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PROBLEMS

CONCERNING BY C. J. DE

LATER

PLATONISM

II

VOGEL

We dorus ?tt??, astat?? ?at?

now

come

to our

second

remark

relative

to the

thesis

of

Cherniss.

his protest against the conclusion of Hermoof a admit ?a? that which (or Dercyllides), ?????? things would be non being : ?ste unstable and infinite, being It concerns

?a? a???f?? ?a? ?pe???? ?a? ??? d? t? t????t?? ???es?a? t?? d?t??. ?p?fas?? of the ?? ?v in the sense It is clear that here is not spoken of the Sophistes. The term ?? d? is even not used. But we may well draw whether question think a is, of some to that other Phil. of attention 59a-b, nature of Plato. passages where Plato is those can possible. things be reached I then asks might first the question to this answer

science

His which

any stability, be any cannot

concerning stable nothing

or knowledge about insight the pure and the true" is pe?? ta ?e? ?at? ta a?t? ?sa?t?? ? Plato or what is most akin to them. tata ????ta, no doubt: the names of

do not possess by us, so that there them. "The stable, ??e??t?leaves us

it is said, "have ???? and f????s??, their truest and most exact 45) ?? ta?? pe?? t? ?v application" in the contemplation the mind is engaged d?t?? ?????a?? (when of true being). Now, being, (Tim. which ways tation ???? if "that he which means clearly 35a) is not true being. In opposition is "laid down as a kind of example, the this same", of the example, ?te??? coming is in Tim. into the same and is always to say that the ?te??? unmixed" is true or ?e??st? ??s?a to the first principle,

and alintelligible as "an imi48e qualified and visible" (???es?? being

?a? ??at??). of Jowett.

45) Phil. 59d, translation

300 So to in the the is

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM Philebus things that is always which which turns out have the to are opposed ?e?a??t?? and in the Timaeus same; no be the world of sensible I a

true

being, ?te???,

again

things, ask: are

the same. is always to ta?t??, that which opposed which admits we then here so far from the doctrine

and unlimited", formless that must be called "unstable, principle non being, because being is denied of it? yes, in a certain sense here that passage I think, we are not far. We must remember in Aristotle's defined plicius before says it is said that "some" 201b20"21, where Physics, as ?te??t?? "motion" ?a? ???s?t?? ?a? t? ?? d?46). Simon this place cites Eudemus, in his comment who wrote about Plato's opinion on motion and says: "Plato Alexander and the is the great and small and non-being and irregNow Plato in his like"47). explicitly says Sophisand rest are not identical with ?te??? and ta?t??.

that motion motion

ularity tes that And not

the changing which is world, yet in Phil. 59 he opposes the same, to the ??t?? d? which is always ?at? ta?ta. always Is there a contradiction?No, there is none. Shortly put, because there is spoken of motion-itself in the Sophist and rest-itself, while the in the Philebus and the Timaeus itself and the and author world. About motion changing and ??te??? said that ta?t?? may each what case other ta being of both, cannot is predicated would be at rest and motion hand, the eternal world other than another about speaks then it is rest-itself of both with itself. of them, Now

be predicated the same be either rest

of them. is

For in that

in motion.

of the

intelligible

on the Thus, ta ?e? ?at?

of sensible ?sa?t?? ????ta, while the changing principle itself ?a? therefore no ???es?? ???? ??at?? (and things, Idea), is this In sense then called "movement" be called ??te???. may ?a? it also be called As far as ???s?t??. ?te??t?? May ?? d?? a?ta

46) In the light of this passage it becomes quite clear that Aristotle, in Metaph. A 9, 992bT, having compared the great and small to the ?a??? ?a? ? ta?ta ??? ?st?? pt????? of the physiologists ?pe???? ?a? ???e???? ? continues: pe?? te ????se??, e? ??? esta? ta?ta (sc. the ???a ?a? ??????, or ?pe???? te ?a? ???e????) ????s??, d???? dt? ????seta? ta e?d?. 47) Simpl., Phys. p. 43116"9, ???t?? d? t? ???a ?a? ?????? ?a? t? ?? d? ^?a? t? ????a??? ?a? dsa t??t??? ?p? ta?t? f??e? t?? ????s?? ???e?.

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM the with the ??t?? world is contrasted ?v, we changing that Plato was not far from this. concede Can we come to a solution??I hope we can. First we that are three who there witnesses state, then, independent bute is to Plato the use of the term or who or also ??? for movement,

301 must must attri-

Hermodorus ?v: we remark that Secondly with connection ?te??t?? par with may sensible

?? ?v for his material principle say at least that in fact this principle Aristotle and Eudemus. (Dercyllides), ?a? in is by Aristotle mentioned on a and by Eudemus ???s?t??,

"movement"

