Endencia vs.

David on November 6, 2010 Separation of Powers Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias SEC. 13. and Justice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. ** The reason behind the Court and exemption this in the is to Constitution, preserve as the interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court, independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial

officials. The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, provides: Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010 Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: xxxx (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.] The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 the Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System which it promulgated on June 25, 1996. For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its authorized

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General GEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. RESOLUTION BRION, J.: The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for certiorari1 and in the motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via these resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. BACKGROUND

representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009. PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-List System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that: (1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already registered with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the partylist system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed; (2) The Supreme Courts ruling in G.R. No. 177548 Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections cannot apply in the instant controversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBIs; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the

Courts ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal protection of the laws; (3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or aborted to prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in accordance with the same Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.2 The COMELEC denied PGBIs motion/opposition for lack of merit. First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A. 7941. 3 The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or organization does not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party, organization or coalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a request for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew. Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections. Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their opposition.

As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to have been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after the deadline. PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the COMELEC when it moved to reconsider its delisting. We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections (Minero);4 we said that no grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning: Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it. PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBI claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994. It cited the following excerpts from the Records of the Senate:

Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7), Section 5 there are actually two grounds it states: " Failure to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or its failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the votes case under the party-list system in either of the last two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered" In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections. The second is, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast under the partylist system in either of the last two preceding elections, Mr. President, Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds. Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President. Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.5 [Underscoring supplied.] PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Considering PGBIs arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in the courts docket. THE ISSUES

We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whether PGBIs right to due process was violated. OUR RULING We find the petition partly impressed with merit. a. The Minero Ruling Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.6 The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.7 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the laws clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law. 8 What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC9 (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows: We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats. We need not extensively discuss Banats significance, except to state that a party-list group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered. To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, 10 and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus: ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. 11The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus: Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same , even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties

similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.12 The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.13 As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an erroneous application of the law an application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law. We are aware that PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this concern to the legislatures notice. b. The Issue of Due Process

On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x.14 We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a partylist group or organization in the coming May 2010 elections. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Filed under Rule 65 of the RULES OF COURT. Rollo, pp. 42-48.

Sec. 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization or coalition already registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.
4

G.R. No. 177548, May 10, 2007; see rollo of G.R. No. 177548, pp. 46-48.
5

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice CERTIFICATION

Rollo, pp. 74-75. Numbering supplied.

Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 204 (2003); see also The Heirs of George Poe v. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. G.R. No. 156302, April 7, 2009.
8

DISSENTING OPINION ABAD, J.: This case stems from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc resolution removing petitioner Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) from the roster of registered party-list organizations because of its failure to obtain at least 2% party-list votes in the May 2004 election and to participate in the May 2007 election. I agree with the view of Justice Arturo D. Brion that Republic Act (R.A.) 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting a party-list organization, namely: a) failure to participate in the last two preceding elections; or b) failure to garner at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. I also agree that because of the Courts decision in BANAT,1 the needed minimum 2% of the votes cast in the two preceding elections should now be understood to mean the actual percentage of the votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives. But this could not apply to PGBI because BANAT took effect only in the preceding May 2007 elections and PGBI did not run in the same. It ran in the preceding May 2004 elections, when the BANAT ruling did not yet exist, but failed to get at least 2% of the votes cast in those elections. I must disagree with the ponencias view that the Court should reverse the Minero ruling2 that invoked Section 6(8) of R.A. 7941, which provides:

See Varias v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010 where we held that the use of wrong considerations is an act not in contemplation of law a jurisdictional error for this is one way of gravely abusing ones discretion.
9

G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009.

10

Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch [5 US] 137, 2 L ed 60 [1803]) holds that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."
11

See Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009, citing Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 132.
12

Id., citing Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180.
13

Ibid. Bautista v. Comelec, 460 Phil, 459, 478 (2003).

14

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. -The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional, or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: xxxx (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. Since by its own admission, Minero failed to get at least 2% of the votes in the 2001 elections and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, the Court held that it necessarily failed to get at least 2% of the votes cast in the two preceding elections. The COMELEC was thus justified in canceling its registration.

last two preceding elections or failure to garner at least 2% of the votes cast in such electionsto be complimentary. Their purpose is to put every party-list organization, which won the right to be registered, to a two-election wringer, a voters preference test, for lack of a better term to describe it. This means that, to remain in the party-list register and enjoy the right to take part in the party-list election, a party must prove by the results of the preceding two elections that it retains the required level of voters preference. Failing in this, such party shall be dropped by the COMELEC, without prejudice to its applying for new registration after a mandatory one-term rest. If the ponencias views were to be followed, petitioner PGBI would be able to circumvent the voters preference test that it needs to pass to remain in the register of party-list organizations. It would succeed in putting one over the parties that exerted efforts to get the required level of voters preference. The following example should illustrate the unfair result:

The ponencia would allow PGBI to remain in the register of party-list organizations and avert disqualifications Election Year Party-List X Party-List Y PGBI Party because, according to it, PGBI cannot be said to May 2004 Deficient votes Did not run Deficient votes have failed to get at least 2% of the votes cast in the two preceding elections because it only ran in May 2007 Deficient votes Did not run Did not run one of those two elections. It cannot also be said to have failed to take part in the two preceding May 2010 Cancelled Cancelled Not cancelled elections because it ran in one of them. What is The register of party-list organizations cannot be allowed to needed, the ponencia claims, are two strikes for the same grow infinitely. The system cannot tolerate sectoral parties ground in the two preceding elections. with low-levels of voters preference to remain on the ballot. For this reason, the legislature established a mechanism for But it is evident from Section 6(8) above that the legislature intended the two separate testsfailure to take part in the

attrition, the enforcement of which is an important responsibility of the COMELEC. The Court must not abandon Minero. I vote to deny PGBIs motion for reconsideration. ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009.
2

Philippine Mine Safety & Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177548, May 10, 2007.

The complaint filed against the accused reads: Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same. At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. Indeed, the accused had appointments from the abovementioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, vs. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee. Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of your duties.

(Sgd.) FELICIA Provincial r FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY: Kind: ROHM-Revolver Make: German SN: 64 Cal: .22 On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of upon the performance of your duties by taking record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent your oath of office and filing the original and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the thereof with us. PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the Very truly yours,

complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent. Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader.

In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground: The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.) The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ... .

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment. Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim " legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero andMacarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should

not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang andLucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio. Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes 1 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164. 2 106 Phil. (1959), 713. 3 103 Phil. (1958), 500.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 177333 April 24, 2009

(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities; xxxx Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated August 19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance. PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as such licensor/regulator to the international business and gaming community, drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE. PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does not give power or authority to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE. Citing three (3) statutes, which it claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903 as it likewise created economic zones and provided for the powers and functions of their respective governing and administrative authorities, PAGCOR posits that the grant therein of authority to operate games of chance is clearly expressed, but it is not similarly so in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903.

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, et al., Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition. Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February 23, 1995, created the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f), viz: Section 7. xxxx

Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their respective pertinent provisions: Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Authority Act" enacted on March 13, 1992: Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. xxxx (b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, otherwise known as the Subic Authority, shall have the following powers and functions: xxxx (7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourismrelated activities subject to priorities and standards set by the Subic Authority including games and amusements, except horse-racing, dog-racing and casino gambling which shall continue to be licensed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) upon recommendation of the Conversion Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested areas as a national park; xxxx Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone Act of 1995" enacted on February 24, 1995: Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority The Cagayan Economic Zone Authority shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx (f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements, recreational and sports facilities such as horse-racing, dog-racing gambling, casinos, golf courses, and others, under priorities and standards set by the CEZA; xxxx And Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic Zone Act of 1995," enacted on February 24, 1995 authorizing other economic zones established under the defunct Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and its successor Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) to establish casinos and other games of chance under the license of PAGCOR by way of the ipso facto clause, viz: SECTION 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions granted to special economic zones under Republic Act No. 7227 shall ipso facto be accorded to special economic zones already created or to be created under this Act. The free port status shall not be vested upon the new special economic zones. PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the above-quoted provisions of the ecozone-related statutes, Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or authorize entities to operate games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and "amusement" employed therein do not include "games of chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes, ZAMBOECOZONE Authoritys grant of license to private respondent PEJI encroached on its (PAGCORs)

authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis the above-stated special laws to centralize and regulate all games of chance. ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its Comment,1 contends that PAGCOR has no personality to file the present petition as it failed to cite a superior law which proves its claim of having been granted exclusive right and authority to license and regulate all games of chance within the Philippines; and that, contrary to PAGCORs assertion, the words "games" and "amusements" in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 include "games of chance" as was the intention of the lawmakers when they enacted the law. In its Reply Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam,2 PAGCOR cites the November 27, 2006 Opinion3 rendered by the Office of the President through Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the pertinent portions of which read: Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related activities including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to ZAMBOECOZONE. xxxx In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing the same. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling. Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities." It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.4 The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure. 5 The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment.6 On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as

