DISEC Background Guide - SanMUN 2013

Sankara Model United Nations 2013
Eighth session
August 9-11
Background Guide Disarmament & International Security

w w w . s a n mu n .o r g
Letter from the Chair

Dear Delegates, Welcome to TheDisarmament and International Security Committee of SanMUN 2013. We, as the Executive Board look forward to three fun, and constructive days of negotiations, debates, and an undertaking of healthy decisions.
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www.sanmun.org disec@sanmun.org fb.com/sanmun2013 fb.com/groups/ sanmun2013
The DISEC committee can be a very rigid, demanding, and exhaustive committee at the Sankara model UN Conference. Every delegate is expected to be well researched with both the agendas, and we expect your research to extend beyond the boundaries of the agendas at hand, and also the stance of your own country; so to say, you should all be extremely well versed with all aspects of your country and otherwise. A successful delegate is not only aware of what is happening in his/her own country, but also of what's happening inside the countries of his/her allies or neighbor countries and enemies or non- allies. The Disarmament and International Security Committee is one which is host to intense disputes, taking place and reaching a consensus via diplomatic dialogues and persuasions. Although, this is a simulation of an organ of the United Nations, please note that it is of utmost importance for delegates to treat each other like actual UN diplomats, and follow all procedural rules.
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It is to be noted that the 1st timers will not be treated rigidly but however a standard of debate is expected in order to keep the committee in pace. The 1st time MUN-ers are expected to not keep silence simply because of lack of confidence or awareness. Mistakes wont be punished. There is always scope for improvement. The following pages will guide you on the working of the committee, and also with relevant information related to both the agendas. The Background Guide is intended to give you an insight as to what we as the Executive Board expect from you in terms of what to debate upon, how to frame a solution, etc. Please NOTE once again this guide may NOT be the only source of your research, and citing arguments, statements, and accusations from the guide will NOT be accepted. You, delegate are the ambassador of your assigned nation, and we hope that you will put in sincere efforts to research and will have a broad understanding of all the important aspects of both the agendas. We, as the Executive Board eagerly hope that you are prepared well in order to give the committee the best expected direction via a highly productive and engaging debate. It is only then, that you would have truly represented your country in the best possible way. Delegates, we insist that you give in your best and most positive effort to experience a
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conference that can be your best conference ever. We encourage you to dig into the agendas as much further as you can to heighten your knowledge on these two key issues that are of utmost importance today. We look forward to a great session with all you brilliant MUNers! Lets debate, discuss and decide on for a better future. Wishing you the best of luck,
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Badrinarayan Rammohan Chair Udhav Tulysan - Guest Chair Gowthami Ashok - Moderator
Disarmament and International Security

This committee is the first standing committee in the UN General Assembly. It deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in international security. The Committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Genevabased Conference on Disarmament. It comprises of all 193 member states of the UN.
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Main Agenda The Usage of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in International Airspace

