Project: North Chennai Thermal Power Station, 3 x 210 MW, Unit 2 Problem: Hydraulic governor not taking over

from Electro Hydraulic Governor On 14/09/2005, in unit no. 2, at a load of 190 MW, the load control changed over to speed control, due to Electro Hydraulic Governor (EHG) fault and it was found that load could not be reduced in speed control mode. EHG had gone to 100 % open, resulting in full opening of all steam turbine control valves. It was decided to change over to the hydraulic governor from EHG. When the Speeder gear position was lowered to take over into hydraulic control, it was observed that the auxiliary secondary oil pressure got reduced, but HP and IP secondary oil pressures did not follow this change. They remained at maximum values. Keeping the isolation valve of EHG and hydraulic governor closed, the same was tried again. Lowering of speeder gear did not have any effect on secondary oil pressure and control valves stayed in full open condition. The data tabled below was observed and reported by M/s TNEB during changeover trials. Trial No. Speeder gear position in % HP sec. Oil pressure in kg/cm2 IP sec. Oil pressure in kg/cm2 Aux. Sec oil pressure in kg/cm2 Starting device position in % HPCV % IPCV % Load in MW 1 100 5.5 6.5 3.4 100 100 100 180 2 95 5.5 6.5 2.9 100 100 100 180 3 90 5.5 6.5 2.4 100 100 100 180 4 85 5.5 7.0 2.1 100 100 100 180 5 100 5.5 6.8 3.2 100 100 100 180

Analysis and solution: The above data clearly indicated that the hydraulic amplifier was not responding to the auxiliary secondary oil pressure variations. It was suspected that the pilot valve of hydraulic amplifier was stuck in the maximum position. TNEB continued to run the unit only on EHG mode and it was decided to attend the hydraulic governor during next tripping of the unit. The unit was shut down on 10/11/2005. Prior to shut down, the top cover of hydraulic amplifier unit was opened and was inspected for hydraulic amplifier pilot valve (7) rotation, (Refer enclosed figure). while machine was on load. The pilot valve (7) was found spinning properly. Therefore, it was concluded that there was no fault in this pilot. But since the position of amplifier piston (1) was found to be at the top and the secondary oil pressures remained high, it was suspected that the link between lever(5) and hydraulic amplifier piston (1) had got disconnected. The self weight of the detached lever had pulled the follow up piston sleeves (3) down and at the same time pushed the pilot (7) up, forcing oil to lift the amplifier piston(1) to top position. Hence the problem. When the inspection cover of follow piston was opened, lever (5) was found disconnected from the amplifier piston in the manner suspected. The connecting pin was found fallen in the unit. The same was assembled back and the hydraulic governing characteristics were checked and found in line with the previous records. Conclusion: During the recent major fire accident of the unit, the fire affected the governing rack. The cables, EHTC unit and defective solenoids were replaced and other components of governing rack were serviced by technicians of BHEL Haridwar. The pin might have come loose because it was insufficiently locked. It is suggested to ensure proper assembly of linkages and cotter pins during servicing of the unit.

LINK FOUND DISCONNECTED

1. Amplifier

piston 2. Follow up piston 3. Sleeve 4. Shaft 5. Lever 6. Feedback lever 7. Pilot valve 8. Compression spring 9. Adjusting screw a. Control oil b. Secondary oil

b1. Aux. Sec. Oil c. Return oil