G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990 FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner, vs.

THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents. FACTS: On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990. However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development (Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena. Subsequently, petitioners timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his letter; Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly covered by petitioners TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter

dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area. However, petitioner's request was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that the timber license agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. The Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively. HELD: NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities

coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.

G.R. No. 152644

February 10, 2006

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, - versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit that discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. The DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac, Marinduque with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067), Section 8 of PD No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Section 108 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the following grounds: (1) the Information were duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act;

(2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of the Information took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification. MTC issued a Consolidated Order), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Information for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942. The RTC granted public respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. RTC affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Petitioners contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are the very same acts complained of in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC. The Court of Appeals affirmed RTCs ruling. ISSUE: Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand. HELD: NO. The information filed by the petitioner should not be quashed. There is no duplicity of charges in the present case. There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense . Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.

G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000 MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO G. BUMOLO et al., , respondents.

FACTS: MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims in Pao, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from February 02,1982 to October 12, 1982. Private respondents Alberto G. Bumolo and others registered their mining claims in the same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988, which claims were subsequently converted into Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA). On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the mining. Under the Agreements, petitioner was granted the exclusive and irrevocable right to explore the mining claims for three (3) years with provision for extension. On December 23, 1982 and March 26, 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting Permit Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on the alleged ground that a portion of the area covered by the mining claims was within the Magat River Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June 26, 1969 and with DAR on account of alleged coverage of the other portion within the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11 September 1975. On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected petitioners Prospecting Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of July 08, 1991

endorsed by the Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed that the area covered was outside government reservation; that the prospect claim was in conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been extensively explored in the early 1980's. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive Director Samuel Paragas recommended to the DENR Secretary that petitioner's request for reconsideration be denied; that the existing rights of mining claim holders be respected; and, that the prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement applicants over subject area be recognized. As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued a clearance to prospect for six (6) months from December 11, 1995. On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). Petitioner maintained that subject area was within the Magat River Forest Reservation. On June 11, 1998 the rejection of the PPA was affirmed whereas the mining claims of respondents Alberto G. Bumolo et al. that had been converted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, were given due course. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Respondent MAB denied petitioners motion . ISSUE: Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the PPA was outside the Magat River Forest Reservation. HELD: Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional Executive Director Paragas in denying petitioner's PPA. The disapproval of Marcoppers PPA moreover, did not emanate from a single recommendation of the RTD for Mines. Records would show that as early as May 31, 1989 x x x the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims which Marcopper has eventually surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of claims x x x x was confirmed by the Forest Engineering Section of the region to be outside proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks and existing government reforestation projects x x x x In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat River Forest Reservation has been adequately established by the following evidence: (a) confirmation as early as 31 May 1989 by the Forest Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991 Memorandum Report of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provided by the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority per its 2 June 1995 indorsement of the maps to the office of the Regional Executive Director. Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area

subject of its PPA within the Magat River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical error committed by somebody in the Engineering Section of the DENR." Aside from the fact that the allegation does not have anything to support it, the aforementioned documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in denying the PPA had already settled the issue. Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for the rejection of petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the Lands Management Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the sketch plan of 11 November 1996 and as shown in the Land Use map of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered under the PPA is indeed outside any government reservation.

G.R. No. 98332

January 16, 1995

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau, respondents. FACTS: Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, the DENR Secretary issued DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989, entitled "Guidelines on Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279." Under the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. The Secretary of the DENR then further issued DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation." The issuance and the impending implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association

of the Philippines, Inc. to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court. Petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., mainly contends that the administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within two (2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits. Petitioner argued that Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate automatic conversion of mining lease agreements into mining production-sharing agreement as provided under Article 9, Administrative Order No. 57 and/or the consequent abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and MPSAs under Section 3, Administrative Order No. 82 because Section 1 of said Executive Order No. 279 empowers the DENR Secretary to negotiate and enter into voluntary agreements which must set forth the minimum terms and conditions provided under Section 2 thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends that the power to regulate and enter into mining agreements does not include the power to preterminate existing mining lease agreements. ISSUE: Whether or not DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR Secretary are unconstitutional. HELD: NO. DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are not unconstitutional. The questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their force and effect upheld. Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It bears mention that under the text of Executive Order No. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well as the terms and conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject to any and all

modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of contract clause under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution do not apply to the aforesaid mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. They can be amended, modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would lead us to conclude that the questioned order authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibly contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all existing mining leases and agreements are automatically converted into production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term "production-sharing agreement" in the same provision implies negotiation between the Government and the applicants, if they are so minded. Negotiation negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the instant petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations arrived at in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82.

OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Petitioner, - versus PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION, Respondent. CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioner, - versus HON. JUDGE BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, and PLATINUM GROUP METAL CORPORATION, Respondents PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, acting for its own interest and on behalf of OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus COURT OF APPEALS and POLLY C. DY, Respondents

FACTS: In 1971 and 1980, Olympic was granted Mining Lease Contracts by the Secretary of the DENR covering mining areas located in the municipalities of Narra and Espanola, Palawan.

On July 18, 2003, Olympic entered into an Operating Agreement with Platinum, by virtue of which Platinum was given the exclusive right to control, possess, manage/operate, and conduct mining operations, and to market or dispose mining products on the Toronto Nickel Mine in the Municipality of Narra. In return, Platinum would pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2% of the gross revenues.

Olympic and Platinum applied for, and were subsequently granted the necessary government permits and environmental compliance certificates.

On April 24, 2006, Olympic sent a letter to Platinum, informing the latter of the immediate termination of the Operating Agreement on account of Platinums gross violations of its terms, and directing Platinum to immediately surrender possession of the subject mining areas under the Operating Agreement. Olympic instituted an action for the issuance of an injunctive writ before the RTC of Puerto Princesa against Platinum. In its prayer, Olympic sought to enjoin Platinum from conducting mining operations on the subject mining areas, and also to recover possession thereof. The RTC dismissed Olympics complaint.

Olympic then filed two cases with the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board ( PMRB) for the revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum, on the ground of Olympics termination of the Operating Agreement because of the alleged gross violations thereof by Platinum. This was dismissed and POA for the cancellation of the Operating Agreement and the revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum. This case was subsequently withdrawn by .

While these two administrative cases were pending, Olympic transferred its applications for mineral agreements, including its rights under the Operating Agreement, to Citinickel

via a Deed of , without the knowledge or consent of Platinum. This assignment was thereafter approved by the Regional Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB).

After the assignment, Citinickel filed Civil Case No. 06-0185 before the RTC of Paraaque, on June 21, 2006, seeking to invalidate the Operating Agreement based on Platinums alleged violation of its terms. This action was also dismissed by the trial court, citing forum shopping and improper venue as among the grounds for dismissal. Citinickel did not bother to appeal this dismissal, opting instead to find other remedies.

Citinickel thereafter filed three administrative cases: PMRB Case No. 002-06, DENR Environmental Management Bureau ( EMB) Case No. 8253, and POA Case No. 200602-B.

Civil Case No. 4199 involved a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach of contract, and specific performance filed by Platinum against Olympic before the RTC of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Branch 95 on June 14, 2006. Olympic sought the dismissal of Platinums Civil Case No. 4199 through a motion to dismiss where Olympic alleged that the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the issues raised in the case. Olympic contended that the case involved a mining dispute requiring the technical expertise of the POA; accordingly, jurisdiction should be with the PO ISSUE: Which body has the authority to hear and decide the dispute between Olympic/Citinickel and Platinum, as parties to the operating agreement. HELD: Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is thus obvious that the complaint falls within the ambit of the RTCs original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other judicial or quasijudicial bodies.

Although Section 77 (d) of the Mining Act has transferred to the POA jurisdiction over disputes pending before the Bureau of Mines and the DENR, Section 77 (b) did not adopt the wording of Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281 so as to include all other forms of contracts public or private involving mining rights; Section 77 (b) in relation to Section 3 (ab) of the Mining Act did not include a general catch-all phrase to cover other agreements involving mining rights similar to those in Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281. Instead, the Mining Act, through the above-quoted Sections 3 (ab) and 26, has limited the jurisdiction of the POA, as successor of the adjudicatory functions of the Bureau of Mines, to mineral agreements between the government and the private contractor. Otherwise stated, while disputes between parties to any mining contract (including operating agreements) may previously fall within the Bureau of Mines jurisdiction under Section 7 (a) or (c) of PD No. 1281, it can no longer be so placed now within the authority of the POA to settle under Section 77 (b) of the Mining Law because its jurisdiction has been limited to the resolution of disputes involving public mineral agreements. The controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary objective for which said cases are filed. Platinums primary objective in filing the complaint is to protect its interest in the subject mining areas, although it joined its claims of breach of contract, damages, and specific performance in the case. In any event, the Rules of Court allow joinder of causes of action in the RTC, provided one of the causes of action (in this case, the cause of action for quieting of title or interest in real property located in Palawan) falls within the jurisdiction of said court and venue lies therein. In fine, there is absolutely no reason to disturb the CAs findings that venue was properly laid in the Palawan court.