"and the like,>. We the great and small, the ????a??? the moving is not meant infer that here by "movement" world

as such, but that side of it which is to be referred which is described as "what to the lower or material principle, the more and the less". We saw that to Plato its chief possesses in and as its nature consists was "the great-and-small", aspect we can understand that it could two extremes, movement. We find that aspect of it in Hermothe that this whole kind which possesses where he states we state that ?a? ?tt??, is unstable Thirdly (?stat??). between with calls the sensible a ?? ?v, but that he in we infer that not the sensible ?v. Again all know Plato to be non being?we world

an oscillating be identified dorus,

?????? Plato nowhere

fact opposes it to the ??t?? world as such is meant by that

he argues in the Philebus that it must (and can) be matheto say is this, that what he means but determined?; matically the nature is in which of sensible have an element them, things and theretwo between extremes, fluctuating, oscillating "moving", fore to true being. as being on good grounds the testimony us to athetize Platonic doctrine. of Hermodorus or that of Aristotle as being false and untrustworthy; it on the contrary, enables their testimony us, when we consider thereand a clearer, a more precise to form for ourselves carefully, fore a truer image of what Plato taught. unstable and opposite This then we may acknowledge It does not compel

proceed the concerning

We

to

our

next

point:

the

second

unwritten

teaching

of Plato,

place of Aristotle 404b16-27. De anima

302 The contents

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM of this passage, with the preceding alinea, are as

follOWS 48) ; "All those soul with 'hand,

to the fact that what has who had special regard in it is moved, adopted the view that soul is to be identified what is eminently of movement. All, on the other originative who looked to the fact that what has soul in it knows or

of what is, identify soul with the principle or principles perceives such as admit several or one Nature, principles they according declares that it is formed out of all his only. Thus Empedocles the same way Plato being soul.?In for like, he the of his soul out fashions elements; holds, is known by like, and things are formed out of the principles or elements, so that soul must be so too. Similarly also ?? t??? pe?? it was set forth that the Animal-itself f???s?f?a? ?e???????? is compounded of the Idea itself of the One tot? ?f??) (a?t? else, gether with the primary length, breath and depth, everything the objects of its perception, constituted. Again being similarly he puts his view in yet other terms (?t? d? ?a? ?????): Mind is the monad, science from deviatingly or knowledge the one point to another), dyad it goes un(because opinion the number of the each elements, in the Timaeus of them also

the number of the solid (4); the numbers are plane (3), sensation identified or principles, with the Forms themselves by him expressly and are formed out of the elements; now things are apprehended and these same by mind or science or opinion or sensation, numbers (1, 2, 3, 4) are the Forms of things." must to Cherniss two passages in the Metaphysics According which is said the proof of this thesis, that the doctrine, procure ? Smith transhere to occur ?? t??? pe?? f???s?f?a? ?e???????? as understand ancient and modern, lates, nearly all interpreters, these words: "On Philosophy" "in his (sc. Plato's) lectures "?, namely that "the Animal itself"49) is compounded of the Idea either

48) I give the translation of J. A. Smith, Oxford 1931. 49) In Tim. 30 6 the visible kosmos is called by Plato a ?f??. Th?mistius says rightly that a?t? t? ?f?? is the kosmos no?t?s. Cp. Soph. 249a, where Plato says that the pa?te??? d? must have motion and life, soul (or conscience) and thought (???? or f????s??). This can mean nothing else than that, platonically speaking, the world of Ideas is a "living being", a ?f?? which has thought and conscience.

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM itself depth Plato between of two, that In name ???e?? those of the

303

and breath with the primary One, together length, the of is doctrine not the ideal 2, 1, 3, Numbers, 4), (i.e. most and 1036b13"15 at all, but of Xenocrates: Metaph. a distinction is made place : and the line itself t? e?d?? t?? ??a???? (a?t???a???) who admit Ideas some say that the eidos of the line is In the first-mentioned the line two itself. The passages the opinion of Xenocrates is referred to. indeed is spoken of Xenocrates. Though it appears clearly Aristotle by which number. from the reproaches Xenocrates in is mentioned again problem all to believe there is no reason at his

1090b20"32.

others here is ta

1043a33.

In these

exclusively 1090 b there not

mentioned,

speaking the man number,

?a???at???, about unmathematically who, while Speusippus identified this number

expression him with indeed was

out of (?e????) magnitudes of bodies out out of 4. Aristotle 3, planes tudes be Ideas, or what is their manner to things?"?He they contribute contribute as the nothing, nothing" Next 50). he speaks about answers objects who

accepted only the mathematical with the Ideas and "made" spatial out of the dyad, numbers: length magniand what do of existence, "These his own question: mathematics contribute asks: "Will these

of first

"those

that of the Forms and that which number, he says: they cannot him and his followers Plato is meant. Against number will exist or from what it tell us how the mathematical comes.? Plato and Xenocrates is clear, that in this passage the first did not identify because could not be mentioned together, Ideas with the mathematical number, while the latter did. Even if the doctrine that line is 2, plane 3 and solid 4 was taught by both, it had a different to each of them. That it has indeed been meaning Now so much and probably than Xenocrates by taught also by other Platonists such as Metaph. Plato himself, is likely from passages Z, 1036 b. Adv. math. X, 259-260, is augmented This probability by Sextus, Platonic other indisputably and 278-280, doctrine, Where, among this also is set forth. of W. D. Ross, Oxford, 21928. 50) Translation

two kinds of posited Here is mathematical".