"making a bet" or "a play for value against an uncertain event in hope of gaining something of value." 7 A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 with similar provisions in the three cited statutes creating ECOZONES shows that while the three statutes, particularly R.A. No. 7922 which authorized the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority to directly or indirectly operate gambling and casinos within its jurisdiction, categorically stated that such power was being vested in their respective administrative bodies, R.A. No. 7903 did not. The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.8 Not any of these instances is present in the case at bar, however. Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude "games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have easily employed the words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to operate the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No. 7922 enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903. But they did not. The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion of the Office of the President which, after differentiating the grant of powers between the Cagayan Special Economic Zone and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, states that while the former is authorized to, among other things, operate gambling casinos and internet gaming, as well as enter into licensing agreements, the latter is not. The relevant portions of said Opinion read:

The difference in the language and grant of powers to CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE is telling. To the former, the grant of powers is not only explicit, but amplified, while to the latter the grant of power is merely what the law (RA 7903) states. Not only are the differences in language telling, it will be noted that both charters of CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE were signed into law only one (1) day apart from each other, i.e., February 23, 1995 in the case of ZAMBOECOZONE and February 24, 1995 in the case of CEZA. x x x Accordingly, both laws have to be taken in the light of what Congress intended them to be, and the distinction that the lawmakers made when they enacted the two laws. Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related activities including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA included such activities as horse-racing, dog-racing and gambling casinos. xxxx In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing the same. (Emphasis supplied) Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of the President, the latters interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical construction. In applying said doctrine, courts often

refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases thereof factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors include the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.8 In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from exercising jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise authorize and regulate the operation of any games of chance. And private respondent Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from operating any games of chance pursuant to the license granted to it by public respondent. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Acting Chairperson

WE CONCUR: DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO* Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Acting Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

Additional member in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave.

1

Rollo, pp. 75-85. Id. at 99-109. Annex "A" of Reply, id. at 111-113.

Vide National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 163448, March 8, 2005, 453 SCRA 70, 79; Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 141246, September 9, 2002, 388 SCRA 485, 487, 491.
5

Id.

Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minnesota, U.S.A., 1990, pp. 679 and 84.
7

Id. at 679.

Asturias v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L19337, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617, 623.

EN BANC REVIEW ASSOCIATION PHILIPPINES, CENTER OF THE Petitioner, PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, - versus YNARESSANTIAGO, CARPIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AUSTRIAEDUARDO ERMITA and MARTINEZ, COMMISSION ON HIGHER CORONA, EDUCATION represented by its CARPIO Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, Respondents. MORALES, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE VELASCO, JR., PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR), NACHURA, PROFESSIONAL REVIEW AND LEONARDO-DE TRAINING CENTER, INC. CASTRO, (PRTC), ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, BRION, and INC. PERALTA, JJ. (ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-ACE), Petitioners-Intervenors. PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor. Promulgated: April 2, 2009 G.R. No. 180046 Present:

x-------------------------------------------------x DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and mandamus assailing Executive Order No. 566 (EO 566) [1] and Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Memorandum Order No. 30, series of 2007 (RIRR).[2] The Antecedent Facts On 11 and 12 June 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the Nursing Board Examinations nationwide. In June 2006, licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report that handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated during the examination period among the examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. George Cordero, Inress Review Centers President, was then the incumbent President of the Philippine Nurses Association. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (MedicalSurgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. [3] On 19 June 2006, the PRC released the results of the Nursing Board Examinations. On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees set on 22 August 2006. Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all the members of the PRCs Board

of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the examinees to retake the Nursing Board Examinations. On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno (Chairman Puno), approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR). [4] In a letter dated 24 November 2006,[5] the Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to amend, if not withdraw the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. In a letter dated 3 January 2007,[6] Chairman Puno wrote petitioner, through its President Jose Antonio Fudolig (Fudolig), that to suspend the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566. Chairman Puno wrote that the IRR was presented to the stakeholders during a consultation process prior to its finalization and publication on 13 November 2006. Chairman Puno also wrote that petitioners comments and suggestions would be considered in the event of revisions to the IRR. In view of petitioners continuing request to suspend and reevaluate the IRR, Chairman Puno, in a letter dated 9 February 2007,[7] invited petitioners representatives to a dialogue on 14 March 2007. In accordance with what was agreed upon during the dialogue, petitioner submitted to the CHED its position paper

on the IRR. Petitioner also requested the CHED to confirm in writing Chairman Punos statements during the dialogue, particularly on lowering of the registration fee from P400,000 to P20,000 and the requirement for reviewers to have five years teaching experience instead of five years administrative experience. Petitioner likewise requested for a categorical answer to their request for the suspension of the IRR. The CHED did not reply to the letter. On 7 May 2007, the CHED approved the RIRR. On 22 August 2007, petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations[8] praying for a ruling: 1. Amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers from the coverage of the CHED; 2. Clarifying the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs, consortium or HEIs and PRCrecognized professional associations with recognized programs, or in the alternative, to convert into schools; and 3. Revising the rules to make it conform with Republic Act No. 7722 (RA 7722)[9] limiting the CHEDs coverage to public and private institutions of higher education as well as degreegranting programs in post-secondary educational institutions. On 8 October 2007, the CHED issued Resolution No. 7182007[10] referring petitioners request to exclude independent review centers from CHEDs supervision and regulation to the Office of the President as the matter requires the amendment of

EO 566. In a letter dated 17 October 2007, [11] then CHED Chairman Romulo L. Neri (Chairman Neri) wrote petitioner regarding its petition to be excluded from the coverage of the CHED in the RIRR. Chairman Neri stated: While it may be true that regulation of review centers is not one of the mandates of CHED under Republic Act 7722, however, on September 8, 2006, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, issued Executive Order No. 566 directing the Commission on Higher Education to regulate the establishment and operation of review centers and similar entities in the entire country. With the issuance of the aforesaid Executive Order, the CHED now is the agency that is mandated to regulate the establishment and operation of all review centers as provided for under Section 4 of the Executive Order which provides that No review center or similar entities shall be established and/or operate review classes without the favorable expressed indorsement of the CHED and without the issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to conduct review classes. x x x To exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No. 566. Considering that the requests requires the amendment of Executive Order No. 566, the Commission, during its 305th Commission

Meeting, resolved that the said request be directly referred to the Office of the President for appropriate action. As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, as required under the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI. [12] (Boldfacing and underscoring in the original) On 26 October 2007, petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Dr. Freddie T. Bernal, Director III, Officer-In-Charge, Office of the Director IV of CHED, sent a letter [13] to the President of Northcap Review Center, Inc., a member of petitioner, that it had until 27 November 2007 to comply with the RIRR. On 15 February 2008,[14] PIMSAT Colleges (respondentintervenor) filed a Motion For Leave to Intervene and To Admit Comment-in-Intervention and a Comment-in-Intervention praying for the dismissal of the petition. Respondent-intervenor alleges that the Office of the President and the CHED did not commit any act of grave abuse of discretion in issuing EO 566 and the RIRR. Respondent-intervenor alleges that the requirements of the RIRR are reasonable, doable, and are not designed to deprive existing review centers of their review business. The Court granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Comment-in-Intervention in its 11 March 2008 Resolution. [15]

On 23 April 2008, a Motion for Leave of Court for Intervention In Support of the Petition and a Petition In Intervention were filed by CPA Review School of the Philippines, Inc. (CPAR), Professional Review and Training Center, Inc. (PRTC), ReSA Review School, Inc. (ReSA), CRC-ACE Review School, Inc. (CRC-ACE), all independent CPA review centers operating in Manila (collectively, petitionersintervenors). Petitioners-intervenors pray for the declaration of EO 566 and the RIRR as invalid on the ground that both constitute an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. The Court granted the intervention in its 29 April 2008 Resolution. [16] On 21 May 2008, the CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) [17] extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the RIRR. In its 25 November 2008 Resolution, this Court resolved to require the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO 21, s. 2008. The Assailed Executive Order and the RIRR Executive Order No. 566 states in full: EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 566 DIRECTING THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF REVIEW CENTERS AND SIMILAR ENTITIES