G.R. No. 163509

PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,petitioner,

- versus -

BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.

CORPORATION

and

THE

MINES

FACTS:

Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines Operating Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation (Banahaw Mining for brevity) whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCIs eighteen (18) mining claims located in Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. So that Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the temporary

permit was subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991. Since a portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was located in petitioner PICOPs logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each others right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims. Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity). While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Minings pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application. Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required. On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended MPSA applications were published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act of 1995. On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals application. After the submission of their respective position paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order disapproving private respondent Base Metals MPSA on the reasons that adverse claim was filed on time, that the granting of the MPSA application on area subject of an IFMA or PTLA which is covered by a Presidential Warranty, the panel believes it cannot, unless the grantee consents thereto, without the grantees consent, the area is considered closed to mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2), DAO No. 96-40) and that the mining location in forest or timberland is allowed only if such forest or timberland is not leased by the government to a qualified person or entity and if it is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in addition to the area clearance to be issued by the agency concerned before it is subjected to mining operation.

Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off tangent to mining. Both are extremes. They can not exist at the same time. The other must necessarily stop before the other operate. Private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public respondent MAB, the latter rendered the assailed decision setting aside the Panel Arbitrators order. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB. Hence this petition. PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756 hectares subject of Base Metals MPSA are closed to mining operations except upon PICOPs written consent pursuant to existing laws, rules and regulations and by virtue of the Presidential Warranty; (2) its Presidential Warranty is protected by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution; and (3) it does not raise new issues in its petition. PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as these are within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly also part of permanent forest established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092), and overlaps the wilderness area where mining applications are expressly prohibited under RA 7586. Hence, the area is closed to mining operations under Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942.

ISSUE: Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, closed to mining activities Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, not closed to mining activities. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining activities. Contrary to PICOPs obvious misreading of our decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve established under Proclamation 369, the Court in that case actually

ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for a permit to explore with the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences. Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subject to existing rights and reservations. Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which include the public forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations With regard to the second issue, the Court do not subscribe to PICOPs argument that the Presidential Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a contract protected by the nonimpairment clause of the 1987 Constitution. An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the governments commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOPs peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession. The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. It is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOPs rights under its timber license. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.

PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, versus MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL, respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the business of mining. On 31 March 2000, petitioners Application for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), for the exploration, development and commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineral deposits in a 4,360.71hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor. Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and engaged in the business of mining. Private respondent filed an Application for Exploration Permit with MGB covering the same properties covered by and during the subsistence of APSA-SF-000089 and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration Permit of the private respondent. It was allegedly filed with the Panel of Arbitrators on 30 August 2005 and was received by the latter on 5 September 2005. Prior, however, to petitioners filing of its Verified Protest/Opposition to the private respondents Application for Exploration Permit, petitioners MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was cancelled, a Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. The MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent.

Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu proprio the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner. Petitioner elevated by appeal to the MAB which was also dismissed. The case was elevated to the Court of appeals but judgment was rendered against the petitioner. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent.

HELD: NO. The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, thus: Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following: 1. Disputes involving rights to mining areas; 2. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits; 3. Disputes involving surface claimholders/concessionaires; and owners, occupants and

4. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act. The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not over cancellation of mineral rights already granted and existing . As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration permit, Section 28 of DAO NO. 96-40 explicitly provides:

Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit . The Director/concerned Regional Director may cancel the Exploration Permit for failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the requirements and for violation(s) of the terms and conditions under which the Permit is issued. For renewed Exploration Permits, the Secretary upon the recommendation of the Director shall cause the cancellation of the same. According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, Director means the Director of the MGB Central Office, while Regional Director means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional Office. As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-001 of private respondent is already lodged with the MGB, and not with the Panel of Arbitrators.