Introduction: An unmanned aerial vehicle or a UAV, simply put, is a pilotless flying object. This does not however mean that it is not controlled; just that the pilot (or controller) can control the aircraft from a secure location. This is one of the biggest advantages of unmanned aerial vehicles; that they are unmanned and the pilot is never in danger. There is no pilot to be taken captive by enemy forces and no pilot to cause a diplomatic problem if they are caught spying on friendly countries. Other advantages include much lesser weight due to the lack of seats or
safety equipment resulting in a much larger range and their ability to conduct persistent surveillance. Moreover, these planes can be flown into regions where manned planes would not or cannot venture. Drones are also cheaper to purchase than manned aircraft. This, however does not mean that the cost incurred over time is any less; in fact, it is quite high. This huge cost, strange as it may seem, is because of the large number of personnel required to fly a drone. There need to be ground-based technicians to maintain the drones where they are based, ground-based crew to help in takeoffs and landings, and a different crew flying it from anywhere else in the world. Not to mention, the large number of analysts to make sense of the data they receive. According to the US Air Force (USAF), it takes 168 people to keep one Predator drone in flight for 24 hours and 300 for a Global Hawk drone. The amount of data received is enormous. Modern day drones are fitted with extraordinarily sensitive sensors. Some drones are even capable of filming entire cities (The Gorgon Stare drone). Just to give an idea of how much, the USAF receives about 1500 hours of non-stop motion videos and another 1500 still images every day. Aiming to simplify such matters, better drones were invented; ones that could decide for themselves based on pre-loaded parameters whether a person on the ground was a terrorist
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or not. And take action. History Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones are not very recent. In 1883, Americans attached a camera to a kite with a long string and flew the kite, thus managing to take aerial pictures. In 1898, this technology was put to use in the Spanish American war, resulting in the first aerial military reconnaissance pictures. It is also said (though no conclusive evidence is available) that in the 1860s, Australians attached nonpiloted balloons with bombs with preset time fuse. They allowed the wind to carry them over the city of Venice and exploded them in a oneof-its-kind war move. However, leaving it to the wind to carry them was a bad idea and some of the balloons were carried back. Also, many of them failed to explode. During the First World War, the USA created about 15000 UAVs as anti-aircraft practice. Many of these were marked with black stripes along the tail part of the fuselage, making them look like drone bees (Possibly the origin of the name). But it wasnt until the Vietnam war that these planes were used to gather intelligence. Background There are 2 types of drone strikes: Personality strikes which target a specific person because he/ she is deemed to be a threat to a country and signature strikes (search and destroy), which monitor the demographics of a person to
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see if it fits into a certain behaviour, based on which he/ she can be deemed a terror suspect and taken out. Countries known to be using armed drones include: USA, UK, China, Israel, France, Russia and India among others. To better explain how armed drones are used, we will examine the case of USA, the country with the largest fleet of drones.
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USAs War on Terror: The use of armed drones outside of war rose exponentially after the 9/11 attacks. In fact, a week before the 9/11 attacks, CIA director George Tenet was quoted by counterterrorism advisors as saying that it would be a terrible mistake for the CIA to fire a weapon like this referring to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. But after the 9/11 attacks, everything changed. The agency asked for, and received a memorandum from President Bush to target Al-Qaeda anywhere in the world. And the drone programme began. In 2000, the Pentagon had fewer than 50 drones, but by 2010, they had more than 7500. It started under Bush and expanded under Obama. And to top it all, the CIA refuses to disclose any information on who is in charge, how targets are selected or how many people were killed, insisting that releasing such information would aid the enemy. When former UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston tried to ask for information, he reportedly said, They blew me off.
CIA (now Pentagon as well) originally began using drones in Afghanistan, but later began deploying most of its drones in Pakistan, where many Al-Qaeda suspects are claimed to be in hiding. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, between 2004 and 2012, the CIA conducted over 350 drone attacks in Pakistan, with an increase of 118 attacks in 2010, killing between 2600 and 3400 people.
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And of course, there have been mistakes. In November 2011, the CIA mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, mistaking them to be the Taliban. It suspended drone operations for a while, but then resumed in mid January. Between October 7,2001 and January 1,2002 over 1000 Afghan civilians were killed directly by the American bombings. This is more than the number of people killed in the 9/11 attacks. Even worse, in Wech Baghtu, a Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan, the US called in a drone strike on a wedding party, mistaking it to be a gathering of Taliban leaders, killing about 40 (innocent) people. In another incident, a strike was launched on an unsuspecting civilian because the US believed that the tall, bearded man was Osama Bin laden. At this point, we must ask this question: Are these drone You must sometimes do evil in order to do good strikes really worth it?