WHEREAS, the State is mandated to protect the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make education accessible to all, pursuant to Section 1, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution; WHEREAS, the State has the obligation to ensure and promote quality education through the proper supervision and regulation of the licensure examinations given through the various Boards of Examiners under the Professional Regulation Commission; WHEREAS, the lack of regulatory framework for the establishment and operation of review centers and similar entities, as shown in recent events, have adverse consequences and affect public interest and welfare; WHEREAS, the overriding necessity to protect the public against substandard review centers and unethical practices committed by some review centers demand that a regulatory framework for the establishment and operation of review centers and similar entities be immediately instituted; WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7722, otherwise known as the Higher Education Act of 1994, created the Commission on Higher Education, which is best equipped to carry out the provisions pertaining to the regulation of the establishment and operation of review centers and similar entities.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order: SECTION 1. Establishment of a System of Regulation for Review Centers and Similar Entities. The Commission on Higher Education (CHED), in consultation with other concerned government agencies, is hereby directed to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities, including but not limited to the development and institutionalization of policies, standards, guidelines for the establishment, operation and accreditation of review centers and similar entities; maintenance of a mechanism to monitor the adequacy, transparency and propriety of their operations; and reporting mechanisms to review performance and ethical practice. SEC. 2. Coordination and Support. The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), Technical Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the various Boards of Examiners under the PRC, as well as other concerned non-government organizations life professional societies, and various government agencies, such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and others that may be tapped later, shall provide the necessary assistance and technical support to the CHED in the successful

operationalization of the System of Regulation envisioned by this Executive Order. SEC. 3. Permanent Office and Staff. To ensure the effective implementation of the System of Regulation, the CHED shall organize a permanent office under its supervision to be headed by an official with the rank of Director and to be composed of highly competent individuals with expertise in educational assessment, evaluation and testing; policies and standards development, monitoring, legal and enforcement; and statistics as well as curriculum and instructional materials development. The CHED shall submit the staffing pattern and budgetary requirements to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for approval. SEC. 4. Indorsement Requirement. No review center or similar entities shall be established and/or operate review classes without the favorable expressed indorsement of the CHED and without the issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to conduct review classes. After due consultation with the stakeholders, the concerned review centers and similar entities shall be given a reasonable period, at the discretion of the CHED, to comply with the policies and standards, within a period not exceeding three (3) years, after due publication of this Executive Order. The CHED shall see to it that the System of Regulation including the implementing mechanisms, policies, guidelines and other necessary procedures and documentation for the effective implementation of the System, are

completed within sixty days (60) upon effectivity of this Executive Order. SEC. 5. Funding. The initial amount necessary for the development and implementation of the System of Regulation shall be sourced from the CHED Higher Education Development Fund (HEDF), subject to the usual government accounting and auditing practices, or from any applicable funding source identified by the DBM. For the succeeding fiscal year, such amounts as may be necessary for the budgetary requirement of implementing the System of Regulation and the provisions of this Executive Order shall be provided for in the annual General Appropriations Act in the budget of the CHED. Whenever necessary, the CHED may tap its Development Funds as supplemental source of funding for the effective implementation of the regulatory system. In this connection, the CHED is hereby authorized to create special accounts in the HEDF exclusively for the purpose of implementing the provisions of this Executive Order. SEC. 6. Review and Reporting. The CHED shall provide for the periodic review performance of review centers and similar entities and shall make a report to the Office of the President of the results of such review, evaluation and monitoring. SEC. 7. Separability. Any portion or provision of this Executive Order that may be

declared unconstitutional shall not have the effect of nullifying other provisions hereof, as long as such remaining provisions can still subsist and be given effect in their entirely. SEC. 8. Repeal. All rules and regulations, other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SEC. 9. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately upon its publication in a national newspaper of general circulation. DONE in the City of Manila, this 8 th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Six. (Sgd.) Macapagal-Arroyo By the President: (Sgd.) Eduardo R. Ermita Executive Secretary The pertinent provisions of the RIRR affecting independent review centers are as follows: Rule VII IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES Gloria

Section 1. Authority to Establish and Operate Only CHED recognized, accredited and reputable HEIs may be authorized to establish and operate review center/course by the CHED upon full compliance with the conditions and requirements provided herein and in other pertinent laws, rules and regulations. In addition, a consortium or consortia of qualified schools and/or entities may establish and operate review centers or conduct review classes upon compliance with the provisions of these Rules.

with these conditions or non-compliance with the requirements set forth in these rules. Section 2. Only after full compliance with the requirements shall a Permit be given by the CHED to review centers contemplated under this Rule. Section 3. Failure of existing review centers to fully comply with the above shall bar them from existing as review centers and they shall be deemed as operating illegally as such. In addition, appropriate administrative and legal proceedings shall be commence[d] against the erring entities that continue to operate and appropriate sanctions shall be imposed after due process. The Issues

Rule XIV TRANSITORY PROVISIONS Section 1. Review centers that are existing upon the approval of Executive Order No. 566 shall be given a grace period of up to one (1) year, to tieup/be integrated with existing HEIs[,] consortium of HEIs and PRC recognized Professional Associations with recognized programs under the conditions set forth in this Order and upon mutually acceptable covenants by the contracting parties. In the alternative, they may convert as a school and apply for the course covered by the review subject to rules and regulations of the CHED and the SEC with respect to the establishment of schools. In the meantime, no permit shall be issued if there is non-compliance

The issues raised in this case are the following: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction; and 2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power. The Ruling of this Court The petition has merit. Violation of Judicial Hierarchy

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of the petition. Among other grounds, the OSG alleges that petitioner violated the rule on judicial hierarchy in filing the petition directly with this Court. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction is not exclusive but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. [18] The Court has explained: This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters

within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. [19] The Court has further explained: The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts. [20] The rule, however, is not absolute, as when exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the exercise of this Court of its primary jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner alleges that EO 566 expands the coverage of RA 7722 and in doing so, the Executive Department usurps the legislative powers of Congress. The issue in this case is not only the validity of the RIRR. Otherwise, the proper remedy of petitioner and petitioners-intervenors would have been an ordinary action for the nullification of the RIRR before the Regional Trial Court. [21] The alleged violation of the Constitution by the Executive Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an action due to its importance to the public and in keeping with its duty to determine whether the other branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution. [22]

OSGs Technical Objections The OSG alleges that the petition should be dismissed because the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were signed only by Fudolig without the express authority of any board resolution or power of attorney. However, the records show that Fudolig was authorized under Board Resolution No. 3, series of 2007[23] to file a petition before this Court on behalf of petitioner and to execute any and all documents necessary to implement the resolution. The OSG also alleges that the petition should be dismissed for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice because Fudolig only presented his community tax certificate as competent proof of identity before the notary public. The Court would have required Fudolig to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice except that Fudolig already presented his Philippine passport before the notary public when petitioner submitted its reply to the OSGs comment. EO 566 Expands the Coverage of RA 7722 The OSG alleges that Section 3 of RA 7722 should be read in conjunction with Section 8, enumerating the CHEDs powers and functions. In particular, the OSG alleges that the CHED has the power under paragraphs (e) and (n) of Section 8 to: (e) monitor and evaluate the performance of programs and institutions of higher learning for appropriate incentives as well as the imposition of sanctions such as, but not limited to, diminution or withdrawal of subsidy, recommendation on the downgrading or withdrawal of accreditation, program termination or school closure;

(n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act[.] The OSG justifies its stand by claiming that the term programs x x x of higher learning is broad enough to include programs offered by review centers. We do not agree.

Section 3 of RA 7722 provides: Sec. 3. Creation of Commission on Higher Education. - In pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as the Commission. The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), and attached to the Office of the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all postsecondary educational institutions, public and private. (Emphasis supplied)

Neither RA 7722 nor CHED Order No. 3, series of 1994 (Implementing Rules of RA 7722) [24] defines an institution of higher learning or a program of higher learning. Higher education, however, is defined as education beyond the secondary level[25] or education provided by a college or university.[26] Under the plain meaning or verba legis rule in statutory construction, if the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.[27] The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.[28] Hence, the term higher education should be taken in its ordinary sense and should be read and interpreted together with the phrase degree-granting programs in all postsecondary educational institutions, public and private. Higher education should be taken to mean tertiary education or that which grants a degree after its completion. Further, Articles 6 and 7 of the Implementing Rules provide: Article 6. Scope of Application. - The coverage of the Commission shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all postsecondary educational institutions, public and private. These Rules shall apply to all public and private educational institutions offering tertiary degree programs.