304

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM But let us consider the cited itself of De anima. "Plato passage the soul out of the (sc. his) elements.

constructs in the Timaeus ? d? ?a? ?? t??? pe?? f???s?f?a? d????s??, ?e???????? ?????? ?a? t?? t?? t? a?t? e??? ?d?a? p??t?? ?f?? ?? a?t?? t?? ??? ?a? p??t??? ?a? ??????/' ?????? remarks : the words ?? t??? pe?? f???s?f?a? Cherniss ?e???????? on philosophy. mean Plato's lectures must not of necessity They entitled pe?? dialogue the fact that is this, proved f???s?f?a?. by they that Th?mistius so understood the ancient commentator them; ascribed who himself, they do mean it, is proved by Aristotle the plane that the line is two, in his Metaphysics the theory can just as well mean Aristotle's mean That can three and solids then, of Plato we Here, doctrine crates two while and not to Plato. four, clearly to Xenocrates in 1090b32"33 the must protest. Metaph. Surely, both from that of Xenois sharply distinguished, this, that Plato assumed and the mathematical, did not. But nowhere does Aristotle say that namely Number own

kinds

and from that of Speusippus, of numbers, the ideal

his two disciples that the line the theory with which we are occupied here, namely, is to be referred to the number two, the plane to three and the solid to four, has been taught and not by exclusively by Xenocrates, too. we must from De the cited passage hand, when we consider of the doctrine remark that in this very passage on the soul, namely that soul is a self-moving number, from also the preceding to Xenocrates. theory, which therefore For directly after the supra, i.e. immediately On the other

Plato

anima, Xenocrates

is sharply distinguished hardly can be ascribed

of which we gave the translation passage after the words "e?d? d?? a?????? ??t?? t?? p?a???t??" ("and these numbers", sc. 1, 2, 3, 4, "are the forms of things"), Aristotle continues: ?pe? d? ?a? ????t???? ?d??e? ? ???? e??a? ?a? ?????st???? ??t??, e????

s???p?e?a? ?? ??f???, t?? ????? ?p?f????e??? ???????* ea?t??. a?????? Smith translates "Some the sense of the passage very clearly: both viz. is both that soul the thinkers, accepting premisses, originative of movement and cognitive, have compounded it of both and declared the soul to be a selfmoving number."

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM

305

This then is the doctrine of Xenocrates. We ?may safely infer that the preceding akin to his views ? as theory, even if it is closely Cherniss rightly shows it is si)?is not set forth here by Aristotle as As to the term a?t? Xenocrates' theory, but as a piece of Platonism. t? I Cherniss thinks it does not mean the kosmos no?t?s, ?f??, think it does. And if the latter interpretation is right, it means that Plato taught that the intelligible world or the world of Ideas can be back

numbers to the elementary 1, 2, 3 and 4, ta d* ???a "and sensible too". d????t??p??, things manner Now, if we write these 1, 2, 3 and 4 in old-Pythagorean in the form of a tetractys, then we have the image of the dekas. referred whether it may not be explained We might ask the question thus, that Plato did not assume more than ten ideal that Aristotle testifies Numbers. This attractive.?Yet explanation it has some at the first may seem serious difficulties 52). sight rather

51) Cherniss treats our passage of De anima again in Aristotle's Criticism of Plato, App. IX, pp. 568-580. He finds his interpretation confirmed by the fr. 15 of Xenocrates, where it is said that he called the monad ????, which he identified with the "primary god"; and by the fr. 5, according to which Xenocr. adopted a triple classification of psychical faculties ? ep?st???, d??a and a?s??s??. In the fragments of Xenocr. the identification of these three faculties with the numbers 2, 3 and 4 does not occur. But it can be found in A?tius, attributed to Pythagoras and Pythagoreans. We find more traces of Xenocr. there (Cherniss o.e., p. 570 f.) ? Now it seems to me highly probable indeed that the said identification was taught by Xenocrates, just because it was Platonic doctrine. Only, that it was not this, has not been proved by Cherniss at all. 52) W. van der Wielen, De Ideegeta?en van Plato, p. 193, rightly remarks that, strictly speaking, to Plato the ideal Numbers two, three and four (together with the one, which was not a number) were sufficient for the explanation of the whole system of Ideas, and consequently of the sensible world. He also thinks of the tetractys. But he shrinks from attributing to Plato the addition of these four numbers to ten, an operation which would be in contradiction with the nature of the monad and of the ideal Numbers. How then can we explain that Plato adopted nine ideal Numbers besides the monad, as Aristotle says he did? ? Van der Wielen proposes this solution: as in the dialogues there is a part of strict reasoning, and a part of mythical form, so in the lecture on the Good too there may have been some portion of mythology. Plato may have spoken there by the mouth of a Pythagorean, and we can ascribe to this fictitious person the adding of the 1, 2, 3 and 4 up to ten. ? Now, this is a highly attractive, yet a too 20 Mnemosyne II

306 What

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM can be inferred World with is this, that Plato did admit certainty number of higher principles, Numand indirectly sensible could be things, that he admitted of a certain hierarchy

in his ideal

a restrained

bers, to which the Ideas, referred back; which means in his kosmos no?t?s. This Adv.