argues Secretary of Defence of USA, Robert McNamara. But then, wouldnt these attacks spark outrage in the public? Would this further fuel anti-American sentiments? Forget the USA, in general, are they even legal? That is what the Executive Board would like this committee to debate upon. Current Issues 1. Right to self-defence: The United States has always maintained that the strikes have been in self-defence and are hence legal. It maintains that the government has a right to assassinate anyone, anywhere, whom it believes to pose a threat to the country. To understand this, we must first understand what the right to self-defence is. Under international law, all nations, when under imminent attack, have the right to act in anticipatory self-defence. But this need not necessarily imply that they can employ lethal force just because they believe that a country/ individual may attack them at some point in the future. Using the same argument, would Russia be justified in assassinating suspected militantChechens in say, the heart of London along with a couple of civilians using its right to selfdefence? 2. Legality There are, of course, rules for killing. In armed conflict, targeted killing is legal if the target is a combatant, a fighter or someone who directly participates in combat. In non-combat, the
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rules are even stricter. The killing must be necessary to protect life and there must be no other means (such as capture or non-lethal incapacitation) to stop that threat. 3. The Double Tap This issue is specific to the United States of America. Citing national security, the CIA began its second strike policy, also known as the double tap, by which a second missile would strike the same place within minutes of the first. Though no official explanation has been provided, one can assume it is to make sure that the target has been eliminated. However, more often than not, the second strike ends up killing any rescuers who arrive at the scene to provide aid to the injured, thus deterring anyone from approaching the scene for upto 6 hours. 4. Sovereignty: Is a countrys sovereignty violated if another country decides to conduct drone strikes there? In a May 2012 report, the then UN Special rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions said, Outside the context of armed conflict, the use of drones for targeted killing is almost never likely to be legal. Under normal conditions a country may not simply enter another countrys airspace. But in cases like USAs War on Terror, should it be considered a sovereignty breach considering the fact that so many militant suspects are being eliminated, which might pose a far greater threat to the host country?
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5. Consensual strikes: Does a strike become legal if the country itself gives the attacking country permission to do so? According to a leaked US State Department Cable, the 33 year dictator of Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, agreed to permit drone strikes in Yemen. He reportedly assured the USA by saying, Well continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours. The position of Pakistan is not very clear. Initially, they consented privately but made public condemnations. WikiLeaks quoted the Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani saying, I dont care if they do it as long as they get the right people. Well protest in National Assembly and then ignore it. But later, after a NATO airstrike mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, they evicted a CIA base near its border and threatened to shoot down any more drones. While, they never actually shot a drone down, they showed their disapproval by calling the strikes unlawful, counterproductive and a violation of the countrys sovereignty. But legally, it doesnt really matter whether or not a countrys government consents. In the end, it all just boils down to the rights of the accused. 6. Civilian casualties: In military conflict, each party has to look at
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proportions. This means decisions have to be made very cautiously and in a way that minimises mistakes and civilian casualties. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Law, wrote that international humanitarian law and the Rome Statute permit belligerents to carry out proportionate attacks against military objectives, even when it is known that some civilian deaths or injuries will occur. A crime occurs is there is intentional attack directed against civilians or an attack is launched on a military objective in the knowledge that incidental civilian injuries would be clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. The important thing is then, what is defined as excessive? As long as the answer to this question remains ambiguous, it is almost certain that such attacks will continue. Possible Solutions: Internationally agreed definition for combatant Necessitating the obtaining of certain permissions (from?) before each strike Making the information more public Resolving the double tap issue Less secrecy on the figures (number of strikes carried out) Research References*:
1.www.reprieve.org.uk 2.www.civicworldwide.org 3.www.antiwar.com 4.www.knowdrones.com 5.www.bbc.com 6.www.guardian.co.uk
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Reserve Agenda The Militarization of the South China Sea

