, and which justified a summary judgment. In another case, we rejected the claim of acquisitive prescription over registered property and found it likewise to be sham, and sustained consequently, a summary judgment rendered because the title challenged was covered by a Torrens Certificate and under the law, Torrens titles are imprescriptible. 20 We also denied reconveyance in one case and approved a summary judgment rendered thereon, on the ground that from the records, the plaintiffs were clearly guilty of laches having failed to act until after twenty-seven years. 21 We likewise allowed summary judgment and rejected contentions of economic hardship as an excuse for avoiding payment under a contract for the reason that the contract imposed liability under any and all conditions. 22 In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because as we said, merger is not possible, and secondly, the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other words, the answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact and can not militate against the petitioner's clear cause of action. As this Court has held, summary judgments are meant to rid a proceeding of the ritual of a trial where, from existing records, 23 the facts have been established, and trial would be futile. What indeed, argues against the posturing of the private respondent and consequently, the challenged holding of the respondent Court of Appeals as well is the fact that the Court of Appeals itself had rendered judgment, in its CA-G.R. No. 13421, entitled Solid Manila Corporation v. Ysrael, in which it nullified the cancellation of the easement annotated at the back of the private respondent's certificate of title ordered by Judge Ysrael in LRC Case No. 273. As the petitioner now in fact insists, the Court of Appeals' judgment, which was affirmed by this Court in its Resolution dated December 14, 1988, in G.R. No. 83540, is at least, the law of the case between the parties, as "law of the case" is known in law, e.g.:

xxx xxx xxx Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. (21 C.J.S. 330) (Emphasis supplied). It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or readjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267) (Emphasis supplied.) In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a definite determination, the court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than those arising subsequently to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second appeal. As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-77). (Emphasis supplied.) Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87). (Emphasis supplied.) 24 CA-G.R. No. 13421 is the law of the case because clearly, it was brought to determine the rights of the parties regarding the easement, subject of the controversy in this case, although as a petition for "cancellation of annotation" it may have, at a glance, suggested a different cause of action. And for reasons of fair play, the private respondent can not validly reject CA-G.R. No. 13421 as the law of the case, after all, it was the one that initiated the cancellation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court in LRC No. 273 that precipitated that appeal. In the second place, the proceedings for cancellation of annotation was in fact meant to preempt the injunction decreed by the lower court in this case. Plainly and simply, the private respondent is guilty of forumshopping, as we have described the term: xxx xxx xxx There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. 25 to which contempt is a penalty. 26

As it happened, in its effort to shop for a friendly forum, the private respondent found an unfriendly court and it can not be made to profit from its act of malpractice by permitting it to downgrade its finality and deny its applicability as the law of the case. As a personal servitude, the right-of-way in question was established by the will of the owner. In the interesting case of North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Hidalgo, 27 this Court, speaking through Justice Claro Recto, declared that a personal servitude (also a right of way in that case) is established by the mere "act" 28 of the landowner, and is not "contractual in the nature," 29 and a third party (as the petitioner herein is a third party) has the personality to claim its benefits. In his separate opinion, however, Justice Jose Laurel maintained that a personal or voluntary servitude does require a contract and that "[t]he act of the plaintiff in opening the private way here involved did not constitute an offer . . . " 30 and "[t]here being no offer, there could be no acceptance; hence no contract." 31 The Court sees no need to relive the animated exchanges between two legal titans (they would contend even more spiritedly in the "larger" world of politics) to whom present scholars perhaps owe their erudition and who, because of the paths they have taken, have shaped history itself; after all, and coming back to the case at bar, it is not disputed that an easement has been constituted, whereas it was disputed in North Negros' case. Rather, the question is whether it is still existing or whether it has been extinguished. As we held, our findings is that it is in existence and as a consequence, the private respondent can not bar the public, by erecting an obstruction on the alley, from its use. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. The petitioner and its counsel are hereby required to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be punished for contempt of court, and also administratively dealt with in the case of counsel, for forum shopping. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978 J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents. Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners. Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials. Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.

On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein. On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral argument. The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court. On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531). The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031. Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack. It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra). Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs. SO ORDERED.