again is confirmed by the often quoted chapter of Sextus, in a whole environment math. X 258, where, of Platonic the author that above the must there be some Ideas doctrine, argues Number.?We principle: in the same direction. the commentators of will see later that Theophrastus

higher points

Besides later

and period Aristotle's account Plato's

of Aristotele, who were all of a much Alexander is the only who has seen of the lecture ?e?? t??a???, we have concerning whom

oral teaching two other testimonies. One of them is the wellknown story of Aristoxenus, AristoxeHarm. Elem. II p. 30Meibom. nus tells us that those who came and heard Plato's lecture on the Good, were deeply disappointed when they heard there nothing else

uncertain hypothesis. We can hardly admit that Plato in a lecture of an apparently highly esoteric character (see the testimony of Aristoxenus on the next page) had a theory of this own set forth, a theory on matters he thought of the highest importance, by a person who explained it in a way quite opposite to his own principles. Consequently we are more inclined to assume either that Plato really adopted nine ideal Numbers besides the One, or that others from the image of the tetractys, used by himself, concluded that he intended to adopt ten. But the latter possibility is surely the less probable. It might be put forward that in later Pythagorean doctrine, which was closely akin to Platonism, more than four numbers are mentioned. See for instance the scholion in Arist. Metaph. 985b29 (Brandis, Scholia in Arisi. p. 541a23-26): t?? d? t?ssa?a a?????? e?e?e? t? s??a t? ap???, t?? d? p??te t? f?s???? s??a, t?? d? e| t? e??????, e- q. s. We find, indeed, in this passage the thought that the monas is the principle of e??s??, ?????t??, e?d?p???a and ta?t?t??, while the dyad is called the principle of ?te??t??, d?a??es?? and ???????t??, ? "the reason why they also called the dyad matter, because it is the cause of separation" (ib. a29-33). Now here one may decidedly speak of Platonic influence. Yet it is difficult to make out what exactly is the addition of a later generation to the Platonic doctrine of numbers, and what is to be related to himself. The same must be said of the doctrine which is attributed to Philolaus by the author of the Theotogoumena arithm. (Diels, V.S.5 44, A 12).

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM than "about

307

and numbers, and astronomy, mathematics geometry ?st?? e?" ? which means: "and that p??a? dt? a?a??? the Finite is the Good, which with the One." is identical Cherniss that Plato in this asserts that it is highly improbable ?a? t? lecture would have identified son, that Alexander lecture derives this identification, and the notion that the principles of number are the principles of everything, from the doctrine that are to "monads lines and are with points substantially posiprior tion". Now this and Numbers; and for this reain his explanations on Aristotle's account of the Ideas

is exactly what Aristotle says that Plato denied 992 a20-24 Aristotle that testifies altogether 53) : for in Metaph. Plato did not attribute to points any existence at all. Hence, if we in this matter, it follows that Plato in his lecture accept his evidence did not give any account of the identification of Ideas for have said he could that Aristotle not Numbers; gave the which Alexander and if Aristotle had reported explanation proposes, some to other Alexander have had no reason would account, and this one. propose In this case again, as in that of Hermodorus, we must state that, even if the explanation causes the value of the some difficulties, itself is taken It is possible, not testimony away. surely, that Alexander gave a wrong explanation the grounds of Plato's concerning doctrine. But even as it stands, importance For the Alexander Sextus author referred prove and we of it. rest, may (Adv. argued back Cherniss' receive Math. some difficulties as light from In a preceding not be could explanations the above-cited passage paragraph (258) but must ???a?, to the of of the if he did, the testimony stands of Aristoxenus the are not allowed to deny nor to diminish on the Good

be that to He then to a higher numbers. proceeds genus: that ?numbers once more must be referred back to two ultimate the One and the indefinite (259 ff.) : Natural bodies back to geometrical referred planes, and planes is dyad. His argumentation are no primary reality. They and these forms or solids; ??a? ep?? ? ap?? ??a???

X 260). the Ideas

principles, as follows must again 53) be to

to lines,

Cherniss, Riddle, p. 28f.

308

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM

???* ?p? s??e??? ep? s??e??? a?????? ?? ????? a?????? ?e???ta?, ?a? a?t?? ?p? t? e? t?? p??te? d????, ?? te a?????? e?eta? pept??as?? (?a? ?a? ? d?a? ??a t?? est? d???, ?a? ? t??a? e? ???e? ?????e?? t? est?, t????, ?a? ? de??? e? ??????? ?ef??a???), e??a? t?? ??t?? ? ???a???a? a???? ef?se? t?? ????da, ?? ?at? e?ast?? t?? d?t?? e? ???eta?." ?et???? If the intention of this passage is, as Wilpert thinks, to set forth that to Plato objections taught apart from number but, being drawn from a point to a point, involves the number two, and that the two once more, being a single two, the one, it might be said that in this case the one has presupposes not an ontological, the author of this but simply passage that declared a logical priority.?Secondly, moved says that Pythagoras, the One is the when must the point had an ontologica! be made. First, if Plato priority to the line, three that the line is not

