Aristotle's Defense of Rhetoric

Southern Political Science Association
Aristotle's Defense of Rhetoric Author(s): Mary P. Nichols Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), pp. 657-677 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131273 . Accessed: 02/06/2013 23:59
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Aristotle's Def ense of Rhetoric

Mary P. Nichols
University of Delaware
In his Rhetoric,Aristotledefends rhetoricagainstthe chargesthat it permitsinjusticeand distortstruth-charges made by Aristophanes and Plato. He presentsrhetoricas a bridge between privateand public, passionand reason,individualinterestand common good, and equity and law. Rhetoricthus appears as a means for statesmanshipratherthan a tool of despotism.
TIhe idea of rhetorichas fallen into disrepute. A man who uses rhetoric appearsto have something to hide. He uses his talk about justice and the common good as a cloak for his selfish aims and unjustpurposes. In this view, rhetoricis not a means to convey knowledge; it is rathera tool used by those who would distort the truth for their own purposes. When charges similar to these were made in Aristotle'stime, Aristotle provided a defense of rhetoric. He saw rhetoric as a means for ratherthana tool of despotism. He conceded that concepts statesmanship such as justice and the common good do not admit of the precise knowledge characteristicof the sciences, but he argued that they can become objects of a kind of knowledge whose truth holds only for the most part. Rhetoric is his prime illustration of such knowledge (NicomacheanEthics, 1094b20-28).' Accordingto Aristotle,the statesman uses rhetoricin order to convey the ambiguoustruthsof political life. In this paper, I shall first discuss the criticisms of rhetoric made by Aristotle's contemporaries, and then elaborate Aristotle's response-a response which provides a defense of rhetoricand of political life.2
I In his Rhetoric, Aristotledividesrhetoricinto threekinds:deliberativerhetoricdealswith the advantageousor the good, epideictic rhetoricwith the noble, and forensicrhetoricwith the just (I. iii. 5). AlthoughAristotlerefers to the advantageouswhen he defines the end of deliberativerhetoric(I. iii. 5), he latersays that"sincethe advantageousis good, we must considerthe elementsof the good and the advantageous" (I. vi. 2). He then defines the good as that which we choose for its own sake (I. vi. 2). In other words, he expands the end of deliberativerhetoricto include the good in all senses. 2 The interest in Aristotelianpolitical science as a possible alternative,corrective, or supplementto currentpolitical science or philosophyis becoming increasinglyprevalent. One can cite the following examples: Richard Bernstein,1977;John W. Danford, 1976; AlasdairMacIntryre,1981;Gerald Mara,1985;Stephen Salkever, 1981;and BernardYak,
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THE JOURNALOF POLITICS,VOL. 49,1987 THE CRITICISMS OFRHETORIC
Aristotle defends rhetoric against two major attacks, the first who criticizedrhetoricin the name of justice exemplified by Aristophanes, and the political community, the second by Plato, who criticized rhetoric in the name of philosophy. Aristophanes'criticism can be found in the Clouds. Its protagonistStrepsiadesseeks the help of teachers of rhetoric in order to free himself from the debts he lacks the resourcesto pay. He wants to learn from them how to persuade the judges that he has no obligationto pay his creditors,who will surelybringhim to courtto collect their money. He wants to learn, in other words, how to "makethe weaker argument the stronger" (Clouds, 112-115; see also Apology, 23d). A rhetoric that lets him argue either side of an issue, he hopes, will make him free of his obligations-as free as the amorphousClouds whom the rhetoriciansworship. Like the Clouds, the rhetoriciancan take any shape he pleases, at least in the eyes of those moved by his rhetoric.As the Unjust Speech claims, his pupil can do injustice and escape the penalty. He is free from the law (Clouds, 1071-82).Aristophanesthus accuses rhetoric of undermining justice and the laws that hold a political community together. While Aristophanes associates the unjust rhetoric with sophists and philosophers and portrays Socrates as its teacher, the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues criticizes rhetoric just as harshly as did Aristophanes. In the Gorgias, for example, Plato has Socrates confront the respected teacher of rhetoric,Gorgias.AlthoughGorgiasclaims to be able to teach his students justice, Socrates shows that Gorgias, by his own admission, does not know what justiceis (Gorg.,460e-461a).By showing that Gorgias
1985.I do not mean to suggest that these scholarssharea common viewpoint or that they find the same advantages to Aristotle'sapproach. Nor is this list exhaustive. Aristotle's Rhetoric,on the otherhand,has received very little attentionas a componentof his political science. Notable exceptions are Ronald Beiner's Political Judgment (1983) and Larry Arnhart's Aristotleon PoliticalReasoning(1981).Beinerarguesthat Aristotle's approachto politics, especially his concept of prudence, is a useful corrective to the political thought of Kant and of those whom Kant influenced. He uses the Rhetoric as one source for his understanding of Aristotle's notionof judgment,but he gives no detailedanalysis of the work, in the firstplace, in its greaterattention as does Arnhart. My analysisdiffers from Arnhart's, to the historicalcontext of the Rhetoric,which allows me to read the Rhetoricas a defense againstthe chargesagainstrhetoriccurrentat the time, especiallyPlato's.Suchan approach, I believe, throwslightuponAristotle's conceptionof the kindof knowledgerhetoricprovides as well as upon the differencesbetween Aristotle's andPlato'spoliticalthought.In the second place, I attributeto rhetoric(and to Aristotle's Rhetoric)a higherplace in Aristotle's thought thandoes Arnhart. WhereasArnhart analyzesthe Rhetoricas a work of inferiorphilosophic status to Aristotle'sNicomacheanEthics and his Politics (e.g., pp. 56-63, 72-74, 78-80, 90; cf. pp. 121-23,128, and 129), I argue that the Rhetoricprovides indispensablesupport for Aristotle'spolitical science, for both its claim to knowledge and its view of the political communityas an associationin speech about the advantageousand the just.