The establishment, conversion, or elevation of degree-granting institutions shall be within the responsibility of the Commission. Article 7. Jurisdiction. - Jurisdiction over institutions of higher learning primarily offering tertiary degree programs shall belong to the Commission. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, HEIs refer to degree-granting institutions, or those offering tertiary degree or post-secondary programs. In fact, Republic Act No. 8292 or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997 covers chartered state universities and colleges. State universities and colleges primarily offer degree courses and programs. Sections 1 and 8, Rule IV of the RIRR define a review center and similar entities as follows: Section 1. REVIEW CENTER. - refers to a center operated and owned by a duly authorized entity pursuant to these Rules intending to offer to the public and/or to specialized groups whether for a fee or for free a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge and competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC). The term review center as understood in these rules shall also embrace the operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided by individuals whether for a fee or not in preparation

for the licensure examinations given by the Professional Regulations Commission. xxx

directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC. It also covers the operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided by individuals whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC. A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course is only intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees. A reviewee is not even required to enroll in a review center or to take a review course prior to taking an examination given by the PRC. Even if a reviewee enrolls in a review center, attendance in a review course is not mandatory. The reviewee is not required to attend each review class. He is not required to take or pass an examination, and neither is he given a grade. He is also not required to submit any thesis or dissertation. Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered programs x x x of higher learning that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED. Further, the similar entities in EO 566 cover centers providing review or tutorial services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.

Section 8. SIMILAR ENTITIES the term refer to other review centers providing review or tutorial services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the Professional Regulations Commission including but not limited to college entrance examinations, Civil Service examinations, tutorial services in specific fields like English, Mathematics and the like. The same Rule defines a review course as follows: Section 3. REVIEW COURSE refers to the set of non-degree instructional program of study and/or instructional materials/module, offered by a school with a recognized course/program requiring licensure examination, that are intended merely to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions . EO 566

[32]

Usurpation of Legislative Power The OSG argues that President Arroyo was merely exercising her executive power to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The OSG further argues that President Arroyo was exercising her residual powers under Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292),[29] particularly Section 20, Title I of Book III, thus: Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)

and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. In Ople v. Torres,[33] the Court declared void, as a usurpation of legislative power, Administrative Order No. 308 (AO 308) issued by the President to create a national identification system. AO 308 mandates the adoption of a national identification system even in the absence of an enabling legislation. The Court distinguished between Legislative and Executive powers, as follows: The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly,

Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO 292 speaks of other powers vested in the President under the law. [30] The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under this provision requires legislation,[31] as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the Presidents other powers and functions has to be provided for under the law. There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA 7722 through an Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them,

legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official

conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. x x x. An administrative order is: Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. x x x.[34] Just like AO 308 in Ople v. Torres, EO 566 in this case is not supported by any enabling law. The Court further stated in Ople: x x x. As well stated by Fisher: x x x Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws.[35]

Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-legislative power. Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations.[36] The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degreegranting programs. Exercise of Police Power Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and the general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law. [37] Police power primarily rests with the legislature although it may be exercised by the President and administrative boards by virtue of a valid delegation.[38] Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers. Republic Act No. 8981 is Not the Appropriate Law It is argued that the President of the Philippines has adequate powers under the law to regulate review centers and this could have been done under an existing validly delegated authority, and that the appropriate law is Republic Act No. 8981[39] (RA 8981). Under Section 5 of RA 8981, the PRC is mandated to establish and maintain a high standard of admission

to the practice of all professions and at all times ensure and safeguard the integrity of all licensure examinations. Section 7 of RA 8981 further states that the PRC shall adopt measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations. There is no doubt that a principal mandate of the PRC is to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations. The PRC has the power to adopt measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations. However, this power should properly be interpreted to refer to the conduct of the examinations. The enumeration of PRCs powers under Section 7(e) includes among others, the fixing of dates and places of the examinations and the appointment of supervisors and watchers. The power to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations should be read together with these functions. These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at all with the regulation of review centers . The PRC has the power to investigate any of the members of the Professional Regulatory Boards (PRB) for commission of any irregularities in the licensure examinations which taint or impugn the integrity and authenticity of the results of the said examinations.[40] This is an administrative power which the PRC exercises over members of the PRB. However, this power has nothing to do with the regulation of review centers. The PRC has the power to bar PRB members from conducting review classes in review centers. However, to interpret this power to extend to the power to regulate review centers is clearly an unwarranted interpretation of RA 8981 . The PRC may prohibit the members of the PRB from conducting review classes at review centers because the PRC has administrative supervision over the members of the PRB. However, such power does not extend to the regulation of review centers. Section 7(y) of RA 8981 giving the PRC the power to perform such other functions and duties as may be necessary to

carry out the provisions of RA 8981 does not extend to the regulation of review centers. There is absolutely nothing in RA 8981 that mentions regulation by the PRC of review centers . The Court cannot likewise interpret the fact that RA 8981 penalizes any person who manipulates or rigs licensure examination results, secretly informs or makes known licensure examination questions prior to the conduct of the examination or tampers with the grades in the professional licensure examinations[41] as a grant of power to regulate review centers. The provision simply provides for the penalties for manipulation and other corrupt practices in the conduct of the professional examinations.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

The assailed EO 566 seeks to regulate not only review centers but also similar entities. The questioned CHED RIRR defines similar entities as referring to other review centers providing review or tutorial services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC including but not limited to college entrance examinations, Civil Service examinations, tutorial services in specific fields like English, LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARESMathematics and the like.[42] The PRC has no mandate to Associate Justice SANTIAGO supervise review centers that give courses or lectures intended to Associate Justice prepare examinees for licensure examinations given by the PRC. It is like the Court regulating bar review centers just because the Court conducts the bar examinations. Similarly, the PRC has no mandate to regulate similar entities whose reviewees will not even take any licensure examination given by the PRC. MA. ALICIA AUSTRIARENATO C. CORONA MARTINEZ Associate Justice WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and the petitionAssociate Justice in-intervention. We DECLARE Executive Order No. 566 and Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 30, series of 2007 VOID for being unconstitutional.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MINITA V. CHICONAZARIO Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO NACHURA Associate Justice B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

Pascual vs. Pascual [G.R. No. 84240. March 25, 1992]

15AUG
Ponente: PARAS, J. FACTS: Don Andres Pascual died intestate (on October 12, 1973) without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children. Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights. the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which resolved to deny this motion reiterating their hereditary rights. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals,

but like the ruling of CA, their motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized (and acknowledged) natural children as their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. HELD: NO. Petition is devoid of merit. RATIO: The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, where this Court ruled that under Art.992 of the Civil Code, there exists a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestado between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.

[T]he interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children and the term illegitimate refers to both natural and spurious. It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936 DECISION (En Banc) LAUREL, J.: I. THE FACTS

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? III. THE RULING [The Court DENIED the petition.] NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution. On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935. Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondents protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion. II. THE ISSUE

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979 LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents. Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for respondents.

rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of nondelegation of legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed. The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road

FERNANDO, J.: The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the

safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There was issued

accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and Communications.10 Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly

equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile. A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an answer thereto within ton (10) days

from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court. 16 Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a

citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied. This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed. 1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force,Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could

thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a preCommonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety. 3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila . 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute. 29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for exaggeration. 5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are

already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31 6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so

long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it. 32 7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. For they,

according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33 8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be

effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority nonlegislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34 9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized

by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality. 10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38"Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that. WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, concur. Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion. Aquino J., took no part. Concepcion J., is on leave. Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the socalled early warning device, without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching consequence such as the case at bar. Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition advances grave and serious

grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society," because of the following considerations, inter alia: 1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated. 2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country; 3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways; and 5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the challenged order. I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner for his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.

# Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the socalled early warning device, without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching consequence such as the case at bar. Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition advances grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society," because of the following considerations, inter alia: 1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated. 2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the

prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country; 3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged; 4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways; and 5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the challenged order.