Introduction The South China Sea is a sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean. It covers an area of around 3.5 million square kilometres. This sea has hundreds of small islands, rocks and reefs, most of which are extremely small. According to the United States Energy Information Administration, this region contains 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves. But China puts the figure higher, at 213 billion barrels of oil. These resources are the main reason that countries are keen to claim their rightful share. Background To fully understand the impacts or implications of different clashes in the region, we must first look at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS replaces older concepts dating back to the 17th century on maritime boundaries. During this time, a cannon shot rule was followed; meaning that the countrys boundary extended upto the maximum range
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of its cannons (which was about 3 nautical miles). Beyond this, all waters were considered international and were free to all countries. But later in the 20th century, things changed. Countries wanted greater freedom. In the year 1945, The United States extended its control to all natural resources in its continental shelf. Soon, many other countries began following this example. By 1950, Argentina was actively claiming its continental shelf as well as the water column above it, Ecuador, Chile, and Peru were asserting rights over a 200-mile zone in order to protect its biological resources from foreign fleets, and several Arab and Eastern European nations were now claiming rights to a 12-mile territorial sea. People began to realize that such a fractured understanding without international agreements could not continue. The following information regarding UNCLOS 1 and 2 is optional. The Executive Board expects delegates to be aware of the outcome of only the last meeting. UNCLOS 1: Beginning in the year 1958, this was the first in a series of meeting convened by the United Nations in order to reach a consensus on national maritime boundaries. The meeting produced four separate conventions: 1) The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which established sovereignty rights and rights of passage through the territorial sea, established the Contiguous Zone to extend 12 nautical miles from the baselines
2) The Convention on the High Seas, which enabled access of the sea for landlocked nations, made the transport of slaves illegal, dealt with piracy, established safety and rescue protocols, established a national duty to prevent pollution, and established rights to laying of undersea cables and pipelines 3) The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, which established the rights of coastal nations to protect living ocean resources, required nations whose fleets leave their territorial sea to establish conservation measures and established measures for dispute resolution 4) The Convention on the Continental Shelf, which established the regime governing the superjacent waters and airspace, the laying and maintenance of submarine cables or pipelines, the regime governing navigation, fishing, scientific research and the coastal nation's competence in these areas, delimitation, and tunneling UNCLOS 2: To deal with the issues that were not yet resolved, the UN General Assembly convened a second meeting in early 1960. Although 2 resolutions were adopted, the issues at hand were not addressed. UNCLOS 3: On November 1, 1976, the ambassador to the United Nations from Malta, Arvid Pardo gave a
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speech in the UNGA calling for "an effective international regime over the seabed and the ocean floor beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction". This set in motion several events including the creation of the United Nations seabed Committee and the signing of a treaty prohibiting the placement of nuclear arms on the seabed and eventually, to the convening of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, to write a comprehensive treaty for the oceans.
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The Convention was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. This marked the culmination of more than 14 years of work involving participation by more than 150 countries representing all regions of the world, all legal and political systems and the spectrum of socio/economic development. At the time of its adoption, the Convention embodied in one instrument traditional rules for the uses of the oceans and at the same time introduced new legal concepts and regimes and addressed new concerns. The Convention also provided the framework for further development of specific areas of the law of the sea. The Convention entered into force in accordance with its article 308 on 16 November 1994, 12 months after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession. Today, it is the globally recognized regime dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea. Some of the key features of the Convention as
listed by the United Nations are the following: 1) Coastal States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea which they have the right to establish its breadth up to a limit not to exceed 12 nautical miles; foreign vessels are allowed "innocent passage" through those waters, 2) Ships and aircraft of all countries are allowed "transit passage" through straits used for international navigation; States bordering the straits can regulate navigational and other aspects of passage, 3) Archipelagic States, made up of a group or groups of closely related islands and interconnecting waters, have sovereignty over a sea area enclosed by straight lines drawn between the outermost points of the islands; the waters between the islands are declared archipelagic waters where States may establish sea lanes and air routes in which all other States enjoy the right of archipelagic passage through such designated sea lanes, 4) Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection, 5) All other States have freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, 6) Landlocked and geographically