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does not know the meaning of what he discusses, Socrates carries Aristophanes'criticism of rhetoric to philosophic grounds, arguing that rhetoricis not based on the truth.Moreover,Socrates agues not only that the rhetoriciandoes not know what justice is, but also that he does not know what is good for his hearers. Instead of aiming at their good, he triesto give pleasure.Rhetoricis the counterpartof cookery, Socratessays, for justas cookery provides pleasurefor the body with no regardfor what truly benefits it, rhetoric gratifies the soul without considering its good. Consequently, rhetoric is ignoble flattery rather than art, both because it aims at the pleasant and also because it cannot give a rationalaccount of its own activity. The criticism of rhetoricthat Socrates makes in the Gorgias,however, cannotbe Socrates'-or Plato's-last word on rhetoric.AlthoughSocrates describes rhetoric in harsh terms, he himself uses rhetoric in speaking to his interlocutors.3 Could Socrates defend rhetoric by his deeds? His use of rhetoric,at any rate, raisesthe question whether there is a rhetoricfree of the defects which he attributesto it, a rhetoric that aims at the good ratherthan the pleasant, that knows the meaning of justice, and that can give an account of its own activity. That Plato saw the possibility of a defensible rhetoricis clear from his other majordialogue on rhetoric,the Phaedrus. Althoughthe Phaedrusalso criticizesthe rhetoricof the day,4it explains what an artof rhetoricwould be: the speech of the truerhetorician is based on knowledge of the soul and its different forms and of the kinds of speeches appropriateto each (271a-272b).True rhetoric must therefore
3 This claim of course implies a definitionof what rhetoricis-the questionthat Gorgias does not answerand thatSocratesanswersso unfavorablyto rhetoric.Referringto Socrates' statementsabout rhetoric,one could arguethatSocratesdoes not use rhetoric,since he aims at the good ratherthan the pleasant,and since he does not speak about what he does not know as if he knew it. There is evidence, however, that Socrates'distinctionbetween the rhetoricused by Gorgiasand the dialectic (ordiscussion)in whichhe himselfengagesbreaks down. For example, although Socrates associates dialectic with "alternatequestion and answer"and rhetoricwith "lengthyspeech" (449b), he himself speaks at length from time to time without recourse to questioning and answering, as Callicles pointedly observes (519e).Moreimportantly, Socratescontrasts rhetoric,which praisesits object,with dialectic, which reveals what its object is. But in the Gorgias,Socratespraisesthe nobility of justice, without saying what justice is (e.g., 474d ff. and 489a ff.). Callicles alerts us to Socrates' use of rhetoric, when he accuses him of "roisteringrecklessly in his speech, like the demagoguethat [he is]"(482c).Platomay be suggestingin thisdialoguethatdialecticcannot be separatedfrom rhetoric,as Socratestriesto do, any more thanthe good can be separated from the pleasant(464b-466a). 4 Socratesagain criticizespublic speakersfor their ignorance,comparingthem to a man who does not know what a horse is, but who tries to persuademen equally ignorantto buy an ass to carry them in battle against their enemies (260b-c). This argumentabout the ignoranceof rhetoricwas commonplacein Aristotle's time. See Cope, 1867.
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THE JOURNALOF POLITICS,VOL. 49,1987
know what is good for men and how to promote their good through speech. It is the alternativeto the pleasure-seekingrhetoricdescribed in the Gorgias.Althoughit is often said that Aristotle'sRhetoriccarries out the proposalsfor rhetoricthat Socratesmakes in the Phaedrus,discussing different kinds of speeches and relating them to the characters and passionsof men (e.g., Freese, 1926,pp. xx-xxii;and Cope, 1867,p. 7), such a statement overlooks the requirementsSocrates lays down for an art of rhetoric. Because a true art of speech must give different speeches to different men, the art of rhetoriccannot be an art of public speech. The same criticism of writing that Socrates presents in the Phaedrusapplies to public speech as well: like writing, speech addressed to many men, or to the city as a whole, says the same things to everyone. It does not make the proper distinctions (275e).5Any rhetoric in the sense of public or political speech must therefore distort the truth. In its inability to comprehend the needs and ends of a variety of individuals,public speech both falls short of the truthand also is fundamentallyunjust.The true art of rhetoric, according to Socrates, must be limited to private speech. It is in fact identical to philosophic speech, the art of discussion used by Socrates,who gives the appropriatespeeches to each of his interlocutors. If the Platonic dialogue serves as an implicit defense of writing, a way found by Plato to give different speeches to different readersthroughits complex levels of meaning (Strauss,1964,pp. 52-57), it is neverthelessnot an implicit defense of public speech. The intricacyof a Platonicdialogue means that its public characteris merely apparent.AlthoughPlato wrote dialogues in the face of Socrates' criticism of writing, he did not write a treatise on public speaking. Aristotle'sRhetoric, which claims to make an art of public speech,6is not "an expanded Phaedrus"so much as an implicit defense of public speech against the Phaedrus'sattack.7 Aristotle's Rhetoric must therefore defend rhetoric from several different standpoints.Aristotlemust allay the suspicionsof the city about use the potential injustice of rhetoric. In order to check the rhetorician's of speech for merely private ends, he must subordinaterhetoricto what the citizens have in common, especially their commonly held opinions about what is good, noble, and just. But the rhetoriciancannot merely follow common opinion, since common opinion is not homogeneous. It
5 In the Protagoras,Socratesmakes explicit that anotherpart of his criticismof writing applies to public speech as well: the speeches of rhetoricians,he claims, are like "books [which]cannoteitheranswera question[whenasked]or aska questionon theirown account" (329a). 6 The first point that Aristotlemakes in the Rhetoricis that rhetoricis rightfullycalled an art (I. e. 1). 7 The phrase"anexpanded Phaedrus" comes from Thompson'sintroduction,quoted by Freese (1926,p. xxi). See also FriedrichSolmsen'sdiscussionof the extentto which Aristotle's Rhetoricis indebted to the Phaedrus(Solmsen,1938,pp. 402-4).
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is composed of a diversity of elements, which may be in contradiction with one another and which in varying degrees reflect some element of the truth.By recognizingthe heterogeneityof common opinion and trying to incorporatethat heterogeneity into a consistent whole, the rhetorician arrivesat a comprehensiveposition thatis both rooted in common opinion and able to go beyond common opinion. He is restrained by the individualswhom he addressesat the same time that he is able to educate them. By offering a complex rhetoric capable of addressing and comprehending the individuals who make up the community, Aristotle answers Socrates'criticism of political rhetoric'signorance as well as his criticismof its inabilityto take into account the individualnaturesof men.
ARISTOTLE'SDEFENSE OF RHETORIC
At the beginning of the Rhetoric Aristotle repeats both Aristophanes' political attack on rhetoricand Plato'sphilosophic one, claiming that the rhetoricof his day is concerned only with promoting the private interests of men regardless of the truth. He will try to subordinate this private rhetoricto a public realm of discourse.He observes that previoustheories of rhetoric have concentrated on forensic rhetoric, or the rhetoric used in law courts.They have provided only "a small part of the art,"devoting
their efforts to arousing the passions of judges (I. i. 3-4).8 By appealing
to anger, envy, and pity, rhetoriciansmove the judges to the decision that they desire. Allowing judges to decide cases on such a basis, Aristotlesays, is like "measuringsomething with a crooked ruler" (I. i. 5-6). For this reason, Aristotle recommends that "laws as much as possible define everythingand leave as little as possible to the judges"(I. i. 7). By limiting the discretionof the judges, Aristotle'srecommendationwould also limit the influence of the rhetoricians.As Aristotle observes, expanding the reach of the law would leave less scope for the play of "love, hate, or private interest"(I. i. 7). We might wonder, however, whether love, hate, and private interest do not come into play in the framing of the laws themselves. Aristotle thinksthis intrusionis less likely in legislating than in judging due to the different character of the two activities. Since laws apply to the whole community and are meant to last into the future in contrast to judicial decisions, which involve particularcases in the present, the legislatorhas a certaindistance from his deliberationsthat the judge lacks. Whereasthe judgmentof the legislatorin framingthe law "doesnot involve a particular case, but is universal and concerns the future," Aristotle writes, the judgment of a judge, applied in specific cases in the present, is often "obscuredby private pleasure and pain"and "cannotconsider the truth