I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner for his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-29658 November 29, 1968

or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post and called the attention of the mayor to section 4 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 which requires the filling of a vacancy within 30 days after its coming into existence. Earlier, on September 5, he announced in the metropolitan newspapers that the position of chief of police of Manila was vacant and listed the qualifications which applicants should possess. The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a demand that the respondent include him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from which the mayor might appoint

ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent. Vicente Rodriguez, for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee. CASTRO, J.: The question for resolution in this case is whether a person who has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. The question calls for an interpretation of the following provisions of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864): Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation,

one as chief of police of the city. He contended that his service alone as captain for more than three years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for appointment. The demand was contained in a letter which he wrote to the respondent on October 8, 1968. The mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but the respondent refused to reconsider his stand. Hence this petition for mandamus to compel the respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five next ranking eligible and qualified persons." The petitioner's reading of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 is, per his own phrasing, as follows: NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless HE (1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning AND has served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR (2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record, OR (3) has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; OR (4) any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant colonel in the MPD since 1954, the petitioner's

insistence is that he falls under the third class of persons qualified for appointment as chief of a city police department. In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act "to place the local police service on a professional level,"1 and contends that a bachelor's degree does not guarantee that one who possesses it will make a good policeman, but that, on the other hand, one who, like the petitioner, has risen from patrolman to lieutenant colonel "meets the test of professionalism." Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's view still we do not see how the requirement of a college degree as additional qualification can run counter to the avowed policy of the Act. On the contrary, we should think that the requirement of such additional qualification will best carry out that policy. The fallacy of petitioner's argument lies in its assumption that the choice is between one who has served long and loyally in a city police agency and another who, not having so served, has only a bachelor's degree. But that is not the issue in this case. The issue rather is whether, within the meaning and intendment of the law, in addition to service qualification, one should have educational qualification as shown by the possession of a bachelor's degree. The petitioner invokes the last paragraph of section 9 of the Act which provides: Persons who at the time of the approval of this Act have rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a provincial, city or municipal police agency although they have not qualified in an

appropriate civil service examination are considered as civil service eligibles for the purpose of this Act. In effect, he contends that if a person who has rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a police agency is considered a civil service eligible, so must a person be considered qualified even though he does not possess a bachelor's degree. The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish between eligibility and qualification. For the statute may allow the compensation of service for a person's lack of eligibility but not necessarily for his lack of educational qualification. Second, section 9 governs the appointment of members of apolice agency only. On the other hand, the appointment of chiefs of police is the precise gravamen of section 10, the last paragraph of which states: Where no civil service eligible is available, provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service Law and rules: Provided, that the appointee possesses the above educational qualification: Provided, further, That in no case shall such appointment extend beyond six months, except for a valid cause, and with the approval of the Civil Service Commission. Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a member of a police agency, it gives no such credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of police. On the contrary, by providing that a person, who is not a civil service eligible, may be provisionally appointed 2 chief of police "[ p]rovided, [t]hat the appointee possesses the

above educational qualification," the Act makes it unequivocal that the possession of a college degree or a high school diploma (in addition to service) is an indispensable requisite. It is next contended that to read section 10 as requiring a bachelor's degree, in addition to service either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or in the National Bureau of Investigation or as chief of police with an exemplary record or as a captain in a city police department for at least three years, would be to create an "absurd situation" in which a person who has served for only one month in the AFP or the NBI is in law considered the equal of another who has been a chief of police or has been a captain in a city police agency for at least three years. From this it is concluded that "the only logical equivalence of these two groups (Chief of Police with exemplary record and Police Captain for at least 3 years in a City Police Agency) is the bachelor's degree." Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in what capacity service in the AFP or in the NBI must have been rendered, but an admission of the existence of the ambiguity in the statute does not necessarily compel acquiescence in the conclusion that it is only in cases where the appointee's service has been in the AFP or in the NBI that he must be required to have a bachelor's degree. The logical implication of the petitioner's argument that a person who has served as captain in a city police department for at least three years need not have a bachelor's degree to qualify, is that such person need not even be a high school graduate. If such be the case would there still be need for a person to be at least a high school graduate provided he has had at least eight years of service as captain in the AFP?

The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to (the meaning of which is not in issue in this case), section 10 of the Act needs no interpretation because its meaning is clear. That the purpose is to require both educational and service qualifications of those seeking appointment as chief of police is evidence from a reading of the original provision of House Bill 6951 and the successive revision it underwent. Thus, section 12 of House Bill 6951 (now section 10 of the Police Act of 1966) read: Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a Police Agency. No chief of a police agency of a province or chartered city shall be appointed unless he is a member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's degree in police administration. Any holder of a bachelor's degree who served either in the Philippine Constabulary or the police department of any city from the rank of captain or inspector, second class, or its equivalent for at least three years shall be eligible for appointment to the position of chief of the police agency. No chief of a municipal police force shall be appointed unless he is a holder of a four-year college degree course or a holder of a Bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology. Where no civil service eligible is available provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service Law and rules, provided the appointee possesses the above educational qualification but in no case shall such appointment exceed beyond six months.

It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood as requiring both educational and service qualifications that the following exchanges of view were made on the floor of the house of Representatives: MR. VELOSO (F.). Section 12, Minimum Qualification for Appointment of Chief of a Police Agency, provides that the chief of a police agency of a province or a chartered city should be at least a member of the Philippine Bar or a holder of a bachelor's degree in Police Administration; and the chief of police of a municipality should be at least a holder of a four years' college degree or holder of a bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology. At first blush, there is no reason why I should object to these minimum requirements; but I find such requirement very rigid because it would not allow a man to rise from the ranks. Take a policeman who rose from the ranks. He became a corporal, a sergeant, a police lieutenant. Shouldn't he be allowed to go higher? If he merited it, he should also be appointed chief of police of a city or municipality. MR. AMANTE. During our committee discussions, I objected to this provision of the bill because it is a very high qualification. However, somebody insisted that in order to professionalize our police system and also to attain a high standard of police efficiency, we must have a chief of police who has a college degree. The point which the gentleman is now raising was brought up by one Member in the sense that a policeman who rose from the ranks through serious hard work, even after serving for fifteen or

twenty years in the police force, cannot become chief of police for lack of a college degree. The gentleman's objection is a very good and reasonable one. I assure him that if he brings it up during the period of amendments, I will consider it. MR. VELOSO (F.). I am glad that the Committee will accept my amendment. My only regret, however, is that because I made a number of proposed amendments, I will not be ready to submit them immediately. We should just limit ourselves to the sponsorship this evening.3 Thus it appears that it was because of the educational requirement contained in the bill that objections were expressed, but while it was agreed to delete this requirement during the period of amendment, no motion was ever presented to effect the change.4 In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure.5 It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance. Parenthetically, the substitute measure gives light on the meaning of the ambiguous phrase "and who has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation." The provision of the substitute bill reads: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has

served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the capacity of captain for at least three years. At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so as to make the provision read: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.6 It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained.

Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was made by mistake, the writer of this opinion personally and painstakingly read and examined the enrolled bill in the possession of the legislative secretary of the Office of the President and found that the text of section 10 of the Act is as set forth in the beginning of this opinion. The text of the Act bears on page 15 thereof the signatures of President of the Senate Arturo M. Tolentino and Speaker of the House of Representatives Cornelio T. Villareal, and on page 16 thereof those of Eliseo M. Tenza, Secretary of the Senate, and Inocencio B. Pareja, Secretary of the House of Representatives, and of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Under the enrolled bill theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito8 this text of the Act must be deemed as importing absolute verity and as binding on the courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark:9 The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in the form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bill which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official

attestations of the Speaker of the house of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent department requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.10 To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that, when the two chambers of the legislature met in conference committee, the phrase "has served as chief of police with exemplary record" was added, thereby accounting for its presence in section 10 of the Act.11 What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that except for that vagrant phrase "who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher" a high school graduate, no matter how long he has served in a city police department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police. Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who has served as captain in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for eight years irrespective of the branch of service where he served can be Chief of Police of Manila, why not one who holds an A.A. degree, completed two years in Law School, and served as Chief of the Detective Bureau for 14 years,

holding the successive ranks of Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel? Not to mention the fact that he was awarded three Presidential Awards, and was given the Congressional Commendation the highest award ever conferred in the history of the Manila Police Department." The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to concede its soundness, still we would be hard put reading it in the law because it is not there. The inclusion of desirable enlargements in the statute is addressed to the judgment of Congress and unless such enlargements are by it accepted courts are without power to make them. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put the matter with lucidity: An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recomment the inclusion. The vital difference between initiating policy, often involving a decided break with the past, and merely carrying out a formulated policy, indicates the relatively narrow limits within which choice is fairly open to courts and the extent to which interpreting law is inescapably making law.12 In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief of police of the city of Manila. Consequently, the respondent has no corresponding legal duty and therefore may not be compelled by mandamus to certify the petitioner as qualified and eligible.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No pronouncements as to costs. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur. Dizon, J., concurs in the result. Zaldivar, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions DIZON, J., concurring: As stated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, petitioner Enrique V. Morales began his career in the Manila Police Department in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position that of Chief of the Detective Bureau thereof and holds the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. In my opinion, a man bearing such credentials can be reasonably expected to be a good Chief of the Manila Police Department. But the issue before us is not whether or not his training and experience justify that expectation, but whether or not, under and in accordance with the pertinent law, he is qualified for appointment to such office to the extent that he is entitled to the relief sought, namely, the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to include him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from which the mayor of the City of Manila might choose the appointee who

will fill the vacant position of Chief of Police of the City of Manila. Section 10 of Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864) which controls the issue before us, reads as follows: Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. The above legal provision may be construed as providing for two different kinds of academic qualification, namely, (1) a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning, and (2) a high school degree, each of which is coupled with separate and distinct service qualifications. Any one of the latter, joined with either of the aforesaid academic requirements, would qualify a person for appointment as Chief of a city police agency. In other words, an applicant who is a holder of a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation would make the grade, in the same manner as would another applicant with a similar bachelor's degree who has served as chief of police with exemplary record, etc.