by these of existing considerations, principle is in which each of the existing things things, by participation to to attribute this whole reasoning called one, are we then allowed doctrine Can it not be, that we have here indeed Pythagorean is meant of as the One even if the priority us??Thirdly, if of the above even the doctrine an ontological and paspriority, that here the point then it must still be remarked sage is Platonic, Plato? before is not spoken of as anterior to the line, but the monad, while the as being ontologically point is not mentioned prior at all. the To these objections be said: First, may priority of the One must indeed be conceived as having an ontological character, just as well as the Ideas are to Plato ontologically prior to things (to terms: they exist pa?? ta p????ata). According put it in Aristotelian if the One did not exist, there to the above passage Plato argues: could not be a two; hence a line could not exist. But if no line could exist, then no plane, and if no plane, no solid. But if no solid, natural bodies could possibly exist.?What is posterior, can view Wilpert what is prior cannot. To this Platonic abolished; the above-cited siones article quotes Aristotekae, preserved of Mutschmann, p. 64): d? ?st? p??te??? ???? f?se? ????? t?? d??? ?a? t? ????? an interesting parallel in the codex Marcianus te from no be in

the Divi-

(in the edition

? t??

?????

e?d???,

?a? ta t?? d??d?? ?a? ap??? dsa a?t?

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM ???????? t? ?st?, ?? f?se? t??t?? s??a??e?ta?, d? s??a?a?????e??? t? ??? ?ste???

309

s??a?a????? p??te??? ? ???? t?? ????d??

a?a??e?e?s??

? d?a? a?a??e?ta?. these paragraphs that of the chapter of Sextus Second, especially do contain Platonic doctrine, may be seen directly from what follows: the doctrine of the a???st?? d??? as the second next principle to the One. For this is, according to Aristotle in Metaph. A 6, a chief between point of difference the ?pe???? was one. The third Plato and the Pythagoreans, to whom

is the most important. It contains a real difobjection For is it not true of Sextus, to this account that, according ficulty. Plato did refer the line back to the number two, and the number two, mentioned. being single, to the One? The point is only accidentally So that Wilpert too much when of he sums the contents says up this reasoning to in these terms: natural can be reduced bodies stereometrical lines stereometrical to planes, figures, figures and lines to points. Quod est demonstrandum. says, commenting and the Pythagoreans because they thought and that of bodies on Metaph. planes to

Alexander "Plato of things, is principle, to the

987 b33 (p. 55,20-26 H.) : as the principles numbers adopted that the first and the uncompounded are first (for what is simpler

planes

and is not annihilated same mathematicians reasoning, called

is naturally first), of planes lines, according and of lines points which the (st???a?), and as themselves monads, s??e?a they they and the

are utteriy uncompounded and have nothing before them; are numbers, monads are the first of things." so numbers This

differs from that of Sextus on the point in quesreasoning Alexander tion, points referring lines back to points and identifying with monads, while lines two to Sextus presuppose according the One. points, and the number two, being single, presupposes Plato by Alexander, being a report of what his in to the lecture pe?? t??a??? said, according disciples, 22m29 which compels (ap. Simpl. Phys. p. 454, D.). It is this passage Cherniss to deny the value of this whole report, because points are account here begins called "monads having position". The quotation of Simplicius as follows: We have another

310

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM

of things (ta? a???? t?? the principles "For Plato, who sought to him naturally number seemed because prior to ??t??), thought, the limits of the line are points, and points are the other things?for and without the line there is neither a plane monads with position, because then nor a solid, but number can exist also without these?, that this first to the other things, he deemed number is naturally of the first number are the is a principle, and that the principles of all number. And the first number is the two, and of principles are the One and the great-and-small."? this the principles 992a20-24: t??tf To this we must compare Aristotle, Metaph. ???t?? ?? ??t? ?e???? ??? tf ???e? (se. points) ?a? d?e???et? ? t??t? d? p??????? ???' ????e? a???? ??a???? ?et???f d???at?, t??t?? e??a? ?? ?t??e? ? ta? ?t????? ?a?t?? a????? ??a????. ? ? ?st' ?st??. ?? ?a? ?? p??a? est?, st???? ????? ??a??? how the presence In these lines Aristotle answers to the question of points class of things in the line must be explained: as being a geometrical ?Plato used to object to this a means: Which fiction." c. by of he

b and 533 kind of hypothesis, such as is meant in Rep. 510 c?511 the line He explained So Plato "destroyed" this hypothesis. the "abstract" without more another, help theory, completely the senses. "He gave the name of principle of the line?and this often posited?to that Plato could the indivisible

lines." It is not strange, indeed, meant of line Idea line this the the is (if by explain I think most it could as We by ?t???? ??a???, is). only probable remark that Plato then could just as well explain the plane by the Idea of plane, and the solid by the Idea of solid.?Of course he with point is, that he tried to dispense is two"?we with Sextus: "and point, saying: complete two being single, presupposes the One".?Now of course it may Plato admit the point by with that did Aristotle, said, implicitly the essential "line preceding Alexander Once once Indeed he did. And this is the argument. gave of his theory the account he gave. more I ask: can we come to a conclusion??And reason could. But the the be his

why

I answer

I hope we can. First. The theory "natural bodies from solids from planes, planes from lines, and lines from points" solids, is a rather obvious ruled by the same law. So it train of thought, more: might seem that he who admits the first three members, admits the