8 Translations from the Greekare mine.
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adequately" (I. i. 7). Consequently, the law, framed in general terms to last over time, shouldact as a restrainton how particularcases are decided. Aristotle's recommendation suggests that at least some men in the community can overcome their absorption in the particular issues immediately before them to consider what should apply to their community as a whole for the indefinite future.9 Through their participationin lawmaking, men might be aroused from their particular interests to an awareness of the public good. Aristotle makes it appear that expanding the reach of law restricts that of rhetoric, and to some extent thatis true.Butwhile thereis less opportunityfor rhetoricto indulge private pleasures and pains in specific cases, there is more opportunity for rhetoric to turn men's attention away from such pleasuresand pains to the public or universaldeterminationsinvolved in lawmaking. It is the existence of a public realm of discourse that makes man's political life more than the conflict of private interestsand passions, that allows cities that come into existence for the sake of mere life to become associations in which men share speech about the advantageous and the just (see Politics, 1251a24-1253al8). In criticizing those rhetoricians concerned primarily with forensic rhetoric,Aristotlemanifestshis intentionof directing men to such a public realm of discourse. In contrast to his predecessors, he argues that "the practice of deliberative rhetoric is nobler and more statesmanlikethan forensic, which involves [private] transactions"(I. i. 10).O Far from looking to common or public concerns, men who bring suits or who are brought to court are involved in their private cases. They, and their rhetoric, do not usually look away from private interests to any public good. Moreover, it is in law courts, Aristotlesays, that rhetoricalskills of arousingpassion are the most dangerous. Judges in law courts, who are not themselves affected by the decisions they render, are more malleable thanlegislatorsin the assembly,whose decisions, affecting the community as a whole, will affect themselves as well (I. i. 10). But if legislatorsare less malleable than judges because they are more interested, is there not less possibility in lawmaking for considerationsof common interests, as opposed to private ones? Through this surprisingturn of the argument, Aristotle indicates a legitimate and necessary role for private interest in lawmaking-as a useful check on the rhetorician'sarbitraryarousal of
9 Aristotlewarns,however, "Itis easierto find one or a few prudentmen thanmany able to legislate"(I. i. 7). 10Aristotlehere uses djmoegorikjfor deliberative rhetoric,a word that means literally "speakingto the demos, or the people." Although only one or a few men may be true legislators(see previousnote), they will raise the level of the political speech of the whole community. Aristotle'suse of di-migoriki in this passage has none of the derogative connotationsof "demagogery" often attachedto the word. See, for example,Gorgias,494d.
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passion. The general or universal rules the rhetoricianproposes in the assembly will fail to be accepted if they are contrary to the personal interestsof the assemblymen.Paradoxically, deliberativerhetoricis nobler and more statesmanlikethan forensic not only because it aims at a general or public end but also because it must addressa greatervariety of private interestsand concerns. To the extent that in deliberating about the laws of his community the rhetoricianbalances public goods againstparticular interests, his rhetoric presents a complex vision of justice. His art is not a morally neutral skill. The forensic rhetorician, in contrast, has the impetus neither to look beyond the personal interests of the individuals concerned toward a public good nor to modify his position to accommodate the diverse interests of others. It is rather in the activity of lawmaking that we find the complex interplay of private and public concerns, of particular and universal elements that for Aristotle characterizespolitical life. Concentratingon the arousalof passionin law courts, previousthinkers have ignored, Aristotlecontinues, what is most essential to rhetoric-the "proofs" (pisteis)available to rhetoricians (I.i. 3). Although pistisis usually translatedas "proof,"Aristotlemeans more broadly "reasonfor or cause of belief." The pisteis are the means of persuasionthat it is the task of rhetoricto discover (I. ii. 1).1" Accordingto Aristotle,there are three kinds of pisteis that are furnishedby the rhetorician'sspeech: "The first lies in the characterof the speaker,the second in disposingthe hearerin a certain way, and the third in the speech itself, in what it proves, or appears to prove" (I. ii. 3).12 Withrespect to the firstkind of "proof,"Aristotlemeans that the rhetoricianmight reveal his good character-his prudence, and virtue,and good will (II. i. 5) -through his speech. And his charactermight be what persuades his audience to accept his point. Characteris thus "a reason for belief"; in this sense it "proves"the truth of the rhetorician's position. With respect to the second kind of proof, Aristotlerefers to the rhetorician'sarousing the passions of his audience. If the rhetorician portraysa situationthatarouseshis audience'sanger,for example, its anger might be the reason it believes him. Through its anger, he "proves"his
11 Aristotle uses pistis to refer also to the state of mind produced in the audience, its argument.For a discussionof the different uses of pistis in acceptance of the rhetorician's and Arnhart, Wikramanayake, 1961,pp. 193-96; the Rhetoric,see Grimaldi,1957,pp. 188-92; 1981,especially pp. 34-38. or "causesof belief" that lie outside the speech, such 12 There are other kinds of "proofs" as witnesses or written agreementsentered into by the parties concerned. These proofs, which are not furnishedby the speaker but already exist, do not fall within the province of the art of rhetoric.Aristotledistinguishesproofs "withinthe art"(entechnoi)from those "outsidethe art" (atechnoi) at I. ii. 2. Since those "outsidethe art"are useful to forensic rhetoric,he concludeshis discussionof forensicrhetoricwith a descriptionof them (I. xv.).