AQUINO, J.: This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra). On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three hundred eighty-three quiones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943). They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages. Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses. On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal was affirmed in toto. (Annex A to Petition, pp. 27-45, Rollo). A timely motion for reconsideration (Annex B to Petition, pp. 66-85, Ibid) was filed by defendants-appellants (now petitioners) to no avail. (Annex C to Petition, p. 87, Ibid) The case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee.

G.R. No. L-28126 November 28, 1975 VITA UY LEE and HENRY LEE, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALBERTA VICENCIO VDA. DE SIMEON, in her own behalf, as substituting heir of former deceased co-plaintiff Emiliano Simeon, and as guardian ad litem of the other substituting heir, minor Emiliano V. Simeon, respondents. Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioners. Salonga, Ordoez, Yap and Associates for private respondents.

The land in question, together with another parcel denominated as Lot No. 732 in the name of Ignacio Simeon, deceased father of Emiliano Simeon, issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal by virtue of Free Patent No. 187771 which Ignacio had obtained from the government way back in 1935. (p. 28, Ibid) After the death of Ignacio Simeon and his wife, plaintiff (now substituted by his spouse, Alberta Vicencia Vda. de Simeon as private respondent) Emiliano Simeon and his brother Deogracias Simeon, as the only surviving heirs, executed on March 27, 1947 a deed of extrajudicial partition of the properties left by their parents (Exh. 2) whereby Lot No. 1 was adjudicated to Deogracias and Lot No. 2 to Emiliano. Because the certificate of title covering the said lots could not be found, they were simply described as "Homestead No. 82945." (Ibid) On January 30, 1957, following some negotiation, plaintiffs (now private respondents) agreed to sell the land in question to Vita Uy Lee (Exh. 1). Upon request of Henry Lee, Vita's husband, plaintiffs (now private respondents) furnished him with a copy of the deed of extrajudicial partition (Exh. 2) and a certification (Exh. 1) issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal that "there is no certificate of title issued for Lots Nos. 1 and 2 located at Antipolo covered by Plan F-54569". Defendants (now petitioners) likewise verified the status of the property from the Land Registration Commission and the Bureau of Lands (pp. 48-49, Ibid). On February 14, 1957, plaintiffs (now private respondents) executed a deed of sale of Lot No. 2 in favor of defendants (now Petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. The document prepared by defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer, Atty. Leonardo M. Guzman, described the property as "Lot 2 of Plan F-954569," instead of a homestead as stated in the deed of extrajudicial partition (Exh. 2). (p. 29, Ibid) The day following the sale, defendant (now petitioner) Vita Uy Lee filed her own application for free patent over Lot No. 2 with the Bureau of Lands (Exh. G.), in which application she expressly acknowledged that said property is a public land previously occupied by Ignacio Simeon and his heirs. The application was denied (p. 50, Ibid). Defendants (now petitioners) then sought registration of the lot in question in their names under the provisions of Act No. 496. The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, acting as a land court, favorably acted upon their application in a decision dated December 7, 1957 (Exh. 5). However, before the final decree and the corresponding certificate of title could be issued, it was discovered that the land in which defendants (now petitioners) sought to register in their names, "has already been patented and is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.)." Acting upon this information, the Court of First Instance of Rizal set aside on February 11, 1958, its decision of December 7, 1957 (Exh. 7). (pp. 30-31, Ibid) Meanwhile, on February 5, 1958, Emiliano and Deogracias Simeon filed a motion praying for the issuance of a substitute owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 732 (F.P.) which was "irretrievably lost during the early period of the American liberation ..." (Exh. 8). The motion was granted. (p. 31, Ibid) On March 4, 1958, defendants' (now petitioners) lawyer prepared a document entitled "Declaration of Heirs and Extrajudicial Partition With Partial Sale" (Exh. B), wherein the