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM

311

from the Metafourth too. This is seen in the above-cited passage it may be also seen in De caelo III, 300 a 8-10 54) physics; of Second. It seems that Plato wished to evade the assumption line. The the line by his indivisible he explained the how from he this his ultimate is: did to question principles: pass to this One and the infinite Dyad??Sextus gives us the answer the point. Hence question by saying: We may conclude the One. the two, being single, presuppose in Aristote1 Alexander Plato that interprets ( )

in his account of Plato's lian terms, when he nevertheless introduces or even, of which doctrine the notion were called monads, "points" and (2) that the account of Sextus is more "monads with position", precise. We add on this two remarks: that he too first, that Alexander agrees knows that Plato considered with two Sextus

as the point, this first number, not the monad. And secondly that, point being an it is an evidence the more for the Platonic character ?d??? ???t????, of the passage of Sextus. It must be said then, that Cherniss was not right in his inference of that Plato in his lecture on the Good did not give any account of Ideas and Numbers, Aristotle his doctrine because could not have said that he gave the explanation which Alexander proposes.

of Theophrastus, Metaph. 6b11"14 Lastly we have the testimony where it is said that Plato "reduced sensible Ross-Fobes, things to This implies that to Plato NumIdeas, and the Ideas to Numbers". bers were hierarchy One or the Good Robin indeed has been a higher principle. Hence it immediately follows that a in the intelligible the must be assumed which of world, stands highest. this line. has followed

His interpretation, however, of our age. of the Plato-scholars accepted by hardly any with the W. D. Ross 55) tried to show that it is in contradiction statements of Aristotle, who says again and again that to Plato Ideas and Numbers were simply identic. Most modern critics accept

54) e?pe? ?????? ??e? st???? ??? p??? ??a????, ??a??? d? p??? ?p?ped??, t??t? d? p??? s??a. 55) Aristotle's Metaphysics I, Introduction LXVII-LXXI.

312

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM is essen-

this view 56). I opposed to it 57) that Robin's interpretation with Aristotle's tially right; that it is not only compatible but that shall

this testimony itself points decidedly have to and (we explain this shortly in the following pages), that Plato himself does so by his hierarchical of conception being, which is displayed most clearly at the end of the sixth book of his We might add to it: this interpretation is also confirmed Republic. doctrine which is given by Sextus, Adv. by the account of Platonic math. X 258 ff. We Cherniss to Plato have now come to our of point: the final conclusions of ideal Numbers, which is ascribed last

testimony, in the said direction

the theory concerning testiCherniss Aristotle's by Aristotle. argues as follows: to be can where we control it mony proves (as on untrustworthy the so-called "material where we control so cannot it, principle"); untrustworthy in the doctrine too. Where it does then, to correspond, own to confide in Plato's not leads and to the rejection on the doctrine of of

it is

we have any dialogues, and to reject what Aristotle writings says. A simple application of these principles Aristotle's two ultimate testimony on the ideal

Numbers

the One and the indefinite principles, Dyad. All this is to declared not of any "oral teaching" be "wrong interpretation"; of Plato?for this is a mere hypothesis?, but (as we can see it in the question of the "material the dialogues. In fact, of principle") Plato has never taught it. To this we answer premisses. When there is something wrong in the constatements says 58) : Aristotle's of the so-called material principle are inconsistshortly. Cherniss and First, not to the but any dia-

the nature cerning ent with one another doctrine logues in the

only do not correspond are dialogues flatly contradicted by to which they themselves refer,"?when he, then,

declares

56) Also Van der Wielen, although his own interpretation of De anima 404b points in another direction. 57) La derni?re phase du Platonisme et l'interpr?tation de M. Robin in Studia Vollgraff, Amsterdam 1948, pp. 165-178. Also in Een groot probteem uit de antieke wijsbegeerte, Utrecht 1947, pp. 11-14. 58) Riddle, p. 26.

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM

313

"What is said about the material principle, this, we might answer: either by Aristotle or by Hermodorus or by Sextus, does certainly in the Platonic to something The fact that correspond dialogues. our three witnesses agree with each other on essential points, warns us not to reject lightly what Aristotle says. On the other hand, we know that his testimony must be handled with prudence, i.e. that its interpretation a of critical measure reserve." requires good Second. cerning so also obvious "the statements conthat, as Aristotle's are inconsistent with one another, principle" in hisx evidence about Ideas and Numbers there are some material contradictions. He mentions two. The first is this: is critiof ideal to ten. Cherniss asserts

1. In Metaph. 1084a10"17 the theory cized because it limits these Numbers 2. In the same theory contains but sometimes as

Numbers

that this work, 1073a14"23 the author complains no statement the number of real entities, concerning seems to treat the Numbers as unlimited, sometimes

only ten. 3. In the same work, 1070a18-19, he ascribes to Plato the doctrine that there are as many Ideas as there are natural classes. ? To this we say: The doctrine are that the ideal Numbers limited to ten, is by Aristotle ascribed to Plato in Phys. explicitly Now in the first of the above-cited to "some": ? fas??. same teaching is ascribed passages, 1084a12"13, ???a ??? el ????? t?? We may infer: not all