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point. Aristotle'sthird use of proof is more familiar to us: a rhetorician might prove his case through the cogency of his reasoning-the acceptability of his premises and the logical validity of the conclusions he drawsfrom them. Aristotle's classificationof rhetoric's proofs is derived from the natureof speech: it must originatein someone (the rhetorician's charactermay persuade), it must follow acceptable patternsof reasoning (the speech itself, what it proves, may persuade), and it must be directed to someone (how the heareris affected by the speech may persuade).The three proofs in rhetoricthus point to the connection between speakerand listenerthat speech effects. Rhetoric is communication. The three proofs of rhetoric,moreover, are in the best case inseparable from one another.13 It is the connection between reason and passion in Aristotle'stheory, for example, that distinguisheshis use of passion from thatof the forensicspeakershe originallycriticized.Whiletheirpassionate appeals had little to do with the merits of the case, Aristotle links the arousalof passion to the argumentof the speech itself.14A man pities, for example, when he recognizes that someone has suffered undeserved misfortune, or he fears when he understands the potential harm that somethingholds (II. vii. 2 and II. v. 1). Aristotleemphasizesthe rationality of the passions by analyzing each passion in terms of its objects and its grounds(II. i. 9; Fortenbaugh,1970,pp. 211-12).As LarryArnhart argues, the rhetoriciancan "reasonwith the passions,"and change "the passions of his listenersby changing their minds"(Arnhart,1981, pp. 114-15).The rhetoricianmust not merely arouse passion, he must do so by means of argument. Moreover,the same argumentsthat arousethe passionsof the audience character.It is from his speech itself, Aristotle also reveal the rhetorician's emphasizes,ratherthanfrom some preconceived notion of the rhetorician,
13 As Grimaldi explains,"Whilethe rationalexplanation,or ethos, or pathos,may be used independentlyto win assentor conviction . . ., Aristotleappearsto affirm clearlythat their effective and proper use is by being brought together in deductive and inductive argumentation" (Grimaldi, 1972,p. 58). Althoughall threekindsof proofsoperatein all kinds of rhetoric,however, some kindsof rhetoricwill rely moreon one kindof proof thananother. In deliberativerhetoric,Aristotleexplains,it is more useful that the rhetoricianappear to be of a certain character,whereas it is more useful in forensic rhetoricthat the audience should be disposed in a certainway (II. i. 4). 14 Cope writes that there are two ways of "inspiring the listenerswith such feelings and sentimentsas are desirable for yourself and your own case":"scientifically,through the by the introductionof considerations medium of the speech itself, . . . and unscientifically, ab extraor ab captandum." advocatesthe former,while criticizing Cope arguesthatAristotle the latter (Cope, 1867, pp. 4-5; see also Arnhart,1981, p. 22). Solmsen points out that part of the speech, such Aristotle's predecessorstried to arousepassiononly in a particular or epilogue.Aristotle,in contrast,"thinks of the logos as a whole and thinks as the peroration of it being made pistos and becoming effective by the combined and simultaneous applicationof the three pisteis"(Solmsen,1867,p. 393).
DEFENSE OF RHETORIC ARISTOTLE'S
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that an audience understands his character (II. ii. 4). Addressing the popular fear that the speech of a clever rhetoricianmight hide his ends, Aristotle calls attention to the extent that a man reveals himself in his speech. If a rhetoricianis to be persuasive,he must show that his advice is advantageousto his audience, that what he is praisingis noble, or that he has justice on his side. In such cases, his premises, his conclusions,and his examples all reveal his character. Moreover, although a successful rhetorician must aim at the end proper to the kind of rhetoric he is practicing, he can refer to the ends of the other kinds of rhetoric as subsidiaryconsiderations(I. iii. 6). A deliberative speaker, for example, must always claim that what he is proposing is beneficial, but he might also show its nobility or justice, just as an epideictic speaker might refuse to separate the noble from the good (see I. ii. 6). The extent to which a speaker brings to bear such considerationsfurtherreveals his character. Althougha man can hide the reasonsthat he is giving a particularspeech, as popular opinion feared, in a broader sense he will be revealed by the kind of speech he makes. One can see the close connections among the three kinds of proof through an examination of Aristotle's discussion of the passions. Regardless of the particularend the rhetoricianaims at, he must direct argumentsto the passionsof his audience, and those argumentswill reveal his character.Aristotle'saccount of anger, the first passion he discusses, illustratesthat the characterof the speaker, the passions he arouses, and the arguments he employs are mutually dependent. We shall therefore consider the rhetoricnecessary to provoke anger in some detail.15 Anger, according to Aristotle, is a man's longing for revenge when someone appears to slight him or one of his relatives or friends and when the slight appears undeserved. Although longing is painful, pleasure accompanies anger, Aristotlesays, due to the thought of revenge, which the angrymanbelieves possible. Angeris so powerful a passion,according to this analysis, because of what provokes it: the man who is slighted is treated as if he were worthless (II. ii. 1-6). In the first place, in order to arouse anger, the rhetoricianmust present this treatment as outrageous, appealing to his hearer'ssense of his own worth, which has been violated. His rhetoric must show the respect that the man who slighted failed to show. In doing this, he manifests a sense of justice, which is based on the worth or the integrity of human beings and which should be defended
15 See also Arnhart's analysisof anger, which points out the cognitive elementsinvolved in the passion (1981, pp. 115-20) and Fortenbaugh's(1970, pp. 216-17). My analysis emphasizesalso the extent to which the argumentsthat arouse anger reveal the character need to employ the ends of the speaker,the moralambiguityof anger,and the rhetorician's of all three kinds of rhetoric-the advantageous,the noble, and the just-in his arousalof anger.
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by appropriate actions. The angry man seeking revenge asserts by his actions,justas the rhetoriciandoes by his speech, that justicemust pertain to the interactionsof men. In the second place, the rhetoricianarousinganger must also claim that an injuryhas been done that calls for redress.Anger acknowledges harm. Man is not self-sufficient, an island unto himself, upon whom the actions of others have no effect. Indeed, if the insult and revenge consume the angry man, the one who insulted remains in control. Anger undermines independence. Because of this danger, there is a certain moral ambiguity in anger and revenge.'6Aristotledoes not, however, condemn anger and revenge, precisely because man is a political animal. While man is able to benefit others and be benefited by them, he is also able to harm and be harmed. Anger is a sign of this mutual dependence.17 In analyzing gentleness, Aristotle does not include in his list of ways in which the rhetoricianmight calm anger any appeal to a desire to be above anger and the dependence it implies. Rather,he recommends calming anger by such means as showing that no slight has occurred, that the slight was not done willingly, or that the person who slighted is grieved for what he has done (III. iii. 17). In these cases he assumes that there are circumstances in which anger and revenge are the appropriatereactions,while he shows thatsuch circumstancesdo not exist in the case at hand. There is no appeal, in other words, to human self-sufficiency. Aristotle even suggests the arousalof fear as anothermeans of calming anger (III. iii. 10). Finally, the rhetorician'sappeal to justice and the nobility of a man's assertinghis worth in the face of its denial might call upon the angry man to risk his life to obtain revenge. His rhetoric must turn his hearer from the expedient concern with his own safety to higher considerations of nobility and justice. At the same time, however, an element of prudential calculationmust be presentin a rhetorician's appeal to anger.If his listener thought that his act would merely recoil on himself rather than hurt the man who slighted him, he would be more inclined to fear than to anger. For anger to predominate over fear, a man must sense that he is more likely to harm than to be harmed. A rhetoricianwill not be persuasive unless he shows a prudentialconcern for the consequences of the action he is urging(on prudence,see NE, 1140a24ff.). His rhetoricmusttherefore
16 Aristotleappears to acknowledge the nobility of retaliation,when listing the uses of rhetoric: "Itwould be strangeif it were shamefulnot to be able to defend oneself with one's body, but not so if one couldn't defend oneself with speech" (I. i. 12). But to be able to defend oneself is not the same as doing so. Aristotle'sacknowledgmentof the nobility of retaliationis qualified. Could that be due to the danger to communityand independence that retaliationentails? 17 This dependence underlyinganger is suggested by the fact that spiritedness,which Aristotleassociateswith anger, is "morearousedagainstintimatesand friendsthan against strangerswhen it considersitself slighted"(Pol., 1328b40-a3).