ESGUERRA, J.: On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee to resell to them a parcel of land situated in Sitio Parugan-Iba Barrio San Jose, Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a homestead with an area of about 2.7342 hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of defendants (now petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee (p. 3, Rollo). Defendants (now petitioners) filed in due time their answer with affirmative defenses. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision on January 6, 1964, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) Ordering the defendants to execute the proper deed of reconveyance of the homestead land in question, free of all liens and encumbrances, in favor of the plaintiffs, upon the payment by the latter to them of the repurchase price of P16,000.00; (2) Directing the defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs the possession of said land; (3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal upon presentation to him of the deed of reconveyance and payment of his legal fees, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 issued to defendant Vita Uy Lee and to issue a new one in lieu thereof in the name of the plaintiff Emiliano Simeon, married to plaintiff Alberta Vicencio; and (4) For defendants to pay the costs of the action. The counterclaim of the defendants are hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED. (pp. 56-57, Record on Appeal) Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motion for new trial (pp. 60-96, Ibid) and later an urgent motion for reconsideration (pp. 114-116, Ibid), which were both denied by the trial court in its orders of March 23, 1964 (pp. 113-114, Ibid) and June 25, 1964 (pp. 119-124, Ibid).

adjudication of Lots Nos. 1 and 2 to Deogracias Simeon and Emiliano Simeon, respectively, and the sale by the latter of his share to Vita Uy Lee for a consideration of P16,000.00 were affirmed. On that day, Original Certificate of Title No. 732 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57272 (Exh. 11) covering Lot No. 2 issued in the name of Emiliano Simeon. Later that day, the new Transfer Certificate was cancelled and replaced by the present Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 (Exh. 14) in the name of Vita Uy Lee, married to Henry Lee, "subject to the provisions of ... the Public Land Act ... " (Exh. H). (Ibid) What transpired next is the crux of this controversy as plaintiff (now substituted by surviving spouse Alberta Vicencio as private respondent) Emiliano Simeon tried to repurchase the property sold to the spouses Lee. The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows: "On June 14, 1960, Emiliano Simeon, through plaintiffs' former counsel Atty. Valeriano Santos, sent a letter of demand (Exh. C) to Vita Uy Lee, advising her that he desires to repurchase the parcel of land situated at Antipolo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 in your name' and requesting that he be informed of her "conformity on the matter within five days from receipt hereof." Notwithstanding receipt of this letter, defendants did not bother to make any reply thereto. Hence, on November 3, 1960, Atty. Santos wrote another letter (Exh. J) reiterating the demand of Emiliano Simeon to repurchase the land. This letter was received by defendant Vita Uy Lee on November 5, 1960 (Exh. J-1), but as in the case of the first letter, the defendants did not reply to the second letter. Consequently, for the third time, on June 24, 1961, Atty. Santos wrote another letter (Exh. D) to Vita Uy Lee repeating the same demand, with a warning that if nothing is heard from her within five days from receipt, the matter would be brought to court. Still the defendants did not answer. However, despite this failure of the defendants, Atty. Santos did not take any court action and apparently because of this indifference of their former counsel, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Narciso Pea (p. 32, Ibid). "On March 2, 1962, Atty. Pea addressed a letter (Exh. E) to Vita Uy Lee reiterating that Emiliano Simeon "is ready to repurchase from you the land" in question. After receipt of this letter, Vita Uy Lee broke her silence and through her counsel Atty. Guzman, she wrote Atty. Pea on March 12, 1962, that she cannot agree to the repurchase of the lot in question, because even assuming that your client had the right to repurchase the land, the period of five (5) years within which to do so, had already expired". (Exh. 12) In view of this flat refusal of the defendants to resell the lot in controversy to the plaintiffs, the latter filed this action in the court below." (p. 33, Ibid) Plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought the redemption of Lot No. 2 from defendants (now petitioners) pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 which provides as follows: Section 119. Every reconveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of conveyance. There is no dispute that the land under litigation was acquired under a free patent (p. 36, Ibid), and that its sale is subject to redemption within five (5) years from the execution of the deed of sale (Galasiano, et al. vs. Austria and Cardenas, 97 Phil. 82; Abogado vs. Aquino, et al., 53 O.G. 5187; Bayaua vs. Suguitan, et al., 53 O.G. 8832; Reyes vs. Manas, L-27755, Oct. 4, 1969, 29 SCRA 736; Lazo vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., L27365, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 329) on February 14, 1957. (p. 29, Ibid) Likewise, there is no question that private respondents instituted the action to compel petitioners to resell the land to them only on June 25, 1965 when the redemption period had already elapsed. (p.

