DOJ OPINION NO. 063, s.

2006 September 11, 2006

Congressman Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon Rm. S-506 House of Representatives Batasan Pambansa Complex Quezon City Sir: This refers to your request for opinion on the effectivity and validity of Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 1264 banning the importation, manufacture, distribution, sale and display of certain types of toy firearms and explosives and on the manner of repealing an LOI. AaSTIH Your request, it appears, relates to the Implementing Rules and Regulations governing the sale, possession and carrying of air rifles/pistols, dated January 29, 1992, which, you claim, have been amended by the Philippine National Police-Firearms and Explosives Division. We take it that you want to be advised on the effect of said amendment on the implementation of LOI No. 1264. With regret, this Department has to decline to render the opinion requested. In the instant case, we note that both the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), who exercise administrative control and/or supervision over the office that allegedly issued the amendment to subject IRR, have yet to issue or express any ruling or opinion on the issues herein presented. While this Department is willing to give legal assistance to the Honorable Congressman in the resolution of difficult questions, official courtesy and sound administrative practice demand that the above-named government officials should first be accorded the opportunity to consider and pass upon the issues raised. Apart from the fact that the Secretary of Justice does not have administrative supervision over the PNP, hence, revisory authority over the acts or omissions thereof, the issues herein raised involves matters which are within the policy-sphere and jurisdiction of said offices IcHDCS For these reasons, and considering that the PNP and/or the DILG are better situated to translate or transcribe the intent and policy behind this enactment and, thus, can give proper meaning and effect to such intent and policy, 1 it is suggested that the matters raised herein be first elevated to the PNP Chief and/or the DILG Secretary. Nevertheless, for your information and guidance only, the Supreme Court, in the case Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 2 stated: Letters of Instructions are the orders by the President to specific government officials directing or authorizing the doing of certain things, or laying guidelines to be complied with for the effective implementation of a law. Examples are Letters of Instructions No. 2 ordering the Secretary of National Defense to take over the management, control and operation of public utilities, and No. 65 directing compliance with certain guidelines for the full implementation of the tax amnesty on previously untaxed income under Presidential Decree No. 23, as amended. ACETSa They have also been issued to announce and order designations to certain positions (e.g., L.I. No. 87) and to announce the approval and effectivity of programs, plans (e.g., L.I. No. 64, 66), or recommendations (e.g., L.I. No. 91 approving NEDA recommendation for the salary structure of the staffing pattern of the NEDA) requiring the approval of the President . . . . They have also been issued to repeal modify or amend laws (e.g., L.I. No. 1054 which amended Sec. 268 of the National Internal Revenue Code by deleting bowling alleys as among those subject to tax). 3 In the case of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, 4 the same Court, resolving the issue of whether a presidential issuance under the 1973 Constitution may be considered a law, also clarified: To form part of the law of the land, the decree, order or LOI must be issued by the President in the exercise of his extraordinary power of legislation as contemplated in Section 6 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution, whenever in his judgment there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action . . . . Verily, not all LOI issued by the President should be dignified into forming part of the law of the land. 5

Moreover, in the earlier cited Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. case, the Court even reiterated that "(u)nlike Presidential Decrees which by usage have gained acceptance as laws promulgated by the President, Letters of Instruction are presumed to be mere administrative issuances except when the conditions set out in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile exist." 6 And, in the more recent consolidated case of Polland Industrial Limited vs. National Development Company, 7 the Court stressed Only when issued under any of the two circumstances will a decree, order or letter be qualified as having the force and effect of law. The decree or instruction should have been issued either when there existed a grave emergency or threat or imminence or when the Legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on the matter. The qualification that there exists a grave emergency or threat or imminence thereof must be interpreted to refer to the prevailing peace and order conditions because the particular purpose the President was authorized to assume legislative powers was to address the deteriorating peace and order situation during the martial law period. TDcAaH Under the 1987 Constitution, the status of said LOI, among others, is clear, thus: SEC. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. 8 Likewise, in the case of Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113, it was held: In terms of their duration and effect, statutes may be permanent and indefinite or temporary. Temporary statutes are those that, according to their provisions, are in force only for a limited period, and they terminate upon the expiration of the term therein stated or upon the occurrence of certain events. No repealing statute is necessary to bring a temporary law to an end. IEaCDH The vast majority of the statutes are permanent and indefinite. Unless a statute is by its provisions for a limited period only, it continues in force until changed or repealed by the legislature. It has been held that "law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. It is not changed by change of sovereignty," except that of a political nature. "There can be no break or interregnum in law. From the time law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change takes place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition, until the next change, so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. 9 Finally, on the issue of repeal of a presidential issuance, DOJ Opinion No. 47, s. 2004, may be relevant to your query: The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a question of legislative intent. The lawmaker may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. However, where the legislative intent is not to work a repeal of specific laws, it provides for a general repealing provision the effect of which is to repeal by implication all inconsistent provisions of extant laws. It is said that an implied repeal takes place when a new law contains some provisions which are contrary to, but do not expressly repeal, those of a former law (School District No. 45 v. Bd. of County of Comira, 141 Kan. 108). cCAIDS Implied repeals or repeals by implication are not favored. Only in cases where the laws or provisions involved are found to be irreconcilably inconsistent with each other may a repeal of the earlier law by a later enactment be presumed. Otherwise, it is the task of the implementers of the law to harmonize the conflicting laws or provisions so as to give effect to both, because laws are presumed to have been passed with full knowledge on the part of the lawmaker of all existing laws on the subject (U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208). However, it has been held that an implied repeal may also result even if the two laws are not repugnant whenever a statute (old law) is revised and the revised statute (new law) purports to cover the entire subject matter of the old law and there is a clear legislative intent to substitute the new law for the old law (Crawford, Statutory Construction, p. 673; Joaquin v. Navarro, 81 Phil 373). In such a case, provisions in the old law which were not reenacted in the new law will be deemed repealed (Op., Sec. of Justice, No. 78, s. 1988, citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 239)." EScIAa Very truly yours, (SGD.) RAUL M. GONZALEZ Secretary