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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY, MARYLAND

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Todd Wetzelberger Counter-Plaintiff vs. Thomas P. Dore, et al.,

) ) ) ) COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS AMENDED VERIFIED MOTION TO ) VACATE JUDGMENT ) CASE NO. 03-C-10-000465

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Counter-Defendants
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Michael T. Cantrell, Renee Olivia Dyson, M&T Bank, R. Jay Fisher, Baltimore County ) Sheriff ) Does 1-10 inclusive ) Third Party Defendant(s) _____________________________________________________________________________ COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS AMENDED VERIFIED MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT Comes now, Counter-plaintiff Todd Wetzelberger (Wetzelberger), for purposes of making a complete record for further proceedings, per Md. Rule 2-535 and moves to court to vacate the erroneous judgment dismissing Wetzelbergers initial counterclaim that was entered by mistake.

FACTS AND LAW I. Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Enter Order Dismissing Counterclaim For Any Reason Other than Lack of Jurisdiction 1. Michael Pate (recently appointed judge in District Court of Maryland) correctly stated in the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of Dore et al. (Dkt. No 61) that the Circuit Court, per Md. Rule 2-322(b), did not have jurisdiction to hear the initial counterclaim on 16 August 2011, the day of filing the complaint as the Court of Special Appeals had jurisdiction over the case.

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2.
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Judge Cahill, being competent to rule on this matter, agreed, as evidenced by the Order

signed by Judge Cahill on 1 December 2011, and filed on 2 December 2011, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

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3. Despite the preceding fact, subsequent orders, entered by a court lacking jurisdiction, were allegedly entered dismissing the very same complaint with prejudice. 4. Repeated requests seeking to correct the obvious mistake went unanswered. 5. Wetzelberger filed a Motion for Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law (Dkt. No 72)IGNORED. 6. Wetzelberger filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the Court of Appeals to compel the Circuit Court to Clarify the obvious mistake- SUMMARYILY DENIED WITH NO EXPLANATION. 7. Wetzelberger filed a Motion for Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law with the Court of Appeals seeking facts and law for the summary denial- SUMMARILY DENIED-NO EXPLANATION. 8. Seeking an answer as to the obvious mistake, at the 30 April 2013 hearing Wetzelberger presented to Judge Norman the valid correct Order signed by Judge Cahill on 1 December 2011, and entered by the clerk on 2 December 2011, dismissing the prior counterclaim filed by Wetzelberger for lack of jurisdiction, NOT with prejudice.

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9. Wetzelberger clearly stated on the record to Judge Norman that there obviously was a
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mistake since there are two conflicting orders.

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10. Wetzelberger clearly stated that Wetzelberger sought clarification for the past 16 months,
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including a Motion for Finding of Fact as well as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 11. Judge Norman summarily ignored the correct Order signed by Judge Cahill dismissing the

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prior counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction. 12. Judge Norman didnt bother to make any statement, or to address the obvious mistake by the Circuit Court, other than to accuse Wetzelberger of waiving rights. 13. Wetzelberger, believing Judge Norman would do what is fair, just, and right, was shocked

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that the two conflicting orders that have serious implications, and could possibly result in the extinguishment of right, title and interest to real and personal property, were summarily ignored with no explanation.

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14. Despite the Circuit Court willfully failing to address the obvious mistake, Wetzelberger served letter requests on Judge Cahill directly, for an explanation of the conflicting orders. 15. A letter request dated 2 May 2013 (only 2 days after the 30 April 2013 hearing) was served on Judge Cahill. Said letter request was IGNORED. 16. As of the date of filing this motion, a second letter request dated 11 June 2013 was served on Judge Cahill. Said letter request was IGNORED. 17. To date, after 6 different good faith attempts over the last 16 months, no public servant, including Judge Cahill, will state on the record, that the court erred and that the prior case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 18. Judge Cahill has a duty to state on the record a valid explanation of two conflicting orders allegedly signed and entered on the exact same day. 19. A judgment which is void due to lack of jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked at any time. Tucker v. Tucker, 35 Md. App. 710, 373 A.2d 16 (1977). 20. When appellate jurisdiction attaches, the Circuit Court loses jurisdiction. Unnamed Atty v. Attorney Grievance Commn, 303 Md. 473, 494 A.2d 940 (1985). 21. In light of the admissible evidence entered in the instant case, Judge Norman abused his discretion, thereby prejudicing Wetzelberger, by not continuing the hearing until such time as the discrepancy could be resolved by Judge Cahill. 22. Wetzelberger, left no other choice, has a clear right (not privilege) to have a determination made on the record per Md. Rule 2-535, that the initial counterclaim was correctly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as the evidence and case citations clearly show. 23. Due to Judge Normans order claiming that no attachments are to be filed with motions filed per Md Rule(s) 2-534, 2-535, Wetzelberger has been obstructed from attaching the 2 letter requests served on Judge Cahill.