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disadvantaged States have the right to participate on an equitable basis in exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the Exclusive Economic Zones of coastal States of the same region or subregion; highly migratory species of fish and marine mammals are accorded special protection, 7) Coastal States have sovereign rights over the continental shelf (the national area of the seabed) for exploring and exploiting it; the shelf can extend at least 200 nautical miles from the shore, and more under specified circumstances, 8) Coastal States share with the international community part of the revenue derived from exploiting resources from any part of their shelf beyond 200 miles 9) The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf shall make recommendations to States on the shelf's outer boundaries when it extends beyond 200 miles, 10) All States enjoy the traditional freedoms of navigation, overflight, scientific research and fishing on the high seas; they are obliged to adopt, or cooperate with other States in adopting, measures to manage and conserve living resources, 11) The limits of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of islands are determined in accordance with rules applicable to land territory, but rocks which
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could not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own would have no economic zone or continental shelf, 12) States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are expected to cooperate in managing living resources, environmental and research policies and activities, 13) Land-locked States have the right of access to and from the sea and enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit States, 14) States are bound to prevent and control marine pollution and are liable for damage caused by violation of their international obligations to combat such pollution, 15) All marine scientific research in the EEZ and on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State, but in most cases they are obliged to grant consent to other States when the research is to be conducted for peaceful purposes and fulfils specified criteria, 16) States are bound to promote the development and transfer of marine technology "on fair and reasonable terms and conditions", with proper regard for all legitimate interests, 17) States Parties are obliged to settle by peaceful means their disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention,
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18) Disputes can be submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established under the Convention, to the International Court of Justice, or to arbitration. Conciliation is also available and, in certain circumstances, submission to it would be compulsory. The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over deep seabed mining disputes. History of conflict:
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Without all countries having signed or ratified it (157 signatories and 165 ratifications to date), naturally there has been conflict. The events that have occurred in this region including statements, conflicts and claims made by different countries can be summarized as follows: 1885: China officially claims all the Nansha Islands. 1939: The Nansha Islands are invaded and occupied by Japan during the Second World War. 1947: The Philippines claims some of the eastern Nansha Islands and the Scarborough Reef. 1951: Japan renounces all rights to the Nansha Islands. No resolution is made on who owns them. Jan. 1974: Chinese military units seize islands in
the Paracels, occupied by South Vietnamese armed forces, and China re-claims sovereignty over the Nansha Islands. 1975: South Vietnam occupies part of the Nansha Islands. 1976: North and South Vietnam unify. 1978: Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos claims the entire territory as part of the Philippines, redrawing the country's map. 1988: China and Vietnam fight a naval battle just off the Nansha Islands in March. 1991: China passes the Law on Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas. 1992: China lands forces on Da Ba Dau reef near Vietnam's claims in Sin Cowe East, triggering a small military skirmish between the two powers. Amid mounting criticism, China offers to negotiate disputes and reiterates its pledge not to use force. 1994: China distributes a map claiming the entire South China Sea, including all the Nansha Islands. 1995: China and the Philippines have a conflict in Mischief Reef. May 2000: Chinese and Philippine foreign ministers agree to "contribute positively toward the formulation and adoption of the regional
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Code of Conduct in the South China Sea." Dec. 2002: Vietnam and China sign two agreements to resolve long-standing territorial disputes over the Gulf of Tonkin. Nov. 2002: China and ASEAN adopt the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea, setting the stage for possible commercial cooperation and long-term stability.
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May 2003: Vietnam issues a "sovereignty" declaration on the Chinese ban on fishing in the South China Sea, claiming that Vietnam has rights to the Paracel and Nansha Islands. June 13, 2011: Vietnam holds live-fire drills in the South China Sea. June 26, 2011: China and Vietnam agree to hold talks and resolve the territorial dispute. June 28, 2011: The US and the Philippines begin routine naval drills near the South China Sea. July 6, 2011: The Philippines' Foreign Secretary Alberto del Rosario visits China to seek a diplomatic solution. July 9, 2011: The US, Japanese and Australian navies hold a joint drill in the South China Sea. July 15, 2011: Vietnam and US launch a series of naval exchanges. 25 July, 2011: Progress is deemed to have been