In the case of an applicant who is a mere high school graduate, the service qualification is not only different but is higher and more exacting for obvious reasons. Petitioner, however, would construe and read the law as follows: NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless HE (1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning AND has served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR (2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record, OR (3) has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; OR (4) any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. While, in my view, petitioner's interpretation is not unreasonable, it falls short of showing that it is the true and correct meaning and intent of the law aforesaid. This, in my opinion, must lead to the conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus for the purpose stated in his petition because to be entitled thereto he must show that, in relation to the matter at issue, he has

a clear enforceable right, on the one hand, and that the respondent has an imperative legal duty to perform, on the other. Because of this I am constrained to concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-28396 December 29, 1967

AGRIPINO DEMAFILES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ANTIQUE, in its capacity as Board of Canvassers for the newly created Municipality of Sebaste of the Province of Antique, and BENITO B. GALIDO,respondents. Salonga, Ordoez Sicat and Associates for respondent. Ramon Barrios for respondent Comelec. Jose W. Diokno for petitioner. CASTRO, J.: The new municipality of Sebaste1 in Antique province held its first election of officers in the general elections of November 14, 1967, with the petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty. On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised Election Code, to disregard, as "obviously manufactured", the election return

from precinct 7 on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were registered (of whom 188 voted), when, according to a certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of October 30, 1997. At its session on the following day, November 22, the board, over the objection of one member, voted to reject the return from precinct 7 and then proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of Sebaste. On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting the board's action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two board members, Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escao, to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Acting on the protest, the COMELEC resolved on November 28, 1967: To annul the canvass and proclamation of the local officials of the new municipality of Sebaste, Antique, which was made by the Provincial Board of Antique; To constitute the Board of Canvassers by appointing the substitutes pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 167 (a) of the Revised Election Code, which shall canvass anew the results of the election for local offices of Sebaste, Antique, in accordance with the Instructions to Boards of Canvassers contained in the Resolution of the Commission No. RR-544, particularly No. 5-K thereof, and thereafter to proclaim the winning candidates for local offices of said municipality.

In turn, Galido asked for a reconsideration on the ground that the two members of the provincial board who were reelectionists were disqualified from sitting only when the board was acting as a provincial, but not as a municipal, board of canvassers and that the COMELEC resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation of officials was issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard. In its resolution of December 4, 1967 the respondent Commission reconsidered its previous order and held "that the canvass and proclamation already made of the local officials . . . stands". Failing to secure a reconsideration of this latter resolution, Demafiles filed the present petition for mandamus andcertiorari to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC, to annull the proclamation of Galido, and to secure an order directing the COMELEC to appoint substitute members of the provincial board and to order a new canvass of the returns, including that from precinct 7. The three principal issues tendered for resolution in this case are: (1) whether the respondent board of canvassers was within the periphery of its power in rejecting the return from precinct 7 on the strength of an election registrar's certificate that a less number of voters than that shown in the return had registered; (2) whether the provincial board members, who were candidates for reelection, were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers; and (3) whether the Commission on Elections can order the board of canvassers to count a return from a given precinct. These issues, together with the arguments of the parties, will be discussed seriatim, but we must first proceed to

dispose of the preliminary question raised by the respondent Galido, namely, that this case is moot because he had taken his oath and assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870. Obviously, the frame of reference is section 2 of the statute which reads: The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified [sic]. In our view, the last portion of the provision "and shall have qualified" is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does not warrant the respondent's reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their proclamation. It is quite probable that that is what the legislature meant. But here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from supplying.itc-alf "If there is no meaning in it," said the King in Alice in Wonderland, "that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any." Frankfurter, who himself was fond of quoting this passage, admonishes that "a judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration."2 Accordingly, we have to go by the general rule that the term of office of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January following their election, 3 and so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way

affected the basic issues in this case, which we need not reach and resolve. First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function that of compiling and adding the results they appear in the returns, transmitted to it. This is the teaching in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections :4 "the canvassers are to be satisfied of the, genuineness of the returns namely, that the papers presented to them are not forged and spurious, that they are returns, and that they are signed by the proper officers. When so satisfied, . . . they may not reject any returns because of informalities in them or because of illegal and fraudulent practices in the elections."5 Thus, they cannot pass upon the validity of an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came are illegal.6 But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the ground that it is "obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the statement therein that there were 195 registered voters, of whom 188 voted, the certificate of the local election registrar states that only 182 voters had registered on October 30, 1967.Lagumbay v. Commission on Elections7 is cited in support of this view. In Lagumbay the returns were palpably false as it was indeed statistically improbable that "all the eight candidates of one party garnered all the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same number, whereas all the eight candidates of the other party got preciselynothing.itc-alf" In other words, the aid of evidence aliunde was not needed, as "the fraud [being] so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facievalue.

On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing on its face from which the canvassers might conclude that it does not speak the truth. It is only when it is compared in the certificate of the election registrar that a discrepancy appears as to the number of registered voters. The return therefore is by no means "obviously manufactured" so as to justify its exclusion. This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more people than registered voters were allowed to vote in precinct 7. Perhaps that is true, although the petitioner claims that after October 30, 1967 eight more voters were allowed to register (making a total of 190, voters), and on the day of the election 5 voters erroneously assigned to precinct 6 were allowed to vote in precinct 7 because that was where they were really assigned. The point is simply that this question should be threshed out in an election contest.itc-alf Lagumbay itself explicitly says Of course we agree that fraud in the holding of the election should be handled and finally settled by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence is necessary. . . . Consequently, the canvass made and proclamation had should be annulled.8 Second, the canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the four members of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it, they being candidates for reelection. As this Court held in Salcedo v. Commission on Elections:9

And added reason for the nullification of the actuation of the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro is the fact that its members were disqualified to act it appearing that they were all candidates for reelection. This is clear from Section 28 of the Revised Election Code which provides that any member of the provincial board who is a candidate for an elective office shall be incompetent to act in said board in the performance of its duties in connection with the election. Branding the above statement as obiter dictum, the respondent Galido argues that reelectionist members of the provincial board are disqualified under section 28 only when the board acts as a provincial board of canvassers, to prevent them fro canvassing their own votes, and not when they sit as a municipal board of canvassers. With respect to the canvass and proclamation made the provincial board of Oriental Mindoro, three issues raised in Salcedo, in resolving which this Court held (1) that a provincial board cannot act as a municipal board of canvassers where a municipal council has been formed; (2) that provincial board members who are candidates for reelection are disqualified to sit in the board and (3) that a board of canvassers which excludes from canvass the return from a precinct acts "in contravention of law." At any rate the language of section 28 is all-inclusive Thus: Any member of a provincial board or of a municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on said body in the performance of the duties the of relative to said election . . . .

The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a provincial board of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal canvassing body new municipalities, and so we make none, in line with the maxim ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos . Third, it is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC has the power to annul an illegal canvass and an illegal proclamation as when they are based on incomplete returns, and order a new canvass to be made by counting the returns wrongfully excluded.10 If it has power to direct that certain copies of election returns be used in preference to other copies of the same returns,11 there is no reason why it cannot direct canvassing bodies to count all turns which are otherwise regular.itc-alf Indeed, it is its duty to do so, failing which it may be compelled by mandamus. As earlier pointed out, it is the ministerial function a board of canvassers to count the results as they appeal in the returns which on their face do not reveal any irregularities or falsities. ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions dated December 4 and 8, 1967 of the Commission on Elections are set aside, and the canvass of returns made and the subsequent proclamation of the respondent Benito B. Galido are annulled. The respondent Commission on Elections is hereby directed. (1) to appoint new members of the board of canvassers in substitution of Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escao, and (2) immediately thereafter to order the board of canvassers as reconstituted to convene, canvass all votes including those appearing in the return from precinct 7, and, in accordance with the results of such canvass, proclaim the winning candidates. Costs against the private respondent Galido.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez and Angeles, JJ., concur. Dizon, Zaldivar and Fernando, JJ., took no part. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Teofilo Ragodon for accused-appellant.