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manifest prudence as well as appeal to justice and nobility, just as it must convey a sense of men's dignity as well as their mutual dependence. For all these reasons, the arguments he uses to arouse passion reveal his character. As the case of anger illustrates, the three pisteis cannot be separated from one another,if rhetoricis to be successful. The rhetoricianlinks his speech to his characterand the passions of his audience by means of the syllogisms he employs, which Aristotle calls enthymemes.The enthymeme,he says, constitutes"thebody of the proof" (I. i. 13).18 The word thymos, from which enthymeme is derived, traditionallymeant the seat of both feeling and thought. An enthymeme, which literally suggests something originating in or assimilated by the thymos, thereforeconnotes, as Grimaldipoints out, "somethingmore than simple logical inference" (Grimaldi, 1972, pp. 69-70).19 "The deductive process"of Aristotle'srhetoric,he writes, "cannotbe the simple scientific syllogism, the syllogism of pure reason."The goal of rhetoric, "personal conviction which will motivate personal action, . . . calls for assent of the whole person: intellect, will, emotions" (Grimaldi, 1972, p. 82). Accordingly, the enthymeme, as the body of the proof, "incorporates or embodies"all three proofs of rhetoric,"imposingform upon them so that they may be used most efficaciously in rhetorical demonstration" The materialsfrom which enthymemes are (Grimaldi,1972, pp. 67-68).2O constructed therefore include not only the common opinions about advantage, justice, and nobility, but also the passions of men and the elements that form character.21It is a discussionof these materialswhich enthymemes must incorporate that constitutes the greater part of Aristotle'sRhetoric. Rhetoricalsyllogisms are based on men's opinions about the good, the noble, and the just. Consequently, Aristotleexamines "happinessand its
18 Althoughthere is a second means, the example, that rhetoricians use to demonstrate theirpoints,the exampleis clearlysubordinate to the enthymeme.Rhetoricians use examples (particular cases) to illustratesome generalpoint which they then apply to the case at hand (I. ii. 19). Examplesare especially useful, Aristotlesays, when they act as evidence of what syllogismsdemonstrate(II. xx. 9). 19 Grimaldiprovides an exhaustiveanalysisof the usage of enthymemepriorto Aristotle (Grimaldi,1972,pp. 69-82). 20 Lloyd F. Bitzerprovidesa useful discussionof the majorinterpretations of the meaning of enthymeme in Aristotle'sRhetoric. Bitzer'sown position is that the enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism, only because it depends upon the audience to supply its premises. Thus Bitzer emphasizes the necessary interactionbetween speaker and audience (Bitzer, 1959, pp. 399-408).His argumentis thereforeconsistentwith my overall interpretation of Aristotle's Rhetoric. 21 1 am indebted to LarryArnhart's account of Aristotle's organizationof Books I and II of the Rhetoric,which shows that Aristotle'sdiscussionof characterand passion in Book II is a continuationof his discussionof the materialsof rhetoricin Book I (Arnhart, 1981, p. 52).
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THE JOURNALOF POLITICS,VOL. 49, 1987
parts"as well as the relativevalue of different goods thatmustbe weighed in making choices (I. v-vii.). Because different things are good for different regimes, he also describes the regimes and their ends (I. viii.). To guide the rhetoricianwhose speech praisesthe noble and censuresthe base, Aristotle discusses the virtues and vices, which actions are nobler than others, and the conditions attaching to nobility (I. ix.). Aristotle's treatmentof the materialsof forensic arguments,in the next place, leads him to an examinationof the complexity of injustice-the kinds of laws that can be violated, the reasonsthat men commit injustice,the situations in which injusticeis likely to occur, and the relative injusticeof different kinds of unjust acts (I. x-xii.) Aristotle'saccount of the materials from which rhetorical syllogisms are formed includes a discussion of the characterof the speaker (his prudence, virtue, and good will) (II. i.), the passions (anger, gentleness, love, hate, fear, shame, benevolence, pity, indignation,envy, and jealousy) (II. ii-xii.), and the charactersof men at different ages and in different walks of life (IL.xiii-xvii.). The character that men trust and the passions to which they are susceptible must be incorporatedinto the rhetorician's speech if he is to be persuasive. AlthoughAristotleplaces more emphasis on the materialsfrom which rhetoricderives its premises than the formal aspects of logical reasoning, he does discuss the latter as well (II. xx-xxvi.) (Grimaldi,1972, pp. 12935 and Arnhart,1981,pp. 141-61).Knowinghow to draw conclusionsfrom premisesis not only necessaryfor the rhetorician's constructionof his own proofs, but also useful in refuting an opponent whose "clever"speech violates logic. To show men what kinds of argumentsare valid and what kinds are not, as Aristotle does, is to limit the rhetorician to logical argumentation.He cannot become as shapeless as the Clouds. Not only must he address the passions of his audience and appear worthy of trust, he must follow the patterns of reasoning that belong to speech and that all men thereforeto some extent share.2 Aristotlethusindicatessomething universal-the rulesof logic thatunderliespeech-which limitsthe speech of a rhetorician,just as the law of a political community might limit the scope of what judges decide and therefore the extent of a rhetorician's influence. The rhetoricianis limited not only by the rules of logical reasoning,but also by the common opinion of his community. The premises that he uses-the views he expresses, for example, about virtue or justice-must be comprehensible to common opinion if his arguments are to be
22 As Grimaldisays, the "common topics" (koinoi topoi) that Aristotlediscusses in this section of the Rhetoricare "waysin which the mind naturallyand readilyreasons,and they are independent, in a way, of the subject to which they are applied, and may be said to be imposed as forms upon this material in order to clarify and determine it further" (Grimaldi,1972,p. 134).
DEFENSE OF RHETORIC ARISTOTLE'S
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successful. The rhetorician, however, cannot simply follow common opinion, for common opinion is composed of different, and even contradictory, viewpoints. These different viewpoints, Aristotle demonstratestime after time in the Ethics and Politics, in different ways 1101a23-24; Pol., grasp some element of the truth (e.g., NE, 1098b9-99b8; the arguments, and especially 1324a5-25b31).By examining 1283a29-42; whether expressed or implicit, that support opposed opinions, Aristotle ascertainswhat is true and false in each of them. His own treatment of opinions serves as an example for the rhetorician.By incorporatingthe varioustruthsembodied in common opinions into a more comprehensive point of view, the rhetorician,like Aristotle,can address the concerns of a greater number of people and possibly be persuasive to them. At the same time his position, because more comprehensive, comes closer to expressing the truth on a given subject. The common opinion to which a rhetoricianmust make his argument acceptable thus acts as a salutary restrainton the rhetorician. The nature of the subjects which the rhetorician treats, moreover, Aristotle usually restricts him to drawing only probable conclusions.23 they about human actions-whether that we deliberate primarily explains have occurred, whether we should undertake them, and what characterizes them. Human actions, like the men who perform them, differ from the objects of science, for they do not exist of necessity (I. ii. 13-14). They did not have to occur, they need not occur in the future, and, more important, what characterizesthem, their goodness, nobility, and justice, will vary according to the different circumstancesin which they occur, circumstancescreated in part by chance but also in part by men's choices. Grimaldispeaks of Aristotle's"awarenessthat anythingparticularlyanything in the area of the probable which is the primary subject matter of rhetoric-may be conditioned and altered by its situation.""In other words, the time, the place, the circumstances, the character,the emotionalinvolvement, may vitally affect the total meaning of a thing in a given situation"(Grimaldi,1972, p. 133). As Aristotlesays in the Ethics, the noble, the just, and the good "wander"in different circumstances;our knowledge of them must therefore remain imprecise (NE, 1094bl9-28;1098a26-33).
23 Aristotledoes not deny that rhetoriccan sometimesdeal with what is necessarilytrue. and "signs," The materialsfrom which enthymemesare formed, he says, are "probabilities" some of which may be necessary(I. ii. 14). He gives the example of a woman'shaving milk as a necessary sign that she has given birth and the example of a man'shaving a fever as a necessarysign that he is ill (I. ii. 18). Althoughrhetoricmay utilize such necessarysigns, the materialsfrom which enthymemesare derived hold "by and large (ta pleista) only for the most part"(I. ii. 14). For a discussionof the probable as the sphere of rhetoricas well signs, see, for example, Grimaldi,1972,pp. use of necessaryand non-necessary as rhetoric's 104-15,and Arnhart,1981,pp. 43-47.
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Moreover,because each humanbeing is different and able to influence human affairs in a different way throughhis choices and actions, human affairs resist classification. Because men, exercising choice, generate novelty and change, universallaws do not always hold. Nature not only embraces necessity, it also allows for freedom. Consequently, any generality that the rhetoriciandeduces may be true only "for the most part." There will always be room for doubt. To demand strict demonstrations from a rhetoricianwould make as much sense as accepting probabilities from a mathematician(NE, 1094b27-28).The rhetorician's speech is merely probable because it must take into account the variety in human affairs and the individualityof men, just as it must incorporate a diversityof views found in common opinion. His rhetoricis truebecause it embraces the particularsthrough the generalitiesof speech. But those generalitieswill admit of exceptions. Aristotleis teaching rhetoriciansthe limitationsof their speech as well as the way in which rhetoricalspeech reveals the truth.Rhetoricembodies a more complex vision of the world than that seen by a precise science like mathematics. Because rhetoric is grounded in diversity, it indicates at least in its highest manifestationsa dimension of the truththat the precise sciences miss. The necessary imprecision of rhetoricalspeech explains why Aristotle calls character the "most authoritative"(kuriotate) proof. 24 We might suppose that an audience would trust a speaker's characterrather than merely rely on its judgmentof the validity of his argumentsdue to its own limitations:unable to follow difficult chains of reasoning or to weigh the complex considerationsinvolved, men might judge an argumentprimarily on the basis of their judgment of the man who makes it. We have surely experienced being favorably impressed by an argument because of our good opinion of its advocate, just as we might refuse to accept the perfectly valid reasoningof a man we distrust.Aristotledoes not, however, locate the source of the authority that he attributes to the rhetorician's character solely in the audience's inability to understand a complex argument. He explains that we trust worthy people in general, but "in matterswhere precision is not possible and there is room for doubt, our trust is complete" (I. ii 4). But as we have seen, in matters with which rhetoricdeals there will usuallybe room for doubt. If a man tried to teach precise knowledge of the subjects appropriateto rhetoric, he would fail to understandnot merely his audience, he would fail to understandwhat he is talkingabout. From one perspective, the imprecisionof rhetoricthat
24 In saying this, Aristotledoes not contradicthis earlier statement that the enthymeme persuasivelyargues,the context of the proofs"(I. i. 11). As Grimaldi is "themostauthoritative of this statementindicatesonly that "deductivereasoningby the enthymemeis superiorto inductivereasoningby paradeigma[example]"(Grimaldi,1972,p. 138). (On the example, all three proofs, and characteris the most see note 16 above.) The enthymemeincorporates of these. authoritative
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renders its conclusions merely probable serves as a limitation on the rhetorician;from anotherit serves as his opportunity.It is what, Aristotle says, makes his character the most authoritativeproof. In speaking of character,Aristotle uses the word he applies to the ruling authorityin a regime (I. ii. 5; see I. viii. 2). If the rhetoricianproves that he is worthy of trust, manifesting his prudence, virtue, and good will through his arguments,his audience will be persuadedby his vision of man'scomplex ends and of the particulargoals he is trying to promote.
ARISTOTLE'SDIVERGENCE FROMPLATO
Aristotle'semphasis on deliberative rhetoricdistinguisheshim not only from the forensic rhetoriciansto whom he refers but from Plato as well. Of the threetypes of rhetoricthatAristotlerecognizes, the type with which the Gorgiasis most concerned is the forensic. There Socratesargues that the greatestuse of rhetoricis for a man to accuse himself and his relatives and friends of whatever wrong they have done so that they may pay the penalty and be cured of injustice(480a-d).25Althoughthis rhetoricdiffers dramaticallyfrom that taughtby Gorgias,which allows men to do wrong and escape the penalty, its end is similarly private: in Socrates' novel proposal for forensic rhetoric,the good of the soul of the rhetoricianand those dear to him replaces the privatepleasuresthatinjusticepermits.The private characterof the rhetoric that Plato writes about can be seen also from the Phaedrus. Although the Phaedrus does include examples of deliberative rhetoric, the deliberation at issue is whether a young boy should gratify a lover or a nonlover. The speeches involve a private, even intimate, affair. Where Plato does examine political affairs, as in the Republic, Socratesdoes not include rhetoricin either the educationof the rulers or in their naturalcapacities. There philosophersrule by force or deception ratherthan by persuasion.Far from mediating between public and private, like Aristotle'sdeliberativerhetorician,the philosophicrulers eliminate the private dimension of life as much as possible (464a-e). WhereasPlato's political theory offers no reconciliationbetween public and private concerns, Aristotle'spolitical theory does. This is indicated in many aspects of Aristotle'spolitical theory, from his criticism of the Republic's communism to the primacy he gives to deliberative rhetoric among the different types of rhetoric. These differences between Plato and Aristotle are related to their different presentationsof the passions. In the Republic Socrates divides
25 When Socrates describes rhetoricto Polus, he claims that it is an imitationof justice, while sophistryis an imitationof legislation (464b-c;465c). This also suggests that in the GorgiasSocratesis criticizingthe rhetoric used in law courts ratherthan the deliberative rhetoricemployed in the assembly.
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the soul into three: the calculatingor rationalpart, the spirited part, and the desiring part. According to him, spiritedness is the ally of reason, obeying its commands and controllingthe desires. In place of these three parts of the soul, Aristotlepresents only two in the Nicomachean Ethics: the rational, which possesses reason simply, and the appetitive, which "possessesreasonin the sense thatit listensto reasonas one would a father" (1103al-4). Aristotlelocates both desire and spiritednessin the appetitive part of the soul. His account does not merely demote spiritednessfrom its special place above the desires, but it elevates the desires and brings them closer to reason (Fortenbaugh, 1970). It is because the desires in Aristotle'sanalysis do partake of the rational element that deliberative rhetoriccan occupy the primaryplace in the Rhetoric. Man is a political animal, whose passions and reason allow him to engage in deliberation about private and public goods. Accordingly, there is no incommensurability between rulers and ruled, as there is in the city described in the Republic, where rulers correspond to one element in the soul and ruled to another. The interplay between reason and desire in Aristotle's psychology parallels that between the public and private dimensions of life in his political science. Aristotle'sdifferent approach to politics is reflected in his answers to Socrates'criticisms of rhetoric. Implied in Socrates'charge that rhetoric is ignorantof the truthis the demand that the rhetoricianhave as certain and as accurate a knowledge about the good, the just, and the noble as the scientist has of those objects that exist of necessity. In the Phaedrus, for example, Socrates speaks critically of those rhetoricianswho "honor probabilitiesmore than truth"(267a). He thus wants rhetoricto be based on truthratherthan on probability. Aristotle'swarning that probabilities thusapplies to Socrates(Cope, 1867, shouldbe accepted from rhetoricians p. 7, n. 1; and Grimaldi, 1972, pp. 109-10). Socrates does acknowledge, however, that certain things admit of irregularity,or "wander,"since different men hold different views about them, and even the same men hold different views at different times (Phdr., 263a-b). Socrates uses the same expressionthat Aristotlelater used in the Ethics of those things that vary in different circumstances(1094bl9-28). But ratherthan accept the imprecision that Aristotle thought necessary, Socrates indicates that rhetorical speech about the things that "wander"should define them, criticizingLysias'speech for its failureto do this very thing. His criticism suggeststhathe is looking for a rhetoricthatcan put a stop to "wandering." The need for simply true definitions that Socrates attributesto rhetoric could be satisfied only if nature were simple, only if it did not include humanbeings who exercisechoice and who thereforeintroducean infinite
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number of circumstances into human affairs.26It is the individuality of men that makes the just, the noble, and the good wander.27 Since Socrates was well aware of the differences among men and the complexity of a nature that includes human beings, he did not think that a public rhetoric was possible. A rhetoric based on universally valid definitions would be open to the same criticism as writing, which Socrates claimed says the same things to everyone. Both achieve a unity at the cost of ignoring or suppressing individual differences. As an alternative to such a rhetoric, as well as an alternative to writing, Socrates offered private speech that addressed itself to the individual natures of men. This he called true rhetoric, identifying rhetoric with his own philosophic activity. When Aristotle argues that the truths of rhetoric hold only for the most part, he therefore answers not only Socrates' concern about rhetoric's ignorance but also his concern that public speech abstracts from the individual natures of men. A rhetoric aware of the probable character of its conclusions, the exceptions to which its truths will inevitably be subject, is a rhetoric that allows for individual differences. It is speech that aspires to communal or general concerns but also recognizes the particular characters of men who cannot be assimilated into a class and phenomena that cannot be adequately captured by a single definition. As we have seen, Aristotle describes at the outset of the Rhetoric the beneficial limits that private interests place upon the deliberative rhetoric that proposes general laws. Because justice demands that both the communal and the private character of men be given their due, Aristotle must qualify his initial recommendation that the scope of law be broadened as much as possible and little discretion left to the judges in particular cases. Laws may be superior to judicial decisions because they are universal rules free from the distortions of pleasure and pain that arise in individual cases. But as universal rules, they do not adequately cover all the particular cases to
26 Similarly, in the Gorgias, Socrates distinguishes two kinds of persuasion: "instruction" or "teaching" that provides knowledge, and a persuasion that offers "belief" or "trust" without knowledge (454e). Socrates uses the word for belief, pistis, with which Aristotle was to designate the proofs that rhetoric used. But whereas Socrates depreciates pistis in favor of knowledge, Aristotle treats it as the legitimate goal of rhetoric. From Aristotle's point of view, Socrates' criticism of rhetoric does not recognize the complexity of the truth and implies that the only valid rhetoric would be essentially like science. Cf., Rhetoric, I. i. 12. 27 This does not mean that no general statements about the good, the noble, and the just are true; it means rather that their truth is only probable. Individuals, and the particular circumstances in which they are involved and which they in part create, will constitute exceptions to the general rule. The general rule must then be modified to take the exception into account if it is to remain a true expression.
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which they are applied. Although universal statements are necessary in framinglaws, they are valid "only for the most part"(I. xiii. 13). Because fixed and unchanging laws cannot always apply to changing human affairs,they must be corrected by equity, a "justicethat goes beyond the written law" in order to take into account the extenuatingcircumstances that bring particularcases outside the general rule (I. xiii. 13). Judging, like deliberating,involves a considerationof the relationbetween public and private,or universaland particular.The laws of a politicalcommunity resemble the truthsof rhetoric:they hold "only for the most part."Like the judge applying equity, the rhetoriciancontinuallymodifies his speech as he directs it to changing circumstances.The flexibility of equity thus parallelsthe flexibility of speech: both take into account the variationand complexity of human life. And the generality of law resembles the universality of the logical rules which limit speech. While both are indispensablefor the community of men, both are incomplete. The judge it in light of particular completes the law by understanding circumstances. So too does the rhetoricianground his speech not only in the formal rules of reasoning but also in the complex and changing materialsthat make his conclusions only probable-the characters,passions, and opinions of men. Just as Plato did not develop an art of rhetoric-of political speech that did justice to the individual natures of its addressees, he did not Given his understandingof the dichotomy develop a concept of equity.28 between passions and reason, and between the private and public dimensions of life, he did not think that politics, whether the speech of its rhetoricians or the justice of its law courts, could manifest the moderationnecessary to make exceptions. The importancethatAristotlegives to equity in forensic speakingbrings his discussion of rhetoric full circle. At the beginning of the Rhetoric, as we have seen, he criticizes forensic rhetoric because it involves strictly private cases and claims that it is inferiorto the deliberative rhetoricthat leads to legislation,a rhetoricthatbringsprivateinterestsinto contact with public ones. But although laws are based on both private and public concerns, they do not change over time. The flexibility of speech makes it superiorto law, not merely because it is instrumentalin framing laws, but also because it is necessary to correct them, so that they apply to
28 In the Statesman, for example, the Eleatic Strangerrefers to the defect of generaland inflexiblelaws:"Thedifferencesamong men and actionsand the fact thatnothingin human life is ever at restforbidany sciencewhatsoeverto promulgateanysimplerulefor everything and for all time"(294b).Suchconsiderations do not, however,lead him, as they did Aristotle, to the concept of equity. Insteadhe recommendsthatthe man with knowledge rule without law. Butsince such a statesmanis not likely to exist, and since lawlessnessis more dangerous than the inflexibilityof law, he recommends absolute obedience to unchanginglaws as a practical political solution (200b-c). Equity, Aristotle's recommendation, might be considereda mean between inflexibilityand lawlessness.
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changinghumanaffairs.Forensicrhetoric,precisely because it focuses on individual cases, is continually necessary to ensure the laws' justice. Without speech, as without equity, politics will be coercive rather than persuasive, its laws distorting particular cases to fit a universal rule. Aristotlesuggests that a universalrule rigidly applied is as bad a measure as private passion. He thus shows how public speech makes politics less coercive at the same time thatit directsto a politicalcommunitythe ethical speeches Socrates gave to men in private.
CONCLUSION
Aristotleteaches rhetoricians how to incorporateinto theirspeeches the variety of goods that men seek, as they are revealed in their opinions and implied in their passions. Because it is based on a comprehensive understandingof human nature, their rhetoric will be persuasive. And because of that same comprehensiveness,it will be both true and just, to the extent that human affairs permit. Aristotle's account of rhetoric answersnot only the ancient criticismsof rhetoric,especially Plato's,but it also constitutesa defense againstrhetoric'smodern detractors.To those who depreciate political speech as involving values that are not scientificallyverifiable, Aristotledistinguishesbetween the mathematical sciences, which admit of precise knowledge, and the less precise sciences such as politics. While political knowledge is only probable, it is true to man's complexity and freedom, which the drive for more precise knowledge obscures. To those who question the legitimacy of a skill that permitsmen to argue on any side of an issue, Aristotlepoints out the limits necessary for successful persuasion-from the logical rules that underlie thought to the diverse elements of common opinion that rhetoric must accommodate. Finally, to those who see in political debate only the rationalizationof subrationaldrives, whether psychological or economic, Aristotleindicates the extent to which rhetoricinvolves refining opinions and modifying desires in light of more comprehensive goods. how theirrhetoricmight combine AlthoughAristotleshows rhetoricians success with truth and justice, he is well aware of the limits to what can be accomplished. He thereforedefines the art of rhetoricnot as the ability to persuade, as others had done, but as "the ability to see the possible means of persuasion in particulr cases" (I. ii. 1; cf. Gorg., 452e). The art does not guaranteesuccess (Arnhart,1981,pp. 34-35;and rhetorician's Cope, 1867, p. 149). Aristotlealso acknowledges the potential dangers of rhetoric. The things that produce good, even those that are "the most useful"and "of the greatest benefit," he says, "canhave equally harmful effects if used unjustly"(I. i. 13). He suggests the good that rhetoric can produce when he makes an observationin the Politics about man himself, similarto the one he applies to rhetoric."Justas man is the best of animals
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when perfected," he says, "he is the worst of all when sunderedfrom law and justice"(1253a32).There Aristotleis explainingman'suniquecapacity for speech, which makes possible his belonging to political communities in which he pursuesthe advantageousand the just (1253al6-18).In writing a Rhetoric about speech that aims at the advantageous and the just, Aristotleis thereforetryingto strengthenpoliticalcommunity.This cannot be done without involving man'spassions,and the ability to elevate them is also the ability to degrade them. The potential harmfulnessof rhetoric is outweighed by its potential good. If rhetoricdoes unite men in speech about the advantageous and the just, it would promote political community. Its practitionerwould resemble the man who first brought men together in a city, whom Aristotle describes as "the cause of the greatest goods" (Pol., 1253a32).
REFERENCES Aristotle. 1926. The "Art"of Rhetoric. Trans. John Henry Freese. Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress. 1926. Aristotle'sNicomacheanEthics. Trans. H. Rackham.Cambridge:Harvard ____. UniversityPress. _ .___ 1932.Aristotle's Politics.Trans.H. Rackham.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. . 1932. Posterior Analytics, Topics. Trans. H. Tredennick and E. S. Forster. Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. Arnhart, Larry. 1981. Aristotle on Political Reasoning. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois UniversityPress. Beiner,Ronald. 1983.PoliticalJudgment.Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress. Bernstein,Richard. 1977. The Restructuringof Social and Political Theory. New York: Harcourt,Braceand Jovanovich. of Speech,45:399EnthymemeRevisited.Quarterly Journal Bitzer,Lloyd F. 1959.Aristotle's 408. Rhetoric.London:Macmillan. Cope, Edward M. 1867.An Introductionto Aristotle's and PoliticalPhilosophy.Chicago:Universityof Chicago Danford,John. 1976.Wittgenstein Press. Rhetoricon Emotions.Archivfur Geschichteder Fortenbaugh, WilliamW. 1970.Aristotle's Philosophie,52:205-34, reprintedin Aristotle:The ClassicalHeritageof Rhetoric.1974. Ed. KeithV. Erickson.Metuchen,NJ: ScarecrowPress. to The "Art" of Rhetoric.Trans.JohnHenryFreese. Freese,JohnHenry. 1926.Introduction Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. WilliamM. A. 1957.A Note on the Pisteisin Aristotle's Rhetoric.American Journal Grimaldi, of Philology,78:188-92. ____. Rhetoric.Weisbaden:FranzSteiner. 1972.Studiesin the Philosophyof Aristotle's MacIntyre, Alasdair.1981.After Virtue.Notre Dame: Notre Dame UniversityPress. Mara,Gerald.1985.After Virtue,Autonomy:JurgenHabermasand GreekPoliticalTheory. The Journalof Politics,47:1036-61. Plato.1926.Euthyphro, Trans.H. N. Fowler.Cambridge: Apology, Crito,Phaedo,Phaedrus. HarvardUniversityPress. ___. 1926. Lysis, Symposium,Gorgias.Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress.
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. 1925. The Statesman, Philebus, Ion. Trans. Harold N. Fowler and W. R. M. Lamb.
Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. Salkever,Stephen. 1981.Aristotle's Social Science. PoliticalTheory,47:1036-61. Solmsen, Friedrich.1938.Aristotleand Cicero on the Orator'sPlaying upon the Feelings. ClassicalPhilology,33:390-404. Strauss,Leo. 1964. The City and Man. Chicago:Rand McNally. Wikramanayake, G. H. 1961.A Note on the Pisteisin Aristotle's Rhetoric.AmericanJournal of Philology,82:193-96. Yak,Bernard.1985.Communityand Conflict in Aristotle's Politics. The Review of Politics, 47:92-112.

Aristotle's Defense of Rhetoric

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