made during the ASEAN Regional Forum. China and ASEAN establish a deal to create a set of guidelines for future negotiations to establish a "code of conduct" as a "first step" towards a more sweeping, binding code of conduct. Oct. 11, 2011: China and Vietnam hold talks about control of disputed islands in potentially oil-rich waters claimed by both nations. Both sides sign an agreement that seeks a peaceful resolution of the dispute by maintaining direct communications between the leaders of both countries. Oct. 18, 2011: Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba proposes a multilateral framework to settle maritime disputes in the South China Sea during a tour of Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, with China reiterating that it would like to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea through talks between nations that are directly involved, rather than involving other countries. Oct. 20, 2011: Annual joint US-Philippines marine drills begin, which include a hostile beach assault exercise near the Nansha Islands. At the same time, a Philippine warship strikes a Chinese fishing boat in the South China Sea, leading to an apology from the Philippine Navy. Nov. 21, 2011: During the East Asia conference, the US and ASEAN countries aligned to effectively pressure China on their claims to hold "indisputable sovereignty" over the South China Seas.
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Jan. 2013: Philippines takes the issue to the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea established under UNCLOS (refer summary of UNCLOS above) but China does not appoint an arbitrator. Conflicts within the region at present: Indonesia, China, and Taiwan over waters NE of the Natuna Islands
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The Philippines, China, and Taiwan over Scarborough Shoal. Vietnam, China, and Taiwan over waters west of the Spratly Islands. Some or all of the islands themselves are also disputed between Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The Paracel Islands are disputed between the PRC/ROC and Vietnam. Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam over areas in the Gulf of Thailand. Singapore and Malaysia along the Strait of Johore and the Strait of Singapore. Conflicts that might arise: Between any countries in the region:
This is very likely as tensions are almost always high between any 2 countries, or (more likely) between one or more countries and China. As you can see in the dispute summary, most clashes have been between countries in the region laying claim to the islands/resources in the sea. Between USA and China: China has never been happy with the fact that the USA continues to conduct routine military drills in the region despite its repeated demands to the contrary. Moreover, China claims that the USA deploys drones for reconnaissance and maintains that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways.
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Figure 1 Disputed Regions Why the issue needs to be resolved soon: Freedom of Passage: With the exception of China, all other countries justify their claims based on the UNCLOS. China uses a mix of historical rights and legal claims. It claims that it allows freedom of passage in its EEZ, but at the same time, demands that foreign militaries obtain prior permission before sailing. So this would mean that according to China, it would hold all rights on who sails in the South China Sea. This severely hampers other countries attempts to hold joint military drills in the region. Economic Interests: Each year, $5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea; U.S. trade accounts for $1.2 trillion of this total. If a crisis occurs, the diversion of cargo ships to other routes would itself harm regional economies as a result of an increase in insurance rates and longer transits. Moreover, any conflict in the South China Sea would hamper the claimants from benefiting from the South China Sea's proven and potential oil resources. Previous attempts at resolution of the issue: There is a long enough history of countries in the region attempting to resolve the issue (not just over a conference table). In 2002, the regional grouping Asean - whose membership includes all of the main players in the dispute except China (and Taiwan) - concluded a code of conduct deal with China.
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Under the agreement, the countries agreed to "resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations". But recent events suggest that Vietnam and China at least have failed to stick to the spirit of that agreement. Then, more recently, Philippines has taken China to the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, but again, it is not clear when a judgement may be passed. Main issues that need to be resolved: Clarity on different countries claims like Chinas so called Nine dash claim. Proper estimate of resources by an independent organization which is agreed upon by all involved countries beforehand. Verification of countries historical claims.
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More clarity on dispute resolutions for better resolution of future conflicts. Guidelines on militarization of seas, that is, under what circumstances, when and where military ships can be allowed to be stationed Research References* www.cfr.org www.bbc.co.uk www.guardian.co.uk
*Please note that this background guide is for reference purposes only. The information may also contain opinions, unverified claims and news from non UN-recognized sources.
Contact Us
Badrinarayan Rammohan, Chair +91-9884550612
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Udhav Tulysan, Guest Chair +91-9444958725 Gowthami Ashok, Moderator +91-44-24522417
disec@sanmun.org

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Sankara Model United Nations 2013

Background Guide Disarmament & International Security

Letter from the Chair

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Disarmament and International Security

Main Agenda The Usage of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in International Airspace

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1.www.reprieve.org.uk 2.www.civicworldwide.org 3.www.antiwar.com 4.www.knowdrones.com 5.www.bbc.com 6.www.guardian.co.uk

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Reserve Agenda The Militarization of the South China Sea

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Udhav Tulysan, Guest Chair +91-9444958725 Gowthami Ashok, Moderator +91-44-24522417

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