This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an information filed by the provincial Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows: That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62), required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended, inspite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same. Contrary to law.

SARMIENTO, J.: The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the municipal council of Pagbilao, in Quezon province. By way of confession and avoidance, the petitioner would admit having committed the acts charged but would claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their constitutionality, that they do not apply to him in any event. The facts are not disputed:

For the prosecution the following witnesses testified in substance as follows; MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer and resident of Lopez, Quezon In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the accused as I worked in his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario is at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I worked in the clearing of the fishpond, the construction of the dikes and the catching of fish. On cross-examination, this witness declared: I worked with the accused up to March 1964. NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married, copra maker and resident of Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since 1959 up to the present. I know the accused since 1959 when he opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. He still operates the fishpond up to the present and I know this fact as I am the barrio captain of Pinagbayanan. On cross-examination, this witness declared: I came to know the accused when he first operated his fishpond since 1959.

On re-direct examination, this witness declared: I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and the accused was there. On re-cross examination, this witness declared: I do not remember the month in 1962 when the accused caught fish. RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, married As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax collection. I know the accused even before I was Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written the accused a letter asking him to pay his taxes (Exhibit B). Said letter was received by the accused as per registry return receipt, Exhibit B-1. The letter demanded for payment of P362.00, more or less, by way of taxes which he did not pay up to the present. The former Treasurer, Ceferino Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand to the accused (Exhibit C). On June 28, 1967, I sent a letter to the Fishery Commission (Exhibit D), requesting information if accused paid taxes with that office. The Commission sent me a certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D-3). The accused had a fishpond lease agreement. The taxes unpaid were for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966.

On cross-examination, this witness declared: I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares. On question of the court, this witness declared: What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on fishpond operation, not rental. The prosecution presented as part of their evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D, D-1, D-2, D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same were admitted by the court, except Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3 which were not admitted for being immaterial. For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48 years of age, married, owner and general manager of the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of 4801 Old Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, declared in substance as follows: I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy my Residence Certificates at Manila or at San Juan. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in Manila and my business is in Manila and my family lives at Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not own a house at Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease agreement to that effect with the Philippine

Fisheries Commission marked as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was still existing and enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15 and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966, were translated into English by the Institute of National Language to better understand the ordinances. There were exchange of letters between me and the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao regarding the payment of the taxes on my leased fishpond situated at Pagbilao. There was a letter of demand for the payment of the taxes by the treasurer (Exhibit 3) which I received by mail at my residence at Manila. I answered the letter of demand, Exhibit 3, with Exhibit 3-A. I requested an inspection of my fishpond to determine its condition as it was not then in operation. The Municipal Treasurer Alvarez went there once in 1967 and he found that it was destroyed by the typhoon and there were pictures taken marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B and 4C. I received another letter of demand, Exhibit 5, and I answered the same (Exhibit 5-A). I copied my reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received another letter of demand from Tomas Ornedo, Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, dated February 16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I answered the same with the letter marked as Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26, 1966. I received another letter of demand from Treasurer Alvarez of Pagbilao, Exhibit 8, and I answered the same (Exhibit 8-A). In 1964, I went to Treasurer Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and he said

none and he told me just to pay my taxes. I did not pay because up to now I do not know whether I am covered by the Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked me to pay different amounts for taxes for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code, municipal taxes lapse if not paid and they are collecting on a lapsed ordinance. Because under the Tax Code, fishermen are exempted from percentage tax and privilege tax. There is no law empowering the municipality to pass ordinance taxing fishpond operators. The defense presented as part of their evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4C, 5, 5-A, 6, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were admitted by the court. From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and finally amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966. On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing

fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected. Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain. There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee of a parcel of forest land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the accused and the government, through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on August 21, 1959. There is no question from the evidences presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land leased by the defendant from the government for fishpond purposes was actually converted into fishpond and used as such, and therefore

defendant is an operator of a fishpond within the purview of the ordinance in question. 1 The trial Court 2 returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows: VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to pay the costs of this proceeding. SO ORDERED. 3 In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner alleges that: I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES OF 1966, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN. II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION, AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST FACTO. III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION COVERS ONLY OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC LANDS. IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID, CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NONRESIDENTS. 4 The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted: Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. 5 xxx xxx xxx

Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries. 6 xxx xxx xxx Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964. 7 The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and uncertain." 8 The petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries." 9 Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964."10 As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 11 It is repugnant to the

Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 12 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." 13 Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' " 14 Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" 15 act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction. It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed against such activities. In Parker v. Levy, 16 a prosecution originally under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically, "conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the defendant, an army officer who had urged his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special Forces trained to fight there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the

void for vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted military interpretation and practice had provided enough standards, and consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible. It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 17 a divided Court sustained an act of Congress (Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing "the too early nomination of candidates" 18 limiting the election campaign period, and prohibiting "partisan political activities"), amid challenges of vagueness and overbreadth on the ground that the law had included an "enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms 'election campaign' or 'partisan political activity" 19 that would supply the standards. "As thus limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set at rest." 20 In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the conduct sought to be prohibited "is not clearly defined at all." 21 "As worded in R.A 4880, prohibited discussion could cover the entire spectrum of expression relating to candidates and political parties." 22 He was unimpressed with the "restrictions" Fernando's opinion had relied on: " 'Simple expressions of opinions and thoughts concerning the election' and expression of 'views on current political problems or issues' leave the reader conjecture, to guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to the nature of the utterance ('simple expressions of opinion and thoughts') or the subject of the utterance ('current political problems or issues')." 23 The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-ofinterests" test, 24 insofar as the statute's ban on early nomination of candidates was concerned: "The rational connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and modest scope of its restriction on

the rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing public interest which Congress has found in the moderation of partisan political activity, lead us to the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with and does not offend the Constitution." 25 In that case, Castro would have the balance achieved in favor of State authority at the "expense" of individual liberties. In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's separate opinion, the balancing test finds a close kin, referred to as the "less restrictive alternative " 26 doctrine, under which the court searches for alternatives available to the Government outside of statutory limits, or for "less drastic means" 27 open to the State, that would render the statute unnecessary. In United States v. Robel, 28 legislation was assailed, banning members of the (American) Communist Party from working in any defense facility. The U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it impaired the right of association, and that in any case, a screening process was available to the State that would have enabled it to Identify dangerous elements holding defense positions. 29 In that event, the balance would have been struck in favor of individual liberties. It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is usually close. It is said, however, that the choice of the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy involves say, economic rights, 30 or as in the Levycase, military affairs, in which less precision in analysis is required and in which the competence of the legislature is presumed. In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the

term " manager." He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. 31 While it appears that it is the National Government which owns them, 32 the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances. We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue measures 33 designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient principle that the Government is immune from taxes and for another, since it is not the Government that had been making money from the venture. Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague. Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the claim that "the imposition of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (three years after the 'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain individual or individuals." 34 Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," 35 is unequivocal about the date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder

"beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964 ," 36 does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In addition, the same would have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law. As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for fishponds in operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds, three years after their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail. To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify imagined ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the intent of the said ordinances. The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The appellant argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior thereto." 37

The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. 38 Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. 39 Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it operates to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one. The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax "public forest land." 40 InGolden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan 41 we held that local governments' taxing power does not extend to forest products or concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264 likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing percentage taxes on sales.) First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate thereof is based on the area of fishponds ("P3.00 per hectare" 42). Secondly, fishponds are not forest lands, although we have held them to the agricultural lands. 43 By definition, "forest" is "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush; a large wood." 44 (Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes were directed on the fishponds, they would not have been taxes on forest products.)