G.R. No. L-49109. December 1, 1987 SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF MINES JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner , Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., is a mining corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of fifty (50) valid mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July 1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short). On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease application, but "under protest", on 13 October 1978, with a reservation annotated on the back of its application that it is not waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court. On 10 October 1978, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to protect its rights (except by said petition). Petitioner assails Presidential

Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declared as its own private and exclusive property in final judgments. The respondents, on the other hand, allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition as it failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies. ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional. HELD: Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Dec. No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974. Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Petition is dismissed.

G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002 SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and THE HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents.

FACTS: The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-DavaoSurigao Forest Reserve known as the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. Located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte, the land has been embroiled in controversy since the mid-80s due to the scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels. On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal area. Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No. 7076, or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act. The law established a Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretarys direct supervision and control. The statute also authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions. On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as

non-forest land open to small-scale mining. The issuance was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No. 369, which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which directs the DENR to study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not be limited to, studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into management agreements or operating agreements, or both, with the appropriate government instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the declared policy of rationalizing the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing between the state and the said parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners, as well as the payment of royalties to indigenous cultural communities, among others. The Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretary for Legal and Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau are hereby ordered to undertake such studies. x x x Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the direct state utilization espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since the same was merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the government for solving the Diwalwal conflict. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailed memorandum order did not adopt the direct state utilization scheme in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. Held: We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners

or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.

G.R. No. 69997. September 30, 1987 UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS, AUREA ARAOJO, GERVACIO ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX DETECIO, JESUS ASUNCION, MELANIO ASUNCION and BIENVENIDO ASUNCION, respondents.

FACTS: On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to herein petitioners and other private individuals. Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner. The assignment of rights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2, 1959. The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July 20, 1962, were all recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and transcribed on September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued the respective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner. Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, tree patents were granted by the respondent Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued by the Register of Deeds to private respondents.

All of the above patents covered portions of the lots covered by the patents belonging to the petitioner. The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents against the private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in their favor for properties over which original certificates of title had already been issued in its favor be declared null and void. The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: a) Whether or not the lands in question belong to the public domain; b) Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same HELD: No. Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides: "All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at bar, we conclude that the issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the minerals which may be found on or under the surface of the land. On the other hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of the private respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to use the land for

agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface. There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that it acquired the right to the mineral lands prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, thus, making such acquisition outside its purview and scope. Anent the second issue, the petitioner has no personality to institute the action below for annulment and cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over which it has a right to extract minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of the public domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can bring an action for reversion.

LOCAL GOVERNANCE CASES: G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997 ALFREDO TANO, ET AL, petitioners, vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES ET AL respondents.

Facts: On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows: In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to

check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS, and, ORDINANCE NO. 2, Series of 1993 Entitled, Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from Palawan Waters. Respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade. Petitioners filed this petition directly with the COURT alleging that the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit and; that Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to

earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion. And finally, to declare Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as null and void, ISSUE: WHETHER OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL. NOT THE ASSAILED ORDINANCES ARE

HELD: It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.

G.R. No. L-40243. March 11, 1992 CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; GAVINO V. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES TABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes, respondents.

FACTS: Celestino Tatel, a businessman, is engaged in the import and export of abaca and other products. He has a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena. Residents of barrio Sta. Elena filed a complaint against petitioner. They alleged that the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine. A committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of petitioner occasioned by a continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood.

Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of Virac. Petitioner instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction. ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of Article 694 of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

HELD: Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

LAND TENURE CASES: G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990 LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

FACTS: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules

and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989. ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657, the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 are unconstitutional. HELD: Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are null and void for being unconstitutional. Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. The requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing corporate farms which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement production-sharing plans (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.

G.R. No. 78742. July 14, 1989 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. APRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent. G.R. No. 79310. July 14, 1989 ARSENIO AL. ACUA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners, vs. JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents. G.R. No. 79744. July 14, 1989 INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, respondents. G.R. No. 79777. July 14, 1989 vs. HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR CONRADO AVANCEA, and ROBERTO TAAY,

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: G.R. No. 79777 Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657. The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Agustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27. The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation. The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. G.R. No. 79310 The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during

the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229 G.R. No. 79744 The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, "in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents. The petitioner now argues that: (1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines. (2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation. (3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution. G.R. No. 78742 The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27: No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-

farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. ISSUE/S: Whether or not R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are constitutional.

HELD: R.A. No. 6657, Section 18 of the CARP Law, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are constitutional. The Court declared that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that: All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.) it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land." The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares: Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text.