DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997) Facts: Private respondent Atty.

Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, DemokrasyaIpagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. Issues:(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. (2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. (3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution. Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

Tolentino vs COMELEC 41 SCRA 702 Petitioner: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO Respondents: Commission on Election, and the Chief Accountant, the Auditor and the Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor dela Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguin Reyna, Victor F. Ortega and Juan V. Borra

Facts

The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132.

Issue

Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a

plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s?

Decision

The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory.

Summary: Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003)Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003)En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur,2 wrote concurring and dissenting separate opinions to which 2 concur. Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted andapproved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous HouseImpeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct aninvestigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by theChief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003,former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachmentcomplaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of theSupreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and otherhigh crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to theHouse Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the firstimpeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of thefirst complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted todismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of theHouse by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on thealleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. Thesecond impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with theSupreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contendthat the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates theprovision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shallbe initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachmentproceedings. Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the governmentin Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "todirect the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settleactual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." Asindicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insuresthat its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. Theseparation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains notthrough express

provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of thegovernment has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme withinits own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be keptseparate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained andindependent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checksand balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of thegovernment. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectivelychecks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence todeclare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted tothe U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine SupremeCourt and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power butalso a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any graveabuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are alsoglaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respectto the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives withoutlimitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusivepower to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of suchpower as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations includethe manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the abovementioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend toleave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided forcertain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethoraof cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action.Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial reviewover impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, theConstitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence andinterdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned toit by the Constitution

Sanidad vs Comelec - A case Digest PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras COMELEC Type of respondent; petition filed: through its SolicitorFOR General CERTIORARI

PETITION

ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional or not.

FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebescite fo its ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990. Allegations of Sanidad:

1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press 2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press bause of its penal provsions in case of violation Responses of COMELEC

-Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646 -Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime (magazine/periodical in the province)

HELD: Petiton is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional . TRO made permanent due to the follwing reasons: 1. It has no statutory basis 2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason 3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.

G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995 HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and the City of Manila, petitioners,vs. HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manilaand ASSOCIATED CORPORATION, respondents. Facts: Th e petition was dismissed by t h e First Division of t h is Court on 01 September 1994based on a finding t h at t h ere was "no abuse of discretion, muc h

less lack of or excessof jurisdiction, on t h e part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing t h e questionedorders. Judge Pacquing h ad earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, R T C of Manila,Branc h 40, t h e following orders w h ic h were assailed by t h e Mayor of t h e City of Manila,Hon. Alfredo S. Lim:(1) order directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue t h e permit/license to operatet h e jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC).(2) order directing mayor Lim to explain w h y h es h ould not be cited for contempt for non-compliance wit h t h e order dated 28 Marc h 1994.(3) order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating t h e previous order directing Mayor Lim toimmediately issue t h e permit/license to Associated Development Corporation (ADC). Th

e order dated 28 marc h 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September 1988 w h ic h ordered t h e Manila Mayor toimmediately issue to ADC t h e permit/license to operate t h e jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No. 7065.Subsequently, also in G.R. No. 115044, t h e Republic of t h eP h ilippines, t h roug h t h eGames and Amusements Board, filed a "Motion for Intervention; for Leave to File aMotion for reconsideration in Intervention; and to Refer t h e case to t h e Court En Banc "and later a "Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention and to Admit Attac h ed Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention". ISSUE: W h et h er or not t h

e Associated Development Corporation h as a valid and subsistingfranc h ise to maintain and operate t h e jai-alai; HELD: No.

It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila thepower "to francise"wagers or betting, including t h e jai-alai, but retained for itself suc h power "to franc h ise". W h at Congress delegated to t h e City of Manila in Rep. Act No.409, wit h respect to wagers or betting, was t h e power to "license, permit, or regulate"w h ic h t h erefore means t h at a license or permit issued by t h e City of Manila to operate awager or betting activity, suc h as t h e jai-alai w h ere bets are accepted, would notamount to somet h ing meaningful UNLESS t h

e h older of t h e permit or license was alsoFRANCHISED by t h e national government to so operate. Moreover, even t h is power tolicense, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed from localgovernments, including t h e City of Manila, and transferred to t h e GAB on 1 January1951 by Executive Order No. 392. Th e net result is t h at t h e aut h ority to grant franc h isesfor t h e operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, w h ile t h e regulatory function isvested in t h e GAB.

Th erefore, to t h e facts of t h is case, since ADC h as no franc h ise from Congress tooperate t h e jai-alai, it may not so operate even if its

h as a license or permit from t h e CityMayor to operate t h e jai-alai in t h e City of Manila. WHEREFORE, for t h e foregoing reasons, judgment is h ereby rendered: 1. allowing t h e Republic of t h eP h ilippines to intervene in G.R. No.115044. 2. declaring Presidential Decree No. 771 valid and constitutional. 3. declaring t h at respondent Associated Development corporation (ADC)does not possess t h e required congressional franc h ise to operate andconduct t h e jai-alai under Republic Act No. 954 and Presidential DecreeNo. 771. 4. setting aside t h e writs of preliminary injunction and preliminarymandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge Vetino Reyes in civilCase No. 94-71656