206b23. the

? a??????, de??d?? ?spe? t???? held this theory. with what is said in the second This, then, agrees passage, 1073a 19-21 namely, that "those who say that there exist Ideas", them with numbers, now as unidentifying speak about numbers now as limited ten: a??????? ?a? ?????s? limited, by the number t?? ?d?a? ?? ?????te? ?????s??, not ?Evidently ?pe????

unlimited, considers he could have been

?t? ??? ?? pe?? ?d?a?, pe?? d? t?? a?????? ? ?t? d? ?? ????? t?? de??d?? ???s?????. the same persons held "now" that they are "now" that they are limited to ten. But as Aristotle here those who admitted the existence of Ideas as one group,

say that they "now" held this, "now" that. Surely it would clearer if he had written ?? ??? ? ?? d? in stead of

314

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM

?t? ??? ? ?t? d?. But he might well believe that his readers would this. be intelligent enough to understand 1. and 2. there is no contradiction. So between Now, according to 3. PlatQ taught that there are as many Ideas as there are "natural classes" d9)'? d?? d? ?? ?a??? ???t?? ?f? dt? e?d? est?? ?p?sa f?se?. ?It classes" not only must be remarked that by these "natural are meant. To Plato also of what we call "natural objects" classes the beautiful, good, rooted in a suprasensible the are equal, and many other qualities, reality. This he expressed by saying that means that they belong toan objective order. the Therefore e?d? of all that is f?se?. Ideas "au moins autant Plato admitted

they are f?se?; which In this sense then he admitted Robin said that

rightly 60) de choses ou de qualit?s." But, this being so, qu'il y a d'esp?ces to accept the interwe are really forced by Aristotle's testimony of Robin, who followed indication that to pretation Theophrastus' were a higher the Ideas. Plato Numbers above This, principle, indeed, we more Ideas must were accept, ranged Now, if we try to find evidence of Aristotle about Idea-Numbers, first are sight Aristotle seems for by this principle only under one ideal Number. it is clear that

against this view in the statements it must be said that, though at to speak of a simple identification, there

texts 61) two these rather numerous strictly speaking, among with our interpretation. which may seem to be in actual contradiction t?? One of them is Metaph. 1090a5, the words e?pe? ??ast?? is an Idea" ?. Indeed ?d?a t?? ? "Since each number a?????? to this text the Idea-Numbers to not be limited would according ten, and but they would be as numerous as there are natural classes qualities ... of Plato? Only, we have to ask: is this the doctrine Can it be his??And we must answer in the negative,

because

in

59) This term is used by Cherniss, Riddle, p. 26. 60) La th?orie Platonicienne des Id?es et des Nombres d'apr?s Aristote, p. 589. Cp. also Metaph. A9, 990b6-8: ?a?' e?ast?? ?a? ???????? t? est?. ?a! pa?? t?? ??s?a?, t?? te ????? (sc. non-substancies) est?? e? ?p? p?????, ?a? ?p? t??sde ?a? ?p! t??? ??d????. 61) Van der Wielen mentions 19 places (De Ideegetalten, p. 54 f., notes 82-84). The principle Greek texts are given in my textbook, Greek Philosophy, the numbers 262-263.

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM 206 b Aristotle Phys. to ten, while Numbers name is mentioned. said explicitly on the last-cited that place Plato limited the

315 ideal no

in the Metaphysics

which makes each number an And whose, then, is the doctrine can answer to this question: we know it was Xenocrates. Idea??We Xenocrates That this Who identified the mathematical number with the Idea. is right, interpretation may be seen from another in the Here the question 1081a5"12. namely Metaphysics, passage or not, Aristotle whether the monads are s?????ta? is treated difference "If : all and without units are associatale 64)^ says 62) 63) kind of and the we get mathematical one number, number?only Ideas himself of each itself; cannot be the numbers. For what sort of number be? There will is one are manIdea or animal-itself or any other one of man-himself and 3 is Form

thing, e.g. but the similar that any

and another numbers more

one of animalinfinitely than any

undifferentiated

so many, other 3." This there

particular

man-himself

means: is ideal

be the numbers. is ideal We

Ideas cannot if there is only mathematical number, ? We will not be such bad as to say: if logicians if there we But are. Number, may say prudently: they at least come it is not excluded that they are.

Number, now have

which seems to be in to the other passage of the ideal Numbers: our interpretation Metaph. after the aboveM 7, 1081a12"17, the lines which follow immediately cited passage. contradiction with e? de ?? e?s?? a?????? a? ?d?a?, ??d' ???? ???? te a?ta? e??a? ? ?? t???? ?a? ?s??ta? ????? a? ?d?a?; ? ?a? a?????? ?st?? ?? t?? e??? ?a? t?? d??d?? ?a? a? ???a? ?a? t?? a???st??, ta st???e?a ?????ta? t?? ????But if the Ideas are not

neither can they exist numbers, at all. For from what principles will the Ideas come? It is number that comes from the One and the indefinite principles dyad, and the are said or elements

62) Translation of W. D. Ross. 63) s?????ta? means first ?comparable"; then, of numbers, it means practically "addible". 64) i.e. without quality, which means: merely quantitative. The IdeaNumbers were '"uncomparable" monads, qualitatively different.

