Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Lopez v. City of Manila (GR No. 127139; Feb.

19, 1999) - Dulnuan FACTS: Section 219 of Republic Act 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the conduct of the general revision of real property. The revision of real property assessments prescribed therein was not yet enforced in the City of Manila. Upon receipt of Memorandum Circular No. 04-95 from the Bureau of Local Government Finance relating to the failure of most of the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, including the City of Manila, to conduct the general revision of real property and after obtaining the necessary funds from the City Council, the City Assessor began the process of general revision based on the updated fair market values of the real properties. The City Assessors Office submitted the proposed schedule of fair market values to the City Council for its appropriate action. The council then enacted Manila Ordinance No. 7894 which was approved. With the implementation of the ordinance, the tax on the land owned by the petitioner was increase hence he filed a special proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894 for being unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect thereafter, reducing by fifty percent (50%) the assessment levels[5] (depending on the use of property, e.g., residential, commercial) for the computation of tax due. The new ordinance amended the assessment levels provided by Section 74, paragraph (A) of Manila Ordinance No. 7794.. Despite the amendment brought about by Manila Ordinance No. 7905, the controversy proceeded. The trial court dismissed the case for failure of the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies. ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with in the instant case? HELD: NO. As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers which enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily within the competence of other department. x x x There are however a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal, (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate

remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of controversy is private land; and (10) in quo-warranto proceeding (citation omitted). In the courts opinion, however, the instant petition does not fall within any of the exceptions abovementioned.

Gonzales v. CA (GR No. 106028; May 9, 2001) - Dulnuan FACTS: Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales received two Orders from the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued pursuant to the operation land transfer program of the government under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27. Petitioner was directed to surrender the titles to her land and to submit the other requirements of the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, while the said bank was ordered to pay the petitioner compensation for the two parcels of land. The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to restrain the enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR Regional Director on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction, alleging that the petitioner never filed a land transfer claim and was not notified of nor heard in the execution of the final survey plans and the valuation of her land. The CA rendered a decision denying due course to, and dismissing the petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. Hence this petition. ISSUE: W/N the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals comes within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies HELD: NO. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. After a careful perusal of the records, we find the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to be applicable in this case. The assailed orders involving parcels of land situated in Naga, Pototan, Iloilo were issued by the Regional Director of DAR Region VI Office in Iloilo City. A Regional Director is the head of a DAR Regional Office which, under the Administrative Code of 1987, is responsible for "supporting the field units and supervising program implementation of the Department within the region".[11] The function of the DAR Regional Office includes "[implementing] laws, policies, plans, rules and regulations of the Department in the regional area".[12] A similar function is delegated to the DAR Regional Offices under Executive Order No. 129-A[13]. With such a broad function and responsibility, it may be reasonably concluded that the issuance of the assailed orders pursuant to the operation land transfer and tenant emancipation program of the government is within the authority and jurisdiction of the DAR Regional

Director. However, questions as to the propriety of the issuance could have still been raised before the proper administrative forum. Instead of going directly to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, the petitioner should have sought redress in the DARAB, and the latter's officials should have been given an opportunity to review the matter and resolve the controversy. Doctrine of Prior Resort Industrial Enterprises Inc. v. CA (184 SCRA 462) - Dulnuan

FACTS: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of Energy for another coal operating contract for the exploration of three additional coal blocks which, together with the original two blocks, comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area." IEI was later on advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal supplydemand balance . . . the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC), which was already developing the coal deposit in another area (Bagacay Area) and that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should be awarded to MMIC. Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal operating contract. Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the then Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. In a summary judgment, the Trial Court ordered the rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement. In reversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals held that the rendition of the summary judgment was not proper since there were genuine issues in controversy between the parties, and more importantly, that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that, under Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks HELD: While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development

and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, Emphasis supplied). Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts (Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399, at 407).

Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action Sta. Rosa Mining v. Liedo (156 SCRA 1) - Dulnuan FACTS: Petitioner Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. (petitioner, for short) is a mining corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of fifty (50) valid mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July 1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short). On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease application, but "under protest," on 13 October 1978, with a reservation annotated on the back of

its application that it is not waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court. 1 On 10 October 1978, or three (3) days before filing the disputed mining lease application, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to protect its rights (except by said petition). Petitioner assails Presidential Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. In answer, the respondents allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition as it failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies. They cite the pendency of petitioner's appeal, with the Office of the President, of the ruling of the respondent Secretary of Natural Resources issued on 2 April 1977 in DNR Case No. 4140, which upheld the decision of the Director of Mines finding that forty four (44) out of petitioner's fifty (50) mining claims were void for lack of valid "tie points" as required under the Philippine Bill of 1902, and that all the mining claims had already been abandoned and cancelled, for petitioner's non-compliance with the legal requirements of the same Phil. Bill of 1902 and Executive Order No. 141. 3 ISSUE: W/N HELD: It is premature for the Court to make a finding on the matter of whether petitioner had abandoned its mining claims. Until petitioner's appeal shall have been decided by the Office of the President, where it is pending, petitioner's attempt to seek judicial recognition of the continuing validity of its mining claims, cannot be entertained by the Court. As stated by the Court, applying the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies: "By its own act of appealing from the decision of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, and without waiting for the latter's decision, the defendant cannot complain if the courts do not take action be fore the President has decided its appeal." The decisions of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte in applications for land registration filed by third persons covering the area over which petitioner had located and registered its mining claims, as cited by petitioner, are inapplicable. Said decisions merely denied the applications of such third persons for land registration over areas already covered by petitioner's mining claims, for failure to show titles that were registrable under the Torrens system; that was all. While the CFI made a statement in one case declaring that the petitioner's mining claims are its vested property and even patentable at that time, there is nothing in said CFI decision that squarely passed upon the question of whether petitioner had valid, patentable (but still unpatented) mining claims which it had continued to maintain, in compliance with the requirements of applicable laws. This question, which involves a finding of facts, is precisely the issue before the Office of the President in the petitioner's appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources in DNR Case No. 4140 holding that petitioner's mining claims are considered abandoned cancelled for failure of petitioner to comply with the requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Executive Order No. 141. In short, the decisions of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, relied upon by petitioner, do not foreclose a proceeding, such as DNR Case No. 4140, to determine whether petitioner's unpatented mining claims have remained valid and subsisting.

Effect of Non- Compliance Landbank v. CA (G.R. no. 126332, Nov. 16, 1999) (pending) Exception to the Doctrine Espina v. CA (294 SCRA 525) (pending) Appeal to the President Appeal to the President Suyat, Jr., v. Hon. Ruben Torres (G.R. No. 133530, Oct. 25, 2004) Dulnuan FACTS: This case stemmed from a criminal case of robbery where herein Prosecutor Suyat Jr was the reviewing prosecutor. Imelda Torres, mother of suspects Randy and Nelson Torres following up with the case talked to Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. who, initially, demanded her the sum of P20,000.00 for the dismissal of the case against the latters two (2) sons and nephew Marlon Bonson. But after bargaining, Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. finally agreed to the sum of P15,000.00 to be given in his office the following day. Upon consultation with her lawyer Imelda Torres immediately sought the assistance Anti-Organized Crime Division of the National Bureau of Investigation who set out to entrap Prosecutor Suyat Jr. After the entrapment, an administrative complaint was filed with the Department of Justice accusing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal of grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties. Finding a prima facie case of grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or any valuable thing in the course of official duties against Prosecutor Suyat, Jr., Secretary Franklin M. Drilon of the Department of Justice issued a formal charge against Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. After several hearings, Secretary Drilon recommended to the then Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. of the Office of the President the immediate dismissal of Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. In response, the Executive Secretary issued a memorandum stating his concurrence with the recommendation of Secretary Drilon, and recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos the approval of the proposed Administrative Order dismissing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. The Office of the President of the Philippines thru then Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. issued the first questioned order dismissing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law as earlier adverted to. Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. filed his first motion for reconsideration which was denied, this time, by new Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in his second questioned order dated February 16, 1996. His two subsequent MRs were likewise denied.

The CA dismissed his petition for certiorari for being an inappropriate remedy. ISSUE: W/N the Courts may validly take cognizance of a petition for certiorari of a decision by the OP that has become final and executory? HELD: NO. Administrative Order No. 95 of the President Had Become Final and Executory When the Petitioner Filed His Petition For Certiorari in the Court of Appeals hence beyond the jurisdiction of the CA to alter, modify or reverse. Instead of filing an appeal, the petitioner opted to file a second MR which is a prohibited pleading hence the reglementary period within which to file an appeal was not tolled. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the said Rules because he realized that the period within which to file the said petition for review had lapsed, and that AO No. 95 of the President had become final and executory. By filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner sought to nullify the said order via an independent action, in lieu of his lost right of appeal. But case law is that the existence and the availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive.