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JOURNAL

OF EXPERIMENTAL

SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY

25, 189-202 (1989)

The Effects of Affective-Cognitive Consistency an on the Attitude-Behavior relation


MURRAY
University

G. MILLAR

of Wisconsin-Pa&side

AND ABRAHAM
University

TESSER
of Georgia

Received January 5, 1988 The present study is concerned with the moderating role of affective-cognitive consistency in the relationship between attitudes and behavior. Eased on earlier research (Millar & Tesser, 1986), attitudes were conceptualized as containing an affective and a cognitive component and subsequent behaviors as being driven by one of these components. It was hypothesized that if the affective and cognitive components are in good evaluative agreement (high affective-cognitive consistency), then thought emphasizing either component would lead to a similar general evaluation that should relate to all behavior in a similar manner. However, if the affective and cognitive components are not in agreement (low affectivecognitive consistency) then thought emphasizing different components would lead to different general evaluations that relate deferentially to subsequent behavior. To test this hypothesis, the affective-cognitive consistency of attiudes about analytic puzzles was measured. The participants were either affectively or cognitively focused prior to an evaluation and then played with the puzzles under instrumental and consumatory conditions. As predicted, thought prior to the evaluation only affected the attitude-behavior relation when attitudes were low in affective-cognitive consistency. 0 1989 Academic Press, Inc.

Recently, Wilson and his colleagues (e.g., Wilson & Dunn, 1986; Wilson, Dunn, Bybee, Hyman, & Rotondo, 1984), in their investigations of the effects of thought on the attitude-behavior relation, have found that thought prior to an assessment of an attitude decreases that attitudes ability to predict behavior. However, other research seems to suggest
Please address correspondence and reprint requests to Murray Millar, Departmeni Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Parkside, Kenosha, WI 53141-2000. 189 0022-2031189 $3.00
Copyright 0 1989 by Academic Press. Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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the opposite. For example, Wicklund (1982) suggested that persons who are focused on themselves (i.e., presumably thinking about their internal feelings) have better access to their attitudes than persons who are not self-focused. Wicklund, unlike Wilson et al., predicted that highly selffocused persons have attitudes that are good predictors of their behavior. Consistent with Wicklunds hypothesis, Scheier, Buss, and Buss (1978) have found that persons dispositionally high in self-awareness exhibit higher attitude-behavior correlations. Even earlier research that used a paradigm similar to that used in Wilsons work has produced the opposite findings (e.g., Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1978). In order to reconcile these conflicting findings, Millar and Tesser (1986) suggested that attitudes be conceptualized as general evaluations based on affect and cognition (for a similar conceptualization see Zanna & Rempel, 1986). It was proposed that thought prior to the formation of a general evaluation of an object may make either the affective or cognitive component of the attitude salient and more important in the general evaluation. For example, Wilsons procedure of requiring persons to think about reasons for liking or disliking an object would tend to make the cognitive component of the attitudes salient; i.e., beliefs about the objects attributes would be salient. Alternatively, requiring persons to think about the feelings they experience in the presence of the object would make the affective component of their attitude salient. In addition, Millar and Tesser (1986) proposed that the decision to engage in a behavior may be based more or less on the cognitive or affective component of the attitude rather than a general evaluation. That is, some types of behavior may be more cognitively driven and other types more affectively driven. For example, instrumental behavior appears to be cognitively driven; i.e., a person who performs a puzzle in order to develop analytic ability would primarily be interested in various attributes of the puzzle and how they relate to analytic ability. Alternatively, consumatory behaviors appear to be affectively driven; i.e., a person who performs a puzzle simply to please himself should be primarily interested in how the puzzle makes him feel, not in the attributes of the puzzle. Since ones general evaluations, i.e., attitude, can be more or less influenced by the affective or cognitive component and since behavior can be more or less driven by the affective and cognitive components, it was hypothesized that a match between the attitude component emphasized by thought and the attitude component driving behavior would lead to a strong attitude-behavior relation and a mismatch between components would lead to a weak attitude-behavior relation. The present study was concerned with the moderating role of affectivecognitive consistency in the relationship between general evaluation and behavior. From the present perspective, if the affective and cognitive components are in good evaluative agreement then thought emphasizing

AFFECTIVE-COGNITIVE

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either component should lead to a similar general evaluation. Pf this is the case, then general evaluations should relate to consumatory or instrumental behavior in the same manner regardless of focus. Overall we would expect highly consistent attitudes to uniformly predict both consumatory and instrumental behavior well. On the other hand, if the cognitive and affective components are not in agreement then thought emphasizing different components would lead to different general evaluations. Consequently, if thought operates in the manner suggested by the model, the match and mismatch effects should occur when attitudes are characterized by low affective-cognitive consistency and become attenuated when there is high affective-cognitive consistency. To test this hypothesis an attempt was made to measure directly affectivecognitive consistency and demonstrate that the match and mismatch effects occur only under low consistency. Participants were allowed to familiarize themselves with the puzzles and then measurements of t affective and cognitive components were made. The measurement affective and cognitive components was conducted so that half the participants finished with an affective focus and half finished with a cognitive focus prior to an evaluation of the puzzles. Following the evaluation of the puzzles, participants were allowed to play with the puzzles under instrumental or consumatory conditions. We expected that when consistency was low there would be an interaction between Focus of Thought and Behavior Type. That is, when there is a match between the attitu component emphasized by thought and the component driving behavior, the evaluation-behavior relation should be strong; when there is a mismatch between the focus of thought and the component driving behavior, the relation between evaluation and behavior should be weak, Alternat s when affective-cognitive consistency is high, this interaction disappear.
METHOD
Slibjects. Subjects were 42 females and 39 males recruited from the introductory psychology classes at a large university, who participated in order to receive class credit. Twenty or twenty-one participants were randomly assigned to each of the four between-groups experimental conditions. Srimuius material. Five puzzle types were presented to the participants. Each of the puzzles were in the form of a multiple choice question with several wrong solutions and one correct solution. The participant was required to choose the best solution to the puzzle. The letter series puzzle presented the participant with a series of letters that formed a Although previous examinations of affective-cognitive consistency (e.g., Rosenberg, 1956, 1960, 1968; Norman, 1975) have found that high consistent attitudes predict behavior better than Iow consistent attitudes, it is difficult to compare their work to the present because they have operationally equated the affective component with the general evaluation. That is, in Normans research affect was measured using a 9-point rating scale with endpoints of very favorable and very unfavorable.

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pattern (e.g., abaabbabc) and the participant was required to choose one of four other letter groupings (e.g., abd abr acd aaa) that would best complete the pattern. The picture matching puzzle presented the participant with a target star pattern and the participant was required to choose which of four other star patterns most closely resembled the target pattern. The analogies puzzle presented the participant with a target analogy and the participant was required to decide which of four other analogies was most similar to the target. The relative quantities puzzle presented the participant with two quantities (e.g., 4 quarts vs 5 liters) and the participant was required to choose one of four relations that best described the relation between the two presented quantities (e.g., equal, greater than, less than, no relation). The sentence completion puzzle presented the participant with a sentence. One word in the sentence was missing and the participant was required to choose one of four words that best completed the sentence. Procedure. Upon entering the experimental room, the participant was seated at a microcomputer by a male experimenter. The experimenter informed the participant that the purpose of the experiment was to assess the utility of several analytic puzzles in measuring analytic ability. The computer then provided the participant with a further set of instructions designed to manipulate the experimental variables. Instrumental versus consumatoty behavior manipulation. In the first set of instructions, participants in the instrumental-behavior conditions were informed that: In this experiment you will be given the opportunity to practice with five types of analytic puzzles which may be useful in developing analytic ability. After this you will be given an analytic puzzle-solving test to assess your analytic ability. Participants in the consumatory behavior conditions were informed that: In this experiment you will be given the opportunity to practice with five types of analytic puzzles which may be useful in developing analytic ability. After this in the second part of the experiment you will be given a test to measure your social sensitivity. Cognitive versus affective focus manipulation. In a second set of directions, participants were asked to familiarize themselves with each of the five types of puzzles by attempting to solve four examples of each type. Each participant completed two examples of each puzzle type while they were affectively focused and two examples of each while they were cognitively focused. Puzzles were presented to the participants using a microcomputer. Using a procedure the same as Wilsons et al. (1984) reasons analysis, cognitive focus was created by asking the participants, while they worked on each puzzle, to analyze WHY you feel the way you do about each type of puzzle, that is, go over in your mind what it is about each puzzle that makes you think it is likeable or not. After receiving these directions, the participants were asked to complete two examples of each type of puzzle. When the participant had completed this, the computer asked him or her to write down their reasons for liking or disliking each type of puzzle and to place a + after positive features and a - after negative features. To do this participants were given a sheet of paper with the names of the five puzzle types. Affective focus was created by asking the participants, while they worked on each puzzle, to analyze HOW you feel while performing each type of puzzle. That is, go over in your mind how you are feeling while you perform each type of puzzle. After receiving these directions the participants were asked to complete two examples of each type of puzzle. When the participant had completed this, the computer asked him or her to write down how each type of puzzle had made them feel. To do this, participants were given a sheet of paper with the names of the five puzzle types.

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The order of presentation for the affective and cognitive focus procedures were counterbalanced (affective-cognitive; cognitive-affective), and separated by a short period of time in which the participants were required to complete Snyders (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale and the Private vs Public Self Awareness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). By counterbalancing the order of presentation of the affective and cognitive focus procedures participants finished this procedure with either an affective or cognitive focus. That is, the last type of information the participant is exposed to should be most available in memory (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977). Self-reports of liking, conjidence, and response times. Immediately following the last focus manipulation (either affective or cognitive), the participants were asked to evaluate each of the five puzzle types on Likert type scales with endpoints of dislike (7) and like (1). Note that half the participants were affectively focused prior to this evaluation and half were cognitively focused prior to this evaluation After each evaluation, they were asked to rate how confident they were of their evaluations on a similar Likert-type scale with endpoints of very confident (7) and not very confident (1). The microcomputer also recorded the length of time the participant used to make each of the evaluations and confidence ratings. Behavioral measures of liking. After finishing the general evaluations, the participants were informed by the experimenter that: I am going to be unable to start the next part of the experiment for about 10 min because I have to start the next participant. While you are waiting, please remain seated at the terminal. You may occupy your time before the analytic abilities test (social sensitivity test) by working on more puzzles if you like. If you want to continue press 1. The experimenter left the experimental room at this point and greeted the next subjec. who was ushered to another microcomputer in an adjacent room. If the original participant pressed 1 to continue playing with the puzzles, the microcomputer allowed the participant to choose which type of puzzle he or she would like to work on. Each time the participant responded to a puzzle, the participant was again given the opportunity to choose which type of puzzle to work on. During these 10 min, the microcomputer recorded the length of time each puzzle was viewed by the participant, the order in which puzzles were chosen, and the participants answers to the puzzles. After 10 min the experimenter returned, stopped the computer, and asked the participant to complete a paper and pencil questionnaire. The questionnaire required the participant to reevaluate each of the puzzle types on Likert-type scales with endpoints of like (I) and dislike (7) Also the participant was asked to evaluate whether each of the puzzle types would help improve analytic ability or social sensitivity on Likert-type scales with endpoints of not very much (7) and great deal (I). These questions were intended to assess whether the participants believed puzzle playing could have instrumental value in the upcoming test. Finally, each participant was questioned concerning his or her understanding of the experimental hypotheses. All of the participants were then fully debriefed and released.

RESULTS

Computing attitude components and affective-cognitive consistency. A measure of cognitive liking (the cognitive component) was calculates
This second set of evaluations was dropped from further consideration because it did not directly relate to the hypotheses tested. in the paper

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by summing the pluses and minuses after the reasons for liking or disliking each puzzle. For example, if a participant gave three reasons for their evaluation of the picture matching puzzle, and two were followed by plus signs and one was followed by a minus sign, the participant was given a cognitive liking score of 1 for picture matching puzzles. Affective liking (the affective component) was calculated by two raters who classified each emotion statement as positive or negative. For example, if a participant stated that picture matching made him/her feel uptight and dumb, they were given an affective liking score of -2. These ratings were highly correlated (Y = 87). The ratings were then summed for each puzzle and a measure of affective-cognitive consistency was constructed by computing the rank-order correlation of each participants cognitive liking scores to his/her affective liking scores across the five puzzles. To examine whether affective-cognitive consistency was affected by the experimental manipulations these correlations were transformed to Fishers z scores and analyzed in a 2 (Instrumental vs Consumatory Behavior) x 2 (Order of Affect vs Cognitive Focus) analysis of variance (ANOVA). No significant effects were obtained. Manipulation checks. To assess the effectiveness of the cognitiveaffective focus manipulation, participants written responses to the thought manipulation were independently coded by two raters. These raters judged whether each statement written by the participant expressed a reason for liking the puzzle or a feeling they .experienced while working on the puzzle. If the statement described an affective state it was coded as an emotion (e.g., I felt worried). Alternatively, if the statement described an attribute of the puzzle, it was coded as a reason (e.g., the puzzle was complex). The two sets of ratings were highly correlated (Y = 85). For each participant, the number of reasons produced after the affective focus procedure and the number of reasons produced after cognitive focus procedure were summed. Also the number of feelings produced after the affective focus and the number of feelings produced after the cognitive focus were summed. Both sets of sums were then analyzed in separate 2 (Instrumental vs Consumatory Behavior) x 2 (High vs Low AffectiveCognitive Consistency) x 2 (Affective Focus Procedure vs Cognitive Focus Procedure) ANOVAs with repeated measures assumed on the last factor. The affective-cognitive consistency variable was created by classifying participants on the basis of a median split as either high or low in affective-cognitive consistency (median Y = .298). As expected the only source of variation to reach significance in both analyses was a main effect for the focus procedure. When the number of reasons was analyzed, the cognitive focus produced more reasons (M = 2.78) than the affective focus (M = 1.03), F(1, 70) = 7.41, p = .008. Alternatively, when the number of feelings was analyzed, the affective focus produced

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more feelings (M = 2.99) than the cognitive focus (M = 1.14), P;(l, 7 = 8.29, p = .005. To assess the effectiveness of the instrumental and consumatory behavior manipulation, participants were asked in the questionnaire presented at the end of the study how much help they thought working on the puzzles would be in the upcoming test. These ratings were analyzed in a 2 (Instrumental vs Consumatory Behavior) x 2 (High vs Low AffectiveCognitive Consistency) x 2 (Affective vs Cognitive Focus prior to the Initial Evaluation) ANOVA. As expected participants in the instrumental conditions believed that working on the puzzles would be more hel on the upcoming test (M = 3.7) than the participants in the consumatory conditions (2w = 4.6), F(1, 73) = 8.78, p = .004. Attitude-behavior consistency. Three measures of attitude-bebav~~r consistency were constructed by computing the rank-order correlation of each participants general evaluation of the puzzles to the three measures of their behavior: the time they spent working on the puzzles in the freeplay period, the order puzzles were chosen in, and the proportion of each type of puzzle they attempted in the free-play period. Correlations between evaluations and behavior were transformed to Fishers z scores and analyzed in three separate 2 (Instrumental vs Consumatory Behavior) x 2 (Affective vs Cognitive Focus prior to the Initial Evaluation) x 2 (High vs Low Affective-Cognitive Consistency) ANOVAs. Cell size in this analysis varied between 12 and 9 participants. When the amount of time spent playing with the puzzles was used as the behavioral measure there was a marginal two-factor interaction of Behavior Type x Focus of Thought, P;(l, 73) = 3.65, p = .06. Overall, cognitive attitudes predicted instrumental behaviors (M = .48) better than affective attitudes (M = .ll), F(1, 73) = 4.92, p = .O2. ~te~at~ve~y. there was a nonsignificant tendency for affective attitudes to predict consumatory behavior (M = .41) better than cognitive attitudes ( .32), F < 1. More importantly for this study, the predicted three-factor interaction of Behavior Type x Focus of Thought x Affecti gnitive Consistency was also obtained, F(1, 73) = 3.82, p = .055. n participants were low in affective-cognitive consistency, the simple Behavior Type x Focus of Thought interaction was significant, F( 1, 73) = 7.33, p = .O The evaluations of participants performing instrumental behaviors predic behavior better when they focused on their cognitions than when they focused on their feelings, F(1, 73) = 8.19, p = .OCt5.Alternatively, participants were high in affective-cognitive consistency the simpl havior Type x Focus of Thought was not significant, F < 1 (se 1). When the order of choice in the free-play riod was used as t havior Type x Focus behavioral measure, the two-factor interaction of

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CONSISTENCY

LOW AFFECTIVE-COGNITIVE

INSTRUMENTAL

BEHAVIOR

CONSUHATORY

BEHAVIOR

HIGH

AFFECTIVE-COGNITIVE

CONSISTENCY

(t-0 H

COGNITIVE AFFECTIVE

FOCUS FOCUS

INSTRUMENTAL

BEHAVIOR

CONSUMATORY

BEHAVIOR

FIG. 1. Mean attitude-behavior correlations thought, and affective-cognitive consistency.

as a function of behavior type, focus of

of Thought was again obtained, F(1, 73) = 4.01, p = .04. Also, the three-factor interaction of Behavior Type x Focus of Thought x AtfectiveCognitive Consistency was obtained, F(1, 73) = 3.95, p = .05. A simple Behavior Type x Focus of Thought was obtained when participants were low in consistency, F(l, 73) = 8.78, p = ,004, and disappeared when participants were high in consistency. When the proportion of puzzles chosen in the free-play period were used as the behavioral measure, a similar pattern of results was obtained; however the three-factor in-

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teraction of Behavior Type x Focus of Thought x Affective-Cognitive Consistency was not significant, F(1, 73) = 1.84, p = .17. Attitude component-evaluation relations. The relationship between liking expressed by each of the attitude components and the general evaluations of the puzzles was also explored. If the focus manipulation was successful, we would expect affective liking to be more related to the general evaluations made after the affective focus and the cognitive liking to be more related to evaluations made after the cognitive focus. To test this hypothesis, within-subject correlations between the general evaluations and both affective and cognitive components were calculate These correlations were transformed to Fisher z, scores and analyzed in a 2 (Focus of Thought prior to the Initial Evaluation) x 2 (Type of Behavior) x 2 (Affective-Cognitive Consistency) x 2 (Affective vs Cognitive Component) ANOVA with repeated measures assumed on the last factor. As expected, a two-factor interaction of Focus of Thought x Attitude Component was obtained, F(1, 70) = 12.86, p = .OOl. kiking expresse by the affective component predicted general evaluations signifi~a~tl better when participants were affectively focused (M = .53) than when they were cognitively focused (M = .292), F(I, 70) = 4.76, p = Alternatively, liking expressed by the cognitive component tende predict evaluations made after the cognitive focus (M = -65) better evaluations made after an affective focus (M = JO), F < 2. The only other source of variation to reach significance was a main effect for affective-cognitive consistency. When there was high evaluative con sistency between the affective and cognitive components, liking expr by the components predicted the evaluations significantly better .61) than when there was low consistency (M = .36)? F(1, 70) = p = .OOl. Attitude component-behavior relations. The present data also allowed us to test the relation between each of the attitude components and behavior. Recall that the present model suggested that consumatory behavior is driven by affect and instrumental behavior is driven by cognition. If this is the case, we would expect liking expressed by the cognitive component to predict instrumental behavior and liking expressed by t affective component to predict consumatory behavior. To test this hy3 The three measures of attitude-behavior relation were highly related (average Y = .74) and were also analyzed in a 2 (Instrumental vs Consumatory Behavior) x 2 (Affective vs Cognitive Focus prior to the Initial Evaluation) x 2 (High vs Low Affective-Cognitive Consistency) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). This analysis produced a pattern of results similar to the univariate ANOVAs. A significant two-factor interaction of Behavior Type X Focus of Thought was obtained, F(3,70) = 5.51, p = .OO6,along with a sign&ant three-fact interaction of Behavior Type x Focus of Thought X Affective-Cognitive Consistency, F(3, 70) = 3.90, p = .0.5.