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24. If there was any question as to bias and prejudice exhibited toward Wetzelberger by Judge Norman, said order answers that question in the affirmative. 25. Those letter requests are in the possession of Judge Cahill and can be obtained by the court for review as well as by the appellate court on appeal. II. Ignorance Is Bar To Estoppel 26. Owing to Wetzelbergers ignorance of special rights to property, Wetzelberger has good cause to file said motion per Md. Rule 2-535 and Md. Rule 14-211. 27. If one has been ignorant of the following facts, ones ignorance of special rights to property cannot be held as a bar or estoppel to any/all defenses in the interest of doing substantial justice. 28. Only after one purges the ignorance of special rights to property by becoming informed, and by their conduct fails to assert their rights, or protect their claims, then and only then can one be construed to have slumbered on their rights. III. Defendants Suffered No Injury Giving Rise to Underlying Order to Docket Being Filed 29. There is no evidence in the record proving either the substituted trustees, Dore et al., or M&T Bank (MTB) suffered any injury or loss caused by Wetzelberger. 30. The 1099a entered into evidence at the 30 April 2013 (no objection was made) is unrebutted, conclusive, settled proof that Wetzelberger has no obligation due to MTB. 31. The 1099a entered into evidence is also proof that there is no privity of contract between Wetzelberger and MTB. 32. Due to the unrebutted fact that neither Dore et al., or MTB suffered any injury giving rise to status as real party in interest, Dore et al. and MTB lack standing to file a complaint. 33. Further proof that MTB suffered no injury or loss is found in Wetzelberger v. LCS Financial, Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland, Case No. 03C12008626. 34. LCS Financial (LCS) attempted to collect on a purported deficiency on behalf of its

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purported client MTB.

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35. When demand for validation of purported deficiency was served on LCS Financial, as is the usual pattern and practice, LCS willfully failed to produce any evidence, then allegedly returned this account to our client MTB. 36. The consistent pattern and practice of conduct exhibited by Dore et al., MTB, and every other attorney attempting to collect on a purported debt, is that every attorney, without exception, has repeatedly ducked their duty to produce a bona fide claim. 37. Due to the fact that Dore et al., and MTB lacked standing, the court was deprived of jurisdiction to enter any orders in the underlying case. 38. The Wetzelbergers repeatedly denied signatures on copies of any/all documents and instruments filed in the underlying case (Dkt. No. 125, 10-14). 39. Since a verified signature evidences manifestation of intent, the original documents were repeatedly demanded to be produced six (6) months before the Order To Docket was filed to comport with the Statute of Frauds. 40. Only the signatory, via written or parol evidence, can determine the manifestation of intent.

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41. The claim filed by Dore et al., lacking any substance, was filed in bad faith. 42. The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the underlying Order to Docket, can never be waived, and can be challenged at any time, including on appeal. IV. No Admissible Evidence Has Been Entered and Discovery Has Not Been Completed 43. Neither Dore et al., or MTB have generally deposited any admissible evidence into the instant case. 44. Md. Rule(s) 5-901 and 5-1002 provide for the explicit production of original, genuine (free from fraud or forgery), unaltered, instruments and documents, authenticated by a credible, competent, reliable witness. 45. Only original documents are admissible, due to former DocX president Lorraine Brown admitting to being responsible for the forgery, falsification, and/or fabrication of over one (1) million documents filed in fraudclosure cases to include notes, mortgages, assignments of

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mortgage, allonges to notes, deeds of trust, deeds of appointment of substitute trustees, affidavits of indebtedness, and bogus certificates of satisfaction/lien releases. (Dkt. No. 112) 46. Lorraine Brown is now serving jail time after being prosecuted by the Department of Justice and several state attorneys general. 47. Fraudclosure mills and banks across the country, including Dore et al. and MTB, contract with DocX to provide false, forged, fabricated and/or fraudulent documents filed as authentic. 48. To date, no original, authenticated documents and instruments supporting a bona fide claim have been produced by Dore et al., or MTB. 49. As filed into the record via Judicial Notice to be included on appeal, and restated orally at the 30 April 2013 hearing, the Florida Bankers Association admitted that all physical notes are deliberately eliminated. See State Street Bank and Trust Company v. Lord, 851 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA (2003). 50. The preceding statement evidences the fact that it is impossible for Thomas P. Dore to have produced a physical note (documentary intangible property) evidencing a purported obligation. 51. Discovery served on Dore et al. and MTB, once produced, will corroborate the 1099a in evidence, and will prove Wetzelberger's verified statements. V. Defendants Claim Fails Under Both Contract and Trust Law 52. There is no privity of contract between Wetzelberger and Dore et al. 53. There is no privity of contract between Wetzelberger and MTB. 54. If Dore et al. and MTB are not attempting the unlawful extinguishment of the right, title and interest to property, under the theory of breach of contract, then the only other reasonable explanation is Dore et al. and MTB are attempting to enforce a purported trust relationship in an equity court. 55. An equity court is the proper court to address this matter as clearly defined in the copy of the deed of trust (assuming arguendo the copy is authentic) on p. 13, 22, 4 to wit [a]n equity court having jurisdiction.

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56. The equitable maxims he who comes to equity must do equity and he who comes to equity must come with clean hands are directly applicable in the instant matter and must be invoked. 57. Dore et al. came to equity with unclean hands. 58. Wetzelberger does not understand the meaning of complex words and phrases that can have multiple meanings in the context of a court case, depending on the jurisdiction asserted. 59. Wetzelberger stated as much in a 6 May 2013 letter to Judge Norman: Readings of Gibsons Suits in Chancery, Pomeroys Equity Jurisprudence, Lewins Practical Treatise on The Law of Trusts, history of the High Court of Chancery in Maryland, including its abolishment in 1854, and attempting to distinguish between the procedural aspects of law and equity after the merger in 1984, have not yet resulted in a full understanding. Its not for lack of effort. 60. Said meanings can be easily misconstrued by the court and by Wetzelberger due to mistake

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and ignorance of special rights in property. 61. Evidence of the above statements is found in the very Maryland Rules that Dore et al. and

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MTB are attempting to use as the basis for an unlawful invasion (hostile or forcible encroachment on the rights of another) of land and unlawful taking. 62. Md. Rule 14-202(b)(2) definitions states that a "borrower" can be a grantor of a deed of trust. 63. Said mistake and ignorance of special rights in property would do harm to Wetzelberger if allowed to stand unchallenged. VI. A Trust Fails When It Lacks The Necessary Elements to Form A Trust 64. If Dore et al., and MTB are attempting the unlawful fraudclosure under trust law, the alleged trust purportedly formed by the deed of trust fails for lack of meeting the elements of a trust. 65. Four (4) elements must be present to form a trust that the law and equity court will recognize. 1) intent, 2) purpose, 3) specific trust res/property, 4) parties. A trust must also have a method of formation.

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66. It was NOT the intent of the Wetzelbergers to form a trust. Intent is manifested in the authenticated signature, along with the full and complete understanding that an express trust was being formed. 67. As restated with regard to manifestation of intent to form a trust, the Wetzelbergers repeatedly denied all signatures on copies and demand authenticated original documents and instruments. 68. At the 30 April 2013 hearing, Wetzelberger again clearly, plainly and unambiguously orally denied signatures on any/all copies of documents and instruments. 69. As restated with regard to manifestation of intent to form a trust, only the signatory can verify and authenticate ones signature. 70. Todd Wetzelbergers name and signature are the property of Todd Wetzelberger (emphasis in bold). A man's name is his own property, and he has the same right to its use and enjoyment as he has to that of any other species of property. "It is hardly necessary to say that an ordinary surname cannot be appropriated as a trade-mark by any one person as against others of the same name, who are using it for a legitimate purpose; although cases are not wanting of injunctions to restrain the use even of one's own name where a fraud upon another is manifestly intended, or where he has assigned or parted with his right to use it." Brown Chemical Company v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540 as cited in Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 US 118 - Supreme Court 1905 71. Todd Wetzelberger did not authorize any person to affix Todd Wetzelbergers property to any document or instrument. 72. Todd Wetzelberger did not assign or part with the right to the name, the property, of Todd Wetzelberger. 73. The copy ( assuming arguendo it is a true copy of the original) of the DOT states on p.3 in covenants that [b]orrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to grant and convey the property... 74. Research of the definition of seised reveals in laymans terms the meaning having ownership. http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/seised