27, Ibid) The main issue to be resolved is whether the three letters sent by respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of the five-year period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the right of private respondents to repurchase the property. Before passing, however, upon said issue, We find it logical, considering their nature, to first examine the other questions raised herein. Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not making "sufficient and complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised as to fully conserve petitioners' right to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of law." (p. 32, Brief for Petitioners) Petitioners based this assignment of error on the requirement embodied in Section 4, Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court which states: Sec. 4. Findings of the court. Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it." More specifically, petitioners assail the failure of the Court of Appeals to include in its decision the complete text of the three letters sent by respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the expiration of the period within which redemption could be made (p. 35, Brief for Petitioners), petitioners intimating that such omission has impaired their position on appeal as another question is raised by them on the basis of the "terminology of those three letters". ( Ibid). We find no merit in this contention. At the outset, it should be stressed that provisions of the Rules of Court like the one invoked by petitioner are to be given liberal construction. (Rule 1, Sec. 2, Rules of Court) As this Court had the occasion to rule, the findings of facts which as found by the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon. (Air France vs. Carrascoso, et al., L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 155, 157, citing Braga vs. Millora, 3 Phil. 458, 465) It is not necessary that the appellate court reproduce in their entirety the exhibits presented by the parties during the trial. To require the Court to do so would be to clutter the pages of the decision with wordy texts of documents when reference to the gist thereof would just as adequately, if not better, serve the purpose of the rule. The respondent Court did not disregard the three letters in question. Neither did it dismiss their evidentiary value. Each letter was properly referred to in the decision and its message clearly reflected thereon. Indeed, it is not alleged that respondent Court misunderstood the communication. Another point raised concerns questions of fact, relating particularly to the testimonies of Henry Lee, his witness Valeriano Santos and respondent Alberta Simeon (pp. 39-45, Brief for Petitioners). Suffice it to state here that these matters cannot be inquired into a review on certiorari. (Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court; De Vera vs. Fernandez, 88 Phil. 668; Velasco vs. Court of Appeals, 90 Phil. 688; Tan vs. Court of Appeals, L-22793, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 54; Lucero vs. Loot, L-16995, October 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 687; Ramirez Telephone Corporation vs. Bank of America, L-22614, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 191; Chan vs. Court of Appeals, L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737; People vs. Perido, L28248, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 97) Going now to the main issue to be resolved, petitioner, assign as error the Court of Appeals' finding that the right of private respondents to repurchase the land in question still subsists. It was respondent court's thinking that the first three letters sent by private respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the lapse of the five-year period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the right of private respondents to redeem the property (pp. 58-59, rollo).

The first letter dated June 14, 1960 (Exh. C) advised petitioner Vita Uy Lee of Emiliano Simeon's "desire to repurchase" the land and requested that the latter be informed of Lee's conformity on the matter within five days from receipt (t)hereof". (p. 32, Ibid) The second letter sent on November 3, 1960 (Exh. J) reiterated Simeon's demand to repurchase the land (Ibid). The third letter dated June 24, 1961, expressed the same demand, this time with a warning that if nothing is heard from petitioner Vita Uy Lee within five days from receipt, respondent Simeon would seek judicial intervention ( Ibid). In no instance was it shown that private respondent offered or tendered the repurchase price. Petitioners maintain that the sending of letters advising of private respondents' desire to repurchase the property and demanding its resale did not constitute a proper exercise of the right of legal redemption, absent an actual and simultaneous tender of payment (p. 17, Brief for Petitioners). Petitioners argue that it is not sufficient for the vendor to inform the vendee that the former intends to redeem the property sold, but he must at the same time offer to repay the price. (p. 21, Ibid). This view deserves consideration. The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary to exercise the right of redemption finds support in civil law. Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in the absence of an applicable provision in Commonwealth Act No. 141, furnishes the guide, to wit: "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the vendee the price of the sale ...". Thus, in the case of Angao vs. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152, it was held that "it is not sufficient for the vendor to intimate or to state to the vendee that the former desires to redeem the thing sold, but he must immediately thereupon offer to repay the price ...". Likewise, in several other cases decided by the Supreme Court (Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362; Retes vs. Suelto, 20 Phil. 394; Rosales vs. Reyes, et al., 25 Phil. 495; Canuto vs. Mariano, 37 Phil. 840; De la Cruz, et al. vs. Resurreccion, et al., .98 Phil. 975; and other cases) where the right to repurchase was held to have been properly exercised, there was a definite finding of tender of payment having been made by the vendor. Private respondent points out, however, that the statement in Angao cited above is an obiter dictum because in that case, the period of redemption had prescribed thereby rendering immaterial the question of whether or not a tender of payment was made. This might be so; nevertheless, a dictum which generally is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule (21 C.J.S. 309) may be followed if sufficiently persuasive (Ibid, citing Karameros vs. Luther, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 508). Accordingly, the Angao ruling was cited with approval in the case of Laserna vs. Javier and Cruz, 110 Phil. 172, where the appellant failed to tender payment of the repurchase price within 30 days after the court below had decided by final judgment that the contract sue upon was a pacto de retro and not a mortgage. (Article 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines gives a vendor a retro "the right to repurchase within thirty days from the time final judgment was rendered in a civil action on the basis that the contract was a true sale with right to repurchase". It was invoked in the subsequent case of Torrijos vs. Crisologo, L-17734, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 184. In that case, Crisologo offered the return to Torrijos of P2,000.00, representing a part of the repurchase price of P19,313.95. Holding that the vendor who desires to redeem the property should offer to repay the price, the Court went further and declared that the full amount of the repurchase price should be tendered. It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing his desire to repurchase the property without an accompanying tender of redemption price fell short of the requirements of law. Having failed to properly exercise his right of redemption within the statutory five-year period, the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing of an action to compel redemption after the lapse of the period.