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pothesis, within-subject correlations between the behavior, as measured by time, and both affective and cognitive components were calculated. These correlations were transformed to Fisher z scores and analyzed in a 2 (Focus of Thought prior to the Initial Evaluation) x 2 (Type of Behavior) x 2 (Affective-Cognitive Consistency) x 2 (Affective vs Cognitive Component) ANOVA with repeated measures assumed on the last factor. As expected, a two-factor interaction of Behavior Type x Attitude Component was obtained, F(1,70) = 4.06, p = .04. There was a tendency for the affective component to predict consumatory behavior better (M = 5.5) than instrumental behavior (M = .43), F(1, 70) = 2.57, p = .lO, and for the cognitive component to predict instrumental behavior better (M = .64) than consumatory behavior (M = .52), F(1, 70) = 1.8. Also, our consistency hypothesis suggested that the interaction of Behavior Type x Attitude Component should be more pronounced when attitudes are low in affective-cognitive consistency than when they are high in consistency. That is, if both attitude components express similar degrees of liking then both should predict behavior equally well and the interaction should disappear. Consistent with this prediction, a marginal interaction of Behavior Type x Affective-Cognitive Consistency x Attitude Component was obtained, F(1, 70) = 3.38, p = .07. When attitudes toward the puzzle were low in affective-cognitive consistency, the simple interaction of Behavior Type x Attitude Component was significant, F(1, 70) = 8.33, p = .005. Alternatively, when attitudes toward the puzzles were high in affective-cognitive consistency the simple interaction of Behavior Type x Attitude Component disappeared, F < 1, (see Table 1).4 In addition several other effects emerged. First there was an affectivecognitive consistency main effect, F(1, 70) = 6.15, p = .Ol. Liking expressed by the attitude components predicted behavior better when affective-cognitive consistency was high (M = .62) than when affectivecognitive consistency was low (M = .45). Also, a large Focus of Thought x Attitude Component interaction was obtained, F(1, 70) = 11.02, p = .OOl. The cognitive component predicted behavior better when cognition was focused on prior to the evaluation (M = .66) than when affect was focused on prior to the evaluation (M = .51), F(1, 70) = 4.12, p = .04.
4 When order of choice was used as the behavioral measure in these analyses a similar pattern of results emerged. A two-factor interaction of Behavior Type x Attitude Component was obtained, F(1, 73) = 4.54, p = .03, and a three-factor interaction of Behavior Type x Affective-Cognitive Consistency x Attitude Component was also obtained, F(1, 73) = 4.17, p = Ski. Further, when the proportion of puzzles played was used as the behavior measure, both the two-factor interaction of Behavior Type x Attitude Component, F(1, 73) = 4.61, p = .03, and the three-factor interaction of Behavior Type x AffectiveCognitive Consistency x Attitude Component, F(1, 73) = 5.38, p = .02, were obtained.

AFFECTIVE-COGNITIVE TABLE
MEANS OF CORRELATIONS AFFECTIVE-COGNITIVE BETWEEN COMPONENT CONSISTENCY,

CONSISTENCY 1
LIKING AND TYPE, BEHAVIOR AND AS A FUNCTION

199

OF

BEHAVIOR

COMPONENT

LIKING

Affective-cognitive High Attitude component Type of behavior Instrumental Consumatofy Affective .52
(n = 9)

consistency Low Attitude component Affective .35


(n = 10)

Cognitive .69
(n = 10)

Cognitive .59
(n = I@)

.57 (n = 12)

.69 (n = 9)

.52 (n = 9)

.34 (n = 12)

Alternatively, the affective component predicted behavior better when affect was focused on prior to the evaluation (M = $0) than when cognition was focused on (44 = .39), F(1, 70) = 8.13, p = .005. Additional analyses. In an attempt to rule out a&factual explanations, we examined whether affective-cognitive consistency covaried with other variables in the study. First, the relationship between affective-cognitive consistency and the personality measures were explored by correlating each participants affective-cognitive consistency score with each of the personality measures. None of these correlations reached significance (the largest correlation was with self-monitoring, 480) = - .lO, p = .3 1). Also, the relationship between affective-cognitive consistency an a number of performance variables was examined. Affective-cognitive consistency scores were correlated with the means: evaluation of the puzzles, confidence in evaluation, time to make the evaluation, time spent working on the puzzles in the practice period, and time spent working on the puzzles in the free play period. Again none of these correlations reached significance (the largest correlation was with mean confidence, 480) = .027, p = .81). In another attempt to rule out a&factual explanations, we examine whether any of the behavioral measures were affected by the ma~p~atio~s~ Rrst, for each participant the amount and the standard deviation of time spent playing with the puzzles both before the initial evaluation and in the free-play period were analyzed in four separate 2 (Consumatory vs Instrumental Behavior) x 2 (Cognitive vs Affective Focus) x 2 (II vs Low Affective-Cognitive Consistency) ANOVAs. The only sou of variation to approach significance was a main effect for behavior type when the amount of time spent playing with the puzzles after the i evaiuation was analyzed. Participants tended to spend more time