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75. A reasonable person, and impartial trier of fact has to ask the question: If borrower/grantor was lawfully seised of the estate (has undivided perfect right, title, possession and use) then who in their right mind would knowingly and willingly, expressly convey that perfect title to perfect strangers as a gift, absent any consideration, bifurcating the perfect title into a legal title in the trustee, and beneficial title in a beneficiary, of which no privity of contract or privity of estate exists? 76. The answer, of course, is that no one in their right mind, that is mentally competent to handle their own affairs, would do so, unless induced or tricked into doing so. 77. Further, one cannot convey property into a trust, unless one is lawfully seised of the estate being conveyed. 78. As evidenced by the Notice of Cloud on Title to Real Property (Dkt. No. 149), the prior purported lien release/certificate of satisfaction is a fraudulent instrument recorded in the land records. 79. Not until the admissions by Lorraine Brown, former DocX president, was it discovered the prior lien release was bogus. 80. If not for Wetzelberger discovering the fraudulent document recorded among the land records, the court would have never been made aware of the mistake. 81. One cannot convey into trust what one does not have the lawful title to. 82. The trust fails for lack of present transfer of trust res/property. 83. A reasonable person, and impartial trier of fact could conclude that the purported contract was allegedly merged into a higher purported security as defined in Blacks Law 8th Ed., p. 3133: Where two parties have made a simple contract for any purpose, and afterwards have entered into an identical engagement by deed, the simple contract is merged in the deed and becomes extinct. This extinction of a lesser in a higher security, like the extinction of a lesser in a greater interest in lands, is called merger. William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 85 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919). 84. A man cannot be compelled to be the debtor of another against his will. 85. If the alleged purpose of the trust was for repayment of a purported debt, then absent evidence of privity of contract or privity of estate, between Todd Wetzelberger and the trustee(s)
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or beneficiary, or evidence of indebtedness, proving Todd Wetzelberger as the obligor, then the purpose is not met. 86. Under trust law, no party need know that a trust has been formed (emphasis in bold). It is to be noticed that an express trust may arise even though the parties in their own minds did not intend to create a trust...It is the manifestation of intention that controls and not the actual intention where that differs from the manifestation of intention. An express trust may be created even though the parties do not call it a trust, and even though they do not understand precisely what a trust is; it is sufficient if what they appears to have in mind is in its essentials what the courts mean when they speak of a trust. LGVA v. BELLEVALE FARMS, 0228 (Md. App. 11-30-2011) 87. Assuming arguendo the copy of the DOT is a true and correct copy, page 11, 16 is evidence of the preceding statement and supporting case citation to wit (emphasis in bold): 16. Governing law;..[A]pplicable law might explicitly or implicitly allow the parties to agree by contract or it might be silent, but such silence shall not be construed as a prohibition against agreement by contract. 88. If the manifestation of intent controls per LGVA v. Bellvale Farms, then that manifestation

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is evidenced in a signature to a writing, or to ones conduct. 89. To restate in clear, plain, unambiguous terms with specificity and particularity, it was NOT

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the intent of the Wetzelbergers to form a trust with unknown persons of which no privity of contract or privity of estate exists with the Wetzelbergers. 90. Said mistake and ignorance, if allowed to stand unchallenged, would prejudice the case, would be fatal, would impair the ability of the Wetzelbergers to assert any/all defenses and would be reversible error on appeal. 91. The equity maxim equity abhors penalties and forfeitures is directly applicable and should invoke the conscience of equity to do what is fair, just, and right. VII. Conclusion 92. When an express trust fails due to lack of meeting all the elements, a resulting trust is formed by operation of law to do what is fair, just and right in the conscience of equity. 93. The parties to the resulting trust are the alleged beneficiary of the failed express trust (MTB) being converted to the trustee.
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94. The construed former beneficiary now trustee (MTB), holds the trust res for the benefit of the grantor(s) of the failed express trust (Wetzelbergers), who are converted to beneficiaries of the resulting trust. 95. In the absence of a resulting trust by operation of law, the Restatement of the Law on Trusts, 3d, and Uniform Trust Code allow rescission and reformation for mistake.

WHEREFORE, owing to ignorance, mistake, the facts, law, and admissible evidence in the case, and for good cause shown, Todd Wetzelberger moves the equity court to do what is fair just and right by declaring the dismissal of the initial counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction and vacating the void conflicting order of dismissal with prejudice. Wetzelberger further moves the court to enter a decree, declaring the failure of the

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misconstrued express trust, and that a resulting trust is formed with beneficial title vesting in the Wetzelbergers. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed this ___ day of _________________2013, at Baltimore County, Maryland. ________________________ Todd Wetzelberger

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I _________________________________ hereby certify that copies of the foregoing document(s) were served upon the following recipients via USPS first class mail in a sealed envelope on or about this ___ day of _____________________________, 2013: Steven A. Allen Pessin Katz Law, P.A. 901 Dulaney Valley Road, Ste 400 Towson, MD. 21204 Michael T. Cantrell McCabe Weisberg & Conway LLC 312 Marshall Ave Ste 800 Laurel, MD 20707-4808 Office of the MD Attorney General Roger L. Wolfe, Jr. 200 St. Paul Place, 20th Floor Baltimore, MD 21202 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed this ___ day of _________________2013, at Baltimore County, Maryland. _______________________________ John Y. Lee Gordon Feinblatt, LLC 233 East Redwood Street Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Rita Ting-Hopper Atlantic Law Group, LLC 1602 Village Market Blvd. SE, Ste 310 Leesburg, VA 20175

Todd Wetzelberger

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