Private respondents also argue, on the assumption that tender of payment was ordinarily required, that the same was not necessary in the instant case because petitioner Vita Uy Lee refused their demands for reconveyance. It may indeed be recalled that before the period for redemption expired, respondent (now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon sent petitioner Vita Uy Lee three letters one in June 1960, the other in November of the same year, and the third in June 1961 demanding the resale to him of the homestead. (p. 52, Rollo) Despite Lee's receipt of the letters, she did not send any reply. It was only when Simeon wrote her a fourth letter, this time after the redemption period had elapsed, that petitioner Lee expressly signified her refusal to resell the land in question on the ground that the 5-year period had already expired (pp. 52-53, Ibid). The appellate court considered appellants' (now petitioners) failure to reply to Simeon's first letters as refusal on petitioners' part to resell the property in question and held that such refusal rendered tender of payment unnecessary (pp. 61-63, Ibid). This position is untenable. Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in ignoring the letters sent her by respondent Emiliano Simeon because the mere mention therein of respondent's intention to redeem the property, without making tender of payment, did not constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. The rule that tender of the repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee has refused to permit the repurchase, as enunciated in at least two cases (Gonzaga vs. Go, 69 Phil. 678 and Laserna vs. Javier, 110 Phil. 172), is premised on the ground that under such circumstance the vendee will also refuse the tender of payment. From petitioner Lee's silence which we have shown above to be justified, no such deduction can be made. Unlike a flat refusal, her silence did not close the door to respondent Simeon's subsequent tender of payment, had he wished to do so, provided that the same was made within five-year period. Yet he neglected to tender payment and, instead, merely filed an action to compel reconveyance after the expiration of the period. WHEREFORE, finding private respondents' right of redemption to have lapsed, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and another one entered dismissing the complaint. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it. Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General. We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents. I First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz: ENTRY OF JUDGMENT This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the aboveentitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision. SO ORDERED. and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999 LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents. RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.: For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that: 1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority; The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . . Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit: a. b. c. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law; The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.

2.

3.

4.

5.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.

Manila, Philippines. e The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as follows: 2 xxx xxx xxx the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible. 5 In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 6 viz: This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon. Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict

has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. 1wphi1.nt The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides: Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10 Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12 The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided: xxx xxx xxx Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers. xxx xxx xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13 The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides: xxx xxx xxx Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx xxx xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial. To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state: xxx xxx xxx 5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief. 6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative

Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed. 7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date at execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by the court. 8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read: Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. 9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art.

II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987]. The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants. II Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government. III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of the same law. When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens. The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows: xxx xxx xxx a. b. c. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law; The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel. 18

provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose. A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999. The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay. SO ORDERED.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which