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the puzzles under instrumental conditions (M = 541 s) than under consumatory conditions (M = 522 s), F(1, 73) = 2.44, p = .22. The effects of the manipulations on the initial evaluations, the standard deviation of the evaluations, the time to make initial evaluations, the confidence in initial evaluations, and the time to make confidence ratings were also examined. Each measure was analyzed separately in a 2 (Consumatory vs Instrumental Behavior) x 2 (Cognitive vs Affective Focus) x 2 (High vs Low Affective-Cognitive Consistency) ANOVAs. Two of these analyses yielded significant effects. First, the standard deviation of the initial evaluations was greater in the cognitive focus conditions (il4 = 1.9) than in the affective focus conditions (M = I.@, F(1, 73) = 4.65, p = .03. Second, the only other source of variation to reach significance in these analyses was a main effect for the time to make confidence ratings, F(1, 73) = 6.36, p = .Ol. Confidence rating in the instrumental conditions took longer (M = 4.11 s) than confidence ratings in the consumatory conditions (M = 3.41 s). v DISCUSSION The results provided strong support for the hypotheses examined. First, the marginal two-factor interaction between Behavior Type x Focus of Thought replicated earlier findings. When there was a match between the attitude component emphasized by thought and the component driving behavior there was a strong evaluation-behavior relation and when there was a mismatch between components there was a weak evaluation-behavior relation. The relative weakness of this effect compared to Millar and Tesser (1986) may have been due to the fact that all participants were both affectively and cognitively focused during the study. It is possible that the original focus may have influenced the evaluation. Second, the results provide support for the hypothesized relation between liking expressed by the attitude components (affective and cognitive) and behavior type (consumatory and instrumental). The liking expressed by the affective component tended to predict consumatory behaviors better than the liking expressed by the cognitive component and, alternatively, the liking expressed by the cognitive component tended to predict instrumental behavior better than consumatory behaviors. The affective-cognitive consistency hypothesis tested in this study also received strong support. When there was low affective-cognitive consistency a match between the attitude component emphasized by thought and the component driving behavior resulted in higher evaluationbehavior correlations than a mismatch between components. Alternatively, when there was high affective-cognitive consistency the match and mismatch effects disappeared. In an attempt to rule out alternative explanations, we examined the possibility that the experimental manipulations affected the participants

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behavior or evaluations in such a way as to artifactually change attitudebehavior consistency. For most of the variables examined (e.g., the amount of time spent playing with the puzzles) there were no differences between the experimental conditions. Recently Wilson and his colleagues (e.g., Wilson, Dunn, G-aft, Lisle, 1987) have offered another possible explanation for their findi that thought decreases the attitude-behavior relation. Wilson et al. (1987) suggested that the attitudes used in his studies were affectively based (e.g., evaluations of dating partner) and that his procedure of asking participants to analyze reasons caused the participants to construct explanations for their feelings (i.e., construct a cognitive component for the attitude). Wilson felt that often these explanations did not correctly explain the participants feelings and as a result the reasons analysis procedure produced attitudes low in affective-cognitive consistency that were less able to predict behavior. Wilsons explanation deals with attitudes that are originally affectively based and it is not inconsistent with the present explanation. It seems likely that both processes occur. To distinguish the two processes future research will need to identify attitu that have inconsistent components and attitudes that are affectively bas with little or no cognition. REFERENCES
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Fen&stein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (197.5). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 522-527. Higgins, E. T., Rholes, W. S., & Jones, C. R. (1977). Category accessibility and impression formation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 141-154. Millar, M. G., & Tesser, A. (1986). Effects of affective and cognitive focus on the attitudebehavior relation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 270-276. Norman, R. (1975). Affective-cognitive consistency attitudes, conformity, and behavior.
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