316 ??? t??a? a?ta?

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM e??a?, t??a? te ??te p??to be principles and elements of number, and the Ideas cannot be ranked posterior as either prior or to the numbers.

t?? e?d??eta? ???' ?st??a?.

a??????

we might say: here, Now, if we would be severe in our judgment, there prove to be two contradictions in Aristotle's then, indeed of the doctrine of Ideas and Numbers. Not those contraaccount dictions always they which tries must be Cherniss to prove numbers, at all. who, in it, but these two: 1. Aristotle, that the Ideas cannot be Numbers, says for otherwise their existence cannot finds who here: be

explained 2. Aristotle as sensible restrained

things, to ten, in fact gave reason to our interpretation according to which are a higher principle above the Ideas, now Numbers excludes the possibility that Ideas could be ranked "either prior or be somewhat unjust. First, because not really mean to say the ideas must be numbers. What he means is only this, that, if Ideas must be assumed at all? which he denies?, because otherwise their they must be numbers, existence could not ?be explained. And as to the second point, it is Aristotle does clear not an account of Plato's here, strictly speaking, a its about When doctrine, possible interpretation. judgement then Aristotle says that the Ideas cannot be ranked as either "prior" or "posterior" to (i.e. ontologically prior) (in the same sense) numbers we have simply (he means here: mathematical numbers), but of Plato must be ranked "prior" to but number; perhaps they might be called "posterior" to the ideal Numbers. And because in this passage Aristotle of the not of the ideal Number, no real speaks mathematical, contradiction with our interpretation of the ideal Numbers can be found here. the mathematical So far, then, about the first contradiction the testimony of Aristotle concerning Ideas a second. is It this: which Cherniss finds in to answer: Ideas in the sense that we have to the numbers... posterior" But I think this severity would

by saying that the Ideas are at least as numerous while on the other hand ideal Numbers were

and Numbers.

He finds

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM Aristotle commonly describes the platonic of sensible Ideas

317

of the Ideas, as it in what we might call the classical Platonic is displayed dialogues the Phaedo, the Republic, and Phaedrus? also Symposion ?say of Idea-Numbers. did exclude the doctrine Cherniss supimplicitly poses it does. so too. seem And many Plato-readers and admirers have thought

but as a metaphysical doubling way agrees with the idea that they This argument would be right, if the doctrine

not as numbers, things. And this in no are numbers.

of Idea-Numbers may say: the conception of classical is the doctrine the dialogues, strange if we take it as it is, without not its historical aspect, removing rather strange to us, too? Take that wonderful product of platonic to us? the Timaeus. is it not, sincerely thought: speaking, strange To this then we must to us. But I think indeed it is. The familiar is more or less

the theory of Ideas, which bridge between and that of to us by the classical dialogues, the as has been made himself: to Plato Idea-Numbers, principle, by in the Republic at the end of already principle, (the hierarchical book and the Timaeus. VI), then in the Philebus in the theory of Idea-Numbers Robin placed, in his work Platon, his view the midst of the later dialogues. Thus he rightly applied nor give a correct interpretation of that we can neither understand later Platonism and whatever without later a careful evidence study we have. of the testimony of Aristotle

To conclude for the work first lecture of the most three

this essay we wish to express our grateful admiration of his of Cherniss. We know that our short account a very feeble impression of necessity of this little book. Indeed, these argumentation are Cherniss very rich; they really splendid. gives and theory well-pondered thoroughly which were convictions or impressions of Plato. and admirers of the dialogues

in the Riddle brilliant

are chapters in a consequent expresses those more or less conscious fostered

by so many readers He does so on the large and deep foundation of a most careful study of Aristotle's manner of writing what we call the history of philoof was to him equal to an inquiry into the principles sophy?which his predecessors, comparing them to his own solutions and treating

318 them

PROBLEMS CONCERNING LATER PLATONISM

as the ??? which must be formed by him to its true form and He does it, moreover, realisation. with acuteness and penetration, with a deep and real understanding for the sense of Plato's philosophy, and, knowledge to combat Criticism much lastly, with of modern his a vast?I literature There should on the like to say a complete Yet we had subject. in Aristotle's

conclusions.

there is also of Plato, not only much which may be of great help to those who good interpretation, Yet, on the whole, we cannot escape the imstudy these subjects. that the author is inspired this, that pression by some ?p??es??: Aristotle cannot be right where he tells us things about Plato, which we do not know from the dialogues. I could say it in these terms: in his interpretations, Cherniss and still appears a highly orthodox and most conservative clusions, far more than Plato was himself . more in his conI fear Platonist.

is, especially valuable material;

Yet we may not close this study without a word of sincere thanks to the man who treated these difficult questions with such a learning and acuteness, with such a daring and tenacity, and most of all, with such a measure of Platonic spirit?which means: with so much true philosophy. Utrecht, Nieuwe Gracht 79bis

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