They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. They are not charged against sales, which would have offended the doctrine enshrined by Golden Ribbon Lumber, 45 but rather on occupation, which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264. 46 They are what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the ordinances themselves. There is, then, no merit in the last objection. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Melencio-Herrera, and Regalado, J., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-28396 December 29, 1967

AGRIPINO DEMAFILES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ANTIQUE, in its capacity as Board of Canvassers for the newly created Municipality of Sebaste of the Province of Antique, and BENITO B. GALIDO,respondents. Salonga, Ordoez Sicat and Associates for respondent. Ramon Barrios for respondent Comelec. Jose W. Diokno for petitioner. CASTRO, J.: The new municipality of Sebaste1 in Antique province held its first election of officers in the general elections of November 14, 1967, with the petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty. On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised Election Code, to disregard, as "obviously manufactured", the election return

from precinct 7 on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were registered (of whom 188 voted), when, according to a certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of October 30, 1997. At its session on the following day, November 22, the board, over the objection of one member, voted to reject the return from precinct 7 and then proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of Sebaste. On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting the board's action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two board members, Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escao, to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Acting on the protest, the COMELEC resolved on November 28, 1967: To annul the canvass and proclamation of the local officials of the new municipality of Sebaste, Antique, which was made by the Provincial Board of Antique; To constitute the Board of Canvassers by appointing the substitutes pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 167 (a) of the Revised Election Code, which shall canvass anew the results of the election for local offices of Sebaste, Antique, in accordance with the Instructions to Boards of Canvassers contained in the Resolution of the Commission No. RR-544, particularly No. 5-K thereof, and thereafter to proclaim the winning candidates for local offices of said municipality.

In turn, Galido asked for a reconsideration on the ground that the two members of the provincial board who were reelectionists were disqualified from sitting only when the board was acting as a provincial, but not as a municipal, board of canvassers and that the COMELEC resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation of officials was issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard. In its resolution of December 4, 1967 the respondent Commission reconsidered its previous order and held "that the canvass and proclamation already made of the local officials . . . stands". Failing to secure a reconsideration of this latter resolution, Demafiles filed the present petition for mandamus andcertiorari to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC, to annull the proclamation of Galido, and to secure an order directing the COMELEC to appoint substitute members of the provincial board and to order a new canvass of the returns, including that from precinct 7. The three principal issues tendered for resolution in this case are: (1) whether the respondent board of canvassers was within the periphery of its power in rejecting the return from precinct 7 on the strength of an election registrar's certificate that a less number of voters than that shown in the return had registered; (2) whether the provincial board members, who were candidates for reelection, were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers; and (3) whether the Commission on Elections can order the board of canvassers to count a return from a given precinct. These issues, together with the arguments of the parties, will be discussed seriatim, but we must first proceed to

dispose of the preliminary question raised by the respondent Galido, namely, that this case is moot because he had taken his oath and assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870. Obviously, the frame of reference is section 2 of the statute which reads: The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified [sic]. In our view, the last portion of the provision "and shall have qualified" is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does not warrant the respondent's reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their proclamation. It is quite probable that that is what the legislature meant. But here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from supplying.itc-alf "If there is no meaning in it," said the King in Alice in Wonderland, "that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any." Frankfurter, who himself was fond of quoting this passage, admonishes that "a judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration."2 Accordingly, we have to go by the general rule that the term of office of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January following their election, 3 and so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way

affected the basic issues in this case, which we need not reach and resolve. First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function that of compiling and adding the results they appear in the returns, transmitted to it. This is the teaching in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections :4 "the canvassers are to be satisfied of the, genuineness of the returns namely, that the papers presented to them are not forged and spurious, that they are returns, and that they are signed by the proper officers. When so satisfied, . . . they may not reject any returns because of informalities in them or because of illegal and fraudulent practices in the elections."5 Thus, they cannot pass upon the validity of an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came are illegal.6 But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the ground that it is "obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the statement therein that there were 195 registered voters, of whom 188 voted, the certificate of the local election registrar states that only 182 voters had registered on October 30, 1967.Lagumbay v. Commission on Elections7 is cited in support of this view. In Lagumbay the returns were palpably false as it was indeed statistically improbable that "all the eight candidates of one party garnered all the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same number, whereas all the eight candidates of the other party got preciselynothing.itc-alf" In other words, the aid of evidence aliunde was not needed, as "the fraud [being] so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facievalue.

On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing on its face from which the canvassers might conclude that it does not speak the truth. It is only when it is compared in the certificate of the election registrar that a discrepancy appears as to the number of registered voters. The return therefore is by no means "obviously manufactured" so as to justify its exclusion. This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more people than registered voters were allowed to vote in precinct 7. Perhaps that is true, although the petitioner claims that after October 30, 1967 eight more voters were allowed to register (making a total of 190, voters), and on the day of the election 5 voters erroneously assigned to precinct 6 were allowed to vote in precinct 7 because that was where they were really assigned. The point is simply that this question should be threshed out in an election contest.itc-alf Lagumbay itself explicitly says Of course we agree that fraud in the holding of the election should be handled and finally settled by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence is necessary. . . . Consequently, the canvass made and proclamation had should be annulled.8 Second, the canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the four members of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it, they being candidates for reelection. As this Court held in Salcedo v. Commission on Elections:9

And added reason for the nullification of the actuation of the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro is the fact that its members were disqualified to act it appearing that they were all candidates for reelection. This is clear from Section 28 of the Revised Election Code which provides that any member of the provincial board who is a candidate for an elective office shall be incompetent to act in said board in the performance of its duties in connection with the election. Branding the above statement as obiter dictum, the respondent Galido argues that reelectionist members of the provincial board are disqualified under section 28 only when the board acts as a provincial board of canvassers, to prevent them fro canvassing their own votes, and not when they sit as a municipal board of canvassers. With respect to the canvass and proclamation made the provincial board of Oriental Mindoro, three issues raised in Salcedo, in resolving which this Court held (1) that a provincial board cannot act as a municipal board of canvassers where a municipal council has been formed; (2) that provincial board members who are candidates for reelection are disqualified to sit in the board and (3) that a board of canvassers which excludes from canvass the return from a precinct acts "in contravention of law." At any rate the language of section 28 is all-inclusive Thus: Any member of a provincial board or of a municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on said body in the performance of the duties the of relative to said election . . . .

The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a provincial board of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal canvassing body new municipalities, and so we make none, in line with the maxim ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos . Third, it is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC has the power to annul an illegal canvass and an illegal proclamation as when they are based on incomplete returns, and order a new canvass to be made by counting the returns wrongfully excluded.10 If it has power to direct that certain copies of election returns be used in preference to other copies of the same returns,11 there is no reason why it cannot direct canvassing bodies to count all turns which are otherwise regular.itc-alf Indeed, it is its duty to do so, failing which it may be compelled by mandamus. As earlier pointed out, it is the ministerial function a board of canvassers to count the results as they appeal in the returns which on their face do not reveal any irregularities or falsities. ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions dated December 4 and 8, 1967 of the Commission on Elections are set aside, and the canvass of returns made and the subsequent proclamation of the respondent Benito B. Galido are annulled. The respondent Commission on Elections is hereby directed. (1) to appoint new members of the board of canvassers in substitution of Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escao, and (2) immediately thereafter to order the board of canvassers as reconstituted to convene, canvass all votes including those appearing in the return from precinct 7, and, in accordance with the results of such canvass, proclaim the winning candidates. Costs against the private respondent Galido.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez and Angeles, JJ., concur. Dizon, Zaldivar and Fernando, JJ., took no part.

People of the Philippines vs. NazarioG.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988 Facts: In the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in t h e M u n i c i p a l i t y o f P a g b i l a o , Q u e z o n , Philippine s, Nazario, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond, refused and failed to pay the municipal taxes required of him as fishpond op erator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended, in spite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same.The ordinances in question were Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, seriesof 1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao.Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted:S e c t i o n 1 . A n y o w n e r o r m a n a g e r o f f i s h p o n d s i n p l a c e s w i t h i n t h e territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in theamount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. 5 xxx xxx xxxSec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds within the territorial limits of this mun icipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three(3) years

starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries. 6 xxx xxx xxxS e c t i o n 1 . A n y o w n e r o r m a n a g e r o f f i s h p o n d s i n p l a c e s w i t h i n t h e territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum beginning and takingeffect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964. 7 The petitioner contended that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he was not covered sincethe said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintained that they arevague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the datesaid fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries." 9 Ordinance No. 12 states thatliability for the tax accrues "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpondstarted operating before the year 1964."Also, Nazario contended that Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the

the establishment for the operation of the

Magtajas vs Pryce
Posted on October 19, 2012

casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation. Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season. Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casinos opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to

Issue: WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 337593 are valid.

Held: No. CdeO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. However,ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.

Gonzales Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Gonzales Vs. Comelec 27 SCRA 835 G.R. L-27833 April 18, 1969 Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through selfrestraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of

clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state. Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional. Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is

the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election

campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.